Good afternoon, Your Honours. May I please the Court? My name is Whitney Elliott representing the petition arrest from Martinez. It's possible I'd like to reserve two minutes for a rebuttal. Okay. I guess just before we start, the main statutory text that's that issue in this case is that page 31 in an, in an, and addendum to our opening brief. So this case in, in Val's section 212H of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which gives an immigration judge of discretion to waive certain crime-based grounds of inadmissibility of certain statutory conditions are satisfied. At the same time, the final paragraph of Section 212H contains a sentence that bars from relief a person who has, quote, previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residents if that person has an aggravated felony conviction since the date of his or her admission. You can help me with this, but it seems like, and again, I'm not sure if this is a sovereign ambiguity issue or not, but your argument, if we were to accept it, would put someone who has come in, quote, illegally, quote, fraudulently do however, in a better position than someone who hadn't perpetrated fraud in order to gain admission. And given that, how should we factor that into our analysis and trying to figure out what, whether or not the 212H wavers becluded? Well, I guess a couple of points about that. In terms of, I agree that a person who does not qualify as, who came in and did not originally qualify as a person lawfully admitted for permanent residents, is not subject to the statutory bar and relief in that sense. So there is an eviction
. So there is an eviction than someone who commits fraud to get in. We'd concede that point. One point I do want to make about that. It wasn't sort of overlooked in our reply brief, but I do think it's important. And that is Congress puts, totally separate and independent ground of an invisibility in the Immigration and Nationality Act. So committing fraud or a willful misrepresentation to gain admission is a completely separate and independent ground of an invisibility with a completely separate and independent waiver of an invisibility that is a way to seek relief from removal. So I think the way that Congress was trying to deal with those kind of fraud cases was dealing with it with a separate provision, had a separate standard for relief. Let me back up then to Sherpon. Would you agree that Sherpon applies in this case, and if it does, how do you get around Ayala? Well, yes, I agree. Mr
. Chief Judge, in the sense that Sherpon does apply to the board interpretations of the Immigration and Nationality Act. What about to this particular statute? This part of the statute. Then know with respect to Judge McKee. We don't think Sherpon applies because we think that the statutory language speaks directly to this issue in the sense that it has, we think that it imposes two conditions, one, what we call a manner of entry condition, which is from the has previously been admitted clause, and the second, an independent immigration status condition, which is in the as-and-alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence clause. We think the only way that Sherpon could apply Chief Judge McKee, I think, is if the court were to find ambiguity in the term lawfully admitted for permanent residence, that is if there were enough sort of Chevron play in the joints of that term. What if that's not ambiguous, but when we read it in conjunction with admitted as, then it becomes ambiguous. Why shouldn't we say that it becomes ambiguous when you read the two together? Well, I think Judge Hartman for a few reasons. First, I think we talked about this sort of at length in our brief. There are other provisions in federal law where Congress has used this exact grammatical structure that is admitted as and then followed by an immigration status. In particular, in the Q&Tan case, where we discuss it in our brief, there was a section of the INA that required that a person had been admitted as a non-immigrant
. The board had interpreted, that was a 1958 version of Section 245A of the Act. The board had been interpreting that provision to require substantive compliance with the immigration status in the As cause, that is as a bona fide, not an immigrant. Congress apparently was unhappy with that. The board itself discusses this. It didn't want the board or the immigration authorities inquiring into whether there was substantive compliance with the immigration status in the As cause. And the way it expressed its, we have Congress expressed itself after deciding that it didn't want the board doing that, is that it removed the As post-immigration status cause, that is it removed the As of Bonifide, not an immigrant cause. So I think Congress understood that the presence or absence of an As post-immigration cause is what drives the analysis of whether the board or the immigration authorities or court is gonna require substantive compliance with an admission. The second point I'd like to make about that, I guess Judge Hardeman is, in the public benefit provisions that we cite, also in our opening brief, those provisions were passed essentially, that roughly the same time, about the same Congress. I don't think that there's any way that Congress would have intended those provisions to apply if a person did not comply with the immigration status in the As cause. Plus, and I guess- Why would not that be interpreted as as though? I'm sorry, Judge Jones, I don't
. The As, why would it not be interpreted as meaning as though or as if he were legal when he came here? I suppose Judge Jones, I mean, I think, because it doesn't have the As though or as if, and it just says, As, and I mean, off we admit for permanent residence. With a logical reading, allow one to, and maybe this is a sign of ambiguity, I don't know, but with a logical reading, allow one to interpret it as though? I don't think so, Judge Jones. I mean, I think Congress went in there with very specific language, with very technical terms, that Congress itself defined, and I think it was setting forth requirements with that language. I don't think that the Court should read that language into the statute. But another point I'd like to make about Chevron, Judge Jones, and Judge Hardeman is, I'm going to flesh this out on our reply brief, is the board wasn't acting in Ayala as if the statute were ambiguous, that as the board itself, hasn't found the statute to be ambiguous. It thought that the result of reached in Ayala was compelled by the statutory text. But it's your position that Ayala, the board, the immigration judge, and the ninth circuit in Heng Sim in 2010, all were wrong. That's correct, Judge Jones, that is our position. And I think, if I could, with respect to the ninth circuit's decision, I think with respect, I really do think that they made a mistake here, because the bit, looking at the text of the statute, the ninth circuit basically made two points. One was a textual point and one was a policy point
. The textual point was, well, if we accept the petitioners reading in that case, that would render that the admitted as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence cause, that would render, if we required it to require, we read that language to require compliance with substantive compliance with the immigration status in the AS cause, it would render the has previously been admitted cause, completely superfluous. And that was the textual hook for the ninth circuit's textual reading of the statute. But as I think, as we discussed, now, three courts of appeals have discussed the function of the has previously been admitted cause, and that has completely separate independent meaning from what the board thought it did in Ayala and what the ninth circuit thought it would have and Heng Sim and all three of those courts found that as a matter of Chevron, step one, that that was the way the statute should be read, and in fact, rejecting an invitation to defer to the board because it was ambiguous. Well, what if the ambiguity arises, and I think it's a corollary of what, excuse me, Judge Hardman just asked you, what if the ambiguity arises not from the text because looking at that phrase, that's previously been admitted to the United States, has an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and just looking at the text that seems clear, however, in the application of it, again, as I asked one of the earlier litigants, you get a result which would suggest that Congress could not possibly have intended it, and that goes back to my first question where, excuse me, someone who comes in using fraud to get a visa or fraud, a fraud, a fraud passport, is in a better position than someone who comes in, honestly, if that is the result, to what extent should we focus on that in trying to inform ourselves of what Congress meant when they built that clause? Well, I guess a few points about that. First, Mr. Chief Judge, first, I think this court addressed a similar equal protection challenge in the Daily On Menosa, which we cited page seven, our reply brief, or that sort of same type of argument was made to try to support a claim that the distinction between lawful permanent residence and nonlawful permanent residence that allowing nonlawful permanent residence to seek this relief effectively puts them in a better position than people who came in lawfully, and Judge Rosen for the court said, it's not good policy, it might be irrational, it might be unfair, it might be unwise, but it's the choice that Congress made, and there could be rational reasons for that decision. I thought you would cite to the circuit court cases that have said it's not an absurd result. You're familiar with linear, and I mean, the fifth circuit, the ninth circuit, you'll fifth and eleventh of..
. Absolutely, yes. Said this is not absurd, right? I mean, exactly. Absolutely, Judge Hardin. It sounds a little odd though, but they've conjured up some reasons why it might not be absurd. For example, in order to adjust to lawful permanent residence status, you might have been here for a long time, you might have extensive family ties, et cetera, et cetera, is that your understanding? That's exactly right, Judge Hardin. But here, I don't know how we don't find an ambiguity here when we read the whole thing together. Your arguments seem to very sort of strategically focus on lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and it didn't, it sort of avoided, correct me if I'm wrong, that previously been admitted part, because that seems to undermine your argument. What am I missing there? No, Judge Hardin, I think we focused on the, we recognize that the has previously been admitted, cause has a function in the statute, that is, it requires that a person have previously been admitted to the United States. We acknowledge that Mr. Martinez in this state
. And how does one get admitted? A person makes a, presents himself to an immigration officer at a border, and the immigration officer allows that person to enter the United States. So if you enter without inspection, you're not admitted. That's exactly right, Judge. Those folks that enter without inspection might try to adjust status, but they're not admitted. A person who enters without inspection has not been admitted. Once they adjust status, that's sort of a question that's percolating before the board, and the courts of appeals about whether that, an adjustment is a press. It was percolating right here this morning. I don't know if you were here this morning, but no, it wasn't Judge. But I think, at the point I do wanna make about this sort of policy point in what Congress was doing here. And I think the statute, you know, the statute as a whole shows that, you know, basically, Congress wanted to first, was dividing forms of relief between persons lawfully admitted for permanent residents, and those who, I see my red light is on
. We can finish through. Between, basically, one of persons, generally speaking, who were lawfully admitted for permanent residents to be able to seek cancellation of removal or 212C, really in saints here, and person who did not have that status, didn't mean that they weren't gonna get any relief, but they were gonna be forced to the 212H waiver, the 212I waiver. And in effect, I think what Congress was doing here is trying to balance the interest in, you know, removing persons non-citizens with criminal convictions, preventing fraud and balancing against the other policy interests of rewarding rehabilitation as in the provision, one of the provisions that issue in this case. And also preserving families, and I think Congress was trying to compromise between two competing interests, and this is the balance that struck, there are awkward results in certain circumstances in that time of major legislative compromise, but we think this is the balance that struck. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. John, please the court. I'm Stuart Neckum on behalf of the Attorney General. The petitioner's council correctly indicates that the sole issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner falls within the meaning of that language in 212H, whether the petitioner is an alien who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence
. The problem with the petitioner's argument, though, is it essentially tries to separate out those two elements of this issue. The first portion, which deals with the word admission, which is specifically defined in the INA, has been defined as essentially evolving a procedurally regular admission. Did the alien go through the ordinary process, have their passport stamp-eye and immigration officer? He did do that, though, because he does. But it's a question of procedural regularity. And then the second element, which is more based on substantive, is the alien a lawful permanent resident. When you look at those two in context, is the alien somebody who has previously been admitted as an LPR. The focus is really on the type of admission that the person made, the status that they were granted entry under. It's not, is the petitioner a lawful permanent resident? It's, was the petitioner admitted as a lawful permanent resident? And somebody can be admitted as a particular type of, in a particular type of status, despite the fact that they're not actually eligible for that status. A person, in fact, you only know for sure until the Supreme Court adjudicates whether the determination that he was an LPR was correct. Essentially, yes, yes, that a person can gain entry to the United States despite not being eligible to gain entry to the United States
. And so this type of statute, where you have, you know, previously been admitted as an LPR, has to focus on what type of admission was the person the person made, even if wrong. Correct, correct. Because DHS, or immigration and natural prison services, in 1991, admitted the petitioner to the United States under the assumption that he was in due to an LPR. He had been granted LPR status. Now, it subsequently discovered that he was not eligible for that status because he failed to divulge the fact that he'd been, he pleaded guilty to a sexual assault offense a few months before. He was not an LPR, he has never been an LPR, he was never legitimately entitled to that status. But then he was admitted like, something sort of logically impossible out there, though he said he's never been an LPR, but you're telling us he was lawfully admitted as an LPR. I'm saying he was admitted as an LPR. In the same way, again, somebody who, so he was admitted as a logical impossibility because he was an ineligible ab initio. Well, no, no, I think that the fact of admission is separate from his eligibility for her particular status. Admission is an historical fact. Was he or was he not allowed to enter the United States? He was, he was allowed to enter the United States as a lawful permanent resident, not because he actually was an lawful permanent resident, but because, again, he didn't disclose the fact it was something of a mistake in terms of allowing him to enter, but he was admitted as an LPR. But it says the language that was just lawfully admitted as, and he was, well, no, the language of 212H is unlawfully admitted or incorrectly or erroneously admitted as an LPR, right? The language of 212H does not say lawfully admitted, and in this respect, it's distinct from provisions like former 212C or cancellation of removal, I believe. The language of 212H and the waiver bar is, it presents the IGF from granting a waiver to an alien, quote, an alien who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residents. The previously been admitted doesn't have the lawful modifier. It's not a question of whether or not the petitioner was lawfully admitted, it's just a question of whether or not. So without that previously been admitted language, you've got problems, right? It would be a very different case, yes. And that previously been admitted is the critical language that takes this out of the realm of those other cases that have held the phrase lawfully admitted for permanent residents, which again is defined in the INA, is substantive. Here we have that phrase previously been admitted. It's a question of the historical fact, was the petitioner admitted as a particular type of alien? And again, that is the critical language that distinguishes the escapes from, other cases, in other cases, you don't see it, for example
. Admission is an historical fact. Was he or was he not allowed to enter the United States? He was, he was allowed to enter the United States as a lawful permanent resident, not because he actually was an lawful permanent resident, but because, again, he didn't disclose the fact it was something of a mistake in terms of allowing him to enter, but he was admitted as an LPR. But it says the language that was just lawfully admitted as, and he was, well, no, the language of 212H is unlawfully admitted or incorrectly or erroneously admitted as an LPR, right? The language of 212H does not say lawfully admitted, and in this respect, it's distinct from provisions like former 212C or cancellation of removal, I believe. The language of 212H and the waiver bar is, it presents the IGF from granting a waiver to an alien, quote, an alien who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residents. The previously been admitted doesn't have the lawful modifier. It's not a question of whether or not the petitioner was lawfully admitted, it's just a question of whether or not. So without that previously been admitted language, you've got problems, right? It would be a very different case, yes. And that previously been admitted is the critical language that takes this out of the realm of those other cases that have held the phrase lawfully admitted for permanent residents, which again is defined in the INA, is substantive. Here we have that phrase previously been admitted. It's a question of the historical fact, was the petitioner admitted as a particular type of alien? And again, that is the critical language that distinguishes the escapes from, other cases, in other cases, you don't see it, for example. So you are being that it would be the same as if it had previously been admitted to the United States as a permanent, for previously admitted United States for permanent residents. Would that be the same? I would be saying yes, lawfully admitted for just, previously been admitted for permanent residents. Yes, I would be saying, since that is, it focuses on the nature of the admission, I'm not suggesting that lawfully admitted into it. I'm sorry, why did they put lawfully admitted into a phrase that would mean the same if it read admitted to the United States for permanent residents? Lawfully admitted for permanent residents is a term of art in the INA. It refers to a particular type of status. I mean, you can argue that it looks as if it was permanent residents, that was it? Again, my apologies, I'm a little bit deaf. I have a little trouble hearingness. When you leave here, you'll probably be more deaf. A permanent residence is a status also, though, isn't it? I mean, you can be admitted for a worker, for a student. You can be admitted for a lot of, as a lot of different kinds of status, having to be in statuses
. So you are being that it would be the same as if it had previously been admitted to the United States as a permanent, for previously admitted United States for permanent residents. Would that be the same? I would be saying yes, lawfully admitted for just, previously been admitted for permanent residents. Yes, I would be saying, since that is, it focuses on the nature of the admission, I'm not suggesting that lawfully admitted into it. I'm sorry, why did they put lawfully admitted into a phrase that would mean the same if it read admitted to the United States for permanent residents? Lawfully admitted for permanent residents is a term of art in the INA. It refers to a particular type of status. I mean, you can argue that it looks as if it was permanent residents, that was it? Again, my apologies, I'm a little bit deaf. I have a little trouble hearingness. When you leave here, you'll probably be more deaf. A permanent residence is a status also, though, isn't it? I mean, you can be admitted for a worker, for a student. You can be admitted for a lot of, as a lot of different kinds of status, having to be in statuses. Correct, correct. So if permanent residents is the status that you admitted for, why does it say lawfully admitted for permanent residents instead of just previously admitted? Previously been admitted to the United States for permanent residents. Are you asking us to read the term lawfully out of that clause? No, no, you're not. The term lawfully admitted for permanent residents is specifically defined in the INA. It's a U.S.C. 101 A20, INA 101 A20. The term lawfully admitted for permanent residents is specifically defined. The, could you give us a definition? Yes, it's a, the term lawfully admitted for permanent residents means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed
. Correct, correct. So if permanent residents is the status that you admitted for, why does it say lawfully admitted for permanent residents instead of just previously admitted? Previously been admitted to the United States for permanent residents. Are you asking us to read the term lawfully out of that clause? No, no, you're not. The term lawfully admitted for permanent residents is specifically defined in the INA. It's a U.S.C. 101 A20, INA 101 A20. The term lawfully admitted for permanent residents is specifically defined. The, could you give us a definition? Yes, it's a, the term lawfully admitted for permanent residents means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed. Now that definition is substantive. It refers to an, an alien who actually is validly an LPR, a local permanent resident. But again, it's a term of art that is used throughout the INA. I believe that's why it appears in 212 age. The term permanent resident would I think have the same meaning, but it's more precise to use the term that is specifically defined in the INA. That's why I'm curious. And then you're saying that in accordance with immigration laws is what, is the hook here that creates the anomaly that I suggested would result with the petitioner's right. That phrase, the definition in accordance with immigration laws is the thing which keeps the anomaly, the petitioner is arguing for from happening. It is not lawfully admitted. Yes, I mean, the, that's what keeps the petitioner from actually being a lawful permanent resident
. Now that definition is substantive. It refers to an, an alien who actually is validly an LPR, a local permanent resident. But again, it's a term of art that is used throughout the INA. I believe that's why it appears in 212 age. The term permanent resident would I think have the same meaning, but it's more precise to use the term that is specifically defined in the INA. That's why I'm curious. And then you're saying that in accordance with immigration laws is what, is the hook here that creates the anomaly that I suggested would result with the petitioner's right. That phrase, the definition in accordance with immigration laws is the thing which keeps the anomaly, the petitioner is arguing for from happening. It is not lawfully admitted. Yes, I mean, the, that's what keeps the petitioner from actually being a lawful permanent resident. Because it's not in accordance with immigration laws. Correct, correct. And that's what the board determined in this case and didn't deny intusual C really, for example, is that the petitioner is not an LPR, because he was not validly granted, he was not eligible for that status. But again, that's a separate question. Is the petitioner an LPR? Is that a separate question from, was the petitioner admitted as an LPR? It was entitled to be, it was entitled to have the status which it really has. Yes. And I think if you, I think the court asked her about Chevron and where we are in terms of Chevron Step 1 or Step 2, I would argue that we, that the statute is unambiguous, but I think we have a much easier argument in saying that it is, it is ambiguous, but that the board's resolution of that is reasonable. And you get into the policy reasons why, that essentially the petitioner's argument that concealing your inelgeability for LPR status at the time you are admitted, is going to be rewarded, whereas a person who comes into the country and actually is entitled to that status, is not going to be eligible for a two-twelfth age waiver, whereas somebody who conceals, a criminal conviction, as in this case, conceals inelgeability is somehow going to be in a better position than somebody who is, who has followed the rules, and not correctly. And so, and I think I was one of, what is the board pointed out in Iowa? And why the board's resolution, if you call this an ambiguity, and again, I think we have a much easier argument in saying that it is ambiguous, not not to concede the other issue, but the board's resolution of that issue based on the policy reasons, that you don't want to reward fraudulent conduct, and the Congress would not have sought to say, if you successfully conceal your inelgeability for LPR status, that you're somehow going to be in a better position than some of you did follow the rules. And again, that the reasonfulness of the board's determination correct me takes that into account
. Because it's not in accordance with immigration laws. Correct, correct. And that's what the board determined in this case and didn't deny intusual C really, for example, is that the petitioner is not an LPR, because he was not validly granted, he was not eligible for that status. But again, that's a separate question. Is the petitioner an LPR? Is that a separate question from, was the petitioner admitted as an LPR? It was entitled to be, it was entitled to have the status which it really has. Yes. And I think if you, I think the court asked her about Chevron and where we are in terms of Chevron Step 1 or Step 2, I would argue that we, that the statute is unambiguous, but I think we have a much easier argument in saying that it is, it is ambiguous, but that the board's resolution of that is reasonable. And you get into the policy reasons why, that essentially the petitioner's argument that concealing your inelgeability for LPR status at the time you are admitted, is going to be rewarded, whereas a person who comes into the country and actually is entitled to that status, is not going to be eligible for a two-twelfth age waiver, whereas somebody who conceals, a criminal conviction, as in this case, conceals inelgeability is somehow going to be in a better position than somebody who is, who has followed the rules, and not correctly. And so, and I think I was one of, what is the board pointed out in Iowa? And why the board's resolution, if you call this an ambiguity, and again, I think we have a much easier argument in saying that it is ambiguous, not not to concede the other issue, but the board's resolution of that issue based on the policy reasons, that you don't want to reward fraudulent conduct, and the Congress would not have sought to say, if you successfully conceal your inelgeability for LPR status, that you're somehow going to be in a better position than some of you did follow the rules. And again, that the reasonfulness of the board's determination correct me takes that into account. There's no reason why the statute should be construed as saying that, it's really a bit of a favor in saying that the concealing of LPR status gives you eligibility for two-twelfth age. The two portions of the statute, and there's two definitions, the admitted definition, which is procedural, and the LPR definition, which is more substantive, you have a statute with these two things, and in terms of reconciling them, again, the board, I think, probably made the more reasonable, took the more reasonable approach, that you focus on the admission definition, what's the nature of the admission made by the petitioner in determining whether or not they're eligible for two-twelfth age status. The arguments they got on brief, unless there are further questions. So if you're not admitted, if you enter without inspection, then you don't need to meet the seven-year requirement, right? I'm sorry, you need to get seven-year requirement for. Well, I mean, it says no waiver shall be granted under this subsection of the case of an alien, it was previously been admitted as an alien lawfully admitted. If you've not resided for seven years, right? Well, I mean, you're talking about the applicability of the waiver bar, though, which only applies to the alien who were admitted as LPRs. If you entered without any kind of an, entered without inspection, and were never adjusted, age doesn't apply to you, right? Two-twelfth age. The eligibility bar in two-twelfth age, just not apply. Right, correct. So the seven-year thing would not be an issue
. There's no reason why the statute should be construed as saying that, it's really a bit of a favor in saying that the concealing of LPR status gives you eligibility for two-twelfth age. The two portions of the statute, and there's two definitions, the admitted definition, which is procedural, and the LPR definition, which is more substantive, you have a statute with these two things, and in terms of reconciling them, again, the board, I think, probably made the more reasonable, took the more reasonable approach, that you focus on the admission definition, what's the nature of the admission made by the petitioner in determining whether or not they're eligible for two-twelfth age status. The arguments they got on brief, unless there are further questions. So if you're not admitted, if you enter without inspection, then you don't need to meet the seven-year requirement, right? I'm sorry, you need to get seven-year requirement for. Well, I mean, it says no waiver shall be granted under this subsection of the case of an alien, it was previously been admitted as an alien lawfully admitted. If you've not resided for seven years, right? Well, I mean, you're talking about the applicability of the waiver bar, though, which only applies to the alien who were admitted as LPRs. If you entered without any kind of an, entered without inspection, and were never adjusted, age doesn't apply to you, right? Two-twelfth age. The eligibility bar in two-twelfth age, just not apply. Right, correct. So the seven-year thing would not be an issue. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, honest. Shelley, did you reserve time? Yes, your arms are two minutes. No, I did. We touched you. I'm gonna stop asking the question that way, though. I hear you say, okay, we'll take the med on the advice, Matt. Not asked for a lawyer to be up in Singapore. Go ahead
. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, honest. Shelley, did you reserve time? Yes, your arms are two minutes. No, I did. We touched you. I'm gonna stop asking the question that way, though. I hear you say, okay, we'll take the med on the advice, Matt. Not asked for a lawyer to be up in Singapore. Go ahead. Just a few quick points in Rebellion or first Chief Judge McKee, in terms of the substantive compliance component and the definition of lawfully admitted for permanent residents, I think there are a couple ways of getting their number, the in accordance with the immigration laws way, and also the adverb lawfully, right before accorded, I think that also would get. Say the last thing again. The word in the definition of lawfully admitted for permanent residents means that the status of having been lawfully accorded, the privilege of residing. Right. So in terms of where you're going. It's kind of circular because we're hung up on what lawfully means. Lawfully admitted, lawfully accorded, the privilege of residing. The issue is rather not this lawful, simply mean you comply with the procedures and get a status or does it mean that you're substantive, to the legally entitled to the status that you get once you go through those procedures. That's the rub between us, and I'm not sure the definition advances that very much. Fair enough
. Just a few quick points in Rebellion or first Chief Judge McKee, in terms of the substantive compliance component and the definition of lawfully admitted for permanent residents, I think there are a couple ways of getting their number, the in accordance with the immigration laws way, and also the adverb lawfully, right before accorded, I think that also would get. Say the last thing again. The word in the definition of lawfully admitted for permanent residents means that the status of having been lawfully accorded, the privilege of residing. Right. So in terms of where you're going. It's kind of circular because we're hung up on what lawfully means. Lawfully admitted, lawfully accorded, the privilege of residing. The issue is rather not this lawful, simply mean you comply with the procedures and get a status or does it mean that you're substantive, to the legally entitled to the status that you get once you go through those procedures. That's the rub between us, and I'm not sure the definition advances that very much. Fair enough. Well, I think with respect to the lawfully admitted for permanent residents, the board itself is included that that term has a substantive, only a substantive compliance component. Second, there's a little bit of, I just want to clarify our position where we do sort of think that the statute imposes two separate conditions a manner of entry condition and an immigration status condition, but we think Congress is the one that Congress separated out those two requirements because it used the term previously admitted, which is its own concept, and Congress expressly defined that concept, and also the term lawfully admitted for permanent residents, which is a separate concept, which Congress defined separately. So we think that Congress separated out those two requirements. Third, in terms of whether he was, he had the status of being lawfully admitted for permanent residents when he entered the United States, we think he was not the board itself on that he never had that status. So, the board found he was not eligible for that status. He was erroneously granted that status. Nope, with respect to Judge Hardiman, at pages seven A and eight A of the appendix, volume one of the appendix, and the blue brief, it says he had never been lawfully admitted for permanent residents, uses it two or three times in those two pages. He was never lawfully admitted. That's right, Judge. Thank you very much
. Thank you. You were there, excuse me. Take marriage and birth, and you can reset