Legal Case Summary

Good afternoon. Are you ready to see him? You want to say a word to our representative? The appellants I'd like to request three minutes to help deserve. Thank you very much. I know there are a number of issues in this case. We are particularly interested in at least initially the standing and the movement of this issues. And we recognize that there were three different classes of planets in this case. Yes, sir. The citizen planets and the association planets and then the state representative as well. And we recognize that there are different standards for each one of these. So if you could take us through each one of your planets and tell us why you have standing on each one that would be very helpful to us. Happy to be your honor and then I assume you'd like me to address the movement. And then address the movement and then if you wish to address the other matters, that's fine too. Sure. I will say the preparatory matter you're on that. All the justish-addibility questions. Each of them depends on a proper understanding of the claim. And at some point we're going to have to get into a discussion of what the plaintiffs actually claim. But I would restrain the issue with questions. Whatever way you would like to do that. I'm sorry I'm standing your honor but I'm not getting any of that. Or could I ask you one question if you could talk about what each of the plaintiffs claim or what is their claim? I mean, nobody's claiming damages, are they? No, we're not your honor. You're seeking what? We're seeking equitable relief. The declaratory and potentially injuncatively. And could you raise your mind before I put that up? Sure. That's it. It's a little bit distracting visual. Now I know that this was a story. When you get you all on tape here and we review this afterwards. Right, your honor. All right, well the question is if I'll put out every issue in the case now. Let me start with standing and devolve that into a discussion of the claims. Because I think that will be required along the way and then we'll move into movements and why the claims are not removed. That makes sense to the court. As the Chief Judge noted, there's three classes of plaintiffs. All of the plaintiffs are essentially citizens of Pennsylvania and all of them qualify under the same heading as the first heading of the individual plaintiffs. Who will lead an injury to their constitutional rights under three provisions of the U.S. Constitution, the due process clause, the equal protection clause, and the first amendment

. Those are individual rights in the Constitution which individuals have a right to comment the federal court and win a game regardless of the number of the litigants who are similarly situated and incurred the same injury. What's your particularized concrete injury that you're alleging on behalf of these folks? That will depend on the claim. And I run through each of those. Pick yours first. That's my best walk. That way you can tie it into my question. The claim that we think most clearly requires a reversal on the remand is the due process claim. There isn't an dispute that there are secret negotiations between the Chief Justice and legislative leaders in Pennsylvania. That in itself gives rise to some due process questions. But the starkest issue that that raises is that quite frankly the plaintiffs allergic simply that those were more of the discussions. Those were actually instances of case fixing. Okay now if you say this is all about case fixing, are your folks, parties to any case alleged to have been fixed? Yes you are. And that was the League of Women Voters. There would be two classes of cases that are alleged to be fixed your honor. One would be the League of Women Voters which was involved in the large class League of Women Voters or part of the class where the litigation was then pending before the court. And that was the Supreme Court at the time of these negotiations. Was this raised before Chief Judge Kane, this assertion? Yes it was your honor. This argument that there was case fixing and that it involved the League of Women Voters who was argued before Chief Judge Kane. It was raised in the pleadings and was argued. Now I don't think that we're case fixing itself is used. But the allegation was quite explicit. I would direct the court's attention to pages 4 to 6 of the complaint which was of 25 to 27 in the appendix where it's alleged very explicitly. The one issue at issue in case is that the Supreme Court traded the results of cases in return for legislation particularly dealing with money that it wanted from the legislature. But that's not the case here obviously. No that is the case here your honor. They're trading the results of cases forward money. Yes you're right. We're going to resolve this case would you be talking about? What's the result of the case? The cases that we believe were an issue would all involve the determinations of whether legislation that was important for the legislature was passed constitutionally. There is a pattern over years of the legislature engaging in behavior that number of plaintiffs including these plaintiffs in this litigation here have some problems with. Most of which of a reason under challenges under the state constitution. That legislation is frequently challenged and winds up pending before the state Supreme Court. In some instances the Supreme Court has actually upheld all those challenges and stricken down the legislation as unconstitutionally enacted. So these are not frivolous claims. In some instances the litigation has not been struck and pushed out. It's a struck down. And the allegation here is that in many of those cases in the past and we believe in some of the cases pending before the court in 2005 at the time of these negotiations there was a deal cut that the Supreme Court would not strike down that litigation in return for the legislature doing what the court wanted. I don't know if any of that

. I'm sorry. You've cited to a generalized statement in the complaint and you might just get specific with me. What paragraph in the second I met a complaint you're talking about. The exact allegation? I would direct you to a couple of sentences on pages 25 to 27 of the appendix which is 46 of the complaint. Starting at the top of the page if you drop down the middle of the sentence you get cut through the verbiage. What are more justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and leaders of the general assembly negotiated legislation desired by the court in exchange for women's favourable to the legislative leadership on cases pending before the court. What page on that? I'm on page 25 the appendix page four of the complaint. Justice leaders of the assembly negotiated legislation in exchange for rulings dropping down halfway down the page. Justice is of the highest court of the state barred their votes on cases continuing after the dashes in exchange for state funding desired by the justice. Do you have any examples of any of those? That's the big inch of law in terms of an accusation. Yes, maybe you're right. And that's why we're here. I noticed you throwing your burrow of the assertion and I can understand that. Two things are on her. The allegations at this point since 12-6 motion must be assumed to be true and they're obviously carefully plent. More importantly I understand the court's skepticism. And we're not here to give testimony or present evidence of course but we have done some presenting of evidence far more than is required in the course of a complaint or on a 12-6 motion at this point in the litigation. I'm having a bit of a problem because I'm still trying to find the particularized concrete injury. You said you've pledged in your complaint that there was what amounts to case fixing. There's nothing in here that talks about any specific case and I'm trying to find out if you ever argued to Chief Judge Kane, here's a case where there was a vote traded by the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in exchange for a pay raise and that corrupted the system and an effective one of my clients. Did that ever happen in the district court? I believe it did you are. Let me explain what I think the allegations are and that were fairly clearly made in this. First of all, there are allegations that are not directly an issue in this case that there are specific named cases of a reference to here that were decided a couple of years ago where the Republicans who are the same litigants here had their case bartered away. In that case, not returned for a salary increase but returned for funding for the judiciary. That the judiciary had been seeking unsuccessfully from the legislature for about a decade. It was a huge amount of funding that went through in return for those case decisions. Those were specific cases that we allege were barred in the present instance. So, on the Act 44, there are two classes of cases essentially that we allege in the pleadings were barred. One was that Act 44 itself as part of the negotiations was a subject of the barred in other words. I understand that and I apologize if I'm not being clear. I'm trying to find out and I think it's my question that you tell me you did point out to Chief Judge Kane specific instances that is a case by name. Where you're saying there was a vote trading by the Supreme Court to corrupted the process and it directly affected your client. Not generalized statements of bad things happen. Yes, very specific. Then my question to you after that is if that's the case that there was an actual case or controversy where somebody was affected by that. Yes, sir. How is this a proper attack on a specific case? In other words, if you had a case decision by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that was allegedly corrupted, how is this not a Rooker Feldman problem for us to be looking at a constitutional claim that goes at that case from the side? Yes, Your Honor

. That's an important question and it's obviously why we had not specifically made part of this litigation and attacked on the 1990 Dine cases. That would present a Rooker Feldman problem. What we have here is Act 44 itself, we allege, was part of the barred in the court and would uphold it and essentially fix that litigation. We actually don't have a Rooker Feldman issue because we did not bring that case in state court. If we had gone to state court, we would be barred by Rooker Feldman from launching a collateral attack in federal court. But we didn't do that so there isn't a Rooker Feldman problem. I don't think that's coming across as clear. There was not state court litigation over Act 44 so there's not a Rooker Feldman problem. The question that I think that raises for the bench then is there a problem at all here that we can be sitting over? I'll ask that question for you, but it's essentially a right-ness question which is did the plaintiffs have to go into federal court, I mean, sorry, into state court to sue over Act 44 in order to have standing to a ledge that Act 44 was corrupted and they didn't get a fair state court process. And we believe obviously the answer to that is no. The due process violation occurs when the court agrees that it's not going to provide fair process. At that point, the essentially the equivalent of if a judge stood up and said, probably, you know what? I worked out a deal with the other litigants. I'm not going to give you a fair day in court. Don't even show up. The due process violation has occurred at that point. Well, here's the problem that I'm having and I don't presume to speak for my colleagues, but if you were to say, look, here's the vote trading that happened. Sure. In case acts they did why and it affected this particular client and we've got a problem with that. Yes. In the absence of doing that, how is this concern about Act 44 different from the concern that any other citizen in the state of Pennsylvania would have about the good government and the concern about corruption in state government that you're alleging? I'm paying the answer to the question that was you. Sure. In order to have standing on the claim that your due process rights have been violated on this, which involves essentially a certain state of law and litigation, you should be a litigant. And we have to use me, you can, but you should be a litigant. Obviously the due process doesn't amorphously affect everybody out there and we're not claiming our rights were violated because we're citizens and this was bad. What rights were violated were essentially two categories. Legal and voters at least had legislation and litigation ending before the court, which we believe was one of the bartered cases and they therefore had their due process rights deprived right there on that case. And I think that's pretty clear and concrete. The second way that concrete rights would be violated is if you were somebody who was going to bring this litigation and now you effectively can't because it's been, as it is in the hypothetical, I just gave a moment ago, essentially announced we fixed the case. No point coming here. The question is, do you then have to go in a state court anyway and file the suit? And we would say no because the deprivation of due process occurs when the court system is corrupted and the case is fixed, which already occurred. So would these litigants like Compton Caws and Tim Pots and legal and women voters have brought this suit in state court, but for the fact that there was at that point no point in bringing it because the case itself had already been bought and sold. These are clearly litigants who would have brought that lawsuit, which I think we can establish for two reasons. One, they've obviously made the effort to bring this lawsuit. They have the adverse interest. They have the determination to bring the suit. And they have a long, long history of bringing exactly this kind of lawsuit over exactly this kind of legislative procedure. In fact, they were the litigants in cases that we believe would fix the decade ago

. Well, what could assume we sent this back? What could Chief Judge Cain give you in the way of relief for this vote trading problem that you've described? Since 44 doesn't exist, what would the relief be that you'd ask for? Well, two things, Your Honor. First of all, I've, whether act 44 doesn't exist or not, it's effects continue to this day. So there are aspects of act 44 that continue to cost the big, specific, and you'll be specific. For example, is there a way to force the return of funds that were already dispersed under the act? We believe that you can reinforce the return of funds, but you don't even have to because funds are continuing to be paid out under act 44 in two ways. And I'm glad that our claim obviously doesn't go just to money because it's constant of violations. But specifically, wouldn't we have to then invalidate the still decision, which is a state Supreme Court decision? They're saying, under still, that they didn't have to return traditional salaries to their pre-act levels pre-act 44. That's correct, although the allegations in this case call on who questioned the propriety of the still decision, but you don't even need to reach that. The fact of the matter is the legislative defendants here as well have received money and are continuing to receive money. Act 44 payments were made out into several months prior to Act 44, what payments were made out? Yes, they're called unboundured expenses, but they're treated by the IRS and by the state itself as salary payments. Those payments were made over a series of months from the time of an act went until the elect repealed Act 44. Not only were those money split out, but one necessary result of that is it leads to a higher salary calculation for everyone of the defendants for the money they took during that period so that their pensions go up. And as a result of Act 44, even if it's repealed, they will have higher pensions thanks to the three months Act 44 was in effect for the rest of their lives and will be paying for the rest of our lives. So is that something different than a generalized complaint by a taxpayer that, hey, the taxpayers are going to be stuck? All taxpayers are going to be stuck because of this. Yes, yes, yes. This thing was that from the Denver crisis, Christ the versus Cunell, or the cases that say you don't get, you know, the generalized. The question about the salary payments did not go to what is our, what are we complaining of, what is our injury, but is there any continuing effect of Act 44? And Act 44 may have been repealed in name, but its effects continue on to this day. But we do not claim that we're here because of the monetary effects of Act 44. In fact, some of the plaintiffs are all for a salary increase for the state officials. And that's not what they're challenging. What they're challenging is the invasion of the constitutional rights, which in most cases has nothing to do with whether Act 44 is still valid day or in fact ever was valid today. The legislative process claims, which claim that the legislature totally excluded 90% of the legislature and the public from any meaningful participation in the legislative process, would be relevant claims even if Act 44 had failed to pass. For instance, they couldn't afford the door to the legislature and kept half the members out and then purported to pass Act 44, except that it failed on the floor. Let me go back. Let me get back to this expenses, the unvantered expenses. Does the complaint, my understanding is the complaint does not seek damages. Is that correct? That's correct, you're right. It doesn't specifically seek reimbursement of the unvantered expenses. I believe that the relief has been pled to allow for that. But the plaintiff's primary interest is in the declaratory and injunctively to stop this process, which we might have been going on for a long time and continues to this very day. This is awesome. I thought your opponent said that it did not, and I'm just asking you whether it. We pled the relief fairly shortly, but the primary is the redressability that is assuming you're right, because you're able to give you the kind of relief that you seek. And I'm trying to find out what relief you're seeking. Yes, and the relief that we seek, your honor is essentially declaratory relief that the behavior that we have cited is unconstitutional. We will have to add that because hopefully that won't happen again. Well then, when you say it won't happen again, how does that fix what you will ledge to be the continuing effect of Act 44? As soon as it went back to Chief Judge Cain and she said to the legislature and to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Supreme Court, you better never do that again. I'm telling you, how does that fix the problem you've identified as the continuing effect? To be accurate, Your Honor, I would not say that that's what I've said is the continuing effect

. That is a continuing effect of Act 44. And it's essentially related to the question that Judge Ambrow raised about the continuing monetary effects of Act 44, and it comes up in the context of his Act 44 still ongoing. I'm confusing because I understood you to say that the continuing effects of Act 44 manifest in things like higher pensions for legislators, because of the three months that that 44 was in effect, etc. And what I'm trying to find out, and I think the Chief Judge's question is pointed to, is how does a declaration and an injunction that this is not to happen in the future do anything to affect that problem that you've identified as a continuing effect of Act 44? How does that effect what happened in the past? How do you get regressed for that? What I think we need to do, Your Honor, is separate the issues of the money, which really is not our concern, even though that is one of the injuries from the constitutional violations, which themselves are injuries. The legislative process violations occurred, and we're not really seeking money we dress from that. The clerks were relieved that it was unconstitutional, is in fact sufficient relief in a civil rights case. And if that were all we were asking for, that would be sufficient for the claims to be viable, because this court could determine that yes, in fact, that action was unconstitutional. I mean, this is clearly true on First Amendment claims, where even if the behavior is purportedly stopped, you can still bring claim for violation of your First Amendment rights, because once violated, they're violated. The Equal Protection Clause, we went that the behavior is continuing today. In fact, they have used the same procedure to, we would say, unconstitutional enact legislation during the dependency of this appeal. So it's clearly ongoing activity. What procedure they used? The procedure used is essentially a misuse of an ancient procedure that I think everybody here is familiar with, which is a conference committee. Conference committees were set up originally in the first part of the Westminster Resolve disputes between two chambers. They get to resolve that dispute by sending a conference report to both chambers to vote on, up or down. There's a reason why it evolved that way. And this has been true in every English-speaking jurisdiction in the world for almost a millennium. And it's because there's a limit on the conference committee. The conference committee, what the houses do with its report, because the conference committee is limited to what the houses did originally. If you want a declaration that the procedure of using conference committees is somehow unconstitutional. No, the procedure of using conference committees is constitutional, and specifying the state constitution. What they did is change the way conference committees have been done for a thousand years, but in a way that violates equal protection. If you go and you have, let's say there is a protocol in the legislature, and that protocol has been violated, isn't your forum to seek redress before the state court? Why would you want a federal court to come in to tell a state legislature that it's somebody violated the protocols they have to do on business? If the protocol violated simply state rules, which this also did, then the proper form for that would be a state court. We are alleging that it violates equal protection, because it sets up two classes of legislators in a way that deprives voters of equal representation in the legislation there for violates equal protection. The analogy I would suggest, Geronner, is the way that the ancient Roman senate operated, which is completely different from any legislature in this country. That's why this is different from the fact that in some legislators, some legislatures are more powerful than others. This is not a matter of some people get their way more than others. This is a class structure, like in the ancient senate, where there were several types of legislators within the same chamber. There were senators who got to draft the legislation, write the amendments, debate it, do it, essentially everything until the final vote. And then, at some extent, they get that right by virtue of the protocols or internal operating procedures that they have in place. Why is it that a federal court should come in and say, you apply those to some, but not to others. Why is that a federal court within what a federal court can do by way of action? Because it violates equal protection, Geronner. It takes a hypothetical, let's say that they adopted a rule to make it the most extreme case of why a court would not get involved. It was an adopted rule that said, six people get to draft all the other legislation. The other 247 of you never but to draft that word. But equal protection is that citizens are entitled to equal protection of the laws. These are internal operating procedures of a state legislature. Yes, Geronner

. And the equal protection clause creates a fundamental right under US Supreme Court jurisprudence to vote equally in state elections. That has been interpreted to mean that your entitled not just to vote on equal terms, but to have equal representation within the legislature. The only question is what exactly does equal representation mean? And our submission is that where you construct a system that divides legislators within the chamber into those who get to actually write the legislation and those who do not get to write a single word of it. And that is enforced that that creates a two class legislature that violates equal protection because it denies equal participation in the legislative process, which denies equal right to vote which denies equal protection. Good. I would like you to spend this put on five more minutes, please. I'd like you to address the witness issue, please. We have a repeal. Yes, repeals of Act 44. And tell us why they did not move out the issues here. Sure, you're on our eye. And a lot of the way Act 44 is like rescuing them that it seems to die and then come back, which says something about the movement. It appeared to have an in a Supreme Court decision, but then a subsequent Act was passed after that. So tell us why the two of those didn't put the silver stake in the heart. Sure. Or enough poison in the rescue. No, then they have to finally throw them in a lake and they may still have to do that here. Because they actually they they may have taken Act 44's name away. There's a number of reasons. This is unfortunately like the argument, but the for starters, the latest reported repeal in Act 30. It basically says, let's take Act 44 the way it is today and keep it. Everything in it. We keep everything in Act 44 and give them an extra dollar and then let's repeal Act 44. If that was sufficient to move out legislation, legislatures could move out every single court case ever brought against legislation. Why assume for the sake of discussion that they didn't do the back room wheel and dealing midnight deal stuff that is deeply offensive to your clients and may well be deeply offensive to many other kinds of things. That's not part of Act 30. It's legislation that went through the system the way legislation ought to and they did what they did in it and gave the the judges another dollar and that was done. Why is that not something that since it would by my hypothetical accord with everything you think ought to have to make your complaints about Act 44 move? I'll tell you why you're right. There's a sort of seesaw that goes through this entire argument today that I think shows what the problem is. The question is, are we talking about constitutional violations or are we talking about their salaries? We do not believe that the financial effects of Act 44 have gone away at all but even if they had, we're not complaining about the fact that they're getting these salaries. We're complaining about the fact that there was the wheeling of the money. I'm sorry. I didn't mean to imply that it was about the money at this point. My question is, if you got a result through a fair process that took you to a specific point and which made Act 44, or a thing of the past, repealed it, what's left to complain about if you got a fair process covering the very same ground? Several things, Your Honor, and I'm glad you asked that because that is the no of the complaint. We are complaining that cases other than involving Act 44 may have been fixed, that we believe they were fixed and that some of the plaintiffs at least were litigants in that. They have been denied due process and whether Act 44 is there or both away, if their case was fixed, their case was fixed. That's a due process

. That's not a generalized grade answer. No, because they were litigants in those cases. And how would that be redressed? I think I got to agree with you. We are doing a little seesaw here. We're back now to the question of redressability. Yes, Your Honor. If you identified a specific case where somebody was the victim of the corrupted system in a vote trading circumstance, how would giving a declaration in this case, in effect, don't do that again, do anything to repair that damage which you claim to be a due process violation? Well, Your Honor, the declaration isn't just don't do this again. What would it be injunctive, of course. It's also, and this may seem like a small thing, but for those of us who do civil rights litigation, it's why we're here. It's a declaration. It's a small at all with very important study issues. And a declaration that the government has acted unconstitutionally. I'm not even talking about your prospective relief saying don't do that again. A simple declaration that this was unconstitutional is, in fact, legal relief that is adequate for legal purposes for plaintiff. And I think at that point the question becomes, well, is that satisfied for the plaintiff? So are they getting anything out of it? Does it change anybody's position? I mean, isn't that what redressability is about that you actually do something that alters the position of parties relative to the circumstances therein before? Other than a psychic benefit, which may, I don't discount as being irrelevant, but other than that, what would a declaration do to fix the problems that anybody had suffered as a result of specific vote buying? Several things you might go from the simple to the complex. The simple is that under any first amendment litigation, a declaration that your rights have been violated is a lot of times how you get and that is sufficient because the time has moved on. On the legislative process violations involving the equal protection clause, we alleged that those violations are continuing. They are continuing to do the same thing with other legislation. They have in the past, it's part of an ongoing scheme. A declaration that that's unconstitutional is clearly helpful for plaintiffs who have spent years trying to stop procedures like that. So it is the prospective relief park. I'm sorry. I was a little worried about that. We would be happy with a declaration that it's unconstitutional because we do think that provides prospective relief that that would keep the government from functioning like this unless they want to argue that they are going to defy a federal court ruling on that. And as for the due process claims, which are the most complex in terms of relief, one could hypophicate. And this is certainly not my plan. But one could go into the state court and reopen the litigation and say, hey, look, there's obviously a constitutional problem here that it not been raised or litigated before. We'd like to take another look at this. So it is possible in fact that there could be relief even in cases that have been decided without launching a collateral federal attack directly on that. So there is further relief even in decided cases beyond that. The Act 44, the extent that it's been decided, was decided we argue as part of a fix so that that decision itself is essentially not valid. And that would then make the decision of Act 44 as the validity of an issue. To what extent are you asking us to decide an abstract issue? To what extent are you asking us to decide an abstract issue of constitutional law? Not at all, Your Honor. The relief for cited speculate here may be a little bit down the road some, but the issues themselves are quite concrete. We are saying that they did specific things and where that's pretty concrete what we say we did, which is why these are serious allegations. Let's just take, if we said, okay, we agree that you have alleged they have done specific things. We're going to assume that those specific things have actually been done

. And therefore there's a violation of some aspect of the Constitution. The question, so what remedy do you get for that? You can't go back to pre Act 44 in light of stilt because it would seem if you try to rule stilt, that is Rockefeller. You can't appeal the state's more decision to a federal court. That's the question. These federal issues were actually not raised in stilt. So if Act 44 is invalidated on equal protection grounds, that was never argued in stilt, got me deciding in stilt. So Act 44 could be invalidated on an issue, which it was not. But shouldn't you have played in stilt, then all the points you're bringing up now? With all respect, you're none of us were in stilt. The question I would suppose should we have gone to court with stilt? And that comes back to the worker felony issue. If we had done that, we couldn't be here. We couldn't get the address of federal issues in a court that we felt had not been corrupted. But I take this off the track, but back to the question. Yes, Robert. If the allegations we assume are true, if we deem them to be a constitutional violation, what remedy do you get? Again, Your Honor, we would get, I believe, several remedies. We would get any minimum declaratory relief on all claims. And that may not be much clear. The declaratory relief was that. A declaration that the conduct that has been alleged and hopefully proven a trial is unconstitutional and cannot properly be done by the state. I just got to assume that that's the case for the moment. What what relief do you get from that? I would presume that the state government doesn't do it any longer. Secondly, well, they're not already not going to do it anymore as a result of act 30. That's what the other than what's already given. You're probably way of the increase. If you point this, can we roll back that increase? Yes, I believe you came actually out. Act 30 is, this is highly technical and it's not the main thing we're seeking. But, at 30, what it sets is the law in effect today, we're going to have an effect tomorrow plus a dollar. If Act 44 were invalid of an issue, how the date that Act 30 was enacted, then the salary increase currently received by all judges would be a dollar, not roughly $40,000 and $1. So, if Act 44 is invalidated, it does have an effect on the salaries as set by Act 30. Because Act 30 is dependent on the existence of Act 40, at least as to the judiciary, on the date of Act 30's enactment. If Act 44 isn't there on the date of Act 30's enactment, there's $40,000 less in the salary increase for every single judge. So, the question of Act 44 is validity of an issue is still relevant under Act 30. And since the legitimacy of Act 44 under the US Constitution has never been raised or mitigated in the state court, there is not a collateral attack problem there. It's complicated, but I understand the complication, but essentially still has set under the state constitution. And that which has been given cannot be taken away. So, then what you do is you come back and the legislature does say, yes, gets around that by saying, OK, we'll give you a dollar increase, but the formula by which you calculate further increases is not going to be there any longer. That's correct. But they also said that, and we're starting from the floor that Act 44 established

. And if Act 44 was void on an issue, you don't get still, you don't get Act 3. How much was the increase that was given by Act 44? I think it varied by various classes, but it's up to 58%. It's pretty substantial. Good. I think I'm sure you don't want me to. He's not all you've been doing great, but I think we do have some rules here. I don't care if I'm just interested. You and not disagree with that. Not at all, you're on a real four rules. I have you back on a rebuttal. Thank you very much, Mr. Adam. Good afternoon, Your Honoris. Good afternoon. Good afternoon. I'm submission to the Court. My name is Arlan Adams, and I am hearing today, on behalf of the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, who, as of a few days ago, was no longer the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, which may add to the moodness discussion. As you may have learned through the press, he resigned as of December 31, 2007, but I don't think that will affect my argument, but you're entitled to know the fact. If you read the complaint as amended in this case, the questions from the bench are very pertinent. And quite sharp-edged. The complaint attacked Act 44, and how it was passed. No question about that. There's no question that Act 44 has been completely modified. Well, there evidently is a question on that point, Mr. Adams, or at least your opposing counsel says they took steps to take Act 44 out of commission, but it's, you know, like the fabled perfume that lingers on. And that continuing lingering effect is the injury or an injury that they want regressed. Can you speak to that point that there are these aftershocks that we have to deal with? You have to, too. Because that is part of the moodness argument, which is my first argument. The traditional jurisprudence is when an Act 44 has been attacked, and then an appeal has been taken. If during the period between the judgment of the lower court and the appellate court, the Act has been scrapped in some way with trillon or nullified, the case becomes moved. There is one minor exception to that doctrine, which incidentally has been spelled out very well by the chief judge here. In Cinecold, that is if there is evidence in the record, which shows that the complaint is likely to recur. There is no such evidence in the record in this case. If there were such evidence in the case of the overdue, the exception is if there were a likelihood that the Act would be executed. Exactly right. But there should be evidence of that, not an argument in this court for the first time that is likely to recur. The reason for that rule, the reason for the rule on moodness is well-established, is not just a mechanical device created by the Supreme Court of the United States

. If you go all the way back to Marbury versus Madison, you will see that Chief Justice explained very carefully why these rules are in place. We have a tripartite system of government, executive, legislative and judiciary. If the courts can decide the sputes within an actual case or controversy, the language of the Constitution, then their effects spills over into the other organs of government. So the framers of the Constitution were very careful to say, and their colleagues wrote the Federalist papers were careful to say, that the judiciary has to confine itself to cases and controversy, where a real plaintiff exists who will be injured by the alleged improper acts. That's the language used by this court in the city called written by your Chief Judge. That is the language that has been used repeatedly by the Supreme Court of the United States, less than 20 years. What do you make of the argument that Mr. Schneer has made that there are the League of Women Voters, for example, a real party in this case, which lost a case because of this corrupted system and vote trading by the justices for legislation favorable to them. That's a real particularized thing that happened to them, and it was talked about in front of Chief Judge Kay, and they pointed it out, they argued, etc. What's your response to that? That's hypothetical, but let's assume it for the moment. I'm sorry, when you say it's hypothetical, they're saying it actually happened. And obviously I'm not suggesting you folks need to confess that that happened. Let's assume that it did happen. They go into court and they lose the case. They then take an appeal. I don't know where they lost the case, and the common police court go up to the Commonwealth Court, etc. They then go up to the Supreme Court of the United States. My colleague conceives that. That's for a fellow. What he's trying to do is to eliminate the appellant procedure of the Federal Court. This court, as much as I love it, and I have a great affection for it, can't review intermediate decisions of state courts. That's a procedure that's relegated to the Supreme Court of the United States. If you don't like what the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania does, if you don't come to this court, you have to go up to the Supreme Court of the United States. So that if hypothetical or actuality, however you want to look at the League of Women's Owners situation, occurs. They would have to go soon to the Supreme Court decided against them up to the Supreme Court of the United States, direct the thought of going. That is from her fellow. Now he's trying to prevent that. You're not permitted to do that. But I'll ask you. Put on 15 minutes. All right. Yes, no, no, we're just adding some more time. I would suggest that he has not answered your question for a moodness to law is clear. And this court and the Supreme Court have said repeatedly, if after the lower court has decided the case, an action is taken place which eliminates the vice. The case is moved. And he or she can only do one thing. They can dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. But that ties in with standing. He argues that this isn't Rooker Feldman in this instance because if I understood him correctly, they're complaining about act 44 specifically and not the cases where that were both fixed. They're looking for relief with respect to act 44 and with relief with respect to that act. The constitutional claims made here were never made in the state courts. Not in stealth or any place else. And therefore, nothing should prevent this court from addressing those constitutional claims. What's your response to that? Well, there is nothing to prevent this court from addressing the constitutional claims if he can get over the moodness hurdle and the standing hurdle. But I haven't heard his answers to your questions that will enable the court to avoid moodness or standing. Now, we haven't talked about standing, but it's pretty clear that if you read Valley Forge, Christian Academy of Valley Forge, if you read Daimler Chrysler and the other standing cases in our brief, there is no standing. These are not concrete complaints. They're more philosophical discussions between my distinguished colleague for whom I have great affection as you may know. And the court, but that's not what the business of the court is about. Your job, you know, what better than I do, is to decide the street disputes. You don't have a discrete dispute any longer because the act in question was they attacked not only the act that the way it was passed is no over in existence. So they are engaging in a very important debate perhaps, but not for this court. Does EPA versus or mass chooses versus EPA have any impact on the standing analysis that this court should make? They went to the trouble of submitting a 28J letter and saying, hey, the Supreme Court just last year has changed the ground for standing analysis with the mass chooses versus EPA case. I'd like to may I answer that? My reading of EPA, Massachusetts versus EPA, is a follows. Standing is still a major concern of the Supreme Court and the Federal courts. There are exceptions perhaps to standing or rather interpretations in EPA, the statute in question, which dealt with noxious gazes specifically provided that the states would have an opportunity to engage in the procedure of throwing by EPA. The Brigh about the protocol, and if they didn't like it to object number one, number two in EPA, you have the sovereign as the plaintiff, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Number three, there was an impact on the property of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the court went out of its way to explain how the coast of Massachusetts was being eroded. So you have those three factors, which distinguish Massachusetts versus EPA from valid forage or dainter or cruster or any of the other standing cases. Now I hope I've answered the question. You have. Thank you. And I don't want to take up any more of the time, the court, because my time was limited to six minutes to talk about movements and standing my distinguished colleague is going to talk about some of the things that my opponent has talked about, which I think are much more philosophical and sound like a political science discussion rather than a legal discussion under the doctrine of case and country. Thank you. Any other questions? Thank you very much. Thank you. Mr. John Quill, your honors. I'm representing the President of Pro Temporary of the Pennsylvania Senate and the Senate Majority Leader. And I will also speak with the concurrence of my colleagues on behalf of some of the other parties also on the issue of community, certain of the legislative parties and the governor pleaded these were not reached by the district cards. Correct. But it's an alternative basis for for a dismissal as to those defendants. And I also know it's pretty clear that legislative immunity attaches to the activities that are complained of here. The governor for one thing is an integral part of the legislative process

. But that ties in with standing. He argues that this isn't Rooker Feldman in this instance because if I understood him correctly, they're complaining about act 44 specifically and not the cases where that were both fixed. They're looking for relief with respect to act 44 and with relief with respect to that act. The constitutional claims made here were never made in the state courts. Not in stealth or any place else. And therefore, nothing should prevent this court from addressing those constitutional claims. What's your response to that? Well, there is nothing to prevent this court from addressing the constitutional claims if he can get over the moodness hurdle and the standing hurdle. But I haven't heard his answers to your questions that will enable the court to avoid moodness or standing. Now, we haven't talked about standing, but it's pretty clear that if you read Valley Forge, Christian Academy of Valley Forge, if you read Daimler Chrysler and the other standing cases in our brief, there is no standing. These are not concrete complaints. They're more philosophical discussions between my distinguished colleague for whom I have great affection as you may know. And the court, but that's not what the business of the court is about. Your job, you know, what better than I do, is to decide the street disputes. You don't have a discrete dispute any longer because the act in question was they attacked not only the act that the way it was passed is no over in existence. So they are engaging in a very important debate perhaps, but not for this court. Does EPA versus or mass chooses versus EPA have any impact on the standing analysis that this court should make? They went to the trouble of submitting a 28J letter and saying, hey, the Supreme Court just last year has changed the ground for standing analysis with the mass chooses versus EPA case. I'd like to may I answer that? My reading of EPA, Massachusetts versus EPA, is a follows. Standing is still a major concern of the Supreme Court and the Federal courts. There are exceptions perhaps to standing or rather interpretations in EPA, the statute in question, which dealt with noxious gazes specifically provided that the states would have an opportunity to engage in the procedure of throwing by EPA. The Brigh about the protocol, and if they didn't like it to object number one, number two in EPA, you have the sovereign as the plaintiff, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Number three, there was an impact on the property of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the court went out of its way to explain how the coast of Massachusetts was being eroded. So you have those three factors, which distinguish Massachusetts versus EPA from valid forage or dainter or cruster or any of the other standing cases. Now I hope I've answered the question. You have. Thank you. And I don't want to take up any more of the time, the court, because my time was limited to six minutes to talk about movements and standing my distinguished colleague is going to talk about some of the things that my opponent has talked about, which I think are much more philosophical and sound like a political science discussion rather than a legal discussion under the doctrine of case and country. Thank you. Any other questions? Thank you very much. Thank you. Mr. John Quill, your honors. I'm representing the President of Pro Temporary of the Pennsylvania Senate and the Senate Majority Leader. And I will also speak with the concurrence of my colleagues on behalf of some of the other parties also on the issue of community, certain of the legislative parties and the governor pleaded these were not reached by the district cards. Correct. But it's an alternative basis for for a dismissal as to those defendants. And I also know it's pretty clear that legislative immunity attaches to the activities that are complained of here. The governor for one thing is an integral part of the legislative process. The presentment requirement in the Pennsylvania Constitution, which requires him to sign bills as a matter of high legislative discretion for the governor, for any governor. And of course, the process of enactment is also squarely within the scope of legislative immunity. The US Supreme Court has long recognized a federal common law doctrine of legislative immunity. And I think it presents an alternative basis for a firmance of judge came here. I would like to say something about Act 30 of 2007, because Mr. Schner's argument implies that Act 30 of 2007 somehow is tainted by Act 44 of 2005. But there's no such tainted doctrine in constitutional law. Each act, each enactment of a legislative body is presumed to be constitutional and presumed to be a fresh policy decision. What I don't know what they're saying is that if there was a corrupt background deal, there there should be a some type of declaration that there was a constitutional violation. And that's in some way, shape a form of a not quite sure what it would be that there would be a remedy. And I keep thinking that likely the remedy, they really want is the rollback of the Act 44 increase, which I think Pennsylvania Supreme Court has already said you cannot do under the Pennsylvania Constitution. That's correct. My clients, by the way, took the opposite point of view before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. We fought very seriously, we lost on that particular issue. However, there are very important issues here of legislative process. Well, doesn't the argument that we heard a few minutes ago from Mr. Schner say not so much that there was a taint although they probably argue there is, but that tainted or not since Act 30 is framed by its terms as taking Act 44 as a basis that, in fact, Act 44 has to be viewed as void. The only thing that Act 30 accomplishes is to give judges a $1 raise for what they had before 44, not that it's tainted, but that because of the way 30 was framed, it will only serve to do what's happening now. If the bad things about 44 are allowed to continue to influence what's going on through Act 30, he can correct me if I'm wrong, but I sort of understood him to be saying something like that. I think that's what he's saying, but it seems to me that that's a contrary to statutory construction and constitutional construction of statutes because legislature is perfectly entitled to make a fresh decision at any time. It could do so again tomorrow to say we want judges salaries to be X plus $2. So what you're saying is the fact that the Pennsylvania legislature chose to use the shorthand of saying Act 44's provisions plus this and been a new process for it doesn't mean that even in fact 44 reviewed is void to have an issue that that guts Act 30 is that right? That's correct. And in fact, you're honored to be precise, although I'm prepared to be corrected. I don't believe Act 30 actually cited 2 Act 44 2005. I think it made reference to salary payable as of the effective date hereafter. So it was really recognizing that whatever judges were getting as of that date, the effective date of Act 30 plus $1 would be their prospective salary. Let me ask this question. Again, I'm not saying this happened, but let's assume for the moment that a legislature and a Supreme Court does engage in a backroom deal in which for certain pending cases there is a vacant a nod that's X will be done in terms of how you will in exchange for the giving of a substantial pay increase. Again, without any way, stating that they're even applying to that's true, but just assuming it, what could be done in that circumstance for redress? Well, those parties who had standing who would challenge the particular enactment could raise, could seek recusal of any judges who were involved in the deal. They could then appeal from that decision on the merits as well as on a refusal to recuse if there was such a thing. And it would go up the line, you would have to go up the line to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and on to the United States. What they were going to do, probably had three cues too, wouldn't they? I'm in the rule of necessity now. And one thing one has to wonder about here is that the complaint and the court should you not get around the necessity by, I don't know, is there a process of any of you for example retired, justices coming back to decide something that, or I don't know? Well, there is a process for senior judges to be brought in by assignment from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Many of them served in fact on the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, which is where cases like these are brought in its original jurisdiction. Senior judges who were retired but are serving on a per, who received a per dem rather than a judicial emodiment arguably would have, would have no interest. And it seems to be one way or another the process, the process can work its way out. So that would be a way around the necessity that they would have to say? It's one way around the, it would look, I mean, just being politically for a second would look very politically bad if they were to decide something that's alleged is that they were, on the deal and then they're supposed to rule on whether that occurred, etc

. The presentment requirement in the Pennsylvania Constitution, which requires him to sign bills as a matter of high legislative discretion for the governor, for any governor. And of course, the process of enactment is also squarely within the scope of legislative immunity. The US Supreme Court has long recognized a federal common law doctrine of legislative immunity. And I think it presents an alternative basis for a firmance of judge came here. I would like to say something about Act 30 of 2007, because Mr. Schner's argument implies that Act 30 of 2007 somehow is tainted by Act 44 of 2005. But there's no such tainted doctrine in constitutional law. Each act, each enactment of a legislative body is presumed to be constitutional and presumed to be a fresh policy decision. What I don't know what they're saying is that if there was a corrupt background deal, there there should be a some type of declaration that there was a constitutional violation. And that's in some way, shape a form of a not quite sure what it would be that there would be a remedy. And I keep thinking that likely the remedy, they really want is the rollback of the Act 44 increase, which I think Pennsylvania Supreme Court has already said you cannot do under the Pennsylvania Constitution. That's correct. My clients, by the way, took the opposite point of view before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. We fought very seriously, we lost on that particular issue. However, there are very important issues here of legislative process. Well, doesn't the argument that we heard a few minutes ago from Mr. Schner say not so much that there was a taint although they probably argue there is, but that tainted or not since Act 30 is framed by its terms as taking Act 44 as a basis that, in fact, Act 44 has to be viewed as void. The only thing that Act 30 accomplishes is to give judges a $1 raise for what they had before 44, not that it's tainted, but that because of the way 30 was framed, it will only serve to do what's happening now. If the bad things about 44 are allowed to continue to influence what's going on through Act 30, he can correct me if I'm wrong, but I sort of understood him to be saying something like that. I think that's what he's saying, but it seems to me that that's a contrary to statutory construction and constitutional construction of statutes because legislature is perfectly entitled to make a fresh decision at any time. It could do so again tomorrow to say we want judges salaries to be X plus $2. So what you're saying is the fact that the Pennsylvania legislature chose to use the shorthand of saying Act 44's provisions plus this and been a new process for it doesn't mean that even in fact 44 reviewed is void to have an issue that that guts Act 30 is that right? That's correct. And in fact, you're honored to be precise, although I'm prepared to be corrected. I don't believe Act 30 actually cited 2 Act 44 2005. I think it made reference to salary payable as of the effective date hereafter. So it was really recognizing that whatever judges were getting as of that date, the effective date of Act 30 plus $1 would be their prospective salary. Let me ask this question. Again, I'm not saying this happened, but let's assume for the moment that a legislature and a Supreme Court does engage in a backroom deal in which for certain pending cases there is a vacant a nod that's X will be done in terms of how you will in exchange for the giving of a substantial pay increase. Again, without any way, stating that they're even applying to that's true, but just assuming it, what could be done in that circumstance for redress? Well, those parties who had standing who would challenge the particular enactment could raise, could seek recusal of any judges who were involved in the deal. They could then appeal from that decision on the merits as well as on a refusal to recuse if there was such a thing. And it would go up the line, you would have to go up the line to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and on to the United States. What they were going to do, probably had three cues too, wouldn't they? I'm in the rule of necessity now. And one thing one has to wonder about here is that the complaint and the court should you not get around the necessity by, I don't know, is there a process of any of you for example retired, justices coming back to decide something that, or I don't know? Well, there is a process for senior judges to be brought in by assignment from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Many of them served in fact on the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, which is where cases like these are brought in its original jurisdiction. Senior judges who were retired but are serving on a per, who received a per dem rather than a judicial emodiment arguably would have, would have no interest. And it seems to be one way or another the process, the process can work its way out. So that would be a way around the necessity that they would have to say? It's one way around the, it would look, I mean, just being politically for a second would look very politically bad if they were to decide something that's alleged is that they were, on the deal and then they're supposed to rule on whether that occurred, etc., etc. So it would seem that they would, you would have somebody else appoint it, would you not? Yes, now I'm not aware that there is any such procedure to appoint a retired justice to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. But it seems to me that on the intermediate appellate courts where, where such senior judges are already assigned that that possibility exists. Of course, if for whatever reason, because there weren't enough qualified justices or they were tied or whatever, the intermediate courts ruling were affirmed that would be it. That would be the end of the matter unless it went up to the US Supreme Court. So, you know, I see, I see state processes that are available. And it seems to me that plaintiffs here are doing what we were told not to do when I was a kid and that was make a federal case out of it. In the state processes and come to the federal courts, trying to create defashioned federal claims, which in fact don't exist. So that's really the core of your standing argument. Yes, it also does to the merits and it does to relief. For example, Mr. Schner gave the example of a conference committee. It seems to me that what he's arguing on an equal protection basis is that all legislators should be equal, that they should have equal influence. Well, that's not the case in Congress. Congress has conference committees come any day of the week and who's on those committees? Leaders. Leaders are on those committees. Why are they there? It's because rank and file members have voted for them to be leaders. Not all legislators participate in every phase of legislation, but what all legislators do participate in is the final year or an vote on that legislation. In that regard, they are all equal. But there's no such doctrine of equal representation in the federal constitution that would support the notion that Mr. Schner advances about the inequality as a power in a legislative process. If there were, then I think much congressional legislation would be under challenge. He said in response to, actually, put on another 10 minutes, please. Thank you. He said in response to the chief judges invitation to submit his best claim, that it was due process, secret negotiations and case fixing. Planktons have talked about a deprivation of due process throughout this case, throughout their briefs. But there's not such concept in the constitution, the precise concept in the 14th Amendment is a deprivation. The no-brazen shall be subjected to a deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process. Planktons have not demonstrated any laws of life, of course, nor of property, nor of liberty. As citizens, they enjoy all the liberties of every citizen of Pennsylvania. If there were any, that their tax is paid for this increase that was vulnerable. And in that respect, they are, as privileged or burdened as every other taxpayer in Pennsylvania. But this does not rise to a federal due process claim. What do you understand, the relief that's being signed in this manner? Well, I disagree with Mr. Schner's characterization, all of the relief that's actually pleaded in the second amended complaint is prospective in nature. None of it seeks any give back of money and for adjustment of pensions based on the invulidity of Act 44. What about what about the expenses? Is that pleaded? No, all of it is prospective in joint divert declaratory relief

., etc. So it would seem that they would, you would have somebody else appoint it, would you not? Yes, now I'm not aware that there is any such procedure to appoint a retired justice to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. But it seems to me that on the intermediate appellate courts where, where such senior judges are already assigned that that possibility exists. Of course, if for whatever reason, because there weren't enough qualified justices or they were tied or whatever, the intermediate courts ruling were affirmed that would be it. That would be the end of the matter unless it went up to the US Supreme Court. So, you know, I see, I see state processes that are available. And it seems to me that plaintiffs here are doing what we were told not to do when I was a kid and that was make a federal case out of it. In the state processes and come to the federal courts, trying to create defashioned federal claims, which in fact don't exist. So that's really the core of your standing argument. Yes, it also does to the merits and it does to relief. For example, Mr. Schner gave the example of a conference committee. It seems to me that what he's arguing on an equal protection basis is that all legislators should be equal, that they should have equal influence. Well, that's not the case in Congress. Congress has conference committees come any day of the week and who's on those committees? Leaders. Leaders are on those committees. Why are they there? It's because rank and file members have voted for them to be leaders. Not all legislators participate in every phase of legislation, but what all legislators do participate in is the final year or an vote on that legislation. In that regard, they are all equal. But there's no such doctrine of equal representation in the federal constitution that would support the notion that Mr. Schner advances about the inequality as a power in a legislative process. If there were, then I think much congressional legislation would be under challenge. He said in response to, actually, put on another 10 minutes, please. Thank you. He said in response to the chief judges invitation to submit his best claim, that it was due process, secret negotiations and case fixing. Planktons have talked about a deprivation of due process throughout this case, throughout their briefs. But there's not such concept in the constitution, the precise concept in the 14th Amendment is a deprivation. The no-brazen shall be subjected to a deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process. Planktons have not demonstrated any laws of life, of course, nor of property, nor of liberty. As citizens, they enjoy all the liberties of every citizen of Pennsylvania. If there were any, that their tax is paid for this increase that was vulnerable. And in that respect, they are, as privileged or burdened as every other taxpayer in Pennsylvania. But this does not rise to a federal due process claim. What do you understand, the relief that's being signed in this manner? Well, I disagree with Mr. Schner's characterization, all of the relief that's actually pleaded in the second amended complaint is prospective in nature. None of it seeks any give back of money and for adjustment of pensions based on the invulidity of Act 44. What about what about the expenses? Is that pleaded? No, all of it is prospective in joint divert declaratory relief. Pages 59 and 60 of the second amended complaint in the appendix show the relief. And the very first point of relief that they seek is a, enjoying the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from citing or relying on AFLCI out at all. And the common cause of all of this is common wall that all. And any decisions, I think, done their end, has precedent in future cases. Now, Mr. Schner and kind of the plaintiffs, appellants, have stated that some cases have gone against the general assembly in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court under Article III, the procedures for enactment of legislation. That's true. The general assembly has lost some significant cases that are cited in the briefs. They cite those cases that we lost for the proposition that Article III is an important procedural provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution. That's vitality, and we agree with that. But then they cite the cases that they lost and say the fix was in. It was in either of them or it wasn't. We really don't want us to get into fat finding. No, of course, that's not this course. Responsibility, but there is an inconsistency in their position. They mentioned secret negotiations. Well, what they call secret negotiations seems to be a meeting to which they were not invited. But the point is, we're under what rule 12 here is. So, don't we have to accept what they've alleged? Let's assume that secret negotiations took place. I think we have to accept that for purposes of the law. I'm sorry, there is no anti-secret negotiation clause in the United States Constitution. Meeting the court behind closed doors all the time in every branch of government, in all three branches of government, and both the state and federal federal investigations go further than that by saying there was a bone trading deal cut that goes against the core of what judges are all about. Actually, precisely what they alleged is on page 11 of their second amendment complaint paragraph 2a, based on information and belief, I'm quoting, a negotiated deal settlement or understanding begun in 1999 between one or more justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and certain leaders, what paragraph are you on? 2a, the second amendment complaint. So, are you challenging the assertion made by Mr. Schner that in fact it was specifically argued to Chief Judge Cain that there were identified cases in which there was a traded vote in a corruption of the system? I am not aware of any specific allegations. Certainly, there are none in the complaint and I was at the argument with Judge Cain. I haven't reviewed the transcript of that argument here on it, but I just don't recall any specific allegations. What I do see here before me in the complaint is an allegation that one or more justices and certain unnamed leaders had discussions that led to an understanding of our settlement or a deal. Well, did that somehow taint legislation? I don't think so because the motives of individual legislators in voting for against legislation is not something that the federal courts ever will get for that matter of the state court's double-getting either when judging the constitutionality of legislation. With respect to whether that one or more justices who were involved in those discussions should have participated in litigation involving those discussions. Well, again, that's an issue for recusal or appeal. Anyone who understands the legislative process moreover knows that when you have 253 members as you do in the Pennsylvania General Assembly, you can't bind the General Assembly as an institution to a deal. It's not like two corporations that can make a contractual agreement and they are bound even after their personnel change. The General Assembly is, its existence is renewed every two years. The membership changes, the leadership changes, in fact it has changed. And therefore it's in its preposterous that there could be a deal that would bind the General Assembly. The fact that part of the change was not as a result of the fallout from this controversy

. Pages 59 and 60 of the second amended complaint in the appendix show the relief. And the very first point of relief that they seek is a, enjoying the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from citing or relying on AFLCI out at all. And the common cause of all of this is common wall that all. And any decisions, I think, done their end, has precedent in future cases. Now, Mr. Schner and kind of the plaintiffs, appellants, have stated that some cases have gone against the general assembly in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court under Article III, the procedures for enactment of legislation. That's true. The general assembly has lost some significant cases that are cited in the briefs. They cite those cases that we lost for the proposition that Article III is an important procedural provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution. That's vitality, and we agree with that. But then they cite the cases that they lost and say the fix was in. It was in either of them or it wasn't. We really don't want us to get into fat finding. No, of course, that's not this course. Responsibility, but there is an inconsistency in their position. They mentioned secret negotiations. Well, what they call secret negotiations seems to be a meeting to which they were not invited. But the point is, we're under what rule 12 here is. So, don't we have to accept what they've alleged? Let's assume that secret negotiations took place. I think we have to accept that for purposes of the law. I'm sorry, there is no anti-secret negotiation clause in the United States Constitution. Meeting the court behind closed doors all the time in every branch of government, in all three branches of government, and both the state and federal federal investigations go further than that by saying there was a bone trading deal cut that goes against the core of what judges are all about. Actually, precisely what they alleged is on page 11 of their second amendment complaint paragraph 2a, based on information and belief, I'm quoting, a negotiated deal settlement or understanding begun in 1999 between one or more justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and certain leaders, what paragraph are you on? 2a, the second amendment complaint. So, are you challenging the assertion made by Mr. Schner that in fact it was specifically argued to Chief Judge Cain that there were identified cases in which there was a traded vote in a corruption of the system? I am not aware of any specific allegations. Certainly, there are none in the complaint and I was at the argument with Judge Cain. I haven't reviewed the transcript of that argument here on it, but I just don't recall any specific allegations. What I do see here before me in the complaint is an allegation that one or more justices and certain unnamed leaders had discussions that led to an understanding of our settlement or a deal. Well, did that somehow taint legislation? I don't think so because the motives of individual legislators in voting for against legislation is not something that the federal courts ever will get for that matter of the state court's double-getting either when judging the constitutionality of legislation. With respect to whether that one or more justices who were involved in those discussions should have participated in litigation involving those discussions. Well, again, that's an issue for recusal or appeal. Anyone who understands the legislative process moreover knows that when you have 253 members as you do in the Pennsylvania General Assembly, you can't bind the General Assembly as an institution to a deal. It's not like two corporations that can make a contractual agreement and they are bound even after their personnel change. The General Assembly is, its existence is renewed every two years. The membership changes, the leadership changes, in fact it has changed. And therefore it's in its preposterous that there could be a deal that would bind the General Assembly. The fact that part of the change was not as a result of the fallout from this controversy. Very much so. Very much so. There's also been change in the personnel of the Pennsylvania Spring Court. Since 1999, in fact this year we will have three out of seven justices on that court who are binding them, and what they are seeking in relief to bar the Pennsylvania Spring Court from signing its own precedent. When one thinks about it, require Judge Kane to say to those new justices as well as the old justices, I'm sorry you cannot cite the old common cause case or the AFL CIO case, I forbid you to do it. One of the new justices, my very well said, you know I've read that decision and regardless of how it was what the internal process was that it was arrived at, I find the reasoning that's within the four corners of the decision to be conscient. I wish to rely on it. Can a federal court say no you may not rely on reasoning that you find conscient? It seems to me that that's beyond the power of the federal court. Again, they seek prospective relief, declaratory judgments that are all prospective, and they seek to permanently join the legislature from enacting any legislation in violation of Article 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. That's on page 60, part of their prayer for relief in the ideal world. If they could get it, what they would like to do is undo the bad things they think were done by Act 44. Except they have not included that in their prayer for relief, Judge Amberwood. They're not seeking a reduction in the calculation of the basis for pensions, they're not seeking a give back of the increase that was actually paid. In fact, they have problems where they try to do that. I think they might have to plead in each individual judge and a legislator who knows where there's a host of problems. There would be a host problem, so recognizing those problems I can understand why they didn't. But that means that their own reasoning and prospective relief and the kind of relief that they're giving is not only impractical for a federal court to administer. I think it's also beyond the power of the federal court because it basically would involve restructuring and superintending the Commonwealth as a sovereign. And superintending, at least two of its co-equal branches, other things that they've complained of similarly. But I guess they come back to it. So if that's the case then what can they do? I mean, you have a lot of groups here who are interested in nothing less than, they're nothing more than just root government. That's what they want. And if the allegation is correct, but there was something untoward done in terms of the deal cut, how do you assure them of good government with respect to what happened here? Well, as you pointed out, there was quite a change in the personnel of the General Assembly. In fact, as a result of Act 44, how did the General Assembly even before the General Election of 2006 repealed Act 44? That didn't stop the voters from changing a substantial number of members in the legislature. Good government, I think, starts with the voters. I mean Abraham Lincoln said, without a virtuous citizen, read democracy cannot survive. So that's where we must start. Now, one thing one can also do is look to procedural reforms within those bodies. And again, that's a matter of self-government for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Not a federal issue. It's political issue. So there was taking place here. There are other things they've complained of. They complained of a First Amendment violation, which it seems to me consists of a complaint that they were not given the opportunity for political speech in a timely fashion to protest Act 44. Good, Mr. Piaw, we understand that there are some other issues, but I'm going to enforce the red light rule at this time. Thank you there

. Very much so. Very much so. There's also been change in the personnel of the Pennsylvania Spring Court. Since 1999, in fact this year we will have three out of seven justices on that court who are binding them, and what they are seeking in relief to bar the Pennsylvania Spring Court from signing its own precedent. When one thinks about it, require Judge Kane to say to those new justices as well as the old justices, I'm sorry you cannot cite the old common cause case or the AFL CIO case, I forbid you to do it. One of the new justices, my very well said, you know I've read that decision and regardless of how it was what the internal process was that it was arrived at, I find the reasoning that's within the four corners of the decision to be conscient. I wish to rely on it. Can a federal court say no you may not rely on reasoning that you find conscient? It seems to me that that's beyond the power of the federal court. Again, they seek prospective relief, declaratory judgments that are all prospective, and they seek to permanently join the legislature from enacting any legislation in violation of Article 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. That's on page 60, part of their prayer for relief in the ideal world. If they could get it, what they would like to do is undo the bad things they think were done by Act 44. Except they have not included that in their prayer for relief, Judge Amberwood. They're not seeking a reduction in the calculation of the basis for pensions, they're not seeking a give back of the increase that was actually paid. In fact, they have problems where they try to do that. I think they might have to plead in each individual judge and a legislator who knows where there's a host of problems. There would be a host problem, so recognizing those problems I can understand why they didn't. But that means that their own reasoning and prospective relief and the kind of relief that they're giving is not only impractical for a federal court to administer. I think it's also beyond the power of the federal court because it basically would involve restructuring and superintending the Commonwealth as a sovereign. And superintending, at least two of its co-equal branches, other things that they've complained of similarly. But I guess they come back to it. So if that's the case then what can they do? I mean, you have a lot of groups here who are interested in nothing less than, they're nothing more than just root government. That's what they want. And if the allegation is correct, but there was something untoward done in terms of the deal cut, how do you assure them of good government with respect to what happened here? Well, as you pointed out, there was quite a change in the personnel of the General Assembly. In fact, as a result of Act 44, how did the General Assembly even before the General Election of 2006 repealed Act 44? That didn't stop the voters from changing a substantial number of members in the legislature. Good government, I think, starts with the voters. I mean Abraham Lincoln said, without a virtuous citizen, read democracy cannot survive. So that's where we must start. Now, one thing one can also do is look to procedural reforms within those bodies. And again, that's a matter of self-government for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Not a federal issue. It's political issue. So there was taking place here. There are other things they've complained of. They complained of a First Amendment violation, which it seems to me consists of a complaint that they were not given the opportunity for political speech in a timely fashion to protest Act 44. Good, Mr. Piaw, we understand that there are some other issues, but I'm going to enforce the red light rule at this time. Thank you there. The briefs on both sides handled these matters very forcefully and thoroughly, and we will take your arguments under advisement. Thank you. Good, Mr. Schner. Thank you for having me. Unfortunately, your honor I could probably take another 45 minutes discussing this. I'll try to handle everything that's come up in the House of Representatives. Could I start with Mr. Krillin? We left off. If something bad happened, as you will ledge, yes, your honor. And there, by all accounts, has been a significant political fallout, which is likely to be remembered, at least for a generation or two. What? Isn't that the best antidote for a bad government in the future? I don't know if it's the best antidote, but it certainly is one of them. But I would take issue with several elements of that statement. First of all, we live in a reputative republic, not just of direct democracy, and we have a court system specifically so constitutional rights can be upheld and vindicated. And that is always a parallel track to the electorate. Second, we're during the course of all the years that we cite in the briefs where both the legislative process we complain of and the case fixing has been going on. Well, aren't you being unduly modest? Isn't it the case that your clients and folks who support your clients' views were very successful in the political arena, in drawing public attention to what they viewed as a problem in the system? And as a result of that, there was a shake-up of really dramatic proportions in the state legislature. And then, indeed, one might argue that it reached the elections for the states of the court, whether it did or didn't, there might be a perception there that it did. And certainly, it did at the legislative level. Now, if that's the case, and we do indeed live in a representative democracy, why isn't Judge Ambro correct in saying, hey, the system worked, the antidote for the problem you identified was political statements and the political process working? Well, two things, Your Honor. The system actually didn't work at least completely. There are the behavior that we complain of has been going on during this appeal. So it didn't stop because the people changed. It's not about the behavior you complain of. But you're talking about the legislative process, Your Honor. The use of a, what is essentially a two-class legislature to make sure that only six people write the words and nobody else gets to do anything but just vote up or down. And that's a story that's continued. Yeah, address that. That your opponent, Mr. Krill says, look, conference committees, that's the way legislatures work. You get senior people, they get into a room, they work out a final deal so that the two houses come up with something that everybody votes on. That's the way it's always work. What's wrong with his analysis? How come that's now in this circumstance today in Pennsylvania, a violation of equal protection? If you have any case at all from any jurisdiction that says that, let me tell you what we do have, Your Honor. Mr. Krill statement, the way that it was done in this case is the way it's always been done is actually factually and historically incorrect. And we're not complaining about conference committees per se. If they had used conference committees, the way they've been used for 700 years, there would be a problem

. The briefs on both sides handled these matters very forcefully and thoroughly, and we will take your arguments under advisement. Thank you. Good, Mr. Schner. Thank you for having me. Unfortunately, your honor I could probably take another 45 minutes discussing this. I'll try to handle everything that's come up in the House of Representatives. Could I start with Mr. Krillin? We left off. If something bad happened, as you will ledge, yes, your honor. And there, by all accounts, has been a significant political fallout, which is likely to be remembered, at least for a generation or two. What? Isn't that the best antidote for a bad government in the future? I don't know if it's the best antidote, but it certainly is one of them. But I would take issue with several elements of that statement. First of all, we live in a reputative republic, not just of direct democracy, and we have a court system specifically so constitutional rights can be upheld and vindicated. And that is always a parallel track to the electorate. Second, we're during the course of all the years that we cite in the briefs where both the legislative process we complain of and the case fixing has been going on. Well, aren't you being unduly modest? Isn't it the case that your clients and folks who support your clients' views were very successful in the political arena, in drawing public attention to what they viewed as a problem in the system? And as a result of that, there was a shake-up of really dramatic proportions in the state legislature. And then, indeed, one might argue that it reached the elections for the states of the court, whether it did or didn't, there might be a perception there that it did. And certainly, it did at the legislative level. Now, if that's the case, and we do indeed live in a representative democracy, why isn't Judge Ambro correct in saying, hey, the system worked, the antidote for the problem you identified was political statements and the political process working? Well, two things, Your Honor. The system actually didn't work at least completely. There are the behavior that we complain of has been going on during this appeal. So it didn't stop because the people changed. It's not about the behavior you complain of. But you're talking about the legislative process, Your Honor. The use of a, what is essentially a two-class legislature to make sure that only six people write the words and nobody else gets to do anything but just vote up or down. And that's a story that's continued. Yeah, address that. That your opponent, Mr. Krill says, look, conference committees, that's the way legislatures work. You get senior people, they get into a room, they work out a final deal so that the two houses come up with something that everybody votes on. That's the way it's always work. What's wrong with his analysis? How come that's now in this circumstance today in Pennsylvania, a violation of equal protection? If you have any case at all from any jurisdiction that says that, let me tell you what we do have, Your Honor. Mr. Krill statement, the way that it was done in this case is the way it's always been done is actually factually and historically incorrect. And we're not complaining about conference committees per se. If they had used conference committees, the way they've been used for 700 years, there would be a problem. But I'm keying off your statement, which was it's going on today. I assume you're not alleging that today while this appeal was pending, members of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were meeting with legislatures in corruptly fixing cases. I assume that you meant, correct me if I'm wrong, that they're still having conference committees where some people go in a room and they work out the final deal or details of a legislation. And then other legislators don't get to rewrite it, they get to vote it up or down. I understood that to be your point. If that's not your point, get me straight. But if it is your point, how is that different than the way conference committees function and have historically function in the United States of America and its several states? I'll tell you exactly how you're on, because as you stated, as Mr. Krill stated, it is accurate to a point, but not to the point where the equal protection clause kicks in and this is the key thing. The conference committee device has function in a certain way its entire history for 700 years, which is not how it's being done here. And it's important, it's a small point, but it's an important point. The conference committees send their conference report to both chambers and say vote up or down because it's a good way of resolved dispute rather than having to go back and forth between the chambers. And under the device that's evolved over these 700 years of usage in every English speaking legislature, the reason why conference committees get to say here's our answer up or down is because they are limited themselves. They don't get to come in and do what was done here, and they say, okay, we're here to resolve this dispute between this house and this house. What we're going to do is tear up everything, every single word, which was done here, throw out every single word that was debated, amended, considered by all 247. So when on the one display is when I chuck it and why our own legislation how much is it? How much is it? How much if they only chucked 80% of it? We're 60% or 50%. At what point does it cease to be a conference committee and become the bad and abusive? Two things you're honored and I think that the this is an obscurity of law but the law of conference committee such as it exists is clear in every authority and every jurisdiction. Conference committees are bound to accept everything that has passed both houses the same and are not allowed and this is the most important point here. They are not allowed to insert any new material that did not appear before one or the other chamber did not pass one or the other chamber. There's a logical reason I'm not trying to draw some sticky little line rule. There's an important reason that I'd like the court to understand and have courts ever enforced that rule or do legislators enforce that rule within their own bodies and say, wait a second, you can't do that because that's new material and we won't accept it. It's a point order. I mean isn't this self-regulating and not judicially regulated behavior? Yes and no. For the most part, yes the rules are to be enforced within the chamber. When they do something that violates equal protection it rises to something that is cognizable by a federal court. I can't stop my hand and think of federal court rulings. There have been state court rulings on this aspect of law and what conference committees may do. Our contention here isn't so much that that violates the historical understanding of conference committees which I couldn't talk to you about for a long time. But the real point here is that by doing it they have violated the equal protection clause. If I may or I know this has gone off a long time, let me explain in a minute what the exact problem is. Why this isn't just a zero percent or one percent? It's okay. The reason why conference committees are confined and thereby the chambers can be confined by the conference committee is because if that weren't the case, what you would have is what you have here. You would have essentially the entire legislative process which in Pennsylvania is spelled out in tremendous detail in the Constitution. You would have, you go through this whole process and would get to the conference committee and under the rules, the conference committee could then rip out every single thing done, putting something new and send it to the chambers for an up and down vote. So they would be the only people that effectively would ever get to ride a single word of legislation. It would render the entire legislative process to that date basically a pre-season game. And then we understand that that's a good point. We understand that

. But I'm keying off your statement, which was it's going on today. I assume you're not alleging that today while this appeal was pending, members of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were meeting with legislatures in corruptly fixing cases. I assume that you meant, correct me if I'm wrong, that they're still having conference committees where some people go in a room and they work out the final deal or details of a legislation. And then other legislators don't get to rewrite it, they get to vote it up or down. I understood that to be your point. If that's not your point, get me straight. But if it is your point, how is that different than the way conference committees function and have historically function in the United States of America and its several states? I'll tell you exactly how you're on, because as you stated, as Mr. Krill stated, it is accurate to a point, but not to the point where the equal protection clause kicks in and this is the key thing. The conference committee device has function in a certain way its entire history for 700 years, which is not how it's being done here. And it's important, it's a small point, but it's an important point. The conference committees send their conference report to both chambers and say vote up or down because it's a good way of resolved dispute rather than having to go back and forth between the chambers. And under the device that's evolved over these 700 years of usage in every English speaking legislature, the reason why conference committees get to say here's our answer up or down is because they are limited themselves. They don't get to come in and do what was done here, and they say, okay, we're here to resolve this dispute between this house and this house. What we're going to do is tear up everything, every single word, which was done here, throw out every single word that was debated, amended, considered by all 247. So when on the one display is when I chuck it and why our own legislation how much is it? How much is it? How much if they only chucked 80% of it? We're 60% or 50%. At what point does it cease to be a conference committee and become the bad and abusive? Two things you're honored and I think that the this is an obscurity of law but the law of conference committee such as it exists is clear in every authority and every jurisdiction. Conference committees are bound to accept everything that has passed both houses the same and are not allowed and this is the most important point here. They are not allowed to insert any new material that did not appear before one or the other chamber did not pass one or the other chamber. There's a logical reason I'm not trying to draw some sticky little line rule. There's an important reason that I'd like the court to understand and have courts ever enforced that rule or do legislators enforce that rule within their own bodies and say, wait a second, you can't do that because that's new material and we won't accept it. It's a point order. I mean isn't this self-regulating and not judicially regulated behavior? Yes and no. For the most part, yes the rules are to be enforced within the chamber. When they do something that violates equal protection it rises to something that is cognizable by a federal court. I can't stop my hand and think of federal court rulings. There have been state court rulings on this aspect of law and what conference committees may do. Our contention here isn't so much that that violates the historical understanding of conference committees which I couldn't talk to you about for a long time. But the real point here is that by doing it they have violated the equal protection clause. If I may or I know this has gone off a long time, let me explain in a minute what the exact problem is. Why this isn't just a zero percent or one percent? It's okay. The reason why conference committees are confined and thereby the chambers can be confined by the conference committee is because if that weren't the case, what you would have is what you have here. You would have essentially the entire legislative process which in Pennsylvania is spelled out in tremendous detail in the Constitution. You would have, you go through this whole process and would get to the conference committee and under the rules, the conference committee could then rip out every single thing done, putting something new and send it to the chambers for an up and down vote. So they would be the only people that effectively would ever get to ride a single word of legislation. It would render the entire legislative process to that date basically a pre-season game. And then we understand that that's a good point. We understand that. We'll give you five more minutes to address anything else you would like. I would ask if we could just spend at least a portion of that time on standing because it's all that you say here. Well, I look at the Supreme Court cases on tax pay or standing. It's a tough, it's almost a matter of time. I would say impossible, your honor. And we're not letting tax pay or standing. And every single case that they cite with that is on the same tax pay or standing. To go back to the very first question of this argument, the standing is different for each claim and for each of the litigants essentially. But it comes down to this, the due process claims, you have standing if you're a litigant who's quite to a fair tribunal was invaded because you were either in court or you would have gone in court on this and had it taken away from you. Now is that to the, is that to the associational plaintiffs here or is that to the citizen? Well, it would start with the, with the associational, I mean, with the individual plaintiffs and the associational plaintiffs build off of that. If their membership has standing to ring those claims and all their membership in our view would, then the associational plaintiffs would have standing derivative of that. They also have standing themselves because these are clearly, the associational plaintiffs, common cause and women voters are clearly the plaintiffs who have sued over this in the past, wanted to sue over Act 44. They are probably exactly the people who legislate your hand in mind when they are rings to make sure that these cases were going to lose. These are the people who sue over and they were going to be there. So the associational plaintiffs would have standing both in their own right because they litigated and will litigate these cases and the standing that is derivative of all of their members who could have been brought these suits. And again, remember that the League of Women Voters at least among the plaintiffs was in court by a case that we have reason to suspect was one of the tainted cases. And so they have a somewhat distinct but similar due process violation there. So they are standing as litigants if one understands that the claim here is that the court system was essentially perverted through a deal. The Equal Protection argument, you have standing if you live in one of the diminished districts. So not every single citizen in the state could sue. If you live in a district where the representative was relegated to only voting up or down at the end rather than ever getting to offer an amendment, then you were representative. But you have a state legislator who is also a plaintiff here, right? Yes, the state legislator would also be able to assert that right as a legislator, the voters have the right to assert that right because it's representative fatali and every other representative similar. No, it's situated in the name who has been developed. I was not able to find any cases that asserted that principle. But perhaps you have so much of a principle you're alluding to. The principle that if an individual legislator doesn't sit on the conference committee that either that legislator or his or her constituents have an equal protection. Sure, and the argument is not that you get to sit on the conference committee. The conference committee is essentially the locus of activity here. The problem we can plan out is not being excluded from conference committees or anything else like that. It is being excluded from the ability to amend legislation. I understand that. That's all part of the same. Is there a case that goes your way that says that there's in that circumstance standing? There isn't a case that I don't believe that addresses specifically can you amend. There are cases that deal with does legislating consist of anything more than an upper down vote at the end. And they do say that, including the cases the other side sides going against us like the Malino case. Part of the Malino says that there is more to just the upper down vote in the end. What representative by the way have to have been like part of a vote or something like that? No, what we're asserting is that your right is a legislator and then derivative is a constituent is not just to the vote at the end like the tribune's got in the Senate

. We'll give you five more minutes to address anything else you would like. I would ask if we could just spend at least a portion of that time on standing because it's all that you say here. Well, I look at the Supreme Court cases on tax pay or standing. It's a tough, it's almost a matter of time. I would say impossible, your honor. And we're not letting tax pay or standing. And every single case that they cite with that is on the same tax pay or standing. To go back to the very first question of this argument, the standing is different for each claim and for each of the litigants essentially. But it comes down to this, the due process claims, you have standing if you're a litigant who's quite to a fair tribunal was invaded because you were either in court or you would have gone in court on this and had it taken away from you. Now is that to the, is that to the associational plaintiffs here or is that to the citizen? Well, it would start with the, with the associational, I mean, with the individual plaintiffs and the associational plaintiffs build off of that. If their membership has standing to ring those claims and all their membership in our view would, then the associational plaintiffs would have standing derivative of that. They also have standing themselves because these are clearly, the associational plaintiffs, common cause and women voters are clearly the plaintiffs who have sued over this in the past, wanted to sue over Act 44. They are probably exactly the people who legislate your hand in mind when they are rings to make sure that these cases were going to lose. These are the people who sue over and they were going to be there. So the associational plaintiffs would have standing both in their own right because they litigated and will litigate these cases and the standing that is derivative of all of their members who could have been brought these suits. And again, remember that the League of Women Voters at least among the plaintiffs was in court by a case that we have reason to suspect was one of the tainted cases. And so they have a somewhat distinct but similar due process violation there. So they are standing as litigants if one understands that the claim here is that the court system was essentially perverted through a deal. The Equal Protection argument, you have standing if you live in one of the diminished districts. So not every single citizen in the state could sue. If you live in a district where the representative was relegated to only voting up or down at the end rather than ever getting to offer an amendment, then you were representative. But you have a state legislator who is also a plaintiff here, right? Yes, the state legislator would also be able to assert that right as a legislator, the voters have the right to assert that right because it's representative fatali and every other representative similar. No, it's situated in the name who has been developed. I was not able to find any cases that asserted that principle. But perhaps you have so much of a principle you're alluding to. The principle that if an individual legislator doesn't sit on the conference committee that either that legislator or his or her constituents have an equal protection. Sure, and the argument is not that you get to sit on the conference committee. The conference committee is essentially the locus of activity here. The problem we can plan out is not being excluded from conference committees or anything else like that. It is being excluded from the ability to amend legislation. I understand that. That's all part of the same. Is there a case that goes your way that says that there's in that circumstance standing? There isn't a case that I don't believe that addresses specifically can you amend. There are cases that deal with does legislating consist of anything more than an upper down vote at the end. And they do say that, including the cases the other side sides going against us like the Malino case. Part of the Malino says that there is more to just the upper down vote in the end. What representative by the way have to have been like part of a vote or something like that? No, what we're asserting is that your right is a legislator and then derivative is a constituent is not just to the vote at the end like the tribune's got in the Senate. It's a right to participate in certain core functions under the same terms as everybody else with amending being one of them. What was done here was the right to offer a single word of legislation at all is effectively eliminated for 247 members of the General Assembly. It's essentially a rule and practice that says six people right everywhere you get to say thumbs up or thumbs down. Now they get to say something thumbs up or thumbs down in our system. And more importantly what the cases clearly say is you can't create two classes of legislators over virtually anything. You could probably have executive washrooms that some can use and not others and we're not complaining about that. But you can't take a process where you say here's something that's very important for legislative process. But the specific effect what you're saying, you have a house built in a Senate built. You go in, you have to accept them and then you cut your deal with respect to the things that have been passed by the House and the things that have been passed by the Senate. And you're saying that here there was something added that wasn't even considered by the House. In fact, you can tie a bill in your honor. Or would set it. So then what a representative does is bring that up and they just vote no and get others to vote no. Isn't that the political process? That's part of the political process. And this is essentially the question. Do they have a right as a legislator to do anything more than just be handed the bills and vote yes or no? And we would say yes, they definitely do because for two reasons. One is it's clearly subsequently an important part of a legislative process and two related to it is you can't create two classes of legislators. One who don't get to write or amend a single word and those who get to write it and just say everybody else has to take it or leave it. It's good to say take it or leave it. But it starts to get to write a word. Thank you very much. You heard enough. No. We've spent a very good argument on all sides. Thank you very much. We appreciate the time and effort that Council have expended on this. There are important issues. We'll take the case under advisement. We thank Council all Council on this. Thank you very much. Thank you.

Good afternoon. Are you ready to see him? You want to say a word to our representative? The appellants I'd like to request three minutes to help deserve. Thank you very much. I know there are a number of issues in this case. We are particularly interested in at least initially the standing and the movement of this issues. And we recognize that there were three different classes of planets in this case. Yes, sir. The citizen planets and the association planets and then the state representative as well. And we recognize that there are different standards for each one of these. So if you could take us through each one of your planets and tell us why you have standing on each one that would be very helpful to us. Happy to be your honor and then I assume you'd like me to address the movement. And then address the movement and then if you wish to address the other matters, that's fine too. Sure. I will say the preparatory matter you're on that. All the justish-addibility questions. Each of them depends on a proper understanding of the claim. And at some point we're going to have to get into a discussion of what the plaintiffs actually claim. But I would restrain the issue with questions. Whatever way you would like to do that. I'm sorry I'm standing your honor but I'm not getting any of that. Or could I ask you one question if you could talk about what each of the plaintiffs claim or what is their claim? I mean, nobody's claiming damages, are they? No, we're not your honor. You're seeking what? We're seeking equitable relief. The declaratory and potentially injuncatively. And could you raise your mind before I put that up? Sure. That's it. It's a little bit distracting visual. Now I know that this was a story. When you get you all on tape here and we review this afterwards. Right, your honor. All right, well the question is if I'll put out every issue in the case now. Let me start with standing and devolve that into a discussion of the claims. Because I think that will be required along the way and then we'll move into movements and why the claims are not removed. That makes sense to the court. As the Chief Judge noted, there's three classes of plaintiffs. All of the plaintiffs are essentially citizens of Pennsylvania and all of them qualify under the same heading as the first heading of the individual plaintiffs. Who will lead an injury to their constitutional rights under three provisions of the U.S. Constitution, the due process clause, the equal protection clause, and the first amendment. Those are individual rights in the Constitution which individuals have a right to comment the federal court and win a game regardless of the number of the litigants who are similarly situated and incurred the same injury. What's your particularized concrete injury that you're alleging on behalf of these folks? That will depend on the claim. And I run through each of those. Pick yours first. That's my best walk. That way you can tie it into my question. The claim that we think most clearly requires a reversal on the remand is the due process claim. There isn't an dispute that there are secret negotiations between the Chief Justice and legislative leaders in Pennsylvania. That in itself gives rise to some due process questions. But the starkest issue that that raises is that quite frankly the plaintiffs allergic simply that those were more of the discussions. Those were actually instances of case fixing. Okay now if you say this is all about case fixing, are your folks, parties to any case alleged to have been fixed? Yes you are. And that was the League of Women Voters. There would be two classes of cases that are alleged to be fixed your honor. One would be the League of Women Voters which was involved in the large class League of Women Voters or part of the class where the litigation was then pending before the court. And that was the Supreme Court at the time of these negotiations. Was this raised before Chief Judge Kane, this assertion? Yes it was your honor. This argument that there was case fixing and that it involved the League of Women Voters who was argued before Chief Judge Kane. It was raised in the pleadings and was argued. Now I don't think that we're case fixing itself is used. But the allegation was quite explicit. I would direct the court's attention to pages 4 to 6 of the complaint which was of 25 to 27 in the appendix where it's alleged very explicitly. The one issue at issue in case is that the Supreme Court traded the results of cases in return for legislation particularly dealing with money that it wanted from the legislature. But that's not the case here obviously. No that is the case here your honor. They're trading the results of cases forward money. Yes you're right. We're going to resolve this case would you be talking about? What's the result of the case? The cases that we believe were an issue would all involve the determinations of whether legislation that was important for the legislature was passed constitutionally. There is a pattern over years of the legislature engaging in behavior that number of plaintiffs including these plaintiffs in this litigation here have some problems with. Most of which of a reason under challenges under the state constitution. That legislation is frequently challenged and winds up pending before the state Supreme Court. In some instances the Supreme Court has actually upheld all those challenges and stricken down the legislation as unconstitutionally enacted. So these are not frivolous claims. In some instances the litigation has not been struck and pushed out. It's a struck down. And the allegation here is that in many of those cases in the past and we believe in some of the cases pending before the court in 2005 at the time of these negotiations there was a deal cut that the Supreme Court would not strike down that litigation in return for the legislature doing what the court wanted. I don't know if any of that. I'm sorry. You've cited to a generalized statement in the complaint and you might just get specific with me. What paragraph in the second I met a complaint you're talking about. The exact allegation? I would direct you to a couple of sentences on pages 25 to 27 of the appendix which is 46 of the complaint. Starting at the top of the page if you drop down the middle of the sentence you get cut through the verbiage. What are more justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and leaders of the general assembly negotiated legislation desired by the court in exchange for women's favourable to the legislative leadership on cases pending before the court. What page on that? I'm on page 25 the appendix page four of the complaint. Justice leaders of the assembly negotiated legislation in exchange for rulings dropping down halfway down the page. Justice is of the highest court of the state barred their votes on cases continuing after the dashes in exchange for state funding desired by the justice. Do you have any examples of any of those? That's the big inch of law in terms of an accusation. Yes, maybe you're right. And that's why we're here. I noticed you throwing your burrow of the assertion and I can understand that. Two things are on her. The allegations at this point since 12-6 motion must be assumed to be true and they're obviously carefully plent. More importantly I understand the court's skepticism. And we're not here to give testimony or present evidence of course but we have done some presenting of evidence far more than is required in the course of a complaint or on a 12-6 motion at this point in the litigation. I'm having a bit of a problem because I'm still trying to find the particularized concrete injury. You said you've pledged in your complaint that there was what amounts to case fixing. There's nothing in here that talks about any specific case and I'm trying to find out if you ever argued to Chief Judge Kane, here's a case where there was a vote traded by the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in exchange for a pay raise and that corrupted the system and an effective one of my clients. Did that ever happen in the district court? I believe it did you are. Let me explain what I think the allegations are and that were fairly clearly made in this. First of all, there are allegations that are not directly an issue in this case that there are specific named cases of a reference to here that were decided a couple of years ago where the Republicans who are the same litigants here had their case bartered away. In that case, not returned for a salary increase but returned for funding for the judiciary. That the judiciary had been seeking unsuccessfully from the legislature for about a decade. It was a huge amount of funding that went through in return for those case decisions. Those were specific cases that we allege were barred in the present instance. So, on the Act 44, there are two classes of cases essentially that we allege in the pleadings were barred. One was that Act 44 itself as part of the negotiations was a subject of the barred in other words. I understand that and I apologize if I'm not being clear. I'm trying to find out and I think it's my question that you tell me you did point out to Chief Judge Kane specific instances that is a case by name. Where you're saying there was a vote trading by the Supreme Court to corrupted the process and it directly affected your client. Not generalized statements of bad things happen. Yes, very specific. Then my question to you after that is if that's the case that there was an actual case or controversy where somebody was affected by that. Yes, sir. How is this a proper attack on a specific case? In other words, if you had a case decision by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that was allegedly corrupted, how is this not a Rooker Feldman problem for us to be looking at a constitutional claim that goes at that case from the side? Yes, Your Honor. That's an important question and it's obviously why we had not specifically made part of this litigation and attacked on the 1990 Dine cases. That would present a Rooker Feldman problem. What we have here is Act 44 itself, we allege, was part of the barred in the court and would uphold it and essentially fix that litigation. We actually don't have a Rooker Feldman issue because we did not bring that case in state court. If we had gone to state court, we would be barred by Rooker Feldman from launching a collateral attack in federal court. But we didn't do that so there isn't a Rooker Feldman problem. I don't think that's coming across as clear. There was not state court litigation over Act 44 so there's not a Rooker Feldman problem. The question that I think that raises for the bench then is there a problem at all here that we can be sitting over? I'll ask that question for you, but it's essentially a right-ness question which is did the plaintiffs have to go into federal court, I mean, sorry, into state court to sue over Act 44 in order to have standing to a ledge that Act 44 was corrupted and they didn't get a fair state court process. And we believe obviously the answer to that is no. The due process violation occurs when the court agrees that it's not going to provide fair process. At that point, the essentially the equivalent of if a judge stood up and said, probably, you know what? I worked out a deal with the other litigants. I'm not going to give you a fair day in court. Don't even show up. The due process violation has occurred at that point. Well, here's the problem that I'm having and I don't presume to speak for my colleagues, but if you were to say, look, here's the vote trading that happened. Sure. In case acts they did why and it affected this particular client and we've got a problem with that. Yes. In the absence of doing that, how is this concern about Act 44 different from the concern that any other citizen in the state of Pennsylvania would have about the good government and the concern about corruption in state government that you're alleging? I'm paying the answer to the question that was you. Sure. In order to have standing on the claim that your due process rights have been violated on this, which involves essentially a certain state of law and litigation, you should be a litigant. And we have to use me, you can, but you should be a litigant. Obviously the due process doesn't amorphously affect everybody out there and we're not claiming our rights were violated because we're citizens and this was bad. What rights were violated were essentially two categories. Legal and voters at least had legislation and litigation ending before the court, which we believe was one of the bartered cases and they therefore had their due process rights deprived right there on that case. And I think that's pretty clear and concrete. The second way that concrete rights would be violated is if you were somebody who was going to bring this litigation and now you effectively can't because it's been, as it is in the hypothetical, I just gave a moment ago, essentially announced we fixed the case. No point coming here. The question is, do you then have to go in a state court anyway and file the suit? And we would say no because the deprivation of due process occurs when the court system is corrupted and the case is fixed, which already occurred. So would these litigants like Compton Caws and Tim Pots and legal and women voters have brought this suit in state court, but for the fact that there was at that point no point in bringing it because the case itself had already been bought and sold. These are clearly litigants who would have brought that lawsuit, which I think we can establish for two reasons. One, they've obviously made the effort to bring this lawsuit. They have the adverse interest. They have the determination to bring the suit. And they have a long, long history of bringing exactly this kind of lawsuit over exactly this kind of legislative procedure. In fact, they were the litigants in cases that we believe would fix the decade ago. Well, what could assume we sent this back? What could Chief Judge Cain give you in the way of relief for this vote trading problem that you've described? Since 44 doesn't exist, what would the relief be that you'd ask for? Well, two things, Your Honor. First of all, I've, whether act 44 doesn't exist or not, it's effects continue to this day. So there are aspects of act 44 that continue to cost the big, specific, and you'll be specific. For example, is there a way to force the return of funds that were already dispersed under the act? We believe that you can reinforce the return of funds, but you don't even have to because funds are continuing to be paid out under act 44 in two ways. And I'm glad that our claim obviously doesn't go just to money because it's constant of violations. But specifically, wouldn't we have to then invalidate the still decision, which is a state Supreme Court decision? They're saying, under still, that they didn't have to return traditional salaries to their pre-act levels pre-act 44. That's correct, although the allegations in this case call on who questioned the propriety of the still decision, but you don't even need to reach that. The fact of the matter is the legislative defendants here as well have received money and are continuing to receive money. Act 44 payments were made out into several months prior to Act 44, what payments were made out? Yes, they're called unboundured expenses, but they're treated by the IRS and by the state itself as salary payments. Those payments were made over a series of months from the time of an act went until the elect repealed Act 44. Not only were those money split out, but one necessary result of that is it leads to a higher salary calculation for everyone of the defendants for the money they took during that period so that their pensions go up. And as a result of Act 44, even if it's repealed, they will have higher pensions thanks to the three months Act 44 was in effect for the rest of their lives and will be paying for the rest of our lives. So is that something different than a generalized complaint by a taxpayer that, hey, the taxpayers are going to be stuck? All taxpayers are going to be stuck because of this. Yes, yes, yes. This thing was that from the Denver crisis, Christ the versus Cunell, or the cases that say you don't get, you know, the generalized. The question about the salary payments did not go to what is our, what are we complaining of, what is our injury, but is there any continuing effect of Act 44? And Act 44 may have been repealed in name, but its effects continue on to this day. But we do not claim that we're here because of the monetary effects of Act 44. In fact, some of the plaintiffs are all for a salary increase for the state officials. And that's not what they're challenging. What they're challenging is the invasion of the constitutional rights, which in most cases has nothing to do with whether Act 44 is still valid day or in fact ever was valid today. The legislative process claims, which claim that the legislature totally excluded 90% of the legislature and the public from any meaningful participation in the legislative process, would be relevant claims even if Act 44 had failed to pass. For instance, they couldn't afford the door to the legislature and kept half the members out and then purported to pass Act 44, except that it failed on the floor. Let me go back. Let me get back to this expenses, the unvantered expenses. Does the complaint, my understanding is the complaint does not seek damages. Is that correct? That's correct, you're right. It doesn't specifically seek reimbursement of the unvantered expenses. I believe that the relief has been pled to allow for that. But the plaintiff's primary interest is in the declaratory and injunctively to stop this process, which we might have been going on for a long time and continues to this very day. This is awesome. I thought your opponent said that it did not, and I'm just asking you whether it. We pled the relief fairly shortly, but the primary is the redressability that is assuming you're right, because you're able to give you the kind of relief that you seek. And I'm trying to find out what relief you're seeking. Yes, and the relief that we seek, your honor is essentially declaratory relief that the behavior that we have cited is unconstitutional. We will have to add that because hopefully that won't happen again. Well then, when you say it won't happen again, how does that fix what you will ledge to be the continuing effect of Act 44? As soon as it went back to Chief Judge Cain and she said to the legislature and to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Supreme Court, you better never do that again. I'm telling you, how does that fix the problem you've identified as the continuing effect? To be accurate, Your Honor, I would not say that that's what I've said is the continuing effect. That is a continuing effect of Act 44. And it's essentially related to the question that Judge Ambrow raised about the continuing monetary effects of Act 44, and it comes up in the context of his Act 44 still ongoing. I'm confusing because I understood you to say that the continuing effects of Act 44 manifest in things like higher pensions for legislators, because of the three months that that 44 was in effect, etc. And what I'm trying to find out, and I think the Chief Judge's question is pointed to, is how does a declaration and an injunction that this is not to happen in the future do anything to affect that problem that you've identified as a continuing effect of Act 44? How does that effect what happened in the past? How do you get regressed for that? What I think we need to do, Your Honor, is separate the issues of the money, which really is not our concern, even though that is one of the injuries from the constitutional violations, which themselves are injuries. The legislative process violations occurred, and we're not really seeking money we dress from that. The clerks were relieved that it was unconstitutional, is in fact sufficient relief in a civil rights case. And if that were all we were asking for, that would be sufficient for the claims to be viable, because this court could determine that yes, in fact, that action was unconstitutional. I mean, this is clearly true on First Amendment claims, where even if the behavior is purportedly stopped, you can still bring claim for violation of your First Amendment rights, because once violated, they're violated. The Equal Protection Clause, we went that the behavior is continuing today. In fact, they have used the same procedure to, we would say, unconstitutional enact legislation during the dependency of this appeal. So it's clearly ongoing activity. What procedure they used? The procedure used is essentially a misuse of an ancient procedure that I think everybody here is familiar with, which is a conference committee. Conference committees were set up originally in the first part of the Westminster Resolve disputes between two chambers. They get to resolve that dispute by sending a conference report to both chambers to vote on, up or down. There's a reason why it evolved that way. And this has been true in every English-speaking jurisdiction in the world for almost a millennium. And it's because there's a limit on the conference committee. The conference committee, what the houses do with its report, because the conference committee is limited to what the houses did originally. If you want a declaration that the procedure of using conference committees is somehow unconstitutional. No, the procedure of using conference committees is constitutional, and specifying the state constitution. What they did is change the way conference committees have been done for a thousand years, but in a way that violates equal protection. If you go and you have, let's say there is a protocol in the legislature, and that protocol has been violated, isn't your forum to seek redress before the state court? Why would you want a federal court to come in to tell a state legislature that it's somebody violated the protocols they have to do on business? If the protocol violated simply state rules, which this also did, then the proper form for that would be a state court. We are alleging that it violates equal protection, because it sets up two classes of legislators in a way that deprives voters of equal representation in the legislation there for violates equal protection. The analogy I would suggest, Geronner, is the way that the ancient Roman senate operated, which is completely different from any legislature in this country. That's why this is different from the fact that in some legislators, some legislatures are more powerful than others. This is not a matter of some people get their way more than others. This is a class structure, like in the ancient senate, where there were several types of legislators within the same chamber. There were senators who got to draft the legislation, write the amendments, debate it, do it, essentially everything until the final vote. And then, at some extent, they get that right by virtue of the protocols or internal operating procedures that they have in place. Why is it that a federal court should come in and say, you apply those to some, but not to others. Why is that a federal court within what a federal court can do by way of action? Because it violates equal protection, Geronner. It takes a hypothetical, let's say that they adopted a rule to make it the most extreme case of why a court would not get involved. It was an adopted rule that said, six people get to draft all the other legislation. The other 247 of you never but to draft that word. But equal protection is that citizens are entitled to equal protection of the laws. These are internal operating procedures of a state legislature. Yes, Geronner. And the equal protection clause creates a fundamental right under US Supreme Court jurisprudence to vote equally in state elections. That has been interpreted to mean that your entitled not just to vote on equal terms, but to have equal representation within the legislature. The only question is what exactly does equal representation mean? And our submission is that where you construct a system that divides legislators within the chamber into those who get to actually write the legislation and those who do not get to write a single word of it. And that is enforced that that creates a two class legislature that violates equal protection because it denies equal participation in the legislative process, which denies equal right to vote which denies equal protection. Good. I would like you to spend this put on five more minutes, please. I'd like you to address the witness issue, please. We have a repeal. Yes, repeals of Act 44. And tell us why they did not move out the issues here. Sure, you're on our eye. And a lot of the way Act 44 is like rescuing them that it seems to die and then come back, which says something about the movement. It appeared to have an in a Supreme Court decision, but then a subsequent Act was passed after that. So tell us why the two of those didn't put the silver stake in the heart. Sure. Or enough poison in the rescue. No, then they have to finally throw them in a lake and they may still have to do that here. Because they actually they they may have taken Act 44's name away. There's a number of reasons. This is unfortunately like the argument, but the for starters, the latest reported repeal in Act 30. It basically says, let's take Act 44 the way it is today and keep it. Everything in it. We keep everything in Act 44 and give them an extra dollar and then let's repeal Act 44. If that was sufficient to move out legislation, legislatures could move out every single court case ever brought against legislation. Why assume for the sake of discussion that they didn't do the back room wheel and dealing midnight deal stuff that is deeply offensive to your clients and may well be deeply offensive to many other kinds of things. That's not part of Act 30. It's legislation that went through the system the way legislation ought to and they did what they did in it and gave the the judges another dollar and that was done. Why is that not something that since it would by my hypothetical accord with everything you think ought to have to make your complaints about Act 44 move? I'll tell you why you're right. There's a sort of seesaw that goes through this entire argument today that I think shows what the problem is. The question is, are we talking about constitutional violations or are we talking about their salaries? We do not believe that the financial effects of Act 44 have gone away at all but even if they had, we're not complaining about the fact that they're getting these salaries. We're complaining about the fact that there was the wheeling of the money. I'm sorry. I didn't mean to imply that it was about the money at this point. My question is, if you got a result through a fair process that took you to a specific point and which made Act 44, or a thing of the past, repealed it, what's left to complain about if you got a fair process covering the very same ground? Several things, Your Honor, and I'm glad you asked that because that is the no of the complaint. We are complaining that cases other than involving Act 44 may have been fixed, that we believe they were fixed and that some of the plaintiffs at least were litigants in that. They have been denied due process and whether Act 44 is there or both away, if their case was fixed, their case was fixed. That's a due process. That's not a generalized grade answer. No, because they were litigants in those cases. And how would that be redressed? I think I got to agree with you. We are doing a little seesaw here. We're back now to the question of redressability. Yes, Your Honor. If you identified a specific case where somebody was the victim of the corrupted system in a vote trading circumstance, how would giving a declaration in this case, in effect, don't do that again, do anything to repair that damage which you claim to be a due process violation? Well, Your Honor, the declaration isn't just don't do this again. What would it be injunctive, of course. It's also, and this may seem like a small thing, but for those of us who do civil rights litigation, it's why we're here. It's a declaration. It's a small at all with very important study issues. And a declaration that the government has acted unconstitutionally. I'm not even talking about your prospective relief saying don't do that again. A simple declaration that this was unconstitutional is, in fact, legal relief that is adequate for legal purposes for plaintiff. And I think at that point the question becomes, well, is that satisfied for the plaintiff? So are they getting anything out of it? Does it change anybody's position? I mean, isn't that what redressability is about that you actually do something that alters the position of parties relative to the circumstances therein before? Other than a psychic benefit, which may, I don't discount as being irrelevant, but other than that, what would a declaration do to fix the problems that anybody had suffered as a result of specific vote buying? Several things you might go from the simple to the complex. The simple is that under any first amendment litigation, a declaration that your rights have been violated is a lot of times how you get and that is sufficient because the time has moved on. On the legislative process violations involving the equal protection clause, we alleged that those violations are continuing. They are continuing to do the same thing with other legislation. They have in the past, it's part of an ongoing scheme. A declaration that that's unconstitutional is clearly helpful for plaintiffs who have spent years trying to stop procedures like that. So it is the prospective relief park. I'm sorry. I was a little worried about that. We would be happy with a declaration that it's unconstitutional because we do think that provides prospective relief that that would keep the government from functioning like this unless they want to argue that they are going to defy a federal court ruling on that. And as for the due process claims, which are the most complex in terms of relief, one could hypophicate. And this is certainly not my plan. But one could go into the state court and reopen the litigation and say, hey, look, there's obviously a constitutional problem here that it not been raised or litigated before. We'd like to take another look at this. So it is possible in fact that there could be relief even in cases that have been decided without launching a collateral federal attack directly on that. So there is further relief even in decided cases beyond that. The Act 44, the extent that it's been decided, was decided we argue as part of a fix so that that decision itself is essentially not valid. And that would then make the decision of Act 44 as the validity of an issue. To what extent are you asking us to decide an abstract issue? To what extent are you asking us to decide an abstract issue of constitutional law? Not at all, Your Honor. The relief for cited speculate here may be a little bit down the road some, but the issues themselves are quite concrete. We are saying that they did specific things and where that's pretty concrete what we say we did, which is why these are serious allegations. Let's just take, if we said, okay, we agree that you have alleged they have done specific things. We're going to assume that those specific things have actually been done. And therefore there's a violation of some aspect of the Constitution. The question, so what remedy do you get for that? You can't go back to pre Act 44 in light of stilt because it would seem if you try to rule stilt, that is Rockefeller. You can't appeal the state's more decision to a federal court. That's the question. These federal issues were actually not raised in stilt. So if Act 44 is invalidated on equal protection grounds, that was never argued in stilt, got me deciding in stilt. So Act 44 could be invalidated on an issue, which it was not. But shouldn't you have played in stilt, then all the points you're bringing up now? With all respect, you're none of us were in stilt. The question I would suppose should we have gone to court with stilt? And that comes back to the worker felony issue. If we had done that, we couldn't be here. We couldn't get the address of federal issues in a court that we felt had not been corrupted. But I take this off the track, but back to the question. Yes, Robert. If the allegations we assume are true, if we deem them to be a constitutional violation, what remedy do you get? Again, Your Honor, we would get, I believe, several remedies. We would get any minimum declaratory relief on all claims. And that may not be much clear. The declaratory relief was that. A declaration that the conduct that has been alleged and hopefully proven a trial is unconstitutional and cannot properly be done by the state. I just got to assume that that's the case for the moment. What what relief do you get from that? I would presume that the state government doesn't do it any longer. Secondly, well, they're not already not going to do it anymore as a result of act 30. That's what the other than what's already given. You're probably way of the increase. If you point this, can we roll back that increase? Yes, I believe you came actually out. Act 30 is, this is highly technical and it's not the main thing we're seeking. But, at 30, what it sets is the law in effect today, we're going to have an effect tomorrow plus a dollar. If Act 44 were invalid of an issue, how the date that Act 30 was enacted, then the salary increase currently received by all judges would be a dollar, not roughly $40,000 and $1. So, if Act 44 is invalidated, it does have an effect on the salaries as set by Act 30. Because Act 30 is dependent on the existence of Act 40, at least as to the judiciary, on the date of Act 30's enactment. If Act 44 isn't there on the date of Act 30's enactment, there's $40,000 less in the salary increase for every single judge. So, the question of Act 44 is validity of an issue is still relevant under Act 30. And since the legitimacy of Act 44 under the US Constitution has never been raised or mitigated in the state court, there is not a collateral attack problem there. It's complicated, but I understand the complication, but essentially still has set under the state constitution. And that which has been given cannot be taken away. So, then what you do is you come back and the legislature does say, yes, gets around that by saying, OK, we'll give you a dollar increase, but the formula by which you calculate further increases is not going to be there any longer. That's correct. But they also said that, and we're starting from the floor that Act 44 established. And if Act 44 was void on an issue, you don't get still, you don't get Act 3. How much was the increase that was given by Act 44? I think it varied by various classes, but it's up to 58%. It's pretty substantial. Good. I think I'm sure you don't want me to. He's not all you've been doing great, but I think we do have some rules here. I don't care if I'm just interested. You and not disagree with that. Not at all, you're on a real four rules. I have you back on a rebuttal. Thank you very much, Mr. Adam. Good afternoon, Your Honoris. Good afternoon. Good afternoon. I'm submission to the Court. My name is Arlan Adams, and I am hearing today, on behalf of the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, who, as of a few days ago, was no longer the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, which may add to the moodness discussion. As you may have learned through the press, he resigned as of December 31, 2007, but I don't think that will affect my argument, but you're entitled to know the fact. If you read the complaint as amended in this case, the questions from the bench are very pertinent. And quite sharp-edged. The complaint attacked Act 44, and how it was passed. No question about that. There's no question that Act 44 has been completely modified. Well, there evidently is a question on that point, Mr. Adams, or at least your opposing counsel says they took steps to take Act 44 out of commission, but it's, you know, like the fabled perfume that lingers on. And that continuing lingering effect is the injury or an injury that they want regressed. Can you speak to that point that there are these aftershocks that we have to deal with? You have to, too. Because that is part of the moodness argument, which is my first argument. The traditional jurisprudence is when an Act 44 has been attacked, and then an appeal has been taken. If during the period between the judgment of the lower court and the appellate court, the Act has been scrapped in some way with trillon or nullified, the case becomes moved. There is one minor exception to that doctrine, which incidentally has been spelled out very well by the chief judge here. In Cinecold, that is if there is evidence in the record, which shows that the complaint is likely to recur. There is no such evidence in the record in this case. If there were such evidence in the case of the overdue, the exception is if there were a likelihood that the Act would be executed. Exactly right. But there should be evidence of that, not an argument in this court for the first time that is likely to recur. The reason for that rule, the reason for the rule on moodness is well-established, is not just a mechanical device created by the Supreme Court of the United States. If you go all the way back to Marbury versus Madison, you will see that Chief Justice explained very carefully why these rules are in place. We have a tripartite system of government, executive, legislative and judiciary. If the courts can decide the sputes within an actual case or controversy, the language of the Constitution, then their effects spills over into the other organs of government. So the framers of the Constitution were very careful to say, and their colleagues wrote the Federalist papers were careful to say, that the judiciary has to confine itself to cases and controversy, where a real plaintiff exists who will be injured by the alleged improper acts. That's the language used by this court in the city called written by your Chief Judge. That is the language that has been used repeatedly by the Supreme Court of the United States, less than 20 years. What do you make of the argument that Mr. Schneer has made that there are the League of Women Voters, for example, a real party in this case, which lost a case because of this corrupted system and vote trading by the justices for legislation favorable to them. That's a real particularized thing that happened to them, and it was talked about in front of Chief Judge Kay, and they pointed it out, they argued, etc. What's your response to that? That's hypothetical, but let's assume it for the moment. I'm sorry, when you say it's hypothetical, they're saying it actually happened. And obviously I'm not suggesting you folks need to confess that that happened. Let's assume that it did happen. They go into court and they lose the case. They then take an appeal. I don't know where they lost the case, and the common police court go up to the Commonwealth Court, etc. They then go up to the Supreme Court of the United States. My colleague conceives that. That's for a fellow. What he's trying to do is to eliminate the appellant procedure of the Federal Court. This court, as much as I love it, and I have a great affection for it, can't review intermediate decisions of state courts. That's a procedure that's relegated to the Supreme Court of the United States. If you don't like what the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania does, if you don't come to this court, you have to go up to the Supreme Court of the United States. So that if hypothetical or actuality, however you want to look at the League of Women's Owners situation, occurs. They would have to go soon to the Supreme Court decided against them up to the Supreme Court of the United States, direct the thought of going. That is from her fellow. Now he's trying to prevent that. You're not permitted to do that. But I'll ask you. Put on 15 minutes. All right. Yes, no, no, we're just adding some more time. I would suggest that he has not answered your question for a moodness to law is clear. And this court and the Supreme Court have said repeatedly, if after the lower court has decided the case, an action is taken place which eliminates the vice. The case is moved. And he or she can only do one thing. They can dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. But that ties in with standing. He argues that this isn't Rooker Feldman in this instance because if I understood him correctly, they're complaining about act 44 specifically and not the cases where that were both fixed. They're looking for relief with respect to act 44 and with relief with respect to that act. The constitutional claims made here were never made in the state courts. Not in stealth or any place else. And therefore, nothing should prevent this court from addressing those constitutional claims. What's your response to that? Well, there is nothing to prevent this court from addressing the constitutional claims if he can get over the moodness hurdle and the standing hurdle. But I haven't heard his answers to your questions that will enable the court to avoid moodness or standing. Now, we haven't talked about standing, but it's pretty clear that if you read Valley Forge, Christian Academy of Valley Forge, if you read Daimler Chrysler and the other standing cases in our brief, there is no standing. These are not concrete complaints. They're more philosophical discussions between my distinguished colleague for whom I have great affection as you may know. And the court, but that's not what the business of the court is about. Your job, you know, what better than I do, is to decide the street disputes. You don't have a discrete dispute any longer because the act in question was they attacked not only the act that the way it was passed is no over in existence. So they are engaging in a very important debate perhaps, but not for this court. Does EPA versus or mass chooses versus EPA have any impact on the standing analysis that this court should make? They went to the trouble of submitting a 28J letter and saying, hey, the Supreme Court just last year has changed the ground for standing analysis with the mass chooses versus EPA case. I'd like to may I answer that? My reading of EPA, Massachusetts versus EPA, is a follows. Standing is still a major concern of the Supreme Court and the Federal courts. There are exceptions perhaps to standing or rather interpretations in EPA, the statute in question, which dealt with noxious gazes specifically provided that the states would have an opportunity to engage in the procedure of throwing by EPA. The Brigh about the protocol, and if they didn't like it to object number one, number two in EPA, you have the sovereign as the plaintiff, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Number three, there was an impact on the property of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the court went out of its way to explain how the coast of Massachusetts was being eroded. So you have those three factors, which distinguish Massachusetts versus EPA from valid forage or dainter or cruster or any of the other standing cases. Now I hope I've answered the question. You have. Thank you. And I don't want to take up any more of the time, the court, because my time was limited to six minutes to talk about movements and standing my distinguished colleague is going to talk about some of the things that my opponent has talked about, which I think are much more philosophical and sound like a political science discussion rather than a legal discussion under the doctrine of case and country. Thank you. Any other questions? Thank you very much. Thank you. Mr. John Quill, your honors. I'm representing the President of Pro Temporary of the Pennsylvania Senate and the Senate Majority Leader. And I will also speak with the concurrence of my colleagues on behalf of some of the other parties also on the issue of community, certain of the legislative parties and the governor pleaded these were not reached by the district cards. Correct. But it's an alternative basis for for a dismissal as to those defendants. And I also know it's pretty clear that legislative immunity attaches to the activities that are complained of here. The governor for one thing is an integral part of the legislative process. The presentment requirement in the Pennsylvania Constitution, which requires him to sign bills as a matter of high legislative discretion for the governor, for any governor. And of course, the process of enactment is also squarely within the scope of legislative immunity. The US Supreme Court has long recognized a federal common law doctrine of legislative immunity. And I think it presents an alternative basis for a firmance of judge came here. I would like to say something about Act 30 of 2007, because Mr. Schner's argument implies that Act 30 of 2007 somehow is tainted by Act 44 of 2005. But there's no such tainted doctrine in constitutional law. Each act, each enactment of a legislative body is presumed to be constitutional and presumed to be a fresh policy decision. What I don't know what they're saying is that if there was a corrupt background deal, there there should be a some type of declaration that there was a constitutional violation. And that's in some way, shape a form of a not quite sure what it would be that there would be a remedy. And I keep thinking that likely the remedy, they really want is the rollback of the Act 44 increase, which I think Pennsylvania Supreme Court has already said you cannot do under the Pennsylvania Constitution. That's correct. My clients, by the way, took the opposite point of view before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. We fought very seriously, we lost on that particular issue. However, there are very important issues here of legislative process. Well, doesn't the argument that we heard a few minutes ago from Mr. Schner say not so much that there was a taint although they probably argue there is, but that tainted or not since Act 30 is framed by its terms as taking Act 44 as a basis that, in fact, Act 44 has to be viewed as void. The only thing that Act 30 accomplishes is to give judges a $1 raise for what they had before 44, not that it's tainted, but that because of the way 30 was framed, it will only serve to do what's happening now. If the bad things about 44 are allowed to continue to influence what's going on through Act 30, he can correct me if I'm wrong, but I sort of understood him to be saying something like that. I think that's what he's saying, but it seems to me that that's a contrary to statutory construction and constitutional construction of statutes because legislature is perfectly entitled to make a fresh decision at any time. It could do so again tomorrow to say we want judges salaries to be X plus $2. So what you're saying is the fact that the Pennsylvania legislature chose to use the shorthand of saying Act 44's provisions plus this and been a new process for it doesn't mean that even in fact 44 reviewed is void to have an issue that that guts Act 30 is that right? That's correct. And in fact, you're honored to be precise, although I'm prepared to be corrected. I don't believe Act 30 actually cited 2 Act 44 2005. I think it made reference to salary payable as of the effective date hereafter. So it was really recognizing that whatever judges were getting as of that date, the effective date of Act 30 plus $1 would be their prospective salary. Let me ask this question. Again, I'm not saying this happened, but let's assume for the moment that a legislature and a Supreme Court does engage in a backroom deal in which for certain pending cases there is a vacant a nod that's X will be done in terms of how you will in exchange for the giving of a substantial pay increase. Again, without any way, stating that they're even applying to that's true, but just assuming it, what could be done in that circumstance for redress? Well, those parties who had standing who would challenge the particular enactment could raise, could seek recusal of any judges who were involved in the deal. They could then appeal from that decision on the merits as well as on a refusal to recuse if there was such a thing. And it would go up the line, you would have to go up the line to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and on to the United States. What they were going to do, probably had three cues too, wouldn't they? I'm in the rule of necessity now. And one thing one has to wonder about here is that the complaint and the court should you not get around the necessity by, I don't know, is there a process of any of you for example retired, justices coming back to decide something that, or I don't know? Well, there is a process for senior judges to be brought in by assignment from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Many of them served in fact on the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, which is where cases like these are brought in its original jurisdiction. Senior judges who were retired but are serving on a per, who received a per dem rather than a judicial emodiment arguably would have, would have no interest. And it seems to be one way or another the process, the process can work its way out. So that would be a way around the necessity that they would have to say? It's one way around the, it would look, I mean, just being politically for a second would look very politically bad if they were to decide something that's alleged is that they were, on the deal and then they're supposed to rule on whether that occurred, etc., etc. So it would seem that they would, you would have somebody else appoint it, would you not? Yes, now I'm not aware that there is any such procedure to appoint a retired justice to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. But it seems to me that on the intermediate appellate courts where, where such senior judges are already assigned that that possibility exists. Of course, if for whatever reason, because there weren't enough qualified justices or they were tied or whatever, the intermediate courts ruling were affirmed that would be it. That would be the end of the matter unless it went up to the US Supreme Court. So, you know, I see, I see state processes that are available. And it seems to me that plaintiffs here are doing what we were told not to do when I was a kid and that was make a federal case out of it. In the state processes and come to the federal courts, trying to create defashioned federal claims, which in fact don't exist. So that's really the core of your standing argument. Yes, it also does to the merits and it does to relief. For example, Mr. Schner gave the example of a conference committee. It seems to me that what he's arguing on an equal protection basis is that all legislators should be equal, that they should have equal influence. Well, that's not the case in Congress. Congress has conference committees come any day of the week and who's on those committees? Leaders. Leaders are on those committees. Why are they there? It's because rank and file members have voted for them to be leaders. Not all legislators participate in every phase of legislation, but what all legislators do participate in is the final year or an vote on that legislation. In that regard, they are all equal. But there's no such doctrine of equal representation in the federal constitution that would support the notion that Mr. Schner advances about the inequality as a power in a legislative process. If there were, then I think much congressional legislation would be under challenge. He said in response to, actually, put on another 10 minutes, please. Thank you. He said in response to the chief judges invitation to submit his best claim, that it was due process, secret negotiations and case fixing. Planktons have talked about a deprivation of due process throughout this case, throughout their briefs. But there's not such concept in the constitution, the precise concept in the 14th Amendment is a deprivation. The no-brazen shall be subjected to a deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process. Planktons have not demonstrated any laws of life, of course, nor of property, nor of liberty. As citizens, they enjoy all the liberties of every citizen of Pennsylvania. If there were any, that their tax is paid for this increase that was vulnerable. And in that respect, they are, as privileged or burdened as every other taxpayer in Pennsylvania. But this does not rise to a federal due process claim. What do you understand, the relief that's being signed in this manner? Well, I disagree with Mr. Schner's characterization, all of the relief that's actually pleaded in the second amended complaint is prospective in nature. None of it seeks any give back of money and for adjustment of pensions based on the invulidity of Act 44. What about what about the expenses? Is that pleaded? No, all of it is prospective in joint divert declaratory relief. Pages 59 and 60 of the second amended complaint in the appendix show the relief. And the very first point of relief that they seek is a, enjoying the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from citing or relying on AFLCI out at all. And the common cause of all of this is common wall that all. And any decisions, I think, done their end, has precedent in future cases. Now, Mr. Schner and kind of the plaintiffs, appellants, have stated that some cases have gone against the general assembly in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court under Article III, the procedures for enactment of legislation. That's true. The general assembly has lost some significant cases that are cited in the briefs. They cite those cases that we lost for the proposition that Article III is an important procedural provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution. That's vitality, and we agree with that. But then they cite the cases that they lost and say the fix was in. It was in either of them or it wasn't. We really don't want us to get into fat finding. No, of course, that's not this course. Responsibility, but there is an inconsistency in their position. They mentioned secret negotiations. Well, what they call secret negotiations seems to be a meeting to which they were not invited. But the point is, we're under what rule 12 here is. So, don't we have to accept what they've alleged? Let's assume that secret negotiations took place. I think we have to accept that for purposes of the law. I'm sorry, there is no anti-secret negotiation clause in the United States Constitution. Meeting the court behind closed doors all the time in every branch of government, in all three branches of government, and both the state and federal federal investigations go further than that by saying there was a bone trading deal cut that goes against the core of what judges are all about. Actually, precisely what they alleged is on page 11 of their second amendment complaint paragraph 2a, based on information and belief, I'm quoting, a negotiated deal settlement or understanding begun in 1999 between one or more justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and certain leaders, what paragraph are you on? 2a, the second amendment complaint. So, are you challenging the assertion made by Mr. Schner that in fact it was specifically argued to Chief Judge Cain that there were identified cases in which there was a traded vote in a corruption of the system? I am not aware of any specific allegations. Certainly, there are none in the complaint and I was at the argument with Judge Cain. I haven't reviewed the transcript of that argument here on it, but I just don't recall any specific allegations. What I do see here before me in the complaint is an allegation that one or more justices and certain unnamed leaders had discussions that led to an understanding of our settlement or a deal. Well, did that somehow taint legislation? I don't think so because the motives of individual legislators in voting for against legislation is not something that the federal courts ever will get for that matter of the state court's double-getting either when judging the constitutionality of legislation. With respect to whether that one or more justices who were involved in those discussions should have participated in litigation involving those discussions. Well, again, that's an issue for recusal or appeal. Anyone who understands the legislative process moreover knows that when you have 253 members as you do in the Pennsylvania General Assembly, you can't bind the General Assembly as an institution to a deal. It's not like two corporations that can make a contractual agreement and they are bound even after their personnel change. The General Assembly is, its existence is renewed every two years. The membership changes, the leadership changes, in fact it has changed. And therefore it's in its preposterous that there could be a deal that would bind the General Assembly. The fact that part of the change was not as a result of the fallout from this controversy. Very much so. Very much so. There's also been change in the personnel of the Pennsylvania Spring Court. Since 1999, in fact this year we will have three out of seven justices on that court who are binding them, and what they are seeking in relief to bar the Pennsylvania Spring Court from signing its own precedent. When one thinks about it, require Judge Kane to say to those new justices as well as the old justices, I'm sorry you cannot cite the old common cause case or the AFL CIO case, I forbid you to do it. One of the new justices, my very well said, you know I've read that decision and regardless of how it was what the internal process was that it was arrived at, I find the reasoning that's within the four corners of the decision to be conscient. I wish to rely on it. Can a federal court say no you may not rely on reasoning that you find conscient? It seems to me that that's beyond the power of the federal court. Again, they seek prospective relief, declaratory judgments that are all prospective, and they seek to permanently join the legislature from enacting any legislation in violation of Article 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. That's on page 60, part of their prayer for relief in the ideal world. If they could get it, what they would like to do is undo the bad things they think were done by Act 44. Except they have not included that in their prayer for relief, Judge Amberwood. They're not seeking a reduction in the calculation of the basis for pensions, they're not seeking a give back of the increase that was actually paid. In fact, they have problems where they try to do that. I think they might have to plead in each individual judge and a legislator who knows where there's a host of problems. There would be a host problem, so recognizing those problems I can understand why they didn't. But that means that their own reasoning and prospective relief and the kind of relief that they're giving is not only impractical for a federal court to administer. I think it's also beyond the power of the federal court because it basically would involve restructuring and superintending the Commonwealth as a sovereign. And superintending, at least two of its co-equal branches, other things that they've complained of similarly. But I guess they come back to it. So if that's the case then what can they do? I mean, you have a lot of groups here who are interested in nothing less than, they're nothing more than just root government. That's what they want. And if the allegation is correct, but there was something untoward done in terms of the deal cut, how do you assure them of good government with respect to what happened here? Well, as you pointed out, there was quite a change in the personnel of the General Assembly. In fact, as a result of Act 44, how did the General Assembly even before the General Election of 2006 repealed Act 44? That didn't stop the voters from changing a substantial number of members in the legislature. Good government, I think, starts with the voters. I mean Abraham Lincoln said, without a virtuous citizen, read democracy cannot survive. So that's where we must start. Now, one thing one can also do is look to procedural reforms within those bodies. And again, that's a matter of self-government for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Not a federal issue. It's political issue. So there was taking place here. There are other things they've complained of. They complained of a First Amendment violation, which it seems to me consists of a complaint that they were not given the opportunity for political speech in a timely fashion to protest Act 44. Good, Mr. Piaw, we understand that there are some other issues, but I'm going to enforce the red light rule at this time. Thank you there. The briefs on both sides handled these matters very forcefully and thoroughly, and we will take your arguments under advisement. Thank you. Good, Mr. Schner. Thank you for having me. Unfortunately, your honor I could probably take another 45 minutes discussing this. I'll try to handle everything that's come up in the House of Representatives. Could I start with Mr. Krillin? We left off. If something bad happened, as you will ledge, yes, your honor. And there, by all accounts, has been a significant political fallout, which is likely to be remembered, at least for a generation or two. What? Isn't that the best antidote for a bad government in the future? I don't know if it's the best antidote, but it certainly is one of them. But I would take issue with several elements of that statement. First of all, we live in a reputative republic, not just of direct democracy, and we have a court system specifically so constitutional rights can be upheld and vindicated. And that is always a parallel track to the electorate. Second, we're during the course of all the years that we cite in the briefs where both the legislative process we complain of and the case fixing has been going on. Well, aren't you being unduly modest? Isn't it the case that your clients and folks who support your clients' views were very successful in the political arena, in drawing public attention to what they viewed as a problem in the system? And as a result of that, there was a shake-up of really dramatic proportions in the state legislature. And then, indeed, one might argue that it reached the elections for the states of the court, whether it did or didn't, there might be a perception there that it did. And certainly, it did at the legislative level. Now, if that's the case, and we do indeed live in a representative democracy, why isn't Judge Ambro correct in saying, hey, the system worked, the antidote for the problem you identified was political statements and the political process working? Well, two things, Your Honor. The system actually didn't work at least completely. There are the behavior that we complain of has been going on during this appeal. So it didn't stop because the people changed. It's not about the behavior you complain of. But you're talking about the legislative process, Your Honor. The use of a, what is essentially a two-class legislature to make sure that only six people write the words and nobody else gets to do anything but just vote up or down. And that's a story that's continued. Yeah, address that. That your opponent, Mr. Krill says, look, conference committees, that's the way legislatures work. You get senior people, they get into a room, they work out a final deal so that the two houses come up with something that everybody votes on. That's the way it's always work. What's wrong with his analysis? How come that's now in this circumstance today in Pennsylvania, a violation of equal protection? If you have any case at all from any jurisdiction that says that, let me tell you what we do have, Your Honor. Mr. Krill statement, the way that it was done in this case is the way it's always been done is actually factually and historically incorrect. And we're not complaining about conference committees per se. If they had used conference committees, the way they've been used for 700 years, there would be a problem. But I'm keying off your statement, which was it's going on today. I assume you're not alleging that today while this appeal was pending, members of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were meeting with legislatures in corruptly fixing cases. I assume that you meant, correct me if I'm wrong, that they're still having conference committees where some people go in a room and they work out the final deal or details of a legislation. And then other legislators don't get to rewrite it, they get to vote it up or down. I understood that to be your point. If that's not your point, get me straight. But if it is your point, how is that different than the way conference committees function and have historically function in the United States of America and its several states? I'll tell you exactly how you're on, because as you stated, as Mr. Krill stated, it is accurate to a point, but not to the point where the equal protection clause kicks in and this is the key thing. The conference committee device has function in a certain way its entire history for 700 years, which is not how it's being done here. And it's important, it's a small point, but it's an important point. The conference committees send their conference report to both chambers and say vote up or down because it's a good way of resolved dispute rather than having to go back and forth between the chambers. And under the device that's evolved over these 700 years of usage in every English speaking legislature, the reason why conference committees get to say here's our answer up or down is because they are limited themselves. They don't get to come in and do what was done here, and they say, okay, we're here to resolve this dispute between this house and this house. What we're going to do is tear up everything, every single word, which was done here, throw out every single word that was debated, amended, considered by all 247. So when on the one display is when I chuck it and why our own legislation how much is it? How much is it? How much if they only chucked 80% of it? We're 60% or 50%. At what point does it cease to be a conference committee and become the bad and abusive? Two things you're honored and I think that the this is an obscurity of law but the law of conference committee such as it exists is clear in every authority and every jurisdiction. Conference committees are bound to accept everything that has passed both houses the same and are not allowed and this is the most important point here. They are not allowed to insert any new material that did not appear before one or the other chamber did not pass one or the other chamber. There's a logical reason I'm not trying to draw some sticky little line rule. There's an important reason that I'd like the court to understand and have courts ever enforced that rule or do legislators enforce that rule within their own bodies and say, wait a second, you can't do that because that's new material and we won't accept it. It's a point order. I mean isn't this self-regulating and not judicially regulated behavior? Yes and no. For the most part, yes the rules are to be enforced within the chamber. When they do something that violates equal protection it rises to something that is cognizable by a federal court. I can't stop my hand and think of federal court rulings. There have been state court rulings on this aspect of law and what conference committees may do. Our contention here isn't so much that that violates the historical understanding of conference committees which I couldn't talk to you about for a long time. But the real point here is that by doing it they have violated the equal protection clause. If I may or I know this has gone off a long time, let me explain in a minute what the exact problem is. Why this isn't just a zero percent or one percent? It's okay. The reason why conference committees are confined and thereby the chambers can be confined by the conference committee is because if that weren't the case, what you would have is what you have here. You would have essentially the entire legislative process which in Pennsylvania is spelled out in tremendous detail in the Constitution. You would have, you go through this whole process and would get to the conference committee and under the rules, the conference committee could then rip out every single thing done, putting something new and send it to the chambers for an up and down vote. So they would be the only people that effectively would ever get to ride a single word of legislation. It would render the entire legislative process to that date basically a pre-season game. And then we understand that that's a good point. We understand that. We'll give you five more minutes to address anything else you would like. I would ask if we could just spend at least a portion of that time on standing because it's all that you say here. Well, I look at the Supreme Court cases on tax pay or standing. It's a tough, it's almost a matter of time. I would say impossible, your honor. And we're not letting tax pay or standing. And every single case that they cite with that is on the same tax pay or standing. To go back to the very first question of this argument, the standing is different for each claim and for each of the litigants essentially. But it comes down to this, the due process claims, you have standing if you're a litigant who's quite to a fair tribunal was invaded because you were either in court or you would have gone in court on this and had it taken away from you. Now is that to the, is that to the associational plaintiffs here or is that to the citizen? Well, it would start with the, with the associational, I mean, with the individual plaintiffs and the associational plaintiffs build off of that. If their membership has standing to ring those claims and all their membership in our view would, then the associational plaintiffs would have standing derivative of that. They also have standing themselves because these are clearly, the associational plaintiffs, common cause and women voters are clearly the plaintiffs who have sued over this in the past, wanted to sue over Act 44. They are probably exactly the people who legislate your hand in mind when they are rings to make sure that these cases were going to lose. These are the people who sue over and they were going to be there. So the associational plaintiffs would have standing both in their own right because they litigated and will litigate these cases and the standing that is derivative of all of their members who could have been brought these suits. And again, remember that the League of Women Voters at least among the plaintiffs was in court by a case that we have reason to suspect was one of the tainted cases. And so they have a somewhat distinct but similar due process violation there. So they are standing as litigants if one understands that the claim here is that the court system was essentially perverted through a deal. The Equal Protection argument, you have standing if you live in one of the diminished districts. So not every single citizen in the state could sue. If you live in a district where the representative was relegated to only voting up or down at the end rather than ever getting to offer an amendment, then you were representative. But you have a state legislator who is also a plaintiff here, right? Yes, the state legislator would also be able to assert that right as a legislator, the voters have the right to assert that right because it's representative fatali and every other representative similar. No, it's situated in the name who has been developed. I was not able to find any cases that asserted that principle. But perhaps you have so much of a principle you're alluding to. The principle that if an individual legislator doesn't sit on the conference committee that either that legislator or his or her constituents have an equal protection. Sure, and the argument is not that you get to sit on the conference committee. The conference committee is essentially the locus of activity here. The problem we can plan out is not being excluded from conference committees or anything else like that. It is being excluded from the ability to amend legislation. I understand that. That's all part of the same. Is there a case that goes your way that says that there's in that circumstance standing? There isn't a case that I don't believe that addresses specifically can you amend. There are cases that deal with does legislating consist of anything more than an upper down vote at the end. And they do say that, including the cases the other side sides going against us like the Malino case. Part of the Malino says that there is more to just the upper down vote in the end. What representative by the way have to have been like part of a vote or something like that? No, what we're asserting is that your right is a legislator and then derivative is a constituent is not just to the vote at the end like the tribune's got in the Senate. It's a right to participate in certain core functions under the same terms as everybody else with amending being one of them. What was done here was the right to offer a single word of legislation at all is effectively eliminated for 247 members of the General Assembly. It's essentially a rule and practice that says six people right everywhere you get to say thumbs up or thumbs down. Now they get to say something thumbs up or thumbs down in our system. And more importantly what the cases clearly say is you can't create two classes of legislators over virtually anything. You could probably have executive washrooms that some can use and not others and we're not complaining about that. But you can't take a process where you say here's something that's very important for legislative process. But the specific effect what you're saying, you have a house built in a Senate built. You go in, you have to accept them and then you cut your deal with respect to the things that have been passed by the House and the things that have been passed by the Senate. And you're saying that here there was something added that wasn't even considered by the House. In fact, you can tie a bill in your honor. Or would set it. So then what a representative does is bring that up and they just vote no and get others to vote no. Isn't that the political process? That's part of the political process. And this is essentially the question. Do they have a right as a legislator to do anything more than just be handed the bills and vote yes or no? And we would say yes, they definitely do because for two reasons. One is it's clearly subsequently an important part of a legislative process and two related to it is you can't create two classes of legislators. One who don't get to write or amend a single word and those who get to write it and just say everybody else has to take it or leave it. It's good to say take it or leave it. But it starts to get to write a word. Thank you very much. You heard enough. No. We've spent a very good argument on all sides. Thank you very much. We appreciate the time and effort that Council have expended on this. There are important issues. We'll take the case under advisement. We thank Council all Council on this. Thank you very much. Thank you