Legal Case Summary

Okay, did you back here again, bro? Good morning. I'm pleased the court. My name is Barry Diller. I represent the Appellants, Andrew and Karen Carmen. I respectfully request to reserve four minutes if I may. We have three major points on which we believe the district court in this case made fundamental errors. First, the district court should have granted the carmains who were the plaintiffs a directed verdict. With respect to their claim that Trooper Carroll, the defendant, had entered their curtilage specifically their backyard and back deck which was attached to their home. Without a warrant or any other exception to the requirement for a warrant. That's really stipulated. That doesn't necessarily get you a verdict. But I thought there's no argument. He admitted he had no warrant as a partner. It wasn't as a partner, but the other trooper arrived there. Roberts, I guess, said they did not have a warrant. And they, I guess you're saying you wanted the judge to tell the jury that where they went was included within the curtilage. Is that it? Yes. I felt that on these undisputed facts that they agreed with that we win. Well, I thought Councils and trial did agree that that was the curtilage. That wasn't the issue. Right. That's right. So that wasn't the issue. But that one gets your directed verdict. I guess maybe I'm not understanding. You were saying that one of the judge have instructed the jury that where Officer Carroll went was the curtilage. Not that that was the directed verdict. Is that the verdict would be something that I haven't mastered that. Something more than that. No, we want that a verdict. One said that. That's kind of why you're in the case. Right. We ask very specifically for a directed verdict. The jury would still have to assess damages. So we have to vacate the current judgment in order to bring the trial that processed back to when you made a motion for a directed verdict. That's right. You're not asking for a new trial. I'm sorry. You're not asking for a new trial. You're asking for damages on this record. What do you want? Well, no, I wouldn't need a new trial to assess damages. But I believe that the appropriate remedy here would be a remand with a direction to enter judge to enter a verdict for the current verdict. Vacate the current verdict and judgment

. And enter a judgment in your favor. That's correct. Directed verdict. That's correct. With the trial determining the amount of the judgment. That's the judgment for it. Yes. And that is because the facts weren't disputed that Trooper Carroll in the absence of warrant consent or exigency chose to go to the backyard, to the back deck. Instead of to the front where there is with societal norms. That's where I'm losing you. Didn't he have a right or cases at hold that you can go through the back door if that's the entrance that's used as a regular entrance? The cases which say that first of all, the third circuit has said that might be the case. That might be the case. That might be the case. But the whole set of verdict. Because because all of those cases, even the most liberal toward the police and permitting that say first, the police must go to the front. Unless there is some tangible reason why the front is obviously not where. Well, he said, this is exactly what you said, they do a cars park along the side and the back and. That's right. So for instance, and we have the photographs as part of the record. And I have the original photographs that they will help. So that they're at the front. There is a pathway of paving stones right to the front porch. Where anyone knows by virtue of living in this society, if I'm calling on someone, I go to their front door. I knock on the door. The police know that in every single case says that that's what the police must do. Even in those circumstances where they are subsequently permitted to check the back, it is first where they have come to the front, knocked on the door and received no answer. If there's any question of fact, you don't get the directed verdict. If there's any legitimate question of fact. Are you suggesting that my learned colleague from the Jersey would interject into the record and illegitimate question of fact? I'm not always from Jersey. He wouldn't do that. Despite New Jersey, I'm not suggesting. I am suggesting if the trooper got on the witness stand blanked, went like crosses fingers and said there was no front door that that wouldn't be legitimate. I'm saying that... But as you approach the house, they approach the house from, I guess you look at it in front, they approach it from the left side. Correct. And actually, as I understand the record, the police vehicle made a left turn into the property. Made a right turn. I'm sorry, I see a correction. And that was a paved area where there were some cars parked. Yes, so that, for instance, if.

.. It's kind of like the door knocker, which is an invitation of this is my front door. When you have a paved area and there are cars, there are already parts. Aren't you invited to go into that area and park your car there? No, because... Well, listen to the question that you say no to. I'm sorry. Listen to your answer to the question that wasn't asked. The question was, maybe, and prep me if I'm wrong. The question was, aren't you invited to go into the area and park your car there? And you're saying no. Oh, yes, okay. You're invited to park your car there. But then you're not invited after parking to say, you know what? I'm not going to go to the front. I'm not going to go to the pathway to the front door. I will cut across the grass in the backyard. I will walk onto the back deck, which is attached to a sliding door to the back of the house and see if anyone's there. That's... that the invitation, the societal implicit invitation, does not extend back. Well, it doesn't matter. Didn't the church... had in the church already occurred before they got to the point where Mr. Curle came out? Not Mr. Curle. Mr. Curle. Mr. Curle. Well, the church for the car had already occurred. They'd entered into the garage. There'd been a breach, if you will, of the garage. And so first, they looked for the car, which they had a license plate and made a number. And it wasn't there. Then they looked in the car port, which is on the side after they've made that right turn to be on the left side of the house. What made you... but when they pulled in with the police vehicle, aren't they already in the Cradle Ligeria? Well, to the extent that you consider someone's driveway the Cradle Ligeria, I suppose you could say yes. And when they step out of the car, they're walking on the Cradle Ligeria

. But all of the cases say... incidentally, the cases are mixed in their language about what is or isn't the Cradle Ligeria. But assuming the worst for me that even that driveway or that side parking area is Cradle Ligeria, the implicit societal norm, which the Supreme Court has recognized, and this Court has recognized, says, well, doesn't say, well, once you have entered into a parking area, now Cradle Ligeria's fair game, nothing of the sort. In fact, when you get in the front door, the door knocker is inside the Cradle Ligeria. You've got to go inside the Cradle Ligeria to get to the door. That's right. So if that is Cradle Liger, that aspect of entering into Cradle Ligeria is permitted because that's what we do. That's where Girl Scouts come. That's where I knock on my neighbor's door. So there's no dispute that the front door was... the path to the front door was clearly marked that police officer vehicle and police officers wherever they parked the car, they've got to go back around to the front door knocker. That's right. That's exactly right. It's not disputed. And it's not disputed that all of that was there. It's not disputed that they didn't do that. It's not disputed that they walked across the backyard. It's not disputed that they went up the steps to the deck, which is attached to the home. None of that is under dispute. And that's why we said it's not part of this appeal. We actually moved to some rejudgment. What if somebody were sitting in that back deck area just sitting there and police officers pulled up in their vehicle and there is a front door but they notice somebody sitting out a male, let's say, on that back porch? Well, they probably wouldn't see it not being able to get into the backyard to see it. But if they could... They were pretty close with the car was parked to the backyard. Both are not a huge plot. Well, take the hypothetical. Supposing they do have somebody there. Do they still have to go to the front door? Well, I think they could say hello and then you judge by reaction. But in fact, there was no one on the back porch. In fact, there was no one who gave any kind of implicit consent either by their friendly response. Let's hello back to you. The police simply decided to look around and go in the back. And the pictures are clear in the appendix and even clearer in the color photos. There's no path in the back to that deck. There is no path. And those are in these photographs. They can see it's just grass

. They chose not to go to the Courage. I mean, not to go to the front, excuse me. Is this for a property trespass type issue or is it expectation of privacy issue? Well, it is both. We don't have a state law trespass cause of action because the federal courts would not have jurisdiction over state law claims. There's a whole lot of expectation of privacy in the back yard. It's open to the public. Everybody sees it. It's not open to the public. And the cases are very clear that it is a complete expectation of privacy. I believe that it was the Supreme Court earlier this year in Florida against Jordanis, which basically said that it is psychologically part of the home. So that there was that complete expectation of privacy. It's a manifestation of privacy. I mean, you wouldn't expect people to be snooping around in your back yard. Right. Right. And then when Mr. Florida was right in his school. Right. And then when Mr. Carmen comes out on his deck, his entitled to say, get off my property. But in this case, the police did not give him that that courtesy and would not get off. It would not let him. What's your remedy here now? The remedy that I'm asking from this court. No, from the district court. Well, the remedy would be grant judgment on the entry on the court of the claim and on the unreasonable seizure claim. And let a jury, uh, instruct the jury. Uh, that I have found for the plaintiff. You must find for the plaintiff. And now it is your job to assess damages. We don't know why the district court decided the way it did on the directed verdict question. Um, I, I think the district court. Um, and if we look at the jury instruction that it crafted on knocking, knocking talk, took accurate language from some of the cases that says. Uh, a police officer might in some circumstances, uh, enter the cartilage. And so said the district court and its reading said, well, that might be okay. But if you read those cases a little more carefully, it might be okay. If at, if first the police officer went to the front, knocked on the door, received no answer. And some other reason to think the occupants are probably in the back. Maybe he hears music back there. Or something of that nature. Thank you. You saved better time. I think so. Thank you

. I'm sure I heard from you again. Good morning, your honors. Counsel may it please the court. I'm Sean Kirkpatrick here with the Pennsylvania Office Attorney General here on behalf of. True per car. And there seems to be perhaps maybe some confusion in the records. I just want to make one fact clear before I begin. On page 79 of the appendix. True per car. I'll just read it quick. We parked the next available spot where we could park our car, which was at the rear of the property. The far rear of the property and we exited our vehicles at that point. From where he parked the car. Do you see the. Yes, Sean. This was this property was on a. As a jury found and again, this is this is a jury verdict that is being asked to overturn. This was a there was the main road where parking was not permitted and then there was a side street. Running along the left hand side. So they turned right. They passed a number of vehicles and the next available parking spot was at the far we are. They parked on the driveway basically. It looks like they parked in the area of the side of the driveway. Well, whether it was a side street or a driveway, it extended to the far rear of the property. But together they had to go past the front of the house. Yes, they did your honor, but they couldn't park there. But there's parking in the back where you can see the harsh excuse you from going through the front door. Yes, your honor. Well, how in the world because the two they see the work the front door. How why because the office would make a decision to park the side of the house. Oh, what I'm at the side of the house is where I parked my vehicle. I want to exit my vehicle and go to the part which is closest, which is this sliding glass door from which point I can see inside the guys house. Rather than walking around to the front porch. That's what you're arguing. See the donut argument I guess. I don't want to exercise and go to the front door. No, your honor. The ultimate touchdown of Fourth Amendment is reasonfulness. So the question is... Why is there reason for the police to decide that where they parked the car defines the part of the car to have a license to enter? Because in order to get to the front door, they would have had to walk on more of the car to get to the front door. So they would have had to go to the private part of the premises, the back door, because that way they'd trample on less grass

. That's what you're arguing? What I'm arguing, your honor, is that police should not be robots. They should not follow a set to fine path that says in every circumstances you must go to the front door. Why not? Because I want my police officers to be reasonable, your honor. What's unreasonable about saying, given the Fourth Amendment protection that we have, they got to go to the front door and less something happens that either forgives that obligation or gives rise to a license when the reasonable officer would assume would dispel that obligation and allow you to go to the side door. And there is that reasonable license in this case. The jury found that it was reasonable, given the circumstances, that the first where they parked and where they were heading to, the first building that they came to was the garage, which looked occupied. So instead of even going to the house, they first stopped at the garage. What did they do when they got to the garage? They announced their presence and looked to see if it was, in fact, a occupier. The girl said he entered. He stuck his head in the garage. He poked his head in the garage to see if it was occupying. Why is the whole thing of the Courtaillage in the front door irrelevant because there's already been an entry into the garage before we even get to the side door? He was merely looking into the garage in order to see if it was occupied. He wasn't searching. They weren't looking for drugs and looking for an occupant. They were trying to do an occupant. They were searching for an occupant. Absolutely, Your Honor. In Marasco, we adopted the Anakitao doctor and in fact the officers there went to the front door first. How do you get around Marasco in this case? Well, I believe in, I think you're presenting an argument of expediency rather than... We really are. Are these requirements? You're speaking of expediency and convenience. Well, no, Your Honor. And therefore reasonable. You're arguing because it's expedient and convenient, it is therefore reasonable, which may apply outside the fourth memo context. But that's really what you're arguing. Clothes is to the back door. Why should I trample the guys long and go to the front door? It's easier in less of a trespass, less of an intrusion to go to the closest door, which happens to be the sliding glass door through, which I can see into their kitchen and eating area. It's easier. Well, the fact of this that were found by the jury in this case was that the back porch and the sliding glass door appeared to be the customary entrance. That doesn't answer the question. That one or not that Augusta gets the jury charge, I want to ask you about, but that doesn't really answer the question. Why isn't it true that the situation here is what Dr. Fuentes just suggested that what is the most convenient and the easiest becomes and for the amendment of parlance? What is reasonable? That's what you're arguing. Well, what I'm arguing your honor, and I'm hoping to mention your question, is that what is reasonable is what would a reasonable officer have done given the exact same circumstance and given the restrictions of the fourth amendment? And given the restrictions of the fourth amendment? Obviously, they couldn't go and search the entire backyard. If they couldn't go through a gate, but this is not a situation in which they park in the front yard, or they park in the front street, they bypass the front door, they go around back to look around and then knock on the back door. Why isn't that exactly the situation we have? They could have parked in the front, and this thing was no place to park. Maybe it's different outside of Philadelphia, but I have not that familiar with the practice that police officers park only in areas that are allowed for parking. They park the car wherever they want to stop the car. You're saying they couldn't stop the car? You're not saying that, Officer Curie was saying. He couldn't park the car in front of the house because it was no place to park. He's in the street

. He could have just pulled over and stopped right there. But your honor isn't that weighing the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. No, I'm not saying he was dishonest on what he was saying, although he did say it was electricity and a garage that had no electricity. I'm not getting there. I'm simply saying that he said he couldn't park in front of the house. And I don't know why, given the limitations of the fourth amendment, he couldn't just stop the car and get out of it in front of the house. He decided to go to the back of the house and I'm not falling in for that. It looked like it was, that's where the park area was. That's fine. But the fact that he made that decision, it was back to Judge Ford cases earlier question. The fact that he took a partner himself and made that decision to park his car there, rather than in front of the house. And bypass the front door doesn't then somehow give him a license to treat the back door as the front door just because he happens to be closer because that's where he got out of his car. But that comes down to a fact question. I mean, that's the facts are not disputed. Everything I said to you was agreed. I think Mr. Dilawar agreed to it. It's consistent with Charles testimony. That's what he said. I mean, except he's testimony is given. Yes. I do not read the fourth amendment as requiring police to violate traffic laws and park the cars in the front when there's no parking. How long have you been flooded out here today? Today? Well, I came in last night. Oh, good boy. It's not for you. But the truth is, they don't have valid the parking laws and they're going to only park the car in areas reserved for parking. Yes. I'm sure that there are a little more civil than some of the consabular and familiar with. But that still gets back to the point of does that decision on their part transform the nature, the private nature and the reasonable list of the expectation of privacy of that back door? Is that transform it somehow because that's happens to be where they got out of the car? Yes, you're on. And the reason why is because based upon where the parking is, what you're looking at the house in order to get to the house, you have to go past the back door. You have to go through the back door. Why wouldn't they just be traced and not suggesting they had to do this on you? But given your position, they could have just retraced the steps in the street. Just walk back along the pavement and then go into the front of the house, never even, never even setting foot in the side yard. Again, I'm not suggesting the long car is that, but given your argument, they could have done that. Yes, Your Honor. I mean, the question comes down to can the police get their feet wet? I'm sorry, I think they can. Can the police get their feet wet? Can they touch the do in the grass? And I'm not saying that in every situation, that's appropriate. I'm just saying that the jury found in this situation that this was their approach to the house in order to do a knock and talk. What was the question to the jury that you're, what do you mean the jury found that in this situation, that's what the officers say was appropriate? Were they given a specific factual question? What they gave, what the court gave the jury, and this was not part of the record, but it's document 72 down below. Do you find the defendant, Jeremy Carroll, and constitutionally entered upon plaintiff's property in back deck? Now, this was based upon the jury instruction that the district court pulled language out of the state of Smith. And going back to the law, and then just Mickey may have a question about the charge, but I wanted to ask you this thing. Every circuit that has looked at this issue of knock and talk, three circuits, including ours in Morocco, the first circuit, the eight circuit, and two separate of things, as I said, you've got to do the knock and talk first. I'd be at the fine, and a federal appellate court that has said, for expediency's sake, you might be able to go in the back door and ignore the front door

. Well, could you respond to this weight of authority against you? Absolutely, Your Honor. What they were doing was a knock and talk. The question is not whether they were doing a knock and talk from our position. It was that they were engaged in the knock and talk. It was just a knock and talk to the back door. No, no. No, no. Knock and talk doesn't surprise me. It's a knock to the back door. It's a front door thing. It's so related to the Fourth Amendment and the expectation of privacy because of the old knocker thing. You know, we put the knock on it. Means this is where you're invited. This is where the mail can be posted. You can drop the mail. This is where I, unfortunately, people can solicit. It's here, the front door. You've got to go there. Is it for what the cases are saying? Well, the cases are saying that. And then, of course, if there is reasonable grounds to go beyond the front door to the back door, then you set forth the grounds. But you got to go to the front door first is what I read these cases to say. I do not read the cases as because the cases, first of all, don't specify what is the front door of every stage. You know what the front door is in this case. You're not arguing that they weren't sure where the front door was. No, you're on it. But what I am arguing is that each case has facts that are specific to it. There is the layout of the property. There is where you're coming from. Let's look at the layout. Where was the sidewalk? I don't know that there was a sidewalk. Are you talking about the... Exhibit 20. Exhibit 20, maybe 22. Are you talking about the gravel area? 22. What's the appendix page? I don't know. It is hit find in Adobe. It takes me there. 22. I have 255. Okay. I see what you're saying

. Yeah. The pathway to the porch. Not? Yes. Yes. In order to get there, they would have had to walk past the backyard. They would have to walk past the back deck. They would have had to walk past the side of the house in order to get that pathway to walk to the front door. I don't know. My pictures must be wrong. They made a right turn onto the property owner's driveway. Yes. They were there looking at the side of the house. The left was the deck to the right was the porch. No, you're wrong. I clarify that for you. Okay. If you look on page 79 of the record. Give me the exhibit number. It's not a picture because there is no picture of where they parked. It says that they parked at the far rear of the property. Now this was past the house. This was past the carport. This wasn't at the side of the house where they had a decision. I can either go right to the front door or I can go left to the back door. It wasn't on the street. It was on the property itself. Oh, yes, absolutely. It was. They pulled in. They went past the house because of the cars. They continued going and they parked at the far rear of the property. But to get there, they must have gone through that porch with the steers leading up to a center door. Well, they drove past it. Yes. And I'm maybe I'm slow today because there was a full moon tonight. I'm still trying to figure out why the fact that they drove past the front door prevents them from walking back to the front door. And you're saying that it would have been more of an intrusion to do that, even though the case is maybe quite of that initial attempt where it's more of an intrusion to do it. You can go to the what is obviously well, let's forget that. It's not obviously the back door. You can forget that intrusion where the officer on the scene concludes well. Yeah, that's the front door, but it's less intrusive for me to go to that door, the private living area. And it also appeared from the layout and the facts of the case that the back door was used by visitors and people who parked there. And I can point to the record where you know they testified to that

. Well, you know, it's used and that's interesting. I know they did testify of that, but it's a think about it. It seems to me that almost any side door by that mission is used by visitors, otherwise you wouldn't need a door there. And the door is there so people can come in out of it. So the fact that the door is used by visitors doesn't necessarily transform the side door or the back door. It really just look more like a back door than a side door. It doesn't change from the back door to the main entrance just because people also use the back door. This is a deck there. There's a sliding glass partition. It's been used to come in and out of the house, but that goes to whether there is an implied consent that they expect people who park at the far rear of the property. When they're coming towards the house, you go to the back door that they will go to the back door. Yes, and the jury garage in the meanwhile. They they thought they looked occupied. So it was right to do that. That's my that's a concerto. Have a right to do that. Yes, Your Honor, because that was the first that was the first area which appeared occupied so that they could announce the presence. If you just remember when the presence is that because he went in. We poke this at it. Okay, didn't go any focus had it. I understand this was. Okay, no. This was. He's. But to be broken your head isn't is that an entry? And there's no more. It's all the cases, even. Marasco, which is very, very limited in school. Assumes a certain set of conditions. And if those conditions exist, then there's a right to go within the court. Let's go to the front door. Knock. And then as the charge was here, there may be circumstances after that, although the judge admitted what the circumstances would be. That would allow you to test the assumption that maybe there's somebody else around back. But all of them start from the proposition. Jardine, does it? Marasco does it? Reigns is a little bit different because that's the services. So process. They all assume the officer is not going there as part of a search. The intent of the officer is not a search in the Supreme Court. That was the decision of the point of debate between the majority and. The dissent opinion because it read subjective intent into the officer's mind, which normally is not the case in fourth member jurisprudence. Justice clear red subjective intent in and said, look, if you're not going there to search, then you can do this. Here we have a case where the whole intent of going to the house is to search and they never bother to get a warrant. So I'm not even sure we need to get to the court's logist, you and the whole side do a bad good because the conditions under which they could do what you're arguing they had a right to do didn't exist. And those are the conditions. I'm not even sure the jury charge that Mr. Diller asked for was specific enough in that regard. It would have directed the jury to what it had to do if there was a legitimate knock in search or knock and talk. But I'm not even sure we have the conditions we see into a legitimate knock in talk. That's a lot to throw at you. I'm sorry, no light is on, but the truth is it takes some liberties and time to respond to that. Marriage, please. Yeah. Okay. I mean, ultimately the question is should this have gone to a jury or not? And I would disagree that their intent was to go and and not do a knock and talk. They were searching for an individual. Absolutely. I'm happy to be with you. They wanted to house the search for somebody. For a person. Yes. But they weren't going to do they weren't. The search was to knock on the door and say, have you seen this person? He's fleeing the law and this isn't addressed that he's been known to be at. Have you talked to him? Do you know where he is? It was to do an investigation. Yes, they were searching for a person. But the purpose of this was to talk to somebody on the property. Now, in order to talk to someone on the property, they had to enter the curtallage whether it be the front door or the back door. It's all curtallage. In order to get to the house in order to knock on the door and speak with someone. I assume the secret package that there were no exigen circumstances. No, and we're not saying that there was. You know, there was no warrant. There's no exigen circumstances. What we are saying that the purpose was not to search. But when the first thing they did the only thing they did was the guy in the house was search. They got consent to do that. Well, that, but that was after that was after they they got there. And it was and was with consent. No, I understand it was consent that that's not when driving at you saying they didn't go to the house to search. But the only thing that did when they got in the house. There was some cordial compensation after the search. But once I got in the house, the only thing that did was search and that's why they went there. They searched, which is what he said he went there for. Well, again, your honor. What I'm saying is not that they weren't looking for someone. I'm not saying that. I mean, they weren't

. And those are the conditions. I'm not even sure the jury charge that Mr. Diller asked for was specific enough in that regard. It would have directed the jury to what it had to do if there was a legitimate knock in search or knock and talk. But I'm not even sure we have the conditions we see into a legitimate knock in talk. That's a lot to throw at you. I'm sorry, no light is on, but the truth is it takes some liberties and time to respond to that. Marriage, please. Yeah. Okay. I mean, ultimately the question is should this have gone to a jury or not? And I would disagree that their intent was to go and and not do a knock and talk. They were searching for an individual. Absolutely. I'm happy to be with you. They wanted to house the search for somebody. For a person. Yes. But they weren't going to do they weren't. The search was to knock on the door and say, have you seen this person? He's fleeing the law and this isn't addressed that he's been known to be at. Have you talked to him? Do you know where he is? It was to do an investigation. Yes, they were searching for a person. But the purpose of this was to talk to somebody on the property. Now, in order to talk to someone on the property, they had to enter the curtallage whether it be the front door or the back door. It's all curtallage. In order to get to the house in order to knock on the door and speak with someone. I assume the secret package that there were no exigen circumstances. No, and we're not saying that there was. You know, there was no warrant. There's no exigen circumstances. What we are saying that the purpose was not to search. But when the first thing they did the only thing they did was the guy in the house was search. They got consent to do that. Well, that, but that was after that was after they they got there. And it was and was with consent. No, I understand it was consent that that's not when driving at you saying they didn't go to the house to search. But the only thing that did when they got in the house. There was some cordial compensation after the search. But once I got in the house, the only thing that did was search and that's why they went there. They searched, which is what he said he went there for. Well, again, your honor. What I'm saying is not that they weren't looking for someone. I'm not saying that. I mean, they weren't. Well, why did they go to the house? Just saying they went to the house to look for him and not to search for him. Even though it seems to me what they said was the men out used the magic word. They went there to search for him. I think they did say that. They went there to look through the house to see if they could find him. Oh, no, I disagree with that. Okay. Why did they go to the house? They went to the house to talk to the people to see if they knew where he was. And they said, nobody don't know where he is. They said they don't know where he is. And then the officer said some guy just came out and was swearing at me. Do you mind if we search your house? Okay. And they said yes. And so they searched the house. I mean, if they said no, they did not mind. They, I'm sorry, they did not mind. We have nothing to hide. Go in. Well, why shouldn't the jury have been told all this? This is coming directly out of Marasco. Where officers are pursuing a lawful objective, unconnected to any search for the, for the future instrumentalities of frontal behavior, the answering to the courage after not receiving the answer at the front door might be reasonable, essentially, into the courage, may provide the only back of a way of attempting the conduct. And seems to me the qualification language that I just read was what Mr. Diller asked for. And your objection to that was that it would have been 10 amount to a directed verdict. Jojenz has the same kind of qualification. Sculip with the same qualifier on the language in Jojenz. And I agree with you. The language may have led you a directed verdict. A few hold on a second. Let me just look at that. That's not. Do you have a appendix number for that? For his range for what I just read? Yeah, I think I just closed it. Let me have the page. Well, no, I have. I have my grief where I say to the page. I'm going to just pull that because I want to, I'm going to be clear on that. I don't want there to be any. Sorry. Rolls-offing because my computer is not doing what I wanted. I can't get to the page records. Well, if you just hold on a second, I'm trying to find my section where I talk about it. Because I cite to the directed verdict language that they wanted. I'll have you read it in a little more. Okay, my paper isn't working for me either

. Well, why did they go to the house? Just saying they went to the house to look for him and not to search for him. Even though it seems to me what they said was the men out used the magic word. They went there to search for him. I think they did say that. They went there to look through the house to see if they could find him. Oh, no, I disagree with that. Okay. Why did they go to the house? They went to the house to talk to the people to see if they knew where he was. And they said, nobody don't know where he is. They said they don't know where he is. And then the officer said some guy just came out and was swearing at me. Do you mind if we search your house? Okay. And they said yes. And so they searched the house. I mean, if they said no, they did not mind. They, I'm sorry, they did not mind. We have nothing to hide. Go in. Well, why shouldn't the jury have been told all this? This is coming directly out of Marasco. Where officers are pursuing a lawful objective, unconnected to any search for the, for the future instrumentalities of frontal behavior, the answering to the courage after not receiving the answer at the front door might be reasonable, essentially, into the courage, may provide the only back of a way of attempting the conduct. And seems to me the qualification language that I just read was what Mr. Diller asked for. And your objection to that was that it would have been 10 amount to a directed verdict. Jojenz has the same kind of qualification. Sculip with the same qualifier on the language in Jojenz. And I agree with you. The language may have led you a directed verdict. A few hold on a second. Let me just look at that. That's not. Do you have a appendix number for that? For his range for what I just read? Yeah, I think I just closed it. Let me have the page. Well, no, I have. I have my grief where I say to the page. I'm going to just pull that because I want to, I'm going to be clear on that. I don't want there to be any. Sorry. Rolls-offing because my computer is not doing what I wanted. I can't get to the page records. Well, if you just hold on a second, I'm trying to find my section where I talk about it. Because I cite to the directed verdict language that they wanted. I'll have you read it in a little more. Okay, my paper isn't working for me either. So that's good. I just got back to it. It's at 520. 520? Oh, no, now of the case. Yeah, no, I'm. Is that what you're looking for? No, I was looking for the actual language that they proper to the court. Okay. Just wait a second. That's that's. I apologize. What's the one? So you can do 28 J letter. No, no, I. Here, 214. 214 of what? Of the appendix. What they this was the supplemental proposed jury instructions. They talk about is undisputed the defendant, Carol entered the property through the backyard, came to the back deck by entering the backyard. They entered protective purtelage. Based on these facts, I instruct you that you must rule in favor both Mr. Carmen and Mrs. Carmen with respect to defendant, Carol's entry onto the property. That's a direct a verdict. That is an a jury question. In the area protected by the fourth amendment, you must decide how much compensatory damage or punitive damage to the award. So that is we're not going to leave it up to the jury. Is it not about whether the obvious reason that again, I'm sorry. Maybe that again. Based on these facts, I instruct you that you must rule in favor of both Mr. Carmen and Mrs. Carmen with respect to defendant, Carol's entry onto their property in the area protected by the fourth amendment. Okay. So what I'm saying is not that what I'm saying is that when you tell them what he's asking for is a directive for certain contested, but it could have been clever because what you're saying that yes, he entered under the curledge that does not get you a verdict. And I think he is saying we'll hear back from that given these circumstances entry upon the curledge is also a verdict. And there's a honest disagreement on how you look at that. Okay. But I guess my main point is that this was a reasonable determination. This was a jury question. It was up to the jury to decide the instructions provided, clarified what factors they were to consider and they made their decisions. The your emphasis is that it's reasonable because correctly, if I'm mistaken, the police parked the vehicle towards the rear of the house and their view was already the back of the house, yes, you're on, meaning the the deck. Yes, Ron. Okay. So I mean, for purposes of analyzing Carol's conduct, does it matter where the police parked the car in the rear or what if they parked it in front? Well, I think that would have been a different way to get the car. Well, it is, but no, but I mean, then it hinges on where the car is parked. If they park it in the front and they're looking at the porch in the front door, if they park it in the back, they're looking at the back in the porch, then the fourth amendment plays a really insignificant role

. So that's good. I just got back to it. It's at 520. 520? Oh, no, now of the case. Yeah, no, I'm. Is that what you're looking for? No, I was looking for the actual language that they proper to the court. Okay. Just wait a second. That's that's. I apologize. What's the one? So you can do 28 J letter. No, no, I. Here, 214. 214 of what? Of the appendix. What they this was the supplemental proposed jury instructions. They talk about is undisputed the defendant, Carol entered the property through the backyard, came to the back deck by entering the backyard. They entered protective purtelage. Based on these facts, I instruct you that you must rule in favor both Mr. Carmen and Mrs. Carmen with respect to defendant, Carol's entry onto the property. That's a direct a verdict. That is an a jury question. In the area protected by the fourth amendment, you must decide how much compensatory damage or punitive damage to the award. So that is we're not going to leave it up to the jury. Is it not about whether the obvious reason that again, I'm sorry. Maybe that again. Based on these facts, I instruct you that you must rule in favor of both Mr. Carmen and Mrs. Carmen with respect to defendant, Carol's entry onto their property in the area protected by the fourth amendment. Okay. So what I'm saying is not that what I'm saying is that when you tell them what he's asking for is a directive for certain contested, but it could have been clever because what you're saying that yes, he entered under the curledge that does not get you a verdict. And I think he is saying we'll hear back from that given these circumstances entry upon the curledge is also a verdict. And there's a honest disagreement on how you look at that. Okay. But I guess my main point is that this was a reasonable determination. This was a jury question. It was up to the jury to decide the instructions provided, clarified what factors they were to consider and they made their decisions. The your emphasis is that it's reasonable because correctly, if I'm mistaken, the police parked the vehicle towards the rear of the house and their view was already the back of the house, yes, you're on, meaning the the deck. Yes, Ron. Okay. So I mean, for purposes of analyzing Carol's conduct, does it matter where the police parked the car in the rear or what if they parked it in front? Well, I think that would have been a different way to get the car. Well, it is, but no, but I mean, then it hinges on where the car is parked. If they park it in the front and they're looking at the porch in the front door, if they park it in the back, they're looking at the back in the porch, then the fourth amendment plays a really insignificant role. And it matters where the car is parked as opposed to where the front door is. But is the, but again, isn't the touchdown of fourth amendment, the reasonfulness of the officers. So the reasonfulness of the officers dependent upon the factors presented to the officers. They were looking at things from their perspective. And we're looking at things from their perspective. So if you have a situation in which an officer parks in the front of the house and is walking towards the house, see I can manipulate the entrance because then I can just park the car where I want to go in. If I want to go in the back, I'll park the car in the front door. Oh, well, but then again, that comes to the reasonfulness. So if the jury finds. This is incredibly reasonable. I'm going to be a officer if it is a pity me a reasonfulness. If I park in the front, I'm going to have to go in the front door. The great stuff is going to be in the back door. I don't park around the back in that way when the back door nothing reasonable about that is. It's just please practice the world more. But why would I park in the front and restrict myself to go into the front door when I can go to the, see what's in the back door and have a better chance of finding something. So I'm just parking the back and then it's reasonable for me to go to the back. But that would be a fact for the jury that you could put in the, in front of the jury that there was plenty of parking in the front. They could have parked in the front where visitors always park, but they chose to go into the back in order to have access to the backyard. And that goes to the reasonable. And now, don't you think there should be some law that is precise about this fourth amendment rather than leaving everything up to reasonfulness. But then, then we're getting rid of some, some precisely. But then we're getting rid of the touchdown of fourth amendment. We're saying you must be robots. We don't care what the layout of the house looks like. We don't care. If there's gates or fences or whatnot, you must walk to the front door as defined by us in every single case. And you cannot knock and talk at any other door. It's kind of what we'll get to the screen that. Now, of course, I will admit, courts use the term front door. But again, it's the. I don't read any of those cases saying you must ignore all the factors that this is the reason for this. Don't say that, but they say go to the front door first. If it's blocked as an doubt, then you can go to the side door. If you hear noise in the back or you see a sign in the front saying party in the rear, well, then you can go to the rear because in that case, there's an implied license. You're being invited to go to the rear. In those kinds of cases, you clearly can go someplace else once you try to go to the front was dropping out of this conversation. It seems to me again is the off the intention of the officers if they went there to search. And this being from dry deans when it comes up in the opinion about. This issue that now for the first time, there's a subjective reason on this being read into the fourth amendment, which had not been. There before in the opinion says here, however, the question before the court is precisely whether the officers conduct was an objectively reasonable search as we have described that depends upon whether the officers had an implied license to enter the porch, which in turn depends upon the purpose for which they entered. Why shouldn't the jury have at least been told that much that you've got to look at what the motivation was for going to the back door. And even in the years in the era, the jury could find well, they went to the back door because it's the most convenient

. And it matters where the car is parked as opposed to where the front door is. But is the, but again, isn't the touchdown of fourth amendment, the reasonfulness of the officers. So the reasonfulness of the officers dependent upon the factors presented to the officers. They were looking at things from their perspective. And we're looking at things from their perspective. So if you have a situation in which an officer parks in the front of the house and is walking towards the house, see I can manipulate the entrance because then I can just park the car where I want to go in. If I want to go in the back, I'll park the car in the front door. Oh, well, but then again, that comes to the reasonfulness. So if the jury finds. This is incredibly reasonable. I'm going to be a officer if it is a pity me a reasonfulness. If I park in the front, I'm going to have to go in the front door. The great stuff is going to be in the back door. I don't park around the back in that way when the back door nothing reasonable about that is. It's just please practice the world more. But why would I park in the front and restrict myself to go into the front door when I can go to the, see what's in the back door and have a better chance of finding something. So I'm just parking the back and then it's reasonable for me to go to the back. But that would be a fact for the jury that you could put in the, in front of the jury that there was plenty of parking in the front. They could have parked in the front where visitors always park, but they chose to go into the back in order to have access to the backyard. And that goes to the reasonable. And now, don't you think there should be some law that is precise about this fourth amendment rather than leaving everything up to reasonfulness. But then, then we're getting rid of some, some precisely. But then we're getting rid of the touchdown of fourth amendment. We're saying you must be robots. We don't care what the layout of the house looks like. We don't care. If there's gates or fences or whatnot, you must walk to the front door as defined by us in every single case. And you cannot knock and talk at any other door. It's kind of what we'll get to the screen that. Now, of course, I will admit, courts use the term front door. But again, it's the. I don't read any of those cases saying you must ignore all the factors that this is the reason for this. Don't say that, but they say go to the front door first. If it's blocked as an doubt, then you can go to the side door. If you hear noise in the back or you see a sign in the front saying party in the rear, well, then you can go to the rear because in that case, there's an implied license. You're being invited to go to the rear. In those kinds of cases, you clearly can go someplace else once you try to go to the front was dropping out of this conversation. It seems to me again is the off the intention of the officers if they went there to search. And this being from dry deans when it comes up in the opinion about. This issue that now for the first time, there's a subjective reason on this being read into the fourth amendment, which had not been. There before in the opinion says here, however, the question before the court is precisely whether the officers conduct was an objectively reasonable search as we have described that depends upon whether the officers had an implied license to enter the porch, which in turn depends upon the purpose for which they entered. Why shouldn't the jury have at least been told that much that you've got to look at what the motivation was for going to the back door. And even in the years in the era, the jury could find well, they went to the back door because it's the most convenient. It's still not sure that's consistent with your deans or with. Or at least that's a charge which is much less less leading than when much less misleading than the one that was given which omitted crucial qualifications on the doctor. We're not we're not a thing. No, the the motivate well, first of all, it's an objective reason. But the second of all, and I don't I mean, I'm really not trying to be cute with with my words when I say that they went searching for an individual in the sense that they went to investigate whether these people knew where this guy was. So they in order to do that, they have to talk to someone in order to talk to someone, they have to announce the presence in some fashion and they. Chose a pathway to do that and the question becomes, was that pathway to announce the presence was that unreasonable given the circumstances and a jury found it wasn't unreasonable. That yes, again, we go to the garage poking his head in walking in what have you once it once the reason they went to the garage was not because it was a garage because it might have a car. They went to the garage because it appeared occupied and so they wanted to talk to someone who who lived there at the property. Now, if Mr. Carmen would have been in the garage and they were poking her head instead of being state police. Have you seen Mr. Zita and he said, no, I know who you're talking about. He used to take her nephew, one of my nieces. He hasn't been here. He's never been here. They would have left. Again, that's not what happened, but they went to the garage not to look for a car. They went to the garage to see if because it appeared occupied and they wanted to talk to someone when it wasn't occupied, they went to the next place that appeared again if there was a gate stuff, if there was fences up, if that's a different case, but they went to an entrance way that appeared to be used by people who parked. I mean, the analysis quite frankly is and I sort of what I come back to is when I go to my dentist, there's a front door and that's leading to a sidewalk, but there's no parking there. There's parking and back. So I drive into the back of the parking lot and there's a back entrance that you have to sort of walk through a cellar and everything in order to get to the lobby. And I trust passing when I use that back exit and the answer is no because they expect people to use that. You know the drill. Exactly. So it's the implied consent that if you park here. He's been like that all morning. I don't mind. You have to live with them. But I will have to live with your, what your own decisions and what I'm asking is that even at circumstance, it is there's implied consent that you can use the back door because we don't lock it, they don't put a sign up because that's where you're parked. And what I'm saying in this case is based upon where they're parked, they took an avenue towards the house. The question is, was that objectively reasonable and a jury answered that question in the affirmative. And this is not a criminal case where evidence is being asked to be a suppress. This is was the conduct of the officer reasonable. And I think that the fourth amendment throughout time has said, well, that's reasonable to this determination. That's a question for a jury. And in this case, a jury was hard to jury. Well, I would, I would argue that you can argue with that. That's not saying you have to concede that Mr. Diller's charge should have been given. No, no, I mean, it, the court was given what I would argue was a directed verdict. Some other people might argue otherwise. Obviously, it didn't contain all the factors your honor is, is, is thinking maybe it should

. It's still not sure that's consistent with your deans or with. Or at least that's a charge which is much less less leading than when much less misleading than the one that was given which omitted crucial qualifications on the doctor. We're not we're not a thing. No, the the motivate well, first of all, it's an objective reason. But the second of all, and I don't I mean, I'm really not trying to be cute with with my words when I say that they went searching for an individual in the sense that they went to investigate whether these people knew where this guy was. So they in order to do that, they have to talk to someone in order to talk to someone, they have to announce the presence in some fashion and they. Chose a pathway to do that and the question becomes, was that pathway to announce the presence was that unreasonable given the circumstances and a jury found it wasn't unreasonable. That yes, again, we go to the garage poking his head in walking in what have you once it once the reason they went to the garage was not because it was a garage because it might have a car. They went to the garage because it appeared occupied and so they wanted to talk to someone who who lived there at the property. Now, if Mr. Carmen would have been in the garage and they were poking her head instead of being state police. Have you seen Mr. Zita and he said, no, I know who you're talking about. He used to take her nephew, one of my nieces. He hasn't been here. He's never been here. They would have left. Again, that's not what happened, but they went to the garage not to look for a car. They went to the garage to see if because it appeared occupied and they wanted to talk to someone when it wasn't occupied, they went to the next place that appeared again if there was a gate stuff, if there was fences up, if that's a different case, but they went to an entrance way that appeared to be used by people who parked. I mean, the analysis quite frankly is and I sort of what I come back to is when I go to my dentist, there's a front door and that's leading to a sidewalk, but there's no parking there. There's parking and back. So I drive into the back of the parking lot and there's a back entrance that you have to sort of walk through a cellar and everything in order to get to the lobby. And I trust passing when I use that back exit and the answer is no because they expect people to use that. You know the drill. Exactly. So it's the implied consent that if you park here. He's been like that all morning. I don't mind. You have to live with them. But I will have to live with your, what your own decisions and what I'm asking is that even at circumstance, it is there's implied consent that you can use the back door because we don't lock it, they don't put a sign up because that's where you're parked. And what I'm saying in this case is based upon where they're parked, they took an avenue towards the house. The question is, was that objectively reasonable and a jury answered that question in the affirmative. And this is not a criminal case where evidence is being asked to be a suppress. This is was the conduct of the officer reasonable. And I think that the fourth amendment throughout time has said, well, that's reasonable to this determination. That's a question for a jury. And in this case, a jury was hard to jury. Well, I would, I would argue that you can argue with that. That's not saying you have to concede that Mr. Diller's charge should have been given. No, no, I mean, it, the court was given what I would argue was a directed verdict. Some other people might argue otherwise. Obviously, it didn't contain all the factors your honor is, is, is thinking maybe it should. The language that the court did use came out of a state versus Smith. I don't believe that the court abused its discretion in using that language, especially if it would be a situation where they were given better language, I suppose, and they, and they refused to take it. I also don't believe the jury was confused. I don't think the jury was confused. Oh, wait, backyard turnout open, open gain. They realized in this case that based upon where it was parking, there was no expectation of privacy because that's what was in front of them. And they had to walk the length of that in order to get to the house and that that was reasonable that given the, the stairway from the parking area up into the back deck that that wasn't. The sort of the flow traffic went up there and it wasn't unreasonable for them to go to that door first to do the knock and talk rather than then go around to the back of the front door. And quite frankly, given that. Well, they never even actually got to the door because obviously Mr. Carmen came out. I do not read again these cases is saying police are robots. They must always go to the front door if front door is blocked then reasonableness comes into the equation. I read it as saying as a police officer, we expect you to be reasonable and as a reasonable person, you look at this layout and the situation and you decide what is where is the implied consent. Where is the pathway that they that the homeowners expect visitors who are parked in the property to use. In this case, the jury looked at that. And in this case, the jury made its decision and I don't believe that that decision should be overturned lightly. Thank you. Thank you, Your Honors. In response to the idea that it was a shorter distance to go to the back door, back sliding door than the front door. Well, no one has ever measured it. Well, that's not true. You can look at the pictures and it does look like it's true. I don't think that's the point. But, but I like the pictures. It does look like a lot shorter. Maybe somewhat shorter, but we're not talking about in a state here. This is a small property. So if it's 42 steps to the sliding door and 52 steps back to the front door, that does not somehow make entry into the backyard onto the back deck. Somehow reasonable because they saved 10 steps. That is really the essence of the troopers argument. It's curious. That's not that discriminatory for the case. Why didn't he ask Carol if he wouldn't do the search? Why didn't you ask Carol if he went to the house to search? It gets very loose between investigate, speak with. But the picture that comes out of this fairly is that he wanted to see if Zeta was in the house and he wasn't going to accept a no from the occupant, the owner without a search, which is reasonable. Why would he say the owner says, he's not here. The officer is going to accept that if you can get a consent to search. Well, I guess I don't know why we didn't ask. Did you go to that house to search? Well, I guess I maybe I do know. It was obvious. There was no other purpose. He didn't go there to have calls to. The Kirkpatrick says they went there to have a discussion with the owner to discuss it, to investigate and see what the owner knew

. The language that the court did use came out of a state versus Smith. I don't believe that the court abused its discretion in using that language, especially if it would be a situation where they were given better language, I suppose, and they, and they refused to take it. I also don't believe the jury was confused. I don't think the jury was confused. Oh, wait, backyard turnout open, open gain. They realized in this case that based upon where it was parking, there was no expectation of privacy because that's what was in front of them. And they had to walk the length of that in order to get to the house and that that was reasonable that given the, the stairway from the parking area up into the back deck that that wasn't. The sort of the flow traffic went up there and it wasn't unreasonable for them to go to that door first to do the knock and talk rather than then go around to the back of the front door. And quite frankly, given that. Well, they never even actually got to the door because obviously Mr. Carmen came out. I do not read again these cases is saying police are robots. They must always go to the front door if front door is blocked then reasonableness comes into the equation. I read it as saying as a police officer, we expect you to be reasonable and as a reasonable person, you look at this layout and the situation and you decide what is where is the implied consent. Where is the pathway that they that the homeowners expect visitors who are parked in the property to use. In this case, the jury looked at that. And in this case, the jury made its decision and I don't believe that that decision should be overturned lightly. Thank you. Thank you, Your Honors. In response to the idea that it was a shorter distance to go to the back door, back sliding door than the front door. Well, no one has ever measured it. Well, that's not true. You can look at the pictures and it does look like it's true. I don't think that's the point. But, but I like the pictures. It does look like a lot shorter. Maybe somewhat shorter, but we're not talking about in a state here. This is a small property. So if it's 42 steps to the sliding door and 52 steps back to the front door, that does not somehow make entry into the backyard onto the back deck. Somehow reasonable because they saved 10 steps. That is really the essence of the troopers argument. It's curious. That's not that discriminatory for the case. Why didn't he ask Carol if he wouldn't do the search? Why didn't you ask Carol if he went to the house to search? It gets very loose between investigate, speak with. But the picture that comes out of this fairly is that he wanted to see if Zeta was in the house and he wasn't going to accept a no from the occupant, the owner without a search, which is reasonable. Why would he say the owner says, he's not here. The officer is going to accept that if you can get a consent to search. Well, I guess I don't know why we didn't ask. Did you go to that house to search? Well, I guess I maybe I do know. It was obvious. There was no other purpose. He didn't go there to have calls to. The Kirkpatrick says they went there to have a discussion with the owner to discuss it, to investigate and see what the owner knew. Well, the dispatch report says he was there, which was part of the evidence and is part of the appendix, says he was there to see if that person or that vehicle, I believe it just said the vehicle, was there. He saw a driving there, the vehicle was not there. If you wanted to take a next step and look for the person, the law prescribes how to do it. But if he's there, you know, to just to talk, then the law prescribes how you do that. You don't do it by trespassing in the back by going on the back deck. And despite. What if they asked you before if they saw somebody on the deck, what if they saw Mr. Carmen in the garage? Well, if he saw Park back there, would they be entitled to go back there and see investigate further? Well, the garage just to talk to you a little factually. Not much of a garage. Well, it's not much of a garage. It's a car port. And it's right at the edge. You could be in the middle of the street. And if there's someone there, you can tell. So I'm not arguing facts when he says I thought there was someone there. I mean, I can't say no, he didn't think it except that I'm saying no, he didn't think it because just like I can see you, he could see. There is or isn't someone in the car. A green. I'm just suppose we agree with your position. You have to go to the front door first, but that's not that firm. It's a firm rule. Yes, but there are exceptions. There are exceptions that you. Which are not towards the front door and say, uh-oh, we better check this out. I'm sorry. I mean, we better check this out. There's a guy there in the garage. Maybe that's an exception. Well, if they want to go. What if I hear noise in the back? Yeah, well, they didn't hear noise in the back. I know, I know that. I know. I know. Yeah, exactly. Okay. Well, if they, um, if they heard noise in the back, um, it becomes all of those facts become. The fact that there are some facts about, is this somehow licensed as a party back there? A reasonable suspicion of other activity in the back or something like that. And we're not talking about criminal activity, just activity. Um, well, I, I think that if there were, you know, there were the July 4th party going on back there, I don't necessarily think it would be unreasonable. As Judge McKee said, if, um, not just if there were a sign that said party in the back, come around. But if the fact suggested that that's really what was going on. Because that's where the people were and the owner had really invited them to the room of the house. Yes

. Well, the dispatch report says he was there, which was part of the evidence and is part of the appendix, says he was there to see if that person or that vehicle, I believe it just said the vehicle, was there. He saw a driving there, the vehicle was not there. If you wanted to take a next step and look for the person, the law prescribes how to do it. But if he's there, you know, to just to talk, then the law prescribes how you do that. You don't do it by trespassing in the back by going on the back deck. And despite. What if they asked you before if they saw somebody on the deck, what if they saw Mr. Carmen in the garage? Well, if he saw Park back there, would they be entitled to go back there and see investigate further? Well, the garage just to talk to you a little factually. Not much of a garage. Well, it's not much of a garage. It's a car port. And it's right at the edge. You could be in the middle of the street. And if there's someone there, you can tell. So I'm not arguing facts when he says I thought there was someone there. I mean, I can't say no, he didn't think it except that I'm saying no, he didn't think it because just like I can see you, he could see. There is or isn't someone in the car. A green. I'm just suppose we agree with your position. You have to go to the front door first, but that's not that firm. It's a firm rule. Yes, but there are exceptions. There are exceptions that you. Which are not towards the front door and say, uh-oh, we better check this out. I'm sorry. I mean, we better check this out. There's a guy there in the garage. Maybe that's an exception. Well, if they want to go. What if I hear noise in the back? Yeah, well, they didn't hear noise in the back. I know, I know that. I know. I know. Yeah, exactly. Okay. Well, if they, um, if they heard noise in the back, um, it becomes all of those facts become. The fact that there are some facts about, is this somehow licensed as a party back there? A reasonable suspicion of other activity in the back or something like that. And we're not talking about criminal activity, just activity. Um, well, I, I think that if there were, you know, there were the July 4th party going on back there, I don't necessarily think it would be unreasonable. As Judge McKee said, if, um, not just if there were a sign that said party in the back, come around. But if the fact suggested that that's really what was going on. Because that's where the people were and the owner had really invited them to the room of the house. Yes. Um, I'm not here to say that there can, that there can never be a time when you go to the back. But there have to be facts, which tell you that. And when the district judge says based on facts, there have to be facts. Um, if I also could address, because I, I know that the court asked about the, um, the verdict slip. And, um, it is not part of the appendix, although, um, it was quoted accurately. And it's in appellees brief of pages five and six on page five. The three questions were the trooper carol. You stipulate because that's not really part of the record with a brief is, but the factual contents in the brief. It's hard for us to accept unless you agree that I can't. That's accurate. I do. Okay. And, um, the three questions on page five. Um, the district judge asks the jury to decide the constitutional issue. And that is not a jury question. Is this, um, the findings whether trooper carol. Did or did not unconstitutionally enter the comments property and back deck, whether he unconstitutionally searched the comments garage slash carport, whether he, um, subjected Mr. Carman to an unconstitutional seizure. So he is asking the district court is asking the jury to decide the constitutional legal issues and not the factual issues. Not is there some reason to believe that this is the normal. Even that, um, descriptive language was taken out. You still have a very fundamental problem with the charge because of the emissions of the qualifier. And it's, it's, you're right. There's a problem. Massing the jury to decide a constitutional question, even absent that. This is a real problem. You're arguing. I believe you're arguing with the way the qualifications on the knock and talk doctrine were not submitted to the jury. That's exactly right. That's exactly right. Um, the cases say knock on the front door. The judge didn't say that. The cases say, um, and the judge. Um, the cases do use the word there might be. It might be appropriate in certain circumstances to go to the back after knocking. Besides the fact that there wasn't knocking, the jury can't decide. Is this one of those times when it might. What about this person that Georgia for instance asked, how do we write something that. Make sense in this context and also place other context. What if there is somebody. Even that's a somebody person that's front of the house. And as he's getting out of the car and walking. Um, toward the house, he sees the garage car

. Um, I'm not here to say that there can, that there can never be a time when you go to the back. But there have to be facts, which tell you that. And when the district judge says based on facts, there have to be facts. Um, if I also could address, because I, I know that the court asked about the, um, the verdict slip. And, um, it is not part of the appendix, although, um, it was quoted accurately. And it's in appellees brief of pages five and six on page five. The three questions were the trooper carol. You stipulate because that's not really part of the record with a brief is, but the factual contents in the brief. It's hard for us to accept unless you agree that I can't. That's accurate. I do. Okay. And, um, the three questions on page five. Um, the district judge asks the jury to decide the constitutional issue. And that is not a jury question. Is this, um, the findings whether trooper carol. Did or did not unconstitutionally enter the comments property and back deck, whether he unconstitutionally searched the comments garage slash carport, whether he, um, subjected Mr. Carman to an unconstitutional seizure. So he is asking the district court is asking the jury to decide the constitutional legal issues and not the factual issues. Not is there some reason to believe that this is the normal. Even that, um, descriptive language was taken out. You still have a very fundamental problem with the charge because of the emissions of the qualifier. And it's, it's, you're right. There's a problem. Massing the jury to decide a constitutional question, even absent that. This is a real problem. You're arguing. I believe you're arguing with the way the qualifications on the knock and talk doctrine were not submitted to the jury. That's exactly right. That's exactly right. Um, the cases say knock on the front door. The judge didn't say that. The cases say, um, and the judge. Um, the cases do use the word there might be. It might be appropriate in certain circumstances to go to the back after knocking. Besides the fact that there wasn't knocking, the jury can't decide. Is this one of those times when it might. What about this person that Georgia for instance asked, how do we write something that. Make sense in this context and also place other context. What if there is somebody. Even that's a somebody person that's front of the house. And as he's getting out of the car and walking. Um, toward the house, he sees the garage car. Boy, it sees somebody in there. So it starts to walk around toward the back. Well, I didn't have a conversation. That's clearly beyond jargings and we're asking, what's wrong with that? Why is that reasonable? Well, I guess I was just in response to how do we write this opinion? I would say, um, I know he wants to write it. No, no, the first paragraph is a we reverse. But, but after this and stuff and after that, I think that the best way for this court to do it and for courts generally to do it is on the narrowest possible grounds. And so in this case on these facts and leave for another factual another day, another factual situation. Um, where maybe there was some reason not to go to the front door. Mr. Kirkpatrick, I imagine would like his plans to have some guidance on this area. And it's a very amorphous area officers should have some basis to know what they can do in a situation like this is not really clear. I mean, that's true. And just from my perspective, I like that too. Um, but, you know, going back 30 years to law school, um, I was, you know, I know that cases, the holding of the case regardless of your language is based on the facts. And I don't know that you could, you know, give it a broad and compassing, it's an opinion that will govern every conceivable situation in the future. Um, so we should jump a footnote right after the first sentence. Uh, this is someone like see bill or on constitutional jurisprudence. I'd appreciate it. Um, see also Kirkpatrick, but not necessary. But I think you could say these are the undisputed facts. There was a front door. There was a front path to the front door. Um, there was no path in the back. Um, the officers went to the side. There were a little closer to the back than the front. Um, the trooper says that it was a shorter path. Therefore, that was the reason. Number one, we reject that. We maintain the rule that we've got knock and talk means go to the front door and knock where there is implied license for police officers as well as girls, and people to go absent some other circumstance, which does not exist here. And that's ultimately what I think this opinion should. How would you define the law? Thank you very much. Thank you very much.

Okay, did you back here again, bro? Good morning. I'm pleased the court. My name is Barry Diller. I represent the Appellants, Andrew and Karen Carmen. I respectfully request to reserve four minutes if I may. We have three major points on which we believe the district court in this case made fundamental errors. First, the district court should have granted the carmains who were the plaintiffs a directed verdict. With respect to their claim that Trooper Carroll, the defendant, had entered their curtilage specifically their backyard and back deck which was attached to their home. Without a warrant or any other exception to the requirement for a warrant. That's really stipulated. That doesn't necessarily get you a verdict. But I thought there's no argument. He admitted he had no warrant as a partner. It wasn't as a partner, but the other trooper arrived there. Roberts, I guess, said they did not have a warrant. And they, I guess you're saying you wanted the judge to tell the jury that where they went was included within the curtilage. Is that it? Yes. I felt that on these undisputed facts that they agreed with that we win. Well, I thought Councils and trial did agree that that was the curtilage. That wasn't the issue. Right. That's right. So that wasn't the issue. But that one gets your directed verdict. I guess maybe I'm not understanding. You were saying that one of the judge have instructed the jury that where Officer Carroll went was the curtilage. Not that that was the directed verdict. Is that the verdict would be something that I haven't mastered that. Something more than that. No, we want that a verdict. One said that. That's kind of why you're in the case. Right. We ask very specifically for a directed verdict. The jury would still have to assess damages. So we have to vacate the current judgment in order to bring the trial that processed back to when you made a motion for a directed verdict. That's right. You're not asking for a new trial. I'm sorry. You're not asking for a new trial. You're asking for damages on this record. What do you want? Well, no, I wouldn't need a new trial to assess damages. But I believe that the appropriate remedy here would be a remand with a direction to enter judge to enter a verdict for the current verdict. Vacate the current verdict and judgment. And enter a judgment in your favor. That's correct. Directed verdict. That's correct. With the trial determining the amount of the judgment. That's the judgment for it. Yes. And that is because the facts weren't disputed that Trooper Carroll in the absence of warrant consent or exigency chose to go to the backyard, to the back deck. Instead of to the front where there is with societal norms. That's where I'm losing you. Didn't he have a right or cases at hold that you can go through the back door if that's the entrance that's used as a regular entrance? The cases which say that first of all, the third circuit has said that might be the case. That might be the case. That might be the case. But the whole set of verdict. Because because all of those cases, even the most liberal toward the police and permitting that say first, the police must go to the front. Unless there is some tangible reason why the front is obviously not where. Well, he said, this is exactly what you said, they do a cars park along the side and the back and. That's right. So for instance, and we have the photographs as part of the record. And I have the original photographs that they will help. So that they're at the front. There is a pathway of paving stones right to the front porch. Where anyone knows by virtue of living in this society, if I'm calling on someone, I go to their front door. I knock on the door. The police know that in every single case says that that's what the police must do. Even in those circumstances where they are subsequently permitted to check the back, it is first where they have come to the front, knocked on the door and received no answer. If there's any question of fact, you don't get the directed verdict. If there's any legitimate question of fact. Are you suggesting that my learned colleague from the Jersey would interject into the record and illegitimate question of fact? I'm not always from Jersey. He wouldn't do that. Despite New Jersey, I'm not suggesting. I am suggesting if the trooper got on the witness stand blanked, went like crosses fingers and said there was no front door that that wouldn't be legitimate. I'm saying that... But as you approach the house, they approach the house from, I guess you look at it in front, they approach it from the left side. Correct. And actually, as I understand the record, the police vehicle made a left turn into the property. Made a right turn. I'm sorry, I see a correction. And that was a paved area where there were some cars parked. Yes, so that, for instance, if... It's kind of like the door knocker, which is an invitation of this is my front door. When you have a paved area and there are cars, there are already parts. Aren't you invited to go into that area and park your car there? No, because... Well, listen to the question that you say no to. I'm sorry. Listen to your answer to the question that wasn't asked. The question was, maybe, and prep me if I'm wrong. The question was, aren't you invited to go into the area and park your car there? And you're saying no. Oh, yes, okay. You're invited to park your car there. But then you're not invited after parking to say, you know what? I'm not going to go to the front. I'm not going to go to the pathway to the front door. I will cut across the grass in the backyard. I will walk onto the back deck, which is attached to a sliding door to the back of the house and see if anyone's there. That's... that the invitation, the societal implicit invitation, does not extend back. Well, it doesn't matter. Didn't the church... had in the church already occurred before they got to the point where Mr. Curle came out? Not Mr. Curle. Mr. Curle. Mr. Curle. Well, the church for the car had already occurred. They'd entered into the garage. There'd been a breach, if you will, of the garage. And so first, they looked for the car, which they had a license plate and made a number. And it wasn't there. Then they looked in the car port, which is on the side after they've made that right turn to be on the left side of the house. What made you... but when they pulled in with the police vehicle, aren't they already in the Cradle Ligeria? Well, to the extent that you consider someone's driveway the Cradle Ligeria, I suppose you could say yes. And when they step out of the car, they're walking on the Cradle Ligeria. But all of the cases say... incidentally, the cases are mixed in their language about what is or isn't the Cradle Ligeria. But assuming the worst for me that even that driveway or that side parking area is Cradle Ligeria, the implicit societal norm, which the Supreme Court has recognized, and this Court has recognized, says, well, doesn't say, well, once you have entered into a parking area, now Cradle Ligeria's fair game, nothing of the sort. In fact, when you get in the front door, the door knocker is inside the Cradle Ligeria. You've got to go inside the Cradle Ligeria to get to the door. That's right. So if that is Cradle Liger, that aspect of entering into Cradle Ligeria is permitted because that's what we do. That's where Girl Scouts come. That's where I knock on my neighbor's door. So there's no dispute that the front door was... the path to the front door was clearly marked that police officer vehicle and police officers wherever they parked the car, they've got to go back around to the front door knocker. That's right. That's exactly right. It's not disputed. And it's not disputed that all of that was there. It's not disputed that they didn't do that. It's not disputed that they walked across the backyard. It's not disputed that they went up the steps to the deck, which is attached to the home. None of that is under dispute. And that's why we said it's not part of this appeal. We actually moved to some rejudgment. What if somebody were sitting in that back deck area just sitting there and police officers pulled up in their vehicle and there is a front door but they notice somebody sitting out a male, let's say, on that back porch? Well, they probably wouldn't see it not being able to get into the backyard to see it. But if they could... They were pretty close with the car was parked to the backyard. Both are not a huge plot. Well, take the hypothetical. Supposing they do have somebody there. Do they still have to go to the front door? Well, I think they could say hello and then you judge by reaction. But in fact, there was no one on the back porch. In fact, there was no one who gave any kind of implicit consent either by their friendly response. Let's hello back to you. The police simply decided to look around and go in the back. And the pictures are clear in the appendix and even clearer in the color photos. There's no path in the back to that deck. There is no path. And those are in these photographs. They can see it's just grass. They chose not to go to the Courage. I mean, not to go to the front, excuse me. Is this for a property trespass type issue or is it expectation of privacy issue? Well, it is both. We don't have a state law trespass cause of action because the federal courts would not have jurisdiction over state law claims. There's a whole lot of expectation of privacy in the back yard. It's open to the public. Everybody sees it. It's not open to the public. And the cases are very clear that it is a complete expectation of privacy. I believe that it was the Supreme Court earlier this year in Florida against Jordanis, which basically said that it is psychologically part of the home. So that there was that complete expectation of privacy. It's a manifestation of privacy. I mean, you wouldn't expect people to be snooping around in your back yard. Right. Right. And then when Mr. Florida was right in his school. Right. And then when Mr. Carmen comes out on his deck, his entitled to say, get off my property. But in this case, the police did not give him that that courtesy and would not get off. It would not let him. What's your remedy here now? The remedy that I'm asking from this court. No, from the district court. Well, the remedy would be grant judgment on the entry on the court of the claim and on the unreasonable seizure claim. And let a jury, uh, instruct the jury. Uh, that I have found for the plaintiff. You must find for the plaintiff. And now it is your job to assess damages. We don't know why the district court decided the way it did on the directed verdict question. Um, I, I think the district court. Um, and if we look at the jury instruction that it crafted on knocking, knocking talk, took accurate language from some of the cases that says. Uh, a police officer might in some circumstances, uh, enter the cartilage. And so said the district court and its reading said, well, that might be okay. But if you read those cases a little more carefully, it might be okay. If at, if first the police officer went to the front, knocked on the door, received no answer. And some other reason to think the occupants are probably in the back. Maybe he hears music back there. Or something of that nature. Thank you. You saved better time. I think so. Thank you. I'm sure I heard from you again. Good morning, your honors. Counsel may it please the court. I'm Sean Kirkpatrick here with the Pennsylvania Office Attorney General here on behalf of. True per car. And there seems to be perhaps maybe some confusion in the records. I just want to make one fact clear before I begin. On page 79 of the appendix. True per car. I'll just read it quick. We parked the next available spot where we could park our car, which was at the rear of the property. The far rear of the property and we exited our vehicles at that point. From where he parked the car. Do you see the. Yes, Sean. This was this property was on a. As a jury found and again, this is this is a jury verdict that is being asked to overturn. This was a there was the main road where parking was not permitted and then there was a side street. Running along the left hand side. So they turned right. They passed a number of vehicles and the next available parking spot was at the far we are. They parked on the driveway basically. It looks like they parked in the area of the side of the driveway. Well, whether it was a side street or a driveway, it extended to the far rear of the property. But together they had to go past the front of the house. Yes, they did your honor, but they couldn't park there. But there's parking in the back where you can see the harsh excuse you from going through the front door. Yes, your honor. Well, how in the world because the two they see the work the front door. How why because the office would make a decision to park the side of the house. Oh, what I'm at the side of the house is where I parked my vehicle. I want to exit my vehicle and go to the part which is closest, which is this sliding glass door from which point I can see inside the guys house. Rather than walking around to the front porch. That's what you're arguing. See the donut argument I guess. I don't want to exercise and go to the front door. No, your honor. The ultimate touchdown of Fourth Amendment is reasonfulness. So the question is... Why is there reason for the police to decide that where they parked the car defines the part of the car to have a license to enter? Because in order to get to the front door, they would have had to walk on more of the car to get to the front door. So they would have had to go to the private part of the premises, the back door, because that way they'd trample on less grass. That's what you're arguing? What I'm arguing, your honor, is that police should not be robots. They should not follow a set to fine path that says in every circumstances you must go to the front door. Why not? Because I want my police officers to be reasonable, your honor. What's unreasonable about saying, given the Fourth Amendment protection that we have, they got to go to the front door and less something happens that either forgives that obligation or gives rise to a license when the reasonable officer would assume would dispel that obligation and allow you to go to the side door. And there is that reasonable license in this case. The jury found that it was reasonable, given the circumstances, that the first where they parked and where they were heading to, the first building that they came to was the garage, which looked occupied. So instead of even going to the house, they first stopped at the garage. What did they do when they got to the garage? They announced their presence and looked to see if it was, in fact, a occupier. The girl said he entered. He stuck his head in the garage. He poked his head in the garage to see if it was occupying. Why is the whole thing of the Courtaillage in the front door irrelevant because there's already been an entry into the garage before we even get to the side door? He was merely looking into the garage in order to see if it was occupied. He wasn't searching. They weren't looking for drugs and looking for an occupant. They were trying to do an occupant. They were searching for an occupant. Absolutely, Your Honor. In Marasco, we adopted the Anakitao doctor and in fact the officers there went to the front door first. How do you get around Marasco in this case? Well, I believe in, I think you're presenting an argument of expediency rather than... We really are. Are these requirements? You're speaking of expediency and convenience. Well, no, Your Honor. And therefore reasonable. You're arguing because it's expedient and convenient, it is therefore reasonable, which may apply outside the fourth memo context. But that's really what you're arguing. Clothes is to the back door. Why should I trample the guys long and go to the front door? It's easier in less of a trespass, less of an intrusion to go to the closest door, which happens to be the sliding glass door through, which I can see into their kitchen and eating area. It's easier. Well, the fact of this that were found by the jury in this case was that the back porch and the sliding glass door appeared to be the customary entrance. That doesn't answer the question. That one or not that Augusta gets the jury charge, I want to ask you about, but that doesn't really answer the question. Why isn't it true that the situation here is what Dr. Fuentes just suggested that what is the most convenient and the easiest becomes and for the amendment of parlance? What is reasonable? That's what you're arguing. Well, what I'm arguing your honor, and I'm hoping to mention your question, is that what is reasonable is what would a reasonable officer have done given the exact same circumstance and given the restrictions of the fourth amendment? And given the restrictions of the fourth amendment? Obviously, they couldn't go and search the entire backyard. If they couldn't go through a gate, but this is not a situation in which they park in the front yard, or they park in the front street, they bypass the front door, they go around back to look around and then knock on the back door. Why isn't that exactly the situation we have? They could have parked in the front, and this thing was no place to park. Maybe it's different outside of Philadelphia, but I have not that familiar with the practice that police officers park only in areas that are allowed for parking. They park the car wherever they want to stop the car. You're saying they couldn't stop the car? You're not saying that, Officer Curie was saying. He couldn't park the car in front of the house because it was no place to park. He's in the street. He could have just pulled over and stopped right there. But your honor isn't that weighing the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. No, I'm not saying he was dishonest on what he was saying, although he did say it was electricity and a garage that had no electricity. I'm not getting there. I'm simply saying that he said he couldn't park in front of the house. And I don't know why, given the limitations of the fourth amendment, he couldn't just stop the car and get out of it in front of the house. He decided to go to the back of the house and I'm not falling in for that. It looked like it was, that's where the park area was. That's fine. But the fact that he made that decision, it was back to Judge Ford cases earlier question. The fact that he took a partner himself and made that decision to park his car there, rather than in front of the house. And bypass the front door doesn't then somehow give him a license to treat the back door as the front door just because he happens to be closer because that's where he got out of his car. But that comes down to a fact question. I mean, that's the facts are not disputed. Everything I said to you was agreed. I think Mr. Dilawar agreed to it. It's consistent with Charles testimony. That's what he said. I mean, except he's testimony is given. Yes. I do not read the fourth amendment as requiring police to violate traffic laws and park the cars in the front when there's no parking. How long have you been flooded out here today? Today? Well, I came in last night. Oh, good boy. It's not for you. But the truth is, they don't have valid the parking laws and they're going to only park the car in areas reserved for parking. Yes. I'm sure that there are a little more civil than some of the consabular and familiar with. But that still gets back to the point of does that decision on their part transform the nature, the private nature and the reasonable list of the expectation of privacy of that back door? Is that transform it somehow because that's happens to be where they got out of the car? Yes, you're on. And the reason why is because based upon where the parking is, what you're looking at the house in order to get to the house, you have to go past the back door. You have to go through the back door. Why wouldn't they just be traced and not suggesting they had to do this on you? But given your position, they could have just retraced the steps in the street. Just walk back along the pavement and then go into the front of the house, never even, never even setting foot in the side yard. Again, I'm not suggesting the long car is that, but given your argument, they could have done that. Yes, Your Honor. I mean, the question comes down to can the police get their feet wet? I'm sorry, I think they can. Can the police get their feet wet? Can they touch the do in the grass? And I'm not saying that in every situation, that's appropriate. I'm just saying that the jury found in this situation that this was their approach to the house in order to do a knock and talk. What was the question to the jury that you're, what do you mean the jury found that in this situation, that's what the officers say was appropriate? Were they given a specific factual question? What they gave, what the court gave the jury, and this was not part of the record, but it's document 72 down below. Do you find the defendant, Jeremy Carroll, and constitutionally entered upon plaintiff's property in back deck? Now, this was based upon the jury instruction that the district court pulled language out of the state of Smith. And going back to the law, and then just Mickey may have a question about the charge, but I wanted to ask you this thing. Every circuit that has looked at this issue of knock and talk, three circuits, including ours in Morocco, the first circuit, the eight circuit, and two separate of things, as I said, you've got to do the knock and talk first. I'd be at the fine, and a federal appellate court that has said, for expediency's sake, you might be able to go in the back door and ignore the front door. Well, could you respond to this weight of authority against you? Absolutely, Your Honor. What they were doing was a knock and talk. The question is not whether they were doing a knock and talk from our position. It was that they were engaged in the knock and talk. It was just a knock and talk to the back door. No, no. No, no. Knock and talk doesn't surprise me. It's a knock to the back door. It's a front door thing. It's so related to the Fourth Amendment and the expectation of privacy because of the old knocker thing. You know, we put the knock on it. Means this is where you're invited. This is where the mail can be posted. You can drop the mail. This is where I, unfortunately, people can solicit. It's here, the front door. You've got to go there. Is it for what the cases are saying? Well, the cases are saying that. And then, of course, if there is reasonable grounds to go beyond the front door to the back door, then you set forth the grounds. But you got to go to the front door first is what I read these cases to say. I do not read the cases as because the cases, first of all, don't specify what is the front door of every stage. You know what the front door is in this case. You're not arguing that they weren't sure where the front door was. No, you're on it. But what I am arguing is that each case has facts that are specific to it. There is the layout of the property. There is where you're coming from. Let's look at the layout. Where was the sidewalk? I don't know that there was a sidewalk. Are you talking about the... Exhibit 20. Exhibit 20, maybe 22. Are you talking about the gravel area? 22. What's the appendix page? I don't know. It is hit find in Adobe. It takes me there. 22. I have 255. Okay. I see what you're saying. Yeah. The pathway to the porch. Not? Yes. Yes. In order to get there, they would have had to walk past the backyard. They would have to walk past the back deck. They would have had to walk past the side of the house in order to get that pathway to walk to the front door. I don't know. My pictures must be wrong. They made a right turn onto the property owner's driveway. Yes. They were there looking at the side of the house. The left was the deck to the right was the porch. No, you're wrong. I clarify that for you. Okay. If you look on page 79 of the record. Give me the exhibit number. It's not a picture because there is no picture of where they parked. It says that they parked at the far rear of the property. Now this was past the house. This was past the carport. This wasn't at the side of the house where they had a decision. I can either go right to the front door or I can go left to the back door. It wasn't on the street. It was on the property itself. Oh, yes, absolutely. It was. They pulled in. They went past the house because of the cars. They continued going and they parked at the far rear of the property. But to get there, they must have gone through that porch with the steers leading up to a center door. Well, they drove past it. Yes. And I'm maybe I'm slow today because there was a full moon tonight. I'm still trying to figure out why the fact that they drove past the front door prevents them from walking back to the front door. And you're saying that it would have been more of an intrusion to do that, even though the case is maybe quite of that initial attempt where it's more of an intrusion to do it. You can go to the what is obviously well, let's forget that. It's not obviously the back door. You can forget that intrusion where the officer on the scene concludes well. Yeah, that's the front door, but it's less intrusive for me to go to that door, the private living area. And it also appeared from the layout and the facts of the case that the back door was used by visitors and people who parked there. And I can point to the record where you know they testified to that. Well, you know, it's used and that's interesting. I know they did testify of that, but it's a think about it. It seems to me that almost any side door by that mission is used by visitors, otherwise you wouldn't need a door there. And the door is there so people can come in out of it. So the fact that the door is used by visitors doesn't necessarily transform the side door or the back door. It really just look more like a back door than a side door. It doesn't change from the back door to the main entrance just because people also use the back door. This is a deck there. There's a sliding glass partition. It's been used to come in and out of the house, but that goes to whether there is an implied consent that they expect people who park at the far rear of the property. When they're coming towards the house, you go to the back door that they will go to the back door. Yes, and the jury garage in the meanwhile. They they thought they looked occupied. So it was right to do that. That's my that's a concerto. Have a right to do that. Yes, Your Honor, because that was the first that was the first area which appeared occupied so that they could announce the presence. If you just remember when the presence is that because he went in. We poke this at it. Okay, didn't go any focus had it. I understand this was. Okay, no. This was. He's. But to be broken your head isn't is that an entry? And there's no more. It's all the cases, even. Marasco, which is very, very limited in school. Assumes a certain set of conditions. And if those conditions exist, then there's a right to go within the court. Let's go to the front door. Knock. And then as the charge was here, there may be circumstances after that, although the judge admitted what the circumstances would be. That would allow you to test the assumption that maybe there's somebody else around back. But all of them start from the proposition. Jardine, does it? Marasco does it? Reigns is a little bit different because that's the services. So process. They all assume the officer is not going there as part of a search. The intent of the officer is not a search in the Supreme Court. That was the decision of the point of debate between the majority and. The dissent opinion because it read subjective intent into the officer's mind, which normally is not the case in fourth member jurisprudence. Justice clear red subjective intent in and said, look, if you're not going there to search, then you can do this. Here we have a case where the whole intent of going to the house is to search and they never bother to get a warrant. So I'm not even sure we need to get to the court's logist, you and the whole side do a bad good because the conditions under which they could do what you're arguing they had a right to do didn't exist. And those are the conditions. I'm not even sure the jury charge that Mr. Diller asked for was specific enough in that regard. It would have directed the jury to what it had to do if there was a legitimate knock in search or knock and talk. But I'm not even sure we have the conditions we see into a legitimate knock in talk. That's a lot to throw at you. I'm sorry, no light is on, but the truth is it takes some liberties and time to respond to that. Marriage, please. Yeah. Okay. I mean, ultimately the question is should this have gone to a jury or not? And I would disagree that their intent was to go and and not do a knock and talk. They were searching for an individual. Absolutely. I'm happy to be with you. They wanted to house the search for somebody. For a person. Yes. But they weren't going to do they weren't. The search was to knock on the door and say, have you seen this person? He's fleeing the law and this isn't addressed that he's been known to be at. Have you talked to him? Do you know where he is? It was to do an investigation. Yes, they were searching for a person. But the purpose of this was to talk to somebody on the property. Now, in order to talk to someone on the property, they had to enter the curtallage whether it be the front door or the back door. It's all curtallage. In order to get to the house in order to knock on the door and speak with someone. I assume the secret package that there were no exigen circumstances. No, and we're not saying that there was. You know, there was no warrant. There's no exigen circumstances. What we are saying that the purpose was not to search. But when the first thing they did the only thing they did was the guy in the house was search. They got consent to do that. Well, that, but that was after that was after they they got there. And it was and was with consent. No, I understand it was consent that that's not when driving at you saying they didn't go to the house to search. But the only thing that did when they got in the house. There was some cordial compensation after the search. But once I got in the house, the only thing that did was search and that's why they went there. They searched, which is what he said he went there for. Well, again, your honor. What I'm saying is not that they weren't looking for someone. I'm not saying that. I mean, they weren't. Well, why did they go to the house? Just saying they went to the house to look for him and not to search for him. Even though it seems to me what they said was the men out used the magic word. They went there to search for him. I think they did say that. They went there to look through the house to see if they could find him. Oh, no, I disagree with that. Okay. Why did they go to the house? They went to the house to talk to the people to see if they knew where he was. And they said, nobody don't know where he is. They said they don't know where he is. And then the officer said some guy just came out and was swearing at me. Do you mind if we search your house? Okay. And they said yes. And so they searched the house. I mean, if they said no, they did not mind. They, I'm sorry, they did not mind. We have nothing to hide. Go in. Well, why shouldn't the jury have been told all this? This is coming directly out of Marasco. Where officers are pursuing a lawful objective, unconnected to any search for the, for the future instrumentalities of frontal behavior, the answering to the courage after not receiving the answer at the front door might be reasonable, essentially, into the courage, may provide the only back of a way of attempting the conduct. And seems to me the qualification language that I just read was what Mr. Diller asked for. And your objection to that was that it would have been 10 amount to a directed verdict. Jojenz has the same kind of qualification. Sculip with the same qualifier on the language in Jojenz. And I agree with you. The language may have led you a directed verdict. A few hold on a second. Let me just look at that. That's not. Do you have a appendix number for that? For his range for what I just read? Yeah, I think I just closed it. Let me have the page. Well, no, I have. I have my grief where I say to the page. I'm going to just pull that because I want to, I'm going to be clear on that. I don't want there to be any. Sorry. Rolls-offing because my computer is not doing what I wanted. I can't get to the page records. Well, if you just hold on a second, I'm trying to find my section where I talk about it. Because I cite to the directed verdict language that they wanted. I'll have you read it in a little more. Okay, my paper isn't working for me either. So that's good. I just got back to it. It's at 520. 520? Oh, no, now of the case. Yeah, no, I'm. Is that what you're looking for? No, I was looking for the actual language that they proper to the court. Okay. Just wait a second. That's that's. I apologize. What's the one? So you can do 28 J letter. No, no, I. Here, 214. 214 of what? Of the appendix. What they this was the supplemental proposed jury instructions. They talk about is undisputed the defendant, Carol entered the property through the backyard, came to the back deck by entering the backyard. They entered protective purtelage. Based on these facts, I instruct you that you must rule in favor both Mr. Carmen and Mrs. Carmen with respect to defendant, Carol's entry onto the property. That's a direct a verdict. That is an a jury question. In the area protected by the fourth amendment, you must decide how much compensatory damage or punitive damage to the award. So that is we're not going to leave it up to the jury. Is it not about whether the obvious reason that again, I'm sorry. Maybe that again. Based on these facts, I instruct you that you must rule in favor of both Mr. Carmen and Mrs. Carmen with respect to defendant, Carol's entry onto their property in the area protected by the fourth amendment. Okay. So what I'm saying is not that what I'm saying is that when you tell them what he's asking for is a directive for certain contested, but it could have been clever because what you're saying that yes, he entered under the curledge that does not get you a verdict. And I think he is saying we'll hear back from that given these circumstances entry upon the curledge is also a verdict. And there's a honest disagreement on how you look at that. Okay. But I guess my main point is that this was a reasonable determination. This was a jury question. It was up to the jury to decide the instructions provided, clarified what factors they were to consider and they made their decisions. The your emphasis is that it's reasonable because correctly, if I'm mistaken, the police parked the vehicle towards the rear of the house and their view was already the back of the house, yes, you're on, meaning the the deck. Yes, Ron. Okay. So I mean, for purposes of analyzing Carol's conduct, does it matter where the police parked the car in the rear or what if they parked it in front? Well, I think that would have been a different way to get the car. Well, it is, but no, but I mean, then it hinges on where the car is parked. If they park it in the front and they're looking at the porch in the front door, if they park it in the back, they're looking at the back in the porch, then the fourth amendment plays a really insignificant role. And it matters where the car is parked as opposed to where the front door is. But is the, but again, isn't the touchdown of fourth amendment, the reasonfulness of the officers. So the reasonfulness of the officers dependent upon the factors presented to the officers. They were looking at things from their perspective. And we're looking at things from their perspective. So if you have a situation in which an officer parks in the front of the house and is walking towards the house, see I can manipulate the entrance because then I can just park the car where I want to go in. If I want to go in the back, I'll park the car in the front door. Oh, well, but then again, that comes to the reasonfulness. So if the jury finds. This is incredibly reasonable. I'm going to be a officer if it is a pity me a reasonfulness. If I park in the front, I'm going to have to go in the front door. The great stuff is going to be in the back door. I don't park around the back in that way when the back door nothing reasonable about that is. It's just please practice the world more. But why would I park in the front and restrict myself to go into the front door when I can go to the, see what's in the back door and have a better chance of finding something. So I'm just parking the back and then it's reasonable for me to go to the back. But that would be a fact for the jury that you could put in the, in front of the jury that there was plenty of parking in the front. They could have parked in the front where visitors always park, but they chose to go into the back in order to have access to the backyard. And that goes to the reasonable. And now, don't you think there should be some law that is precise about this fourth amendment rather than leaving everything up to reasonfulness. But then, then we're getting rid of some, some precisely. But then we're getting rid of the touchdown of fourth amendment. We're saying you must be robots. We don't care what the layout of the house looks like. We don't care. If there's gates or fences or whatnot, you must walk to the front door as defined by us in every single case. And you cannot knock and talk at any other door. It's kind of what we'll get to the screen that. Now, of course, I will admit, courts use the term front door. But again, it's the. I don't read any of those cases saying you must ignore all the factors that this is the reason for this. Don't say that, but they say go to the front door first. If it's blocked as an doubt, then you can go to the side door. If you hear noise in the back or you see a sign in the front saying party in the rear, well, then you can go to the rear because in that case, there's an implied license. You're being invited to go to the rear. In those kinds of cases, you clearly can go someplace else once you try to go to the front was dropping out of this conversation. It seems to me again is the off the intention of the officers if they went there to search. And this being from dry deans when it comes up in the opinion about. This issue that now for the first time, there's a subjective reason on this being read into the fourth amendment, which had not been. There before in the opinion says here, however, the question before the court is precisely whether the officers conduct was an objectively reasonable search as we have described that depends upon whether the officers had an implied license to enter the porch, which in turn depends upon the purpose for which they entered. Why shouldn't the jury have at least been told that much that you've got to look at what the motivation was for going to the back door. And even in the years in the era, the jury could find well, they went to the back door because it's the most convenient. It's still not sure that's consistent with your deans or with. Or at least that's a charge which is much less less leading than when much less misleading than the one that was given which omitted crucial qualifications on the doctor. We're not we're not a thing. No, the the motivate well, first of all, it's an objective reason. But the second of all, and I don't I mean, I'm really not trying to be cute with with my words when I say that they went searching for an individual in the sense that they went to investigate whether these people knew where this guy was. So they in order to do that, they have to talk to someone in order to talk to someone, they have to announce the presence in some fashion and they. Chose a pathway to do that and the question becomes, was that pathway to announce the presence was that unreasonable given the circumstances and a jury found it wasn't unreasonable. That yes, again, we go to the garage poking his head in walking in what have you once it once the reason they went to the garage was not because it was a garage because it might have a car. They went to the garage because it appeared occupied and so they wanted to talk to someone who who lived there at the property. Now, if Mr. Carmen would have been in the garage and they were poking her head instead of being state police. Have you seen Mr. Zita and he said, no, I know who you're talking about. He used to take her nephew, one of my nieces. He hasn't been here. He's never been here. They would have left. Again, that's not what happened, but they went to the garage not to look for a car. They went to the garage to see if because it appeared occupied and they wanted to talk to someone when it wasn't occupied, they went to the next place that appeared again if there was a gate stuff, if there was fences up, if that's a different case, but they went to an entrance way that appeared to be used by people who parked. I mean, the analysis quite frankly is and I sort of what I come back to is when I go to my dentist, there's a front door and that's leading to a sidewalk, but there's no parking there. There's parking and back. So I drive into the back of the parking lot and there's a back entrance that you have to sort of walk through a cellar and everything in order to get to the lobby. And I trust passing when I use that back exit and the answer is no because they expect people to use that. You know the drill. Exactly. So it's the implied consent that if you park here. He's been like that all morning. I don't mind. You have to live with them. But I will have to live with your, what your own decisions and what I'm asking is that even at circumstance, it is there's implied consent that you can use the back door because we don't lock it, they don't put a sign up because that's where you're parked. And what I'm saying in this case is based upon where they're parked, they took an avenue towards the house. The question is, was that objectively reasonable and a jury answered that question in the affirmative. And this is not a criminal case where evidence is being asked to be a suppress. This is was the conduct of the officer reasonable. And I think that the fourth amendment throughout time has said, well, that's reasonable to this determination. That's a question for a jury. And in this case, a jury was hard to jury. Well, I would, I would argue that you can argue with that. That's not saying you have to concede that Mr. Diller's charge should have been given. No, no, I mean, it, the court was given what I would argue was a directed verdict. Some other people might argue otherwise. Obviously, it didn't contain all the factors your honor is, is, is thinking maybe it should. The language that the court did use came out of a state versus Smith. I don't believe that the court abused its discretion in using that language, especially if it would be a situation where they were given better language, I suppose, and they, and they refused to take it. I also don't believe the jury was confused. I don't think the jury was confused. Oh, wait, backyard turnout open, open gain. They realized in this case that based upon where it was parking, there was no expectation of privacy because that's what was in front of them. And they had to walk the length of that in order to get to the house and that that was reasonable that given the, the stairway from the parking area up into the back deck that that wasn't. The sort of the flow traffic went up there and it wasn't unreasonable for them to go to that door first to do the knock and talk rather than then go around to the back of the front door. And quite frankly, given that. Well, they never even actually got to the door because obviously Mr. Carmen came out. I do not read again these cases is saying police are robots. They must always go to the front door if front door is blocked then reasonableness comes into the equation. I read it as saying as a police officer, we expect you to be reasonable and as a reasonable person, you look at this layout and the situation and you decide what is where is the implied consent. Where is the pathway that they that the homeowners expect visitors who are parked in the property to use. In this case, the jury looked at that. And in this case, the jury made its decision and I don't believe that that decision should be overturned lightly. Thank you. Thank you, Your Honors. In response to the idea that it was a shorter distance to go to the back door, back sliding door than the front door. Well, no one has ever measured it. Well, that's not true. You can look at the pictures and it does look like it's true. I don't think that's the point. But, but I like the pictures. It does look like a lot shorter. Maybe somewhat shorter, but we're not talking about in a state here. This is a small property. So if it's 42 steps to the sliding door and 52 steps back to the front door, that does not somehow make entry into the backyard onto the back deck. Somehow reasonable because they saved 10 steps. That is really the essence of the troopers argument. It's curious. That's not that discriminatory for the case. Why didn't he ask Carol if he wouldn't do the search? Why didn't you ask Carol if he went to the house to search? It gets very loose between investigate, speak with. But the picture that comes out of this fairly is that he wanted to see if Zeta was in the house and he wasn't going to accept a no from the occupant, the owner without a search, which is reasonable. Why would he say the owner says, he's not here. The officer is going to accept that if you can get a consent to search. Well, I guess I don't know why we didn't ask. Did you go to that house to search? Well, I guess I maybe I do know. It was obvious. There was no other purpose. He didn't go there to have calls to. The Kirkpatrick says they went there to have a discussion with the owner to discuss it, to investigate and see what the owner knew. Well, the dispatch report says he was there, which was part of the evidence and is part of the appendix, says he was there to see if that person or that vehicle, I believe it just said the vehicle, was there. He saw a driving there, the vehicle was not there. If you wanted to take a next step and look for the person, the law prescribes how to do it. But if he's there, you know, to just to talk, then the law prescribes how you do that. You don't do it by trespassing in the back by going on the back deck. And despite. What if they asked you before if they saw somebody on the deck, what if they saw Mr. Carmen in the garage? Well, if he saw Park back there, would they be entitled to go back there and see investigate further? Well, the garage just to talk to you a little factually. Not much of a garage. Well, it's not much of a garage. It's a car port. And it's right at the edge. You could be in the middle of the street. And if there's someone there, you can tell. So I'm not arguing facts when he says I thought there was someone there. I mean, I can't say no, he didn't think it except that I'm saying no, he didn't think it because just like I can see you, he could see. There is or isn't someone in the car. A green. I'm just suppose we agree with your position. You have to go to the front door first, but that's not that firm. It's a firm rule. Yes, but there are exceptions. There are exceptions that you. Which are not towards the front door and say, uh-oh, we better check this out. I'm sorry. I mean, we better check this out. There's a guy there in the garage. Maybe that's an exception. Well, if they want to go. What if I hear noise in the back? Yeah, well, they didn't hear noise in the back. I know, I know that. I know. I know. Yeah, exactly. Okay. Well, if they, um, if they heard noise in the back, um, it becomes all of those facts become. The fact that there are some facts about, is this somehow licensed as a party back there? A reasonable suspicion of other activity in the back or something like that. And we're not talking about criminal activity, just activity. Um, well, I, I think that if there were, you know, there were the July 4th party going on back there, I don't necessarily think it would be unreasonable. As Judge McKee said, if, um, not just if there were a sign that said party in the back, come around. But if the fact suggested that that's really what was going on. Because that's where the people were and the owner had really invited them to the room of the house. Yes. Um, I'm not here to say that there can, that there can never be a time when you go to the back. But there have to be facts, which tell you that. And when the district judge says based on facts, there have to be facts. Um, if I also could address, because I, I know that the court asked about the, um, the verdict slip. And, um, it is not part of the appendix, although, um, it was quoted accurately. And it's in appellees brief of pages five and six on page five. The three questions were the trooper carol. You stipulate because that's not really part of the record with a brief is, but the factual contents in the brief. It's hard for us to accept unless you agree that I can't. That's accurate. I do. Okay. And, um, the three questions on page five. Um, the district judge asks the jury to decide the constitutional issue. And that is not a jury question. Is this, um, the findings whether trooper carol. Did or did not unconstitutionally enter the comments property and back deck, whether he unconstitutionally searched the comments garage slash carport, whether he, um, subjected Mr. Carman to an unconstitutional seizure. So he is asking the district court is asking the jury to decide the constitutional legal issues and not the factual issues. Not is there some reason to believe that this is the normal. Even that, um, descriptive language was taken out. You still have a very fundamental problem with the charge because of the emissions of the qualifier. And it's, it's, you're right. There's a problem. Massing the jury to decide a constitutional question, even absent that. This is a real problem. You're arguing. I believe you're arguing with the way the qualifications on the knock and talk doctrine were not submitted to the jury. That's exactly right. That's exactly right. Um, the cases say knock on the front door. The judge didn't say that. The cases say, um, and the judge. Um, the cases do use the word there might be. It might be appropriate in certain circumstances to go to the back after knocking. Besides the fact that there wasn't knocking, the jury can't decide. Is this one of those times when it might. What about this person that Georgia for instance asked, how do we write something that. Make sense in this context and also place other context. What if there is somebody. Even that's a somebody person that's front of the house. And as he's getting out of the car and walking. Um, toward the house, he sees the garage car. Boy, it sees somebody in there. So it starts to walk around toward the back. Well, I didn't have a conversation. That's clearly beyond jargings and we're asking, what's wrong with that? Why is that reasonable? Well, I guess I was just in response to how do we write this opinion? I would say, um, I know he wants to write it. No, no, the first paragraph is a we reverse. But, but after this and stuff and after that, I think that the best way for this court to do it and for courts generally to do it is on the narrowest possible grounds. And so in this case on these facts and leave for another factual another day, another factual situation. Um, where maybe there was some reason not to go to the front door. Mr. Kirkpatrick, I imagine would like his plans to have some guidance on this area. And it's a very amorphous area officers should have some basis to know what they can do in a situation like this is not really clear. I mean, that's true. And just from my perspective, I like that too. Um, but, you know, going back 30 years to law school, um, I was, you know, I know that cases, the holding of the case regardless of your language is based on the facts. And I don't know that you could, you know, give it a broad and compassing, it's an opinion that will govern every conceivable situation in the future. Um, so we should jump a footnote right after the first sentence. Uh, this is someone like see bill or on constitutional jurisprudence. I'd appreciate it. Um, see also Kirkpatrick, but not necessary. But I think you could say these are the undisputed facts. There was a front door. There was a front path to the front door. Um, there was no path in the back. Um, the officers went to the side. There were a little closer to the back than the front. Um, the trooper says that it was a shorter path. Therefore, that was the reason. Number one, we reject that. We maintain the rule that we've got knock and talk means go to the front door and knock where there is implied license for police officers as well as girls, and people to go absent some other circumstance, which does not exist here. And that's ultimately what I think this opinion should. How would you define the law? Thank you very much. Thank you very much