Legal Case Summary

Our next case is Berry vs Ford Motor Company, 15-1699. I did your honor. You may proceed. Thank you. May I please the court? We're here today on a decision-granting summary judgment. The Eastard is a permission. For summary judgment, the rules are simple and clear. If there's a material question, the fact must be reversed. Just out of curiosity, it's not an issue that was brought up. But a question is, in this case, be back in state court. How do we have jurisdiction on this? It should be in state court. And I think it may be, hopefully, instead of there. It started out in state court. We brought in state court. It was moved to federal court because of the allegations of ownership of athletes. Okay. Immediately, there has to be more than a continual evidence for a material fact. I think we've met that more. The other line. On this jurisdiction question, you're saying that this really shouldn't be before us. It should be in state court and Michigan state court. But you were the one that brought the advenorship claim, right? That's correct. So you'd have to be arguing the only way that the existence of an advenorship claim wouldn't be sufficient to sustain jurisdiction here over not only that claim, but also the supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims would be if the advenorship claim were frivolous. And you're not arguing that

. I take it. No, we're not arguing that. Well, then how do we not have jurisdiction? You do have jurisdiction. Well, I thought you said it shouldn't be here. I said we started off as state court. Well, I thought in your first response that this case shouldn't be in the federal court. It should be. Okay. That's your section. Thank you. I'm my apologies. Any of the interline facts in this case are really undisputed. Back in 2006 Ford was having difficulty getting funding and developing a SYNC system. They could get funding so they contacted Mr. Berry for help. Mr. Berry came in. He's a telephone communication expert. And Mr. Berry in the fall of 2006 redesigned the SYNC system. Is it your argument that Mr. Berry provided Ford with intellectual property as opposed to just like technical information or technical advice? He provided technical information to Ford and able them to redesign the entire SYNC system. But no intellectual property

. It may have included some intellectual property but it included technical information that some of it clearly was not. When you say intellectual property, patentful subject matter, in my view. So your claim is during the fall of 2006 Mr. Berry didn't invent anything in terms of contributing to those four patents. Not quite. Mr. Berry gave a lot of technical information in the fall of 2006. Some of the technical information may very well be patentful subject matter but not all of it. So when did he invent all of the subject matter that relates to the four patents in question that Mr. Berry is seeking to correct the inventorship? I really have nothing to add to the question of the inventorship. My argument today really is directed to the ungestionary Richmond. Okay. May I continue? Okay. The, anyways Mr. Berry redesigned the SYNC system, eliminated the data modem, used the smart phone of the driver instead. That was a cost saving course. He also told Ford and the technical information that they could use the voice channel to transmit data. Now if he didn't invent that, in fact that was invented by a company called Airpiquity that was currently commercializing it. Before didn't know that, but that technical information was known by Berry and Berry conveyed that technical information to Ford which they adopted. Back in 2006 most people who had smartphones did not have a data program. I mean, I just, just to be clear, you're abandoning your ventorship claim? No, I just have nothing to add to it. I don't have enough time to argue about it. So I would like to concentrate on the ungestionary Richmond

. Do you know, is there anything in the record that shows that Mr. Berry at the time in 2006 communicated to Ford? Mr. Berry's expectation that he was going to be compensated for the activities that he was doing without any formal contract during the time of 2006. No, yeah. Okay. Did Ford, is there anything in the record where Ford was somehow intimating, suggesting or expressly stating that all of the technical information that was flowing to Ford from Mr. Berry during 2006, Ford was planning on paying him for all of that work and technical information during the fall of 2006? There's some testimony, but it's not in the record here. Okay. There were certain things that were made, yes. Okay. Mr. Van Dagen's. It's also in dispute that there was no contract in the fall of 2006. There is a dispute about the effect of Mr. Zoo's contract for, believe that Mr. Zoo had in December of 2006. Forbably, that Mr. Zoo had access to Mr. Berry, but there's no document to support that. And then Mr. Berry disputes that Mr. Zoo had any. Why would Mr

. Zoo be paying Mr. Berry if that was the case? Mr. Berry helped with the little question about Mr. Zoo's unsuccessful designing it, but Mr. Berry entered into a contract to develop the SDN in May of 2007. And he was paid to do that, certainly. Under the unjust and rich claim, the DMB case is the controlling law in Michigan. That's from the core of appeals. It has been reversed as this recent law. And under the DMB case, the Ford had problems with their headliners. They were grinkled. And so DMB came in and said, we'll put these blocks in the mold and it worked. They read later brought soup, they put the damages, well, actually collected money for that unjust and rich. In this case. What is your answer, go ahead. What is your answer to the suggestion that this was an arrangement in which at least implicit in the arrangement was the contemplation that with some, after some initial period of working cooperatively without a contract and without compensation, that Mr. Berry expected that he would have a good chance of getting a lucrative contract from Ford and indeed he ultimately did. Why does that not undermine the argument for unjust enrichment? Well, there's nothing to support that from one thing. The Mr. Berry. Well, he did end up with a lucrative contract from Ford. Mr. Berry gave up a more lucrative job offer to do that contract

. In that case, he made a bad deal, but nonetheless, God, it wasn't as if Ford said, okay, now that you've given us all your, all that you have to offer and you're out of here. I mean, he ended up with what most people would regard as a pretty attractive contract. Mr. Berry was well paid to develop the SDN as a part of saying that has nothing to do with 9-11, but since the SDN has nothing to do with the data communication, that's the vehicle health report. And the SDN really has nothing to do with the conversion over to the smartphone. Those are all things that were separate. Those are the things that even the technical information that Mr. Berry had today. But he got his foot in the door with Ford. He got his foot in the door with Ford and ultimately ended up being paid pretty well for work that he did for Ford, right? For the SDN, but Salahe was in the door, Ford called him. Well, initially, but his, you know, there are lots of instances in which people in services or selling products will offer in effect free samples at the outset. They'll say, take this product, use it for a while. If you don't like it, send it back. If you like it, pay us or buy some more, whatever, or services. Somebody comes in and says, I'll work for you for a year for free. At the end of the year, you decide whether you want to hire me. And I bet you're going to want to hire me. That's not unjust enrichment, is it? If the company ultimately decides, thanks for your year. That wouldn't be unjust enrichment, right? I would agree that we're not the unjust enrichment, but didn't happen here. Okay. Why is that different from what happened? Because he never got into the place where we're hiring me. I'll do all this work for free. And then you hire me

. What companies like Ford do is they make time for free for a period of time. He was working, yes, for a long period of time. His hope was probably, or we can see that as his hope was, I'm going to work for free. You don't see that I'm smart. I can get to proven. I can add part to the knowledge. And maybe you'll hire me in the future. There's nothing in the record that would be suggested that happened. That's a problem with that. But I guess also what might be a problem going the other way is that there's nothing in the record that suggests that Mr. Barry was expected. And he was acting any kind of compensation for the time that he was working for free. Under Michigan law, you don't, Mr. Barry, do not have to say that you expect a compensation. Under Michigan law are the DMV case which controls unjust enrichment. The only question is whether or not technical information was given and whether they created a benefit. And in that case, that happened. The Ford relies upon the press and case. But does the rest of the question do it for unjust enrichment claims? All that matter? For unjust enrichment claims, you're saying all that matters is whether a benefit was conferred? Well, the technical information was granted. Well, it's actually several of us. Well, the technical information was conveyed and used by the defendant. And whether that unjustly enriched the defendant. You're into your bottle time

. Do you want to reserve your time? I've got to say a couple more things. Didn't have time to wait. That's all that's required. There's one other element which is the request. There has to be a request from the defendant. And in this case, it clearly wasn't a request. Ford call Mr. Barry and Adam come in. That's the law of Michigan for unjust enrichment. The Ford, the defendant, Ford relies upon the press and case, which has nothing to do with unjust enrichment. The press and case has nothing to do with ownership of intellectual property. Unjust enrichment deals with compensation for technical information. That's what we're talking about, compensation. Not ownership of that technical information. Some of the technical information that Mr. Barry provided clearly he didn't know, such as the data communication system that was created by airbiquely. He didn't develop that, but he knew about it. And that was technical information. He also had, he was a telephone communication expert. He had information on how one can legally make a 9-11 call automatically. There are laws against that. Can't do it. They don't want home security systems calling 9-11 every time it's accidentally tripped

. But he said, yes, you can make an automatic call or what looks like an automatic call. And here's how you can do it. He told him how to do it using the DTM, DTM F tones on the dial tone to communicate with the 9-11 operator. Compliance with federal laws concerning automated 9-11 calls. I don't know if that's possible, such a matter. How you comply with the law. But his technical information in under D&B, he's entitled to compensation. Mr. Barry is a sophisticated person. But can't reserve two minutes. I won't ask. You go ahead and finish. No, no, I mean, I won't, I'll withhold my question. So you go ahead and proceed as you. I'm your time to two minutes. Okay, that's fine. I'll say you're two minutes. Go ahead and judge. Well, okay, since we're back here. Thanks for the presentation. I will. What? Give us an idea as to what Mr. Barry's state of mind may have been

. He's a sophisticated man. This is not somebody that just fell off. It's very sophisticated. So he goes into Ford and Ford says, if you want to come in and help us, we'll give you an office, we'll give you an email, so forth. And he agrees and one thing that isn't happening, at least for a couple of months, is he's not getting a check. What does he think? Do you want to know why? Do you know why he did all these things? I am curious. I will tell you why. He had a job paid about $500,000 a year. He quit in June. His old employer did not want him to go to work for the competitor who had a new job with until the being of the following year. His former job that he quit agreed to pay him through the temper. The new job started in January. He's right. He's got a lot of time with him. It doesn't help. It doesn't help you. Yeah, it does. He's being compensated during what from September. He's being compensated by a third party. And he's born. He goes in the..

. He's got friends of Fort. He goes in and helps them start to stay around the house. And he had every intention by taking the new job in January. But the thing was just taking off and he had someone to take a stay. But he had no expectation that he was going to be compensated for the work that he did between September and November. That's what you're saying. From Fort. He had... Certainly had no agreement. Well, but no. It's only an excursion. You just wandered in and helped out for a while. And that was sort of... No, I won't say had no expectation. Certainly had no agreement that he would be compensated. All right. Thank you. May I please the court Morgan Goodsfeed on behalf of Fort her company. Many of your honors questions go to the point in this case, which is that as Mr. Berry admits, he... In the fall of 2006, he was bored. He had friends at Ford. He went into Ford and pitched some ideas. And those ideas landed him a series of contracts that earned him well over a million dollars. That's not a case where there's any unjust enrichment because the other component of Michigan law that Mr. Berry leaves out is the unjust part. It's not just that Ford needs to earn a benefit here. It's that it has to be unjust for some reason for Ford to be the one to keep that benefit. But that's not the only reason why Michigan law precludes the claim here. And the other reason, and really the critical one here that the District Court focused on, is that under Michigan law, an expressed contract will preclude a claim for unjust enrichment. And here it's undisputed that at least as of May 2007, there were contracts between Ford and Mr. Berry that said any intellectual property, any inventions or discoveries or improvements that were reduced to practice after the time those contracts. Well, that's fine. They cover the inventorship problem, but it doesn't seem to me it covers the initial period in which he was going in to work in effect for free. So there was no contract at that point. So it seems to me your contract argument really doesn't get you where you need to go with respect to the period from September to November. What do you say about that? Well, Your Honor, it does get us there for a couple reasons. And the first is to the extent that time period was simply one in Mr. Berry was pitching ideas that he would later reduce to practice well at Ford. It would be a complete end run around the contract which says either conception or reduction to practice is enough for Ford to own the intellectual property

. Berry admits, he... In the fall of 2006, he was bored. He had friends at Ford. He went into Ford and pitched some ideas. And those ideas landed him a series of contracts that earned him well over a million dollars. That's not a case where there's any unjust enrichment because the other component of Michigan law that Mr. Berry leaves out is the unjust part. It's not just that Ford needs to earn a benefit here. It's that it has to be unjust for some reason for Ford to be the one to keep that benefit. But that's not the only reason why Michigan law precludes the claim here. And the other reason, and really the critical one here that the District Court focused on, is that under Michigan law, an expressed contract will preclude a claim for unjust enrichment. And here it's undisputed that at least as of May 2007, there were contracts between Ford and Mr. Berry that said any intellectual property, any inventions or discoveries or improvements that were reduced to practice after the time those contracts. Well, that's fine. They cover the inventorship problem, but it doesn't seem to me it covers the initial period in which he was going in to work in effect for free. So there was no contract at that point. So it seems to me your contract argument really doesn't get you where you need to go with respect to the period from September to November. What do you say about that? Well, Your Honor, it does get us there for a couple reasons. And the first is to the extent that time period was simply one in Mr. Berry was pitching ideas that he would later reduce to practice well at Ford. It would be a complete end run around the contract which says either conception or reduction to practice is enough for Ford to own the intellectual property. If Mr. Berry can then go back and say, well, fine Ford, you own the intellectual property, but I want unjust enrichment for the conception component. Here's why it doesn't seem to me that the contract helps you very much because had Ford decided in November, well, thank you very much, Mr. Berry, but we don't really need you now. And there'd been no contract. Would you concede that there would be an unjust enrichment for the period between September and November which he wasn't being paid? And there was no contract. Your Honor, we wouldn't concede that there'd be unjust enrichment for the reasons we've discussed before which is that he was there pitching ideas without an expectation to be paid. But we wouldn't see that. The contract doesn't have anything to do with that. No, Your Honor, the reason why the contract, again, these are alternative arguments, but the reason why the contract's matter here is precisely because that's what Mr. Berry was seeking compensation for in his complaint. He talks a lot today about technical information, but if you actually take a look at his complaint at page 215 in your appendix, at paragraph 11, he lays out what his unjust enrichment suit is for. And this is his fourth amended complaint, by the way. And he says in that paragraph that he's seeking compensation for novel approaches and improvements that he shared with Ford in these early months, that he'll call those his inventions, and that those inventions are all found in the patents and patent applications here. So this technical information theory is not even one that lines up with his complaint. And that's why the existence of an express contract. Your opponent said that one of the reasons why Mr. Berry was not being compensated in that September to November of period was because he was being compensated by somebody else. I don't believe that issue was briefed or anything, but was Ford aware of that? It was not being briefed. Ford was not aware of it. It has come up in discovery that Mr. Berry was being paid by another company, Tele Atlas. It's in the record though not in your appendix

. If Mr. Berry can then go back and say, well, fine Ford, you own the intellectual property, but I want unjust enrichment for the conception component. Here's why it doesn't seem to me that the contract helps you very much because had Ford decided in November, well, thank you very much, Mr. Berry, but we don't really need you now. And there'd been no contract. Would you concede that there would be an unjust enrichment for the period between September and November which he wasn't being paid? And there was no contract. Your Honor, we wouldn't concede that there'd be unjust enrichment for the reasons we've discussed before which is that he was there pitching ideas without an expectation to be paid. But we wouldn't see that. The contract doesn't have anything to do with that. No, Your Honor, the reason why the contract, again, these are alternative arguments, but the reason why the contract's matter here is precisely because that's what Mr. Berry was seeking compensation for in his complaint. He talks a lot today about technical information, but if you actually take a look at his complaint at page 215 in your appendix, at paragraph 11, he lays out what his unjust enrichment suit is for. And this is his fourth amended complaint, by the way. And he says in that paragraph that he's seeking compensation for novel approaches and improvements that he shared with Ford in these early months, that he'll call those his inventions, and that those inventions are all found in the patents and patent applications here. So this technical information theory is not even one that lines up with his complaint. And that's why the existence of an express contract. Your opponent said that one of the reasons why Mr. Berry was not being compensated in that September to November of period was because he was being compensated by somebody else. I don't believe that issue was briefed or anything, but was Ford aware of that? It was not being briefed. Ford was not aware of it. It has come up in discovery that Mr. Berry was being paid by another company, Tele Atlas. It's in the record though not in your appendix. And it's understandable then. I think that if Ford was interested in having his services, that the wheels moved a little bit more slowly there in light of the fact that he was compensated by another company. But again, going back briefly to my response to you, Judge Bryson, under the theory that is pleaded in Mr. Berry's complaint, the ownership of these inventions is actually the critical thing and that ownership is governed by the contracts. Again, that's simply an alternative to the argument that there's no unjust enrichment here under Michigan law because there's no unjust component. I guess theoretically, why couldn't there be an unjust component just for the period where there was no contract? In the sense that there was services being rendered, there was labor being done, and there was some value arguing being extracted by Ford, and there was no compensation during that time. So why do we have to conclude that there's no genuine issue of material fact that all those facts line up to a potential unjust enrichment theory, regardless of whether whatever was conceived during that time frame down the road was reduced to practice and led to patents, what's more important is just that critical timeframe, just isolating that and looking at that. Why can't there be an unjust enrichment theory on that? Well, you're on our, Mr. Berry has never pointed to any case in which what essentially amounted to someone's pitch would then earn him a benefit as it did here. Undisputably, he received over a million dollars. So it's not accurate. But Ford received a benefit. I guess my concern, slight concern, is that there isn't something in the record. There isn't any statement in the record that demonstrates that that is what was going on in the fall of 2006, that this was an attempted pitch to induce Ford to offer a contract on the road. Now the facts bear out that that's ultimately what happened, but in terms of the parties and tensions in the fall, it's less clear. We have to make an inference based on how everything transpired over the next two years. That in fact, what could have been happening in the fall was an attempt by Mr. Berry to get Ford to hire him on with lucrative contracts. Well, what we do happen in the record is Mr. Berry's statements 269 and 271 in the appendix that he never actually sought an agreement to compensation. So we know that, and we know that even if there's some concern under this aspect of Michigan law, we know that based on the theory and Mr. Berry's complaint, all of the intellectual property here is owned by Ford, and that there's no theory of unjust enrichment where Ford could be unjustly enriched by using the inventions that it owns. And again, the other reason why this doesn't work is for one thing that you alluded to here, and that's that Mr

. And it's understandable then. I think that if Ford was interested in having his services, that the wheels moved a little bit more slowly there in light of the fact that he was compensated by another company. But again, going back briefly to my response to you, Judge Bryson, under the theory that is pleaded in Mr. Berry's complaint, the ownership of these inventions is actually the critical thing and that ownership is governed by the contracts. Again, that's simply an alternative to the argument that there's no unjust enrichment here under Michigan law because there's no unjust component. I guess theoretically, why couldn't there be an unjust component just for the period where there was no contract? In the sense that there was services being rendered, there was labor being done, and there was some value arguing being extracted by Ford, and there was no compensation during that time. So why do we have to conclude that there's no genuine issue of material fact that all those facts line up to a potential unjust enrichment theory, regardless of whether whatever was conceived during that time frame down the road was reduced to practice and led to patents, what's more important is just that critical timeframe, just isolating that and looking at that. Why can't there be an unjust enrichment theory on that? Well, you're on our, Mr. Berry has never pointed to any case in which what essentially amounted to someone's pitch would then earn him a benefit as it did here. Undisputably, he received over a million dollars. So it's not accurate. But Ford received a benefit. I guess my concern, slight concern, is that there isn't something in the record. There isn't any statement in the record that demonstrates that that is what was going on in the fall of 2006, that this was an attempted pitch to induce Ford to offer a contract on the road. Now the facts bear out that that's ultimately what happened, but in terms of the parties and tensions in the fall, it's less clear. We have to make an inference based on how everything transpired over the next two years. That in fact, what could have been happening in the fall was an attempt by Mr. Berry to get Ford to hire him on with lucrative contracts. Well, what we do happen in the record is Mr. Berry's statements 269 and 271 in the appendix that he never actually sought an agreement to compensation. So we know that, and we know that even if there's some concern under this aspect of Michigan law, we know that based on the theory and Mr. Berry's complaint, all of the intellectual property here is owned by Ford, and that there's no theory of unjust enrichment where Ford could be unjustly enriched by using the inventions that it owns. And again, the other reason why this doesn't work is for one thing that you alluded to here, and that's that Mr. Berry hasn't come into court and said, you know, I was effectively an employee for a couple months. You should pay me my salary for a couple more months for services rendered. What he's argued instead is that he should be compensated based on Ford's use of the sink system for information that he shared by his own admission without any secrecy or confidentiality. And if that's the argument that he's making, then that's barred as well under this court's decision and ultra precision, which would say that a claim like that is preempted under federal patent law. A claim that all the plaintiff offered was technical information outside the patent system and offered that without any sort of secrecy, and is now seeking damages based on the use of that information. That's where Lee, what ultra precision says, cannot be brought under a state law claim. Now, I just want to reiterate that these are all multiple alternatives. He does in his complaint. You did point to a clause in the complaint in which he itemizes the invention-related damages that he asserts. But his complaint also has a general request for damages to alleviate any unjust enrichment. So it would be broad enough, I would think, to include something along the line of Judge Chen's question about whether he would be entitled or should be entitled as a matter of unjust enrichment to some kind of quantum arrow at payment for the period that he worked as an uncompensated employee in effect before. Why? What is there about Michigan law that says he's not entitled to that? Well, Your Honor, again, I don't think that is the theory that's found anywhere in his complaint. It's very clear that the theory he was alleging is that he was the owner of this intellectual property, both paragraph 11, where he defines his invention and paragraph 13, where he says, I conceived of these inventions and reduced them to practice. Well, let's assume you're right for a moment and just be hypothetical about this. Let's assume that he did say implicitly or otherwise, in his complaint that he wanted compensation for the work that he did in between September and November. And let's further assume that he would make that claim whether he got the later contract or not. What's your answer under Michigan law, as to whether he's entitled to unjust enrichment for that work? Our answer is twofold. First, under Michigan law itself, there is no case that Mr. Berry has cited anywhere that someone who was ultimately paid as a result of an interim pre-contractor. Okay. Now let's take the ultimate payment. Let's suppose that I'm really trying to get a sense of whether someone who walks in the door works for a while and then is shown the door. They don't get an ultimate contract under Michigan law, whether that person would be entitled to unjust enrichment

. Berry hasn't come into court and said, you know, I was effectively an employee for a couple months. You should pay me my salary for a couple more months for services rendered. What he's argued instead is that he should be compensated based on Ford's use of the sink system for information that he shared by his own admission without any secrecy or confidentiality. And if that's the argument that he's making, then that's barred as well under this court's decision and ultra precision, which would say that a claim like that is preempted under federal patent law. A claim that all the plaintiff offered was technical information outside the patent system and offered that without any sort of secrecy, and is now seeking damages based on the use of that information. That's where Lee, what ultra precision says, cannot be brought under a state law claim. Now, I just want to reiterate that these are all multiple alternatives. He does in his complaint. You did point to a clause in the complaint in which he itemizes the invention-related damages that he asserts. But his complaint also has a general request for damages to alleviate any unjust enrichment. So it would be broad enough, I would think, to include something along the line of Judge Chen's question about whether he would be entitled or should be entitled as a matter of unjust enrichment to some kind of quantum arrow at payment for the period that he worked as an uncompensated employee in effect before. Why? What is there about Michigan law that says he's not entitled to that? Well, Your Honor, again, I don't think that is the theory that's found anywhere in his complaint. It's very clear that the theory he was alleging is that he was the owner of this intellectual property, both paragraph 11, where he defines his invention and paragraph 13, where he says, I conceived of these inventions and reduced them to practice. Well, let's assume you're right for a moment and just be hypothetical about this. Let's assume that he did say implicitly or otherwise, in his complaint that he wanted compensation for the work that he did in between September and November. And let's further assume that he would make that claim whether he got the later contract or not. What's your answer under Michigan law, as to whether he's entitled to unjust enrichment for that work? Our answer is twofold. First, under Michigan law itself, there is no case that Mr. Berry has cited anywhere that someone who was ultimately paid as a result of an interim pre-contractor. Okay. Now let's take the ultimate payment. Let's suppose that I'm really trying to get a sense of whether someone who walks in the door works for a while and then is shown the door. They don't get an ultimate contract under Michigan law, whether that person would be entitled to unjust enrichment. Because your opposing counsel is saying absolutely they are under Michigan law and sites of Michigan Court of Appeals case. Sure. He's citing B&M Dye, which is a case in which there was no, again, no subsequent contract paid. But even then the question has to be whether in light of the circumstances there was a reasonable expectation. And here, there's no reasonable expectation of payment when Mr. Berry essentially volunteered his services. Upon request. Upon request that he come give a pitch just like a law firm might. But he was given an office, right? The record is an entirely clear on the extent of his relationship with court. But yes, I think so. And I do want to be clear here, even if this court goes down this route, which at this point we've slowed off multiple of the facts that were in place here, but even if the court does, B&M Dye and the circumstances there could be preempted by this court's decision in ultra precision. And the claim that Mr. Berry makes here is not for services rendered over the course of a couple months. It's for Ford's use of patented information. And he claims that he shared technical information without secrecy or without confidentiality. That's probably why they're not addressing the IP aspect of the case. Bill L. Grill Corporation, versus City of Detroit says that a contract will be implied. Only if there's no express contract covering the same subject matter. And here, the subsequent contract would cover the same subject matter for talking about the IP intellectual property matters, but probably not if it's technical information. Sure. Your honor, maybe I'd been unclear here. Let me lay it out this way

. Because your opposing counsel is saying absolutely they are under Michigan law and sites of Michigan Court of Appeals case. Sure. He's citing B&M Dye, which is a case in which there was no, again, no subsequent contract paid. But even then the question has to be whether in light of the circumstances there was a reasonable expectation. And here, there's no reasonable expectation of payment when Mr. Berry essentially volunteered his services. Upon request. Upon request that he come give a pitch just like a law firm might. But he was given an office, right? The record is an entirely clear on the extent of his relationship with court. But yes, I think so. And I do want to be clear here, even if this court goes down this route, which at this point we've slowed off multiple of the facts that were in place here, but even if the court does, B&M Dye and the circumstances there could be preempted by this court's decision in ultra precision. And the claim that Mr. Berry makes here is not for services rendered over the course of a couple months. It's for Ford's use of patented information. And he claims that he shared technical information without secrecy or without confidentiality. That's probably why they're not addressing the IP aspect of the case. Bill L. Grill Corporation, versus City of Detroit says that a contract will be implied. Only if there's no express contract covering the same subject matter. And here, the subsequent contract would cover the same subject matter for talking about the IP intellectual property matters, but probably not if it's technical information. Sure. Your honor, maybe I'd been unclear here. Let me lay it out this way. Mr. Berry is trying to have it both ways. At the motion to dismiss stage, Ford said, you are seeking compensation for technical information. And so you are doing exactly what this court has said in ultra precision cannot be done. And your claim is preempted. And Mr. Berry said, no, because actually I'm seeking information related to the patents themselves. I am the owner of the patents. And that allowed him to survive his motion to dismiss. So he ran from ultra precision and now he runs directly into the press. Which says, OK, if what we're talking about is the intellectual property here, not some sort of technical information, then in fact, Ford owns that intellectual property. And it can't be faulted for failing to pay you for using the intellectual property that it owns. So Mr. Berry's theory has shifted here on one end. It's covered by ultra precision on the other end. It's covered by press. And that's even putting aside any concerns the court may have about Michigan law here. And just want to, with my remaining time, I want to briefly address jurisdiction. Because Ford does not, in fact, believe Mr. Berry has standing to bring his Inventorship claim. But jurisdiction in this case lied because not because of the Inventorship claim, but because the state law claims as originally pleaded, necessarily raised a substantial question of federal patent law. And that's because as originally pleaded under the theory that Mr. Berry originally had, he had to demonstrate both for his unjust enrichment claim and for a fraudulent inducement claim that is no longer an issue

. Mr. Berry is trying to have it both ways. At the motion to dismiss stage, Ford said, you are seeking compensation for technical information. And so you are doing exactly what this court has said in ultra precision cannot be done. And your claim is preempted. And Mr. Berry said, no, because actually I'm seeking information related to the patents themselves. I am the owner of the patents. And that allowed him to survive his motion to dismiss. So he ran from ultra precision and now he runs directly into the press. Which says, OK, if what we're talking about is the intellectual property here, not some sort of technical information, then in fact, Ford owns that intellectual property. And it can't be faulted for failing to pay you for using the intellectual property that it owns. So Mr. Berry's theory has shifted here on one end. It's covered by ultra precision on the other end. It's covered by press. And that's even putting aside any concerns the court may have about Michigan law here. And just want to, with my remaining time, I want to briefly address jurisdiction. Because Ford does not, in fact, believe Mr. Berry has standing to bring his Inventorship claim. But jurisdiction in this case lied because not because of the Inventorship claim, but because the state law claims as originally pleaded, necessarily raised a substantial question of federal patent law. And that's because as originally pleaded under the theory that Mr. Berry originally had, he had to demonstrate both for his unjust enrichment claim and for a fraudulent inducement claim that is no longer an issue. He had to demonstrate that he was, in fact, the sole inventor of the patents. And so the state law claims themselves raised a question of Inventorship. That's just like this court has said in cases like HIF bio in cases like Schum. If the theory in the complaint necessarily requires a determination of Inventorship, then that's enough for jurisdiction. Okay. Do you, do you think there's an alternative theory for affirming the district court that there's just a lack of evidentiary proof that an actual benefit was conferred during the fall of 2006? Your Honor, I think that is a reasonable theory for this court to affirm on. Again, in some ways depends on which of Mr. Berry's theories the court wishes to credit. But to the extent it is crediting his technical information theory then that would be available. Okay. Thank you very much. Mr. Springgill, I'm going to extend the time back to three minutes. Thank you, Your Honor. I'm going to just address some of the things that Council will address. Firstly, the preemption argument was raised and this is a violation of the patent law and so forth. It hasn't been raised before, but it fails. As Council pointed out in their briefing, unjust enrichment has another element. Another element is there must be a request. One cannot burst in the forehead and say, I've got a great idea. I had to be in just enrichment. In this case, the request of Mr. Berry came in

. He had to demonstrate that he was, in fact, the sole inventor of the patents. And so the state law claims themselves raised a question of Inventorship. That's just like this court has said in cases like HIF bio in cases like Schum. If the theory in the complaint necessarily requires a determination of Inventorship, then that's enough for jurisdiction. Okay. Do you, do you think there's an alternative theory for affirming the district court that there's just a lack of evidentiary proof that an actual benefit was conferred during the fall of 2006? Your Honor, I think that is a reasonable theory for this court to affirm on. Again, in some ways depends on which of Mr. Berry's theories the court wishes to credit. But to the extent it is crediting his technical information theory then that would be available. Okay. Thank you very much. Mr. Springgill, I'm going to extend the time back to three minutes. Thank you, Your Honor. I'm going to just address some of the things that Council will address. Firstly, the preemption argument was raised and this is a violation of the patent law and so forth. It hasn't been raised before, but it fails. As Council pointed out in their briefing, unjust enrichment has another element. Another element is there must be a request. One cannot burst in the forehead and say, I've got a great idea. I had to be in just enrichment. In this case, the request of Mr. Berry came in. The request of the Hegelman and they told the problem and he provides some solutions. That's a little different than pitching your own idea. But because there is a requirement for unjust enrichment is that another requirement for unjust enrichment is that the benefit, the retention of the benefit had to be unjust. The unjust is that they made a lot of money off of the benefit. The technical information that he provided and the benefit, the money that they made from it is sufficient to be in just. But on the preemption argument, the request, that's the additional element. I guess in case of all the compulsion about the confusion for me about the argument that they made a lot of money off of the benefit is that whatever he provided in the fall of the fall of 2006, it wasn't siloed off from everything else that he did under the contracts for the following few years. I mean, it was all connected together. These were projects that he started thinking about and tinkering with in the fall and then they continued on under the contracts that now he was getting paid. I don't think that's an accurate statement, you know, to be honest. But he did design the architecture and he was called the, you know, the chief architect by independent witnesses. But he designed the architecture for the overall sync system. And then it had to be built. He built one component of that, which is CSBM. But there's one other thing I do want to address, and that's the only emphasis. Where's the evidence in the record of what he did beyond what he said, what he testified to, what he did? Well, he certainly testified of what he did. Yes. And we certainly had testimony from Mark Scalf and Mr. Nixon, who were independent. But none of those refer back to what he did in 2006. Yes. They said that he designed, he was the architect for the sync system in 2006. Oh, where does it say that in 2006 that he did this particular work in 2006? Because the architecture had to be designed before it had fun by the PPC in November 2006

. The request of the Hegelman and they told the problem and he provides some solutions. That's a little different than pitching your own idea. But because there is a requirement for unjust enrichment is that another requirement for unjust enrichment is that the benefit, the retention of the benefit had to be unjust. The unjust is that they made a lot of money off of the benefit. The technical information that he provided and the benefit, the money that they made from it is sufficient to be in just. But on the preemption argument, the request, that's the additional element. I guess in case of all the compulsion about the confusion for me about the argument that they made a lot of money off of the benefit is that whatever he provided in the fall of the fall of 2006, it wasn't siloed off from everything else that he did under the contracts for the following few years. I mean, it was all connected together. These were projects that he started thinking about and tinkering with in the fall and then they continued on under the contracts that now he was getting paid. I don't think that's an accurate statement, you know, to be honest. But he did design the architecture and he was called the, you know, the chief architect by independent witnesses. But he designed the architecture for the overall sync system. And then it had to be built. He built one component of that, which is CSBM. But there's one other thing I do want to address, and that's the only emphasis. Where's the evidence in the record of what he did beyond what he said, what he testified to, what he did? Well, he certainly testified of what he did. Yes. And we certainly had testimony from Mark Scalf and Mr. Nixon, who were independent. But none of those refer back to what he did in 2006. Yes. They said that he designed, he was the architect for the sync system in 2006. Oh, where does it say that in 2006 that he did this particular work in 2006? Because the architecture had to be designed before it had fun by the PPC in November 2006. Can I say one thing about the ultra-precision case, for any time? Thank you. The ultra-precision case really doesn't have much effect here either. It's really, they have a pleading problem. They plan that they want a royalty, just like a patent royalty. They say, you can't do that. Federal law preempts that. And the judge said, why don't you go back in a minute to just say unjust enrichment? The benefit. And they declined to, a man had complained to plead unjust enrichment. So they lost. But that was the way the ultra-precision case was the way just depleting. Oh, problem. Thank you very much.

Our next case is Berry vs Ford Motor Company, 15-1699. I did your honor. You may proceed. Thank you. May I please the court? We're here today on a decision-granting summary judgment. The Eastard is a permission. For summary judgment, the rules are simple and clear. If there's a material question, the fact must be reversed. Just out of curiosity, it's not an issue that was brought up. But a question is, in this case, be back in state court. How do we have jurisdiction on this? It should be in state court. And I think it may be, hopefully, instead of there. It started out in state court. We brought in state court. It was moved to federal court because of the allegations of ownership of athletes. Okay. Immediately, there has to be more than a continual evidence for a material fact. I think we've met that more. The other line. On this jurisdiction question, you're saying that this really shouldn't be before us. It should be in state court and Michigan state court. But you were the one that brought the advenorship claim, right? That's correct. So you'd have to be arguing the only way that the existence of an advenorship claim wouldn't be sufficient to sustain jurisdiction here over not only that claim, but also the supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims would be if the advenorship claim were frivolous. And you're not arguing that. I take it. No, we're not arguing that. Well, then how do we not have jurisdiction? You do have jurisdiction. Well, I thought you said it shouldn't be here. I said we started off as state court. Well, I thought in your first response that this case shouldn't be in the federal court. It should be. Okay. That's your section. Thank you. I'm my apologies. Any of the interline facts in this case are really undisputed. Back in 2006 Ford was having difficulty getting funding and developing a SYNC system. They could get funding so they contacted Mr. Berry for help. Mr. Berry came in. He's a telephone communication expert. And Mr. Berry in the fall of 2006 redesigned the SYNC system. Is it your argument that Mr. Berry provided Ford with intellectual property as opposed to just like technical information or technical advice? He provided technical information to Ford and able them to redesign the entire SYNC system. But no intellectual property. It may have included some intellectual property but it included technical information that some of it clearly was not. When you say intellectual property, patentful subject matter, in my view. So your claim is during the fall of 2006 Mr. Berry didn't invent anything in terms of contributing to those four patents. Not quite. Mr. Berry gave a lot of technical information in the fall of 2006. Some of the technical information may very well be patentful subject matter but not all of it. So when did he invent all of the subject matter that relates to the four patents in question that Mr. Berry is seeking to correct the inventorship? I really have nothing to add to the question of the inventorship. My argument today really is directed to the ungestionary Richmond. Okay. May I continue? Okay. The, anyways Mr. Berry redesigned the SYNC system, eliminated the data modem, used the smart phone of the driver instead. That was a cost saving course. He also told Ford and the technical information that they could use the voice channel to transmit data. Now if he didn't invent that, in fact that was invented by a company called Airpiquity that was currently commercializing it. Before didn't know that, but that technical information was known by Berry and Berry conveyed that technical information to Ford which they adopted. Back in 2006 most people who had smartphones did not have a data program. I mean, I just, just to be clear, you're abandoning your ventorship claim? No, I just have nothing to add to it. I don't have enough time to argue about it. So I would like to concentrate on the ungestionary Richmond. Do you know, is there anything in the record that shows that Mr. Berry at the time in 2006 communicated to Ford? Mr. Berry's expectation that he was going to be compensated for the activities that he was doing without any formal contract during the time of 2006. No, yeah. Okay. Did Ford, is there anything in the record where Ford was somehow intimating, suggesting or expressly stating that all of the technical information that was flowing to Ford from Mr. Berry during 2006, Ford was planning on paying him for all of that work and technical information during the fall of 2006? There's some testimony, but it's not in the record here. Okay. There were certain things that were made, yes. Okay. Mr. Van Dagen's. It's also in dispute that there was no contract in the fall of 2006. There is a dispute about the effect of Mr. Zoo's contract for, believe that Mr. Zoo had in December of 2006. Forbably, that Mr. Zoo had access to Mr. Berry, but there's no document to support that. And then Mr. Berry disputes that Mr. Zoo had any. Why would Mr. Zoo be paying Mr. Berry if that was the case? Mr. Berry helped with the little question about Mr. Zoo's unsuccessful designing it, but Mr. Berry entered into a contract to develop the SDN in May of 2007. And he was paid to do that, certainly. Under the unjust and rich claim, the DMB case is the controlling law in Michigan. That's from the core of appeals. It has been reversed as this recent law. And under the DMB case, the Ford had problems with their headliners. They were grinkled. And so DMB came in and said, we'll put these blocks in the mold and it worked. They read later brought soup, they put the damages, well, actually collected money for that unjust and rich. In this case. What is your answer, go ahead. What is your answer to the suggestion that this was an arrangement in which at least implicit in the arrangement was the contemplation that with some, after some initial period of working cooperatively without a contract and without compensation, that Mr. Berry expected that he would have a good chance of getting a lucrative contract from Ford and indeed he ultimately did. Why does that not undermine the argument for unjust enrichment? Well, there's nothing to support that from one thing. The Mr. Berry. Well, he did end up with a lucrative contract from Ford. Mr. Berry gave up a more lucrative job offer to do that contract. In that case, he made a bad deal, but nonetheless, God, it wasn't as if Ford said, okay, now that you've given us all your, all that you have to offer and you're out of here. I mean, he ended up with what most people would regard as a pretty attractive contract. Mr. Berry was well paid to develop the SDN as a part of saying that has nothing to do with 9-11, but since the SDN has nothing to do with the data communication, that's the vehicle health report. And the SDN really has nothing to do with the conversion over to the smartphone. Those are all things that were separate. Those are the things that even the technical information that Mr. Berry had today. But he got his foot in the door with Ford. He got his foot in the door with Ford and ultimately ended up being paid pretty well for work that he did for Ford, right? For the SDN, but Salahe was in the door, Ford called him. Well, initially, but his, you know, there are lots of instances in which people in services or selling products will offer in effect free samples at the outset. They'll say, take this product, use it for a while. If you don't like it, send it back. If you like it, pay us or buy some more, whatever, or services. Somebody comes in and says, I'll work for you for a year for free. At the end of the year, you decide whether you want to hire me. And I bet you're going to want to hire me. That's not unjust enrichment, is it? If the company ultimately decides, thanks for your year. That wouldn't be unjust enrichment, right? I would agree that we're not the unjust enrichment, but didn't happen here. Okay. Why is that different from what happened? Because he never got into the place where we're hiring me. I'll do all this work for free. And then you hire me. What companies like Ford do is they make time for free for a period of time. He was working, yes, for a long period of time. His hope was probably, or we can see that as his hope was, I'm going to work for free. You don't see that I'm smart. I can get to proven. I can add part to the knowledge. And maybe you'll hire me in the future. There's nothing in the record that would be suggested that happened. That's a problem with that. But I guess also what might be a problem going the other way is that there's nothing in the record that suggests that Mr. Barry was expected. And he was acting any kind of compensation for the time that he was working for free. Under Michigan law, you don't, Mr. Barry, do not have to say that you expect a compensation. Under Michigan law are the DMV case which controls unjust enrichment. The only question is whether or not technical information was given and whether they created a benefit. And in that case, that happened. The Ford relies upon the press and case. But does the rest of the question do it for unjust enrichment claims? All that matter? For unjust enrichment claims, you're saying all that matters is whether a benefit was conferred? Well, the technical information was granted. Well, it's actually several of us. Well, the technical information was conveyed and used by the defendant. And whether that unjustly enriched the defendant. You're into your bottle time. Do you want to reserve your time? I've got to say a couple more things. Didn't have time to wait. That's all that's required. There's one other element which is the request. There has to be a request from the defendant. And in this case, it clearly wasn't a request. Ford call Mr. Barry and Adam come in. That's the law of Michigan for unjust enrichment. The Ford, the defendant, Ford relies upon the press and case, which has nothing to do with unjust enrichment. The press and case has nothing to do with ownership of intellectual property. Unjust enrichment deals with compensation for technical information. That's what we're talking about, compensation. Not ownership of that technical information. Some of the technical information that Mr. Barry provided clearly he didn't know, such as the data communication system that was created by airbiquely. He didn't develop that, but he knew about it. And that was technical information. He also had, he was a telephone communication expert. He had information on how one can legally make a 9-11 call automatically. There are laws against that. Can't do it. They don't want home security systems calling 9-11 every time it's accidentally tripped. But he said, yes, you can make an automatic call or what looks like an automatic call. And here's how you can do it. He told him how to do it using the DTM, DTM F tones on the dial tone to communicate with the 9-11 operator. Compliance with federal laws concerning automated 9-11 calls. I don't know if that's possible, such a matter. How you comply with the law. But his technical information in under D&B, he's entitled to compensation. Mr. Barry is a sophisticated person. But can't reserve two minutes. I won't ask. You go ahead and finish. No, no, I mean, I won't, I'll withhold my question. So you go ahead and proceed as you. I'm your time to two minutes. Okay, that's fine. I'll say you're two minutes. Go ahead and judge. Well, okay, since we're back here. Thanks for the presentation. I will. What? Give us an idea as to what Mr. Barry's state of mind may have been. He's a sophisticated man. This is not somebody that just fell off. It's very sophisticated. So he goes into Ford and Ford says, if you want to come in and help us, we'll give you an office, we'll give you an email, so forth. And he agrees and one thing that isn't happening, at least for a couple of months, is he's not getting a check. What does he think? Do you want to know why? Do you know why he did all these things? I am curious. I will tell you why. He had a job paid about $500,000 a year. He quit in June. His old employer did not want him to go to work for the competitor who had a new job with until the being of the following year. His former job that he quit agreed to pay him through the temper. The new job started in January. He's right. He's got a lot of time with him. It doesn't help. It doesn't help you. Yeah, it does. He's being compensated during what from September. He's being compensated by a third party. And he's born. He goes in the... He's got friends of Fort. He goes in and helps them start to stay around the house. And he had every intention by taking the new job in January. But the thing was just taking off and he had someone to take a stay. But he had no expectation that he was going to be compensated for the work that he did between September and November. That's what you're saying. From Fort. He had... Certainly had no agreement. Well, but no. It's only an excursion. You just wandered in and helped out for a while. And that was sort of... No, I won't say had no expectation. Certainly had no agreement that he would be compensated. All right. Thank you. May I please the court Morgan Goodsfeed on behalf of Fort her company. Many of your honors questions go to the point in this case, which is that as Mr. Berry admits, he... In the fall of 2006, he was bored. He had friends at Ford. He went into Ford and pitched some ideas. And those ideas landed him a series of contracts that earned him well over a million dollars. That's not a case where there's any unjust enrichment because the other component of Michigan law that Mr. Berry leaves out is the unjust part. It's not just that Ford needs to earn a benefit here. It's that it has to be unjust for some reason for Ford to be the one to keep that benefit. But that's not the only reason why Michigan law precludes the claim here. And the other reason, and really the critical one here that the District Court focused on, is that under Michigan law, an expressed contract will preclude a claim for unjust enrichment. And here it's undisputed that at least as of May 2007, there were contracts between Ford and Mr. Berry that said any intellectual property, any inventions or discoveries or improvements that were reduced to practice after the time those contracts. Well, that's fine. They cover the inventorship problem, but it doesn't seem to me it covers the initial period in which he was going in to work in effect for free. So there was no contract at that point. So it seems to me your contract argument really doesn't get you where you need to go with respect to the period from September to November. What do you say about that? Well, Your Honor, it does get us there for a couple reasons. And the first is to the extent that time period was simply one in Mr. Berry was pitching ideas that he would later reduce to practice well at Ford. It would be a complete end run around the contract which says either conception or reduction to practice is enough for Ford to own the intellectual property. If Mr. Berry can then go back and say, well, fine Ford, you own the intellectual property, but I want unjust enrichment for the conception component. Here's why it doesn't seem to me that the contract helps you very much because had Ford decided in November, well, thank you very much, Mr. Berry, but we don't really need you now. And there'd been no contract. Would you concede that there would be an unjust enrichment for the period between September and November which he wasn't being paid? And there was no contract. Your Honor, we wouldn't concede that there'd be unjust enrichment for the reasons we've discussed before which is that he was there pitching ideas without an expectation to be paid. But we wouldn't see that. The contract doesn't have anything to do with that. No, Your Honor, the reason why the contract, again, these are alternative arguments, but the reason why the contract's matter here is precisely because that's what Mr. Berry was seeking compensation for in his complaint. He talks a lot today about technical information, but if you actually take a look at his complaint at page 215 in your appendix, at paragraph 11, he lays out what his unjust enrichment suit is for. And this is his fourth amended complaint, by the way. And he says in that paragraph that he's seeking compensation for novel approaches and improvements that he shared with Ford in these early months, that he'll call those his inventions, and that those inventions are all found in the patents and patent applications here. So this technical information theory is not even one that lines up with his complaint. And that's why the existence of an express contract. Your opponent said that one of the reasons why Mr. Berry was not being compensated in that September to November of period was because he was being compensated by somebody else. I don't believe that issue was briefed or anything, but was Ford aware of that? It was not being briefed. Ford was not aware of it. It has come up in discovery that Mr. Berry was being paid by another company, Tele Atlas. It's in the record though not in your appendix. And it's understandable then. I think that if Ford was interested in having his services, that the wheels moved a little bit more slowly there in light of the fact that he was compensated by another company. But again, going back briefly to my response to you, Judge Bryson, under the theory that is pleaded in Mr. Berry's complaint, the ownership of these inventions is actually the critical thing and that ownership is governed by the contracts. Again, that's simply an alternative to the argument that there's no unjust enrichment here under Michigan law because there's no unjust component. I guess theoretically, why couldn't there be an unjust component just for the period where there was no contract? In the sense that there was services being rendered, there was labor being done, and there was some value arguing being extracted by Ford, and there was no compensation during that time. So why do we have to conclude that there's no genuine issue of material fact that all those facts line up to a potential unjust enrichment theory, regardless of whether whatever was conceived during that time frame down the road was reduced to practice and led to patents, what's more important is just that critical timeframe, just isolating that and looking at that. Why can't there be an unjust enrichment theory on that? Well, you're on our, Mr. Berry has never pointed to any case in which what essentially amounted to someone's pitch would then earn him a benefit as it did here. Undisputably, he received over a million dollars. So it's not accurate. But Ford received a benefit. I guess my concern, slight concern, is that there isn't something in the record. There isn't any statement in the record that demonstrates that that is what was going on in the fall of 2006, that this was an attempted pitch to induce Ford to offer a contract on the road. Now the facts bear out that that's ultimately what happened, but in terms of the parties and tensions in the fall, it's less clear. We have to make an inference based on how everything transpired over the next two years. That in fact, what could have been happening in the fall was an attempt by Mr. Berry to get Ford to hire him on with lucrative contracts. Well, what we do happen in the record is Mr. Berry's statements 269 and 271 in the appendix that he never actually sought an agreement to compensation. So we know that, and we know that even if there's some concern under this aspect of Michigan law, we know that based on the theory and Mr. Berry's complaint, all of the intellectual property here is owned by Ford, and that there's no theory of unjust enrichment where Ford could be unjustly enriched by using the inventions that it owns. And again, the other reason why this doesn't work is for one thing that you alluded to here, and that's that Mr. Berry hasn't come into court and said, you know, I was effectively an employee for a couple months. You should pay me my salary for a couple more months for services rendered. What he's argued instead is that he should be compensated based on Ford's use of the sink system for information that he shared by his own admission without any secrecy or confidentiality. And if that's the argument that he's making, then that's barred as well under this court's decision and ultra precision, which would say that a claim like that is preempted under federal patent law. A claim that all the plaintiff offered was technical information outside the patent system and offered that without any sort of secrecy, and is now seeking damages based on the use of that information. That's where Lee, what ultra precision says, cannot be brought under a state law claim. Now, I just want to reiterate that these are all multiple alternatives. He does in his complaint. You did point to a clause in the complaint in which he itemizes the invention-related damages that he asserts. But his complaint also has a general request for damages to alleviate any unjust enrichment. So it would be broad enough, I would think, to include something along the line of Judge Chen's question about whether he would be entitled or should be entitled as a matter of unjust enrichment to some kind of quantum arrow at payment for the period that he worked as an uncompensated employee in effect before. Why? What is there about Michigan law that says he's not entitled to that? Well, Your Honor, again, I don't think that is the theory that's found anywhere in his complaint. It's very clear that the theory he was alleging is that he was the owner of this intellectual property, both paragraph 11, where he defines his invention and paragraph 13, where he says, I conceived of these inventions and reduced them to practice. Well, let's assume you're right for a moment and just be hypothetical about this. Let's assume that he did say implicitly or otherwise, in his complaint that he wanted compensation for the work that he did in between September and November. And let's further assume that he would make that claim whether he got the later contract or not. What's your answer under Michigan law, as to whether he's entitled to unjust enrichment for that work? Our answer is twofold. First, under Michigan law itself, there is no case that Mr. Berry has cited anywhere that someone who was ultimately paid as a result of an interim pre-contractor. Okay. Now let's take the ultimate payment. Let's suppose that I'm really trying to get a sense of whether someone who walks in the door works for a while and then is shown the door. They don't get an ultimate contract under Michigan law, whether that person would be entitled to unjust enrichment. Because your opposing counsel is saying absolutely they are under Michigan law and sites of Michigan Court of Appeals case. Sure. He's citing B&M Dye, which is a case in which there was no, again, no subsequent contract paid. But even then the question has to be whether in light of the circumstances there was a reasonable expectation. And here, there's no reasonable expectation of payment when Mr. Berry essentially volunteered his services. Upon request. Upon request that he come give a pitch just like a law firm might. But he was given an office, right? The record is an entirely clear on the extent of his relationship with court. But yes, I think so. And I do want to be clear here, even if this court goes down this route, which at this point we've slowed off multiple of the facts that were in place here, but even if the court does, B&M Dye and the circumstances there could be preempted by this court's decision in ultra precision. And the claim that Mr. Berry makes here is not for services rendered over the course of a couple months. It's for Ford's use of patented information. And he claims that he shared technical information without secrecy or without confidentiality. That's probably why they're not addressing the IP aspect of the case. Bill L. Grill Corporation, versus City of Detroit says that a contract will be implied. Only if there's no express contract covering the same subject matter. And here, the subsequent contract would cover the same subject matter for talking about the IP intellectual property matters, but probably not if it's technical information. Sure. Your honor, maybe I'd been unclear here. Let me lay it out this way. Mr. Berry is trying to have it both ways. At the motion to dismiss stage, Ford said, you are seeking compensation for technical information. And so you are doing exactly what this court has said in ultra precision cannot be done. And your claim is preempted. And Mr. Berry said, no, because actually I'm seeking information related to the patents themselves. I am the owner of the patents. And that allowed him to survive his motion to dismiss. So he ran from ultra precision and now he runs directly into the press. Which says, OK, if what we're talking about is the intellectual property here, not some sort of technical information, then in fact, Ford owns that intellectual property. And it can't be faulted for failing to pay you for using the intellectual property that it owns. So Mr. Berry's theory has shifted here on one end. It's covered by ultra precision on the other end. It's covered by press. And that's even putting aside any concerns the court may have about Michigan law here. And just want to, with my remaining time, I want to briefly address jurisdiction. Because Ford does not, in fact, believe Mr. Berry has standing to bring his Inventorship claim. But jurisdiction in this case lied because not because of the Inventorship claim, but because the state law claims as originally pleaded, necessarily raised a substantial question of federal patent law. And that's because as originally pleaded under the theory that Mr. Berry originally had, he had to demonstrate both for his unjust enrichment claim and for a fraudulent inducement claim that is no longer an issue. He had to demonstrate that he was, in fact, the sole inventor of the patents. And so the state law claims themselves raised a question of Inventorship. That's just like this court has said in cases like HIF bio in cases like Schum. If the theory in the complaint necessarily requires a determination of Inventorship, then that's enough for jurisdiction. Okay. Do you, do you think there's an alternative theory for affirming the district court that there's just a lack of evidentiary proof that an actual benefit was conferred during the fall of 2006? Your Honor, I think that is a reasonable theory for this court to affirm on. Again, in some ways depends on which of Mr. Berry's theories the court wishes to credit. But to the extent it is crediting his technical information theory then that would be available. Okay. Thank you very much. Mr. Springgill, I'm going to extend the time back to three minutes. Thank you, Your Honor. I'm going to just address some of the things that Council will address. Firstly, the preemption argument was raised and this is a violation of the patent law and so forth. It hasn't been raised before, but it fails. As Council pointed out in their briefing, unjust enrichment has another element. Another element is there must be a request. One cannot burst in the forehead and say, I've got a great idea. I had to be in just enrichment. In this case, the request of Mr. Berry came in. The request of the Hegelman and they told the problem and he provides some solutions. That's a little different than pitching your own idea. But because there is a requirement for unjust enrichment is that another requirement for unjust enrichment is that the benefit, the retention of the benefit had to be unjust. The unjust is that they made a lot of money off of the benefit. The technical information that he provided and the benefit, the money that they made from it is sufficient to be in just. But on the preemption argument, the request, that's the additional element. I guess in case of all the compulsion about the confusion for me about the argument that they made a lot of money off of the benefit is that whatever he provided in the fall of the fall of 2006, it wasn't siloed off from everything else that he did under the contracts for the following few years. I mean, it was all connected together. These were projects that he started thinking about and tinkering with in the fall and then they continued on under the contracts that now he was getting paid. I don't think that's an accurate statement, you know, to be honest. But he did design the architecture and he was called the, you know, the chief architect by independent witnesses. But he designed the architecture for the overall sync system. And then it had to be built. He built one component of that, which is CSBM. But there's one other thing I do want to address, and that's the only emphasis. Where's the evidence in the record of what he did beyond what he said, what he testified to, what he did? Well, he certainly testified of what he did. Yes. And we certainly had testimony from Mark Scalf and Mr. Nixon, who were independent. But none of those refer back to what he did in 2006. Yes. They said that he designed, he was the architect for the sync system in 2006. Oh, where does it say that in 2006 that he did this particular work in 2006? Because the architecture had to be designed before it had fun by the PPC in November 2006. Can I say one thing about the ultra-precision case, for any time? Thank you. The ultra-precision case really doesn't have much effect here either. It's really, they have a pleading problem. They plan that they want a royalty, just like a patent royalty. They say, you can't do that. Federal law preempts that. And the judge said, why don't you go back in a minute to just say unjust enrichment? The benefit. And they declined to, a man had complained to plead unjust enrichment. So they lost. But that was the way the ultra-precision case was the way just depleting. Oh, problem. Thank you very much