Legal Case Summary

I have a very fundamental question. And perhaps you can answer it in the simplest possible terms because I really don't understand how we've gotten to this point. The initial complaint, named 36 plaintiffs, with residences in 15 states. That complaint did not alleg any specific violation of the substantive law of any state, only or common law. By the time Judge Blifland denied class certification, we were at the third amended complaint. You had over a hundred plaintiffs of 52 jurisdictions and still no allegation that the substantive law, any particular substantive law of any particular state has been violated. How did we get to the point where $4.6 million in attorneys' fees and costs has been awarded under a fee shifting provision of California law? What? What? Substantive law of California was violated here. What was pled and what was violated, I can't find it. It's not in there. The record, the plaintiffs did not plead any specific California provisions. There are only hookers for a 50 federal statute of maximum tax, which are in the case because there were not enough plaintiffs. And so the patient never had been in federal court. No, that's a different issue. But there was never any adjudication of California law. So why has a Chrysler been in here screaming bloody murder over the last ex number of years? In a sense it did scream bloody murder. In the district court, over and over, Chrysler's five-difit case dismissed by the warrant attorney's fees, five-difit cases in the court. A fictional round, faster vacation would be denied. No, but not specifically on what I'm saying. I'm saying I have not seen and I have counted, talk about anal preparation. There are 277 pages of complaint filed in this case. There has not been one specific violation of substantive law of any state alleged. I agree

. One of our arguments is that California law was not planned, no plaintiff's plan, no plaintiff's due to the case, but the statute for attorney needs the procedural statute to catch all, not built into this any substantive plan. But the statute, the California statute says, upon motion a court may award attorneys fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted, etc. Do you read that to be any action anywhere in the world? I don't, Your Honor. I don't think it applies to this case in the dirty at all. It applies to California cases. Exactly. Can we research this honor drastically? I've not been in my one single case in American history in any jurisdiction state of federal that defies this California statute. Shouldn't that be your first argument? Shouldn't that have been your first argument at all? You started all this jurisdictional stuff. Can't you? I didn't want to bother you with the other stuff, but I'll go right to it. Well, I'd like to ask you a question that's on Christworthy rather than on plaintiff's problem, if I can. My question is, you take the position that you can't have an individual Magnus Morse claim combined with a separate class action, whether a class acted below and whatnot. I'd like to know the basis for that. Your Honor, I think it's the plain language of the statute, which is. Go ahead. Yes, we've said that very carefully, graphically, no claim shall be possible in a suit brought to federal court if the action brought to the class action and the number of claims is less than one point. Okay, now you could have, is there any reason why you couldn't have separate suits, one brought as a Magnus Morse action, and one brought as a diversity action. There was not a complete diversity here, so they would not have had a choice. I thought they knocked out the New Jersey. Where was Christworthy? Christworthy Mission. Are there any missions in the plaintiff? It was filed on the citizens of every state, but two more, few more jurisdictions, so there was not diversity at the soul. Okay. Theoretically, though, is there any reason you couldn't have a separate Magnus Morse action and a diversity action that really is a diversity action? If you readically are on our if the class is properly defined, there might be a claims-plitting argument because the Magnus Morse actor's current jurisdiction, but I think that would raise separately

. But you could have those and then a district court could combine them to consolidate them if they came at a rose out of the same transaction. I'm trying to find out what the theoretical basis is for this argument that they can't be joined in a complaint. What's the harm? Well, the two things, the statute was drafted in by Congress in order to put limits on jurisdiction for class action that don't belong to the plaintiff. But they didn't talk about the joinedists. They don't talk about joinedists. But a class representative in your honor, who has individual claims that don't belong to the class, is thrown into an immediate conflict with the class representative, has to stand in the human class. So if there was an individual claim and a class claim, I don't think I've seen in case you actually communicated that way because the class members then have separate interests. Well, the A-prosied, the second circuit's A-pronged case certainly suggested you do that. They ultimately said that there could be no class and said maybe the individual action is going forward. And I don't think the defendant's raising a real burden that if the Magnus and Laws Act claims, this was called a class action claim, there's no question about it. Then there's no jurisdiction. It can't be used in the jurisdiction of the federal court unless there are at least 100 names in any very rare neighborhood case didn't address that. You've waited some seven or eight years before you challenged jurisdiction. What should be able to do that? Because they put a amended certain claim if you haven't waited some more. They did remain in the jurisdiction, but that was not enough to solve a jurisdiction. The time of filing will jurisdiction amended. The time of the filing will be original complaint. They might have been able to. Does the third circuit have any such case? Yes. On the time of filing. The Rosa case, which says it is firmly established inside of the court, is a federal question case. It's firmly established that there's a subject manager that can judge the time of filing

. They could have filed a new action instead of the lending there. Before the statute of limitations. If you had challenged it in time. But one of the reasons you're honored that that would not have been attractive to you. Is that the plaintiff's race into federal court. If I had to get a complaint about the federal, a bunch of other flat-sacred files. And this is a pattern of flat-sacred cases. Then the plaintiff's lawyers argue that even though there was a federal investigation form. Voluntary recall. The claim is that their flat-sacred and opposed to the other five somehow with a catalyst. With the Supreme Court rejected in the theory for a certain reason. That's a matter of federal law. That's under federal law and the magazine of the flat-sacred. Well, so we have one federal claim sold for jurisdiction. Under that statute, fees would be barred by the book can in case you need to pay for it. Going back to judge Berry's point, we have a California's. Well, that might depend on whether it's substantive or procedural. In that issue, whether it's substantive or procedural. Going back to this point, the judiciary made. That to say the California law out of the 52 jurisdiction clause that were in vote. When there was never an adjudicated of that California claim. Never even really a leading convention or analysis of it

. The plaintiff's argued that new Jersey law to apply to everybody in the class. Now they're trying to put attorney's fees under the California law. Going back to Judge Sloveter's question. The fact that you did not object to the lack of jurisdiction. Yes. What is it? The first amendment, first amended complaint, then did have more than 100 plaintiff claiming a class out. And you are saying that because the original complaint didn't satisfy the statute, they couldn't amend it. So what if we look at the first amended complaint as a new complaint? What would you object to now? Then I would say you're on right. I would go to my second question. There's no basis for applying California law here, first of all. Well, but you would say that it's a good complaint. I mean, that's not the jurisdiction. Our jurisdictional argument is based on the time of filing. Which applies here and requires that we look at the facts as they use the time of filing. But if we say, okay, this court had discretion to say, this is an amendment, but I'm not going to consider an amendment. I'm going to consider a new complaint and move forward from there. Would you have any objection to that? I would, Your Honor, that would be improper. There would have been a refiling of the complaint. The law is very clear. In this circuit, the Supreme Court decided to group a data box case which decided in this connect-buting case. The point is brought to the court attention. The latest deraising that argument is the time of filing rules

. I didn't find the court said there. The United States has been committed to complaint as a new complaint. I think that would be wrong already. There would have to be a new action file. Can't the district court say I am considering this a new file? No, Your Honor. Why? Because the court does not have jurisdiction to do that yet. Proper complaint does not brought the action. Well, you've got the complaint before you. You've got the parties before you. You say this is a new complaint. That would not be enough, Your Honor. In fact, if you go back and look at all these jurisdictional cases, the Supreme Court and the group of data blocks case, the case had bonded the jury. The parties were diverse. By the time of the jury murdered, the Supreme Court said there was no subject manager's decision. At the time of filing, there was no diversity. There, under the drop of the year, the district court said, you're all here. I've got your jurisdiction considered as a new. But the point is you didn't object for seven years. So if you had objected right away, the district court could have said right away, okay, this amended complaint is a filing of a new complaint we will proceed from there. There's no will be, although there would have been behind all the other class actions that brought the item even before it. But as the court knows, the raise goes to the court and every moment. Yeah, I'm just

... I don't get any time. Judge Slough would have raised the question, why did you wait so long? And I see some of you that there is prejudice to the plaintiffs from you having movements. Well, your Honor, prejudice is not part of the jurisdiction for you. And this issue was not focused on, but there were many things going on that didn't take one on and on. You mean you people didn't focus on it? When you put it in the past, then you say it was not focused on it. Yes, Christor did not focus on it and then realized there was no jurisdiction. It would have been better had it been raised earlier because there wouldn't have been now been on the 14th of the 18th. I don't know if I agree it would have been better. But for the legal issue, there's no jurisdiction. I think I'm running out of time. But I do think that it goes to power of the district court and at lead to this bizarre situation where we have these people were going to tell for them off. The court should reverse the deal and they can't. Thank you. Thank you. That's fine. We have a question says to you on the panel. Mr. Huffer? Yes, my please support from here on behalf of the plaintiffs. You're too busy. You better put your phone name on

. Pardon? Put your phone name on. You said you're here. If you are. My name is Brian Huffer. Let me ask you at the very beginning of the question that Judge Barry asked Christor, which I think I would like you to answer. What is this case doing in New Jersey? Your honor, this case was originally filed in October 1995. In New Jersey. In New Jersey with New Jersey plaintiffs as well as many other plaintiffs in Maryland. There's a substantive case challenging defective breaks all across the country. Who's substantive law? Are you claiming which state substance law are you claiming was violent? The allegation of the weak claims first under the Magnus Moss Act and then under the state laws of fraud, deception and fraud. Which state? Which state? Of each of the members of the class would be all 50 states. 52 states. Yes. Now I already said it. Okay. In that case then why would you use the attorney's being statute from one only one of the states? Well, your honor, because the law completely allows us to do it. So what happened was the initial law. If I could explain your honor. What? That's my fundamental law. What? The statute. We initially filed the claim for attorneys to be under Magnus Moss. Which an under federal authority at that time, including the bomb-guarded case, there's a folder wrote specifically allowed the catalyst theory to apply

. We filed this case and the Supreme Court has now called this a chance. And the Supreme Court said no. We then said, well, we're still with the catalyst. We are still with the cause of price-issuing these two recalls, what $54 million. 25 of our name plaintiffs in California. Under this case, and the price or argued this in the District Court Judge's Listman argument, you have to apply state laws for every one of the plaintiffs. Well, now hold on. Are you claiming then that your entitled under that very strange unique California statute that that applies to the fees only with respect to those plaintiffs or from California? Because if you apply the state, as I understood what you just did, you apply state law for each of the plaintiffs. But California is unique in that strange statute. What this case provides and what the District Court Judge Lifflin held in what price or argument is, and the reason why we lost that certification is because you have to apply the state laws for each plaintiff. Okay, so. Therefore, that's why they argued in support of their motion to deny certifications. Yes. They argue that not that those laws should apply if there was no class, but that's why there should not be a class because you'd have to apply the law of 52 jurisdictions for, quote unquote, hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs. Yes. So once the class is denied for the 25 named California residents, if that case had been pursued, California law would apply. Where is the catalyst theory specifically pled as a matter of California law in any of these complaints? It does not need to be denied. You don't have to plead it. You can just come in for attorneys to do this. Yes. And here's why New Jersey law under Rule 442-988 is a specific exception that New Jersey adopted to the American Rule. That is where you are allowed to bring seek attorneys to seek

. You're picking and choosing various states laws that serve you best. It's the law that's applied. The American Rule is the law of New Jersey absent the exceptions. So why not go to the American Rule? Anyway, go back to the, I'm so asked for her question, and then I have another one that follows it. The issue is, California law applies to those 25 plaintiffs. That is exactly the law specifies that the price are arguing. What law specifies that? The common law under eerie. The common law. If we're suing the price for fraud. And of 52 states, whether, with your complaint, the applicable common law is all that is planned, so that it would be the applicable common law of 52 jurisdictions, correct? Correct. Initially. But let me explain the issue for the attorneys. When you get to the question of attorney's fees for those 25 name plaintiffs in California, it's California law that applies. May I suggest to you that the issue is not eerie, but the issue is choice of law, and that, so that we've eerie at the moment out of this, and that choice of law is an issue that has to be decided. How would New Jersey apply its choice of law? And the district court deal with that? The district court didn't specifically raise the issue of rule 442-9. Well, what did it deal with New Jersey choice of law? It didn't do a choice of law analysis. The court ultimately concluded that California law should apply. After after after a choice of law analysis, the court basically looked at it and said, we are going to be applying in California law in this case. Isn't that a vote of 25 name? It may have been your own. But if you go through that stage, what you come down to is rule 442-9. And the floor 42 would state that, look against may of plain attorney's fees, in all cases where council fees are permitted by statute, as far as we could tell, the New Jersey Supreme Court has never applied that rule to the fee shifting rule of another state, as this thing which as opposed to the New Jersey, in other words, has permitted by statute, as the New Jersey Supreme Court ever said, has permitted by statute, means any statute of any state. It's New Jersey statute

. That's what New Jersey is talking about. New Jersey has not your honor. But New Jersey Pellet Division decisions in New Jersey have held that it applies. Well, then we have to look at the New Jersey Supreme Court. Well, one case is critical. It's not directly on the issue of other states, but on the issue of the applicability of rule 442-988 is the Supreme Court decision to be count brand versus Trump passive, 626-82425, New Jersey 1993. Now, what are the critical arguments? The crisis does not cite a single case that says you cannot apply this rule outside New Jersey. If the interesting thing is, A8's an exception to the general rule that there aren't attorney's fees in New Jersey. Well, of course, the American rule applies in order to the American rule, but a clear exception in New Jersey is that the statute provides for fees. Isn't this something perhaps a district court should consider in the first instance if we were to determine that New Jersey law applies? Well, if you look at the rule, it's very explicit. And the only argument, Chrysler Hatt, the only argument he gets to applying this rule is that 1021.5 in California is procedural, not substantive. In the account brand case in New Jersey, Supreme Court specifically held the rule 442-988 applies to procedural statutes, because it held that it applies to New Jersey's privilege litigation statute. Similarly, and this is an important case, Vegas versus Scott, 597-825-799. Is that in your brief? It's not your honor, because the argument about that this rule only applies to procedural, only came up in the reply. Well, did you want, but you have the ability to write us a letter to say, please take these cases into consideration. I don't remember receiving that. We didn't do that only because it was not new authority, Your Honor. It was a new argument made in the fall. Well, I know, but you're supposed to bring to our attention any certainly state cases that are not in your brief. I strongly suggest that you do that within the next 48 hours. We will, Your Honor. I think that we don't have to sit here on the Vegas. You know, it's a critical point, and I apologize for not having done that. The critical point is that this rule, under New Jersey, clearly has been recognized by New Jersey courts as providing an important remedy, has been applied by many appellate division courts in New Jersey outside the state. Do you agree that New Jersey has a strong policy against application of counsel, free, and discontent case? Actually, it does not in the case involving consumers. In fact, New Jersey has a very strong argument in favor of attorneys for consumers. In New Jersey, crack it. And so forth. They've applied that to New Jersey, to consumer protection structures. Correct. But I'll give an example in the Garcia case, in the appellate division, where the appellate division for New Jersey applied 9A8 to apply laws of Massachusetts, allowed attorneys fees under Massachusetts law. But in doing that, it also acknowledges the consideration of New Jersey law. Here's what it says. Quote, on a remand, the courts have considered the purpose of a fee-shifting statute, and a consumer statute is to ensure the plaintiffs of bonafide claims are able to find lawyers to represent them, citing the Coleman versus fewer brothers New Jersey to import case 1984. What was important there is the court was applying another state statute under 9A8. It said it applies here, and that's consistent with New Jersey public. Don't have a problem with that. The problem I have is no state statute was fled in this case, and there's been no finding as to any state statute. But because of the Cali-Sterior honor, this plot-challifón your attorney's fee-shifting provision out of the air. Well, Your Honor, it's not that simple with 102.25. That statute has many serious steps that have to be taken to be entitled. Judge Litzman did an exhaustive analysis

. I think that we don't have to sit here on the Vegas. You know, it's a critical point, and I apologize for not having done that. The critical point is that this rule, under New Jersey, clearly has been recognized by New Jersey courts as providing an important remedy, has been applied by many appellate division courts in New Jersey outside the state. Do you agree that New Jersey has a strong policy against application of counsel, free, and discontent case? Actually, it does not in the case involving consumers. In fact, New Jersey has a very strong argument in favor of attorneys for consumers. In New Jersey, crack it. And so forth. They've applied that to New Jersey, to consumer protection structures. Correct. But I'll give an example in the Garcia case, in the appellate division, where the appellate division for New Jersey applied 9A8 to apply laws of Massachusetts, allowed attorneys fees under Massachusetts law. But in doing that, it also acknowledges the consideration of New Jersey law. Here's what it says. Quote, on a remand, the courts have considered the purpose of a fee-shifting statute, and a consumer statute is to ensure the plaintiffs of bonafide claims are able to find lawyers to represent them, citing the Coleman versus fewer brothers New Jersey to import case 1984. What was important there is the court was applying another state statute under 9A8. It said it applies here, and that's consistent with New Jersey public. Don't have a problem with that. The problem I have is no state statute was fled in this case, and there's been no finding as to any state statute. But because of the Cali-Sterior honor, this plot-challifón your attorney's fee-shifting provision out of the air. Well, Your Honor, it's not that simple with 102.25. That statute has many serious steps that have to be taken to be entitled. Judge Litzman did an exhaustive analysis. Well, wait a minute. But he missed, he inserted a word that's not in the statute when he permitted attorney's fees in any action anywhere. The word anywhere was left out. He used, he inserted implicitly anywhere. When the statute clearly means an action in California, a California law by a letter. Well, in this case, again, because California law applied to those 25 plaintiffs, in our case, forced-chrycerd issue recalls the benefit of the plaintiff. How's because 25 of the more than 100 plaintiffs live in California? That's it. That cal-even though there's no substantive violation of any California law found and nor pled that they get attorney's fees. Well, that's your position. That's your position? That is our position, Your Honor. And in fact, with the court held under very good authority, Judge Litzman held, is that there is no need to allocate between the California and the non-California red. Why? Because of the fact that all the work was done to benefit all the plaintiffs. Now, of course, it doesn't appeal that argument. You know, arguably one could say that if you file an action with plaintiffs or all of them, you pick. And why did you pick New Jersey? Why did you pick California to file your sue then? Well, our initial plaintiff was from New Jersey, Your Honor. At the time I was in the room. Yeah, but 25 are from California. Nothing. I mean... We could have picked many places to file your Honor

. Well, wait a minute. But he missed, he inserted a word that's not in the statute when he permitted attorney's fees in any action anywhere. The word anywhere was left out. He used, he inserted implicitly anywhere. When the statute clearly means an action in California, a California law by a letter. Well, in this case, again, because California law applied to those 25 plaintiffs, in our case, forced-chrycerd issue recalls the benefit of the plaintiff. How's because 25 of the more than 100 plaintiffs live in California? That's it. That cal-even though there's no substantive violation of any California law found and nor pled that they get attorney's fees. Well, that's your position. That's your position? That is our position, Your Honor. And in fact, with the court held under very good authority, Judge Litzman held, is that there is no need to allocate between the California and the non-California red. Why? Because of the fact that all the work was done to benefit all the plaintiffs. Now, of course, it doesn't appeal that argument. You know, arguably one could say that if you file an action with plaintiffs or all of them, you pick. And why did you pick New Jersey? Why did you pick California to file your sue then? Well, our initial plaintiff was from New Jersey, Your Honor. At the time I was in the room. Yeah, but 25 are from California. Nothing. I mean... We could have picked many places to file your Honor. Yeah, and why? That's right. And we could have been interested. Why New Jersey? Your venue for provision in your initial complaint. Certain of the plaintiffs in New Jersey residents, tribes were maintained offices in this district. Received substantial compensation and profits and sales of tribes are vehicleed in this district, made representations and breach warranties in this district, moreover allied signal to manufacture of the Bendix-10ABS. Has its principal executive office in this district, thus much of the discovery and the witnesses are here. So that's a good reason for having brought in here. But you're unwilling to abide by New Jersey's principal, which is that we don't give attorneys fees in this time of year. And in Garcia, the court was enforcing chapter 93A of the Massachusetts Law. It was enforcing a specific Massachusetts Law, and then followed up with the attorney, the provision of that law, it was enforcing, which is very different from the situation here. We accept in Macount Brand, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, made clear that rule 9a8 applies not only to substantive fees shifting, but also whether procedural fees shifting, including the Tribal statute. The law clearly allows, and there's not a single case, not a single case that says the court in New Jersey could not apply California law in any circumstances. And given that part of the reason this rose this way, because the changing of law in the Canada, et cetera, is because we filed this case, and the judge recognized that we have painted substantial benefits. Christler wanted to punish me. But no other state in the country would allow that, except for California, which doesn't follow the catalyst too. Well, currently California does not follow what I suspect other states will follow that as well, but right now, I agree it's California that explicitly. And that came up in our case. In fact, it was the case against Christ. The Gram case, specifically, because of their conduct, denying that the plan for a catalyst, and in fact the law, the fact clearly showed that we were. And in this case, the 25-name plaintiffs, the judge, Judge Lifflin, clearly had the right to apply California law, where there's a common law claim to California. And he clearly had the right to meet Jersey authority to apply 102.1

. Yeah, and why? That's right. And we could have been interested. Why New Jersey? Your venue for provision in your initial complaint. Certain of the plaintiffs in New Jersey residents, tribes were maintained offices in this district. Received substantial compensation and profits and sales of tribes are vehicleed in this district, made representations and breach warranties in this district, moreover allied signal to manufacture of the Bendix-10ABS. Has its principal executive office in this district, thus much of the discovery and the witnesses are here. So that's a good reason for having brought in here. But you're unwilling to abide by New Jersey's principal, which is that we don't give attorneys fees in this time of year. And in Garcia, the court was enforcing chapter 93A of the Massachusetts Law. It was enforcing a specific Massachusetts Law, and then followed up with the attorney, the provision of that law, it was enforcing, which is very different from the situation here. We accept in Macount Brand, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, made clear that rule 9a8 applies not only to substantive fees shifting, but also whether procedural fees shifting, including the Tribal statute. The law clearly allows, and there's not a single case, not a single case that says the court in New Jersey could not apply California law in any circumstances. And given that part of the reason this rose this way, because the changing of law in the Canada, et cetera, is because we filed this case, and the judge recognized that we have painted substantial benefits. Christler wanted to punish me. But no other state in the country would allow that, except for California, which doesn't follow the catalyst too. Well, currently California does not follow what I suspect other states will follow that as well, but right now, I agree it's California that explicitly. And that came up in our case. In fact, it was the case against Christ. The Gram case, specifically, because of their conduct, denying that the plan for a catalyst, and in fact the law, the fact clearly showed that we were. And in this case, the 25-name plaintiffs, the judge, Judge Lifflin, clearly had the right to apply California law, where there's a common law claim to California. And he clearly had the right to meet Jersey authority to apply 102.1.5. Now, I haven't got a chance to focus on the jurisdiction issues, but I think one thing that's very important here, under jurisdiction, if the court lets to follow the decision of the first circuit, connect you versus Zuckerberg, 522, F3rd, 82, that resolves the jurisdiction issue. Because we connect you with this issue just in this past April, after preaching had been done, that held the one, a federal question jurisdiction is an issue, as long as the plaintiff files an amendment complaint as of right, prior to any objection being raised to jurisdiction, and for jurisdiction purposes, all you look at is the amendment complaint. You don't have to look at the original complaint. And we believe price was wrong on the argument under the original complaint, but it's irrelevant to connect you. You simply have to look at the amendment complaint. Now, it's very interesting because connect you actually followed, or adopted a much of the analysis from the third circuit. In fact, Judge Roth's decision in new Roth assets back in 1996, in that decision, that Roth specifically said that when you look at the time of filing rule, that generally does not apply in a federal question jurisdiction case. It's only rarely applied, and in fact, Roth is not applied in that case. Because she specifically held, we are looking at the amendment complaint, and found in that case, there is no jurisdiction in that amendment. But this isn't a federal question case. This is a federal question case for jurisdiction purposes. It was brought into the Magnes Moss Act for jurisdiction. Yeah, but you can't maintain the maximum of time. Your time is up. I would direct you to give without argument, give us the letter within 48 hours with the citations of every state case that you've talked about that you do not have in the brief. I would. I think our rules are very clear about that. You haven't done it. We really require people to follow our rules. All right. Thank you

.5. Now, I haven't got a chance to focus on the jurisdiction issues, but I think one thing that's very important here, under jurisdiction, if the court lets to follow the decision of the first circuit, connect you versus Zuckerberg, 522, F3rd, 82, that resolves the jurisdiction issue. Because we connect you with this issue just in this past April, after preaching had been done, that held the one, a federal question jurisdiction is an issue, as long as the plaintiff files an amendment complaint as of right, prior to any objection being raised to jurisdiction, and for jurisdiction purposes, all you look at is the amendment complaint. You don't have to look at the original complaint. And we believe price was wrong on the argument under the original complaint, but it's irrelevant to connect you. You simply have to look at the amendment complaint. Now, it's very interesting because connect you actually followed, or adopted a much of the analysis from the third circuit. In fact, Judge Roth's decision in new Roth assets back in 1996, in that decision, that Roth specifically said that when you look at the time of filing rule, that generally does not apply in a federal question jurisdiction case. It's only rarely applied, and in fact, Roth is not applied in that case. Because she specifically held, we are looking at the amendment complaint, and found in that case, there is no jurisdiction in that amendment. But this isn't a federal question case. This is a federal question case for jurisdiction purposes. It was brought into the Magnes Moss Act for jurisdiction. Yeah, but you can't maintain the maximum of time. Your time is up. I would direct you to give without argument, give us the letter within 48 hours with the citations of every state case that you've talked about that you do not have in the brief. I would. I think our rules are very clear about that. You haven't done it. We really require people to follow our rules. All right. Thank you. Your Honor, is my man, let me start with the juridic statute. Yeah, as you can see, what the court is focusing on and is concerned that those barriers said you didn't start out bang, pushing that issue. It's screaming bloody murder. I think it's what I said. Let me try it now. Because I think it is long. I think it's never made this argument under this section, this rule 442, the council is just made it. What do you mean they never made it? In the district court, they never vote the rule. Then it's way. It's way. We make that point in our life. Any issue that is not raised in the district court is just way. Correct, Your Honor. So everything that we just heard about the New Jersey court might apply California law into the statute of mention in the fight. Now, you're telling us that they didn't do it in oral arguments. They didn't do it in their briefs. Not that I know of, Your Honor. You mentioned this on page 21 of our refibrates. This came up on appeal the first time this noted in that New Jersey court would apply as New Jersey procedural statute to fight California law. It was not reached at all below. Even on appeal that not raised in the A8 exception. So that's way

. Your Honor, is my man, let me start with the juridic statute. Yeah, as you can see, what the court is focusing on and is concerned that those barriers said you didn't start out bang, pushing that issue. It's screaming bloody murder. I think it's what I said. Let me try it now. Because I think it is long. I think it's never made this argument under this section, this rule 442, the council is just made it. What do you mean they never made it? In the district court, they never vote the rule. Then it's way. It's way. We make that point in our life. Any issue that is not raised in the district court is just way. Correct, Your Honor. So everything that we just heard about the New Jersey court might apply California law into the statute of mention in the fight. Now, you're telling us that they didn't do it in oral arguments. They didn't do it in their briefs. Not that I know of, Your Honor. You mentioned this on page 21 of our refibrates. This came up on appeal the first time this noted in that New Jersey court would apply as New Jersey procedural statute to fight California law. It was not reached at all below. Even on appeal that not raised in the A8 exception. So that's way. And furthermore, the New Jersey case is that the intermediate court case is just wrong pointed out. Like our seal, all involved situations where the B should be committed to the subject of statute. And that was the law of being applied. Not one of the involved situations like this. You say you raise it on what case of your advisory? Maybe on page 21 of our refibrates where we talk about this New Jersey. And we say, for the first time in a appeal, plain to starting with one of the exceptions. But the rule of 442, the BASH 9A is relevant. And that was not an issue in Judge Lipplin never had the opportunity to address that. And so that way. I was wrong. This. Thank you. The other point I wanted to make on it with respect to the case in this case is, you know, New Jersey law, going back to the choice of law question, because it's over, you put it out, that is a coup de lait. If we looked at traditional principles, New Jersey would apply New Jersey law. If you put it aside all the thought back, then that would include the New Jersey choice of law for the case. And the New Jersey cases are absolutely clear that B-shifting issues are procedural for the law in New Jersey, like New Jersey law. And there's no catalyst. What do I do with, what do we do with the statement in Judge Lipplin's opinion denying class certification? Oh, Brytschler argues that a choice of law analysis leads to the conclusion that the law of each plaintiff's home court, that the state must be applied because those states have interest that outweigh the interests of New Jersey. If not, I think we can clearly stand by that statement, but that would mean there are about four levels of analysis that would have had to go from California, would have liked its choice of law for me, which we never got to. That just leaves us back to all those states, and Judge Lipplin never went beyond that. And so it is completely consistent with what we're arguing here. I think that's what happened, though

. And furthermore, the New Jersey case is that the intermediate court case is just wrong pointed out. Like our seal, all involved situations where the B should be committed to the subject of statute. And that was the law of being applied. Not one of the involved situations like this. You say you raise it on what case of your advisory? Maybe on page 21 of our refibrates where we talk about this New Jersey. And we say, for the first time in a appeal, plain to starting with one of the exceptions. But the rule of 442, the BASH 9A is relevant. And that was not an issue in Judge Lipplin never had the opportunity to address that. And so that way. I was wrong. This. Thank you. The other point I wanted to make on it with respect to the case in this case is, you know, New Jersey law, going back to the choice of law question, because it's over, you put it out, that is a coup de lait. If we looked at traditional principles, New Jersey would apply New Jersey law. If you put it aside all the thought back, then that would include the New Jersey choice of law for the case. And the New Jersey cases are absolutely clear that B-shifting issues are procedural for the law in New Jersey, like New Jersey law. And there's no catalyst. What do I do with, what do we do with the statement in Judge Lipplin's opinion denying class certification? Oh, Brytschler argues that a choice of law analysis leads to the conclusion that the law of each plaintiff's home court, that the state must be applied because those states have interest that outweigh the interests of New Jersey. If not, I think we can clearly stand by that statement, but that would mean there are about four levels of analysis that would have had to go from California, would have liked its choice of law for me, which we never got to. That just leaves us back to all those states, and Judge Lipplin never went beyond that. And so it is completely consistent with what we're arguing here. I think that's what happened, though. I think that was an argument you'd raised that there shouldn't be class certification, because you have to apply the law of 50-teacher restrictions. Everybody is taking different positions. There are some people who've never even been harmed by the braces, the whole thing hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs. And then as the case continued, I suppose there was just almost the assumption that if a plaintiff was from a particular state, that law would apply. Well, that's the IRA, right? No, he didn't. That's where the screaming blood emerged. No one, I'm not, it's not funny. I mean, this is a 13-year-old case now. No, it's a hit to the case. The legitimate point here are obviously, but let me just make this point. The case didn't begin. The plaintiffs dismissed the case years ago, and only through this trying to kick a law, first they picked them out because the law's act claimed to be in the district judge denied it under Buchanan. Then they plucked out of the thin air, California law. And I argued the Graham case back in California, so I know all about it, and it is unique. And so it is. There's no basis for applying California law. If Jersey would apply its own law, there's no capital to be. And plaintiffs didn't make this argument under Section 442. Yeah, I would, if you didn't say that, you just got up, and you do have it in your brief, now because the right brief. But I can't understand why you didn't put that in your principal argument. Because we didn't know they were going to make the argument or are they had made it below. So this came out of the blue dot, I told the Sutton they're making arguments

. I think that was an argument you'd raised that there shouldn't be class certification, because you have to apply the law of 50-teacher restrictions. Everybody is taking different positions. There are some people who've never even been harmed by the braces, the whole thing hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs. And then as the case continued, I suppose there was just almost the assumption that if a plaintiff was from a particular state, that law would apply. Well, that's the IRA, right? No, he didn't. That's where the screaming blood emerged. No one, I'm not, it's not funny. I mean, this is a 13-year-old case now. No, it's a hit to the case. The legitimate point here are obviously, but let me just make this point. The case didn't begin. The plaintiffs dismissed the case years ago, and only through this trying to kick a law, first they picked them out because the law's act claimed to be in the district judge denied it under Buchanan. Then they plucked out of the thin air, California law. And I argued the Graham case back in California, so I know all about it, and it is unique. And so it is. There's no basis for applying California law. If Jersey would apply its own law, there's no capital to be. And plaintiffs didn't make this argument under Section 442. Yeah, I would, if you didn't say that, you just got up, and you do have it in your brief, now because the right brief. But I can't understand why you didn't put that in your principal argument. Because we didn't know they were going to make the argument or are they had made it below. So this came out of the blue dot, I told the Sutton they're making arguments. No, no, I'm not saying why did you do it here, apply to it, why didn't you do it here, principal argument before us? Because they had not, I didn't know they were going to make this argument. Well, but that's the only basis on which the district court of Louis, the poor million dollar fee that you're objecting to. No, no, he didn't involve New Jersey law. He just said California in Section 1021.5 applied. He acted until he were in California and applied the law with law and in the portrait reverse and vacant. Well, what do you think we should do? Do you think we should send it back to the district court to consider New Jersey law? Or should we decide it as a matter of law? I think the court should find that that argument about New Jersey law is way different from the beginning against New Jersey law applied. They were wrong. This case is gone on and not exactly in one point I wanted to make for it again. This is completely contrary to the Supreme Court, the policy for the federal court, the Supreme Court laid down the mechanic. It's precisely you avoid a new litigation over attorneys fee, major satellite secondary litigation. But this is not supposed, this is no longer a federal case in the sense that whatever common law, the plaintiffs purportedly prevailed under, it is a state claim. Whether it's breach of warranty, whether it's whatever it is, it's a state claim. There were five state claims that Judge Lifland managed to tease out of the complaint. But we don't even know which one of those they allegedly achieved success on. And any of it wasn't a federal court. Well, that's correct, Your Honor. But I have a proposed rule and it's where, and there's a not found a case where he's supposed to be never gone. Where there's a federal question, a federal claim, both in the basis of the Supreme Court's decision. And there are state claims that are brought supplementary. And there is a key shift in provision of federal claim. And the plaintiffs are barred from these under that claim

. No, no, I'm not saying why did you do it here, apply to it, why didn't you do it here, principal argument before us? Because they had not, I didn't know they were going to make this argument. Well, but that's the only basis on which the district court of Louis, the poor million dollar fee that you're objecting to. No, no, he didn't involve New Jersey law. He just said California in Section 1021.5 applied. He acted until he were in California and applied the law with law and in the portrait reverse and vacant. Well, what do you think we should do? Do you think we should send it back to the district court to consider New Jersey law? Or should we decide it as a matter of law? I think the court should find that that argument about New Jersey law is way different from the beginning against New Jersey law applied. They were wrong. This case is gone on and not exactly in one point I wanted to make for it again. This is completely contrary to the Supreme Court, the policy for the federal court, the Supreme Court laid down the mechanic. It's precisely you avoid a new litigation over attorneys fee, major satellite secondary litigation. But this is not supposed, this is no longer a federal case in the sense that whatever common law, the plaintiffs purportedly prevailed under, it is a state claim. Whether it's breach of warranty, whether it's whatever it is, it's a state claim. There were five state claims that Judge Lifland managed to tease out of the complaint. But we don't even know which one of those they allegedly achieved success on. And any of it wasn't a federal court. Well, that's correct, Your Honor. But I have a proposed rule and it's where, and there's a not found a case where he's supposed to be never gone. Where there's a federal question, a federal claim, both in the basis of the Supreme Court's decision. And there are state claims that are brought supplementary. And there is a key shift in provision of federal claim. And the plaintiffs are barred from these under that claim. It's improper to try to pick out some state claim and get around the federal rule. Particularly because it's extraordinary circumstances where we've had to know that you've been patient, not even the identification of a state claim under those circumstances. And the federal policies are overwhelmingly strong. We make this point, our brief, and the discordant look to this point. About access to the court, we use the federal policy crumbs here without reason. But I think the court to this court to reverse in the dismay, the second battle at litigation. That's what the court can mandate. You must press the court to do that. Thank you very much. We'll take the case under advisement. Thank you, Your Honor. I want to.

I have a very fundamental question. And perhaps you can answer it in the simplest possible terms because I really don't understand how we've gotten to this point. The initial complaint, named 36 plaintiffs, with residences in 15 states. That complaint did not alleg any specific violation of the substantive law of any state, only or common law. By the time Judge Blifland denied class certification, we were at the third amended complaint. You had over a hundred plaintiffs of 52 jurisdictions and still no allegation that the substantive law, any particular substantive law of any particular state has been violated. How did we get to the point where $4.6 million in attorneys' fees and costs has been awarded under a fee shifting provision of California law? What? What? Substantive law of California was violated here. What was pled and what was violated, I can't find it. It's not in there. The record, the plaintiffs did not plead any specific California provisions. There are only hookers for a 50 federal statute of maximum tax, which are in the case because there were not enough plaintiffs. And so the patient never had been in federal court. No, that's a different issue. But there was never any adjudication of California law. So why has a Chrysler been in here screaming bloody murder over the last ex number of years? In a sense it did scream bloody murder. In the district court, over and over, Chrysler's five-difit case dismissed by the warrant attorney's fees, five-difit cases in the court. A fictional round, faster vacation would be denied. No, but not specifically on what I'm saying. I'm saying I have not seen and I have counted, talk about anal preparation. There are 277 pages of complaint filed in this case. There has not been one specific violation of substantive law of any state alleged. I agree. One of our arguments is that California law was not planned, no plaintiff's plan, no plaintiff's due to the case, but the statute for attorney needs the procedural statute to catch all, not built into this any substantive plan. But the statute, the California statute says, upon motion a court may award attorneys fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted, etc. Do you read that to be any action anywhere in the world? I don't, Your Honor. I don't think it applies to this case in the dirty at all. It applies to California cases. Exactly. Can we research this honor drastically? I've not been in my one single case in American history in any jurisdiction state of federal that defies this California statute. Shouldn't that be your first argument? Shouldn't that have been your first argument at all? You started all this jurisdictional stuff. Can't you? I didn't want to bother you with the other stuff, but I'll go right to it. Well, I'd like to ask you a question that's on Christworthy rather than on plaintiff's problem, if I can. My question is, you take the position that you can't have an individual Magnus Morse claim combined with a separate class action, whether a class acted below and whatnot. I'd like to know the basis for that. Your Honor, I think it's the plain language of the statute, which is. Go ahead. Yes, we've said that very carefully, graphically, no claim shall be possible in a suit brought to federal court if the action brought to the class action and the number of claims is less than one point. Okay, now you could have, is there any reason why you couldn't have separate suits, one brought as a Magnus Morse action, and one brought as a diversity action. There was not a complete diversity here, so they would not have had a choice. I thought they knocked out the New Jersey. Where was Christworthy? Christworthy Mission. Are there any missions in the plaintiff? It was filed on the citizens of every state, but two more, few more jurisdictions, so there was not diversity at the soul. Okay. Theoretically, though, is there any reason you couldn't have a separate Magnus Morse action and a diversity action that really is a diversity action? If you readically are on our if the class is properly defined, there might be a claims-plitting argument because the Magnus Morse actor's current jurisdiction, but I think that would raise separately. But you could have those and then a district court could combine them to consolidate them if they came at a rose out of the same transaction. I'm trying to find out what the theoretical basis is for this argument that they can't be joined in a complaint. What's the harm? Well, the two things, the statute was drafted in by Congress in order to put limits on jurisdiction for class action that don't belong to the plaintiff. But they didn't talk about the joinedists. They don't talk about joinedists. But a class representative in your honor, who has individual claims that don't belong to the class, is thrown into an immediate conflict with the class representative, has to stand in the human class. So if there was an individual claim and a class claim, I don't think I've seen in case you actually communicated that way because the class members then have separate interests. Well, the A-prosied, the second circuit's A-pronged case certainly suggested you do that. They ultimately said that there could be no class and said maybe the individual action is going forward. And I don't think the defendant's raising a real burden that if the Magnus and Laws Act claims, this was called a class action claim, there's no question about it. Then there's no jurisdiction. It can't be used in the jurisdiction of the federal court unless there are at least 100 names in any very rare neighborhood case didn't address that. You've waited some seven or eight years before you challenged jurisdiction. What should be able to do that? Because they put a amended certain claim if you haven't waited some more. They did remain in the jurisdiction, but that was not enough to solve a jurisdiction. The time of filing will jurisdiction amended. The time of the filing will be original complaint. They might have been able to. Does the third circuit have any such case? Yes. On the time of filing. The Rosa case, which says it is firmly established inside of the court, is a federal question case. It's firmly established that there's a subject manager that can judge the time of filing. They could have filed a new action instead of the lending there. Before the statute of limitations. If you had challenged it in time. But one of the reasons you're honored that that would not have been attractive to you. Is that the plaintiff's race into federal court. If I had to get a complaint about the federal, a bunch of other flat-sacred files. And this is a pattern of flat-sacred cases. Then the plaintiff's lawyers argue that even though there was a federal investigation form. Voluntary recall. The claim is that their flat-sacred and opposed to the other five somehow with a catalyst. With the Supreme Court rejected in the theory for a certain reason. That's a matter of federal law. That's under federal law and the magazine of the flat-sacred. Well, so we have one federal claim sold for jurisdiction. Under that statute, fees would be barred by the book can in case you need to pay for it. Going back to judge Berry's point, we have a California's. Well, that might depend on whether it's substantive or procedural. In that issue, whether it's substantive or procedural. Going back to this point, the judiciary made. That to say the California law out of the 52 jurisdiction clause that were in vote. When there was never an adjudicated of that California claim. Never even really a leading convention or analysis of it. The plaintiff's argued that new Jersey law to apply to everybody in the class. Now they're trying to put attorney's fees under the California law. Going back to Judge Sloveter's question. The fact that you did not object to the lack of jurisdiction. Yes. What is it? The first amendment, first amended complaint, then did have more than 100 plaintiff claiming a class out. And you are saying that because the original complaint didn't satisfy the statute, they couldn't amend it. So what if we look at the first amended complaint as a new complaint? What would you object to now? Then I would say you're on right. I would go to my second question. There's no basis for applying California law here, first of all. Well, but you would say that it's a good complaint. I mean, that's not the jurisdiction. Our jurisdictional argument is based on the time of filing. Which applies here and requires that we look at the facts as they use the time of filing. But if we say, okay, this court had discretion to say, this is an amendment, but I'm not going to consider an amendment. I'm going to consider a new complaint and move forward from there. Would you have any objection to that? I would, Your Honor, that would be improper. There would have been a refiling of the complaint. The law is very clear. In this circuit, the Supreme Court decided to group a data box case which decided in this connect-buting case. The point is brought to the court attention. The latest deraising that argument is the time of filing rules. I didn't find the court said there. The United States has been committed to complaint as a new complaint. I think that would be wrong already. There would have to be a new action file. Can't the district court say I am considering this a new file? No, Your Honor. Why? Because the court does not have jurisdiction to do that yet. Proper complaint does not brought the action. Well, you've got the complaint before you. You've got the parties before you. You say this is a new complaint. That would not be enough, Your Honor. In fact, if you go back and look at all these jurisdictional cases, the Supreme Court and the group of data blocks case, the case had bonded the jury. The parties were diverse. By the time of the jury murdered, the Supreme Court said there was no subject manager's decision. At the time of filing, there was no diversity. There, under the drop of the year, the district court said, you're all here. I've got your jurisdiction considered as a new. But the point is you didn't object for seven years. So if you had objected right away, the district court could have said right away, okay, this amended complaint is a filing of a new complaint we will proceed from there. There's no will be, although there would have been behind all the other class actions that brought the item even before it. But as the court knows, the raise goes to the court and every moment. Yeah, I'm just... I don't get any time. Judge Slough would have raised the question, why did you wait so long? And I see some of you that there is prejudice to the plaintiffs from you having movements. Well, your Honor, prejudice is not part of the jurisdiction for you. And this issue was not focused on, but there were many things going on that didn't take one on and on. You mean you people didn't focus on it? When you put it in the past, then you say it was not focused on it. Yes, Christor did not focus on it and then realized there was no jurisdiction. It would have been better had it been raised earlier because there wouldn't have been now been on the 14th of the 18th. I don't know if I agree it would have been better. But for the legal issue, there's no jurisdiction. I think I'm running out of time. But I do think that it goes to power of the district court and at lead to this bizarre situation where we have these people were going to tell for them off. The court should reverse the deal and they can't. Thank you. Thank you. That's fine. We have a question says to you on the panel. Mr. Huffer? Yes, my please support from here on behalf of the plaintiffs. You're too busy. You better put your phone name on. Pardon? Put your phone name on. You said you're here. If you are. My name is Brian Huffer. Let me ask you at the very beginning of the question that Judge Barry asked Christor, which I think I would like you to answer. What is this case doing in New Jersey? Your honor, this case was originally filed in October 1995. In New Jersey. In New Jersey with New Jersey plaintiffs as well as many other plaintiffs in Maryland. There's a substantive case challenging defective breaks all across the country. Who's substantive law? Are you claiming which state substance law are you claiming was violent? The allegation of the weak claims first under the Magnus Moss Act and then under the state laws of fraud, deception and fraud. Which state? Which state? Of each of the members of the class would be all 50 states. 52 states. Yes. Now I already said it. Okay. In that case then why would you use the attorney's being statute from one only one of the states? Well, your honor, because the law completely allows us to do it. So what happened was the initial law. If I could explain your honor. What? That's my fundamental law. What? The statute. We initially filed the claim for attorneys to be under Magnus Moss. Which an under federal authority at that time, including the bomb-guarded case, there's a folder wrote specifically allowed the catalyst theory to apply. We filed this case and the Supreme Court has now called this a chance. And the Supreme Court said no. We then said, well, we're still with the catalyst. We are still with the cause of price-issuing these two recalls, what $54 million. 25 of our name plaintiffs in California. Under this case, and the price or argued this in the District Court Judge's Listman argument, you have to apply state laws for every one of the plaintiffs. Well, now hold on. Are you claiming then that your entitled under that very strange unique California statute that that applies to the fees only with respect to those plaintiffs or from California? Because if you apply the state, as I understood what you just did, you apply state law for each of the plaintiffs. But California is unique in that strange statute. What this case provides and what the District Court Judge Lifflin held in what price or argument is, and the reason why we lost that certification is because you have to apply the state laws for each plaintiff. Okay, so. Therefore, that's why they argued in support of their motion to deny certifications. Yes. They argue that not that those laws should apply if there was no class, but that's why there should not be a class because you'd have to apply the law of 52 jurisdictions for, quote unquote, hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs. Yes. So once the class is denied for the 25 named California residents, if that case had been pursued, California law would apply. Where is the catalyst theory specifically pled as a matter of California law in any of these complaints? It does not need to be denied. You don't have to plead it. You can just come in for attorneys to do this. Yes. And here's why New Jersey law under Rule 442-988 is a specific exception that New Jersey adopted to the American Rule. That is where you are allowed to bring seek attorneys to seek. You're picking and choosing various states laws that serve you best. It's the law that's applied. The American Rule is the law of New Jersey absent the exceptions. So why not go to the American Rule? Anyway, go back to the, I'm so asked for her question, and then I have another one that follows it. The issue is, California law applies to those 25 plaintiffs. That is exactly the law specifies that the price are arguing. What law specifies that? The common law under eerie. The common law. If we're suing the price for fraud. And of 52 states, whether, with your complaint, the applicable common law is all that is planned, so that it would be the applicable common law of 52 jurisdictions, correct? Correct. Initially. But let me explain the issue for the attorneys. When you get to the question of attorney's fees for those 25 name plaintiffs in California, it's California law that applies. May I suggest to you that the issue is not eerie, but the issue is choice of law, and that, so that we've eerie at the moment out of this, and that choice of law is an issue that has to be decided. How would New Jersey apply its choice of law? And the district court deal with that? The district court didn't specifically raise the issue of rule 442-9. Well, what did it deal with New Jersey choice of law? It didn't do a choice of law analysis. The court ultimately concluded that California law should apply. After after after a choice of law analysis, the court basically looked at it and said, we are going to be applying in California law in this case. Isn't that a vote of 25 name? It may have been your own. But if you go through that stage, what you come down to is rule 442-9. And the floor 42 would state that, look against may of plain attorney's fees, in all cases where council fees are permitted by statute, as far as we could tell, the New Jersey Supreme Court has never applied that rule to the fee shifting rule of another state, as this thing which as opposed to the New Jersey, in other words, has permitted by statute, as the New Jersey Supreme Court ever said, has permitted by statute, means any statute of any state. It's New Jersey statute. That's what New Jersey is talking about. New Jersey has not your honor. But New Jersey Pellet Division decisions in New Jersey have held that it applies. Well, then we have to look at the New Jersey Supreme Court. Well, one case is critical. It's not directly on the issue of other states, but on the issue of the applicability of rule 442-988 is the Supreme Court decision to be count brand versus Trump passive, 626-82425, New Jersey 1993. Now, what are the critical arguments? The crisis does not cite a single case that says you cannot apply this rule outside New Jersey. If the interesting thing is, A8's an exception to the general rule that there aren't attorney's fees in New Jersey. Well, of course, the American rule applies in order to the American rule, but a clear exception in New Jersey is that the statute provides for fees. Isn't this something perhaps a district court should consider in the first instance if we were to determine that New Jersey law applies? Well, if you look at the rule, it's very explicit. And the only argument, Chrysler Hatt, the only argument he gets to applying this rule is that 1021.5 in California is procedural, not substantive. In the account brand case in New Jersey, Supreme Court specifically held the rule 442-988 applies to procedural statutes, because it held that it applies to New Jersey's privilege litigation statute. Similarly, and this is an important case, Vegas versus Scott, 597-825-799. Is that in your brief? It's not your honor, because the argument about that this rule only applies to procedural, only came up in the reply. Well, did you want, but you have the ability to write us a letter to say, please take these cases into consideration. I don't remember receiving that. We didn't do that only because it was not new authority, Your Honor. It was a new argument made in the fall. Well, I know, but you're supposed to bring to our attention any certainly state cases that are not in your brief. I strongly suggest that you do that within the next 48 hours. We will, Your Honor. I think that we don't have to sit here on the Vegas. You know, it's a critical point, and I apologize for not having done that. The critical point is that this rule, under New Jersey, clearly has been recognized by New Jersey courts as providing an important remedy, has been applied by many appellate division courts in New Jersey outside the state. Do you agree that New Jersey has a strong policy against application of counsel, free, and discontent case? Actually, it does not in the case involving consumers. In fact, New Jersey has a very strong argument in favor of attorneys for consumers. In New Jersey, crack it. And so forth. They've applied that to New Jersey, to consumer protection structures. Correct. But I'll give an example in the Garcia case, in the appellate division, where the appellate division for New Jersey applied 9A8 to apply laws of Massachusetts, allowed attorneys fees under Massachusetts law. But in doing that, it also acknowledges the consideration of New Jersey law. Here's what it says. Quote, on a remand, the courts have considered the purpose of a fee-shifting statute, and a consumer statute is to ensure the plaintiffs of bonafide claims are able to find lawyers to represent them, citing the Coleman versus fewer brothers New Jersey to import case 1984. What was important there is the court was applying another state statute under 9A8. It said it applies here, and that's consistent with New Jersey public. Don't have a problem with that. The problem I have is no state statute was fled in this case, and there's been no finding as to any state statute. But because of the Cali-Sterior honor, this plot-challifón your attorney's fee-shifting provision out of the air. Well, Your Honor, it's not that simple with 102.25. That statute has many serious steps that have to be taken to be entitled. Judge Litzman did an exhaustive analysis. Well, wait a minute. But he missed, he inserted a word that's not in the statute when he permitted attorney's fees in any action anywhere. The word anywhere was left out. He used, he inserted implicitly anywhere. When the statute clearly means an action in California, a California law by a letter. Well, in this case, again, because California law applied to those 25 plaintiffs, in our case, forced-chrycerd issue recalls the benefit of the plaintiff. How's because 25 of the more than 100 plaintiffs live in California? That's it. That cal-even though there's no substantive violation of any California law found and nor pled that they get attorney's fees. Well, that's your position. That's your position? That is our position, Your Honor. And in fact, with the court held under very good authority, Judge Litzman held, is that there is no need to allocate between the California and the non-California red. Why? Because of the fact that all the work was done to benefit all the plaintiffs. Now, of course, it doesn't appeal that argument. You know, arguably one could say that if you file an action with plaintiffs or all of them, you pick. And why did you pick New Jersey? Why did you pick California to file your sue then? Well, our initial plaintiff was from New Jersey, Your Honor. At the time I was in the room. Yeah, but 25 are from California. Nothing. I mean... We could have picked many places to file your Honor. Yeah, and why? That's right. And we could have been interested. Why New Jersey? Your venue for provision in your initial complaint. Certain of the plaintiffs in New Jersey residents, tribes were maintained offices in this district. Received substantial compensation and profits and sales of tribes are vehicleed in this district, made representations and breach warranties in this district, moreover allied signal to manufacture of the Bendix-10ABS. Has its principal executive office in this district, thus much of the discovery and the witnesses are here. So that's a good reason for having brought in here. But you're unwilling to abide by New Jersey's principal, which is that we don't give attorneys fees in this time of year. And in Garcia, the court was enforcing chapter 93A of the Massachusetts Law. It was enforcing a specific Massachusetts Law, and then followed up with the attorney, the provision of that law, it was enforcing, which is very different from the situation here. We accept in Macount Brand, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, made clear that rule 9a8 applies not only to substantive fees shifting, but also whether procedural fees shifting, including the Tribal statute. The law clearly allows, and there's not a single case, not a single case that says the court in New Jersey could not apply California law in any circumstances. And given that part of the reason this rose this way, because the changing of law in the Canada, et cetera, is because we filed this case, and the judge recognized that we have painted substantial benefits. Christler wanted to punish me. But no other state in the country would allow that, except for California, which doesn't follow the catalyst too. Well, currently California does not follow what I suspect other states will follow that as well, but right now, I agree it's California that explicitly. And that came up in our case. In fact, it was the case against Christ. The Gram case, specifically, because of their conduct, denying that the plan for a catalyst, and in fact the law, the fact clearly showed that we were. And in this case, the 25-name plaintiffs, the judge, Judge Lifflin, clearly had the right to apply California law, where there's a common law claim to California. And he clearly had the right to meet Jersey authority to apply 102.1.5. Now, I haven't got a chance to focus on the jurisdiction issues, but I think one thing that's very important here, under jurisdiction, if the court lets to follow the decision of the first circuit, connect you versus Zuckerberg, 522, F3rd, 82, that resolves the jurisdiction issue. Because we connect you with this issue just in this past April, after preaching had been done, that held the one, a federal question jurisdiction is an issue, as long as the plaintiff files an amendment complaint as of right, prior to any objection being raised to jurisdiction, and for jurisdiction purposes, all you look at is the amendment complaint. You don't have to look at the original complaint. And we believe price was wrong on the argument under the original complaint, but it's irrelevant to connect you. You simply have to look at the amendment complaint. Now, it's very interesting because connect you actually followed, or adopted a much of the analysis from the third circuit. In fact, Judge Roth's decision in new Roth assets back in 1996, in that decision, that Roth specifically said that when you look at the time of filing rule, that generally does not apply in a federal question jurisdiction case. It's only rarely applied, and in fact, Roth is not applied in that case. Because she specifically held, we are looking at the amendment complaint, and found in that case, there is no jurisdiction in that amendment. But this isn't a federal question case. This is a federal question case for jurisdiction purposes. It was brought into the Magnes Moss Act for jurisdiction. Yeah, but you can't maintain the maximum of time. Your time is up. I would direct you to give without argument, give us the letter within 48 hours with the citations of every state case that you've talked about that you do not have in the brief. I would. I think our rules are very clear about that. You haven't done it. We really require people to follow our rules. All right. Thank you. Your Honor, is my man, let me start with the juridic statute. Yeah, as you can see, what the court is focusing on and is concerned that those barriers said you didn't start out bang, pushing that issue. It's screaming bloody murder. I think it's what I said. Let me try it now. Because I think it is long. I think it's never made this argument under this section, this rule 442, the council is just made it. What do you mean they never made it? In the district court, they never vote the rule. Then it's way. It's way. We make that point in our life. Any issue that is not raised in the district court is just way. Correct, Your Honor. So everything that we just heard about the New Jersey court might apply California law into the statute of mention in the fight. Now, you're telling us that they didn't do it in oral arguments. They didn't do it in their briefs. Not that I know of, Your Honor. You mentioned this on page 21 of our refibrates. This came up on appeal the first time this noted in that New Jersey court would apply as New Jersey procedural statute to fight California law. It was not reached at all below. Even on appeal that not raised in the A8 exception. So that's way. And furthermore, the New Jersey case is that the intermediate court case is just wrong pointed out. Like our seal, all involved situations where the B should be committed to the subject of statute. And that was the law of being applied. Not one of the involved situations like this. You say you raise it on what case of your advisory? Maybe on page 21 of our refibrates where we talk about this New Jersey. And we say, for the first time in a appeal, plain to starting with one of the exceptions. But the rule of 442, the BASH 9A is relevant. And that was not an issue in Judge Lipplin never had the opportunity to address that. And so that way. I was wrong. This. Thank you. The other point I wanted to make on it with respect to the case in this case is, you know, New Jersey law, going back to the choice of law question, because it's over, you put it out, that is a coup de lait. If we looked at traditional principles, New Jersey would apply New Jersey law. If you put it aside all the thought back, then that would include the New Jersey choice of law for the case. And the New Jersey cases are absolutely clear that B-shifting issues are procedural for the law in New Jersey, like New Jersey law. And there's no catalyst. What do I do with, what do we do with the statement in Judge Lipplin's opinion denying class certification? Oh, Brytschler argues that a choice of law analysis leads to the conclusion that the law of each plaintiff's home court, that the state must be applied because those states have interest that outweigh the interests of New Jersey. If not, I think we can clearly stand by that statement, but that would mean there are about four levels of analysis that would have had to go from California, would have liked its choice of law for me, which we never got to. That just leaves us back to all those states, and Judge Lipplin never went beyond that. And so it is completely consistent with what we're arguing here. I think that's what happened, though. I think that was an argument you'd raised that there shouldn't be class certification, because you have to apply the law of 50-teacher restrictions. Everybody is taking different positions. There are some people who've never even been harmed by the braces, the whole thing hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs. And then as the case continued, I suppose there was just almost the assumption that if a plaintiff was from a particular state, that law would apply. Well, that's the IRA, right? No, he didn't. That's where the screaming blood emerged. No one, I'm not, it's not funny. I mean, this is a 13-year-old case now. No, it's a hit to the case. The legitimate point here are obviously, but let me just make this point. The case didn't begin. The plaintiffs dismissed the case years ago, and only through this trying to kick a law, first they picked them out because the law's act claimed to be in the district judge denied it under Buchanan. Then they plucked out of the thin air, California law. And I argued the Graham case back in California, so I know all about it, and it is unique. And so it is. There's no basis for applying California law. If Jersey would apply its own law, there's no capital to be. And plaintiffs didn't make this argument under Section 442. Yeah, I would, if you didn't say that, you just got up, and you do have it in your brief, now because the right brief. But I can't understand why you didn't put that in your principal argument. Because we didn't know they were going to make the argument or are they had made it below. So this came out of the blue dot, I told the Sutton they're making arguments. No, no, I'm not saying why did you do it here, apply to it, why didn't you do it here, principal argument before us? Because they had not, I didn't know they were going to make this argument. Well, but that's the only basis on which the district court of Louis, the poor million dollar fee that you're objecting to. No, no, he didn't involve New Jersey law. He just said California in Section 1021.5 applied. He acted until he were in California and applied the law with law and in the portrait reverse and vacant. Well, what do you think we should do? Do you think we should send it back to the district court to consider New Jersey law? Or should we decide it as a matter of law? I think the court should find that that argument about New Jersey law is way different from the beginning against New Jersey law applied. They were wrong. This case is gone on and not exactly in one point I wanted to make for it again. This is completely contrary to the Supreme Court, the policy for the federal court, the Supreme Court laid down the mechanic. It's precisely you avoid a new litigation over attorneys fee, major satellite secondary litigation. But this is not supposed, this is no longer a federal case in the sense that whatever common law, the plaintiffs purportedly prevailed under, it is a state claim. Whether it's breach of warranty, whether it's whatever it is, it's a state claim. There were five state claims that Judge Lifland managed to tease out of the complaint. But we don't even know which one of those they allegedly achieved success on. And any of it wasn't a federal court. Well, that's correct, Your Honor. But I have a proposed rule and it's where, and there's a not found a case where he's supposed to be never gone. Where there's a federal question, a federal claim, both in the basis of the Supreme Court's decision. And there are state claims that are brought supplementary. And there is a key shift in provision of federal claim. And the plaintiffs are barred from these under that claim. It's improper to try to pick out some state claim and get around the federal rule. Particularly because it's extraordinary circumstances where we've had to know that you've been patient, not even the identification of a state claim under those circumstances. And the federal policies are overwhelmingly strong. We make this point, our brief, and the discordant look to this point. About access to the court, we use the federal policy crumbs here without reason. But I think the court to this court to reverse in the dismay, the second battle at litigation. That's what the court can mandate. You must press the court to do that. Thank you very much. We'll take the case under advisement. Thank you, Your Honor. I want to