Mr. Kowski versus Attorney General. I'll talk mostly. I'd like to please the Court on Toss Motley for petitioner Daria Spiskovsky. With the Court's permission, I'd like to reserve two minutes for a rebuttal. Okay. As you in this case is whether an alien person president in the United States for some 20 years can be deprived of statutory eligibility for relief from removal based upon the retroactive transformation of a federal misdemeanor, a federal misdemeanor for which he received 30 days. Mr. Kowski, if you're an off-light and that one seconds you've got the misdemeanor issue in there and the retroactivity in there. I think what is the crux of the issue before us is the meaning of action taken in 321C? Are you going beyond that? No, absolutely not. You're right. And I think I would not have limited a judge of a key to the meaning of action taken
. I think we have to see this in the broader context if you will. What Congress intended with respect to IRR in creating a new procedure for removal cases and really eliminating or lending those new procedures for cases such as Mr. Spiskovsky, which was a deportation case that had begun way back in January of 1994. And this court a long time ago in Shideman, for example, I think very disallowing and reasonably held that the issue about definition of an aggravated felony is separate and apart from when and under what substantive context you apply that definition. And that's really the crux of the central part of the issue that I submitted here. A Congress could clearly, especially in the immigration context forgetting about the sentencing context, could clearly come up with a definition in call that it's like the Cheshire cat. The wood means exactly what Congress intended it to mean in Congress uses the word. Well, it's not locked into this way than one year in the spirit of the sentence. And I will get separately to the issue whether a misdemeanor can be transformed into an aggravated felony. I do not think that under the circumstances we ought to assume that Congress chose to, if you will, employ the logic of the rubric of Humpty Dumpty, that a word means what I say, it means nothing more in this context. But with respect to the Humpty Dumpty, I feel the working less
. I think it's Allison Wunderland, where Humpty Dumpty says to Allison a word means what I say is nothing more. But I would submit that Congress has not adopted the death, has not in these circumstances adopted the jurisprudence of Allison Wunderland with respect to the meaning of felony. But to get to the point which you are, which Judge McKee recognizes as the crux of this issue, the issue of retroactivity, I think here the Tron case from the Sixth Circuit very persuasively holds that Congress didn't intend by actions taken to apply the definitions of aggravated felony to ongoing deportation proceedings. And I think under those circumstances I think Tron, which was certainly in a position to hold that, despite what the government has suggested, because the individual in that case had originally been put in deportation proceedings before these definitions came into play, and then subsequently put in the new removal proceedings. And Tron. But what about Guido Morito? Is this you think there? Well, the Fifth Circuit decision was actually interesting, and then it does help me on the aggravated felony point, because there's language in there which says that the definition was intended only to pick up felonies. But Guido Patelum, what? Guido Patelum. But Patelum only with the issue about whether, and Mr. Patelum had been convicted of a felony harboring count. So he was not convicted like Mr. Biscotsky of a missing year, a beating someone in lawfully into the United States
. But Guido Morito is also interesting, and first of all from the Fifth Circuit, but it didn't involve the situation where an immigration had already made a determination of eligibility, the way that it was done here, I believe in 1996 by Judge Ragno, up in Boston. But moreover, it's interesting because the Fifth Circuit panel there is in pains to say that no argument is being made or was made that the transitional rules of Ira Ira should apply here. And that's where I think that Tron really gets it in strong support, because Congress in Section 309C of Ira Ira, I know it's 2007, and we're still looking at the un-codified provisions of Ira Ira given that the decision was made. And I think that's what we call the congressional drafting here. But that provision says generally speaking, the new procedures that are being employed should not be applicable to pending proceedings. It gives the government some options in Section 309C. But it's also, I think, significant in that the only part of the new procedures that Congress intended to apply to this former relief here, namely suspension de-cortation. Was the so-called stop time rule by which one should serve with a notice to appear or once you serve in the order to show cause, you're a cruel of a necessary seven-year stomps. So I think if you read actions taken in firing material as we should and take the statute as a whole, take the structure of the statute as a whole, we come to the point that Tron has certainly correctly decided that Congress didn't intend to do so. It's in to apply this to apply this to to pending proceedings. And this this nevertheless left the government the option to this nevertheless left the government the option to terminate proceedings against Mr
. Dyskowski and putting in the new removal proceedings, which of course they didn't do here. And as you're in your position that actions taken that we ought to hold actions taken actually means when proceedings are initiated. I think that the construction I'm going to introduce is that you ought to limit actions taken to actions taken in the new removal proceedings that were created by that were created by Ira Ira and that actions taken should not apply to deportation proceedings such as Mr. Dyskowski. Because of the general intent of Congress expressed in 309 C that those proceedings shouldn't be subject with certain exceptions not relevant here. Those proceedings shouldn't be subject to those proceedings should be subject to the new rules that Congress was creating by the new removal proceedings. And I think at the very least at the very least my point underscores what I would call the ambiguity that's inherent in terms of congressional intent since there is ambiguity in that congressional intent here since there is ambiguity in that congressional intent. We fall back, I submit to the second step in the decision in the in the in making a decision with respect to retroactivity where we look at whether this changed, whether this changed in a material way the consequences of the guilty plea and clearly it did. At the time of Mr. Dyskowski entered his plea to dismiss him in January of 1994 it wasn't an aggravated felony. It wouldn't have barmed from eligibility for suspension of the removal of suspension of deportation
. So we have a situation very much white where we have a situation where obviously very severe and new consequences have been attached to events that certainly antidote the initiation of deportation proceedings. You know, it's saying, Syria, going on what back in the red, saying Syria again, and you say, I felt, saying, Syria could be a big help for you. When I read it again, I wasn't as sure that it was as helpful for you as anything thought of works. How does saying, Syria, brought up? I think saying, Syria is important in that it certainly recognizes about the new consequences being attached to an act before. Now, since Syria does have language, I'm sure the government will rely upon it about the definitional section. And they specifically say the definitional section, but I think as this court recognized in Shia Yulin and has been recognized, for example, in any of the applicants and elsewhere, that you have a new definition does not really thanks the question about where that definition might be applied. And where and under what circumstances that definition might be applied to the substantive provisions issue. Just to throw out a whole new example, which I hasten to add, has no relevance to my personal life. If the state legislature decides to define adultery as having lustful thoughts towards someone who is not your spouse and makes that fully rep and makes it and says that that definition who did not apply, wherever lustful, you know, whenever the lustful thoughts have occurred, that really begs the question. And by whether that definition is going to be applied to ongoing divorce proceedings or whether it's going to be applied to those provisions of the family law, which barred child custody based on adulterator making adulteries and grounds for as a grounds where divorce. And that I submit is precisely the kind of situation that we're presented with here
. That would lend itself to the classical biblical closing argument of jury that he happened to jury who was without doubt cast the first tone. But I don't cast the first tone. I certainly, and as I say, that could maybe run that... But as I say, that is the fundamental distinction. You have definitions to be sure. And that's what St. Cyr really addresses. But the court there very clearly uses this definitional enactment as an example of when Congress gave its explicit intent of retroactive.
.. Well, Congress gave the explicit intent of retroactivity into the circumstances in judgment. But he in terms of the definitions, but what it did not do was to say, where under what circumstances those definitions would apply. That's what the distinction, for example, as I say, that Shidenin makes... Why does that thing 21C do that? Well, 321C with respect to actions taken is part of that. But all that I'm saying here is that 321C should be read in party material with 309, which expresses the general view that the new procedures enacted by Ira Ira should not apply to pending deportation proceedings with certain exceptions. And interestingly, those exceptions in the suspension context, as I've heard, those exceptions in the suspension context are only applying the so-called stop-time rules. It says nothing about applying the aggravated felony definitions or applying those in this context. And in any event, I would submit that this underscores the ambiguity in terms of ascertaining congressional attempts so that we fall back to the second step in the same sphere of attaching new consequences
. Let me go back to the question of actions taken. Would you agree that the words actions taken have to apply to actions taken by the attorney general? I don't think Judge Fisher that that is a necessary conclusion. And I think, for example, that actions taken as a term that is not defined that could very well mean actions taken by the attorney general in the new removal proceedings, which are created by trial. I'll let me get to my question. It seems to me that actions taken as a term that has to apply and actions taken by the attorney general. And if that's the case or could apply, then when the denial of discretionary relief here clearly be an action taken. If actions taken is read and I submit that when you look at the structure of the statute as a whole, if actions taken is read to apply to actions taken, if his read to apply to ongoing deportation proceedings, which I submitted, I intend not to do that. Moreover, not just Tron, even the government's authority, the Rita Morta from the fifth circuit specifically says that no argument unlike here was made to them that the transitional provisions didn't intend for this definition to be applied in the context of deportation proceedings. I know my time is up. If I could, I just wanted to emphasize that, and of course we rely upon our brief, but I would submit that both Leia Cal and Lopez establish a new world with respect to the definition of anger with respect to the definition of aggravated felony, putting emphasis on the term that's being defying, namely aggravated and felony, and then absent a clearer indication from Congress here, felony has to be part of the fences being included. And in a minimum, this shows ambiguity which under the rule of let it are there are construction as your are held in Francis means that we should win the battle
. Thank you. Mr. Grimes. Good morning, may please the Court of my name is James Grimes. I'm here on behalf of the Attorney General, and we ask the Court to deny the petition for a reason stated in our brief Mr. Huskowski is an aggravated felony, and that definition applies to him. Why is an aggravated felony? Well, he's an aggravated felony because the E-plac guilty to violating AUC 1324A2A, and the definition provision at 1101A43N makes violations of that provision an aggravated felony. In fact, A1324A2A is a Mr. Meena provision, and the definition says that it is false within the term of aggravated felony. So by the very terms of the definition, it falls into the term of an aggravated felony. If you're lying about that, then that's good, Mr
. Mosley's other or why should we apply that definition? Why should we read 321C in this context? Mr. Mosley's third and out reminding us of the E-plac. This is someone who has a criminal offense, which is certainly not an amiss. But when I was talking about a crack dealer here, or an enemy could bat in anything else, he was giving a cabaret to some people that were aliens. I know situations where we had a reckless disregard of their right to be here. Then in the United States for 20 years, as someone gainfully employed for a boost of the law, that was 20 years. And all of a sudden now he's being sent back to Poland for no particular reason other than the fact he happened to be giving a cabaret to these folks in the car. He wasn't thinking of allegedly being smuggling a ring. It's kind of like a guy in Patel. Mr. Patel, I know that doesn't figure you into a illegal analysis. But doesn't that put some need on Mr. Mosley's arguments, moments about what Congress intended and how we applied 321C in actions taken in this context? Well, I would certainly concede that he does have number of equities in his favor that Mr. Mosley has discussed. But I think this court has to look to what it is the Congress said. And the language of session 321C commands that the amendment that added the new definition to 321A, quote, shall apply from here on out. It says it was shall apply to actions that are taken on or after the date that O'Rea was passed on September 30th, 1996. So what definition are you urging us to adopt in terms of what actions taken made? Well, you're on or I think it's a broad term because the 321 does is it mends the definition in a definition section. And those definitions apply throughout the act. So what have to be an action taken in which that definition is relevant under the act in this judge-fisher address that would necessarily have to be at least be an action taken by the Attorney General. And here you have seven years of actions taken, seven years of hearings, you have two, you have decision by the immigration judge, and in final decision by the board at all, our actions taken under the act. So I would urge that at the very least it would have to apply to the actions taken by the Attorney General in this case to deny relief where the amended definition is relevant
. But doesn't that put some need on Mr. Mosley's arguments, moments about what Congress intended and how we applied 321C in actions taken in this context? Well, I would certainly concede that he does have number of equities in his favor that Mr. Mosley has discussed. But I think this court has to look to what it is the Congress said. And the language of session 321C commands that the amendment that added the new definition to 321A, quote, shall apply from here on out. It says it was shall apply to actions that are taken on or after the date that O'Rea was passed on September 30th, 1996. So what definition are you urging us to adopt in terms of what actions taken made? Well, you're on or I think it's a broad term because the 321 does is it mends the definition in a definition section. And those definitions apply throughout the act. So what have to be an action taken in which that definition is relevant under the act in this judge-fisher address that would necessarily have to be at least be an action taken by the Attorney General. And here you have seven years of actions taken, seven years of hearings, you have two, you have decision by the immigration judge, and in final decision by the board at all, our actions taken under the act. So I would urge that at the very least it would have to apply to the actions taken by the Attorney General in this case to deny relief where the amended definition is relevant. And initiating proceedings is not enough. Well, if proceedings are initiated after the act, if it's relevant to whether or not the person is removal as an aggravated thumb, then certainly that would be relevant. But here, I think what Congress is trying to do is you had this sort of chaotic patchwork of varying effective dates from the immigration act in 1990, you had another act in 91, 92, 94, and you had different effective dates. And I think what Congress did through 321B and 321C was to just cut that off and make things plain and simple. The aggravated felony definition will apply no matter when the conviction was entered. And from here on out, Congress is saying, we don't care what happened before, from here on out, you will apply this definition. How should Section 309 work into our analysis? Well, I think the 309, if you look at the interesting, 309A is a provision in which Congress said the, the, the, a rear of would generally not be effective until six months later, it refers to 1997. So Congress knew how to, to, to limit the reach of a rear, but, and it, but it didn't do so with respect to a rear of Section 321B and C. So that's sort of an indication that, although Congress knew how to do that, it didn't do that in this case. And instead said, from here on out, apply this definition to actions taken. And as I said, we believe that those, that that would include actions taken by the, by the Attorney General
. And initiating proceedings is not enough. Well, if proceedings are initiated after the act, if it's relevant to whether or not the person is removal as an aggravated thumb, then certainly that would be relevant. But here, I think what Congress is trying to do is you had this sort of chaotic patchwork of varying effective dates from the immigration act in 1990, you had another act in 91, 92, 94, and you had different effective dates. And I think what Congress did through 321B and 321C was to just cut that off and make things plain and simple. The aggravated felony definition will apply no matter when the conviction was entered. And from here on out, Congress is saying, we don't care what happened before, from here on out, you will apply this definition. How should Section 309 work into our analysis? Well, I think the 309, if you look at the interesting, 309A is a provision in which Congress said the, the, the, a rear of would generally not be effective until six months later, it refers to 1997. So Congress knew how to, to, to limit the reach of a rear, but, and it, but it didn't do so with respect to a rear of Section 321B and C. So that's sort of an indication that, although Congress knew how to do that, it didn't do that in this case. And instead said, from here on out, apply this definition to actions taken. And as I said, we believe that those, that that would include actions taken by the, by the Attorney General. So although Judge McKee, he, he certainly does have some equities, I think he can't get past the, the legal analysis in this case. So would actually taken a prior to judicial action? Well, that's an interesting question. I know there are some, there's some difference of opinion among the courts on that. The Aids are going to say that it would, the Aids are going to say that it wouldn't. I don't know that you have to answer that, but I would, I would propose that, that this Court's jurisdiction is controlled by the Act in this case. So there is certainly, it's not a stretch to say that, dear, that this Court is taking action under the Act and interpreting that, but I'm not, I'm not pushing that. But the obvious problem with it, and it's what the Ninth Circuit focused on, is that if we read actions taken to include all actions taken under after the day, to eliminate any ambiguity, we get into a situation where the Act of taking jurisdiction deprived the Court of jurisdiction, which makes no sense. But not in this case, your Honor does not because he's not removal or reportable for the criminal of the sense. In this case, he's only removal for the non-criminal offenses. So that actually, that point wouldn't apply here, although I granted it could have run other cases. But if it does, in other cases, that would seem to create an ambiguity, which would maybe then use the second-stimmed performance graph, but since your analysis
. So although Judge McKee, he, he certainly does have some equities, I think he can't get past the, the legal analysis in this case. So would actually taken a prior to judicial action? Well, that's an interesting question. I know there are some, there's some difference of opinion among the courts on that. The Aids are going to say that it would, the Aids are going to say that it wouldn't. I don't know that you have to answer that, but I would, I would propose that, that this Court's jurisdiction is controlled by the Act in this case. So there is certainly, it's not a stretch to say that, dear, that this Court is taking action under the Act and interpreting that, but I'm not, I'm not pushing that. But the obvious problem with it, and it's what the Ninth Circuit focused on, is that if we read actions taken to include all actions taken under after the day, to eliminate any ambiguity, we get into a situation where the Act of taking jurisdiction deprived the Court of jurisdiction, which makes no sense. But not in this case, your Honor does not because he's not removal or reportable for the criminal of the sense. In this case, he's only removal for the non-criminal offenses. So that actually, that point wouldn't apply here, although I granted it could have run other cases. But if it does, in other cases, that would seem to create an ambiguity, which would maybe then use the second-stimmed performance graph, but since your analysis. Your Honor, in those cases, they're initiated based upon an aggravated felony provision in the Court would with Act of jurisdiction in either of that. So I don't know if I would agree with your Honor's concern in that respect. Now with respect to Mr. Mosley, he's a savings by Tran. Tran, he was previously in deportation proceedings, but those proceedings were terminated. So he was in removal proceedings that were initiated after the Rear-Up. And so that's, when the Court said it was an argument about the transition rules, that's right. There was no argument about the court's, the transition rules there, I believe, are respect to the Court's jurisdiction and how that would apply. It really doesn't have any, it doesn't really matter to the analysis. So I would agree that I think Trans-Supports are a position that says that the term actually taken applies to actions taken after a Rear-Up was passed. So we would urge the Court to apply the term to the actions that were taken in this case to find that Mr
. Your Honor, in those cases, they're initiated based upon an aggravated felony provision in the Court would with Act of jurisdiction in either of that. So I don't know if I would agree with your Honor's concern in that respect. Now with respect to Mr. Mosley, he's a savings by Tran. Tran, he was previously in deportation proceedings, but those proceedings were terminated. So he was in removal proceedings that were initiated after the Rear-Up. And so that's, when the Court said it was an argument about the transition rules, that's right. There was no argument about the court's, the transition rules there, I believe, are respect to the Court's jurisdiction and how that would apply. It really doesn't have any, it doesn't really matter to the analysis. So I would agree that I think Trans-Supports are a position that says that the term actually taken applies to actions taken after a Rear-Up was passed. So we would urge the Court to apply the term to the actions that were taken in this case to find that Mr. Buscowski is involved in for relief, because as I mentioned, he is an aggravated felony as that term is defined as a term bar is defined in the act. And so we would ask that you find that he is an aggravated felony and apply the definition to him. I could address the case arguments that Mr. Molesley raised in his brief. I believe that even if that doctor applies, it does not apply when there's been an intervening change in the law, which is what we have here. And I invite the Court's attention finally to pages 343-349 and 377 of the record. There you have some discussion about whether or not he was an aggravated felony. His counsel said he was at page 349. That was not Mr. Molesley. The one that asked Mr
. Buscowski is involved in for relief, because as I mentioned, he is an aggravated felony as that term is defined as a term bar is defined in the act. And so we would ask that you find that he is an aggravated felony and apply the definition to him. I could address the case arguments that Mr. Molesley raised in his brief. I believe that even if that doctor applies, it does not apply when there's been an intervening change in the law, which is what we have here. And I invite the Court's attention finally to pages 343-349 and 377 of the record. There you have some discussion about whether or not he was an aggravated felony. His counsel said he was at page 349. That was not Mr. Molesley. The one that asked Mr. Molesley, we have a side standard of the point that I would ask. We would ask that you deny the petition for the reasons I've stated. Most are in further questions. Thank you. Mr. Molesley, what about the Navy Barra Council? Wasn't quite as able or inferior or meticulous as you. What about counsel statement that he is an aggravated felony? Well, first of all, the Court and the immigration judge did not affirm on that basis. So it's really not an extent that it might be used as a concession. And I think it's far more ambiguous than I read the record. Both Chenery, for example, and more at the Karnwood would permit reliance upon that. Moreover, the immigration judge's decision is very confusing in that regard
. Molesley, we have a side standard of the point that I would ask. We would ask that you deny the petition for the reasons I've stated. Most are in further questions. Thank you. Mr. Molesley, what about the Navy Barra Council? Wasn't quite as able or inferior or meticulous as you. What about counsel statement that he is an aggravated felony? Well, first of all, the Court and the immigration judge did not affirm on that basis. So it's really not an extent that it might be used as a concession. And I think it's far more ambiguous than I read the record. Both Chenery, for example, and more at the Karnwood would permit reliance upon that. Moreover, the immigration judge's decision is very confusing in that regard. Because I don't think he holds certainities in aggravated. The human immigration judge doesn't do that. At one point, he says, I'm not denying your eligibility for asylum because in your criminal conviction, that's at a three or a 46-year appendix, not because of your criminal conviction, but because you failed a file on time. And if the criminal conviction wasn't aggravated felony, then under those circumstances, that would have been a clear basis for denying asylum. He said there wouldn't have been jurisdiction for the petition. Right. Well, exactly. I think your honor hits upon a conundrum with respect to actions taken because, if you read 309c, with respect to judicial review, it simply says that a person who is deportable for conviction in an aggravated felony gets no judicial review. So if you read action taken broadly here, then Congress really has with that provision a strict jurisdiction. And of course, the government quite candidly conceded it would certainly apply in other cases where other deportation cases where this was charged. With respect to the aggravated felony definition, I think this court's decision in New Gend and the decision in Bob, which talks about the basic logic where you have a universal and case aggravated felony that all the particulars under that have to include felony unless there's a specific indication to the contrary, would certainly at the very least create an ambiguity resolving, which should be resolved in our favor under the rule of lending
. Because I don't think he holds certainities in aggravated. The human immigration judge doesn't do that. At one point, he says, I'm not denying your eligibility for asylum because in your criminal conviction, that's at a three or a 46-year appendix, not because of your criminal conviction, but because you failed a file on time. And if the criminal conviction wasn't aggravated felony, then under those circumstances, that would have been a clear basis for denying asylum. He said there wouldn't have been jurisdiction for the petition. Right. Well, exactly. I think your honor hits upon a conundrum with respect to actions taken because, if you read 309c, with respect to judicial review, it simply says that a person who is deportable for conviction in an aggravated felony gets no judicial review. So if you read action taken broadly here, then Congress really has with that provision a strict jurisdiction. And of course, the government quite candidly conceded it would certainly apply in other cases where other deportation cases where this was charged. With respect to the aggravated felony definition, I think this court's decision in New Gend and the decision in Bob, which talks about the basic logic where you have a universal and case aggravated felony that all the particulars under that have to include felony unless there's a specific indication to the contrary, would certainly at the very least create an ambiguity resolving, which should be resolved in our favor under the rule of lending. So I mean, that would require us to disregard the clear language of the statute. No, in one, in one requiring you to disregard the clear language of the statute, Judge Shigerriss, but if we take the basic proposition as the Supreme Court said in Leo Palin and Lopez, that you have to look at what's being defined in Leo Palin's crime of violence and in Florida that it was tracking me, you have to look at that when you make a determination about what is included here and the clear universal that set forth here is felony, aggravated felony. Now, the maybe sections were Congress specifically decided to include misdemeanors, but I would submit that there's no such clear signal by sentence or otherwise in 101A43N. We're not really new to the law of cases that attempted to determine how to treat a conviction and fell within two definitional sections as opposed to the case we had before us here. Well, that's the ultimate question presented to you both of those, but I would submit Judge Fisher that the law could give, that the law could give, but that the law could be an analysis used, yet not say not only will there be control in the right thing, the law could be an analysis of clients here with equal force and more over its supports, reinforced by the Supreme Court's decision in Leo Palin, Supreme Court's decision in Leo Palin's role. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you. I take the matter under advisement. Thank you both for a very great help to one. Next slide is the Sovereign Bank vs. BGL
. So I mean, that would require us to disregard the clear language of the statute. No, in one, in one requiring you to disregard the clear language of the statute, Judge Shigerriss, but if we take the basic proposition as the Supreme Court said in Leo Palin and Lopez, that you have to look at what's being defined in Leo Palin's crime of violence and in Florida that it was tracking me, you have to look at that when you make a determination about what is included here and the clear universal that set forth here is felony, aggravated felony. Now, the maybe sections were Congress specifically decided to include misdemeanors, but I would submit that there's no such clear signal by sentence or otherwise in 101A43N. We're not really new to the law of cases that attempted to determine how to treat a conviction and fell within two definitional sections as opposed to the case we had before us here. Well, that's the ultimate question presented to you both of those, but I would submit Judge Fisher that the law could give, that the law could give, but that the law could be an analysis used, yet not say not only will there be control in the right thing, the law could be an analysis of clients here with equal force and more over its supports, reinforced by the Supreme Court's decision in Leo Palin, Supreme Court's decision in Leo Palin's role. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you. I take the matter under advisement. Thank you both for a very great help to one. Next slide is the Sovereign Bank vs. BGL.
Mr. Kowski versus Attorney General. I'll talk mostly. I'd like to please the Court on Toss Motley for petitioner Daria Spiskovsky. With the Court's permission, I'd like to reserve two minutes for a rebuttal. Okay. As you in this case is whether an alien person president in the United States for some 20 years can be deprived of statutory eligibility for relief from removal based upon the retroactive transformation of a federal misdemeanor, a federal misdemeanor for which he received 30 days. Mr. Kowski, if you're an off-light and that one seconds you've got the misdemeanor issue in there and the retroactivity in there. I think what is the crux of the issue before us is the meaning of action taken in 321C? Are you going beyond that? No, absolutely not. You're right. And I think I would not have limited a judge of a key to the meaning of action taken. I think we have to see this in the broader context if you will. What Congress intended with respect to IRR in creating a new procedure for removal cases and really eliminating or lending those new procedures for cases such as Mr. Spiskovsky, which was a deportation case that had begun way back in January of 1994. And this court a long time ago in Shideman, for example, I think very disallowing and reasonably held that the issue about definition of an aggravated felony is separate and apart from when and under what substantive context you apply that definition. And that's really the crux of the central part of the issue that I submitted here. A Congress could clearly, especially in the immigration context forgetting about the sentencing context, could clearly come up with a definition in call that it's like the Cheshire cat. The wood means exactly what Congress intended it to mean in Congress uses the word. Well, it's not locked into this way than one year in the spirit of the sentence. And I will get separately to the issue whether a misdemeanor can be transformed into an aggravated felony. I do not think that under the circumstances we ought to assume that Congress chose to, if you will, employ the logic of the rubric of Humpty Dumpty, that a word means what I say, it means nothing more in this context. But with respect to the Humpty Dumpty, I feel the working less. I think it's Allison Wunderland, where Humpty Dumpty says to Allison a word means what I say is nothing more. But I would submit that Congress has not adopted the death, has not in these circumstances adopted the jurisprudence of Allison Wunderland with respect to the meaning of felony. But to get to the point which you are, which Judge McKee recognizes as the crux of this issue, the issue of retroactivity, I think here the Tron case from the Sixth Circuit very persuasively holds that Congress didn't intend by actions taken to apply the definitions of aggravated felony to ongoing deportation proceedings. And I think under those circumstances I think Tron, which was certainly in a position to hold that, despite what the government has suggested, because the individual in that case had originally been put in deportation proceedings before these definitions came into play, and then subsequently put in the new removal proceedings. And Tron. But what about Guido Morito? Is this you think there? Well, the Fifth Circuit decision was actually interesting, and then it does help me on the aggravated felony point, because there's language in there which says that the definition was intended only to pick up felonies. But Guido Patelum, what? Guido Patelum. But Patelum only with the issue about whether, and Mr. Patelum had been convicted of a felony harboring count. So he was not convicted like Mr. Biscotsky of a missing year, a beating someone in lawfully into the United States. But Guido Morito is also interesting, and first of all from the Fifth Circuit, but it didn't involve the situation where an immigration had already made a determination of eligibility, the way that it was done here, I believe in 1996 by Judge Ragno, up in Boston. But moreover, it's interesting because the Fifth Circuit panel there is in pains to say that no argument is being made or was made that the transitional rules of Ira Ira should apply here. And that's where I think that Tron really gets it in strong support, because Congress in Section 309C of Ira Ira, I know it's 2007, and we're still looking at the un-codified provisions of Ira Ira given that the decision was made. And I think that's what we call the congressional drafting here. But that provision says generally speaking, the new procedures that are being employed should not be applicable to pending proceedings. It gives the government some options in Section 309C. But it's also, I think, significant in that the only part of the new procedures that Congress intended to apply to this former relief here, namely suspension de-cortation. Was the so-called stop time rule by which one should serve with a notice to appear or once you serve in the order to show cause, you're a cruel of a necessary seven-year stomps. So I think if you read actions taken in firing material as we should and take the statute as a whole, take the structure of the statute as a whole, we come to the point that Tron has certainly correctly decided that Congress didn't intend to do so. It's in to apply this to apply this to to pending proceedings. And this this nevertheless left the government the option to this nevertheless left the government the option to terminate proceedings against Mr. Dyskowski and putting in the new removal proceedings, which of course they didn't do here. And as you're in your position that actions taken that we ought to hold actions taken actually means when proceedings are initiated. I think that the construction I'm going to introduce is that you ought to limit actions taken to actions taken in the new removal proceedings that were created by that were created by Ira Ira and that actions taken should not apply to deportation proceedings such as Mr. Dyskowski. Because of the general intent of Congress expressed in 309 C that those proceedings shouldn't be subject with certain exceptions not relevant here. Those proceedings shouldn't be subject to those proceedings should be subject to the new rules that Congress was creating by the new removal proceedings. And I think at the very least at the very least my point underscores what I would call the ambiguity that's inherent in terms of congressional intent since there is ambiguity in that congressional intent here since there is ambiguity in that congressional intent. We fall back, I submit to the second step in the decision in the in the in making a decision with respect to retroactivity where we look at whether this changed, whether this changed in a material way the consequences of the guilty plea and clearly it did. At the time of Mr. Dyskowski entered his plea to dismiss him in January of 1994 it wasn't an aggravated felony. It wouldn't have barmed from eligibility for suspension of the removal of suspension of deportation. So we have a situation very much white where we have a situation where obviously very severe and new consequences have been attached to events that certainly antidote the initiation of deportation proceedings. You know, it's saying, Syria, going on what back in the red, saying Syria again, and you say, I felt, saying, Syria could be a big help for you. When I read it again, I wasn't as sure that it was as helpful for you as anything thought of works. How does saying, Syria, brought up? I think saying, Syria is important in that it certainly recognizes about the new consequences being attached to an act before. Now, since Syria does have language, I'm sure the government will rely upon it about the definitional section. And they specifically say the definitional section, but I think as this court recognized in Shia Yulin and has been recognized, for example, in any of the applicants and elsewhere, that you have a new definition does not really thanks the question about where that definition might be applied. And where and under what circumstances that definition might be applied to the substantive provisions issue. Just to throw out a whole new example, which I hasten to add, has no relevance to my personal life. If the state legislature decides to define adultery as having lustful thoughts towards someone who is not your spouse and makes that fully rep and makes it and says that that definition who did not apply, wherever lustful, you know, whenever the lustful thoughts have occurred, that really begs the question. And by whether that definition is going to be applied to ongoing divorce proceedings or whether it's going to be applied to those provisions of the family law, which barred child custody based on adulterator making adulteries and grounds for as a grounds where divorce. And that I submit is precisely the kind of situation that we're presented with here. That would lend itself to the classical biblical closing argument of jury that he happened to jury who was without doubt cast the first tone. But I don't cast the first tone. I certainly, and as I say, that could maybe run that... But as I say, that is the fundamental distinction. You have definitions to be sure. And that's what St. Cyr really addresses. But the court there very clearly uses this definitional enactment as an example of when Congress gave its explicit intent of retroactive... Well, Congress gave the explicit intent of retroactivity into the circumstances in judgment. But he in terms of the definitions, but what it did not do was to say, where under what circumstances those definitions would apply. That's what the distinction, for example, as I say, that Shidenin makes... Why does that thing 21C do that? Well, 321C with respect to actions taken is part of that. But all that I'm saying here is that 321C should be read in party material with 309, which expresses the general view that the new procedures enacted by Ira Ira should not apply to pending deportation proceedings with certain exceptions. And interestingly, those exceptions in the suspension context, as I've heard, those exceptions in the suspension context are only applying the so-called stop-time rules. It says nothing about applying the aggravated felony definitions or applying those in this context. And in any event, I would submit that this underscores the ambiguity in terms of ascertaining congressional attempts so that we fall back to the second step in the same sphere of attaching new consequences. Let me go back to the question of actions taken. Would you agree that the words actions taken have to apply to actions taken by the attorney general? I don't think Judge Fisher that that is a necessary conclusion. And I think, for example, that actions taken as a term that is not defined that could very well mean actions taken by the attorney general in the new removal proceedings, which are created by trial. I'll let me get to my question. It seems to me that actions taken as a term that has to apply and actions taken by the attorney general. And if that's the case or could apply, then when the denial of discretionary relief here clearly be an action taken. If actions taken is read and I submit that when you look at the structure of the statute as a whole, if actions taken is read to apply to actions taken, if his read to apply to ongoing deportation proceedings, which I submitted, I intend not to do that. Moreover, not just Tron, even the government's authority, the Rita Morta from the fifth circuit specifically says that no argument unlike here was made to them that the transitional provisions didn't intend for this definition to be applied in the context of deportation proceedings. I know my time is up. If I could, I just wanted to emphasize that, and of course we rely upon our brief, but I would submit that both Leia Cal and Lopez establish a new world with respect to the definition of anger with respect to the definition of aggravated felony, putting emphasis on the term that's being defying, namely aggravated and felony, and then absent a clearer indication from Congress here, felony has to be part of the fences being included. And in a minimum, this shows ambiguity which under the rule of let it are there are construction as your are held in Francis means that we should win the battle. Thank you. Mr. Grimes. Good morning, may please the Court of my name is James Grimes. I'm here on behalf of the Attorney General, and we ask the Court to deny the petition for a reason stated in our brief Mr. Huskowski is an aggravated felony, and that definition applies to him. Why is an aggravated felony? Well, he's an aggravated felony because the E-plac guilty to violating AUC 1324A2A, and the definition provision at 1101A43N makes violations of that provision an aggravated felony. In fact, A1324A2A is a Mr. Meena provision, and the definition says that it is false within the term of aggravated felony. So by the very terms of the definition, it falls into the term of an aggravated felony. If you're lying about that, then that's good, Mr. Mosley's other or why should we apply that definition? Why should we read 321C in this context? Mr. Mosley's third and out reminding us of the E-plac. This is someone who has a criminal offense, which is certainly not an amiss. But when I was talking about a crack dealer here, or an enemy could bat in anything else, he was giving a cabaret to some people that were aliens. I know situations where we had a reckless disregard of their right to be here. Then in the United States for 20 years, as someone gainfully employed for a boost of the law, that was 20 years. And all of a sudden now he's being sent back to Poland for no particular reason other than the fact he happened to be giving a cabaret to these folks in the car. He wasn't thinking of allegedly being smuggling a ring. It's kind of like a guy in Patel. Mr. Patel, I know that doesn't figure you into a illegal analysis. But doesn't that put some need on Mr. Mosley's arguments, moments about what Congress intended and how we applied 321C in actions taken in this context? Well, I would certainly concede that he does have number of equities in his favor that Mr. Mosley has discussed. But I think this court has to look to what it is the Congress said. And the language of session 321C commands that the amendment that added the new definition to 321A, quote, shall apply from here on out. It says it was shall apply to actions that are taken on or after the date that O'Rea was passed on September 30th, 1996. So what definition are you urging us to adopt in terms of what actions taken made? Well, you're on or I think it's a broad term because the 321 does is it mends the definition in a definition section. And those definitions apply throughout the act. So what have to be an action taken in which that definition is relevant under the act in this judge-fisher address that would necessarily have to be at least be an action taken by the Attorney General. And here you have seven years of actions taken, seven years of hearings, you have two, you have decision by the immigration judge, and in final decision by the board at all, our actions taken under the act. So I would urge that at the very least it would have to apply to the actions taken by the Attorney General in this case to deny relief where the amended definition is relevant. And initiating proceedings is not enough. Well, if proceedings are initiated after the act, if it's relevant to whether or not the person is removal as an aggravated thumb, then certainly that would be relevant. But here, I think what Congress is trying to do is you had this sort of chaotic patchwork of varying effective dates from the immigration act in 1990, you had another act in 91, 92, 94, and you had different effective dates. And I think what Congress did through 321B and 321C was to just cut that off and make things plain and simple. The aggravated felony definition will apply no matter when the conviction was entered. And from here on out, Congress is saying, we don't care what happened before, from here on out, you will apply this definition. How should Section 309 work into our analysis? Well, I think the 309, if you look at the interesting, 309A is a provision in which Congress said the, the, the, a rear of would generally not be effective until six months later, it refers to 1997. So Congress knew how to, to, to limit the reach of a rear, but, and it, but it didn't do so with respect to a rear of Section 321B and C. So that's sort of an indication that, although Congress knew how to do that, it didn't do that in this case. And instead said, from here on out, apply this definition to actions taken. And as I said, we believe that those, that that would include actions taken by the, by the Attorney General. So although Judge McKee, he, he certainly does have some equities, I think he can't get past the, the legal analysis in this case. So would actually taken a prior to judicial action? Well, that's an interesting question. I know there are some, there's some difference of opinion among the courts on that. The Aids are going to say that it would, the Aids are going to say that it wouldn't. I don't know that you have to answer that, but I would, I would propose that, that this Court's jurisdiction is controlled by the Act in this case. So there is certainly, it's not a stretch to say that, dear, that this Court is taking action under the Act and interpreting that, but I'm not, I'm not pushing that. But the obvious problem with it, and it's what the Ninth Circuit focused on, is that if we read actions taken to include all actions taken under after the day, to eliminate any ambiguity, we get into a situation where the Act of taking jurisdiction deprived the Court of jurisdiction, which makes no sense. But not in this case, your Honor does not because he's not removal or reportable for the criminal of the sense. In this case, he's only removal for the non-criminal offenses. So that actually, that point wouldn't apply here, although I granted it could have run other cases. But if it does, in other cases, that would seem to create an ambiguity, which would maybe then use the second-stimmed performance graph, but since your analysis. Your Honor, in those cases, they're initiated based upon an aggravated felony provision in the Court would with Act of jurisdiction in either of that. So I don't know if I would agree with your Honor's concern in that respect. Now with respect to Mr. Mosley, he's a savings by Tran. Tran, he was previously in deportation proceedings, but those proceedings were terminated. So he was in removal proceedings that were initiated after the Rear-Up. And so that's, when the Court said it was an argument about the transition rules, that's right. There was no argument about the court's, the transition rules there, I believe, are respect to the Court's jurisdiction and how that would apply. It really doesn't have any, it doesn't really matter to the analysis. So I would agree that I think Trans-Supports are a position that says that the term actually taken applies to actions taken after a Rear-Up was passed. So we would urge the Court to apply the term to the actions that were taken in this case to find that Mr. Buscowski is involved in for relief, because as I mentioned, he is an aggravated felony as that term is defined as a term bar is defined in the act. And so we would ask that you find that he is an aggravated felony and apply the definition to him. I could address the case arguments that Mr. Molesley raised in his brief. I believe that even if that doctor applies, it does not apply when there's been an intervening change in the law, which is what we have here. And I invite the Court's attention finally to pages 343-349 and 377 of the record. There you have some discussion about whether or not he was an aggravated felony. His counsel said he was at page 349. That was not Mr. Molesley. The one that asked Mr. Molesley, we have a side standard of the point that I would ask. We would ask that you deny the petition for the reasons I've stated. Most are in further questions. Thank you. Mr. Molesley, what about the Navy Barra Council? Wasn't quite as able or inferior or meticulous as you. What about counsel statement that he is an aggravated felony? Well, first of all, the Court and the immigration judge did not affirm on that basis. So it's really not an extent that it might be used as a concession. And I think it's far more ambiguous than I read the record. Both Chenery, for example, and more at the Karnwood would permit reliance upon that. Moreover, the immigration judge's decision is very confusing in that regard. Because I don't think he holds certainities in aggravated. The human immigration judge doesn't do that. At one point, he says, I'm not denying your eligibility for asylum because in your criminal conviction, that's at a three or a 46-year appendix, not because of your criminal conviction, but because you failed a file on time. And if the criminal conviction wasn't aggravated felony, then under those circumstances, that would have been a clear basis for denying asylum. He said there wouldn't have been jurisdiction for the petition. Right. Well, exactly. I think your honor hits upon a conundrum with respect to actions taken because, if you read 309c, with respect to judicial review, it simply says that a person who is deportable for conviction in an aggravated felony gets no judicial review. So if you read action taken broadly here, then Congress really has with that provision a strict jurisdiction. And of course, the government quite candidly conceded it would certainly apply in other cases where other deportation cases where this was charged. With respect to the aggravated felony definition, I think this court's decision in New Gend and the decision in Bob, which talks about the basic logic where you have a universal and case aggravated felony that all the particulars under that have to include felony unless there's a specific indication to the contrary, would certainly at the very least create an ambiguity resolving, which should be resolved in our favor under the rule of lending. So I mean, that would require us to disregard the clear language of the statute. No, in one, in one requiring you to disregard the clear language of the statute, Judge Shigerriss, but if we take the basic proposition as the Supreme Court said in Leo Palin and Lopez, that you have to look at what's being defined in Leo Palin's crime of violence and in Florida that it was tracking me, you have to look at that when you make a determination about what is included here and the clear universal that set forth here is felony, aggravated felony. Now, the maybe sections were Congress specifically decided to include misdemeanors, but I would submit that there's no such clear signal by sentence or otherwise in 101A43N. We're not really new to the law of cases that attempted to determine how to treat a conviction and fell within two definitional sections as opposed to the case we had before us here. Well, that's the ultimate question presented to you both of those, but I would submit Judge Fisher that the law could give, that the law could give, but that the law could be an analysis used, yet not say not only will there be control in the right thing, the law could be an analysis of clients here with equal force and more over its supports, reinforced by the Supreme Court's decision in Leo Palin, Supreme Court's decision in Leo Palin's role. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you. I take the matter under advisement. Thank you both for a very great help to one. Next slide is the Sovereign Bank vs. BGL