Legal Case Summary

Mr. Tochin, I'm happy to hear from you. Morning, Your Honours. I'm Ed Tochin. I represent the appellant in this case, Cortell of Virginia. We're here appealing a summary judgment decision that was issued in the Eastern District of Virginia. Now, it's our position that what the District Court did was make findings of facts regarding disputed matters. And those disputed matters were genuine disputes about material issues. And that's why we're here. There are really three issues that the court decided. One of those three issues is divided into two sub-issues. We call facilities, switched access, and reciprocal compensation. And I'll try to address it in that order. Facilities are divided into two different aspects. There's our facilities and there's Verizon's facilities. Now, what's very odd in this case is that Verizon's position, and indeed the position adopted by the District Court on summary judgment, is that Verizon can charge the highest compensation that exists out there in their tariffs for interaction to their facilities, for entrances to their facilities. But Cortell can't charge anything for the entrance facilities. It provided to Verizon, not at the highest rate, not at the lowest rate, at no rate. Those two separate questions aren't there? They are separate but interrelated. And they're not understand, but in order to make the argument, you're going to have to start with the notion of the contract. This is a contract case. This is a contract case. 3.4.3 provides the two alternative rates, or any rate that's agreed upon. But we're talking about either the tariff rate or the cost rate. True. And the question then is, what does that mean? The question in this, what does that mean? The tariff rate, I mean, the cost rate is listed in Zibadeh for unbundled services, facilities, and is labeled as such under Romandermal 2. And if you take those away, then you don't have any cost rates. And so the question is, did that agreement continue to apply the unbundled rates in Zibadeh? Could I? And I think that Verizon's point is, and I says what I'd like you to address, is that when the agreement was adopted, the unbundled rates were eliminated. Could I just, the predicate to that question, is that correct that if you take away tell-writ rates for unbundled elements, that that's the end of the inquiry? No. That's, I just wanted to make sure you knew that that wasn't, or at least I think that's an open question. No, it's not

. And let me explain by beginning to focus the court on the, I'll come back to the history, but let me focus the court first on the interconnection agreement, the ICA itself. If you look at the ICA, and what you're referring to is the list of charges in Zibadeh. I'm really under. What I really want you to focus on, I've read the agreement fairly carefully, and I'm happy to have you argue it, but my question is really directed at the adoption agreement. And the adoption agreement makes the statement, makes the statement that for avoidance of doubt, adoption of the terms does not include adoption of any vision imposing an unbundling obligation on Verizon. And it seems to me that that was, whether the law did make a change or not, the parties thought it made a change, and was not adopting any unbundling obligation. Half you don't have a bundled obligation, Verizon's argument is then the rates are the terror rates. But the problem is, that's the argument, I want you to address it. That doesn't have what they argue. That's their argument, fair enough. But what that does is it confuses two separate matters. One is unbundling and bundled. The unbundling network elements, the unies, and the second is interconnection. Would talk America made absolutely clear is that those are two separate matters. Just because unbundling goes away, interconnection still continues to exist. And that's what talk America said. And when the FCC found it's... We're looking at an agreement. Let's stick with the contract. This is the briefs I found to be a little difficult because they started arguing what the law was. And this is a straightforward contract case. We're reading a contract as adopted in November of 2004 and 2005. Judge, do you have the contract in front of you? Look at Section 3.1, if you would. Just take a moment if you can. If you look at Section... What it says. It says there that this ICA covers both interconnection and unies, it covers both

. And when it comes... I understand, but I'm just asking you this. I would like you to address their argument, which is this, that the big debate is under 3.4.3 as to what rate? There's two rates referred to their tariff rate and the cost rate, the telleric rate. And the question is, what applies? Because they're in the disjunctive. Their argument is before the adoption, the telleric applied explicitly. It was attached to the exhibit A, as part of exhibit A. That's, they acknowledge that. But they argue that when that agreement was adopted, there was a modification made in the adoption letter. That's a 359. And that is a adoption letter modified the agreement. Now, why doesn't it? It doesn't modify the agreement, because it doesn't take away the interconnection rights which are stated in the agreement. And that's exhibit A that you're referring to. It has teller rates that apply to both interconnection and unies. If you look at... If you look at exhibit A, it's just because it has a heading unbundled transport is irrelevant. No, no. They're not focusing on what I want you to focus on. The adoption agreement got rid of all unbundled rates. We're not talking about unbundled. It's irrelevant. There is nothing about unbundling. There's any relevance to this case. Mr. Johnson, Judge Duncan has a question. Yes. The proviso specifies that the adoption of the terms doesn't include adoption of any provision imposing an unbundling rate

. There's a qualifier to that that no longer applies to Verizon under FCC orders, including the Triennial order review. And what talk America makes clear is that it appears that although it eliminated unbundled access to entrance facilities as unies, but not as not for interconnection or what they call... Well, going back. Interest facilities are used for interconnection, but they're also used for back calling. So you can have them used for different things as the point. So the premise that the proviso takes out all unbundling obligations, it doesn't really hit, it doesn't address the interconnection point. So the question is whether Courtaill ever purchased unies, well, ever purchased entrance facilities as unbundled network element or for interconnection. And if you... Because there are two different things. Correct. And if you look at every order that was placed, every order that was placed was an order for an entrance facility for interconnection at Tower Grace. Look again, look at the... We gave one example at the appendix on 196. The way orders were placed was through an ASR system, it was called the Access Service Request System that Verizon contains. That order says explicitly, we want interconnection at Tower Grace. That's what we're ordering. We're not ordering unies, and unies are completely irrelevant to this case. If you look at 965, 968, and 970 of the appendix, if you look at those, those are the letters that first were sent by Courtaill to Verizon of Virginia, saying Courtaill of Virginia wants to order interconnection at Tower Grace. It says it explicitly. This is what we're ordering. We never ordered a unie, we never wanted a unie, we had nothing to do with unies, we had... And the TRO only deals with unies. And getting back to your question, this interconnection agreement provides for interconnection at Tower Grace. Because if you look at exhibit A, just because it says unbundle transport, unbundle transport is used for both unies and interconnection

. And in fact, if you look at the triennial order, the TRO, and specifically at Section 365 of the TRO, it says that explicitly. I'll read it to you. I'll only read bits and pieces of it because it's too long. But competitive lex often use transmission links, including unbundle transport. That's the word that you were focusing on. Predator lex also use transmission links, including unbundle transport. Competitive lex use these transmission connections between incumbent lex networks and their own networks, both for interconnection and the backhole. And right. They use it for both. Those unbundle transport is used for both. And the other question, you say that the interconnection agreement, the ICA provides interconnection at Tower Wreck. Yes. And that is what was your quote, what was your site for that? Well, the ICA provides it at 4.3. And then in the exhibit A, it provides the tower grace under the category of unbundle transport, but unbundle transport includes interconnection and the unies. That is what the definition of it is. And in any event, the headings are irrelevant, but besides that, that's exactly what we're talking about here. And that's what the- Is there a dispute about whether or not Courtaill purchased the entrance facilities as a uni or for interconnection? There is no dispute whatsoever. Every document, every order that was issued was issued for interconnection with an entrance facility at Tower Wreck rates. There is not a single document in which anything else is said. So to the extent that summary judgment was appropriate, summary judgment was appropriate for Courtaill, but clearly there's no right to summary judgment for Verizon because there is at worst for Courtaill it disputed as to what we ordered. And in fact, as I said, every document says we ordered interconnection at Tower Grace. What's your argument as to where the district court went wrong on this issue? This court went wrong. Well, we're here to know, well, on this issue, what the district court did is it bought the same confusion that Verizon tried to sew between unies and interconnection. They're two separate things. It didn't make any distinction between purchase for the two purposes. No distinction. They just lumped it all together. And then what it said is that Verizon was providing these pursuant to an ICA that didn't have any rates for interconnection. And that's just not true. It's just in a real, it's just wrong. So again, you'd look at

... Where are the rates? Exhibit A. Exhibit A. Under what you said is on bundle transport, but on that on bundle transport doesn't mean unies. It simply means this is how transport works. Look at section 365. It says it explicitly in the TRO. It says that explicitly in the TRO. But besides that, if you just think about it, if you think about it, what we did is when we first opened this system up in Virginia, we told them that we wanted interconnection at these rates, at these tower grades. Verizon's response, if it was accurate, that if their argument now is true, Verizon's response back then should have been, well, we need to amend the agreement if that's what you want. But they didn't, because as soon as we ordered it, they said we're providing it, but then they started sending bills at the higher rate. But under the agreement, if they're right... I'm looking at Exhibit A. Show me the rates that you think are applicable. If you look at... It says entrance facilities on the first page, I believe, of Exhibit A. If you look at, I think it's 324 of the appendix. Well, the first page is 322. I'll page 324 of the appendix, which is maybe the third page of the Exhibit. Do you see the entrance facilities there? Yeah. Those are tower grades. And that is what they refuse to charge us, even though that is what we ordered. One of the things that concerns me is the contract seems less explicit than one would hope with respect to what rates apply to what orders. You know, we have the fact that tailorac rates in the contract may apply only to unbundle facilities and that the court tail ordered entrance facilities in a bundle state, but that's still an argument by implication. No. No. Well, it's based in part on the distinctions made by the FCC orders which are incorporated into the agreement

. Correct. These are highly technical terms. And when these companies entered into this agreement, they were entering into it on the theory that everybody understood what these were. And everybody understands that these rates apply across the board. The contract itself never seems to explicitly say what either of you, what either side indicates they wanted to say. Because this contract was entered into in the area of 251C, everybody knew 251C was part of this contract and 251C is explicit. So when you enter into a contract, you enter into it with the idea that the law that the law applies to it. Let me follow up there. It's a you pointed me to entrance facilities, which are part of the unbundled transport rates. Again, if you want to give the hellings credit, but okay, yeah. You got to. That's what is identifying here. Section 2.0 says you don't give hellings credit, but I understand, but that's what it's describing. This whole section, Roman numeral 2 is dedicated to unbundled transport. Okay. And under unbundled transport, it has entrance facilities. And you've explained to me that the rates there are tell Rick rates. Correct. Now, I take you back to 359, which says the unbundled rates are in adoption. We're not adopting the unbundled rates. The uni rates, the unbundled network rates, but unbundled transport applies to both uni's and interconnection. That's the difference. Well, facilities purchased as uni's and facilities purchased for interconnection. Again, the TRO says that explicitly, and that adoption agreement is simply reflecting what the TRO was saying. And the TRO, and again, I refer you to 365 of the TRO, where it is 100% explicit. Well, I don't see where it says it says, for avoidance of doubt, adoption of the terms, that's of that contract, does not include adoption of any provision imposing an unbundled obligation on Verizon. That's uni's. Because the TRO said there's no unbundling obligation. Hold it. That doesn't say that. That's just, that's categorical

. That knocks out all the unbundling rates. No, it knocks the unbundling network elements. Where does it say that? It knocks out unbundling obligations that no longer apply. That's the answer to the part. No, that's what it's, well, the proviso says that it doesn't include adoption of any provision imposing an unbundling obligation that no longer applies under FCC orders. Which are the TRO? Which are the TRO? Which is right, and which is South America. Right, but interconnection still applies under those orders. And unbundled transport is useful. Except the way I read this is that the parties assumed, incorrectly, maybe, what those terms, those orders. But they basically said, unbund, any unbundling obligation. And it's not restricted. The, that no longer applies is because those acts were ended. And the parties could have been misconstruing the scope of the orders. But the amendment is not so restricted. Okay, so, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the Supreme Court in talk America. That the relevant market is sufficiently mature to no longer require Ilex to provide unbundled access to entrance facilities purchased as unies. Right. But not for interconnection. Right. But you still have to interpret the contract. That's just what the law did. Well, parties can agree on whatever they want. This is a contract case. And I was very, found, very difficult to get through this case because there was so much law argued and yet the parties set forth in detail what they agreed to do and what they agreed not to do. And they referred to tariff rates. Right. But looking at it, there's an alternative tariff rates or a, uh, tell rate rates. But look at that adoption agreement, Judge. Please. And if you look at that adoption agreement, it doesn't say unbundling at end. It's talking about the FCC orders. So you have to read it in the context that the FCC orders

. That's what the parties are talking. Why it's explaining why they are unbundling. But the language of the adoption does not limit it. It says any unbundling obligation. By the FCC orders. That's what it says. It's not, we're not talking about unbundling in the department store. We're talking about unbundling in the communications world under the FCC orders. And that's what it's referring to. You have to read every, every document in context. Um, if you, if you read something out of context, you can, you can make it. I can't read the token. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Angstrey. Thank you, Your Honours. May I please the court judge Duncan to demire a federal president. If I can start with the trial and review order. Please. And just, could you just eliminate one just factual basic question? It is not your position. Is it that? Intrinsed facilities can be ordered either as an unbundled network element or for interconnection. Are we, are we good there? They can be put to that purpose. Can entrance, well, I can't let you get away with that because that's not what the talk America says. You're, you're on a fight to clarify. Yeah, my answer. Please. Under this was a 2002 contract drafted as the law existed in 2002, right? In 2002, no one thought that there was an independent, tell work pricing obligation under section 251 C2. So that independent obligation is nowhere reflected in this contract. A key distinction that the FCC drew in 2003, which then seven years later decided, created this new obligation is that if you buy an entrance facility under section 251 C2, you can use it for fewer purposes than if you buy it under the old rules under C3. There is not a single provision in this contract that reflects those more limited purposes. And again, there's a reason for that

. When this contract was written, the only way anybody ever bought tell work priced entrance facilities was as unbundled elements used for both interconnection and backhaul. That's what's in section 11.6. There's provision after provision in section 11.6 of this contract detailing how one would use them. If Courtault wanted to take advantage of this new obligation, I understand. I understand your argument, but it's not responsive to my question. I'm sorry, I'll try again. In the cup. No. I'll go for the time after here. Yeah. The agreement with Cox provided for the purchase of unbundled entrance facilities at Tellerick. At section 11.6. Right. In your in the agreement with Courtault, Verizon had a proviso that the intervening FCC order in review of the section 251 unbundling obligations of incumbent local carriers to reflect the changes that that order, all of these contracts are amended in conjunction with and to reflect the evolving. I think that overstated your honor. The way I read that section is that rather than going through the contract with a black marker and striking out the specific provisions that no longer apply as a result of the intervening orders, we are saying you should read this contract understanding them to have been strictly out. We are not through this proviso adding to the contract any provisions. Courage never argued that this adoption letter added to the contract provisions that are not there currently. And the proviso says that the adoption of the terms of the Cox contract does not include an adoption of provision providing an unbundling obligation that no longer applies with reference to the FCC orders. So the FCC orders as they evolve are effectively, even as you express it specifically in the proviso, are effectively incorporated within what does the proviso mean when it says that no longer applies under among other things the triennial review order. Absolutely. In this agreement is section 11.6. What section 11.6 says expressly is that Courtaul can buy entrance facilities as unbundled elements at the rates and the pricing attachment. This proviso says strike those provisions from the contract. And my question is a factual one because I'm not suggesting that I necessarily buy the argument that Courtaul is entitled to judgment as a matter of law but it seems to me that the contract as you acknowledge Courtaul, you don't seem to be in the dispute, cannot order an entrance facility as an unbundled network element at anything other than tariff. Your Honor, our position right is once you strike out section 11.6 from the contract, there are no other provisions in the contract

. It doesn't say that. It simply says. It does not include it. It doesn't say it includes things in the order that aren't found in the contract. Isn't it that at best unclear because you have the unbundled transport facilities? But the problem that I'm having is precisely that when you say that the unbundling obligation no longer that you're limiting the proviso to only those unbundling obligations imposed by the FCC, and the FCC specifically references or referenced in the proviso explicitly says that while the entrance facilities do not generally need to be offered at tariff as unbundled elements, they must still be provided on that basis for interconnection. Not on that basis, Your Honor, not as unbundled elements. This is again a critical thing that the FCC made clear seven years later in its amicus brief. If a competitor is going to you buy an entrance facility under section 251C2, it is not buying as an unbundled element. It is buying as something different for a limited purpose. And my only point here, Your Honor, is that the course argument has never been that it's unclear the extent to which the adoption letters import into the contract, things in subsequent FCC orders. Courthouse position has always been the contracts already included provisions. No. That give them the right to this section 251C2 duty. And our point has always been there is no provision in this contract that implements a section 251C2 duty to use entrance facilities for the limited purpose of interconnection and interconnection only at teller rates to implement that provision. But the FCC obligated incumbent Ilex to provide interconnection at cost. That was the purpose. That was basically the purpose of the statute. But that was announced again after this contract was written. At the time, you know, at the time, Courthouse adopted this contract, only one state commission had considered the question of whether the C2 duty exists. It was Illinois and it said it didn't. At the time, Courthouse adopted the contract. The second time, three more state commission had weighed in. Two more of them had said it did not give them this right. If Courthouse wanted a contract that included provisions that implemented this section 251C2 duty, it had to either find one pre-existing or had to use the process and the act to negotiate its own contract. The FCC makes clear that the background provisions and principles of the law are not what govern the two companies rights with respect to each other. It is the words in the contract. And Courthouse, they pointed section 3.1. Section 3.1 does not say Verizon will provide interconnection at teller rates. It's a little provide interconnection. There is no provision in here. No comparable provision section 11.6 that specifies Courthouse may buy an entrance facility for interconnection, but it is prohibited from using that entrance facility for backhaul. That's the kind of provision you would expect to see in the contract. It's not there. So, Courthouse had no right to use to purchase entrance facilities for interconnection purposes? Under the 2000 contract? Of course it did, but it bought them as unbundled transport under Section 251C3. I think it's critically recommended. Where is it? If you, that would help me immensely because it does not appear that the district court recognized the distinction in the usage or the ability to purchase entrance facilities under two different rubrics. Your honor, I respectfully as you, I think what the district court recognized is that when you pick a contract in 2002. There is no, I can't find this. In part of the problem that I'm having is the lack of clarity on this particular point. Well, Your Honor, if you look at the FCC order from 2002 that led to the creation of these agreements, and it's specifically paragraph 17. The FCC explains that AT&T wanted to buy entrance facilities in transport for interconnection. It's paragraph 217. Where did AT&T see in the FCC staff? See AT&T's right to do that. Section 251C3 and the unbundling rules. That obligation is reflected in Section 11.6 of the contract, which is part of the unbundling section of the contract, and which says in 11.6.1.1, it's on JA255, that COCs could by dedicated transport that provides connections between its switches and Verizon. That's what an entrance facility is. And it refers, all of Section 11.6 refers you to the unbundling prices in the back of the agreement. Those are the provisions that implement paragraph 217 in that duty. It's telling AT&T didn't say, oh, and by the way, even in addition to Section 251C3 and the then existing unbundling rules, we also have a duty under Section 251C2 and we'd like to put provisions in the contract. So what does unbundling transport mean? Unbundling transport means effectively they get the use of Verizon's network as dealt with their own to put to any purpose whatsoever they so choose. Interconnection, backhaul, transporting data between their own network facilities, whatever it says, if they built the pipe themselves. If you buy an entrance facility under this new Section 251C2 duty, which was not recognized when this contract was written and therefore is not unsurprisingly reflected in it, you may use it only for the purposes of exchanging calls between the two networks. You would think that if this contract implemented that duty, you would see those words somewhere in this contract. But you're not, you are now arguing as you suggest, Courtael argues, that we read it in historical and administrative context. You say that it's, I agree. What is less clear is that it comports with your reading of it given the extent to which the FCC has carefully spoken to to continue to encourage or to make the distinction between requiring the purchase of the, of, of, of interest facilities as unies as the market maturs

. No comparable provision section 11.6 that specifies Courthouse may buy an entrance facility for interconnection, but it is prohibited from using that entrance facility for backhaul. That's the kind of provision you would expect to see in the contract. It's not there. So, Courthouse had no right to use to purchase entrance facilities for interconnection purposes? Under the 2000 contract? Of course it did, but it bought them as unbundled transport under Section 251C3. I think it's critically recommended. Where is it? If you, that would help me immensely because it does not appear that the district court recognized the distinction in the usage or the ability to purchase entrance facilities under two different rubrics. Your honor, I respectfully as you, I think what the district court recognized is that when you pick a contract in 2002. There is no, I can't find this. In part of the problem that I'm having is the lack of clarity on this particular point. Well, Your Honor, if you look at the FCC order from 2002 that led to the creation of these agreements, and it's specifically paragraph 17. The FCC explains that AT&T wanted to buy entrance facilities in transport for interconnection. It's paragraph 217. Where did AT&T see in the FCC staff? See AT&T's right to do that. Section 251C3 and the unbundling rules. That obligation is reflected in Section 11.6 of the contract, which is part of the unbundling section of the contract, and which says in 11.6.1.1, it's on JA255, that COCs could by dedicated transport that provides connections between its switches and Verizon. That's what an entrance facility is. And it refers, all of Section 11.6 refers you to the unbundling prices in the back of the agreement. Those are the provisions that implement paragraph 217 in that duty. It's telling AT&T didn't say, oh, and by the way, even in addition to Section 251C3 and the then existing unbundling rules, we also have a duty under Section 251C2 and we'd like to put provisions in the contract. So what does unbundling transport mean? Unbundling transport means effectively they get the use of Verizon's network as dealt with their own to put to any purpose whatsoever they so choose. Interconnection, backhaul, transporting data between their own network facilities, whatever it says, if they built the pipe themselves. If you buy an entrance facility under this new Section 251C2 duty, which was not recognized when this contract was written and therefore is not unsurprisingly reflected in it, you may use it only for the purposes of exchanging calls between the two networks. You would think that if this contract implemented that duty, you would see those words somewhere in this contract. But you're not, you are now arguing as you suggest, Courtael argues, that we read it in historical and administrative context. You say that it's, I agree. What is less clear is that it comports with your reading of it given the extent to which the FCC has carefully spoken to to continue to encourage or to make the distinction between requiring the purchase of the, of, of, of interest facilities as unies as the market maturs. In competition is more likely to take care of exerting down with price pressure and imposing the obligation to provide them as an interconnection agreement. I'm sorry, I can't get your honest contracts. Written after 2005, and especially after talk America, include express provisions, the detail, how one buys an entrance facility under this Section 251C2 duty and the limitations on the use of it and have rates generated specific to those uses. That's not this contract because again in 2002, no one thought that duty existed. That's why there is no provision in the contract that says you could, I mean, because under Courtael there were four ways that Cox could have, I mean this is, the, under Courtael there were four ways that Cox could have bought an entrance facility under this agreement. Either as an unbundled element which you could use for any purpose under the sun, or as a 251C2 entrance facility which you could only use for a limited purpose, or under the tariff or under some substance agreement. And I can find provisions in this contract that talk about how one orders an entrance facility as an unbundled network element, but there is not a single provision in the contract that talks about how one orders it to implement this 251C2 duty. What about the provisions they had to put it in there? What about 4.3.3 that essentially says Courtael may order entrance facilities for interconnection, I think that's what they'd say. Any of the interconnection methods? In accordance with the rates in charge of set forth. More than that, on accordance with the order intervals and other terms and conditions, including without limitation rates and charges. Set forth in the agreement. I read that given that it comes right out of paragraph 217 of the FCC's order to refer you to section 11.6. That's the only provisions in the agreement that discuss how one orders, what the limitations on it are. There's no second section that says, in order for facility to be used for limited purposes, Verizon would have to be able to monitor to make sure Courtael is only using it for the purpose. That where it was entitled to use it for under this C2 duty, they're just not in the contract. Courtael has lots of ways it could have gotten this provision in the contract. It chose to use none of them. I can't then I don't understand your interpretation of 4.3.3, which seems pretty, or it certainly makes it puzzling. Well, you're on again set forth in the agreement. The only rates terms and conditions set forth in the agreement that deal with the use of entrance facilities for interconnection are section 11.6 and the associated prices. Those are the provisions that set forth the order intervals, order intervals, terms and conditions and rates. It's just it. Courtael is suggesting that that rate that's called as Judge Neymar noted, an unbundled transport rate, part of the unbundling rates, was actually also unmentioned to anybody a rate for this other thing. This section 251 C2 entrance facility that is not an unbundled element that can only be used for a very limited purpose. And yet nobody thought to write any provisions in the contract to talk about any of that. Courtael is trying to add to a 2002 agreement a legal requirement that did not exist in 2002

. In competition is more likely to take care of exerting down with price pressure and imposing the obligation to provide them as an interconnection agreement. I'm sorry, I can't get your honest contracts. Written after 2005, and especially after talk America, include express provisions, the detail, how one buys an entrance facility under this Section 251C2 duty and the limitations on the use of it and have rates generated specific to those uses. That's not this contract because again in 2002, no one thought that duty existed. That's why there is no provision in the contract that says you could, I mean, because under Courtael there were four ways that Cox could have, I mean this is, the, under Courtael there were four ways that Cox could have bought an entrance facility under this agreement. Either as an unbundled element which you could use for any purpose under the sun, or as a 251C2 entrance facility which you could only use for a limited purpose, or under the tariff or under some substance agreement. And I can find provisions in this contract that talk about how one orders an entrance facility as an unbundled network element, but there is not a single provision in the contract that talks about how one orders it to implement this 251C2 duty. What about the provisions they had to put it in there? What about 4.3.3 that essentially says Courtael may order entrance facilities for interconnection, I think that's what they'd say. Any of the interconnection methods? In accordance with the rates in charge of set forth. More than that, on accordance with the order intervals and other terms and conditions, including without limitation rates and charges. Set forth in the agreement. I read that given that it comes right out of paragraph 217 of the FCC's order to refer you to section 11.6. That's the only provisions in the agreement that discuss how one orders, what the limitations on it are. There's no second section that says, in order for facility to be used for limited purposes, Verizon would have to be able to monitor to make sure Courtael is only using it for the purpose. That where it was entitled to use it for under this C2 duty, they're just not in the contract. Courtael has lots of ways it could have gotten this provision in the contract. It chose to use none of them. I can't then I don't understand your interpretation of 4.3.3, which seems pretty, or it certainly makes it puzzling. Well, you're on again set forth in the agreement. The only rates terms and conditions set forth in the agreement that deal with the use of entrance facilities for interconnection are section 11.6 and the associated prices. Those are the provisions that set forth the order intervals, order intervals, terms and conditions and rates. It's just it. Courtael is suggesting that that rate that's called as Judge Neymar noted, an unbundled transport rate, part of the unbundling rates, was actually also unmentioned to anybody a rate for this other thing. This section 251 C2 entrance facility that is not an unbundled element that can only be used for a very limited purpose. And yet nobody thought to write any provisions in the contract to talk about any of that. Courtael is trying to add to a 2002 agreement a legal requirement that did not exist in 2002. There's a way to do that under the contract. According to an FCC brief in 2010, I came in when the FCC first dealt with it in 2003. In the intervening time period, there was lots of disagreement among the state commissions that addressed the issue. And as I said, when Courtael was adopting these agreements, only four state commissions had dealt with it. Illinois, Texas, Candace, and Missouri. The first three of those had ruled that Courtael disagreed with the ultimate position that the 2010 FCC took as what the Supreme Court did to something to defer to. If I understand your argument, it is that the 2002 agreement, which is the substance of this agreement, subject to the adoption letter, that the 2002 agreement went as far as any obligation was known to exist. And there was no obligation that Courtael now claims the right to get tellrick rates. That's right. Or anything. Except under C3. Yes, except this is the unbondled elements. That was the duty known at the time that was how competitors bought entrance facilities at home. So that when the adoption letter was made, that's all it could be referring to. All of the right to exist. Strike out the provisions of the contract that deal with our obligations in the longer exist. It does indeed, Your Honor. If I could move on to deal with the other three issues briefly. As far as Courtael's facilities bills to Verizon, there's no dispute that those facilities that Courtael belatedly billed for are on its side of the interconnection point. The district court was right to point to section 422, which says the way Courtael gets paid for those facilities is by charging for the individual calls that are routed over them, not for the facilities themselves. I'm so sorry. I know it's, I don't mean to sound argumentative, but I just think I'm just having difficulty conceptualizing what you're saying in the context of the pricing requirements imposed by the Telecommunications Act. The reason I'm having the difficulty is that you seem to be saying that the contract didn't require an I-Lec to provide interconnection at cost. Certain, Your Honor. 251 C2 just makes that untenable. There's lots of ways for interconnection to occur. If, for example, Courtael deployed its own entrance facilities, there's still work Verizon has to do to hook those up to the extent there were any charges for that work. That would be at Tellwork rates. The notion that that C2 duty not only included the duty to let somebody interconnect with you, but to actually provide to them the facility that they would use to do it was unheard of until the FCC, honestly, unheard of from the FCC until 2010, when it announced in an Amicus brief, that that's how one should understand its 2003 order. I-Lec must provide interconnection and unbundled access. How does it do that except through a facility? Your Honor, it depends on the facility. To interconnect two networks, you not only need the wire that spans the physical distance between the two buildings, but you need all sorts of things to attach to the wire

. There's a way to do that under the contract. According to an FCC brief in 2010, I came in when the FCC first dealt with it in 2003. In the intervening time period, there was lots of disagreement among the state commissions that addressed the issue. And as I said, when Courtael was adopting these agreements, only four state commissions had dealt with it. Illinois, Texas, Candace, and Missouri. The first three of those had ruled that Courtael disagreed with the ultimate position that the 2010 FCC took as what the Supreme Court did to something to defer to. If I understand your argument, it is that the 2002 agreement, which is the substance of this agreement, subject to the adoption letter, that the 2002 agreement went as far as any obligation was known to exist. And there was no obligation that Courtael now claims the right to get tellrick rates. That's right. Or anything. Except under C3. Yes, except this is the unbondled elements. That was the duty known at the time that was how competitors bought entrance facilities at home. So that when the adoption letter was made, that's all it could be referring to. All of the right to exist. Strike out the provisions of the contract that deal with our obligations in the longer exist. It does indeed, Your Honor. If I could move on to deal with the other three issues briefly. As far as Courtael's facilities bills to Verizon, there's no dispute that those facilities that Courtael belatedly billed for are on its side of the interconnection point. The district court was right to point to section 422, which says the way Courtael gets paid for those facilities is by charging for the individual calls that are routed over them, not for the facilities themselves. I'm so sorry. I know it's, I don't mean to sound argumentative, but I just think I'm just having difficulty conceptualizing what you're saying in the context of the pricing requirements imposed by the Telecommunications Act. The reason I'm having the difficulty is that you seem to be saying that the contract didn't require an I-Lec to provide interconnection at cost. Certain, Your Honor. 251 C2 just makes that untenable. There's lots of ways for interconnection to occur. If, for example, Courtael deployed its own entrance facilities, there's still work Verizon has to do to hook those up to the extent there were any charges for that work. That would be at Tellwork rates. The notion that that C2 duty not only included the duty to let somebody interconnect with you, but to actually provide to them the facility that they would use to do it was unheard of until the FCC, honestly, unheard of from the FCC until 2010, when it announced in an Amicus brief, that that's how one should understand its 2003 order. I-Lec must provide interconnection and unbundled access. How does it do that except through a facility? Your Honor, it depends on the facility. To interconnect two networks, you not only need the wire that spans the physical distance between the two buildings, but you need all sorts of things to attach to the wire. Verizon, for example, has an obligation to modify its network, the receptacles one you could think of them, so that they can accommodate third-party interconnection in ways that didn't work. That's what the existing rules that were in place in 2002 imposed a duty. Verizon has to let a competitor stick its equipment in Verizon's own building. That's a new obligation. Those are all obligations, and this contract talks about those. But the notion that Verizon, above and beyond that, had to actually hand over a facility to another company to use for this narrow limited purpose unknown in 2002. And that's why, when AT&T, the most sophisticated of any of the competitors that we ever dealt with in these interconnection agreement negotiations, doesn't say, oh, by the way, we have this other right under this other section, I think it confirms what the FCC said to the Supreme Court in its Amicus brief, that its original rules didn't impose this obligation, and that it wasn't until 2003 that it had any occasion to think about it. And to get it wasn't until 2010, that it's called the world that that's what it meant. And I very much appreciate your patience. Thank you. Let me ask you on the second point, you were just addressing, how would Cortelle build Bill just for the calls? In other words, one of the problems they complain about, they calls weren't identified, they didn't have the data to separate out the calls for which they would bill you for. For some of the calls, they did have the data and they didn't use it. But even for the calls where they don't have the data, the industry deals with that all the time through billing factors. Unlike your retail bill or my retail bill where you expect to see your actual calls, intercarrier billing deals with millions and tens of millions of calls every month. Precision is, it's a best effort system. Companies routinely use billing factors. You do a study, you update the study every six months. You say, well, we're going to assume 40% or 60% or whatever comes out of our precise study. There are ways to do it. They're time consuming, which is again why people use billing factors. But the contract is clear. As far as reciprocal compensation charges, they can only be billed for local calls dialed by our customers. There's no dispute they build them for calls that were not local. Now, there are a lot of, as part of the judgment in this case, a number entered for that, wasn't there? For core. Yes. Right. In favor of core? And why doesn't that agreement on that number and that dispute in this case on appeal? I think core believes, you have to ask Mr. Tolton. I think core. You intend it does, end it. In other words, there's been an adjustment for those calls and they get 250,000. Is that what's it? The reason for that, Your Honor, in all candor

. Verizon, for example, has an obligation to modify its network, the receptacles one you could think of them, so that they can accommodate third-party interconnection in ways that didn't work. That's what the existing rules that were in place in 2002 imposed a duty. Verizon has to let a competitor stick its equipment in Verizon's own building. That's a new obligation. Those are all obligations, and this contract talks about those. But the notion that Verizon, above and beyond that, had to actually hand over a facility to another company to use for this narrow limited purpose unknown in 2002. And that's why, when AT&T, the most sophisticated of any of the competitors that we ever dealt with in these interconnection agreement negotiations, doesn't say, oh, by the way, we have this other right under this other section, I think it confirms what the FCC said to the Supreme Court in its Amicus brief, that its original rules didn't impose this obligation, and that it wasn't until 2003 that it had any occasion to think about it. And to get it wasn't until 2010, that it's called the world that that's what it meant. And I very much appreciate your patience. Thank you. Let me ask you on the second point, you were just addressing, how would Cortelle build Bill just for the calls? In other words, one of the problems they complain about, they calls weren't identified, they didn't have the data to separate out the calls for which they would bill you for. For some of the calls, they did have the data and they didn't use it. But even for the calls where they don't have the data, the industry deals with that all the time through billing factors. Unlike your retail bill or my retail bill where you expect to see your actual calls, intercarrier billing deals with millions and tens of millions of calls every month. Precision is, it's a best effort system. Companies routinely use billing factors. You do a study, you update the study every six months. You say, well, we're going to assume 40% or 60% or whatever comes out of our precise study. There are ways to do it. They're time consuming, which is again why people use billing factors. But the contract is clear. As far as reciprocal compensation charges, they can only be billed for local calls dialed by our customers. There's no dispute they build them for calls that were not local. Now, there are a lot of, as part of the judgment in this case, a number entered for that, wasn't there? For core. Yes. Right. In favor of core? And why doesn't that agreement on that number and that dispute in this case on appeal? I think core believes, you have to ask Mr. Tolton. I think core. You intend it does, end it. In other words, there's been an adjustment for those calls and they get 250,000. Is that what's it? The reason for that, Your Honor, in all candor. Verizon had disputed at the core tells bills and had withheld pay. Payments of amounts, it believed, were due on a current basis to recoup past over payments. We over withheld. We overestimated the amount of. So that final adjustment though, but there was an agreement. It sort of looks like a gross, down and dirty agreement just to get final judgment. But there was an agreement that seems to resolve that now, isn't it? I think it's still open to core tell to argue that they don't breach the agreement by billing reciprocal compensation charges for non-local third party calls. I don't think they've actually made that argument here. So I think the arguments that they're trying to make here, yes, I think it resolves those arguments. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. Tolton. Verizon argued to this court a few moments ago that no one knew that there was an interconnection requirement pre-before 2010. An interconnection requirement at Telwirk. An interconnection. An interconnection at Telwirk. The FCC brief in Talk America, which we cite on pages eight through nine of our reply brief. It says explicitly that this has always been there since 1996 when the Federal Communications Act was adopted. So for Verizon to say nobody knew insists that nobody has read the statute. And that's a position, I don't know how we can square that with common sense. Mr. Anxwright argues quite forcefully that 11.6 is the only thing you have to look at. But look at section four, which is the interconnection requirement. And section four, I direct your attention just as an impassant to section 4.2. 4.2.1 explicitly says that these are section four describes the architecture for interconnection of the party's facilities. And you read down and it says traffic exchange strunks, pursuing the section 251C2. It's an explicit incorporation of the statute that says Telwirk rates

. Verizon had disputed at the core tells bills and had withheld pay. Payments of amounts, it believed, were due on a current basis to recoup past over payments. We over withheld. We overestimated the amount of. So that final adjustment though, but there was an agreement. It sort of looks like a gross, down and dirty agreement just to get final judgment. But there was an agreement that seems to resolve that now, isn't it? I think it's still open to core tell to argue that they don't breach the agreement by billing reciprocal compensation charges for non-local third party calls. I don't think they've actually made that argument here. So I think the arguments that they're trying to make here, yes, I think it resolves those arguments. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. Tolton. Verizon argued to this court a few moments ago that no one knew that there was an interconnection requirement pre-before 2010. An interconnection requirement at Telwirk. An interconnection. An interconnection at Telwirk. The FCC brief in Talk America, which we cite on pages eight through nine of our reply brief. It says explicitly that this has always been there since 1996 when the Federal Communications Act was adopted. So for Verizon to say nobody knew insists that nobody has read the statute. And that's a position, I don't know how we can square that with common sense. Mr. Anxwright argues quite forcefully that 11.6 is the only thing you have to look at. But look at section four, which is the interconnection requirement. And section four, I direct your attention just as an impassant to section 4.2. 4.2.1 explicitly says that these are section four describes the architecture for interconnection of the party's facilities. And you read down and it says traffic exchange strunks, pursuing the section 251C2. It's an explicit incorporation of the statute that says Telwirk rates. And 11.6 is not the only way that you get Telwirk rates. It's right there. And it's in the statute. It's everywhere. You can't possibly argue that it is not in this agreement. There is a 96 statute. Yes, a 96 statute. Why didn't the contract allude to that in any way? Explicitly. It sites the statute over and over again. It's cited there. It's cited in the 27.1. For the point you're trying to urge, which is that there's an interconnection obligation of Telwirk rates. It's cited for interconnection under 251C2. And 251C2 explicitly says, Telwirk rates. So it doesn't say, the word Telwirk doesn't appear in here. But those are the cost-based rates. 251C2 or the cost-based rates. The unies or the cost-based rates. What's the language of 252C2? 251C2. Yeah, what's the language? I don't have it. Well, actually I do. I'll read it to you. It says that you have to provide interconnection, quote, on rates, terms, and conditions that are just reasonable and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section. And section 252. What's that? And that has been defined as Telwirk. That's the statutory language for the Telwirk rates, which are in our agreement. Telwirk is just the industry's terms for the just. And what's the reason you're nondiscriminatory? Just the question of why they have section 3, unbundled for unbundled access. Why they have section 3, where? The unbundled transport, oh, I'm sorry. In section 3, in what? 251C3

. And 11.6 is not the only way that you get Telwirk rates. It's right there. And it's in the statute. It's everywhere. You can't possibly argue that it is not in this agreement. There is a 96 statute. Yes, a 96 statute. Why didn't the contract allude to that in any way? Explicitly. It sites the statute over and over again. It's cited there. It's cited in the 27.1. For the point you're trying to urge, which is that there's an interconnection obligation of Telwirk rates. It's cited for interconnection under 251C2. And 251C2 explicitly says, Telwirk rates. So it doesn't say, the word Telwirk doesn't appear in here. But those are the cost-based rates. 251C2 or the cost-based rates. The unies or the cost-based rates. What's the language of 252C2? 251C2. Yeah, what's the language? I don't have it. Well, actually I do. I'll read it to you. It says that you have to provide interconnection, quote, on rates, terms, and conditions that are just reasonable and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section. And section 252. What's that? And that has been defined as Telwirk. That's the statutory language for the Telwirk rates, which are in our agreement. Telwirk is just the industry's terms for the just. And what's the reason you're nondiscriminatory? Just the question of why they have section 3, unbundled for unbundled access. Why they have section 3, where? The unbundled transport, oh, I'm sorry. In section 3, in what? 251C3. 251C3 is unbundled access. Okay, so there's unbundled access and then there's interconnection under C2. You have both. And entrance facilities can be used for both. And that's what the FCC made clear in their brief in talk America and what the Supreme Court adopted in talk America. And that issue, by the way, talk America was in the first case that even that addressed this. This was addressed in 2002 in Maryland, in a case called AT&T versus Verizon. The Verizon was involved in when it said the same exact thing. It just took another eight years to get up to the Supreme Court. But the same issue arose in 2002. And exactly what I'm telling you now was said by the Maryland Public Utilities Commission in 2002. So when you look at the way this whole document is cobbled together, it is clear that this document contemplated 251 would apply. And 251 has two parts to it. C2 and C3. This document references C2 explicitly with respect to interconnection. And when it references explicitly with respect to interconnection, it's referencing the Telwick rates that are in C2D. And when it's referencing the Telwick rates in C2D, it's setting them out in the attachment under the category on bundle transport, because on bundle transport in the industry is used for both interconnection and unies. And that's how this contract is all ready to get. You've got to read a contract as a whole. You can't just say, look at 11.6. It's talking about unies there. Yeah. But in Section 4 it's talking about interconnection. Both of them exist. And the Supreme Court has made clear that Verizon's reading of this contract is just wrong because you have the right to interconnect. And you have the right to interconnect at Telwick rates. Now, let me briefly address, if I could, the issue, the other issue. Does it address that in the remand order? In the TRRO? Yes. It addresses it explicitly in the TRRO in Section 365. I'm not sure. I believe it

. 251C3 is unbundled access. Okay, so there's unbundled access and then there's interconnection under C2. You have both. And entrance facilities can be used for both. And that's what the FCC made clear in their brief in talk America and what the Supreme Court adopted in talk America. And that issue, by the way, talk America was in the first case that even that addressed this. This was addressed in 2002 in Maryland, in a case called AT&T versus Verizon. The Verizon was involved in when it said the same exact thing. It just took another eight years to get up to the Supreme Court. But the same issue arose in 2002. And exactly what I'm telling you now was said by the Maryland Public Utilities Commission in 2002. So when you look at the way this whole document is cobbled together, it is clear that this document contemplated 251 would apply. And 251 has two parts to it. C2 and C3. This document references C2 explicitly with respect to interconnection. And when it references explicitly with respect to interconnection, it's referencing the Telwick rates that are in C2D. And when it's referencing the Telwick rates in C2D, it's setting them out in the attachment under the category on bundle transport, because on bundle transport in the industry is used for both interconnection and unies. And that's how this contract is all ready to get. You've got to read a contract as a whole. You can't just say, look at 11.6. It's talking about unies there. Yeah. But in Section 4 it's talking about interconnection. Both of them exist. And the Supreme Court has made clear that Verizon's reading of this contract is just wrong because you have the right to interconnect. And you have the right to interconnect at Telwick rates. Now, let me briefly address, if I could, the issue, the other issue. Does it address that in the remand order? In the TRRO? Yes. It addresses it explicitly in the TRRO in Section 365. I'm not sure. I believe it. I believe it addresses this. I can find it. Thank you. TRRO2. Just briefly, this issue with Quartel's Facility, with Quartel's Facilities, there are so many issues of fact there. We have 300 pages. We put them in the record because Verizon says it never placed a order. So we put 300 pages in this. It starts at page, I think, 12.01 to 1300. I'm sorry. Yeah. It's somewhere in there. It ends at page 1300 of our appendix. 300 pages of orders. 102.01. I'm sorry. 1300. Where Verizon ordered facilities from Quartel. Said, give us facilities. And it said, bill us for those facilities. Write in those orders. We showed it to you. Says, bill us in those facilities. And Quartel writes back saying, we are firmly, or we give you a FOC, a firm order confirmation, that we're providing those facilities. Verizon comes to the district court and says, we don't have to pay for those facilities because we quote unquote, self-provisioned. Well, all they meant is that on their side of the network, they provided a facility. But they still have to get into our side of the network. And this, in fact, our ICA says explicitly, the only way they can get into my client's network is through an entrance facility. The only way, that's 4.3

. I believe it addresses this. I can find it. Thank you. TRRO2. Just briefly, this issue with Quartel's Facility, with Quartel's Facilities, there are so many issues of fact there. We have 300 pages. We put them in the record because Verizon says it never placed a order. So we put 300 pages in this. It starts at page, I think, 12.01 to 1300. I'm sorry. Yeah. It's somewhere in there. It ends at page 1300 of our appendix. 300 pages of orders. 102.01. I'm sorry. 1300. Where Verizon ordered facilities from Quartel. Said, give us facilities. And it said, bill us for those facilities. Write in those orders. We showed it to you. Says, bill us in those facilities. And Quartel writes back saying, we are firmly, or we give you a FOC, a firm order confirmation, that we're providing those facilities. Verizon comes to the district court and says, we don't have to pay for those facilities because we quote unquote, self-provisioned. Well, all they meant is that on their side of the network, they provided a facility. But they still have to get into our side of the network. And this, in fact, our ICA says explicitly, the only way they can get into my client's network is through an entrance facility. The only way, that's 4.3.3. The only way is through an entrance facility. Their argument is that, well, we built our facilities on the inside of the wall. Well, that's crazy. Why is it wrong with that? What's wrong with that? Look at that door right there. That's an entrance facility. Say, that door is an entrance facility, judge. On the hall is the tunnel. And here is my client's office. And here is my client's office. What my client did is he put the, see the hinge on that door? It put the hinge on the inside because it just fit better there. They're saying that hinge is not part of the door because it's on the inside. That's exactly what their argument is. There's nothing in this record. They're saying that their own facility solves the problem that we don't need your facility. Then it's on the other side. Then they can't communicate. Unless we put that door there, they can't communicate with my client's facility. We built the facility because they ordered it. That's why they ordered it. If they're right, they self-provision. Why are the 300 pages of orders to my client to provide facilities? That makes no sense. And of course it makes no sense. And these are the questions of fact, which the district court simply said, well, I'm not looking at any of this because I don't know why the district court said it on this one. But it essentially said we don't buy any argument because they self-provisioned. Well, they only self-provisioned on that end of the hallway. They never self-provisioned on this end. Thank you, sir. Thank you. We'll come down to greet Council and take a brief recess.

Mr. Tochin, I'm happy to hear from you. Morning, Your Honours. I'm Ed Tochin. I represent the appellant in this case, Cortell of Virginia. We're here appealing a summary judgment decision that was issued in the Eastern District of Virginia. Now, it's our position that what the District Court did was make findings of facts regarding disputed matters. And those disputed matters were genuine disputes about material issues. And that's why we're here. There are really three issues that the court decided. One of those three issues is divided into two sub-issues. We call facilities, switched access, and reciprocal compensation. And I'll try to address it in that order. Facilities are divided into two different aspects. There's our facilities and there's Verizon's facilities. Now, what's very odd in this case is that Verizon's position, and indeed the position adopted by the District Court on summary judgment, is that Verizon can charge the highest compensation that exists out there in their tariffs for interaction to their facilities, for entrances to their facilities. But Cortell can't charge anything for the entrance facilities. It provided to Verizon, not at the highest rate, not at the lowest rate, at no rate. Those two separate questions aren't there? They are separate but interrelated. And they're not understand, but in order to make the argument, you're going to have to start with the notion of the contract. This is a contract case. This is a contract case. 3.4.3 provides the two alternative rates, or any rate that's agreed upon. But we're talking about either the tariff rate or the cost rate. True. And the question then is, what does that mean? The question in this, what does that mean? The tariff rate, I mean, the cost rate is listed in Zibadeh for unbundled services, facilities, and is labeled as such under Romandermal 2. And if you take those away, then you don't have any cost rates. And so the question is, did that agreement continue to apply the unbundled rates in Zibadeh? Could I? And I think that Verizon's point is, and I says what I'd like you to address, is that when the agreement was adopted, the unbundled rates were eliminated. Could I just, the predicate to that question, is that correct that if you take away tell-writ rates for unbundled elements, that that's the end of the inquiry? No. That's, I just wanted to make sure you knew that that wasn't, or at least I think that's an open question. No, it's not. And let me explain by beginning to focus the court on the, I'll come back to the history, but let me focus the court first on the interconnection agreement, the ICA itself. If you look at the ICA, and what you're referring to is the list of charges in Zibadeh. I'm really under. What I really want you to focus on, I've read the agreement fairly carefully, and I'm happy to have you argue it, but my question is really directed at the adoption agreement. And the adoption agreement makes the statement, makes the statement that for avoidance of doubt, adoption of the terms does not include adoption of any vision imposing an unbundling obligation on Verizon. And it seems to me that that was, whether the law did make a change or not, the parties thought it made a change, and was not adopting any unbundling obligation. Half you don't have a bundled obligation, Verizon's argument is then the rates are the terror rates. But the problem is, that's the argument, I want you to address it. That doesn't have what they argue. That's their argument, fair enough. But what that does is it confuses two separate matters. One is unbundling and bundled. The unbundling network elements, the unies, and the second is interconnection. Would talk America made absolutely clear is that those are two separate matters. Just because unbundling goes away, interconnection still continues to exist. And that's what talk America said. And when the FCC found it's... We're looking at an agreement. Let's stick with the contract. This is the briefs I found to be a little difficult because they started arguing what the law was. And this is a straightforward contract case. We're reading a contract as adopted in November of 2004 and 2005. Judge, do you have the contract in front of you? Look at Section 3.1, if you would. Just take a moment if you can. If you look at Section... What it says. It says there that this ICA covers both interconnection and unies, it covers both. And when it comes... I understand, but I'm just asking you this. I would like you to address their argument, which is this, that the big debate is under 3.4.3 as to what rate? There's two rates referred to their tariff rate and the cost rate, the telleric rate. And the question is, what applies? Because they're in the disjunctive. Their argument is before the adoption, the telleric applied explicitly. It was attached to the exhibit A, as part of exhibit A. That's, they acknowledge that. But they argue that when that agreement was adopted, there was a modification made in the adoption letter. That's a 359. And that is a adoption letter modified the agreement. Now, why doesn't it? It doesn't modify the agreement, because it doesn't take away the interconnection rights which are stated in the agreement. And that's exhibit A that you're referring to. It has teller rates that apply to both interconnection and unies. If you look at... If you look at exhibit A, it's just because it has a heading unbundled transport is irrelevant. No, no. They're not focusing on what I want you to focus on. The adoption agreement got rid of all unbundled rates. We're not talking about unbundled. It's irrelevant. There is nothing about unbundling. There's any relevance to this case. Mr. Johnson, Judge Duncan has a question. Yes. The proviso specifies that the adoption of the terms doesn't include adoption of any provision imposing an unbundling rate. There's a qualifier to that that no longer applies to Verizon under FCC orders, including the Triennial order review. And what talk America makes clear is that it appears that although it eliminated unbundled access to entrance facilities as unies, but not as not for interconnection or what they call... Well, going back. Interest facilities are used for interconnection, but they're also used for back calling. So you can have them used for different things as the point. So the premise that the proviso takes out all unbundling obligations, it doesn't really hit, it doesn't address the interconnection point. So the question is whether Courtaill ever purchased unies, well, ever purchased entrance facilities as unbundled network element or for interconnection. And if you... Because there are two different things. Correct. And if you look at every order that was placed, every order that was placed was an order for an entrance facility for interconnection at Tower Grace. Look again, look at the... We gave one example at the appendix on 196. The way orders were placed was through an ASR system, it was called the Access Service Request System that Verizon contains. That order says explicitly, we want interconnection at Tower Grace. That's what we're ordering. We're not ordering unies, and unies are completely irrelevant to this case. If you look at 965, 968, and 970 of the appendix, if you look at those, those are the letters that first were sent by Courtaill to Verizon of Virginia, saying Courtaill of Virginia wants to order interconnection at Tower Grace. It says it explicitly. This is what we're ordering. We never ordered a unie, we never wanted a unie, we had nothing to do with unies, we had... And the TRO only deals with unies. And getting back to your question, this interconnection agreement provides for interconnection at Tower Grace. Because if you look at exhibit A, just because it says unbundle transport, unbundle transport is used for both unies and interconnection. And in fact, if you look at the triennial order, the TRO, and specifically at Section 365 of the TRO, it says that explicitly. I'll read it to you. I'll only read bits and pieces of it because it's too long. But competitive lex often use transmission links, including unbundle transport. That's the word that you were focusing on. Predator lex also use transmission links, including unbundle transport. Competitive lex use these transmission connections between incumbent lex networks and their own networks, both for interconnection and the backhole. And right. They use it for both. Those unbundle transport is used for both. And the other question, you say that the interconnection agreement, the ICA provides interconnection at Tower Wreck. Yes. And that is what was your quote, what was your site for that? Well, the ICA provides it at 4.3. And then in the exhibit A, it provides the tower grace under the category of unbundle transport, but unbundle transport includes interconnection and the unies. That is what the definition of it is. And in any event, the headings are irrelevant, but besides that, that's exactly what we're talking about here. And that's what the- Is there a dispute about whether or not Courtaill purchased the entrance facilities as a uni or for interconnection? There is no dispute whatsoever. Every document, every order that was issued was issued for interconnection with an entrance facility at Tower Wreck rates. There is not a single document in which anything else is said. So to the extent that summary judgment was appropriate, summary judgment was appropriate for Courtaill, but clearly there's no right to summary judgment for Verizon because there is at worst for Courtaill it disputed as to what we ordered. And in fact, as I said, every document says we ordered interconnection at Tower Grace. What's your argument as to where the district court went wrong on this issue? This court went wrong. Well, we're here to know, well, on this issue, what the district court did is it bought the same confusion that Verizon tried to sew between unies and interconnection. They're two separate things. It didn't make any distinction between purchase for the two purposes. No distinction. They just lumped it all together. And then what it said is that Verizon was providing these pursuant to an ICA that didn't have any rates for interconnection. And that's just not true. It's just in a real, it's just wrong. So again, you'd look at... Where are the rates? Exhibit A. Exhibit A. Under what you said is on bundle transport, but on that on bundle transport doesn't mean unies. It simply means this is how transport works. Look at section 365. It says it explicitly in the TRO. It says that explicitly in the TRO. But besides that, if you just think about it, if you think about it, what we did is when we first opened this system up in Virginia, we told them that we wanted interconnection at these rates, at these tower grades. Verizon's response, if it was accurate, that if their argument now is true, Verizon's response back then should have been, well, we need to amend the agreement if that's what you want. But they didn't, because as soon as we ordered it, they said we're providing it, but then they started sending bills at the higher rate. But under the agreement, if they're right... I'm looking at Exhibit A. Show me the rates that you think are applicable. If you look at... It says entrance facilities on the first page, I believe, of Exhibit A. If you look at, I think it's 324 of the appendix. Well, the first page is 322. I'll page 324 of the appendix, which is maybe the third page of the Exhibit. Do you see the entrance facilities there? Yeah. Those are tower grades. And that is what they refuse to charge us, even though that is what we ordered. One of the things that concerns me is the contract seems less explicit than one would hope with respect to what rates apply to what orders. You know, we have the fact that tailorac rates in the contract may apply only to unbundle facilities and that the court tail ordered entrance facilities in a bundle state, but that's still an argument by implication. No. No. Well, it's based in part on the distinctions made by the FCC orders which are incorporated into the agreement. Correct. These are highly technical terms. And when these companies entered into this agreement, they were entering into it on the theory that everybody understood what these were. And everybody understands that these rates apply across the board. The contract itself never seems to explicitly say what either of you, what either side indicates they wanted to say. Because this contract was entered into in the area of 251C, everybody knew 251C was part of this contract and 251C is explicit. So when you enter into a contract, you enter into it with the idea that the law that the law applies to it. Let me follow up there. It's a you pointed me to entrance facilities, which are part of the unbundled transport rates. Again, if you want to give the hellings credit, but okay, yeah. You got to. That's what is identifying here. Section 2.0 says you don't give hellings credit, but I understand, but that's what it's describing. This whole section, Roman numeral 2 is dedicated to unbundled transport. Okay. And under unbundled transport, it has entrance facilities. And you've explained to me that the rates there are tell Rick rates. Correct. Now, I take you back to 359, which says the unbundled rates are in adoption. We're not adopting the unbundled rates. The uni rates, the unbundled network rates, but unbundled transport applies to both uni's and interconnection. That's the difference. Well, facilities purchased as uni's and facilities purchased for interconnection. Again, the TRO says that explicitly, and that adoption agreement is simply reflecting what the TRO was saying. And the TRO, and again, I refer you to 365 of the TRO, where it is 100% explicit. Well, I don't see where it says it says, for avoidance of doubt, adoption of the terms, that's of that contract, does not include adoption of any provision imposing an unbundled obligation on Verizon. That's uni's. Because the TRO said there's no unbundling obligation. Hold it. That doesn't say that. That's just, that's categorical. That knocks out all the unbundling rates. No, it knocks the unbundling network elements. Where does it say that? It knocks out unbundling obligations that no longer apply. That's the answer to the part. No, that's what it's, well, the proviso says that it doesn't include adoption of any provision imposing an unbundling obligation that no longer applies under FCC orders. Which are the TRO? Which are the TRO? Which is right, and which is South America. Right, but interconnection still applies under those orders. And unbundled transport is useful. Except the way I read this is that the parties assumed, incorrectly, maybe, what those terms, those orders. But they basically said, unbund, any unbundling obligation. And it's not restricted. The, that no longer applies is because those acts were ended. And the parties could have been misconstruing the scope of the orders. But the amendment is not so restricted. Okay, so, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the Supreme Court in talk America. That the relevant market is sufficiently mature to no longer require Ilex to provide unbundled access to entrance facilities purchased as unies. Right. But not for interconnection. Right. But you still have to interpret the contract. That's just what the law did. Well, parties can agree on whatever they want. This is a contract case. And I was very, found, very difficult to get through this case because there was so much law argued and yet the parties set forth in detail what they agreed to do and what they agreed not to do. And they referred to tariff rates. Right. But looking at it, there's an alternative tariff rates or a, uh, tell rate rates. But look at that adoption agreement, Judge. Please. And if you look at that adoption agreement, it doesn't say unbundling at end. It's talking about the FCC orders. So you have to read it in the context that the FCC orders. That's what the parties are talking. Why it's explaining why they are unbundling. But the language of the adoption does not limit it. It says any unbundling obligation. By the FCC orders. That's what it says. It's not, we're not talking about unbundling in the department store. We're talking about unbundling in the communications world under the FCC orders. And that's what it's referring to. You have to read every, every document in context. Um, if you, if you read something out of context, you can, you can make it. I can't read the token. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Angstrey. Thank you, Your Honours. May I please the court judge Duncan to demire a federal president. If I can start with the trial and review order. Please. And just, could you just eliminate one just factual basic question? It is not your position. Is it that? Intrinsed facilities can be ordered either as an unbundled network element or for interconnection. Are we, are we good there? They can be put to that purpose. Can entrance, well, I can't let you get away with that because that's not what the talk America says. You're, you're on a fight to clarify. Yeah, my answer. Please. Under this was a 2002 contract drafted as the law existed in 2002, right? In 2002, no one thought that there was an independent, tell work pricing obligation under section 251 C2. So that independent obligation is nowhere reflected in this contract. A key distinction that the FCC drew in 2003, which then seven years later decided, created this new obligation is that if you buy an entrance facility under section 251 C2, you can use it for fewer purposes than if you buy it under the old rules under C3. There is not a single provision in this contract that reflects those more limited purposes. And again, there's a reason for that. When this contract was written, the only way anybody ever bought tell work priced entrance facilities was as unbundled elements used for both interconnection and backhaul. That's what's in section 11.6. There's provision after provision in section 11.6 of this contract detailing how one would use them. If Courtault wanted to take advantage of this new obligation, I understand. I understand your argument, but it's not responsive to my question. I'm sorry, I'll try again. In the cup. No. I'll go for the time after here. Yeah. The agreement with Cox provided for the purchase of unbundled entrance facilities at Tellerick. At section 11.6. Right. In your in the agreement with Courtault, Verizon had a proviso that the intervening FCC order in review of the section 251 unbundling obligations of incumbent local carriers to reflect the changes that that order, all of these contracts are amended in conjunction with and to reflect the evolving. I think that overstated your honor. The way I read that section is that rather than going through the contract with a black marker and striking out the specific provisions that no longer apply as a result of the intervening orders, we are saying you should read this contract understanding them to have been strictly out. We are not through this proviso adding to the contract any provisions. Courage never argued that this adoption letter added to the contract provisions that are not there currently. And the proviso says that the adoption of the terms of the Cox contract does not include an adoption of provision providing an unbundling obligation that no longer applies with reference to the FCC orders. So the FCC orders as they evolve are effectively, even as you express it specifically in the proviso, are effectively incorporated within what does the proviso mean when it says that no longer applies under among other things the triennial review order. Absolutely. In this agreement is section 11.6. What section 11.6 says expressly is that Courtaul can buy entrance facilities as unbundled elements at the rates and the pricing attachment. This proviso says strike those provisions from the contract. And my question is a factual one because I'm not suggesting that I necessarily buy the argument that Courtaul is entitled to judgment as a matter of law but it seems to me that the contract as you acknowledge Courtaul, you don't seem to be in the dispute, cannot order an entrance facility as an unbundled network element at anything other than tariff. Your Honor, our position right is once you strike out section 11.6 from the contract, there are no other provisions in the contract. It doesn't say that. It simply says. It does not include it. It doesn't say it includes things in the order that aren't found in the contract. Isn't it that at best unclear because you have the unbundled transport facilities? But the problem that I'm having is precisely that when you say that the unbundling obligation no longer that you're limiting the proviso to only those unbundling obligations imposed by the FCC, and the FCC specifically references or referenced in the proviso explicitly says that while the entrance facilities do not generally need to be offered at tariff as unbundled elements, they must still be provided on that basis for interconnection. Not on that basis, Your Honor, not as unbundled elements. This is again a critical thing that the FCC made clear seven years later in its amicus brief. If a competitor is going to you buy an entrance facility under section 251C2, it is not buying as an unbundled element. It is buying as something different for a limited purpose. And my only point here, Your Honor, is that the course argument has never been that it's unclear the extent to which the adoption letters import into the contract, things in subsequent FCC orders. Courthouse position has always been the contracts already included provisions. No. That give them the right to this section 251C2 duty. And our point has always been there is no provision in this contract that implements a section 251C2 duty to use entrance facilities for the limited purpose of interconnection and interconnection only at teller rates to implement that provision. But the FCC obligated incumbent Ilex to provide interconnection at cost. That was the purpose. That was basically the purpose of the statute. But that was announced again after this contract was written. At the time, you know, at the time, Courthouse adopted this contract, only one state commission had considered the question of whether the C2 duty exists. It was Illinois and it said it didn't. At the time, Courthouse adopted the contract. The second time, three more state commission had weighed in. Two more of them had said it did not give them this right. If Courthouse wanted a contract that included provisions that implemented this section 251C2 duty, it had to either find one pre-existing or had to use the process and the act to negotiate its own contract. The FCC makes clear that the background provisions and principles of the law are not what govern the two companies rights with respect to each other. It is the words in the contract. And Courthouse, they pointed section 3.1. Section 3.1 does not say Verizon will provide interconnection at teller rates. It's a little provide interconnection. There is no provision in here. No comparable provision section 11.6 that specifies Courthouse may buy an entrance facility for interconnection, but it is prohibited from using that entrance facility for backhaul. That's the kind of provision you would expect to see in the contract. It's not there. So, Courthouse had no right to use to purchase entrance facilities for interconnection purposes? Under the 2000 contract? Of course it did, but it bought them as unbundled transport under Section 251C3. I think it's critically recommended. Where is it? If you, that would help me immensely because it does not appear that the district court recognized the distinction in the usage or the ability to purchase entrance facilities under two different rubrics. Your honor, I respectfully as you, I think what the district court recognized is that when you pick a contract in 2002. There is no, I can't find this. In part of the problem that I'm having is the lack of clarity on this particular point. Well, Your Honor, if you look at the FCC order from 2002 that led to the creation of these agreements, and it's specifically paragraph 17. The FCC explains that AT&T wanted to buy entrance facilities in transport for interconnection. It's paragraph 217. Where did AT&T see in the FCC staff? See AT&T's right to do that. Section 251C3 and the unbundling rules. That obligation is reflected in Section 11.6 of the contract, which is part of the unbundling section of the contract, and which says in 11.6.1.1, it's on JA255, that COCs could by dedicated transport that provides connections between its switches and Verizon. That's what an entrance facility is. And it refers, all of Section 11.6 refers you to the unbundling prices in the back of the agreement. Those are the provisions that implement paragraph 217 in that duty. It's telling AT&T didn't say, oh, and by the way, even in addition to Section 251C3 and the then existing unbundling rules, we also have a duty under Section 251C2 and we'd like to put provisions in the contract. So what does unbundling transport mean? Unbundling transport means effectively they get the use of Verizon's network as dealt with their own to put to any purpose whatsoever they so choose. Interconnection, backhaul, transporting data between their own network facilities, whatever it says, if they built the pipe themselves. If you buy an entrance facility under this new Section 251C2 duty, which was not recognized when this contract was written and therefore is not unsurprisingly reflected in it, you may use it only for the purposes of exchanging calls between the two networks. You would think that if this contract implemented that duty, you would see those words somewhere in this contract. But you're not, you are now arguing as you suggest, Courtael argues, that we read it in historical and administrative context. You say that it's, I agree. What is less clear is that it comports with your reading of it given the extent to which the FCC has carefully spoken to to continue to encourage or to make the distinction between requiring the purchase of the, of, of, of interest facilities as unies as the market maturs. In competition is more likely to take care of exerting down with price pressure and imposing the obligation to provide them as an interconnection agreement. I'm sorry, I can't get your honest contracts. Written after 2005, and especially after talk America, include express provisions, the detail, how one buys an entrance facility under this Section 251C2 duty and the limitations on the use of it and have rates generated specific to those uses. That's not this contract because again in 2002, no one thought that duty existed. That's why there is no provision in the contract that says you could, I mean, because under Courtael there were four ways that Cox could have, I mean this is, the, under Courtael there were four ways that Cox could have bought an entrance facility under this agreement. Either as an unbundled element which you could use for any purpose under the sun, or as a 251C2 entrance facility which you could only use for a limited purpose, or under the tariff or under some substance agreement. And I can find provisions in this contract that talk about how one orders an entrance facility as an unbundled network element, but there is not a single provision in the contract that talks about how one orders it to implement this 251C2 duty. What about the provisions they had to put it in there? What about 4.3.3 that essentially says Courtael may order entrance facilities for interconnection, I think that's what they'd say. Any of the interconnection methods? In accordance with the rates in charge of set forth. More than that, on accordance with the order intervals and other terms and conditions, including without limitation rates and charges. Set forth in the agreement. I read that given that it comes right out of paragraph 217 of the FCC's order to refer you to section 11.6. That's the only provisions in the agreement that discuss how one orders, what the limitations on it are. There's no second section that says, in order for facility to be used for limited purposes, Verizon would have to be able to monitor to make sure Courtael is only using it for the purpose. That where it was entitled to use it for under this C2 duty, they're just not in the contract. Courtael has lots of ways it could have gotten this provision in the contract. It chose to use none of them. I can't then I don't understand your interpretation of 4.3.3, which seems pretty, or it certainly makes it puzzling. Well, you're on again set forth in the agreement. The only rates terms and conditions set forth in the agreement that deal with the use of entrance facilities for interconnection are section 11.6 and the associated prices. Those are the provisions that set forth the order intervals, order intervals, terms and conditions and rates. It's just it. Courtael is suggesting that that rate that's called as Judge Neymar noted, an unbundled transport rate, part of the unbundling rates, was actually also unmentioned to anybody a rate for this other thing. This section 251 C2 entrance facility that is not an unbundled element that can only be used for a very limited purpose. And yet nobody thought to write any provisions in the contract to talk about any of that. Courtael is trying to add to a 2002 agreement a legal requirement that did not exist in 2002. There's a way to do that under the contract. According to an FCC brief in 2010, I came in when the FCC first dealt with it in 2003. In the intervening time period, there was lots of disagreement among the state commissions that addressed the issue. And as I said, when Courtael was adopting these agreements, only four state commissions had dealt with it. Illinois, Texas, Candace, and Missouri. The first three of those had ruled that Courtael disagreed with the ultimate position that the 2010 FCC took as what the Supreme Court did to something to defer to. If I understand your argument, it is that the 2002 agreement, which is the substance of this agreement, subject to the adoption letter, that the 2002 agreement went as far as any obligation was known to exist. And there was no obligation that Courtael now claims the right to get tellrick rates. That's right. Or anything. Except under C3. Yes, except this is the unbondled elements. That was the duty known at the time that was how competitors bought entrance facilities at home. So that when the adoption letter was made, that's all it could be referring to. All of the right to exist. Strike out the provisions of the contract that deal with our obligations in the longer exist. It does indeed, Your Honor. If I could move on to deal with the other three issues briefly. As far as Courtael's facilities bills to Verizon, there's no dispute that those facilities that Courtael belatedly billed for are on its side of the interconnection point. The district court was right to point to section 422, which says the way Courtael gets paid for those facilities is by charging for the individual calls that are routed over them, not for the facilities themselves. I'm so sorry. I know it's, I don't mean to sound argumentative, but I just think I'm just having difficulty conceptualizing what you're saying in the context of the pricing requirements imposed by the Telecommunications Act. The reason I'm having the difficulty is that you seem to be saying that the contract didn't require an I-Lec to provide interconnection at cost. Certain, Your Honor. 251 C2 just makes that untenable. There's lots of ways for interconnection to occur. If, for example, Courtael deployed its own entrance facilities, there's still work Verizon has to do to hook those up to the extent there were any charges for that work. That would be at Tellwork rates. The notion that that C2 duty not only included the duty to let somebody interconnect with you, but to actually provide to them the facility that they would use to do it was unheard of until the FCC, honestly, unheard of from the FCC until 2010, when it announced in an Amicus brief, that that's how one should understand its 2003 order. I-Lec must provide interconnection and unbundled access. How does it do that except through a facility? Your Honor, it depends on the facility. To interconnect two networks, you not only need the wire that spans the physical distance between the two buildings, but you need all sorts of things to attach to the wire. Verizon, for example, has an obligation to modify its network, the receptacles one you could think of them, so that they can accommodate third-party interconnection in ways that didn't work. That's what the existing rules that were in place in 2002 imposed a duty. Verizon has to let a competitor stick its equipment in Verizon's own building. That's a new obligation. Those are all obligations, and this contract talks about those. But the notion that Verizon, above and beyond that, had to actually hand over a facility to another company to use for this narrow limited purpose unknown in 2002. And that's why, when AT&T, the most sophisticated of any of the competitors that we ever dealt with in these interconnection agreement negotiations, doesn't say, oh, by the way, we have this other right under this other section, I think it confirms what the FCC said to the Supreme Court in its Amicus brief, that its original rules didn't impose this obligation, and that it wasn't until 2003 that it had any occasion to think about it. And to get it wasn't until 2010, that it's called the world that that's what it meant. And I very much appreciate your patience. Thank you. Let me ask you on the second point, you were just addressing, how would Cortelle build Bill just for the calls? In other words, one of the problems they complain about, they calls weren't identified, they didn't have the data to separate out the calls for which they would bill you for. For some of the calls, they did have the data and they didn't use it. But even for the calls where they don't have the data, the industry deals with that all the time through billing factors. Unlike your retail bill or my retail bill where you expect to see your actual calls, intercarrier billing deals with millions and tens of millions of calls every month. Precision is, it's a best effort system. Companies routinely use billing factors. You do a study, you update the study every six months. You say, well, we're going to assume 40% or 60% or whatever comes out of our precise study. There are ways to do it. They're time consuming, which is again why people use billing factors. But the contract is clear. As far as reciprocal compensation charges, they can only be billed for local calls dialed by our customers. There's no dispute they build them for calls that were not local. Now, there are a lot of, as part of the judgment in this case, a number entered for that, wasn't there? For core. Yes. Right. In favor of core? And why doesn't that agreement on that number and that dispute in this case on appeal? I think core believes, you have to ask Mr. Tolton. I think core. You intend it does, end it. In other words, there's been an adjustment for those calls and they get 250,000. Is that what's it? The reason for that, Your Honor, in all candor. Verizon had disputed at the core tells bills and had withheld pay. Payments of amounts, it believed, were due on a current basis to recoup past over payments. We over withheld. We overestimated the amount of. So that final adjustment though, but there was an agreement. It sort of looks like a gross, down and dirty agreement just to get final judgment. But there was an agreement that seems to resolve that now, isn't it? I think it's still open to core tell to argue that they don't breach the agreement by billing reciprocal compensation charges for non-local third party calls. I don't think they've actually made that argument here. So I think the arguments that they're trying to make here, yes, I think it resolves those arguments. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Your Honor. Mr. Tolton. Verizon argued to this court a few moments ago that no one knew that there was an interconnection requirement pre-before 2010. An interconnection requirement at Telwirk. An interconnection. An interconnection at Telwirk. The FCC brief in Talk America, which we cite on pages eight through nine of our reply brief. It says explicitly that this has always been there since 1996 when the Federal Communications Act was adopted. So for Verizon to say nobody knew insists that nobody has read the statute. And that's a position, I don't know how we can square that with common sense. Mr. Anxwright argues quite forcefully that 11.6 is the only thing you have to look at. But look at section four, which is the interconnection requirement. And section four, I direct your attention just as an impassant to section 4.2. 4.2.1 explicitly says that these are section four describes the architecture for interconnection of the party's facilities. And you read down and it says traffic exchange strunks, pursuing the section 251C2. It's an explicit incorporation of the statute that says Telwirk rates. And 11.6 is not the only way that you get Telwirk rates. It's right there. And it's in the statute. It's everywhere. You can't possibly argue that it is not in this agreement. There is a 96 statute. Yes, a 96 statute. Why didn't the contract allude to that in any way? Explicitly. It sites the statute over and over again. It's cited there. It's cited in the 27.1. For the point you're trying to urge, which is that there's an interconnection obligation of Telwirk rates. It's cited for interconnection under 251C2. And 251C2 explicitly says, Telwirk rates. So it doesn't say, the word Telwirk doesn't appear in here. But those are the cost-based rates. 251C2 or the cost-based rates. The unies or the cost-based rates. What's the language of 252C2? 251C2. Yeah, what's the language? I don't have it. Well, actually I do. I'll read it to you. It says that you have to provide interconnection, quote, on rates, terms, and conditions that are just reasonable and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section. And section 252. What's that? And that has been defined as Telwirk. That's the statutory language for the Telwirk rates, which are in our agreement. Telwirk is just the industry's terms for the just. And what's the reason you're nondiscriminatory? Just the question of why they have section 3, unbundled for unbundled access. Why they have section 3, where? The unbundled transport, oh, I'm sorry. In section 3, in what? 251C3. 251C3 is unbundled access. Okay, so there's unbundled access and then there's interconnection under C2. You have both. And entrance facilities can be used for both. And that's what the FCC made clear in their brief in talk America and what the Supreme Court adopted in talk America. And that issue, by the way, talk America was in the first case that even that addressed this. This was addressed in 2002 in Maryland, in a case called AT&T versus Verizon. The Verizon was involved in when it said the same exact thing. It just took another eight years to get up to the Supreme Court. But the same issue arose in 2002. And exactly what I'm telling you now was said by the Maryland Public Utilities Commission in 2002. So when you look at the way this whole document is cobbled together, it is clear that this document contemplated 251 would apply. And 251 has two parts to it. C2 and C3. This document references C2 explicitly with respect to interconnection. And when it references explicitly with respect to interconnection, it's referencing the Telwick rates that are in C2D. And when it's referencing the Telwick rates in C2D, it's setting them out in the attachment under the category on bundle transport, because on bundle transport in the industry is used for both interconnection and unies. And that's how this contract is all ready to get. You've got to read a contract as a whole. You can't just say, look at 11.6. It's talking about unies there. Yeah. But in Section 4 it's talking about interconnection. Both of them exist. And the Supreme Court has made clear that Verizon's reading of this contract is just wrong because you have the right to interconnect. And you have the right to interconnect at Telwick rates. Now, let me briefly address, if I could, the issue, the other issue. Does it address that in the remand order? In the TRRO? Yes. It addresses it explicitly in the TRRO in Section 365. I'm not sure. I believe it. I believe it addresses this. I can find it. Thank you. TRRO2. Just briefly, this issue with Quartel's Facility, with Quartel's Facilities, there are so many issues of fact there. We have 300 pages. We put them in the record because Verizon says it never placed a order. So we put 300 pages in this. It starts at page, I think, 12.01 to 1300. I'm sorry. Yeah. It's somewhere in there. It ends at page 1300 of our appendix. 300 pages of orders. 102.01. I'm sorry. 1300. Where Verizon ordered facilities from Quartel. Said, give us facilities. And it said, bill us for those facilities. Write in those orders. We showed it to you. Says, bill us in those facilities. And Quartel writes back saying, we are firmly, or we give you a FOC, a firm order confirmation, that we're providing those facilities. Verizon comes to the district court and says, we don't have to pay for those facilities because we quote unquote, self-provisioned. Well, all they meant is that on their side of the network, they provided a facility. But they still have to get into our side of the network. And this, in fact, our ICA says explicitly, the only way they can get into my client's network is through an entrance facility. The only way, that's 4.3.3. The only way is through an entrance facility. Their argument is that, well, we built our facilities on the inside of the wall. Well, that's crazy. Why is it wrong with that? What's wrong with that? Look at that door right there. That's an entrance facility. Say, that door is an entrance facility, judge. On the hall is the tunnel. And here is my client's office. And here is my client's office. What my client did is he put the, see the hinge on that door? It put the hinge on the inside because it just fit better there. They're saying that hinge is not part of the door because it's on the inside. That's exactly what their argument is. There's nothing in this record. They're saying that their own facility solves the problem that we don't need your facility. Then it's on the other side. Then they can't communicate. Unless we put that door there, they can't communicate with my client's facility. We built the facility because they ordered it. That's why they ordered it. If they're right, they self-provision. Why are the 300 pages of orders to my client to provide facilities? That makes no sense. And of course it makes no sense. And these are the questions of fact, which the district court simply said, well, I'm not looking at any of this because I don't know why the district court said it on this one. But it essentially said we don't buy any argument because they self-provisioned. Well, they only self-provisioned on that end of the hallway. They never self-provisioned on this end. Thank you, sir. Thank you. We'll come down to greet Council and take a brief recess