Legal Case Summary

Case number 17-7023, David Schneermorehorn, at all, appellates, verses the State of Israel, at all, Mr. Schneebaum, for the appellates, Mr. Belinger, for the appellees. Good morning. Good morning, Your Honor. Good morning, and may it please the Court. The District Court below addressed two issues of first impression in this case. She concluded that Israel is entitled to immunity for an assault committed on board a U.S. flagged vessel on the high seas in 2010. And because that abit, the Court concluded did not take place in the United States. And second, she imposed the requirement, not part of the statute to her basis, that a state be listed by the State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism in order to lose its immunity under the Barnes-Overnight-U.S. flagged vessel. And I will address those two if I may, in turn. First, the so-called non-commercial toward exception. The France-Overnight-U

.S. Act provides that sovereigns are not entitled to immunity for torts committed in the United States. And for many reasons, in many contexts and in many decisions, courts of this country have held that American ships on the high seas are within the United States. Logic, context. Those are FSI cases. None is an FSI case. Okay, you are interpreting the FSI case. You are interpreting the FSI case. Defines the United States. Right? As all territories were continental or insular. So you have to work with that definition. That is the starting point, Your Honor. Well, it's also the ending point. We're interpreting this statute. Yes. The reason we submit with respect that it is not the end point of the analysis is that the definition of the United States provided in Section 1603-C is that the United States, that term includes, not means the territory continental and insular and the territorial war

. And we submit that when Congress uses the word includes, it means not to limit the definition to the listed items, but rather to suggest that others might be included that share essential characteristics with those listed items. And our submission is that ships on the high seas. What do you do with our decision in person? In person, Your Honor, is the case involving the United States and the State? I know what it's about. Emissaries are not. But it says, the court says we say that the modifying phrases rather clearly intended to restrict the definition of the United States, restrict the definition of the United States. To the United States and such islands, there was part of it and then it goes on to say that if it was broader, it would be completely on there being a limit stone. The person in the case and the McKeill case in the Ninth Circuit concluded correctly that embassies are not parts of the territory of the sending states, and in fact the Vienna Convention on Interplomatic Relations provides that. But that case, of course, those cases did not address the situation before your honor, as it did not address the question of vessels, American flag vessels on the high seas. The holding of that case was that embassies are not within the United States for purposes of Section 6105A5, and we take no exception. Was there anything in person, that indicated that it turned on the fact that was there anything in person, that indicated that the embassy was in a different country and knowledge? Well, I believe the decision in personer concluded that the embassy of the United States in Terran was in Iran. It was not in the United States, and our submission is again that that is all that the court held in personer and in the Ninth Circuit decision. The court, in those cases, did not consider the situation wrong. But is there any personer, just what the court is talking about in personer again and again are these words continental or insular? That's what he's focusing on, and it says that Congress had in mind a geographic limitation. Indeed, it seems to eliminate a ship. The court did, of course, rely on that language. Our submission is that the definition of the United States provided in this statute uses the word includes and not means

. I understand. And I understand your argument. In the case of including the Supreme Court, President, I'm sorry, I don't know if we suggest that that use of language is deliberate, and especially when as here, sometimes are defined by what they mean and others defined by what they include. The Supreme Court had Congress intended to limit the definition of the United States to the territory continental and insular and territorial waters. It knew how to say that, but it didn't say that. It said instead that the definition includes those areas and suggests that the common thread connecting those areas and connecting US flag ships is that over those places, American jurisdiction is exclusive and cleanery. That is true of ships sailing on the high seas, and indeed the Supreme Court has said that on any number of occasions. But you would agree that if we don't accept your reading, well, let me just ask you this, do you agree that if we don't accept your reading of includes, if we think that the language of the statute combined with person's or suggest that this is geographic, that this clause doesn't help you. That this clause is dispositive, that there's no, that the Israel's protected under this clause, that is a commercial, non-commercial toward exception. And what your whole argument depends on the word include? Our argument depends on the word include, as we would direct respect the Court's attention to such cases as Helveringby Morgan's in which the Supreme Court elaborated on the proper construction of the word include. As contrasted with the word means, and pointed in that very case to the fact that the statute before the Court included both kinds of definitions, and that is what we have here. So what do you do with the distinction between prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction? Our submission is that the jurisdiction of the United States to prescribe reaches US flagged ships wherever, whenever they are on the high sea. I understand, but even the Supreme Court seemed to recognize that the sailor on the ship might not have all the rights. So that distinction, it seems to me, addresses or places in context which definition of includes the Court should adopt. In that context of the case, which your honor refers, cases that, in case it is, really, that talk about the rights of semen on ships, the question of whether a baby born on an American ship is a natural born citizen of the United States, those cases determined that for some purposes it would simply make no sense for the term the United States to be understood otherwise than geographically. But in those statutes, Congress did not provide the definition, the operative definition, that courts were meant to interpret in applying the statute to facts before them

. Here, Congress did do that, and again stated the definition in terms of what term includes rather than means. So we would hold that, we would urge the Court to conclude that, person, or the other cases involving embassies, McGeele, for example, are distinguishable on that basis because US jurisdiction over embassies is not plenary and exclusive. The Court of the below relied also on Smith against Libya involving an aircraft over which US jurisdiction was not plenary and exclusive. But here it is. It was plenary and exclusive over the challenger. One would sayling in the international portion of the Mediterranean Sea where these courts occurred, and therefore we submit that the government of Israel is not entitled to immunity on that basis. In addition, of course. Can I ask you to go on to the other, unless my colleagues have questions on that subject. Could you go on to the state's sponsor of terrorism exception? I'm sorry. Let me move this here. How's it? That's better. Thank you. Could you go on to the state's sponsor of terrorism exception? Go on to that one. Yes. It was about to do that. Thank you, Your Honor

. Okay. So the state's sponsor terrorism issue, the 16-0 file. I'll just tell you right now, my question about it. I think your reading of this revision is quite creative, actually. And the statutes, the stereos given the way Congress amended it. But I have two big problems with your interpretation. If you're right, what this statute now means is that when Congress rewrote it, it eliminated two major provisions of the Foreign Cyber and the Unity Act that used to be there. In other words, under the previous act, it had to be a state's elisted state sponsor to her, right? Yes, correct. And the plaintiff had to be a national United States. Correct. But under your view, both of those are gone. That is correct. That is our... But is there any indication at all? Do you know of any indication at all that that's what Congress had in mind here? We do have some indications

. What? Your Honor, I certainly can't. Because that's a pretty dramatic change for Congress. It's a dramatic change. You're put it by switching from a statute that rested on a double negative to a statute that was written in the affirmative. Because that's Congress did a little bit more than that. Yeah. Congress indicated that what it was attempting to do in the 2008 amendments to the Foreign Cyber and the Unity Act was to make it more, make courts more available to victims of acts of terrorism wherever they occur around the globe. And it indicated that intent in ways other than or in addition to the removal, the repeal of the provision that required that states be on the state-sponsored list. It did it, for example, by changing the caption of the section. Captions are guides to statutory interpretation. It used to say jurisdiction for lawsuits against terrorist states. Against states. Doesn't say that anymore. Now it says terrorism exception to immunity. Shifting the focus from the identity of the defendant to the nature of the act. And similarly, the caption of section 1605AA1 also, the Congress drafted the language to read no immunity

. And the statute says specifically that states do not deserve, do not get, do not warrant immunity in situations in which they are involved in acts defined by U.S. law as terrorism. Before 2008, there is no question that we would not be standing at this lecture. But since 2008, when the law changed and Congress repealed the requirement. Is there anything in the legislative history? I mean, I know we have to be careful about the legislative. But is there anything which says, you know, we really want to eliminate this requirement for the state having to be on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. And we also don't want to restrict this any longer to U.S. nationals. Is there anything? There is nothing that we have been able to find in the legislative history that discusses this either way. But again, the language that Congress chose here is as clear as could be. No immunity. Only I would not have thought that way. I wouldn't go that far. I don't think you could say the statute is as clear as can be

. I think you've clearly identified an ambiguity in this thing. Well, it's hard to say. It's, quote, clear as can be given the dramatic change that it brought about in the absence of any evidence that that's what Congress expected. The statute says a foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States in certain instances. The state is not immune. Now, to contend at this stage that Congress perhaps met something else or intended something else, is we submit a stretch in the process of judicial integrity. No, I'm not talking about that. That's why I started out by telling you. I thought it's very creative. Let me ask you my other question. So your theory is then that under the first clause, the no-ununity clause, which is where you say your case comes, right? The jurisdiction does not have to hear the case, right? That is correct. Okay, so what are the May-entertain defenses that the state of Israel and its agencies might raise in this matter? So what are the, how would the district court decide whether it's going to exercise jurisdiction under this provision? What are the standards that's going to use? We submit that the district court can and should apply the traditional legal analysis to whatever defenses Israel might bring to it. But that's true under the second clause, too. All those defenses would be for a listed sponsor, like for a listed sponsor. All those defenses would still be available. The statute says that with respect to listed states, the court shall hear these cases

. I'm trying to understand what other than all that seems to be the defenses, once you're passed being on a list and whether or not the plaintiff has to be a US national, the defenses in either case will be beyond that will be the same, that the country could offer. So what, how does a district judge decide whether it's going to allow a case to go forward under the in general clause? How will it distinguish between two different cases? Supposed to assess two cases before it. They're both against states that are not listed. How will it decide which one goes forward and which one doesn't? How will it decide which one to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction? Because you acknowledge that it could, right? So how will it decide that? The decision would be made, we submit on the basis of the objections that the defendant state raises the constitutional question. The only question is jurisdiction. Does the court have jurisdiction over a terrorism case against a country that is not on the list? Yes. Now how will it decide whether to exercise, whether to grant the motion to dismiss or to deny it and let the case go on to other defenses? Let me answer the question as they were under asked, but in two parts. First, yes, there is jurisdiction over the defendant in such cases. Under 1605, big A, A1, the foreign state is not entitled to immunity. So the answer to the jurisdiction question is absolutely yes. What are the factors that might cause a court, a trial court, not to exercise that jurisdiction? No, no. There must be a force. There could be an active state defense. There could be a foreign nonconvianced defense. There could be a political question defense in theory at least. So there are ways in which courts can control their notches

. Those are all of the notches. Those are all of the notches. Those are all available to defendants that are on the list. I'm sorry again. Those are all of the available to defendants that are on the list. They are all there in any event, of course, but the statute guidance provides that the court shall view cases against state sponsors. Your Honor's, I see that not only is my primary plan, but my rebuttal time is too. Thank you. I'm done. Councillor Farratt, please. Good morning, Your Honor. And may it please the court. I'm John Belenture, counsel for the State of Israel and its ministries. The appellants argue in this case that this is a case of first impression. However, the facts may be new, but the legal arguments are not. They have been considered and rejected by the Supreme Court, this circuit, and by all other courts that have considered them. As the appellants can see, Israel and its ministries have immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, but they argue that two exceptions apply the non-commercial tort exception and the terrorism exception. Judge Jackson rejected both arguments as did the U.S. government in a statement of interest that it filed in the district court. Judge Jackson was correct as opposed to U.S. government that this suit must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Let me address each of these exceptions. The non-commercial tort exception says that a foreign government does not have immunity for torsious acts in the United States. Judge Tadal, you read the relevant language. The United States is defined to include territory and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. You discuss the person your case, which I'll come to, but the starting point really is the Amarada Hesse case. Well, what about his focus on the word include? It doesn't say meaning, it says include. Which means there could be others. The include can be a term of enlargement in some statutes, but here we have guidance both from the Supreme Court and this Court in the person your case. And I want to read the relevant language from the Amarada Hesse case where the Supreme Court construed this particular language

. As the appellants can see, Israel and its ministries have immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, but they argue that two exceptions apply the non-commercial tort exception and the terrorism exception. Judge Jackson rejected both arguments as did the U.S. government in a statement of interest that it filed in the district court. Judge Jackson was correct as opposed to U.S. government that this suit must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Let me address each of these exceptions. The non-commercial tort exception says that a foreign government does not have immunity for torsious acts in the United States. Judge Tadal, you read the relevant language. The United States is defined to include territory and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. You discuss the person your case, which I'll come to, but the starting point really is the Amarada Hesse case. Well, what about his focus on the word include? It doesn't say meaning, it says include. Which means there could be others. The include can be a term of enlargement in some statutes, but here we have guidance both from the Supreme Court and this Court in the person your case. And I want to read the relevant language from the Amarada Hesse case where the Supreme Court construed this particular language. The Supreme Court said in Amarada Hesse, quote, we construed the modifying phrase continental and insular to restrict the definition of United States to the continental United States and those islands that are part of the United States. That was not limited to the facts of the case. That was a conclusion of law. And Judge Tadal, as you correctly pointed out, this circuit reached the same decision in person. And this was a conclusion of law. And the question was, what is the case of the Amarada Hesse case? The case of the Amarada Hesse case, which is the case of the Amarada Hesse case and the case of the Amarada Hesse case. And this Court's decision in person, clearly limit the words territory and waters to the geographic United States. And to read the case of the Amarada Hesse case, which is the case of the Amarada Hesse case, which is the rule for the appellants, this Court would have to conclude that both the Supreme Court and Amarada Hesse and the circuit and the person were wrong. The appellants continually tried to ignore the words continental and insular, and instead to focus on the breadth of Congress's ability to exercise jurisdiction. And Judge Rogers, that was your point about confusing prescriptive jurisdiction with the Judicative jurisdiction. Of course, Congress does have broad power, but the question is, did they try in this case to remove the immunity of foreign governments, and there's nothing that indicates that they did so? In person, or this case, said that the issue was not the raw power of Congress to exercise jurisdiction, but a question of intent in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. And there's nothing that indicates that the Congress tried to exercise jurisdiction outside the United States. Again, in person, the Court said very well that there would be unhappy policy consequences to take a broader view. And indeed, in this case, if you were to accept appellants' arguments, the jurisdiction over foreign governments would be removed not only over 40,000 U.S. flagged vessels around the world, but up to 15 million pleasure craft registered in the different states, as it appears that the vessel, in this case, was, that would be an enormous expansion of U

. The Supreme Court said in Amarada Hesse, quote, we construed the modifying phrase continental and insular to restrict the definition of United States to the continental United States and those islands that are part of the United States. That was not limited to the facts of the case. That was a conclusion of law. And Judge Tadal, as you correctly pointed out, this circuit reached the same decision in person. And this was a conclusion of law. And the question was, what is the case of the Amarada Hesse case? The case of the Amarada Hesse case, which is the case of the Amarada Hesse case and the case of the Amarada Hesse case. And this Court's decision in person, clearly limit the words territory and waters to the geographic United States. And to read the case of the Amarada Hesse case, which is the case of the Amarada Hesse case, which is the rule for the appellants, this Court would have to conclude that both the Supreme Court and Amarada Hesse and the circuit and the person were wrong. The appellants continually tried to ignore the words continental and insular, and instead to focus on the breadth of Congress's ability to exercise jurisdiction. And Judge Rogers, that was your point about confusing prescriptive jurisdiction with the Judicative jurisdiction. Of course, Congress does have broad power, but the question is, did they try in this case to remove the immunity of foreign governments, and there's nothing that indicates that they did so? In person, or this case, said that the issue was not the raw power of Congress to exercise jurisdiction, but a question of intent in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. And there's nothing that indicates that the Congress tried to exercise jurisdiction outside the United States. Again, in person, the Court said very well that there would be unhappy policy consequences to take a broader view. And indeed, in this case, if you were to accept appellants' arguments, the jurisdiction over foreign governments would be removed not only over 40,000 U.S. flagged vessels around the world, but up to 15 million pleasure craft registered in the different states, as it appears that the vessel, in this case, was, that would be an enormous expansion of U.S. jurisdiction. And we would not be simply removing the jurisdiction over or removing the immunity of Israel, but of every country in the world with respect to those 40,000 to 50 million pleasure craft. So the immunity of close, other close allies like the United Kingdom or Australia would be removed. If the British Navy attempted to rescue some U.S. nationals or British nationals on a ship off of Somalia and something went wrong, the immunity of the British Navy would be removed. Again, in person, or I thought you said it very well, that the possibilities are almost endless for tort actions against foreign governments for acts and emissions. We also have to think about reciprocity. If this court were to decide to remove the immunity of foreign governments, it would be very difficult for the executive mansion to complain if other countries removed the immunity of the U.S. government, the Navy and the Coast Guard off of our vessels. And then finally, there's really nothing in the legislative history that suggests that Congress was focused on. Anything other than traffic accidents inside the United States. Let me turn to the plaintiffs' creative argument, as you said, Judge Saddle. It's pretty creative, isn't it? Sorry

.S. jurisdiction. And we would not be simply removing the jurisdiction over or removing the immunity of Israel, but of every country in the world with respect to those 40,000 to 50 million pleasure craft. So the immunity of close, other close allies like the United Kingdom or Australia would be removed. If the British Navy attempted to rescue some U.S. nationals or British nationals on a ship off of Somalia and something went wrong, the immunity of the British Navy would be removed. Again, in person, or I thought you said it very well, that the possibilities are almost endless for tort actions against foreign governments for acts and emissions. We also have to think about reciprocity. If this court were to decide to remove the immunity of foreign governments, it would be very difficult for the executive mansion to complain if other countries removed the immunity of the U.S. government, the Navy and the Coast Guard off of our vessels. And then finally, there's really nothing in the legislative history that suggests that Congress was focused on. Anything other than traffic accidents inside the United States. Let me turn to the plaintiffs' creative argument, as you said, Judge Saddle. It's pretty creative, isn't it? Sorry. It's pretty creative. I mean, if you just look at the language of the statute, just the playing language, the playing text of it, you know, this first section, it establishes a set of conditions under which they're not immune and being on the list isn't one of them. It is creative, your honor. So what? But every other court that has considered this has... You know that, but none of them are binding on us at this point, right? Well, the DC Circuit has said both in the Weinstein and the Mawady case that the 1605A was materially similar to 1605A7. I know, but that really wasn't a holding. But actually, I think you put your finger on it, Judge Saddle, is if you were to accept a palant's argument and say that the only relevant part of 1605 was A1, which removes the immunity of foreign governments, and the restrictions in A2 don't apply, then it's not simply that you don't have to be a state-spot sort of terrorism, but that you don't even have to be an American or a member of the Armed Services. The implication of this, and you were heading there, I think, Judge Saddle, was that the courts in the United States would have jurisdiction to hear any claim by any foreign national against any foreign government in the world for any extradudicial killing. So, for example, if a foreign national is concerned that someone has been killed in Iraq or Afghanistan by the British, that would be an extradudicial killing. And this court would have jurisdiction. They wouldn't have to hear it, but they could hear it. There's nothing that suggests that Congress intends to do. So, do you have any idea why I ask Council for a point of whether he knew whether there was any indication of what Congress intended here? Do you know why the Congress switched from this double negative in the old version to speaking positively in the new version? Do we know why this change was made? In general, the purpose of 1605 overall was to remove some impediments that plaintiffs had had in previous cases against Iran and others. And there's nothing to indicate that Congress wanted to broaden this enormous

. It's pretty creative. I mean, if you just look at the language of the statute, just the playing language, the playing text of it, you know, this first section, it establishes a set of conditions under which they're not immune and being on the list isn't one of them. It is creative, your honor. So what? But every other court that has considered this has... You know that, but none of them are binding on us at this point, right? Well, the DC Circuit has said both in the Weinstein and the Mawady case that the 1605A was materially similar to 1605A7. I know, but that really wasn't a holding. But actually, I think you put your finger on it, Judge Saddle, is if you were to accept a palant's argument and say that the only relevant part of 1605 was A1, which removes the immunity of foreign governments, and the restrictions in A2 don't apply, then it's not simply that you don't have to be a state-spot sort of terrorism, but that you don't even have to be an American or a member of the Armed Services. The implication of this, and you were heading there, I think, Judge Saddle, was that the courts in the United States would have jurisdiction to hear any claim by any foreign national against any foreign government in the world for any extradudicial killing. So, for example, if a foreign national is concerned that someone has been killed in Iraq or Afghanistan by the British, that would be an extradudicial killing. And this court would have jurisdiction. They wouldn't have to hear it, but they could hear it. There's nothing that suggests that Congress intends to do. So, do you have any idea why I ask Council for a point of whether he knew whether there was any indication of what Congress intended here? Do you know why the Congress switched from this double negative in the old version to speaking positively in the new version? Do we know why this change was made? In general, the purpose of 1605 overall was to remove some impediments that plaintiffs had had in previous cases against Iran and others. And there's nothing to indicate that Congress wanted to broaden this enormous... Did abandoning the double negative solve that problem? I was asking about that in particular. Why did they let Congress to make this odd change that created this... Your honor, my guess is that this was simply a matter of legislative drafting where they tried to break it out into two sessions with a preambular part about removal of immunity. And then that A2 were the conditions that really needed to be read together with A1. So, your bottom line then, I think it is that yes, you know, this statutory language could be read. If you just looked at that, it could be read the way the plaintiffs want, but that would produce such a dramatic change in the way this has been interpreted before. And there's no evidence that Congress attended that, right? Is that your... That's right, although I think it really would be a stretch to read it that way because A1 and A2 have to be read together. As the Supreme Court has said, and other courts have said we don't interpret simply provisions, we have to interpret the entire statutory framework. Well, what their point is is that the two provisions, yeah, you interpret them both

... Did abandoning the double negative solve that problem? I was asking about that in particular. Why did they let Congress to make this odd change that created this... Your honor, my guess is that this was simply a matter of legislative drafting where they tried to break it out into two sessions with a preambular part about removal of immunity. And then that A2 were the conditions that really needed to be read together with A1. So, your bottom line then, I think it is that yes, you know, this statutory language could be read. If you just looked at that, it could be read the way the plaintiffs want, but that would produce such a dramatic change in the way this has been interpreted before. And there's no evidence that Congress attended that, right? Is that your... That's right, although I think it really would be a stretch to read it that way because A1 and A2 have to be read together. As the Supreme Court has said, and other courts have said we don't interpret simply provisions, we have to interpret the entire statutory framework. Well, what their point is is that the two provisions, yeah, you interpret them both. And the first one is discretionary and the second one is mandatory. They're not eliminating any of them. They're not ignoring them. They aren't interpreting them both. Well, I would say, well, certainly not binding on you, I think, constructive was the Eastern District of New York's decision in the Carpenter case, which did quite specifically address this argument, and said that that was a case against Chile, in which the plaintiffs tried to argue that Chile could then be sued under the new 1605A under this theory. And the Eastern District of New York said while theoretically possible, it would produce otherly absurd results. And then went on to discuss the policy consequences that the U.K. and Australia could be sued in Afghanistan and Iraq. And that's not the second circuit that affirmed on that grant. So again, I think we have to look both at the fact that in the 10 years that this change has been on the books, no court has accepted this argument. The policy consequences would be dramatic. It's hard to imagine that Congress intended that every country in the world, not just Israel, but every other country could be sued in federal court, for not only alleged acts of terrorism, but for extra-due-ditional killings. And then we have to also consider the reciprocal concerns that if this court were to lift the, read the terrorism exception to apply to all governments, then it would be difficult for the executive branch to complain if other governments were to remove the immunity of the United States for acts of terrorism or alleged extra-due-ditional killings. So the policy consequences would be very broad. And then once again on the legislative history, while there's not much there, it is hard to imagine that Congress would have made this dramatic change without any suggestion in the record

. And the first one is discretionary and the second one is mandatory. They're not eliminating any of them. They're not ignoring them. They aren't interpreting them both. Well, I would say, well, certainly not binding on you, I think, constructive was the Eastern District of New York's decision in the Carpenter case, which did quite specifically address this argument, and said that that was a case against Chile, in which the plaintiffs tried to argue that Chile could then be sued under the new 1605A under this theory. And the Eastern District of New York said while theoretically possible, it would produce otherly absurd results. And then went on to discuss the policy consequences that the U.K. and Australia could be sued in Afghanistan and Iraq. And that's not the second circuit that affirmed on that grant. So again, I think we have to look both at the fact that in the 10 years that this change has been on the books, no court has accepted this argument. The policy consequences would be dramatic. It's hard to imagine that Congress intended that every country in the world, not just Israel, but every other country could be sued in federal court, for not only alleged acts of terrorism, but for extra-due-ditional killings. And then we have to also consider the reciprocal concerns that if this court were to lift the, read the terrorism exception to apply to all governments, then it would be difficult for the executive branch to complain if other governments were to remove the immunity of the United States for acts of terrorism or alleged extra-due-ditional killings. So the policy consequences would be very broad. And then once again on the legislative history, while there's not much there, it is hard to imagine that Congress would have made this dramatic change without any suggestion in the record. As Judge Scalia said, Justice Scalia said, Congress does not hide elephants and mouseholes. And then finally, I think it's also worth looking at the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, which Congress passed last year over great controversy to remove the immunity of Saudi Arabia and other countries for acts of terrorism. If Saudi Arabia had been not immune previously under the terrorism exception, it's hard to see why Congress would have gone to all the trouble of passing jazz to and the President having vetoed it. So again, it's the terrorism exception. I think it's hard to see that Congress intended it to apply to anything other than state sponsors. Although Judge Jackson did not address the issues, we think this case would also be barred by the political question an act of state doctrines. There are no traditionally manageable standards. We don't have to reach that, though. We agree on this. I agree. In that case, we believe that Judge Jackson, the U.S. government, we're correct in rejecting the appellant arguments. The Court should not adjudicate Israel's military actions, nor should it expand the toward exception or the terrorism exception to lift the immunity not only of Israel, but of all other states without some showing a congressional intent. The district court should be affirmed. Thank you

. As Judge Scalia said, Justice Scalia said, Congress does not hide elephants and mouseholes. And then finally, I think it's also worth looking at the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, which Congress passed last year over great controversy to remove the immunity of Saudi Arabia and other countries for acts of terrorism. If Saudi Arabia had been not immune previously under the terrorism exception, it's hard to see why Congress would have gone to all the trouble of passing jazz to and the President having vetoed it. So again, it's the terrorism exception. I think it's hard to see that Congress intended it to apply to anything other than state sponsors. Although Judge Jackson did not address the issues, we think this case would also be barred by the political question an act of state doctrines. There are no traditionally manageable standards. We don't have to reach that, though. We agree on this. I agree. In that case, we believe that Judge Jackson, the U.S. government, we're correct in rejecting the appellant arguments. The Court should not adjudicate Israel's military actions, nor should it expand the toward exception or the terrorism exception to lift the immunity not only of Israel, but of all other states without some showing a congressional intent. The district court should be affirmed. Thank you. Thank you. Council for repellent? Thank you, Your Honours. Let me make three points quickly if I may. The district, I'll injure suggests that the includes and means of conundrum can be resolved by the fact that he said territory and ships have nothing in common. We submit that they have something very critical in common. They have the in common, the critical notion that U.S. territory continental and insular U.S. territorial waters and ships on the high seas are subject to the exclusive. And plenary jurisdiction of the United States. Not many other places are, but they are. That's the first one. You could read his comments in the context of fixity. I'm sorry. Well, the context

. Thank you. Council for repellent? Thank you, Your Honours. Let me make three points quickly if I may. The district, I'll injure suggests that the includes and means of conundrum can be resolved by the fact that he said territory and ships have nothing in common. We submit that they have something very critical in common. They have the in common, the critical notion that U.S. territory continental and insular U.S. territorial waters and ships on the high seas are subject to the exclusive. And plenary jurisdiction of the United States. Not many other places are, but they are. That's the first one. You could read his comments in the context of fixity. I'm sorry. Well, the context. I understand it was a very broad statement. Perhaps Congress could have done this differently, but again, we submit that the task at hand is not to re-register the statute but to interpret it. Second, the purpose of the Foreign Suburban communities act is to transfer authority away from the executive branch to the judiciary to make decisions about immunity. And our reading of both of the exceptions is consistent with that interpretation. What do you think about Mr. Belinger's hypothetical that under your interpretation of the terrorism exception, the British citizens subject to state terrorism in Iraq could sue in the district court here? Our submission is that you could under your theory, right? Congress opened the door to that kind of suit. And if Congress opened it and if it needs to be closed, it should be Congress that closes it. Congress said no foreign state is immune to that. It said Congress opened the door. Congress opened the door. I'm not sure about this, but your complaint is filed only on behalf of U.S. nationals, right? No, we have, we have among our four plaintiffs, three of U.S. nationals and one is not. No, okay

. Thanks. Okay. Thank you. Thank you. I'm sorry. We'll take the keys. I'm sorry. Thank you