My name is Karen Buker and I represent the appellant Kenneth Bradford and with a college permit you and I'll like to reserve two minutes for rebuttal. This is the case where the talent was on parole and if you search just help without a valid warrant. So the question in this case is whether or not at the time from Mr. Bradford's conviction which was in 1998 was the search and invalid parole search and if so were his attorneys ineffective failing to argue that during the trial and on that pill. And the answer to that question is yes in 1998 there was US Supreme Court authority which provided that even though parolees had a diminished expectation prior to see it wasn't totally eliminated and any search and parolee parolees still had to be reasonable under the force amendment and reasonedowness was you have to have some sort of suspicion. Now in this case there was no evidence that the police knew that there was a crime being committed inside his home at the time and during the trial his attorney relied on people versus Reyes which is a California Supreme Court case which held that California parolees do not have an expectation of privacy. He's conceded that it was a valid parole search and argued on other grounds but attorney have to rely on federal law. Federal law in that state law provides or governs the extent of protection the force amendment provides and he relied on the state law versus the federal law and in Crawford this Court a couple of months ago it's something very interesting. The Court noted California's ruling is quite possibly wrong
. Excuse me? Also quite possibly wrong. People versus Reyes? Cuff it. I don't believe so many. Interesting that quite possibly wrong. Well in this case what I'm referring to the Court said noted that the California court is ruling in people versus Reyes that parolees have no expectation of privacy and found a search of California parole was comport with the demands of the federal constitution and there's one sentence in Crawford that sums up my entire argument and I must court this questions I don't have anything for you to say so to repeat him what I want to make. You know okay Crawford came down and if you're going to choice ineffective I guess he would have had to know that at the time that at the time he was reading that federal law required a search on reasonable suspicion at the time right and what you're arguing as Crawford says that was the law at the time. Is that your argument? The argument is the law at the time was Griffin versus Wisconsin. That was the law in 1998
. The person who was Griffin versus Wisconsin was decided in 1987. Mr. Graduate was convicted in 1998. How has Griffin clearly established that a parolee is entitled to a search based on reasonable suspicion? Because in that case it clearly stated that that was a probation case but even probationers have expectation of privacy everyone does. But it didn't. Yeah okay. He didn't say parolee is entitled to a search based on reasonable suspicion. That's what would have to be clearly established right for the counsels to be ineffective and not knowing that
. I mean you have to do a few steps to get Griffin to control the situation don't you? Well in Crawford this Court did say that both Griffin and I's which is the case that came down later. And I said also after the time this counsel that's the time of the State Court proceeding. The lawyer was having to anticipate nights and Crawford. Those two cases. He would have had to anticipate those two cases. No. Are you alright? I just feel I believe. You can work
. I mean if you're alive and the latest case from the California Supreme Court. So it's not like he missed the case. He was well all of the cases. What he didn't do. Is that he didn't anticipate that the law would develop in a particular direction. That night would say what it said. And then that Crawford would say what it said. Or the Crawford would stay on the box
. I think nights disconferred. Well nights disconferred. Conferred what Griffith had to say. The law was always there. Reasons this vision is always required. Well the nights said reason was precious enough. They didn't say you need reasons to mention. Night said nothing of a sort
. For that just happened to be what the scandal was at night. And they said oh well now you don't need public cars. Reasons was suspicious enough. They could have said nothing enough too. We don't know. They were addressing the question of whether the police could just knock on the door randomly and say hey, you're a parley. We feel like looking at your house today. That question wasn't presented in lights
. I see the only way you win this. If you can show that there is some clearly established law that he missed. And I'm telling you that from my point of view I didn't see it in Griffith. So you see it somewhere else you can explain to me how Griffith makes it clear. Not just an implication from Griffith. Which I think is what Crawford says. There's an implication in Griffith. But I don't think implications enough to show an effective assistance
. My reading of the case was clear to me that from my reading that reasonable suspicion is required in order to serve a probably appropriate probationer. Based on what? State law for the law. What is it that gave you that conviction? The site that I have is not good enough. The site I have is a Griffith 40, 483 at 880 through 881. And you based on crime on Griffith? Yes. And then as time went by, nights came down and confirmed with Griffith had to stay. Then after nights. But again, Griffith was like nights
. It was a case where they said this is good enough. They didn't say well that's quiet. I'm sorry, Your Honor. Griffith was a case where they said reasonable grounds, reasonable suspicion is good enough. They didn't say it's required. They simply said no more is required. There's nothing about it that said you couldn't have adopted the standard of California then. Which is another standard
. Another standard being we can do it all you want, so long as not arbitrary pressures. That's the case. Nothing in Griffith is a part of that. You are right. I read it differently. I would have to pull the case and find the exact quote from Rurali. Did you like to look at the case? Here it is. Carbass. I'm sorry? Here it is. Have you had your own copy? I don't know if it was a chance for five or six. I only have two minutes left. Okay. Good morning, Your Honor. I would like to point out that the time the suppression hearing was made, people versus raise, reasonable suspicion was not required for an otherwise warrantless parole search. The California Supreme Court ruled that a search was reasonable and knew the force amendment unless it was found arbitrary and capricious. In this instance, Petitus Council did actually argue in the suppression motion and at the hearing, they tried to distinguish raise on the basis that this search was not a parole search at the time it was based on a warrant
. I'm sorry? Here it is. Have you had your own copy? I don't know if it was a chance for five or six. I only have two minutes left. Okay. Good morning, Your Honor. I would like to point out that the time the suppression hearing was made, people versus raise, reasonable suspicion was not required for an otherwise warrantless parole search. The California Supreme Court ruled that a search was reasonable and knew the force amendment unless it was found arbitrary and capricious. In this instance, Petitus Council did actually argue in the suppression motion and at the hearing, they tried to distinguish raise on the basis that this search was not a parole search at the time it was based on a warrant. However, the court indicated that it was not going to go with that argument and that it was going to follow California Supreme Court authority for a pressman at the time based on the trial court's inclinations to agree with the prosecutor, the Petitus Council changed his tactics and decided to argue that it was an arbitrary and capricious search. His change in tactic was reasonable and was not ineffective as the system of the council. He did attempt to distinguish the currently existing California Supreme Court authority. However, based on that apparent failure of that argument, he proceeded to follow with the most maritalist argument he could make at the time. I was trying to see whether the first argument or the main argument may be necessary to resolve it and I was trying to figure out whether the trial court had actually found reasonable suspicion. She didn't say so, but she had this hearing. She listened to the informant as well as the detective and then I looked at the language in the warrant which has specific things to say about Mr. Radford
. However, the court indicated that it was not going to go with that argument and that it was going to follow California Supreme Court authority for a pressman at the time based on the trial court's inclinations to agree with the prosecutor, the Petitus Council changed his tactics and decided to argue that it was an arbitrary and capricious search. His change in tactic was reasonable and was not ineffective as the system of the council. He did attempt to distinguish the currently existing California Supreme Court authority. However, based on that apparent failure of that argument, he proceeded to follow with the most maritalist argument he could make at the time. I was trying to see whether the first argument or the main argument may be necessary to resolve it and I was trying to figure out whether the trial court had actually found reasonable suspicion. She didn't say so, but she had this hearing. She listened to the informant as well as the detective and then I looked at the language in the warrant which has specific things to say about Mr. Radford. Is there any way to put that together to find that there really was a finding of reasonable suspicion or is it lacking? It doesn't appear in the record that there was a specific finding of reasonable suspicion. In fact, there was a problem with the record and that it wasn't even clear initially whether the trial court had denied this a question motion and then it had to be determined later. It was recent back to the trial court where the trial court did say that it had denied the suppression motion because there was no arbitrary and it ruled that it wasn't arbitrary and capricious. The officer searched. But according to California Supreme Court is already at the time, there didn't have to be reasonable suspicion because of the parole search and so the trial court didn't have to make a finding of reasonable suspicion because the trial court was going with the California Supreme Court. I guess the last thing you knew is, can we tell from this record that there was reasonable suspicion? Or is it not possible to? The problem is that the hearings were held in camera and I think that makes it very difficult to determine whether there was reasonable suspicion or not. I think that it's, impliedly, the trial court may have found reasonable suspicion but without knowing what actually occurred during the in-camera hearings with but the detective and the informant is difficult to tell. So I don't know
. Is there any way to put that together to find that there really was a finding of reasonable suspicion or is it lacking? It doesn't appear in the record that there was a specific finding of reasonable suspicion. In fact, there was a problem with the record and that it wasn't even clear initially whether the trial court had denied this a question motion and then it had to be determined later. It was recent back to the trial court where the trial court did say that it had denied the suppression motion because there was no arbitrary and it ruled that it wasn't arbitrary and capricious. The officer searched. But according to California Supreme Court is already at the time, there didn't have to be reasonable suspicion because of the parole search and so the trial court didn't have to make a finding of reasonable suspicion because the trial court was going with the California Supreme Court. I guess the last thing you knew is, can we tell from this record that there was reasonable suspicion? Or is it not possible to? The problem is that the hearings were held in camera and I think that makes it very difficult to determine whether there was reasonable suspicion or not. I think that it's, impliedly, the trial court may have found reasonable suspicion but without knowing what actually occurred during the in-camera hearings with but the detective and the informant is difficult to tell. So I don't know. With regard to the California Court's decisions not being contrary to currently just to U.S. Supreme Court authority, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in Andreate versus Lockyer that the relevance, that the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of the relevant California Court decisions are the clearly established authority that should be followed under a data. And here, the only clearly established
. With regard to the California Court's decisions not being contrary to currently just to U.S. Supreme Court authority, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in Andreate versus Lockyer that the relevance, that the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of the relevant California Court decisions are the clearly established authority that should be followed under a data. And here, the only clearly established. Yeah, but that doesn't work quite within an effective assistance of council claim because whereas you may be an effective councilman in effective for missing relevant authorities, sometimes council can be effective for missing future developments in the law. I mean, after all, the way future developments in the law get to be relevant to law because some lawyer is smart enough to see the laws changing, raise an objection, set it up for a deal presented and eventually it just takes. So I don't think we can look at time. I think what we have to do, even with Ed Pineplace, is to ask the question is, what would a reasonable lawyer at the time of the hearing in this case, the suppression hearing in this case, what would the lawyer have argued? Would he have limited himself to the California standard based on the risk of the Supreme Court case? Or would he have raised the law, but no, I think the law requires more, requires his suppression and basically raise the car for kind of argument. I think that is included within, within, in effect, assistance. I think it's in you know, just when he comes to the edge of the current president, you don't just fall off. I think you do have some responsibility to look at the future. But in this case, it sounds something like it's really the way around the corner
. Yeah, but that doesn't work quite within an effective assistance of council claim because whereas you may be an effective councilman in effective for missing relevant authorities, sometimes council can be effective for missing future developments in the law. I mean, after all, the way future developments in the law get to be relevant to law because some lawyer is smart enough to see the laws changing, raise an objection, set it up for a deal presented and eventually it just takes. So I don't think we can look at time. I think what we have to do, even with Ed Pineplace, is to ask the question is, what would a reasonable lawyer at the time of the hearing in this case, the suppression hearing in this case, what would the lawyer have argued? Would he have limited himself to the California standard based on the risk of the Supreme Court case? Or would he have raised the law, but no, I think the law requires more, requires his suppression and basically raise the car for kind of argument. I think that is included within, within, in effect, assistance. I think it's in you know, just when he comes to the edge of the current president, you don't just fall off. I think you do have some responsibility to look at the future. But in this case, it sounds something like it's really the way around the corner. I agree that it is really the problem. I'm sorry, you want to? It's really the problem, it's really the way around the corner. They would really what they've had with the fact would dissipate this car for them. And I just paid what none of us yet know is what a car for this would be. It's going to be the last word on this issue. I agree with your honor. I do agree on the Strickland that you know, Council's duty is to try to make arguments that he thinks will succeed. I don't think the Strickland requires for you to have effectiveness as Council that your Council be the most clever or come up with the most normal argument
. I agree that it is really the problem. I'm sorry, you want to? It's really the problem, it's really the way around the corner. They would really what they've had with the fact would dissipate this car for them. And I just paid what none of us yet know is what a car for this would be. It's going to be the last word on this issue. I agree with your honor. I do agree on the Strickland that you know, Council's duty is to try to make arguments that he thinks will succeed. I don't think the Strickland requires for you to have effectiveness as Council that your Council be the most clever or come up with the most normal argument. I think, under Strickland is an objective standard of reasonableness. And in this case, Council did try to distinguish the Calc. It was a regular clunky clunky counsel standard. Yes, you're under the regular clunky clunky counsel standard. I think Council here did try to distinguish California Supreme Court authority and based on current United States Supreme Court authority at the time, I think he was effective in proceeding with an obternt, I think he was just argument and might have trial courts, argument, excuse me, and might have the trial courts responses. If the court states that the court court has been on the books of the time and final, of course it was not have been binding. That's correct, Your Honor. But you agree with the or not that if it existed out here, as press of them, Council at that point should have argued the court for theory in the hopes that it could be set up for possible trial in the United States Supreme Court
. I think, under Strickland is an objective standard of reasonableness. And in this case, Council did try to distinguish the Calc. It was a regular clunky clunky counsel standard. Yes, you're under the regular clunky clunky counsel standard. I think Council here did try to distinguish California Supreme Court authority and based on current United States Supreme Court authority at the time, I think he was effective in proceeding with an obternt, I think he was just argument and might have trial courts, argument, excuse me, and might have the trial courts responses. If the court states that the court court has been on the books of the time and final, of course it was not have been binding. That's correct, Your Honor. But you agree with the or not that if it existed out here, as press of them, Council at that point should have argued the court for theory in the hopes that it could be set up for possible trial in the United States Supreme Court. I think that's an arguable point. I think that based on the fact that Crawford is not binding and it's not United States Supreme Court authority, I think that an attorney would have discretion in whether he would choose to actually argue that law, Crawford's not binding on California courts, and I think it would not be ineffective as sensitive to counsel to choose not to argue that authority in my case that it wasn't binding on California courts and it wasn't United States Supreme Court authority. Either way if someone chose to argue to choose not to, I think it would not be ineffective if they chose not to. Your Honor, have no further questions, also then. Thank you. And the book, please. You are looking at Giffin. I think this was your looking at
. I think that's an arguable point. I think that based on the fact that Crawford is not binding and it's not United States Supreme Court authority, I think that an attorney would have discretion in whether he would choose to actually argue that law, Crawford's not binding on California courts, and I think it would not be ineffective as sensitive to counsel to choose not to argue that authority in my case that it wasn't binding on California courts and it wasn't United States Supreme Court authority. Either way if someone chose to argue to choose not to, I think it would not be ineffective if they chose not to. Your Honor, have no further questions, also then. Thank you. And the book, please. You are looking at Giffin. I think this was your looking at. I'm going to start off with Crawford. There's a sentence in Crawford that says, given the holdings and nights and Griffin, the court finds that at least reasonable suspicion is required to justify the search of the parole and that's that page 714-715. I know that you didn't go back to Griffin like I actually. Is it a way? To find what the sentences are. We've got to Griffin and the judge around has sometimes has a way of overreading precedent. And within Griffin right now under the pressure of the court, there was a different reading precedent for the full value. What is the thing Griffin? Griffin, you could possibly refer to. In the case right now, I sit in there, I couldn't find exactly which except for in the head mode, which says, all that is required is that the information provided indicates as it adhere, the likelihood of facts justifying the search, which means to me you need reasonable suspicion and its pages 875- All that is required doesn't mean that less would know that all those are quiet in this case
. There's nothing, nothing Griffin that says a stand could be lower. He just says the stand that's there, which is lower than Powell Claus is okay. So are we know nothing's okay too? I just read it a little bit differently to me what is required is reasonable suspicion and I'll also be on my brief. Good enough. I have a question