Good morning. Good morning. Carl Bexsted appearing on behalf of Lennoy Phillip, the appellant. And I'd like to reserve five minutes of rebuttal if it may be the police of court. Thank you. We're here today on, on the adder that embeiles two issues. And I have to apologize. I'm getting over a cold, so. I didn't think people caught colds in the islands. I didn't. I was on a deposition trip last week, five cities and six days. I'm teaching a several new cases early
. Good point, Your Honor. I'll take that up with my client. If they want to keep their lawyer, I have them have an early death. At any rate, Your Honor, I understand is that the court specifically wanted us to address jurisdictions under 16-13. And I'm happy to respond to any questions with respect to that. Our viewpoint is pretty simple that this is a final decision that has been rendered by the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands that it meets at least two of the requirements under the cocks. Tell us, tell us which ones if you would. Yes, Your Honor. We've got four exceptions for provisions under the cocks. The first provision is the one that I believe is most applicable. And I'm just turning to it in my brief
. In which it's a decision that, first of all, it will not be subject to review at a list. And the case is that we have a later date. And the scenarios that we play out are that if the case, the, the appellee suggests that if the case goes back to the trial court, it's as if the trial judge had denied some rejudgment. And we could bring that appeal at a later date. But that's not the case. Because you, you've argued, raised you to Cotta here somewhere, haven't you? Correct. How, how does raised you to Cotta apply in this case? My sense was you were saying that you could not raise the same issue in a second appeal. And I don't see how that's raised you to Cotta. Well, what the Supreme Court has made the decision has entered the decision that employers are not protected under the workers compensation immunity. If it goes back to the trial level and we have a trial, and let's assume for the record that Mr. Philip loses the case, and there is an appeal of the verdict, we would be appealing to the Supreme Court that their decision that they already entered finding that there is no immunity offered to an employer, we would be appealing that decision
. So they would, I believe, raise you to Cotta or issue preclusion would prevent us from bringing that issue back up. They would say we decided that issue in the appeal of the trial court's original grants of summary judgment. So therefore, this decision has been settled. Our only recourse at this point in time is to petition this court to revisit or to review that decision of the default court. We can't come back to that court the highest, the Supreme Court, and ask them to revisit that decision. So it's final in that sense. If on the other hand, Mr. Philip wins at trial, now the issue is moot. If there's an appeal, I suppose there could be a potential cross appeal, but again, you'd be back to square one with the decision being revisited by the Supreme Court. But if he wins at trial and there's no appeal, then the default court's decision, the Supreme Court's decision, and the default stands as the law of the land and the Virgin Islands, and again, no chance for an appeal. So we believe the residue to Cotta lies in the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands saying we decided that issue fully when it was briefed the first time on appeal of the lower court's decision
. That's different than if the lower court had denied the summary judgment motion, in which case the case would continue to trial, and then at the appeal stage, we would be able to appeal the denial of the summary judgment motion by the lower court. And presumably, it would invoke the fact that trial council would have to bring a rule 50 motion, as well as after the verdict centered, would have to preserve that objection to the denial of the summary judgment with a motion post. The first verdict, post trial motion. What is the, you have, as I recall, it relied upon two of the exceptions. Yes. Okay. In my apologies. So, the court, I'm just looking for my... This will be the major faux pas of appellate council not to have too many tabs such that I can't find my recitation of the Cox criteria
. Well, could this possibly also fit under the fourth prox exception that applies only if a failure to grant review might seriously erode federal policy? I think that that may be a stretcher owner, but if it erodes federal policy in the sense that, yes, Congress has mandated that this court for the 15 year period or shorter period of Congress decides or longer period, but for a period of time, Congress has mandated that the decisions of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands be subject to review by this court. And therefore, if this court does not engage in its mentoring process and its responsibility that Congress has set to work with the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands to establish the institutional traditions, then that would be a violation. All right. Why don't we move on then from questions and issues of jurisdictional import to the merits? Yes, Your Honor. In short, the issue that this case presents that's different from any other cases that have thus far come along is whether or not the Supreme Court has the ability to overturn established precedent that's strictly wrong. And so it's directly on point that that has been previously issued by the Third Circuit in particular, the Tavares opinion, which as I understand it was written by Judge Smith, so that we can get to that. But I would like to focus on what I read the issue to be, and that seems to me to be whether or not it is simply our pre-2007 cases, which Tavares is, they're really implicated here because has an awkward clearly said that at least from 2007 forward, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court is making the law of the Virgin Islands be it common law determinations or the construction of Virgin Islands statues. I absolutely agree with that. All right. So if that's the case, what is it about pre-2007 that you'd somehow afford to those cases, including Tavares, some tell mutic, nearly tell mutic authority? I think that this Court has embraced the fact that at least at a minimum there, and I look to the local rule of this Court, 112.1, where it suggests that great consideration is going to be given to whether the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands enters an opinion that conflicts with the applicable decisions of this Court
. Well, there's no question that there is a conflict here, but isn't the real test whether or not the Virgin Islands decision is inescapably wrong. I agree that that is the root test. So no matter how one might wax about the clarity and logic and excellence, the Virgin Islands, the Tavares opinion, how can we say that the Supreme Court of the V.I. was inescapably wrong here? Well, in fact, is that what has been presented to us on Sarah Sherrera, not the rightness or wrongness of the Supreme Court's decision, but the effect of precedent? If you had said that the Supreme Court's decision was inescapably wrong, you would have asked for a certain on that issue, but that's not the issue you got certain, is it? Well, I know the Appellio argue that that's not the issue that we got certain, but that was intertwined in the issue, and I believe it is the issue in part that we got certain. In the reply brief, we brought up and we tried to emphasize the fact that the absurd consequences of the Supreme Court's decision basically opening liability to all co-employees whether they're doing a delogable or non-delogable duty. This is not here on the merits. This is here on the strictly procedural issue of is a pretty 2007, third circuit opinion binding on the Virgin Islands Supreme Court. Let me give you a hypothetical. If, for instance, the District Court in Delaware disagreed with a previous third circuit decision and wrote an opinion to the contrary, went up to the third circuit. The third circuit, if it said, aha, that district judge, very brilliantly saw points that we didn't see in our earlier decision
. We will go in bank and we will reconsider our earlier decision. Now, if the same thing happens with the Virgin Islands and the Virgin Islands Supreme Court after careful, an intelligent consideration of the issue says that this prior case brilliant as it may have been. Yes, clear and loosened. It should not govern us in this situation. This case should go in bank and the third circuit as a court in bank can reconsider the earlier decision. Now, with a decision by the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, how can you take it in bank to have that later decision reconsidered by the third circuit and light of the earlier decision? I think the only way you can take it in bank is by getting surgery during the supervisory period. But that would be getting surgery on the merits rather than getting surgery on the procedural issue. Your Honor, one of the key points for an appeal is if there is a direct conflict and in this petition, we argued number one that the third circuit or the Supreme Court of Virgin Islands has acknowledged that the third circuit is the highest court in this jurisdiction during at least this interim period until their release from the oversight of the court. What purposes would you wouldn't maintain with you that if this were a decision based upon the common law of the Virgin Islands that the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands decision whatever it was would be inescapably wrong with you? Are you suggesting that a decision by the third circuit on the V.I. Common Law should somehow trump a decision of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands? If the decision of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands was inescapably wrong or clearly erroneous, then I believe that the third circuit would have an obligation in its duty of overseeing the Supreme Court during this period of time to take that case on cert and to examine the case as part of its perhaps mentoring process or process of allowing the Supreme Court to work to succeed at the court
. I don't mean in any way to nitpick here but on several occasions invoke the term mentoring process and that's not a term that as far as I know appears anywhere in the description of the relationship between our two courts neither statutorily nor anywhere else that I'm aware of. We have had a role under federal statute of reviewing the performance but I don't know that we're in a position of teaching or mentoring or certainly that Congress has actually given us that role. Have I missed something? No, perhaps my choice of words is incorrect but obviously the court is responsible for making sure that there are sufficient traditions that are implemented and I think in doing that and also especially with consideration to examining closely opinions of the Supreme Court that diverge or conflict with the third circuit is probably an indication or a triggering mechanism that we need to look closely at. I think you will have you back on the bottle Mr. Dexter. Good morning for the record my name is Joel Holtz and I represent the Apollee Mr. Defoe. I'd like to note at the outset that when I began this case I certainly didn't intend to end up here arguing that to bear a speed overturn I thought the facts in the case below we turn on simpler issues such as driving a vehicle and involving a non-supervisory supervisory co-employee. Isn't there a good argument that the Maris is distinguishable from this case and I'll argue that all the way through because of the brilliant consideration to virus. If you look at that I think we've made that point pretty well and I'll take your initial notice of it at this point. You didn't address 263 because the appellant there or as lawyer didn't raise it and in 192, 193 on those pages you also pointed out that this is applied to supervisory employees who are implementing the safe workplace of the employer and you also then in a footnote said you didn't address the other issues that might exist in cases where there is an automobile and a different independent relationship
. So when I started this case I didn't intend to be here arguing that the virus should be overruled. So what do you want us to do dismiss the appeal is improvinantly granted or do you want us to rule that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court has the power to chart its own course even if inconsistent with the prior decision of this court? So on the jurisdiction issue I'm kind of on a prong here because I don't really want to go back and try this case again. Come back up to the Supreme Court and if search still exists be here again. If I was a betting man the way the House has now adopted the recommendations of the Supreme Court, I mean of the third circuit too, but it's a jurisdiction be gone and the Senate will probably adopt that. But as a betting man I might say I'll take my chances on that but the truth matters I like to end this issue. So I don't really want to pose the jurisdictional arguments to erase even though I don't think the Cox factors are met and they rely a lot on rule one 12 of the third circuit but rule one 12 is just a procedural device that's not a jurisdictional device. And so I can argue that it's not really final in the Cox. For example he said what if the faux wins below? I mean loses below. Well the faux loses below. Lin-Way Phillips is happy. He's won his case
. He doesn't care about this issue. So it's a non-issue. And this look at the other. What if the faux had won some judgment below gone to trial, gotten a judgment gone up the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had affirmed some judgment on this issue but had sent it back for reasons unrelated to this. Could they then ask for search? Or would we have to go back and start the case over? The fact that it got to the Supreme Court does that give it some special recognition that we don't have to go back to the Superior Court? So I can argue that there's no jurisdiction but this go pass that and get to the merits of the argument. Can the Virgin Islands Supreme Court in a well-reason opinion? Do what it did in this case by overtly saying that it was reversing to theirs which I don't think it needed to do. I think it could have merged in 263. It could have done the non-supervisory person. It could have done the automobile but it didn't. And I respectfully submit that based upon Petrato and Lewis that this court is set forth as standard and that is the Virgin Islands Supreme Court is the last say on local law. Unless they do something that's inescapably wrong or manifest that they have to say on it. And Judge Walther, I appreciate that. In majority of states have gone the other way. Does that suggest that they were inescapably wrong here? No, I think if you read the Supreme Court opinion on that, they talk about the reason they've gone on the other ways because there's different statutory language in those jurisdictions. In the jurisdictions which have language like ours, there's very well-reason opinions saying that the term employer means exactly that. And they don't have the immunity. So I think the Supreme Court addressed that issue in its opinion by going through all of this cases and analyzing those cases. And of course what you're doing is again as Judge Roth said, you're now getting to the merits of the argument which really wasn't what cert was granted on. And Judge Roth raised another point and that was in the third circuit you go, you have an on-box hearing when you want to reverse a power panel. The Supreme Court doesn't really have that option. But I look at the analogy a little bit differently and that is the Virgin Islands Supreme Court is like any state Supreme Court or the US Supreme Court
. Unless they do something that's inescapably wrong or manifest that they have to say on it. And Judge Walther, I appreciate that. In majority of states have gone the other way. Does that suggest that they were inescapably wrong here? No, I think if you read the Supreme Court opinion on that, they talk about the reason they've gone on the other ways because there's different statutory language in those jurisdictions. In the jurisdictions which have language like ours, there's very well-reason opinions saying that the term employer means exactly that. And they don't have the immunity. So I think the Supreme Court addressed that issue in its opinion by going through all of this cases and analyzing those cases. And of course what you're doing is again as Judge Roth said, you're now getting to the merits of the argument which really wasn't what cert was granted on. And Judge Roth raised another point and that was in the third circuit you go, you have an on-box hearing when you want to reverse a power panel. The Supreme Court doesn't really have that option. But I look at the analogy a little bit differently and that is the Virgin Islands Supreme Court is like any state Supreme Court or the US Supreme Court. If there is a prior opinion which they think is no longer the reason it will rule of law, then they can reverse it. Of course the well-known is plusy versus Ferguson. This doesn't rise to that level as far as the importance of the social issue. Coming back to that, I just think that's how Supreme Court's work. And in this particular case, the only catch on that is the fact that this court had has 15 years or whatever it will be a jurisdiction to hear appeals. And I would respectfully submit that the reasoning that was set forth in Bichardo and in Lewis is basically the rule of law that the circuit has said. And which I think that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court carefully followed in reaching the conclusion that it did. I don't think that they quickly did this. As a matter of fact, this case was pending so long in the Supreme Court. I was beginning to wonder if they were going to rule on it. And actually they came out with a very well-reasoned decision in December which dealt with the case that you had referred to them for an opinion on state law
. If there is a prior opinion which they think is no longer the reason it will rule of law, then they can reverse it. Of course the well-known is plusy versus Ferguson. This doesn't rise to that level as far as the importance of the social issue. Coming back to that, I just think that's how Supreme Court's work. And in this particular case, the only catch on that is the fact that this court had has 15 years or whatever it will be a jurisdiction to hear appeals. And I would respectfully submit that the reasoning that was set forth in Bichardo and in Lewis is basically the rule of law that the circuit has said. And which I think that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court carefully followed in reaching the conclusion that it did. I don't think that they quickly did this. As a matter of fact, this case was pending so long in the Supreme Court. I was beginning to wonder if they were going to rule on it. And actually they came out with a very well-reasoned decision in December which dealt with the case that you had referred to them for an opinion on state law. And I think they were holding this opinion just to bring them all in to try to establish what their authority is and what they could do. And I think that's probably why they went further than I think they really needed to do to get to the result they did. Because I think they could have just said to various just distinguishable for all the reasons that I've already gone over. And instead I think they wanted to confront the issue to see what their authority was. And I think they made my job harder by doing that. But I'm not going to turn around and say that's not what they did. I'd like to argue that's not what they did. But when you read their opinion, clearly that's what they did. And so I think as we are here today, I can argue that there's no cocks fact that it really makes the final judgment. I can argue that rule 112 doesn't really give you jurisdiction. It's just a procedural statute for how you would take jurisdiction over the final arguments
. And I think they were holding this opinion just to bring them all in to try to establish what their authority is and what they could do. And I think that's probably why they went further than I think they really needed to do to get to the result they did. Because I think they could have just said to various just distinguishable for all the reasons that I've already gone over. And instead I think they wanted to confront the issue to see what their authority was. And I think they made my job harder by doing that. But I'm not going to turn around and say that's not what they did. I'd like to argue that's not what they did. But when you read their opinion, clearly that's what they did. And so I think as we are here today, I can argue that there's no cocks fact that it really makes the final judgment. I can argue that rule 112 doesn't really give you jurisdiction. It's just a procedural statute for how you would take jurisdiction over the final arguments. And I can argue that to various is distinguishable for all the reasons I've already said. But the truth matters, the issue that is here today is whether or not the Virgin on Supreme Court can on a local law issue and a well-reasoned opinion. Reverse of prior decision of this circuit of pretty 2002 opinion from the circuit. And I think based upon the logic and the reasoning and petroleum in Lewis, the answer is yes to the can. And frankly, you know, I probably have to take a personal if you if you said they can here and the next week the Senate rules and and search your eyes, it goes out. And this will be the only case with that doesn't happen. And of course, as I started this whole argument, I guess I'd ever thought that Representative Fo would get me here today. Yeah, I never intended to try to overturn the eloquent decision of to various. And I never thought that I really appreciate that. And of course, you're the author also of the recommendation that the oversight be removed as well. So basically, those are my arguments
. And I can argue that to various is distinguishable for all the reasons I've already said. But the truth matters, the issue that is here today is whether or not the Virgin on Supreme Court can on a local law issue and a well-reasoned opinion. Reverse of prior decision of this circuit of pretty 2002 opinion from the circuit. And I think based upon the logic and the reasoning and petroleum in Lewis, the answer is yes to the can. And frankly, you know, I probably have to take a personal if you if you said they can here and the next week the Senate rules and and search your eyes, it goes out. And this will be the only case with that doesn't happen. And of course, as I started this whole argument, I guess I'd ever thought that Representative Fo would get me here today. Yeah, I never intended to try to overturn the eloquent decision of to various. And I never thought that I really appreciate that. And of course, you're the author also of the recommendation that the oversight be removed as well. So basically, those are my arguments. And unless you have other questions, I don't really have anything to stand to it. We have nothing. Thank you very much. Mr. Holt. We'll have respect said back. We were buttle. I do think that the issue of whether or not this this decision is inescapably wrong was brought forth in the petition. And there was definitely a lot of effort put into show how the absurd consequences that we see as a result of this very broad finding of making all co employees regardless of what duty that they're carrying out. Immune or to no longer have immunity under the workers comp is going to have a devastating effect in the Virgin Islands. It's the minority view, though, this isn't unprecedented
. And unless you have other questions, I don't really have anything to stand to it. We have nothing. Thank you very much. Mr. Holt. We'll have respect said back. We were buttle. I do think that the issue of whether or not this this decision is inescapably wrong was brought forth in the petition. And there was definitely a lot of effort put into show how the absurd consequences that we see as a result of this very broad finding of making all co employees regardless of what duty that they're carrying out. Immune or to no longer have immunity under the workers comp is going to have a devastating effect in the Virgin Islands. It's the minority view, though, this isn't unprecedented. And some are are all the other states that are in the minority inescapably wrong. Well, the concern that we have with the decision, for example, when the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands reaches its decision, it starts out its whole premise on the fact that there are no definitions of employer employee in the workers cop code. And it sites to the third circuits decision a few months before the taver has decision and the Eddie decision. And it missed, I think it wrongly sites to that decision to say there are no definitions, whereas what the third circuit said is there was session law by the Virgin Islands government that added additional definitions, but then later in the session law, it talked about adding a couple of clauses to the definition section. And I guess the editors at Butterworth removed the definitions and in place and in place put in these couple of clauses about administrative data into the workers cop code. So that whole analysis that was done by the Eddie court wasn't done by the Supreme Court and they jumped to the conclusion that there are no definitions of employer employee. Likewise, when they talk in their decision about how it was a definition of employer employee. I put it, what is it? And where is it? Well, they site to it in the decision. The original workers cop code had a definition of employer and employee in section, I believe it's 251 or 261. And then in 1994, the legislature passed the session law which added some new definitions to create an administrator. And this is discussed in the Eddie case
. And some are are all the other states that are in the minority inescapably wrong. Well, the concern that we have with the decision, for example, when the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands reaches its decision, it starts out its whole premise on the fact that there are no definitions of employer employee in the workers cop code. And it sites to the third circuits decision a few months before the taver has decision and the Eddie decision. And it missed, I think it wrongly sites to that decision to say there are no definitions, whereas what the third circuit said is there was session law by the Virgin Islands government that added additional definitions, but then later in the session law, it talked about adding a couple of clauses to the definition section. And I guess the editors at Butterworth removed the definitions and in place and in place put in these couple of clauses about administrative data into the workers cop code. So that whole analysis that was done by the Eddie court wasn't done by the Supreme Court and they jumped to the conclusion that there are no definitions of employer employee. Likewise, when they talk in their decision about how it was a definition of employer employee. I put it, what is it? And where is it? Well, they site to it in the decision. The original workers cop code had a definition of employer and employee in section, I believe it's 251 or 261. And then in 1994, the legislature passed the session law which added some new definitions to create an administrator. And this is discussed in the Eddie case. And then because of an apparently another version of that same section later in the session law, which I believe was intended to add some additional sentences to the definitions statute, the way it's worded, the editor replaced the definitions. So within the same session law, you have new definitions being added and then the editor just wiping all those out along with the old definitions and putting in these two sentences as the new section 261. I think that was an error. It appears to be an error. I don't even know. The Eddie court. It's plausible, but we can't be sure. The Eddie court looked at it as not having been expressly repealed is how the Eddie court reviewed the that those session laws. But my point is more importantly, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court didn't even address that issue in determining that there are no definitions. Also, in the decision, again, getting into the whole issue about the absurd consequences of this finding, which is at the heart of both taveras and this decision, the sub virgin island Supreme Court relied on a whole list of cases for the argument that an agent is not relieved from liability, even when entrusted with a non-delegable duty. But if you read through each of those cases, they're all involving independent contractors, a bank that hired somebody to keep ice off the sidewalk, a company that hired someone to salvage a vessel
. And then because of an apparently another version of that same section later in the session law, which I believe was intended to add some additional sentences to the definitions statute, the way it's worded, the editor replaced the definitions. So within the same session law, you have new definitions being added and then the editor just wiping all those out along with the old definitions and putting in these two sentences as the new section 261. I think that was an error. It appears to be an error. I don't even know. The Eddie court. It's plausible, but we can't be sure. The Eddie court looked at it as not having been expressly repealed is how the Eddie court reviewed the that those session laws. But my point is more importantly, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court didn't even address that issue in determining that there are no definitions. Also, in the decision, again, getting into the whole issue about the absurd consequences of this finding, which is at the heart of both taveras and this decision, the sub virgin island Supreme Court relied on a whole list of cases for the argument that an agent is not relieved from liability, even when entrusted with a non-delegable duty. But if you read through each of those cases, they're all involving independent contractors, a bank that hired somebody to keep ice off the sidewalk, a company that hired someone to salvage a vessel. Not one of them is involving an employee doing the employee's duty. So this whole issue, which was brought up in the petition for cert, about the consequences of finding that an employee is going to be able to be sued by a co-employee, I think is at the root of what's inescapably wrong in this case. And it seems like the Virgin Islands Supreme Court took pains, and perhaps with all due respect, because I agree they are doing a very, it's a great wonderful time to be a Virgin Islands bar member and to see our Supreme Court doing what it's doing. And in a way it pains me, but it's still, I think, a problem in this decision where they've gone to the wrong conclusion based upon the way they've gone about looking at these cases, as well as the definitions in the statute and whether or not they're there or not there. And that analysis remains to be seen, what it would be if they decided that no of the legislature didn't intend, and it's not clear that the legislature intended to remove these definitions. Would that lead to a different analysis? I don't know, but I think that if this court looks at the analysis and looks at what they're doing, it'll find that the way there's basically applying statutory construction is in a way that should not be done, that results in a clearly erroneous end result. And one other thing I want to point out too is the legislature never, in the decades since Tavarez came out, worked to change or to pass legislation to change Tavarez. But if anything, the legislature has embraced Tavarez as being exactly what is meant under the Workers' Compensation Act. And so that never gets really considered. And the fact that in the 22 jurisdictions of the 26, I think, jurisdictions that had this issue with what's the third party and does it include a different point? The Supreme Court did not, in their opinion, address the inaction, shall we call it, on the part of the legislature today. They did not
. Not one of them is involving an employee doing the employee's duty. So this whole issue, which was brought up in the petition for cert, about the consequences of finding that an employee is going to be able to be sued by a co-employee, I think is at the root of what's inescapably wrong in this case. And it seems like the Virgin Islands Supreme Court took pains, and perhaps with all due respect, because I agree they are doing a very, it's a great wonderful time to be a Virgin Islands bar member and to see our Supreme Court doing what it's doing. And in a way it pains me, but it's still, I think, a problem in this decision where they've gone to the wrong conclusion based upon the way they've gone about looking at these cases, as well as the definitions in the statute and whether or not they're there or not there. And that analysis remains to be seen, what it would be if they decided that no of the legislature didn't intend, and it's not clear that the legislature intended to remove these definitions. Would that lead to a different analysis? I don't know, but I think that if this court looks at the analysis and looks at what they're doing, it'll find that the way there's basically applying statutory construction is in a way that should not be done, that results in a clearly erroneous end result. And one other thing I want to point out too is the legislature never, in the decades since Tavarez came out, worked to change or to pass legislation to change Tavarez. But if anything, the legislature has embraced Tavarez as being exactly what is meant under the Workers' Compensation Act. And so that never gets really considered. And the fact that in the 22 jurisdictions of the 26, I think, jurisdictions that had this issue with what's the third party and does it include a different point? The Supreme Court did not, in their opinion, address the inaction, shall we call it, on the part of the legislature today. They did not. That's my recollection. And what we find from reading what they did address is that 22 other jurisdictions jumped when they found out that employees were going to be considered third parties, they jumped to change. So if anything, the overall legislative intent throughout the country is to have employees be immune. And so in conclusion, I do believe that the issue of whether or not the decision is inescapably wrong is embodied in the petition for cert. It's coming up through the issue of whether or not they're required to follow the third circuit at least during this period of time, why the third circuit is the highest court of the world. Thank you very much, Mr. Bexted. I hope you get rid of that code while this panel returns to the Northeast and the mainland. I think you'll be doing better over the long haul than we will. Thank you for a well argued case council. We'll take the matter under advisement