Our third case of the morning, Borough of Lucic versus Darwin Professional Underwriters. Ready whenever you are. Off the clock. How did the Borough of Lucic get its name? Siri, I don't know that one. I mean, I take a lot of Gufferan being from Altuna. And so, you know, hearing about Borough of Lucic is reassuring. I don't know the answer to that question. I can submit a brief on that. You'd like your honor to address that. I'd like to reserve three minutes for Rebuttal. May please the court. My name is David Strausser. And I represent the Appellates in this manner, the Bureau of Music, Music Burrow Council, Music Planning Commission, Music Burrow Zoning Board, and five individuals who also sued in the Civil Rights action. Each of the Appellates is entitled to coverage under the terms of a public officials' professional liability policy in connection with the government. Now, wasn't there an earlier policy that was in effect at the time the first man-damaged petition was filed? There may have been, there was the Darwin policies commenced on August 2006. And that's the inception date of those policies
. I do not know, and I don't believe there's anything in the record that says whether or not the Bureau of Music had a policy before that time. One would assume they did. One would expect it, yes, Your Honor. You give the notice then, and as that case continues, don't you then continue coverage with the policy that existed when the man-damaged complaint was filed? That would be the case if in fact that you had a claim in 2005, which we dispute, and that later actions that occurred were involved. The man-damage complaint that you're talking about in 2005 was dismissed in 2006. That was filed, and that was filed in the state system. Correct. And in the court found there that in essence it was a misplaced zoning appeal. And it does not matter if there would have been any coverage. That was a complaint filed against the Bureau of Music at that time. Now, isn't it when actions are filed against a government entity? Isn't it the responsibility of that government entity at that time to notify the insurance parent? I would agree with that when you have an action that's within the coverage of the policy. In this instance, we do not believe that there was coverage, and no one has disagreed with that position that we've taken in our brief, that there wasn't a coverage for this man-damage action. So that there was no duty just when the papers were filed to let your insurance company know, hey, we're being sued? No, I do not believe there is a duty to do that unless you believe there's coverage. In order to trigger that coverage. In other words, your position would be the purpose of the notice
. The notification is to let your carry your know you're going to make a claim coming into the defense. A claim you want a defense and ultimately you probably want the indemnity of the case. That's absolutely correct. And it serves no purpose to provide notice if you're not making a stop line. That is correct, Your Honor. How does this situation not fit within the related claims? In fact, there is no coverage for the related claims here. It's a very broad related claims language, and the word claim is very broad. I didn't get from your brief real dispute as to why you don't fit within that language. Well, first of all, the question of this being a related claim is a red herring because you don't get to that issue. You have to interpret the policy through all its provisions. You have an ensuring agreement, and there's no dispute that the civil rights action that was filed in 2010 falls within the coverage provided by the 2010 policy. There is an exclusion that deals with prior claims that are filed. The court doesn't rely on that exclusion. The court reads it out of the policy, and that's the determination. That's the test that should be applied
. There is a provision that says if another claim was made rising out of the same facts and circumstances, you take that date as the date of the claim. And in this situation, that precedes the demand, and that precedes the conception of this policy, and therefore there is no coverage. That's what the denial letter said. How does that not correctly state? Because the purpose of the policy, again, if you consider all the provisions related, I want to go to this provision and say why that doesn't bar the coverage. Because the ensuring agreement does not include related claims, it's limited specifically to claims. The definition of claims does not include a definition, but does not include within it related claims. The provision you're talking about is in the policy for the sole purpose of determining what limit of liability applies, and whether or not the policy of order has to be done. That claims made policy. And if there was a previous claim that's part of the same similar facts and circumstances, they're saying you should have, like Judge Russett, you should have made the claim back then for coverage, and we are not going to cover it. That's a prior claim exclusion. The related claim issue is determining what limits do you get. If I'm a professional engineer, and I design this building, and I don't properly calculate the structure, and this roof falls down and injures me and someone else, I sue you in 2009, someone else sue you in 2010. What the related claim provision says is that I only get $1 million limit for those two claims because they're related. So that's my limit of liability for that. And on the other side, I don't have to pay one deductible
. Where does that appear in the related claims depenement? Well, it appears in the sections. It appears in conditions that, regardless of the number of claims brought under this policy, the number of persons or entities included within the definition of insure, the number of claimants, the insurers liability is limited as follows. Related claims will be deemed a single claim, and only one each claim, limit of liability, and only one retention will apply. That's the only place in the policy that terms related claims are used in the terms, because that's how the policy will you apply correct interpretive principles. That's the purpose of the related claims language. It's not to be used as an exclusion. You have an exclusion that applies to prior claims. And if you allow this to circumvent that, you've read that exclusion completely out of the policy. You've read the saving provision in that exclusion that says you go back to the initial inception date of the string of policies as your first date to determine prior claims. Is there a claim made policy? Yes, this is a claim made policy. The denial letter said, Section 2 definition pay of the policy defines related claims and it's all claims are wrong, who acts based upon arising out of resulting from or anyone involving the same related facts or in this transaction situation. Policy Section 4, condition F4 states that all related claims will be treated as a single claim made, single claim made. When the earliest of such related claims was first made or when the earliest of such related claims is treated as having been made in accordance with condition F2, whichever is earlier. How is that? And therefore made previous to inception. How is that? All that's telling you is which policy do you look to to determine what your limits of liability are? That's what I'm telling you
. Do you look at today or do you look at the policy from three years ago? And the policy can differ. The deductible can change. We've been discussing the merits here. You raised a procedural question as well. Yes, sir. Well, explain to me your position as to how the district court heard in your view and deciding this as a motion to dismiss based on the very limited record is available and what the district court should have done. Well, asking the question answers it in our view, this was decided as a motion to dismiss the court relied on documents that were clearly outside the record. It did not convert. The documents that you were involved you as a party. I mean, you dispute the bonafides of the documents that were attached. No, we didn't have an opportunity to address those documents. But when you, the principal and the Davis complaint, the denial letter, things like that, would you be, you know, you said you were a sandbag and you wanted to distinguish the documents, but weren't these documents that you, you know, you were a party to where you received? Well, we were party, well, part of the insurers were party to the mandamus. Only two of the nine. You had four individuals that weren't even party to the mandamus that are having their rights stripped away by this view. But no, we didn't have an opportunity
. The original motion to dismiss didn't discuss mandamus at all. It's submitted for the first time and argued for the first time in the reply. In the reply to the motion to dismiss? In the reply to the motion to dismiss. Yes. To our argument. And the court didn't adopt any of the arguments that were raised in the motion. So what's at stake here is that the district court would not have had a sufficient basis, perhaps evidentiary basis, to make a determination as too related. Is that at the heart of your point? Yes. Yes. I mean, we had, there was ongoing discovery at the time. Even with the attachment of the mandamus complaint to the reply that would not have been sufficient information available. Yes. The district. Yes, because we were denied the opportunity to do discovery. It's to decisions that were made
. We were denied the opportunity to do broker discovery, to determine what the basis of these policies being written. We were denied the opportunity to do reasonable expectations, to put in evidence. Because this motion should have been converted into a motion for summary judgment. If you look at the cases that they rely on when they use a prior notice exclusion, they all, those cases all rely on prior notice exclusion. None of them use this insured, I got these. None of them rely on a, we're going to read related claim into the insuring agreement. They all rely on exclusions. Can I finish my thought? They all rely on those exclusions. They don't rely on that issue at all. We were denied the opportunity to address those issues. Thank you. May I please the court, Tony Mishiocha and Gail White from White and Williams for the defendant and appellee, Darwin National Shorts Company. I'd like to try to do two things if I have a comment. Mr. Bourdek, who is lead counsel, has left the firm
. As far as I know, he's with another firm. What I'd like to do is in addition to respond your questions. I'm early addressed to two issues. The first being whether the district court erred in its construction of the policy. I want to respond to what I believe are some misunderstandings or mischaracterizations of the nature of some of the policy language. Then second, I'd like to respond to Judge Smith's question about the procedure and what evidence was considered by the district court. First of all, I think all the parties agree and the district court properly held that the starting place is going to be the policy language. If I can just have a moment to walk the court through a couple of provisions of the policy that are significant, because my colleague had stated, although I think Judge Rendell you corrected him, that there was only one place in the policy where the related claims language is used. He said that that was in the limits provision. That's not accurate, but I'll get to that in a second. The starting point for coverage is going to be under the insuring agreement in the policy and that's found at A34 in the record. Here it says, in short, that the insurance company will pay on behalf of the insured, loss that the insured is legally obligated to pay. What provision you're on in the policy? It's the insuring agreement section, Roman No. 1A page A33. Very beginning of the
... Yes. And focusing now on the third line, where it talks about that there's coverage for any claim first made against the insured during the policy period. There's been much talk in the brief about the insurance company or the district court reading language out of the policy, and I respectfully submit that it's actually the insured that's reading the word first out of this policy. This is a claims made policy. The claim has to be made and actually first made during the policy. As I believe Judge Rendell noticed, under this policy, unlike some of the policies in the case law that's been cited to the court, there is a definition of claim. It's a very broad definition of claim, and that's on page A35 of the record. And the definition of claim in this policy includes, among other things, any written demand for monetary damages or non-monetary relief, and it also includes, under part three of the definition, any civil proceeding in a court of law or equity. The policy then goes on to- So when we are talking about this civil rights action being filed against the Bureau of Moosey, the prior claim does not have to have anything to do with the civil rights action is that your position? The prior claim has to be a related claim, and I think determining whether or not it is related, you look at the totality of the circumstances, you're going to look at factors like where the party is the same, where the facts the same, was the relief the same, that could be one of the factors, I don't think that's a dispositive factor that the earlier claim had to have been a civil rights claim. You look at the definition of related claims, right? You start with the definition of related claims, which I was going to get to next, which is on page A39 of the record. It's defined extremely broadly in the policy as all claims for wrongful acts based upon a rising out of resulting from or in any way involving the same or related facts circumstances etc., or the same or related series of facts or circumstances, whether related logically, causally or in any other way. The language of the related claim definition in this policy is broader than the language that's been discussed in the case that we've cited from the third circuit and from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that is construed a rising out of or relating to broadly
. That case will certainly apply, but this provision is even broader than that because it uses additional language to discuss it. But here's the important point where I think my colleague misunderstands the policy. The related claims language is then discussed in two different places in the condition section. One is on page A44 of the record, Condition A limits of Liability, and he's talked about how in that section there's discussion about how the related claims will be deemed a single claim and there will be one limit and one retention. That's fine. But he ignores the fact, although Judge Rendell, I think you've called it to his attention, that the related claim language is also discussed in condition F, which deals with notice, timing, and interrelationship of claims. The significance here, and I think this is something that Judge Roth touched upon on her first question, is that it doesn't exclude coverage. What it does is it determines which policy responds when you have related claims. It says in condition F4, all related claims will be treated as a single claim made when the earliest of such related claims was first made. So when you go back to the insuring agreement and you have to determine when a claim was first made, this provision tells you that if you have related claims, they will be deemed to be made when the first claim was made. It doesn't necessarily exclude coverage. Here under these facts. I know that there could have been a few policies of this company that were different, but you go back to that time. Correct. Now, I think was what Judge Roth was asking about is that if you went back to the policy in effect in 2005 or 2006 and had the policy language been implicated, had noticed, been given in everything else, and insured under this condition that gives notice, then locks in coverage for related claims that even happened subsequent to that first policy period. So to characterize this related claims provision as an exclusion is inaccurate, it's not. It just places when the claim is made. In some instances like this, the net effect under this particular 2010 policy is to exclude coverage, but it just places it back to the earlier one and you go back to that policy to look at coverage. Now I'd like to use a moment to talk about Judge Smith's comments about what did the district court consider and was it an error to consider what it looked at? I mean, this really should have been summary judgment. Should it not? Certainly, we wouldn't have this. It would matter to accomplish that. We wouldn't have this issue if it was summary judgment, but I don't know that summary judgment is how this would be disposed. If we even went back below, I think this would be a motion for judgment on the pleading issue, Your Honor. The issue is, in the insured's declaratory judgment complaint. If you take a look at that complaint, which is in the record as well, starting on page A19, the insured in the complaint against Barwin discusses the underlying action in underlying complaint in paragraph 9, placing that document issue. The insured's discusses. It doesn't, it does not attach the mandates. Right? The debt complaint doesn't attach it. They attach the declination letter, which clearly discusses and references the mandate and the miscomplaint, identifies the mandate and miscomplaint as a basis for denying coverage, explains that the denial of coverage is based upon the fact that the claim is a related claim and is therefore not deemed to have been first made during this policy period. They can test that in response to the motion to dismiss
. So to characterize this related claims provision as an exclusion is inaccurate, it's not. It just places when the claim is made. In some instances like this, the net effect under this particular 2010 policy is to exclude coverage, but it just places it back to the earlier one and you go back to that policy to look at coverage. Now I'd like to use a moment to talk about Judge Smith's comments about what did the district court consider and was it an error to consider what it looked at? I mean, this really should have been summary judgment. Should it not? Certainly, we wouldn't have this. It would matter to accomplish that. We wouldn't have this issue if it was summary judgment, but I don't know that summary judgment is how this would be disposed. If we even went back below, I think this would be a motion for judgment on the pleading issue, Your Honor. The issue is, in the insured's declaratory judgment complaint. If you take a look at that complaint, which is in the record as well, starting on page A19, the insured in the complaint against Barwin discusses the underlying action in underlying complaint in paragraph 9, placing that document issue. The insured's discusses. It doesn't, it does not attach the mandates. Right? The debt complaint doesn't attach it. They attach the declination letter, which clearly discusses and references the mandate and the miscomplaint, identifies the mandate and miscomplaint as a basis for denying coverage, explains that the denial of coverage is based upon the fact that the claim is a related claim and is therefore not deemed to have been first made during this policy period. They can test that in response to the motion to dismiss. Actually, what they did in response to the motion to dismiss, I believe, is put the mandate and miscomplaint at issue by making misstatements to the court. If you look at their response in the district court to the motion to dismiss, which starts around A89, they talk about, in their counter, factual background, first of all, on page A96, that the background set forth by Darwin in its brief, where Darwin quoted at length the factual recitation of the court in the underlying motion to dismiss. They said it's all set forth in that opinion. It's all in the underlying action. They don't respond to any of it. They don't say any of it's inaccurate. They don't say they need any discovery. They then go on to discuss a number of the letters that were described in the denial letter of Darwin. They don't specifically talk about the man-damous complaint. What they do say, and this is wrong, is that the remaining pre-inception data allegations are complaints about a third party, a request to investigate, a request to enter a written denial, and a belief by the author that the barrel was not enforcing its zoning ordinance. They are not a lawsuit. This is what they represented to the district court. This is page A98 of the record. They are not a lawsuit. They are not a claim for damages
. Actually, what they did in response to the motion to dismiss, I believe, is put the mandate and miscomplaint at issue by making misstatements to the court. If you look at their response in the district court to the motion to dismiss, which starts around A89, they talk about, in their counter, factual background, first of all, on page A96, that the background set forth by Darwin in its brief, where Darwin quoted at length the factual recitation of the court in the underlying motion to dismiss. They said it's all set forth in that opinion. It's all in the underlying action. They don't respond to any of it. They don't say any of it's inaccurate. They don't say they need any discovery. They then go on to discuss a number of the letters that were described in the denial letter of Darwin. They don't specifically talk about the man-damous complaint. What they do say, and this is wrong, is that the remaining pre-inception data allegations are complaints about a third party, a request to investigate, a request to enter a written denial, and a belief by the author that the barrel was not enforcing its zoning ordinance. They are not a lawsuit. This is what they represented to the district court. This is page A98 of the record. They are not a lawsuit. They are not a claim for damages. They are not a requester suggestion of a claim for damages. And based on that misstatement to the district court in their opposition to the motion to dismiss, they argue that the man-damous complaint and everything else was not a claim. I think it was more than fair at that point in time for the man-damous complaint to be put in front of the court. All the court had at that time was the summary of it in the denial letter. It's a public record. That's what was done. It was attached to the response in support of the motion to dismiss the reply. I'm sorry. And the court had it at that point in time. But again, it was in response to factual misstatements that they made saying there was no complaint, saying there was no demand for money. It's a public record. At any point in time, in the case, a court can take judicial notice of public records, even at a 12-6 stage, it's rare, it's unusual, but it doesn't mean that it's unjust or a denial-of-do process here. This is not a complaint. It's from some third-party action to which they were not a party. It's not a document that surprised them or sandbagged them
. They are not a requester suggestion of a claim for damages. And based on that misstatement to the district court in their opposition to the motion to dismiss, they argue that the man-damous complaint and everything else was not a claim. I think it was more than fair at that point in time for the man-damous complaint to be put in front of the court. All the court had at that time was the summary of it in the denial letter. It's a public record. That's what was done. It was attached to the response in support of the motion to dismiss the reply. I'm sorry. And the court had it at that point in time. But again, it was in response to factual misstatements that they made saying there was no complaint, saying there was no demand for money. It's a public record. At any point in time, in the case, a court can take judicial notice of public records, even at a 12-6 stage, it's rare, it's unusual, but it doesn't mean that it's unjust or a denial-of-do process here. This is not a complaint. It's from some third-party action to which they were not a party. It's not a document that surprised them or sandbagged them. It was prominently discussed in the denial letter. It was, in fact, mentioned, although in passing, in the original motion to dismiss papers filed in this case by Darwin, I believe it's on the end of the brief in the dead faith section, but they do mention the fact that part of the reason they didn't engage in bad faith is they reviewed a bunch of documents, including the letters, including the mandamus complaint. So there was some reference to it. It certainly wasn't a focal point of the initial break. But it wasn't a public record. As to, I believe it's Judge Rendell's comments, shouldn't this have been a motion for summary judgment? Again, the answer is no. There's no disputed fact here. There's no real factual determination of finding the court needs to make. The mandamus complaint is a document writing a public record speaks for itself. The question before the district court, and now this court is, what is the legal significance of that document when compared against the policy language and considering the related claims, definition, and provisions in the Darwin policy? The attachments to the complaint were the insurance policy and the denial letter. Correct. But in the coverage complaint, they also reference in the body of that, the underlying complaint, which obviously has to be considered for purposes of assessing duty to defend. They mentioned their own motion to dismiss that was filed in the underlying case. They mentioned the district court's order and memorandum, granting in part that motion to dismiss, which was then cited by the district court in this case. So they certainly placed all of those documents at issue and those documents in turn reference the mandamus complaint
. It was prominently discussed in the denial letter. It was, in fact, mentioned, although in passing, in the original motion to dismiss papers filed in this case by Darwin, I believe it's on the end of the brief in the dead faith section, but they do mention the fact that part of the reason they didn't engage in bad faith is they reviewed a bunch of documents, including the letters, including the mandamus complaint. So there was some reference to it. It certainly wasn't a focal point of the initial break. But it wasn't a public record. As to, I believe it's Judge Rendell's comments, shouldn't this have been a motion for summary judgment? Again, the answer is no. There's no disputed fact here. There's no real factual determination of finding the court needs to make. The mandamus complaint is a document writing a public record speaks for itself. The question before the district court, and now this court is, what is the legal significance of that document when compared against the policy language and considering the related claims, definition, and provisions in the Darwin policy? The attachments to the complaint were the insurance policy and the denial letter. Correct. But in the coverage complaint, they also reference in the body of that, the underlying complaint, which obviously has to be considered for purposes of assessing duty to defend. They mentioned their own motion to dismiss that was filed in the underlying case. They mentioned the district court's order and memorandum, granting in part that motion to dismiss, which was then cited by the district court in this case. So they certainly placed all of those documents at issue and those documents in turn reference the mandamus complaint. But I think the biggest issue is there's no surprise to them. It's a public record for which the court can take and properly took judicial notice. And there's no discovery that they would need. They talk about discovery. But the discovery that they talk about is as to their reasonable expectations that has nothing to do with this issue. Second, you don't even get through reasonable expectations because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is construing the arising out of language, which is less broad than our policy. It's not that it's unambiguous and they define what it means. So you don't get to reasonable expectations in this case because there's no ambiguity. Secondly, reasonable expectations typically applies in a situation where you have a consumer and you have something like a fire policy, a life insurance policy. Some sort of non-commercial insured. That's not the case here. We have a government entity that's the insured and the policy is not ambiguous. Finally, let me just take a moment to address the separation of insured's provision because they make much in their brief that there's a separation of insured provision. And because of that, the fact that the man-damage complaint only names some but not all of the defendants to the current complaint creates coverage for some but maybe not all of the insured's. That's for as to exclusions
. But I think the biggest issue is there's no surprise to them. It's a public record for which the court can take and properly took judicial notice. And there's no discovery that they would need. They talk about discovery. But the discovery that they talk about is as to their reasonable expectations that has nothing to do with this issue. Second, you don't even get through reasonable expectations because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is construing the arising out of language, which is less broad than our policy. It's not that it's unambiguous and they define what it means. So you don't get to reasonable expectations in this case because there's no ambiguity. Secondly, reasonable expectations typically applies in a situation where you have a consumer and you have something like a fire policy, a life insurance policy. Some sort of non-commercial insured. That's not the case here. We have a government entity that's the insured and the policy is not ambiguous. Finally, let me just take a moment to address the separation of insured's provision because they make much in their brief that there's a separation of insured provision. And because of that, the fact that the man-damage complaint only names some but not all of the defendants to the current complaint creates coverage for some but maybe not all of the insured's. That's for as to exclusions. It only applies to exclusion. Yes, Your Honor. And here- So not sure that people are actually insured or lost as insured under a policy. I'm not sure whether people- Correct. The policy insured's laws, it pertains to won't flacks but the separation of insured provision first only applies to exclusions. Here, what we've argued and what the district court found is that there's no coverage looking at the insuring agreement and the condition pertaining to when related claims are deemed to have made. Secondly, the separation of insured provisions refers to acts, errors or emissions of any insured. It doesn't speak to a situation like this where a third party makes a claim against insured. It doesn't say anything about that. And even when you look at the definition of related claims, that doesn't speak to a claim made against any particular insured or anything like that. So I think that provision- In fact, related types doesn't even say the same people. I'm sorry? It doesn't even say involving the same parties or the same people that make no reference to that. That's my point. Right. It's related claims provisions, too
. It only applies to exclusion. Yes, Your Honor. And here- So not sure that people are actually insured or lost as insured under a policy. I'm not sure whether people- Correct. The policy insured's laws, it pertains to won't flacks but the separation of insured provision first only applies to exclusions. Here, what we've argued and what the district court found is that there's no coverage looking at the insuring agreement and the condition pertaining to when related claims are deemed to have made. Secondly, the separation of insured provisions refers to acts, errors or emissions of any insured. It doesn't speak to a situation like this where a third party makes a claim against insured. It doesn't say anything about that. And even when you look at the definition of related claims, that doesn't speak to a claim made against any particular insured or anything like that. So I think that provision- In fact, related types doesn't even say the same people. I'm sorry? It doesn't even say involving the same parties or the same people that make no reference to that. That's my point. Right. It's related claims provisions, too. Correct. But this one is very broad in this case. So based on all that, Your Honors, I would ask that you affirm the district court ruling, the district court reached the correct coverage decision in this case. It properly considered the mandamus complaint in reaching its decision. Even if the court were to find that the court should not have considered the mandamus complaint because this was a rule 12b6 motion, it was simply hard most error at worst because this would have been then before the court, again, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, you still wouldn't get to discovery. They haven't identified any discovery that they need relevant to this issue. And at the end of the day, neither Justice Nordu process will be served by remanding this case back to district court and forcing the parties in the court just to redo these issues. Again, don't either eyes a little bit more closely. Thank you, Your Honor. Okay. Where do I start? Let's talk about innocent and short. Innocent and short provision is there to protect people who are having acts computed against them to deny them coverage. You have individuals here who are not being asserted. There's no claim that there was somehow a claim being made against them that somehow should be used to exclude coverage. But there is no exclusion here
. Correct. But this one is very broad in this case. So based on all that, Your Honors, I would ask that you affirm the district court ruling, the district court reached the correct coverage decision in this case. It properly considered the mandamus complaint in reaching its decision. Even if the court were to find that the court should not have considered the mandamus complaint because this was a rule 12b6 motion, it was simply hard most error at worst because this would have been then before the court, again, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, you still wouldn't get to discovery. They haven't identified any discovery that they need relevant to this issue. And at the end of the day, neither Justice Nordu process will be served by remanding this case back to district court and forcing the parties in the court just to redo these issues. Again, don't either eyes a little bit more closely. Thank you, Your Honor. Okay. Where do I start? Let's talk about innocent and short. Innocent and short provision is there to protect people who are having acts computed against them to deny them coverage. You have individuals here who are not being asserted. There's no claim that there was somehow a claim being made against them that somehow should be used to exclude coverage. But there is no exclusion here. Your Honor, I just have to disagree with you. It's a timing for the purposes of determining the limit of liability that's available. It's not timing to determine when the claim was made because we know when the civil rights, right, for purposes of the limit of liability. And even to get to related claim, you have the threshold burden of determining that these claims were in fact related. They're not related. You have different parties involved. You have different acts. You have different time. You have different relief being sought. I mean, the civil rights action is talking about the nine free speech in 2007 and 2008. But you're reading out the, you're assuming that related claims is to find differently from the way it is. It's to find very broadly. Is it not? Well, it is as an exclusion, it needs to be interpreted strictly against them. And there are other cases that have looked at the same issue. And you look at the cases that we've cited and have different provisions
. Your Honor, I just have to disagree with you. It's a timing for the purposes of determining the limit of liability that's available. It's not timing to determine when the claim was made because we know when the civil rights, right, for purposes of the limit of liability. And even to get to related claim, you have the threshold burden of determining that these claims were in fact related. They're not related. You have different parties involved. You have different acts. You have different time. You have different relief being sought. I mean, the civil rights action is talking about the nine free speech in 2007 and 2008. But you're reading out the, you're assuming that related claims is to find differently from the way it is. It's to find very broadly. Is it not? Well, it is as an exclusion, it needs to be interpreted strictly against them. And there are other cases that have looked at the same issue. And you look at the cases that we've cited and have different provisions. Every related claims provision is not the same. Well, if you accept their position, Your Honor, what you're telling nonprofits, you're telling bureaus, you're telling anybody who has awarded directives with these types of provision that any time they get a letter, a postcard, an email from someone complaining about a pothole, complaining about the police harass me that you have to put that even though it's not a claim. It's not a lawsuit. There's no coverage. They have to send all of us to this, and sure is because five years from now, when a civil rights action is brought completely and totally different facts, the insurer is going to say, well, didn't, you know, in their civil rights complaint, they talked about how the bureau didn't fix their pothole in 2005. That was a claim. You should have noticed us in 2005. You've made the coverage completely illusory by doing that. On the issue of the, as I stumble here on this, the, the, what we addressed in the opposition was that letters were not a lawsuit. That's what we addressed. We didn't invite mandamus. We had no opportunity to explain to the court why, and I know my time's up if I could just finish this thought, we had no opportunity to explain to the trial court why the mandamus action was not related. We explained why the letters weren't and the district court rejected that. They didn't reject it because there's nothing in the opinion, but he didn't rely on that. He relied on the mandamus action, which was first submitted and argued in the reply
. We didn't get an opportunity. And if some adjustment we would have gotten an opportunity, we would have been able to discovery on the policy. We would have been able to convince the court that he can't do what he did, which is read out sections of policies that are directed for these specific issues. So I apologize for going over. All right. Thank you. Thank you very much. We'll take the case under advisement