The next day we'll be right, the score is now a session. Good morning, we say you're under my control. And the clerk called the next day's please. Every 21-0-585, Arthur Bay is happily by Thomas Cassidy, versus former developers LLC at all, Thomas Booth and Joe Moodle. And Joe's a job. It's a job, I'm really pretty pleased. Ma'am, please the court and council. Good morning, hours. This case is about whether or not the April 4, 2014 was a final judgment or ever became a final judgment. Now what is a final judgment? I guess the best place to start. A final judgment under Illinois law is a final determination of liability and damages. So in other words, a court has to determine, make a final determination of the amount due or the damages here. If the court decides it's not at that point in time going to enter a final amount on the damages and maybe amended later, then that's not a final judgment. In this case, this is a commercial foreclosure case that involved Council 1-8, where foreclosure counts of 9-12 were on a guarantee. It's undisputed in this case that on April 4, 2014, Judge Stainis, the underlying judge, granted the banks some re-judged emotion and counts 1-12. So the question becomes, was that a final determination on liability and damages? It's our contention in this case that for two reasons that that was not a final judgment and never became a final judgment. First, it's very clear from the record as we'll go through that judge Stainis on April 4, 2014, was not making a final determination on the damages. As we all know, this is a commercial foreclosure case with two separate, the guarantee claims and the foreclosure claims. Now, normally in a foreclosure complaint upon judgment of foreclosure on a summary judgment, it's not a final judgment and there's not a final determination of damages, right? Because then you've got to go to the judicial sale and then the sale has to be confirmed. It's our contention in this case that Judge Stainis, the prior attorney for Archer bank, and myself, I'm the record, I agree that we were going to treat the foreclosure claims, sorry, we were going to treat the guarantee claims the same as the foreclosure claims pertaining to the damages
. That there was not going to be a final calculation of the damages on the guarantee claims until after the judicial sale and those amounts were subtracted from the amount due. And then at that point, the court was going to entertain a final judgment. But why did the order that was entered on that date and state that the order against the guarantee court is only for liability purposes only? Well, I mean, it put a number. That's true. There's two, okay, so we're there on April 4th. There's going to be two orders entered at the end of the hearing, right? There's this handwritten order that said that grants the summary judgment and there's this type written order that's like six pages long, a judgment for foreclosure order. That order could have to be amended based on the discussions that we were having during the hearing that day that we were going to treat the foreclosure counts and the guarantee counts the same. So Mr. Doddack, who was the lawyer for the bank had to go and add that language into the order, which I can show, which I'll go through with you later, that identifies that there would be a judgment for foreclosure and a judgment on the guarantees after the judicial sale. So those orders have to be read together, because they were both memorializing the ruling by the court that day. And just one of them wasn't entered on that day. One was entered on May 8th. One was at the handwritten one on April 4th and the type written one on May 8th. If you read the May 8th order, I think to trial court, Judge Oscar Burton, who handled this case, agreed with us that the May 8th order contemplated a future judgment on both claims because it used the word shall. But she was concerned about the fact that there were two separate dates on the orders, right? The May, the April order, and then one couple weeks later. But it was that that's one. It should be considered one order furthermore. But she differentiate between the content of the May, the April 4th order and the May 8th order correct? Well, she did. Well, she first she agreed that yes, the May 8th order looks like it's contemplating a future judgment
. But since the May 8th order didn't say I'm vacating the April order, then somehow that that that that order was that language and the May 8th order was surplussage was unnecessary. But if you look at the transcript of what was being said that day, it's clear that the court was and the parties were agreeing to treat the guarantee claims the same as the foreclosure claims. So you have to re-bolt the orders together. So as I laid out my brief, I'm April 4th, there was basically four options that could have occurred there, right? One, the bank could have asked for 304A language and tried to get that from the judge making it a final judgment. If the judge said, okay, I'm making a final determination, I'm going to grant you 304A language, that's the final judgment. It's undisputed that didn't happen here, the bank didn't do that. Secondly, the bank could have voluntarily dismissed the foreclosure claims in an effort to try to create a final judgment on the guarantee claims. That's once the foreclosure claims were voluntary dismissed, that wouldn't theory create a final judgment. That didn't happen here. That's option 2. And in my brief I call option 1, option 2, option 3, option 4. So option 1, option 2 didn't occur here. Option 3, apparently with the bank's claim, is that there was an order under April 4th, 2014, that became final upon the entry of the order confirming the sale in August. Now, it's our contention that that did not happen because for that scenario, option 3 to occur, the order could not have been superseded by the May order. And it had to have been the final determination of damages that was done on April 4th, 2014, and the transcript was pretty clear in the other documents that I'll go through, are pretty clear that there was not a final determination of damages on that day. Mr. Gentlemen, if you're suggesting that both of the orders need to be read in conjunction with one another. Yes sir. Did the booths file a notice of a appeal on April 21st, 2014? That was related to the motion for summary judgment that the booths brought
. So on April 4th, 2014, there were two motions for summary judgment. The booths motion for summary judgment and the banks, the judges denied the booths motion for summary judgment and allowing the appeal on that gave us 304A language. Did not they never ask for or sought 304 language on that part of the order. So there were two competing motions, so that appeal had nothing to do with anything that related to today. So, and then there's option 4, which is what we're claiming happened here, that it's possible that it's not illegal or improper for the court to treat the foreclosure claims, the same as the guarantee claims, and calculate the damages at the end of the case. There's nothing that prohibits that under the law and the record and the evidence in this case establishes that's what everyone agreed to and that's how everyone proceeded in this case. Now, I mean the best place to look at our most year honors have, it doesn't look like you have the appendix because it's pretty thick. But attached to the appendix and I do have a hypothesis you want to read along. So I think it's important. The transcript of April 4, 2014, it's pretty, it's the Huck somewhat lengthy transcript, but that shows us exactly what was going on that day, right? And you can see there's discussion I cited in my brief, I don't know if the live cop is, if you're just as is want to look at the transcript and read along with it, because I think it's pretty important that what's being said here. I think you cited it here, open, brewed, and you're black and white. I know, I've come later. Okay, so I mean, if you look at page AO3, AO, appendix 103, so this is the day of the ruling, right? So Judge Stata says, I'm lying three, and the question will be your clients, the boost personally liable under guarantees, and the question will be whether the bank will be pursuing that at some point. And then this is me, I was actually there, this is not some other lawyer that handled this case, this was me. And then I said, because I was trying to bring up the point about the damages in the for and the guarantee claims, are they going to be a final judgment now or at the end of the case? So then I say, right, at some point they will, but that's down at the end. I suppose that would be down, sorry for the language, but sometimes when you're talking, it doesn't come through that grade on the transcript. Because right now the total amount isn't determined, because I mean there, there maybe there is no deficiency, because this was commercial real estate, my client, not only pledged the real estate was along or the development was going on, but other additional real estate worth millions of dollars. So then we skip through to the very end of the hearing, well, I want to reiterate to Judge Stata, what's what we're doing with the foreclosure counts. And I say, I'm page 8122, I say, oh, okay, I don't have, I have one issue
. I suppose so they enter the judgment and a certain dollar amount on the guarantee. But theoretically that won't be correct. If ultimately once there's a sale and everything, then the amount of sale will be deducted and they're getting the judgment on the deficiency, right? So here I'm talking to, I'm asking the judge, saying we're talking about the guarantee claims, they're not going to get the judgment or final determination on damages until after the judicial sale. And Mr. Daudiac, who was counsel for the bank at that point, says correct. Then the court, the court then says the confirmation order would include a specific amount and there would be a memorandum of judgment present with a specific amount of deficiency as opposed to a 9 million plus, the 9 million, sorry, I'm not going to mean the point. The 9 million dollars was in that handwritten order, right? It said summary judgment and the 9 million dollars. So here's the court saying when we're talking specifically about the guarantee claims, no, we're going to wait till after the confirmation of the sale. So then I go, I say, so there's no memorandum of judgment going to be entered based on the 9 million, correct? The judge says, Judge Stain says, can't act until there's a sale. Then I go back in, I say, okay, so we have to put that in there that is state or something that's part of it. I just don't want anyone turning around and saying, and then the judge cut me off because I was getting excited probably like today. If you are looking for some protective language, if you want to say the amount of the deficiency judgment shall be determined when the confirmation order is presented, we can do that. This is again, not talking about the foreclosure counts, talking about the guarantee claims. And then I say, yes, something like that is that okay? And Mr. Daudet, the bank's lawyer at that point, says, yeah, I understand how that's how it works. This is what he's telling the judge. And then the judge says, I don't know, I don't think I don't know that the bank can proceed on a deficiency until there is a sale. And then we determine how much money is in the pot. Again, talking about the guarantee claims, not the foreclosure claims
. And I say, okay, that's all, I mean, and the court says, it's on the record. And I say, it's on the, okay, okay, okay, the court cuts me off again, says, I can't do it anyway. If Mr. Daudet presented a memorandum of judgment today, I couldn't sign it. And I say, okay, and then Mr. Daudet says, we'll present it to the court in order for confirmation, which will include the order of judgment, and we'll include the amount that was bid at the share sale. So again, the bank's lawyer is agreeing that there is no final determination of damage. That will be done at the end of the case. And then I say, it's fine. And that's how this transcript ends. That's the very end of the transcript. So the transcript, if you look at the transcript here, it's very clear, I believe, that judge status was not making a final determination in April 4th, 2014, stating that there was a final judgment or a final determination of damages. He was going to wait and treat it the same as the foreclosure case, claims. So, then if we look at the order, that justice was referring to the May 8th order. If you look at the language of the May 8th order, it says, in the section, section 4, page 7 says, the proceeds of sale, talking about the proceeds of the sale, right? And this is what was added in later that day, which took a couple of weeks for counsel to type it up. We added it into, not to G, where it says that the bank will be getting, after the sale, if there's not enough money to pay off everything, the bank would get a judgment for this efficiency against not only the borrowers, the entities, but the gear and tours. So it clearly says, right here, shall we see the judgment? And that's where Judge Astorberg agreed with us. She did believe she says, well, it does seem like this paragraph does talk about how to play a future judgment and determination of damages. So this is what was memorialized as a result of what was set on the record
. Now, maybe we could have done it better in hindsight, I suppose. I don't know. We thought it was pretty clear there. And then we skipped along to the next issue that supports the fact that there was no final determination of damages. So right after this occurs in April, then the bank comes to us and says, look, we're not going to come after your guy on the guarantee. We're not going to do it. I provided an affidavit rather my client provided an affidavit because I was there and that hasn't been contradicted. Council for the bank now says that they talked to Mr. Daudi at during the underlying case when we were down in front of Judge Astorberg. They didn't produce any affidavit saying what I was saying was incorrect or I misread number. So the only evidence before this court is that the bank said, okay, we're not going to pursue the guarantee after getting this summary judgment motion. So what occurred then in August, the bank files a motion to confirm the sale, right? After the sale occurs, the file was in the confirm the sale. And in the motion, it attached a draft order which would have given the bank a deficiency judgment against the booths. And here it's right here in this section of the order. As soon as I got this motion, I called out Mr. Daudi yet and said, what are you doing? I thought you guys weren't going to go after the booths for the guarantee points. And he said, oh, okay, I get it right. I forgot. So what he did is he took this language out of the actual order that was entered at 822
. So if you compare the draft order in July to the order that was entered, it removed the language giving the bank a deficiency judgment or a judgment against the booths on the guarantee. And the actual order entered on August 22, 2014 confirming the sale did not give them the bank a judgment against the booths on the guarantee. And they pretty much admit that because they're not trying to say the banks not trying to say that the August order gave them a judgment against the booths. They're trying to say the April order. So why would a lawyer, and I, this is again my affidavit, I call him and he removed it. Why would the lawyer remove that language unless they weren't getting a judgment against it? Oh, okay. And then the one last thing I'd like to say really quickly is that after they got the judgment for closure, the prior lawyers went and got memorandums of judgment. But only against the entities, not against the individuals. Why would the lawyer do that? If he had a judgment against the booths, he wouldn't have just gotten a memorandum of judgment against the entities and not the individuals. It doesn't make any sense. And finally, it kind of device comes in because basically they make a saying on August of 2014 that court entered two judgments. One for nine million against the booths and one for four million against the entities. Why would a court do that? Especially after based on the conversations that we had and discussions that we had on the transcript. The court, you know, it just doesn't make any sense. I'll court me. You're not. Okay. Thank you. Thank you
. I'll see the panel. Any questions? Any questions? Any questions? No, no questions. No questions. It's fast. Good morning. And may it please the court, counsel? My name is Tom Cassidy. I'm the attorney for the plan for Pellea Archibank. The issues in this case are very simple. Much more simple than Mr. Gentlemen just laid out. There are two main issues in the appeal. Whether a judgment was entered against the defendant's, Thomas and Joan Booth, and whether a citation to discover assets issued by the bank was proper. And in order to be proper, it had to be based on a valid judgment. I noticed Mr. Gentlemen didn't mention anything about 1401. He didn't mention anything about the citations. It's important because at this stage, we are so far beyond judgment that their 1401 procedural method of getting us in front of the court was improper. But it's also important to go back and look at the loan documents and to understand why there are different loan documents. There's a mortgage, a note, guarantee, two guarantees
. Those documents all have separate promises, separate obligations. They're distinct documents and they're distinct for a reason. Which is, I can go into all the reasons why I'm mortgageing there, too, different. But it's laid out in our complaint. There's different counts. So those different documents lead to different counts, which lead to different judgments. And that's where we are today. It's where we were in 2014, where the foreclosure counts were dealt with separately from the guarantee counts. The third issue really is whether the 1401 motion is procedurally proper. And I think that the court needs to analyze that. I'll get into that. As to the mortgage, mortgages, there were various judgments of foreclosure. As to the guarantees, there were judgments individually. As to the note, there was a separate judgment as to the deficiency. Another thing Mr. General did not mention, which is important, is that the borrower here on the note, the entity liable for a deficiency judgment, is home or developers. It's a different entity. It's not the individuals, the booths. That is crucial because the bank could not have obtained a deficiency judgment against the booths
. They obtained instead a judgment on the guarantee. So everything that Mr. General said today, and everything in his briefs and in the circuit court, about the transcript of the April 4th, 2014 hearing, is really irrelevant as to the guarantee that, or the judgment on the guarantees, the judgment against the booths. Because that transcript and that hearing dealt with the deficiencies on the note. At the end of the foreclosure, the deficiency could be given in favor of the bank and against the entities that signed the note. The booths now claim that the April 14th judgment order, the April 4th, 2014 judgment order, is void, because it was not restated in the final order, which is the order of proving sale. There was no reason for the court to do that. And what they are trying to do is to meld together all of the counts and all of the judgments into one convenient unit. But that's not what they are because of the different loan documents at the origination of the loan. There is no reason why the court would have re-entered the judgment on the guarantee at the end of the case. The plaintiff bank did not attempt to enforce the judgment between the time that the judgment on the guarantees was entered in 9.5 million dollars approximately, between that time and April and between August when the order of proving sale was confirmed. That order of proving sale deducted from the judgment on the guarantees, the amount that was handed sale. That amount obviously was reduced, the booth's liability was reduced in the amount that the property sold for, just several million dollars. I think that's the fact that the foregone conclusion that it wouldn't be reduced by that, where is that show of your diamonds? That's in the judgment of foreclosure. That's not what you're talking about, the guarantee. That's right, the guarantee, so the answer to your question more specifically, it's in the guarantee that it says that, that the amount that is owed by the individual guarantors is the amount that's owed on the note. So they are securing the guarantee, literally, the note. So if the amount due on the note is a lesser amount than what it was a month ago or a year ago or whatever, then they'll guarantors only owe that amount. We can't collect from the guarantor more than what is due on the note. So that's in the provisions of the guarantee. It's not discretionary in the provisions of the guarantee. No, I can't imagine that is, I don't know off the top of my head. But the following with that logic, your judgment of April 4th is in a lying to the judgment because of the actual numbers not around that until the very end. Well, it's a non-final order. It's entered in a case where there's multiple counts or 14 counts. So that judgment, we didn't ask for it to be final, and it, because we weren't intending to enforce until after we saw what the properties got its sale. So of course we weren't going to, shouldn't say, of course, because sometimes plaintiffs do try to enforce, but the bank in this case did not seek to enforce the judgment between the judgment on the guarantee and the sale. So that it was non-final. We did it for six years after that, right? That's right. And we have seven years, and it was revived. But even before the revival is when we started to enforce the judgment. And after, notably, after the order of proven sale in the case. So after we determined how much the mortgage properties would reduce the liability of the guarantee tours and the amount due on the note, then we began enforcement of the judgment against the guarantee tours years later. And that's statutory. We have that right, so we..
. We can't collect from the guarantor more than what is due on the note. So that's in the provisions of the guarantee. It's not discretionary in the provisions of the guarantee. No, I can't imagine that is, I don't know off the top of my head. But the following with that logic, your judgment of April 4th is in a lying to the judgment because of the actual numbers not around that until the very end. Well, it's a non-final order. It's entered in a case where there's multiple counts or 14 counts. So that judgment, we didn't ask for it to be final, and it, because we weren't intending to enforce until after we saw what the properties got its sale. So of course we weren't going to, shouldn't say, of course, because sometimes plaintiffs do try to enforce, but the bank in this case did not seek to enforce the judgment between the judgment on the guarantee and the sale. So that it was non-final. We did it for six years after that, right? That's right. And we have seven years, and it was revived. But even before the revival is when we started to enforce the judgment. And after, notably, after the order of proven sale in the case. So after we determined how much the mortgage properties would reduce the liability of the guarantee tours and the amount due on the note, then we began enforcement of the judgment against the guarantee tours years later. And that's statutory. We have that right, so we... I think the Biden's client feel that it was not necessary to refute the allegations made by the police as far as the supporters could really explain their form of cons, all that in the bank, not to enforce, when the two-fourteen-one proceedings were going on. So Judge, there's no evidence that that took place, that that agreement was had. The record shows the opposite. The record shows that there was a draft order for an order of proven sale, which included a person on the efficiency of the abuse. I submit that the bank never could have obtained a deficiency against the abuse. It must have been removed from the final order. It could not have been included in the file. There was a Saturday that the bank agreed for a bearer. There was no response to the bank, that's the best point I've got into the fact. The United States and the injured point, while the officials didn't, not made the end of the abortion deficiency or being obtained. But the other allegations supporting the PGR-2-14-01 petition, that's the one I'm asking about. Judge, the orders of the court supersede any allegations made in the affidavits that were filing the case. We can look, aren't now, in retrospect, we can look at the orders of the court and see what was ordered. We don't need to look into a hypothetical situation of what could have happened or what agreement could have been made. We know what the court ordered. The court ordered that the Judgement on the Guarantees was entered. The plaintiff could have dismissed its case right then and there and had a valid judgment on the Guarantees for $9.5 million. That would have been the end of it
. I think the Biden's client feel that it was not necessary to refute the allegations made by the police as far as the supporters could really explain their form of cons, all that in the bank, not to enforce, when the two-fourteen-one proceedings were going on. So Judge, there's no evidence that that took place, that that agreement was had. The record shows the opposite. The record shows that there was a draft order for an order of proven sale, which included a person on the efficiency of the abuse. I submit that the bank never could have obtained a deficiency against the abuse. It must have been removed from the final order. It could not have been included in the file. There was a Saturday that the bank agreed for a bearer. There was no response to the bank, that's the best point I've got into the fact. The United States and the injured point, while the officials didn't, not made the end of the abortion deficiency or being obtained. But the other allegations supporting the PGR-2-14-01 petition, that's the one I'm asking about. Judge, the orders of the court supersede any allegations made in the affidavits that were filing the case. We can look, aren't now, in retrospect, we can look at the orders of the court and see what was ordered. We don't need to look into a hypothetical situation of what could have happened or what agreement could have been made. We know what the court ordered. The court ordered that the Judgement on the Guarantees was entered. The plaintiff could have dismissed its case right then and there and had a valid judgment on the Guarantees for $9.5 million. That would have been the end of it. That was a minor plaintiff. That's right. We could have asked for it to have been final. We could have not proceeded. I should say the plaintiff could have not proceeded with the sale of the property. That's his choice. Obviously, it was the most efficient best way to get some sort of recovery on this very large loan is to go through the sale process. The defendant could have probably exercised that right then at that point in time. If you were, the bank was not going to foreclose. They just come to them for the money, would they step and do shoes then? I'm not able to. I'm sorry, I don't understand your question. I understand that we all understand that separate counts, separate clauses of action, the Guarantees is a separate action. Yes, and you've raised the point that you can take your argument, just go after the Guaranteur and that's it. That's right. That could just be an independent suit on its own against the Guarantees. Okay, so would they be stepping into your shoes then? Could they step into your shoes and try to force the foreclose to cover that efficiency? I don't know the answer to that. No, I don't think they could proceed with our case without an assignment of the mortgage to them. They wouldn't have the ability to do that. In my opinion, I have a research that I don't know the answer to that
. That was a minor plaintiff. That's right. We could have asked for it to have been final. We could have not proceeded. I should say the plaintiff could have not proceeded with the sale of the property. That's his choice. Obviously, it was the most efficient best way to get some sort of recovery on this very large loan is to go through the sale process. The defendant could have probably exercised that right then at that point in time. If you were, the bank was not going to foreclose. They just come to them for the money, would they step and do shoes then? I'm not able to. I'm sorry, I don't understand your question. I understand that we all understand that separate counts, separate clauses of action, the Guarantees is a separate action. Yes, and you've raised the point that you can take your argument, just go after the Guaranteur and that's it. That's right. That could just be an independent suit on its own against the Guarantees. Okay, so would they be stepping into your shoes then? Could they step into your shoes and try to force the foreclose to cover that efficiency? I don't know the answer to that. No, I don't think they could proceed with our case without an assignment of the mortgage to them. They wouldn't have the ability to do that. In my opinion, I have a research that I don't know the answer to that. I have not considered that. I'd like to move to the 1401 portion of this case. That their motion that was brought in the circuit court was brought about six years too late. So they brought it in their seventh or eighth year. They only have two years, it doesn't matter if it was seventh or eighth. They have two years in their 1401 to bring a motion arguing that the judgment is voidable. So the council's arguments in the brief, not so much today, but they argued that the April 4th order was void. The judge of the burger found no, it actually was voidable. Because if anything, even though a judgment did exist and even though the judgment was valid, if anything, it would have been an error on the court's part. Again, this is assuming in the alternative that the judgment was not valid, that the court's error would have been avoidable error, a voidable error, and not a void order. So by bringing their motion, seeking to declare the order void, six years later, they're far outside the 1401, two-year limit. They need to show that it's void and it can't. It wasn't void, it exists. The court had jurisdiction. It exists in the record. If there was some mistake that was made, then you can look at the transcripts as Mr. gentlemen suggested, if there was a mistake that was made, the mistake should have been corrected years prior. It should have been corrected right after the case was over. But they had two years, they didn't correct anything within two years, they didn't bring their motion, until we started to attempt to collect
. I have not considered that. I'd like to move to the 1401 portion of this case. That their motion that was brought in the circuit court was brought about six years too late. So they brought it in their seventh or eighth year. They only have two years, it doesn't matter if it was seventh or eighth. They have two years in their 1401 to bring a motion arguing that the judgment is voidable. So the council's arguments in the brief, not so much today, but they argued that the April 4th order was void. The judge of the burger found no, it actually was voidable. Because if anything, even though a judgment did exist and even though the judgment was valid, if anything, it would have been an error on the court's part. Again, this is assuming in the alternative that the judgment was not valid, that the court's error would have been avoidable error, a voidable error, and not a void order. So by bringing their motion, seeking to declare the order void, six years later, they're far outside the 1401, two-year limit. They need to show that it's void and it can't. It wasn't void, it exists. The court had jurisdiction. It exists in the record. If there was some mistake that was made, then you can look at the transcripts as Mr. gentlemen suggested, if there was a mistake that was made, the mistake should have been corrected years prior. It should have been corrected right after the case was over. But they had two years, they didn't correct anything within two years, they didn't bring their motion, until we started to attempt to collect. And at that time, it was too late. As I mentioned, the transcripts of April 4th, I wanted to also state that you should read the transcript of April 4th, because it does state that which the plaintiff is arguing here in this case, that the deficiency judgments. So council confuses the deficiency judgment, language in the transcript, with the guarantee judgment, that was already entered on April 4th. There's totally different things. So in his arguments in the brief, in the opalence brief and in the reply, he argues that the transcript supports his arguments, that the deficiency judgment against the booths should have been, that there was a deficiency judgment against the booths. Admittedly, there was no deficiency judgment against the booths. There never could have been. So as council invited you to, I invite you also to read the transcript of April 4th, because you will see that the particular language that's used refers to the foreclosure palates, which are the deficiencies on the notes. And as to that issue also in the opalence reply brief, it's notable that on page two, they quote part of the transcript, which I believe was read here today. And I will read this sentence, booths attorney then stated on the record when referring to the April 14th draft order, I'm sorry, the April 4th 2014 draft order, that quote, so they entered a judgment in a certain dollar amount on the guarantees, that theoretically that won't be correct. If ultimately once there's a sale of everything, then the amount of the sale will be deducted, and then they're getting a judgment, and then he wrote in brackets on the guarantee counts, on the deficiency, right? Council's insertion in brackets into the quote of the transcript. It sort of sums up this whole argument that they're making, and why their argument doesn't hold any water, because they had to insert, in the quote, their own little brackets of information to say on the guarantee counts on the deficiency. So if you were to read the transcript, you would see that it actually does support the plaintiff throughout. I see that my time is up. Any questions? Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you. I would ask that the circuit court's order is before. Thank you
. And at that time, it was too late. As I mentioned, the transcripts of April 4th, I wanted to also state that you should read the transcript of April 4th, because it does state that which the plaintiff is arguing here in this case, that the deficiency judgments. So council confuses the deficiency judgment, language in the transcript, with the guarantee judgment, that was already entered on April 4th. There's totally different things. So in his arguments in the brief, in the opalence brief and in the reply, he argues that the transcript supports his arguments, that the deficiency judgment against the booths should have been, that there was a deficiency judgment against the booths. Admittedly, there was no deficiency judgment against the booths. There never could have been. So as council invited you to, I invite you also to read the transcript of April 4th, because you will see that the particular language that's used refers to the foreclosure palates, which are the deficiencies on the notes. And as to that issue also in the opalence reply brief, it's notable that on page two, they quote part of the transcript, which I believe was read here today. And I will read this sentence, booths attorney then stated on the record when referring to the April 14th draft order, I'm sorry, the April 4th 2014 draft order, that quote, so they entered a judgment in a certain dollar amount on the guarantees, that theoretically that won't be correct. If ultimately once there's a sale of everything, then the amount of the sale will be deducted, and then they're getting a judgment, and then he wrote in brackets on the guarantee counts, on the deficiency, right? Council's insertion in brackets into the quote of the transcript. It sort of sums up this whole argument that they're making, and why their argument doesn't hold any water, because they had to insert, in the quote, their own little brackets of information to say on the guarantee counts on the deficiency. So if you were to read the transcript, you would see that it actually does support the plaintiff throughout. I see that my time is up. Any questions? Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you. I would ask that the circuit court's order is before. Thank you. The government of the state? Can you guys proceed? Yes, Your Honor. The transcript is pretty clear. We're talking in the transcript about the guarantee claims. Now, the council keeps getting hung up on the word deficiency. That's not a real, that's the term of art. There's no official legal definition of deficiency. Deficiency means here, after the sale, if there's money owed on the guarantee claim, and the foreclosure claims, that will be with the judgment amount, the final determination will be, there's no deficiency, and the final certainty is exclusively used in foreclosure cases, which just means a deficiency. The last reason I want to point out is that the April 4, 2014 order could never be a final order, even the respective of the final damages park that we've already talked about, because as we all know, it was as council, or as Justice asked the question, it wasn't the interlocatory order for judgment at best, right? On April 14, which means it's subject to revision, which means the April 4, 2014 order could not become a final judgment, if an order entered after it, or before the judgment confirming sale, superseded it or provided the same relief, right? Because then that would be a later. Was all claims resolved in the audience that became a final order? In theory, that's what they're claiming, right? But the only way the April order could become a final order is if some order in between that period of time did not supersede the April order. In other words, if an order was entered after April that provided all the same relief that the April order did, then the April order becomes means, because it's an interlocutor order, it's been superseded by a later interd order. And here, the May 8 order supersedes the April order, because the April order, and paragraph 1 is what they're relying upon, says, motion for some of judgment's grant in a certain amount. That's it. If you look at the April, the May order, why wasn't there a May order? Why didn't they just say this order supersedes all previous orders? Well, because we thought we were going to enter them in the same day. And Mr. Daudi had this type of order, this long one, and he was just going to fix it up, and then one of them got entered that day, and this one just took a couple of weeks for it to get entered. I guess they sent it to the court, they didn't get entered. We should have been entered on the same day, because that's what the judge ordered. In fact, at the bottom of the handwritten order, it says right down here that we're entering a second order. So everybody knew that there was going to be two orders that should be read together
. The government of the state? Can you guys proceed? Yes, Your Honor. The transcript is pretty clear. We're talking in the transcript about the guarantee claims. Now, the council keeps getting hung up on the word deficiency. That's not a real, that's the term of art. There's no official legal definition of deficiency. Deficiency means here, after the sale, if there's money owed on the guarantee claim, and the foreclosure claims, that will be with the judgment amount, the final determination will be, there's no deficiency, and the final certainty is exclusively used in foreclosure cases, which just means a deficiency. The last reason I want to point out is that the April 4, 2014 order could never be a final order, even the respective of the final damages park that we've already talked about, because as we all know, it was as council, or as Justice asked the question, it wasn't the interlocatory order for judgment at best, right? On April 14, which means it's subject to revision, which means the April 4, 2014 order could not become a final judgment, if an order entered after it, or before the judgment confirming sale, superseded it or provided the same relief, right? Because then that would be a later. Was all claims resolved in the audience that became a final order? In theory, that's what they're claiming, right? But the only way the April order could become a final order is if some order in between that period of time did not supersede the April order. In other words, if an order was entered after April that provided all the same relief that the April order did, then the April order becomes means, because it's an interlocutor order, it's been superseded by a later interd order. And here, the May 8 order supersedes the April order, because the April order, and paragraph 1 is what they're relying upon, says, motion for some of judgment's grant in a certain amount. That's it. If you look at the April, the May order, why wasn't there a May order? Why didn't they just say this order supersedes all previous orders? Well, because we thought we were going to enter them in the same day. And Mr. Daudi had this type of order, this long one, and he was just going to fix it up, and then one of them got entered that day, and this one just took a couple of weeks for it to get entered. I guess they sent it to the court, they didn't get entered. We should have been entered on the same day, because that's what the judge ordered. In fact, at the bottom of the handwritten order, it says right down here that we're entering a second order. So everybody knew that there was going to be two orders that should be read together. But if you're not going to read them together, you're going to read this one in different days. This order provides all the same relief as this order. Down here, it grants all the relief in the complaint, same as granting some rejouismate. And then later on, it provides the amounts that are owed, so the damages that are owed. So it provides everything in the main order is within the April order. Therefore, it's superseded, plus this order used the term judgment, also said it retains jurisdiction to enforce it. So this order no longer exists because this order superseded. It provided everything that this order did. So that's the secondary reason, in addition to the fact that I think we've already beat this to a denorse, that the transcript shows treating guarantee in the foreclosure claims the same. We're going to do the damages determination at the act. Council really didn't have an answer to your question about where's their affidavit to contradict me, because there's nothing to contradict. It's true, your higher house there. I think the transcript supports me. I'm an officer of the court, and I've provided this affidavit to explain what happened here, your honors. They had the opportunity, they talked to Mr. Daudi, yet he couldn't provide any contrary evidence. That's why they didn't produce the affidavit, your honor. I think, and I'm entitled to at least a presumption of that. Finally, I just want to explain what happened here, I think, from the bank standpoint
. But if you're not going to read them together, you're going to read this one in different days. This order provides all the same relief as this order. Down here, it grants all the relief in the complaint, same as granting some rejouismate. And then later on, it provides the amounts that are owed, so the damages that are owed. So it provides everything in the main order is within the April order. Therefore, it's superseded, plus this order used the term judgment, also said it retains jurisdiction to enforce it. So this order no longer exists because this order superseded. It provided everything that this order did. So that's the secondary reason, in addition to the fact that I think we've already beat this to a denorse, that the transcript shows treating guarantee in the foreclosure claims the same. We're going to do the damages determination at the act. Council really didn't have an answer to your question about where's their affidavit to contradict me, because there's nothing to contradict. It's true, your higher house there. I think the transcript supports me. I'm an officer of the court, and I've provided this affidavit to explain what happened here, your honors. They had the opportunity, they talked to Mr. Daudi, yet he couldn't provide any contrary evidence. That's why they didn't produce the affidavit, your honor. I think, and I'm entitled to at least a presumption of that. Finally, I just want to explain what happened here, I think, from the bank standpoint. They had the lawyers, we had the agreement, the case is over. Mr. Cruever was the guy at the bank dealing with us, right? He left after about a couple years, and then they've got a new law firm, the bank merged, or was bought out by somebody, and then six years later, somebody who rifles TVO files and comes up and tries to enforce this case. At that point in time, they created Mr. Daudi or Mr. Fassidy created a document that was not recorded, it wasn't a Memorandum of judgment, but just look at this document. It says on this document that they started their collection proceedings, that they got a judgment against the entities for $9 million an April 4th. That's not true. They got a judgment against the entities in August for $4 million. So, basically what happened here, looks like somebody came in six years later, looked at the file, didn't have the transcript, didn't call me, didn't call Mr. Daudi, to see what actually happened here, so they ended up proceeding with these cases. The last thing I want to talk about, it's really covered in the briefs, this 14-on-1 stuff, it's our case in, the Supreme Court case recently dealt with this. If you're trying to track a void order, this is the procedure you have to follow, you don't have to do the two, you're not limited to two years, and you don't have to show a maritalist defense. The void order is one of the important naturalistic. The void order is something where there's an estate in the state. Well, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what are claiming? We're, we're claiming there was no final judgment. If you look at the cases in my brief, then they file the citation. The citation is void because, in the cases say this, you cannot institute or serve a citation, or proceed on a citation, unless you have a final judgment. And if you do all that's void, so that's the voidness too
. They had the lawyers, we had the agreement, the case is over. Mr. Cruever was the guy at the bank dealing with us, right? He left after about a couple years, and then they've got a new law firm, the bank merged, or was bought out by somebody, and then six years later, somebody who rifles TVO files and comes up and tries to enforce this case. At that point in time, they created Mr. Daudi or Mr. Fassidy created a document that was not recorded, it wasn't a Memorandum of judgment, but just look at this document. It says on this document that they started their collection proceedings, that they got a judgment against the entities for $9 million an April 4th. That's not true. They got a judgment against the entities in August for $4 million. So, basically what happened here, looks like somebody came in six years later, looked at the file, didn't have the transcript, didn't call me, didn't call Mr. Daudi, to see what actually happened here, so they ended up proceeding with these cases. The last thing I want to talk about, it's really covered in the briefs, this 14-on-1 stuff, it's our case in, the Supreme Court case recently dealt with this. If you're trying to track a void order, this is the procedure you have to follow, you don't have to do the two, you're not limited to two years, and you don't have to show a maritalist defense. The void order is one of the important naturalistic. The void order is something where there's an estate in the state. Well, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what are claiming? We're, we're claiming there was no final judgment. If you look at the cases in my brief, then they file the citation. The citation is void because, in the cases say this, you cannot institute or serve a citation, or proceed on a citation, unless you have a final judgment. And if you do all that's void, so that's the voidness too. There was no, we're saying there was, there's no final judgment in it. I'm guaranteeing that's void, and two, you can't collect, I don't, I don't, I don't, unless you have a final enforceable judgment. And that's why it's a 14-on-1 petition under sarcasm because, how else would someone be able to attack this too? I mean, I like the sarcasm case, it provides some sort of procedural mechanism for people to attack void orders. But, so. Thank you. Any questions? No. Thank you, everyone. Council, can you hear a healing, the denial of the summary judgment order arguing this court room? Yes, I did. After all of this occurred. Correct. What was the need for that? The need for that was, as we laid out in our affidavit in part, that my client could, he had to give, so there was a foreclosure property where the loan was not right, whether it was the valid. You were standing out, so the guarantee is what you were appealing. You asked for the 304 language you got, you brought it. Right. But that was after you had a guarantee the bank wasn't going to collect again. Right, so that was the agreement with the bank, because there was a separate property that was not part of this that we were trying to keep. And that's what the appeal was related to, that there was a settlement with the brother, and that he would, that my client would be able to keep that other property, not the property that was, this was a development and, and overglend. So, that appeal was trying to say, look, there was a settlement, he gets to keep his mouth. Because he had turned over like a $3 million dollar mall, which he did in this case, in partial satisfaction of the judgment
. So, thank you. You bet you like it. Thank you. Thank you, Castle, for your earnings today and for your briefs. We'll be a recipient in due course. We got to take another