Legal Case Summary

Bach. Look what's in there. Let's see. What is in there? Is there anything else we can do? looks in stone for the appellant ABB. As a preliminary matter, you're honest before I turn to the district court's order in this matter that precipitated the appeal, I want to apprise the court that as we inform the clerk last week, we did reach settlement in principle with regard to one of the appellees that's Johann Hermann Franken. He's abbreviated in the brief as Hans Franken. Please report that yesterday the final settlement term was met when we were filing the dismissal papers. But solely as to the issues with regards to Hans Franken this afternoon. So I believe that just eliminates one issue unique to Hans Franken. Does that affect anything with regard to the allegations of conspiracy in the company? No, your honor, it doesn't. I mean, the fact remains that there was a conspiracy with regard to the three entities of TurboUSA, Villem Franken and Hans Franken. And those conspiracy allegations still remain. The settlement doesn't remove the allegation to just eliminate our ability to proceed separately against Hans Franken on those. So turning to the district court's order that precipitated this appeal, your honors, we submit that in dismissing ADB's allegations of trade secret misappropriation, the district court committed three errors of law that warrant reversal. Firstly, with regard to the district court's two primary bases for dismissing ADB's complaint, those concern the issues of statute of limitations and the measures that were taken by ADB to protect its trade secrets. Now those are two highly fact specific inquiries and on both at the pleading stage, the district court judge misapplied or mischaracterized the allegations in our complaint. And then on the basis of those mischaracterized allegations preceded them to draw inferences adverse to ADB

. And then furthermore, compounding that error, the district court then misapplied the law to conclude that there was no basis on which ADB could proceed with its claims and seek discovery. Now the third issue concerns the the swambley at ball-cleaning sufficiency points. That was addressed in a footnote in the district court's work. The entirety of the district court's evaluation of our extensive complaint with regard to the trade secret issues was that those allegations were quote vague and devoid of dates, facts, and specifics. Close quote. On the specifics, what does the complaint detail about the content of the alleged trade secret? That is detailed in paragraph 32 of our complaint and it specifies five particular categories of trade secret information. Really the types of trade secret information that is customary and traditional for the type of engineering operations that are at issue here. So for example, in paragraph 32, Romanat 1, discusses assembly and production drawings, models and other schematics and it goes on. Romanat 2 refers to manufacturing and working instructions. Romanat 3, training and other instruction manuals. Romanat 4, detailed information on and specifications about the actual delivered turbocharger product. So ADB maintains a database that correlates the products that is delivered to the customers that receive them. That actually is material information if you're in the business of servicing, for example, a turbocharger that is located in an ocean going vessel where if that vessel is making port and requires service, party that's actually rendering the service needs to understand what particulars of that turbocharger are. You all knew that PAP turbo was in this business, right? That turbo NED and turbo USA? Yeah, I'm sorry, I'm sorry, I'm sorry. Turbo USA was in the business of repairing these machines. That's correct

. So if, and you just said, I think that in order to do that, they needed this information. It ordered to do that in a way that would make their services more attractive and enhance their ability to compete with my clients. That is a beneficial piece of information that would be very useful to a competitor. You could of course wait until the vessel makes port go in and inspect it and decide what components are necessary. So I might have spoke a little bit to precisely when I said it could be a great point. But it goes to a theme of the district courts ruling that it's hard to believe you didn't know that they had a bunch of information and until you have specified the things you consider secret, it's hard to know that there is a plausible narrative here that they had something that they shouldn't have had given that you knew they were in this business. Well, I think the issue, Your Honor, is you can, one could be in this business without misappropriating trade secrets, trade secrets, excuse me. There's nothing internally inconsistent about that. And that's essentially the conundrum that the district court believed to exist that one has to be privy to the types of information that ABB contends to be trade secret information in order even to exist in this space. And that simply is not the case. It is possible for somebody to compete honestly and without the basis of misappropriated trade secrets. So merely the presence of another competitor in this market isn't enough to trigger the belief that somebody has misappropriated trade secrets. And I would submit that if we were proceeding on the basis of that alone, we would certainly hear that our allegations are far too speculative to satisfy Twombliic Ball. I mean, it really can't be. But if we can, doesn't that support the trial judges' concern about the amount of detail in the complaint? The trial judge actually, Your Honor, never identified with any real, particularly, what he found to be defective about the level of detail concerning our trade secret allegations. So everybody told you the problem was the absence of particularity

. Well, it was the burden on him to rewrite your complaint. Absolutely not, Your Honor. But we would submit that where a district court judge is making an assessment that pleading failed to satisfy Twombliic Ball, that it isn't coming upon a district court judge to identify what elements of the cause of action we have supposedly failed to meet. I mean, that would, for example, give us the opportunity to approach to district court and seek leave to amend. Here, there was simply no guidance. We have paragraphs upon paragraphs of allegations about the trade secret misappropriation that, for example, begin with allegations of cash being paid in a parking garage in Zurich, Switzerland, in exchange for AVB trade secret information. This is the quintessential case of misappropriation where a former employee departs a company to then engage in competition with his former employer. He knows whom to call and he calls them and he offers them money in exchange for the secrets. But does this record those and have those details? Well, we allege them in our complaint in detail about parking garages in Zurich, Switzerland, in paragraphs 70 through 82, for example. So this is again a classic situation, Your Honors, of a party with specific inside information having been employed by my client for 17 years. He knows where to go. It doesn't mention names, I'm looking at 73. The court did appear to be concerned about the generality even of these allegations. Well, we would submit Your Honor that there is, there's nothing under 11 circuit law or any other court that we've seen that would even suggest that the level of precision that we have laid out here is insufficient to satisfy Twombley-Ikbal. Twombley-Ikbal is not a standard of product belief, a standard of plausibility. And having recited allegations that must be accepted as true at the pleading stage of targeted efforts to obtain trade secret information from entities and individuals at our client, where efforts were then made to cover the tracks of that whole effort, where people didn't use email, at least not in these initial contacts

. These were done as face-to-face exchanges, where cash money was exchanged for ABB's trade secret information, all is alleged in paragraph 75 through 82. Can I return to, I think we're actually all talking about, she was actually the same issue. Their line of work encompassed what? So, ABB or the other set? TurboNet and TurboUSA were involved. TurboNet was involved in both producing parts for turbocharging. Producing parts as well as serving. As well as serving. So, one concrete aspect of the paragraph, 32 enumeration, is about parts prices. So, for example, Romana 1 goes to the issue of parts and the ability to reproduce parts. And Romana 5. And Romana 5 goes to price list as well, so the ability to effectively compete with my client because you know what they're charging. So, both the manufacturing capability and then the commercial ability to compete in one and five. So, and then the others, for example, the other aspect of the business for both TurboNet and TurboUSA was servicing turbochargers. And so, for example, Romana 2 refers to information for disassembly and reassembly of our turbochargers. These are complex devices. Those details about how somebody is to go ahead and service a turbocharger is also a trade secret that's plainly alleged. And is it was, I should know this by now, but Ab Turbo was it also in the business of servicing and providing replacement parts? Yes, Romana

. They would manufacture them on OEM parts, of course, using their own internal trade secrets, and then they would service vessels on the basis of those parts. So, you know, we're left here with allegations that from the, from the, from the perspective of the initial acquisition of the trade secrets all the way to the use today of the trade secrets are amply supported by the allegations in the complaint. And with regard to this the whole Twombliic Ball sufficiency of our allegations, I would submit that it is notable that it was neither the primary nor the alternative grounds on which our complaint was dismissed. I do understand there was a footnote that did make reference to Twombliic Ball. But the fundamental issues on which our complaint work was dismissed were number one, statute of limitations, very fact-specific issue. And on that issue the district court drew inferences that were adverse to ABB. The district court said, well, on the scope of these allegations, it must be the case, I'm paraphrasing here, that ABB must have had an inkling that was the judge's word, an inkling that something was amiss. Well, that's not the standard for, for triggering the duty of diligence under statute of limitations. That's not, you know, something that would put us reasonably on notice. But more than that, that's plainly an instance where the district court judge with all respect drew an inference that it's adverse to us. The inference that is most reasonable to draw on the basis of our allegations is that Turbonead and Homs, Tronkin took steps to cover their tracks, and they were good at it. They were effective at it. They did things in such a way that they would be untraceable. And so those allegations from the four corners of the complaint, there is absolutely nothing that would show that the statute of limitations began for around three years before the complaint was filed. On that issue, the district court judge makes no findings even as to when the statute allegedly began to run. He just simply says, well, the allegations are so widespread that it must have triggered at least an inkling

. Secondly, with regard to the alternative route on which the district court dismissed the action, and that was on the sufficiency of the measures taken by ADB to protect its trade figures. And in that regard, the district court judge actually made a finding or drew an inference, either one, that is directly contrary to the expressed allegations in the complaint. Paragraph 35 of the complaint says that ADB used all of the time-honored and widely and well-accepted techniques to protect its trade secrets. The law is clear that just because there has been a breach of those protections certainly doesn't mean that we had no reasonable protection. That would defeat trade secret, the ability to proceed trade secret claims in every case. The law doesn't say that. The law says your measures need to be reasonable. And our measures as a ledger have been found by multiple courts after full discovery and after trial, to be sufficient measures to constitute reasonable protections. And the district court judge said, well, it must be the case, or as the appellees call it a plead, dichotomy. Either you didn't have sufficient protections in place, in which case you fail that aspect of the trade secret claim or you had sufficient protections in place, and they fail to alert you to the ongoing visit. I love you, Nurek. I know you're out of time. Your opponent makes a large point out of the fact that at this stage after the concerns of the district court were made known, you didn't move accompanied by an amended complaint to respond to the trial court's concerns. That seems to be an interesting and strong argument. What's the answer to that? There are issues your honor with regard to the three different bases on which the district court dismissed our claims. The first with regard to statute of limitations, we submit that the law is clear that there's nothing on the face of the complaint that would show that the statute began to run at any point in time

. I mean, there's nothing else to amend to add. Moreover, our complaint also recites all of the responses to defeat that affirmative defense. In other words, the active concealment is already in the complaint. So we would submit that nothing would need to be added to address the statute of limitations concerns at the district court race, with regard to the measures that we took to protect our trade secrets, which was his alternative basis. Again, there too, the measures that we have alleged to be sufficient protection have been found after full bench trials in cases to be sufficient. So there too, we would contend there's really nothing more to be said. That brings me to the third issue, which is the passing reference made in footnote 6 to the complaint in it to ICBALL, where the district court simply did not tell us, I'm not saying the district court was obligated to, but in order to amend, given the extensive allegations over dozens and dozens of paragraphs, we had no insight at all into what we could say that would help address some of the district court's pleading concerns. And so there was just simply no basis on which we thought we could really effectively move to amend to address the district court's concerns. All right. It does seem going through all of this exercise with an appeal and all else that at least some offer, some proper of additional details to say that the burden is on the district court to rewrite the complaint and say fill in these gaps seems unrelated to the Twampley ball. Perhaps I could give an illustration in the briefing that accompanied the motions to dismiss, for example, we explained a bit more about the timing at which we discovered the widespread. Without relates to the statute of limitations, it's not seemed concerned about the substance of the generality of the allegation. In our in our in our bravery, your honor, we go through each of the elements of the cause of action and in our opening brief as well in our group brief. And for every one of those, we identify case authority that shows that the scope of our allegations are sufficient. There is no requirement. There's no height completing requirement imposed on trade secret plaintiffs

. It is measured under rule eight, not rule nine. And so for every one of these, we looked at the case lawyer honor and we couldn't find a case that would say to us that we fell short in any one of the elements of the cause of action of trade secret misappropriation under floor law. And so where we did that research and where we didn't see any identification of a deficiency, we really did come away without really any understanding as to what more we would do. And we've spelled that out. I mean, there are cases that deal with the issues that that appellees have raised on appeal. And we would submit that I mean, appellees position your honors, tantamount to the the burdens one might impose on the movement on summary judgment or on on on J. Mall. No case says that we need to provide all manner of factual specificity that underlies our factual allegations. We don't need to attach an expert declaration, for example, to make a verified complaint. Our factual allegations have been accepted by other courts as being sufficient. And so it left us really with no place else to go on the issue of the sufficiency of our misappropriation points. Yes, for the other place left to go is here, which and the delay and cost and oil to repeal. And I understood I substantively we didn't know one more ad maybe would have done a better way for me to sit down. Okay. Okay. We've gone way over

. So well, we store two minutes of repuddle time for you, which put us about six minutes over. So we'll add six minutes to the other side time to keep it even if you need it. Morning, our honor may it please support. My name is John Pills. If you're today representing turbo USA and Willem Franken, the settlement that have occurred leading up to this point, allow us to do quite a bit of focusing here, which I don't think really occurred during my colleagues argument. We've eliminated the patent claims. We've eliminated all claims against turbo mid. We've eliminated all claims against tons. Franken, frankly, a great deal of the discussion that I heard during our argument, particularly in response to some of the judge's newman's questions. We're getting into what I would call the saltier facts that they have alleged with respect to the meeting in Zurich, parking garages and whatnot. These allegations are generally contained in the complaint of paragraph 70 through 93, but I would point out that all of those allegations relate to hunts, Franken's, and turbo net. They do not relate to my clients. Well, they might relate to your client on an issue that the district judge did not address, but that you ask us to decide anyway, which is a question of knowledge and improper means that the district court did not did not address that. And those allegations could, in fact, a number of the saltier allegations, could relate to the question of knowledge in particular, turbo USA's cooperation with hunts in what the complaint suggests was in not entirely above-forward effort to secure hunts payment after the Netherlands company was sold. Those allegations are through respect to whether hunts was manipulating payments to turbo net. If anything that suggests maybe the turbo net might have a claim or to be owners might have a claim against punts, but they don't have anything to do with the acquisition of these trade secrets

. Those paragraphs, and again, they are 70 to 93. I commend the committee. Well, guilty knowledge might, in fact, under the quite low rule 401 standard for relevance be transferable from one kind of misconduct to another. In this instance, you're on there would be separated by decades. It'd be acquisition of these trade secrets 20 to 30 years ago, and then hunts allegedly manipulating how much money turbo USA overpaid to turbo net for the sake of getting money back. Frankly, it sounds to me like a zero sum game. They haven't alleged any more than that, but assuming there's something wrongful in turbo USA overpaying turbo net for parts, it has nothing to do logically or factually with the acquisition of these trade secrets 20 to 30 years previously. There's nothing in the four corners of this complaint that suggests that will them at all participated in that acquisition or that will them knew about it later. And actually, it's actually a great deal. That's right. It's turbo USA. There are two defendants on the corporate one was using them and is at least alleged to have been part of the alleged scheme to secure hunts. His post sale money that much is correct. You're honoring that five or six paragraph section that talks about that price manipulation between turbo USA and turbo net, but again, there's no correlation between that alleged price manipulation, which had to do with the asset purchase or an asset purchase or a stock. Whatever the agreement was by which hunts disposed of turbo net, there's no correlation factually or logically between that and knowledge of these particular trade secrets fact for all we know, these price manipulations may have been with products that are completely divorced from anything has need to do with a beard beer is turbo chargers. There's nothing a legend is complaint to say that they were so there is no connection to be drawn there to pull in turbo USA or well. So among the saltier to use your word allegations is the Zurich hotel allegations. Putting to one side the sufficient or insufficient specificity of paragraph 32 of the complaint, why isn't that allegations. I don't I guess I won't say enough, but why doesn't it in fact bear on whether there was improper means and I'm putting completely to one side here the question of enough of domestic will him in turbo USA's knowledge of it, which was not a ground on which the district court relied. So let's assume they knew everything that Hans knew because that was not a ground of the district court's dismissal. Why is it not in fact relevant to the question whether there was an acquisition of information by improper means that some of this was done by cash in a garage. That is what the district court found to be lacking in sufficient particularity and you're on out had to respectfully disagree as I believe that finding a lack of sufficient particularity includes all the elements of the claim which and the individual knowledge of turbo USA and will him is an important part of the elements of the claim against those to defend its my two points. And so while the district court may not have gone and did not go frankly item by item through each of the elements of the causes of action and say there's a lack of particularity as to this one to this one to this one and the next one did say the complaint was generally lacking that particularity again did not take the ABB to school and explain to them exactly how they're on point of the sufficient and how it could be repaired but did address the lack of sufficient particularity. And so I think we have to look at what is actually alleged here there is no allegation in these five or six paragraphs about the price manipulation that says that price manipulation somehow conveyed or evidence knowledge on the parts of turbo USA. Okay, we'll focus just on paragraph 32. Why is that not sufficient at the pleading stage to alleged that there were trade secret. 32 is alleged in the existence of those trade secrets. This isn't anything about the garage or the envelope full of money or anything like that. But yes, and this is repeated in all later paragraph almost verbatim later in the complaint where they do attempt to identify the trade secrets. And we talked about that identification. The Florida courts and the 11th Circuit in particular has been extremely strict and it's the application of Columbia ball. And I commend it to this court the cases of Simpson and sanctuary, both of which are 11 circuit cases where they held the parties to a very high standard of factual pleading in order to state of cause of action

. So among the saltier to use your word allegations is the Zurich hotel allegations. Putting to one side the sufficient or insufficient specificity of paragraph 32 of the complaint, why isn't that allegations. I don't I guess I won't say enough, but why doesn't it in fact bear on whether there was improper means and I'm putting completely to one side here the question of enough of domestic will him in turbo USA's knowledge of it, which was not a ground on which the district court relied. So let's assume they knew everything that Hans knew because that was not a ground of the district court's dismissal. Why is it not in fact relevant to the question whether there was an acquisition of information by improper means that some of this was done by cash in a garage. That is what the district court found to be lacking in sufficient particularity and you're on out had to respectfully disagree as I believe that finding a lack of sufficient particularity includes all the elements of the claim which and the individual knowledge of turbo USA and will him is an important part of the elements of the claim against those to defend its my two points. And so while the district court may not have gone and did not go frankly item by item through each of the elements of the causes of action and say there's a lack of particularity as to this one to this one to this one and the next one did say the complaint was generally lacking that particularity again did not take the ABB to school and explain to them exactly how they're on point of the sufficient and how it could be repaired but did address the lack of sufficient particularity. And so I think we have to look at what is actually alleged here there is no allegation in these five or six paragraphs about the price manipulation that says that price manipulation somehow conveyed or evidence knowledge on the parts of turbo USA. Okay, we'll focus just on paragraph 32. Why is that not sufficient at the pleading stage to alleged that there were trade secret. 32 is alleged in the existence of those trade secrets. This isn't anything about the garage or the envelope full of money or anything like that. But yes, and this is repeated in all later paragraph almost verbatim later in the complaint where they do attempt to identify the trade secrets. And we talked about that identification. The Florida courts and the 11th Circuit in particular has been extremely strict and it's the application of Columbia ball. And I commend it to this court the cases of Simpson and sanctuary, both of which are 11 circuit cases where they held the parties to a very high standard of factual pleading in order to state of cause of action. Neither one of these were trade secret cases. I was suggesting it were. Have you indicated that the plaintiff here knows more about the details of the acquired trade secrets than it has pled dramatically more or honor. They list in fact seven different witnesses who they say would testify in this and then fail to tell us with any one of the Senate witnesses would say. And so yes, they probably could fill volumes with what they know about the supposed, you know, trade secret theft. And what was contained in the trade secrets with they have not alleged and I think it's because they cannot alleged is that will a more turbo USA were involved in that acquisition or knew about it now in their grave brief. They have isolated down to eight paragraphs out of this complaint that they would like this court to look to to say this is where we alleged the turbo USA and will have had directly to guilty knowledge for a Florida trade secret claim. Those are paragraphs one on nine and one ten from which they pull out the allegations that terrible USA acquired the trade secrets and could not reverse engineer. Neither one of those factors that they pull out on page 16 of their brief really addresses the knowledge that these trade secrets were obtained illicitly. It's merely says that they had them and that they couldn't reverse engineer them. We'll get to the reverse engineering later, but neither one of those really say that will or turbo USA knew these were improperly obtained. Then in paragraph 63 and 64 they pull out from those two paragraphs a general allegation that will and was familiar with turbo USA is excuse me with ABB's business again there's nothing in that that says that will and more turbo USA knew that these trade secrets were illicitly obtained. They alleged in paragraph 35 that the documents were marked as trade secret at the time they were stolen the ABB's employees from ABB and then sold the turbo net. What they leave out is 60 paragraphs later they alleged the turbo net removed those markings from those documents and now they're in turbo USA's hands without those markings. So again that shows nothing of the turbo USA's where will it's knowledge finally they alleged in paragraph 94 111 12 some of the most broad and conclusive allegations it could possibly be made. paragraph 94 was upon information and belief will him frankly was knowledgeable of or participated in the procurement of ABB's turbo charge trade secrets from ABB

. Neither one of these were trade secret cases. I was suggesting it were. Have you indicated that the plaintiff here knows more about the details of the acquired trade secrets than it has pled dramatically more or honor. They list in fact seven different witnesses who they say would testify in this and then fail to tell us with any one of the Senate witnesses would say. And so yes, they probably could fill volumes with what they know about the supposed, you know, trade secret theft. And what was contained in the trade secrets with they have not alleged and I think it's because they cannot alleged is that will a more turbo USA were involved in that acquisition or knew about it now in their grave brief. They have isolated down to eight paragraphs out of this complaint that they would like this court to look to to say this is where we alleged the turbo USA and will have had directly to guilty knowledge for a Florida trade secret claim. Those are paragraphs one on nine and one ten from which they pull out the allegations that terrible USA acquired the trade secrets and could not reverse engineer. Neither one of those factors that they pull out on page 16 of their brief really addresses the knowledge that these trade secrets were obtained illicitly. It's merely says that they had them and that they couldn't reverse engineer them. We'll get to the reverse engineering later, but neither one of those really say that will or turbo USA knew these were improperly obtained. Then in paragraph 63 and 64 they pull out from those two paragraphs a general allegation that will and was familiar with turbo USA is excuse me with ABB's business again there's nothing in that that says that will and more turbo USA knew that these trade secrets were illicitly obtained. They alleged in paragraph 35 that the documents were marked as trade secret at the time they were stolen the ABB's employees from ABB and then sold the turbo net. What they leave out is 60 paragraphs later they alleged the turbo net removed those markings from those documents and now they're in turbo USA's hands without those markings. So again that shows nothing of the turbo USA's where will it's knowledge finally they alleged in paragraph 94 111 12 some of the most broad and conclusive allegations it could possibly be made. paragraph 94 was upon information and belief will him frankly was knowledgeable of or participated in the procurement of ABB's turbo charge trade secrets from ABB. What can I definitely anticipate that is 94. So I'm paid 17 and I didn't write the appendix page. paragraph 111 12 are equally conclusive paragraph 111 is upon information and belief Hans Franken and Willem Franken also obtained ABB's turbo charge trade secrets so maybe be employees located in Florida 112 virtually identical such now they substitute turbo net in turbo USA for Hans and Willem as having received these trade secrets in Florida. These are the classic conclusive allegations that are mere recitations of the elements of the cause of action that were condemned in ICBAL. They are indistinguishable from the allegation that the attorney general was the principal architect of this policy was being challenged or the FBI director was instrumental implementing it. Those kinds of blanket formulaic allegations are exactly what caused the court and called the NICFAL to hike and completing centers. These allegations you don't you don't think that the knowledge allegations in ICBAL the judgment of their insufficiency was influenced by the particular context there. Perhaps they were you are. What is the ordinary course post ICBAL for what must be tens of thousands of complaints alleging intent or knowledge. The Mamanik case from the 11th Circuit I think gives us a guideline. It says the first thing you do when you're judging the sufficiency of the complaint like this is you go through the complaint and you virtually strike every pleading that is conclusive and merely parrots the requirements of the elements of the cause of action. And that is exactly these paragraphs. 94 111 111 12 would be stricken in that first go through with Mamanik. They'd be out of this case. And so if you just take the eight paragraphs that ABB has identified as being the ones that are the best paragraphs for showing willum and terrible USA's knowledge they in fact are woefully deficient and they're clumbly at fault and cannot. And the trial court district court was entirely correct and dismissing the simplifying for lack of particularity because again you can read paragraph upon paragraph

. What can I definitely anticipate that is 94. So I'm paid 17 and I didn't write the appendix page. paragraph 111 12 are equally conclusive paragraph 111 is upon information and belief Hans Franken and Willem Franken also obtained ABB's turbo charge trade secrets so maybe be employees located in Florida 112 virtually identical such now they substitute turbo net in turbo USA for Hans and Willem as having received these trade secrets in Florida. These are the classic conclusive allegations that are mere recitations of the elements of the cause of action that were condemned in ICBAL. They are indistinguishable from the allegation that the attorney general was the principal architect of this policy was being challenged or the FBI director was instrumental implementing it. Those kinds of blanket formulaic allegations are exactly what caused the court and called the NICFAL to hike and completing centers. These allegations you don't you don't think that the knowledge allegations in ICBAL the judgment of their insufficiency was influenced by the particular context there. Perhaps they were you are. What is the ordinary course post ICBAL for what must be tens of thousands of complaints alleging intent or knowledge. The Mamanik case from the 11th Circuit I think gives us a guideline. It says the first thing you do when you're judging the sufficiency of the complaint like this is you go through the complaint and you virtually strike every pleading that is conclusive and merely parrots the requirements of the elements of the cause of action. And that is exactly these paragraphs. 94 111 111 12 would be stricken in that first go through with Mamanik. They'd be out of this case. And so if you just take the eight paragraphs that ABB has identified as being the ones that are the best paragraphs for showing willum and terrible USA's knowledge they in fact are woefully deficient and they're clumbly at fault and cannot. And the trial court district court was entirely correct and dismissing the simplifying for lack of particularity because again you can read paragraph upon paragraph. A formulaic recitation and conclusion that is not an allegation of a fact from which it can be inferred that willum and terrible USA had knowledge when you refer to a little while ago to how the plaintiff had seven witnesses. What do you mean by had seven witnesses if that was your language? Is that stated in the complaint? Is that today? Yes, it is your honor. They list them by name and they complain to these seven individuals who were allegedly former church-turboonid employees who they say would testify. But then again they don't provide us with any information that these gentlemen or ladies would provide. Now another thing that the very brief completely failed address are the allegations within this complaint that directly contradict any inference that willum and terrible USA had knowledge that this information was illicitly obtained. A.B.B. Affirmative alleges in their complaint that terrible USA on its website advertised the fact that it had this information advertising the world certainly to the people in the terrible church market and terrible church or church or universe that they had this information and they had these capabilities under 11th Circuit Case Law. What are you referring to now? Those allegations your honor are in pages on in the appendix of 365 Paragraphs 58 to 62. In the 11th Circuit it is appropriate for the record to look to those allegations to say the inferences I can draw from that contradict the essential elements of the cause of action and therefore the case should be dismissed as the Edwards versus Prime Case and the Rahab versus Englewood case where in those cases the plaintiff affirmatively alleged that they are complaint that which gave rise to an inference that was stated in the court. So it is not a very important point to say that the court is contrary to an essential element of their cause of action. Does that do these allegations say when the terrible USA's webpage disclosed that terrible USA had all of this information? It does not. So if it was within the statute of limitations period that wouldn't be harmful to them. Just to be clear. If it goes to the issue of the statute of limitations depending upon when it occurred it may either hurt them or help them on whether or not they knew about it or should have known about it within the three years prior since they don't actually allegate

. A formulaic recitation and conclusion that is not an allegation of a fact from which it can be inferred that willum and terrible USA had knowledge when you refer to a little while ago to how the plaintiff had seven witnesses. What do you mean by had seven witnesses if that was your language? Is that stated in the complaint? Is that today? Yes, it is your honor. They list them by name and they complain to these seven individuals who were allegedly former church-turboonid employees who they say would testify. But then again they don't provide us with any information that these gentlemen or ladies would provide. Now another thing that the very brief completely failed address are the allegations within this complaint that directly contradict any inference that willum and terrible USA had knowledge that this information was illicitly obtained. A.B.B. Affirmative alleges in their complaint that terrible USA on its website advertised the fact that it had this information advertising the world certainly to the people in the terrible church market and terrible church or church or universe that they had this information and they had these capabilities under 11th Circuit Case Law. What are you referring to now? Those allegations your honor are in pages on in the appendix of 365 Paragraphs 58 to 62. In the 11th Circuit it is appropriate for the record to look to those allegations to say the inferences I can draw from that contradict the essential elements of the cause of action and therefore the case should be dismissed as the Edwards versus Prime Case and the Rahab versus Englewood case where in those cases the plaintiff affirmatively alleged that they are complaint that which gave rise to an inference that was stated in the court. So it is not a very important point to say that the court is contrary to an essential element of their cause of action. Does that do these allegations say when the terrible USA's webpage disclosed that terrible USA had all of this information? It does not. So if it was within the statute of limitations period that wouldn't be harmful to them. Just to be clear. If it goes to the issue of the statute of limitations depending upon when it occurred it may either hurt them or help them on whether or not they knew about it or should have known about it within the three years prior since they don't actually allegate. But here we're talking not about that aspect of the case we're talking about Willem's guilty knowledge and Willem if he had guilty knowledge would not be trumpeting it to the world saying I've got this information which is illicitly obtained that allows me to service your terminal charges. Just on this particular paragraph you're telling us that because they advertise they had a website that contains without identifying the information that contains it says part specifications that that's adequate. Well it is a Bb who is alleged that those parts and specifications and were included the trade secrets that were. It does not say on but it is a Bb's conclusion that it was the trade secrets of the allegra misappropriated that that's so. Give you the precise line within those six paragraphs but it's among those six paragraphs that it was a Bb's conclusion that what was being advertised here on the website were the very trade secrets of the allegra misappropriated. So again get that kind of inference directly contradicts any inference that Willem in Turbo USA had the requisite guilty knowledge and therefore under the element of circuit practice in case law can be looked to the district court to determine whether the complaint is sufficient. And you're saying that that would affect anything that might have been improperly transferred whether or not it was on the website. If in fact it was something that Willem and Turbo USA were advertising for they had they would not again they would not be advertising if they thought that it was illicit for them to have it or that they got obtained it illicitly. They would simply go out and use the practices to compete more efficiently and get their benefit that way but by advertising it to the world they are essentially demonstrating that they have no inclination or no indication rather that this information is something that they shouldn't have. They need to be hiding it somehow in order to protect themselves from this kind of litigation. So the other thing that it means to be addressed in terms of knowledge here is the way the allegations are laid out in the complaint. Turbo USA is in fact a downstream user of information that was stolen first by ABVs employees then sold the Hans and Turbo NED and then transferred to Turbo USA under the Liberty American insurance case that we discussed in the red brief. The downstream user is not assumed to have knowledge that the information that is being used by downstream user or for the downstream user was illicitly obtained. In fact the mere fact that the thief and the beneficiary in that case the downstream user were good friends and were both at a financial interest in the success of the downstream user was not enough to acute knowledge to the downstream user for the purpose of a misappropriation claim. People told liable the downstream user was not. Can I just follow up on something? Your seven witnesses, this is paragraph 86 to 92 I trust

. But here we're talking not about that aspect of the case we're talking about Willem's guilty knowledge and Willem if he had guilty knowledge would not be trumpeting it to the world saying I've got this information which is illicitly obtained that allows me to service your terminal charges. Just on this particular paragraph you're telling us that because they advertise they had a website that contains without identifying the information that contains it says part specifications that that's adequate. Well it is a Bb who is alleged that those parts and specifications and were included the trade secrets that were. It does not say on but it is a Bb's conclusion that it was the trade secrets of the allegra misappropriated that that's so. Give you the precise line within those six paragraphs but it's among those six paragraphs that it was a Bb's conclusion that what was being advertised here on the website were the very trade secrets of the allegra misappropriated. So again get that kind of inference directly contradicts any inference that Willem in Turbo USA had the requisite guilty knowledge and therefore under the element of circuit practice in case law can be looked to the district court to determine whether the complaint is sufficient. And you're saying that that would affect anything that might have been improperly transferred whether or not it was on the website. If in fact it was something that Willem and Turbo USA were advertising for they had they would not again they would not be advertising if they thought that it was illicit for them to have it or that they got obtained it illicitly. They would simply go out and use the practices to compete more efficiently and get their benefit that way but by advertising it to the world they are essentially demonstrating that they have no inclination or no indication rather that this information is something that they shouldn't have. They need to be hiding it somehow in order to protect themselves from this kind of litigation. So the other thing that it means to be addressed in terms of knowledge here is the way the allegations are laid out in the complaint. Turbo USA is in fact a downstream user of information that was stolen first by ABVs employees then sold the Hans and Turbo NED and then transferred to Turbo USA under the Liberty American insurance case that we discussed in the red brief. The downstream user is not assumed to have knowledge that the information that is being used by downstream user or for the downstream user was illicitly obtained. In fact the mere fact that the thief and the beneficiary in that case the downstream user were good friends and were both at a financial interest in the success of the downstream user was not enough to acute knowledge to the downstream user for the purpose of a misappropriation claim. People told liable the downstream user was not. Can I just follow up on something? Your seven witnesses, this is paragraph 86 to 92 I trust. Those are the people listed. They are seven. Are those people that ABV has access to right now or are they? Turbo NED or Turbo USA. When we first talked about, when I asked you some questions to which you responded about the seven witnesses, I took your answer to be suggesting that these were people that the plaintiff had access to has access to can get information from. Could they have filled an amended complaint or a second amended complaint with many many details based on those discussions with the seven witnesses. My question is, are these seven people, people that plaintiff has access to download everything in their heads? I assume that they do your honor. The reason I say that is because they are ledge that they found out about all this from Turbo NED and all of these people, these seven people are ledge to be Turbo NED employees. While they don't come out and say in their brief, which is somewhat true to form, they don't come out and say that they do or do not have access to these individuals, but I would infer from those facts and circumstances that they do. Briefly on the question of the statute of limitations, the district court really expressed a certain amount of disbelief and frustration. That a massive theft of trade secrets like these occurring over a space of 20 to 30 years could go undiscovered until actually after this litigation was filed. They claim they didn't learn about it until after the litigation was initially filed. This is a theft by some kind of senior or trusted employee at ABB. Some of them either had legitimate access to the trade secrets or was able to get it illegitimately because of their position. In that respect, somehow it's a senior or trusted employee, this isn't alleged. It's being used against ABB daily in competition in this very closed market and that somehow ABB didn't know about it or to discover it. The district court was quite correct in being concerned about those allegations

. Those are the people listed. They are seven. Are those people that ABV has access to right now or are they? Turbo NED or Turbo USA. When we first talked about, when I asked you some questions to which you responded about the seven witnesses, I took your answer to be suggesting that these were people that the plaintiff had access to has access to can get information from. Could they have filled an amended complaint or a second amended complaint with many many details based on those discussions with the seven witnesses. My question is, are these seven people, people that plaintiff has access to download everything in their heads? I assume that they do your honor. The reason I say that is because they are ledge that they found out about all this from Turbo NED and all of these people, these seven people are ledge to be Turbo NED employees. While they don't come out and say in their brief, which is somewhat true to form, they don't come out and say that they do or do not have access to these individuals, but I would infer from those facts and circumstances that they do. Briefly on the question of the statute of limitations, the district court really expressed a certain amount of disbelief and frustration. That a massive theft of trade secrets like these occurring over a space of 20 to 30 years could go undiscovered until actually after this litigation was filed. They claim they didn't learn about it until after the litigation was initially filed. This is a theft by some kind of senior or trusted employee at ABB. Some of them either had legitimate access to the trade secrets or was able to get it illegitimately because of their position. In that respect, somehow it's a senior or trusted employee, this isn't alleged. It's being used against ABB daily in competition in this very closed market and that somehow ABB didn't know about it or to discover it. The district court was quite correct in being concerned about those allegations. I've seen that a lot of time. I just ask you to affirm. Thank you. Your Honor's leisure here's plausibility, not probability. And the allegations in this case are replete with illustrations of actual adrejas misappropriation by people including Hans Rocket. We allege in paragraph 94 that his son will knew of or participated in that misappropriation. We allege without dispute that Turbo USA, one of the remaining athletes in this matter was operated as the alter ego and instrumentality of Hans Rocket. That's the significance of the price manipulation allegations. There are one in the same Turbo USA's actions are, excuse me, Hans Rocket's actions are therefore chargeable to Turbo USA. And it is inconceivable, frankly, that Hans Rocket had a set up Turbo NED in the Netherlands to compete specifically with companies including my client and having sold Turbo NED and founded Turbo USA of which he is the 100% owner through another company and which his son is the president of. And it's engaging in exactly the same business operations is not following exactly the same course of conduct that you followed in the Netherlands. He is out of the business in Holland. He is in the business in Florida. And it is more than plausible for us to assert that he is engaging in his company, now Turbo USA, and his son Willem Frank and are engaging in the exact same misuse of our information. And it's inconceivable for Turbo USA and Willem Frank and to suggest that they are the innocent downstream recipients of this information. This is not an arms-length transaction

. I've seen that a lot of time. I just ask you to affirm. Thank you. Your Honor's leisure here's plausibility, not probability. And the allegations in this case are replete with illustrations of actual adrejas misappropriation by people including Hans Rocket. We allege in paragraph 94 that his son will knew of or participated in that misappropriation. We allege without dispute that Turbo USA, one of the remaining athletes in this matter was operated as the alter ego and instrumentality of Hans Rocket. That's the significance of the price manipulation allegations. There are one in the same Turbo USA's actions are, excuse me, Hans Rocket's actions are therefore chargeable to Turbo USA. And it is inconceivable, frankly, that Hans Rocket had a set up Turbo NED in the Netherlands to compete specifically with companies including my client and having sold Turbo NED and founded Turbo USA of which he is the 100% owner through another company and which his son is the president of. And it's engaging in exactly the same business operations is not following exactly the same course of conduct that you followed in the Netherlands. He is out of the business in Holland. He is in the business in Florida. And it is more than plausible for us to assert that he is engaging in his company, now Turbo USA, and his son Willem Frank and are engaging in the exact same misuse of our information. And it's inconceivable for Turbo USA and Willem Frank and to suggest that they are the innocent downstream recipients of this information. This is not an arms-length transaction. These are not unrelated companies. These companies and their operations are about as related and interlinked as it comes. The one case that they cite to suggest that that chain is somehow broken because these are formally separate parties, liberty, insurance. That was a case for preliminary injunction, not a pleadings case. That's the one case that they direct you to. It was a case for preliminary injunction where there was record evidence from the parties in that case saying, no, I didn't take the trade secrets from the company that I left. It's very simple here. It is a classic illustration of a former employee using knowledge gained both before and after he left his company's employee in order to operate an ongoing business. I just asked you a question about the seven witnesses. Can you have access to them? We have spoken with one of them, Mr. Dreyer and the other information that we have is information that we can have. So the short answer to your question is, no, these are not employees of my clients. We would anticipate needing to seek discovery through the hate of these individuals. These allegations included Hans Franken and Terbonead. We didn't want to be accused of saying these were unduly generalized allegations. The people who really matter, if they think that they are not on notice despite the paragraphs upon paragraphs of our allegations as to what our claims are, they have far better access to these people than we do

. These are not unrelated companies. These companies and their operations are about as related and interlinked as it comes. The one case that they cite to suggest that that chain is somehow broken because these are formally separate parties, liberty, insurance. That was a case for preliminary injunction, not a pleadings case. That's the one case that they direct you to. It was a case for preliminary injunction where there was record evidence from the parties in that case saying, no, I didn't take the trade secrets from the company that I left. It's very simple here. It is a classic illustration of a former employee using knowledge gained both before and after he left his company's employee in order to operate an ongoing business. I just asked you a question about the seven witnesses. Can you have access to them? We have spoken with one of them, Mr. Dreyer and the other information that we have is information that we can have. So the short answer to your question is, no, these are not employees of my clients. We would anticipate needing to seek discovery through the hate of these individuals. These allegations included Hans Franken and Terbonead. We didn't want to be accused of saying these were unduly generalized allegations. The people who really matter, if they think that they are not on notice despite the paragraphs upon paragraphs of our allegations as to what our claims are, they have far better access to these people than we do. I believe these are people that Hans Franken actually worked with at Terbonead. So to the suggestion from my brother that we sort of held back on information, we've gone the other direction, your honors. We have tried to tell a sequence of events that leads in extravially to the conclusion that they are improperly trading on our information and they knowingly acquired it. And their best excuse is, well, this was an atypical business transaction where we acquired information on the garage. That's their excuse to explain the genesis and the provenance of the information that they built their business around. And at the pleading stage, at the pleading stage, what we've alleged is plainly sufficient and we should be permitted the opportunity to take discovery of our allegations. Thank you. Thank you.

Bach. Look what's in there. Let's see. What is in there? Is there anything else we can do? looks in stone for the appellant ABB. As a preliminary matter, you're honest before I turn to the district court's order in this matter that precipitated the appeal, I want to apprise the court that as we inform the clerk last week, we did reach settlement in principle with regard to one of the appellees that's Johann Hermann Franken. He's abbreviated in the brief as Hans Franken. Please report that yesterday the final settlement term was met when we were filing the dismissal papers. But solely as to the issues with regards to Hans Franken this afternoon. So I believe that just eliminates one issue unique to Hans Franken. Does that affect anything with regard to the allegations of conspiracy in the company? No, your honor, it doesn't. I mean, the fact remains that there was a conspiracy with regard to the three entities of TurboUSA, Villem Franken and Hans Franken. And those conspiracy allegations still remain. The settlement doesn't remove the allegation to just eliminate our ability to proceed separately against Hans Franken on those. So turning to the district court's order that precipitated this appeal, your honors, we submit that in dismissing ADB's allegations of trade secret misappropriation, the district court committed three errors of law that warrant reversal. Firstly, with regard to the district court's two primary bases for dismissing ADB's complaint, those concern the issues of statute of limitations and the measures that were taken by ADB to protect its trade secrets. Now those are two highly fact specific inquiries and on both at the pleading stage, the district court judge misapplied or mischaracterized the allegations in our complaint. And then on the basis of those mischaracterized allegations preceded them to draw inferences adverse to ADB. And then furthermore, compounding that error, the district court then misapplied the law to conclude that there was no basis on which ADB could proceed with its claims and seek discovery. Now the third issue concerns the the swambley at ball-cleaning sufficiency points. That was addressed in a footnote in the district court's work. The entirety of the district court's evaluation of our extensive complaint with regard to the trade secret issues was that those allegations were quote vague and devoid of dates, facts, and specifics. Close quote. On the specifics, what does the complaint detail about the content of the alleged trade secret? That is detailed in paragraph 32 of our complaint and it specifies five particular categories of trade secret information. Really the types of trade secret information that is customary and traditional for the type of engineering operations that are at issue here. So for example, in paragraph 32, Romanat 1, discusses assembly and production drawings, models and other schematics and it goes on. Romanat 2 refers to manufacturing and working instructions. Romanat 3, training and other instruction manuals. Romanat 4, detailed information on and specifications about the actual delivered turbocharger product. So ADB maintains a database that correlates the products that is delivered to the customers that receive them. That actually is material information if you're in the business of servicing, for example, a turbocharger that is located in an ocean going vessel where if that vessel is making port and requires service, party that's actually rendering the service needs to understand what particulars of that turbocharger are. You all knew that PAP turbo was in this business, right? That turbo NED and turbo USA? Yeah, I'm sorry, I'm sorry, I'm sorry. Turbo USA was in the business of repairing these machines. That's correct. So if, and you just said, I think that in order to do that, they needed this information. It ordered to do that in a way that would make their services more attractive and enhance their ability to compete with my clients. That is a beneficial piece of information that would be very useful to a competitor. You could of course wait until the vessel makes port go in and inspect it and decide what components are necessary. So I might have spoke a little bit to precisely when I said it could be a great point. But it goes to a theme of the district courts ruling that it's hard to believe you didn't know that they had a bunch of information and until you have specified the things you consider secret, it's hard to know that there is a plausible narrative here that they had something that they shouldn't have had given that you knew they were in this business. Well, I think the issue, Your Honor, is you can, one could be in this business without misappropriating trade secrets, trade secrets, excuse me. There's nothing internally inconsistent about that. And that's essentially the conundrum that the district court believed to exist that one has to be privy to the types of information that ABB contends to be trade secret information in order even to exist in this space. And that simply is not the case. It is possible for somebody to compete honestly and without the basis of misappropriated trade secrets. So merely the presence of another competitor in this market isn't enough to trigger the belief that somebody has misappropriated trade secrets. And I would submit that if we were proceeding on the basis of that alone, we would certainly hear that our allegations are far too speculative to satisfy Twombliic Ball. I mean, it really can't be. But if we can, doesn't that support the trial judges' concern about the amount of detail in the complaint? The trial judge actually, Your Honor, never identified with any real, particularly, what he found to be defective about the level of detail concerning our trade secret allegations. So everybody told you the problem was the absence of particularity. Well, it was the burden on him to rewrite your complaint. Absolutely not, Your Honor. But we would submit that where a district court judge is making an assessment that pleading failed to satisfy Twombliic Ball, that it isn't coming upon a district court judge to identify what elements of the cause of action we have supposedly failed to meet. I mean, that would, for example, give us the opportunity to approach to district court and seek leave to amend. Here, there was simply no guidance. We have paragraphs upon paragraphs of allegations about the trade secret misappropriation that, for example, begin with allegations of cash being paid in a parking garage in Zurich, Switzerland, in exchange for AVB trade secret information. This is the quintessential case of misappropriation where a former employee departs a company to then engage in competition with his former employer. He knows whom to call and he calls them and he offers them money in exchange for the secrets. But does this record those and have those details? Well, we allege them in our complaint in detail about parking garages in Zurich, Switzerland, in paragraphs 70 through 82, for example. So this is again a classic situation, Your Honors, of a party with specific inside information having been employed by my client for 17 years. He knows where to go. It doesn't mention names, I'm looking at 73. The court did appear to be concerned about the generality even of these allegations. Well, we would submit Your Honor that there is, there's nothing under 11 circuit law or any other court that we've seen that would even suggest that the level of precision that we have laid out here is insufficient to satisfy Twombley-Ikbal. Twombley-Ikbal is not a standard of product belief, a standard of plausibility. And having recited allegations that must be accepted as true at the pleading stage of targeted efforts to obtain trade secret information from entities and individuals at our client, where efforts were then made to cover the tracks of that whole effort, where people didn't use email, at least not in these initial contacts. These were done as face-to-face exchanges, where cash money was exchanged for ABB's trade secret information, all is alleged in paragraph 75 through 82. Can I return to, I think we're actually all talking about, she was actually the same issue. Their line of work encompassed what? So, ABB or the other set? TurboNet and TurboUSA were involved. TurboNet was involved in both producing parts for turbocharging. Producing parts as well as serving. As well as serving. So, one concrete aspect of the paragraph, 32 enumeration, is about parts prices. So, for example, Romana 1 goes to the issue of parts and the ability to reproduce parts. And Romana 5. And Romana 5 goes to price list as well, so the ability to effectively compete with my client because you know what they're charging. So, both the manufacturing capability and then the commercial ability to compete in one and five. So, and then the others, for example, the other aspect of the business for both TurboNet and TurboUSA was servicing turbochargers. And so, for example, Romana 2 refers to information for disassembly and reassembly of our turbochargers. These are complex devices. Those details about how somebody is to go ahead and service a turbocharger is also a trade secret that's plainly alleged. And is it was, I should know this by now, but Ab Turbo was it also in the business of servicing and providing replacement parts? Yes, Romana. They would manufacture them on OEM parts, of course, using their own internal trade secrets, and then they would service vessels on the basis of those parts. So, you know, we're left here with allegations that from the, from the, from the perspective of the initial acquisition of the trade secrets all the way to the use today of the trade secrets are amply supported by the allegations in the complaint. And with regard to this the whole Twombliic Ball sufficiency of our allegations, I would submit that it is notable that it was neither the primary nor the alternative grounds on which our complaint was dismissed. I do understand there was a footnote that did make reference to Twombliic Ball. But the fundamental issues on which our complaint work was dismissed were number one, statute of limitations, very fact-specific issue. And on that issue the district court drew inferences that were adverse to ABB. The district court said, well, on the scope of these allegations, it must be the case, I'm paraphrasing here, that ABB must have had an inkling that was the judge's word, an inkling that something was amiss. Well, that's not the standard for, for triggering the duty of diligence under statute of limitations. That's not, you know, something that would put us reasonably on notice. But more than that, that's plainly an instance where the district court judge with all respect drew an inference that it's adverse to us. The inference that is most reasonable to draw on the basis of our allegations is that Turbonead and Homs, Tronkin took steps to cover their tracks, and they were good at it. They were effective at it. They did things in such a way that they would be untraceable. And so those allegations from the four corners of the complaint, there is absolutely nothing that would show that the statute of limitations began for around three years before the complaint was filed. On that issue, the district court judge makes no findings even as to when the statute allegedly began to run. He just simply says, well, the allegations are so widespread that it must have triggered at least an inkling. Secondly, with regard to the alternative route on which the district court dismissed the action, and that was on the sufficiency of the measures taken by ADB to protect its trade figures. And in that regard, the district court judge actually made a finding or drew an inference, either one, that is directly contrary to the expressed allegations in the complaint. Paragraph 35 of the complaint says that ADB used all of the time-honored and widely and well-accepted techniques to protect its trade secrets. The law is clear that just because there has been a breach of those protections certainly doesn't mean that we had no reasonable protection. That would defeat trade secret, the ability to proceed trade secret claims in every case. The law doesn't say that. The law says your measures need to be reasonable. And our measures as a ledger have been found by multiple courts after full discovery and after trial, to be sufficient measures to constitute reasonable protections. And the district court judge said, well, it must be the case, or as the appellees call it a plead, dichotomy. Either you didn't have sufficient protections in place, in which case you fail that aspect of the trade secret claim or you had sufficient protections in place, and they fail to alert you to the ongoing visit. I love you, Nurek. I know you're out of time. Your opponent makes a large point out of the fact that at this stage after the concerns of the district court were made known, you didn't move accompanied by an amended complaint to respond to the trial court's concerns. That seems to be an interesting and strong argument. What's the answer to that? There are issues your honor with regard to the three different bases on which the district court dismissed our claims. The first with regard to statute of limitations, we submit that the law is clear that there's nothing on the face of the complaint that would show that the statute began to run at any point in time. I mean, there's nothing else to amend to add. Moreover, our complaint also recites all of the responses to defeat that affirmative defense. In other words, the active concealment is already in the complaint. So we would submit that nothing would need to be added to address the statute of limitations concerns at the district court race, with regard to the measures that we took to protect our trade secrets, which was his alternative basis. Again, there too, the measures that we have alleged to be sufficient protection have been found after full bench trials in cases to be sufficient. So there too, we would contend there's really nothing more to be said. That brings me to the third issue, which is the passing reference made in footnote 6 to the complaint in it to ICBALL, where the district court simply did not tell us, I'm not saying the district court was obligated to, but in order to amend, given the extensive allegations over dozens and dozens of paragraphs, we had no insight at all into what we could say that would help address some of the district court's pleading concerns. And so there was just simply no basis on which we thought we could really effectively move to amend to address the district court's concerns. All right. It does seem going through all of this exercise with an appeal and all else that at least some offer, some proper of additional details to say that the burden is on the district court to rewrite the complaint and say fill in these gaps seems unrelated to the Twampley ball. Perhaps I could give an illustration in the briefing that accompanied the motions to dismiss, for example, we explained a bit more about the timing at which we discovered the widespread. Without relates to the statute of limitations, it's not seemed concerned about the substance of the generality of the allegation. In our in our in our bravery, your honor, we go through each of the elements of the cause of action and in our opening brief as well in our group brief. And for every one of those, we identify case authority that shows that the scope of our allegations are sufficient. There is no requirement. There's no height completing requirement imposed on trade secret plaintiffs. It is measured under rule eight, not rule nine. And so for every one of these, we looked at the case lawyer honor and we couldn't find a case that would say to us that we fell short in any one of the elements of the cause of action of trade secret misappropriation under floor law. And so where we did that research and where we didn't see any identification of a deficiency, we really did come away without really any understanding as to what more we would do. And we've spelled that out. I mean, there are cases that deal with the issues that that appellees have raised on appeal. And we would submit that I mean, appellees position your honors, tantamount to the the burdens one might impose on the movement on summary judgment or on on on J. Mall. No case says that we need to provide all manner of factual specificity that underlies our factual allegations. We don't need to attach an expert declaration, for example, to make a verified complaint. Our factual allegations have been accepted by other courts as being sufficient. And so it left us really with no place else to go on the issue of the sufficiency of our misappropriation points. Yes, for the other place left to go is here, which and the delay and cost and oil to repeal. And I understood I substantively we didn't know one more ad maybe would have done a better way for me to sit down. Okay. Okay. We've gone way over. So well, we store two minutes of repuddle time for you, which put us about six minutes over. So we'll add six minutes to the other side time to keep it even if you need it. Morning, our honor may it please support. My name is John Pills. If you're today representing turbo USA and Willem Franken, the settlement that have occurred leading up to this point, allow us to do quite a bit of focusing here, which I don't think really occurred during my colleagues argument. We've eliminated the patent claims. We've eliminated all claims against turbo mid. We've eliminated all claims against tons. Franken, frankly, a great deal of the discussion that I heard during our argument, particularly in response to some of the judge's newman's questions. We're getting into what I would call the saltier facts that they have alleged with respect to the meeting in Zurich, parking garages and whatnot. These allegations are generally contained in the complaint of paragraph 70 through 93, but I would point out that all of those allegations relate to hunts, Franken's, and turbo net. They do not relate to my clients. Well, they might relate to your client on an issue that the district judge did not address, but that you ask us to decide anyway, which is a question of knowledge and improper means that the district court did not did not address that. And those allegations could, in fact, a number of the saltier allegations, could relate to the question of knowledge in particular, turbo USA's cooperation with hunts in what the complaint suggests was in not entirely above-forward effort to secure hunts payment after the Netherlands company was sold. Those allegations are through respect to whether hunts was manipulating payments to turbo net. If anything that suggests maybe the turbo net might have a claim or to be owners might have a claim against punts, but they don't have anything to do with the acquisition of these trade secrets. Those paragraphs, and again, they are 70 to 93. I commend the committee. Well, guilty knowledge might, in fact, under the quite low rule 401 standard for relevance be transferable from one kind of misconduct to another. In this instance, you're on there would be separated by decades. It'd be acquisition of these trade secrets 20 to 30 years ago, and then hunts allegedly manipulating how much money turbo USA overpaid to turbo net for the sake of getting money back. Frankly, it sounds to me like a zero sum game. They haven't alleged any more than that, but assuming there's something wrongful in turbo USA overpaying turbo net for parts, it has nothing to do logically or factually with the acquisition of these trade secrets 20 to 30 years previously. There's nothing in the four corners of this complaint that suggests that will them at all participated in that acquisition or that will them knew about it later. And actually, it's actually a great deal. That's right. It's turbo USA. There are two defendants on the corporate one was using them and is at least alleged to have been part of the alleged scheme to secure hunts. His post sale money that much is correct. You're honoring that five or six paragraph section that talks about that price manipulation between turbo USA and turbo net, but again, there's no correlation between that alleged price manipulation, which had to do with the asset purchase or an asset purchase or a stock. Whatever the agreement was by which hunts disposed of turbo net, there's no correlation factually or logically between that and knowledge of these particular trade secrets fact for all we know, these price manipulations may have been with products that are completely divorced from anything has need to do with a beard beer is turbo chargers. There's nothing a legend is complaint to say that they were so there is no connection to be drawn there to pull in turbo USA or well. So among the saltier to use your word allegations is the Zurich hotel allegations. Putting to one side the sufficient or insufficient specificity of paragraph 32 of the complaint, why isn't that allegations. I don't I guess I won't say enough, but why doesn't it in fact bear on whether there was improper means and I'm putting completely to one side here the question of enough of domestic will him in turbo USA's knowledge of it, which was not a ground on which the district court relied. So let's assume they knew everything that Hans knew because that was not a ground of the district court's dismissal. Why is it not in fact relevant to the question whether there was an acquisition of information by improper means that some of this was done by cash in a garage. That is what the district court found to be lacking in sufficient particularity and you're on out had to respectfully disagree as I believe that finding a lack of sufficient particularity includes all the elements of the claim which and the individual knowledge of turbo USA and will him is an important part of the elements of the claim against those to defend its my two points. And so while the district court may not have gone and did not go frankly item by item through each of the elements of the causes of action and say there's a lack of particularity as to this one to this one to this one and the next one did say the complaint was generally lacking that particularity again did not take the ABB to school and explain to them exactly how they're on point of the sufficient and how it could be repaired but did address the lack of sufficient particularity. And so I think we have to look at what is actually alleged here there is no allegation in these five or six paragraphs about the price manipulation that says that price manipulation somehow conveyed or evidence knowledge on the parts of turbo USA. Okay, we'll focus just on paragraph 32. Why is that not sufficient at the pleading stage to alleged that there were trade secret. 32 is alleged in the existence of those trade secrets. This isn't anything about the garage or the envelope full of money or anything like that. But yes, and this is repeated in all later paragraph almost verbatim later in the complaint where they do attempt to identify the trade secrets. And we talked about that identification. The Florida courts and the 11th Circuit in particular has been extremely strict and it's the application of Columbia ball. And I commend it to this court the cases of Simpson and sanctuary, both of which are 11 circuit cases where they held the parties to a very high standard of factual pleading in order to state of cause of action. Neither one of these were trade secret cases. I was suggesting it were. Have you indicated that the plaintiff here knows more about the details of the acquired trade secrets than it has pled dramatically more or honor. They list in fact seven different witnesses who they say would testify in this and then fail to tell us with any one of the Senate witnesses would say. And so yes, they probably could fill volumes with what they know about the supposed, you know, trade secret theft. And what was contained in the trade secrets with they have not alleged and I think it's because they cannot alleged is that will a more turbo USA were involved in that acquisition or knew about it now in their grave brief. They have isolated down to eight paragraphs out of this complaint that they would like this court to look to to say this is where we alleged the turbo USA and will have had directly to guilty knowledge for a Florida trade secret claim. Those are paragraphs one on nine and one ten from which they pull out the allegations that terrible USA acquired the trade secrets and could not reverse engineer. Neither one of those factors that they pull out on page 16 of their brief really addresses the knowledge that these trade secrets were obtained illicitly. It's merely says that they had them and that they couldn't reverse engineer them. We'll get to the reverse engineering later, but neither one of those really say that will or turbo USA knew these were improperly obtained. Then in paragraph 63 and 64 they pull out from those two paragraphs a general allegation that will and was familiar with turbo USA is excuse me with ABB's business again there's nothing in that that says that will and more turbo USA knew that these trade secrets were illicitly obtained. They alleged in paragraph 35 that the documents were marked as trade secret at the time they were stolen the ABB's employees from ABB and then sold the turbo net. What they leave out is 60 paragraphs later they alleged the turbo net removed those markings from those documents and now they're in turbo USA's hands without those markings. So again that shows nothing of the turbo USA's where will it's knowledge finally they alleged in paragraph 94 111 12 some of the most broad and conclusive allegations it could possibly be made. paragraph 94 was upon information and belief will him frankly was knowledgeable of or participated in the procurement of ABB's turbo charge trade secrets from ABB. What can I definitely anticipate that is 94. So I'm paid 17 and I didn't write the appendix page. paragraph 111 12 are equally conclusive paragraph 111 is upon information and belief Hans Franken and Willem Franken also obtained ABB's turbo charge trade secrets so maybe be employees located in Florida 112 virtually identical such now they substitute turbo net in turbo USA for Hans and Willem as having received these trade secrets in Florida. These are the classic conclusive allegations that are mere recitations of the elements of the cause of action that were condemned in ICBAL. They are indistinguishable from the allegation that the attorney general was the principal architect of this policy was being challenged or the FBI director was instrumental implementing it. Those kinds of blanket formulaic allegations are exactly what caused the court and called the NICFAL to hike and completing centers. These allegations you don't you don't think that the knowledge allegations in ICBAL the judgment of their insufficiency was influenced by the particular context there. Perhaps they were you are. What is the ordinary course post ICBAL for what must be tens of thousands of complaints alleging intent or knowledge. The Mamanik case from the 11th Circuit I think gives us a guideline. It says the first thing you do when you're judging the sufficiency of the complaint like this is you go through the complaint and you virtually strike every pleading that is conclusive and merely parrots the requirements of the elements of the cause of action. And that is exactly these paragraphs. 94 111 111 12 would be stricken in that first go through with Mamanik. They'd be out of this case. And so if you just take the eight paragraphs that ABB has identified as being the ones that are the best paragraphs for showing willum and terrible USA's knowledge they in fact are woefully deficient and they're clumbly at fault and cannot. And the trial court district court was entirely correct and dismissing the simplifying for lack of particularity because again you can read paragraph upon paragraph. A formulaic recitation and conclusion that is not an allegation of a fact from which it can be inferred that willum and terrible USA had knowledge when you refer to a little while ago to how the plaintiff had seven witnesses. What do you mean by had seven witnesses if that was your language? Is that stated in the complaint? Is that today? Yes, it is your honor. They list them by name and they complain to these seven individuals who were allegedly former church-turboonid employees who they say would testify. But then again they don't provide us with any information that these gentlemen or ladies would provide. Now another thing that the very brief completely failed address are the allegations within this complaint that directly contradict any inference that willum and terrible USA had knowledge that this information was illicitly obtained. A.B.B. Affirmative alleges in their complaint that terrible USA on its website advertised the fact that it had this information advertising the world certainly to the people in the terrible church market and terrible church or church or universe that they had this information and they had these capabilities under 11th Circuit Case Law. What are you referring to now? Those allegations your honor are in pages on in the appendix of 365 Paragraphs 58 to 62. In the 11th Circuit it is appropriate for the record to look to those allegations to say the inferences I can draw from that contradict the essential elements of the cause of action and therefore the case should be dismissed as the Edwards versus Prime Case and the Rahab versus Englewood case where in those cases the plaintiff affirmatively alleged that they are complaint that which gave rise to an inference that was stated in the court. So it is not a very important point to say that the court is contrary to an essential element of their cause of action. Does that do these allegations say when the terrible USA's webpage disclosed that terrible USA had all of this information? It does not. So if it was within the statute of limitations period that wouldn't be harmful to them. Just to be clear. If it goes to the issue of the statute of limitations depending upon when it occurred it may either hurt them or help them on whether or not they knew about it or should have known about it within the three years prior since they don't actually allegate. But here we're talking not about that aspect of the case we're talking about Willem's guilty knowledge and Willem if he had guilty knowledge would not be trumpeting it to the world saying I've got this information which is illicitly obtained that allows me to service your terminal charges. Just on this particular paragraph you're telling us that because they advertise they had a website that contains without identifying the information that contains it says part specifications that that's adequate. Well it is a Bb who is alleged that those parts and specifications and were included the trade secrets that were. It does not say on but it is a Bb's conclusion that it was the trade secrets of the allegra misappropriated that that's so. Give you the precise line within those six paragraphs but it's among those six paragraphs that it was a Bb's conclusion that what was being advertised here on the website were the very trade secrets of the allegra misappropriated. So again get that kind of inference directly contradicts any inference that Willem in Turbo USA had the requisite guilty knowledge and therefore under the element of circuit practice in case law can be looked to the district court to determine whether the complaint is sufficient. And you're saying that that would affect anything that might have been improperly transferred whether or not it was on the website. If in fact it was something that Willem and Turbo USA were advertising for they had they would not again they would not be advertising if they thought that it was illicit for them to have it or that they got obtained it illicitly. They would simply go out and use the practices to compete more efficiently and get their benefit that way but by advertising it to the world they are essentially demonstrating that they have no inclination or no indication rather that this information is something that they shouldn't have. They need to be hiding it somehow in order to protect themselves from this kind of litigation. So the other thing that it means to be addressed in terms of knowledge here is the way the allegations are laid out in the complaint. Turbo USA is in fact a downstream user of information that was stolen first by ABVs employees then sold the Hans and Turbo NED and then transferred to Turbo USA under the Liberty American insurance case that we discussed in the red brief. The downstream user is not assumed to have knowledge that the information that is being used by downstream user or for the downstream user was illicitly obtained. In fact the mere fact that the thief and the beneficiary in that case the downstream user were good friends and were both at a financial interest in the success of the downstream user was not enough to acute knowledge to the downstream user for the purpose of a misappropriation claim. People told liable the downstream user was not. Can I just follow up on something? Your seven witnesses, this is paragraph 86 to 92 I trust. Those are the people listed. They are seven. Are those people that ABV has access to right now or are they? Turbo NED or Turbo USA. When we first talked about, when I asked you some questions to which you responded about the seven witnesses, I took your answer to be suggesting that these were people that the plaintiff had access to has access to can get information from. Could they have filled an amended complaint or a second amended complaint with many many details based on those discussions with the seven witnesses. My question is, are these seven people, people that plaintiff has access to download everything in their heads? I assume that they do your honor. The reason I say that is because they are ledge that they found out about all this from Turbo NED and all of these people, these seven people are ledge to be Turbo NED employees. While they don't come out and say in their brief, which is somewhat true to form, they don't come out and say that they do or do not have access to these individuals, but I would infer from those facts and circumstances that they do. Briefly on the question of the statute of limitations, the district court really expressed a certain amount of disbelief and frustration. That a massive theft of trade secrets like these occurring over a space of 20 to 30 years could go undiscovered until actually after this litigation was filed. They claim they didn't learn about it until after the litigation was initially filed. This is a theft by some kind of senior or trusted employee at ABB. Some of them either had legitimate access to the trade secrets or was able to get it illegitimately because of their position. In that respect, somehow it's a senior or trusted employee, this isn't alleged. It's being used against ABB daily in competition in this very closed market and that somehow ABB didn't know about it or to discover it. The district court was quite correct in being concerned about those allegations. I've seen that a lot of time. I just ask you to affirm. Thank you. Your Honor's leisure here's plausibility, not probability. And the allegations in this case are replete with illustrations of actual adrejas misappropriation by people including Hans Rocket. We allege in paragraph 94 that his son will knew of or participated in that misappropriation. We allege without dispute that Turbo USA, one of the remaining athletes in this matter was operated as the alter ego and instrumentality of Hans Rocket. That's the significance of the price manipulation allegations. There are one in the same Turbo USA's actions are, excuse me, Hans Rocket's actions are therefore chargeable to Turbo USA. And it is inconceivable, frankly, that Hans Rocket had a set up Turbo NED in the Netherlands to compete specifically with companies including my client and having sold Turbo NED and founded Turbo USA of which he is the 100% owner through another company and which his son is the president of. And it's engaging in exactly the same business operations is not following exactly the same course of conduct that you followed in the Netherlands. He is out of the business in Holland. He is in the business in Florida. And it is more than plausible for us to assert that he is engaging in his company, now Turbo USA, and his son Willem Frank and are engaging in the exact same misuse of our information. And it's inconceivable for Turbo USA and Willem Frank and to suggest that they are the innocent downstream recipients of this information. This is not an arms-length transaction. These are not unrelated companies. These companies and their operations are about as related and interlinked as it comes. The one case that they cite to suggest that that chain is somehow broken because these are formally separate parties, liberty, insurance. That was a case for preliminary injunction, not a pleadings case. That's the one case that they direct you to. It was a case for preliminary injunction where there was record evidence from the parties in that case saying, no, I didn't take the trade secrets from the company that I left. It's very simple here. It is a classic illustration of a former employee using knowledge gained both before and after he left his company's employee in order to operate an ongoing business. I just asked you a question about the seven witnesses. Can you have access to them? We have spoken with one of them, Mr. Dreyer and the other information that we have is information that we can have. So the short answer to your question is, no, these are not employees of my clients. We would anticipate needing to seek discovery through the hate of these individuals. These allegations included Hans Franken and Terbonead. We didn't want to be accused of saying these were unduly generalized allegations. The people who really matter, if they think that they are not on notice despite the paragraphs upon paragraphs of our allegations as to what our claims are, they have far better access to these people than we do. I believe these are people that Hans Franken actually worked with at Terbonead. So to the suggestion from my brother that we sort of held back on information, we've gone the other direction, your honors. We have tried to tell a sequence of events that leads in extravially to the conclusion that they are improperly trading on our information and they knowingly acquired it. And their best excuse is, well, this was an atypical business transaction where we acquired information on the garage. That's their excuse to explain the genesis and the provenance of the information that they built their business around. And at the pleading stage, at the pleading stage, what we've alleged is plainly sufficient and we should be permitted the opportunity to take discovery of our allegations. Thank you. Thank you