Okay. All persons having business with the Honourary United States Court to kill state third Circuit are not issued wrong here under their attention. This court is now in session. God save the United States and its Honourary Court is to be seated. The last time you thought, wow, can we get some more of this? How's your name? I'm here, you judge. I have, but we can't see it. I don't know. We have nothing to do with it. It was a slightest bit of a shock. It was a slightly different day. I don't know if you can do that, but I'm normal. I'll certainly drop you. Okay. This is dangerous. Good morning, Ruby. Good morning. I'm sorry you can't see me. I'm sorry you can't see me. I'm sorry you can't see me
. How do you get in? Life wouldn't be worth living if I couldn't see you. That's it. That's the best thing. Yeah, no, closer. But it brings me a little help. No. What? Yeah, we'll set it off. Actually, see. Okay, we have to remember that there's a camera up there that has to be able to capture the attorney as well. But we have only two of them in the two sets. Okay. We think it was just was. We're sitting right in the lamp. What is that? Is that okay? I'm here. Now you have to ask Judge. You have to ask. I can see. Get all of this here
. Fine. Okay. I think many of you who come here pretty often, then we have this video conferencing, which prevents judges who are at a distance that doesn't allow them to come to art for one reason or another to come to an argument to join us and to participate in the oral argument. We did it with Judge Wise and Pittsburgh on Tuesday. And we're doing it with Judge Holiser in sunny California today. But the weather here is great, Ruby. So we're sorry you're not here. Perfected. Well, I'm sorry I'm not there to join my colleagues. Okay. All right. We won't hear. I haven't sent all that. We will hear argument in from Rico versus Hendipo. Okay. May I please before my name is Colledo Hassan. I appear at my behalf would be a pellant, General Fred or Rico. And before I start, I would like to request six minutes for the rebuttal
. Six minutes. That's fine. Okay. Mr. Hassan, let me just tell you the matter that we asked you to argue before us one. Is the question of our jurisdiction. And particularly we're held in, I haven't any of it. When the amount of controversy, your client, let me see, oh no, you're the pellant. So you represent Fred Rico. Yes, so you're really not the main person on this, but you go ahead and comment too. I don't want my first comment, I don't want to just like to say that there is no jurisdiction. The respondent home depot had the burden of proving to legal certainty that the amount in controversy was $5 million and more. But can't they base that on what you say in your complaint? On my complaint, there is nothing in my complaint that specifies what the amount of damages sought are you on it. Well, but they're underlying facts. They're underlying facts. And Tom Deepow has said that based on these underlying facts, if they are accepted as true, which one does at this point, that would support jurisdiction because you talk of thousands of similar, similarly situated versions. Well, there are two things to say about that. The first is that if you take the complaint and listen to it's scrapped, the damages of $250, which is similar to the damages that are sought by the federal courts
. And what I would say is that it was $279, something like that. But if there were some fees over there, we're only going to see the late fees that we say are excessive. So that comes to somewhere around $250. If you multiply that by $2000 or $10,000, it puts you in a range of between $500,000, half a million dollars, to $2.5 million. If you prevel down into the CFA, it takes you to a range of $1.5 million at a minimum to a maximum of $7.5 billion. But they can get put into damages and they can get counsel fees. And my question to you is why didn't you move to dismiss from at the time of the removal? Why didn't you move to dismiss or to remand on the ground that there was no federal jurisdiction? And the thought of the rule we're on are we assume that they're actually what's federal jurisdiction based on the assumption that because the maximum would have exceeded $5 million, that that would have suffice. But as it turns out, as it turns out, the burden is actually on the proponent of removal. And they cannot leave it to the court or the opponent to refute. Because in order for us to actually ascertain what the exact announcement would have had to go into the records, the business records during the time period. But you couldn't have done that. You can do that in discovery. We were about to ask them, I'm telling the pros and lawyers, we were going to ask them what they did. But it's sort of unfair for you to sit back after having an adverse, I mean you didn't even, nobody raised jurisdiction this court on its own motion. And I'm pointing to myself, raised jurisdictional issue, sort of unfair, do you know what I'm saying now? Well, we will go back to the same court
. Shouldn't we assume that your silence suggests that you would agree that there was $5 million in controversy after aggregation as we can do under Kaffa 1332D? Our silence indicated that we thought that because there was a possibility that the amounts could exceed $5 million, that that's all that Kaffa required. And bearing my darn head, the time was when it was fall Kaffa was a relative reason statue, so they hadn't been that way. It's a very clear statute unlike some of the others who will deal with today. Correct, Your Honor. However, I just like to point out that our assumption was that the maximum possible is what you find whether you reach that threshold of over 5 million. But as it turns out, under one of the cases cited in morning V.Gay, and specifically that's a drill. I'm going to tell you, this is Judge Alderson, when you keep your voice up all the time, you're very strong and then you drop the force of your speech, I cannot hear you when you drop your voice. I apologize, Your Honor, I'll try to be very honest. But in the case of real, which is cited in morning V.Gay, it's specifically stated that the defendant's burden goes beyond what amount could be in conferversy to what the actual amount is in conferversy. And the defendant's, because they're the ones in the description of their own business records, are the party that's capable of ascertain exactly what that amount or at least the outside parameter of what the class of claimants could be. Is that getting into the merits of the underlying litigation? No, that's not even getting into the merits. That's basically the finding where the parameters was the maximum number of plaintiffs, the actual plaintiffs of this class. For example, paragraph 18 of the company, which defines, which is the class definition, specifies that the class is consistent of basically the juridic consumers who purchased the rental vehicles from home people's stores that did not have after our return facilities, and were unable to return their vehicles until the following day. The defendant's got gone into their records and basically just came during that class period of how many returns did we have with our late fees for people that were rented on one day with return to the next. Mr. Critchler, this is a crutch, no, I'm sorry
. Until the Morgan case came along, the unfailing case law in the Supreme Court and other courts of appeal won't, if a plaintiff wants to challenge the jurisdiction, he has to do it in good faith and prove to a legal certainty. That is the responsibility of the plaintiff who asserts that we do not have federal jurisdiction. Am I right? Your honor, I believe that the burden has always been on the defendant on the proponent of removal to a status. I am talking about the burden on the part of the person seeking removal. I'm talking about the burden of the plaintiff who claims that there is not federal jurisdiction and that the plaintiff then has the burden. This starts off with what is the case, Tennessee. It starts off with saying you have the burden of proving good faith by a, as in the red cap case, I'm sorry, it's a red cap case. We have the burden of proving to legal certainty. Am I not stating the law as it existed before Morgan? Honesty, I do believe that the burden is always on the proponent of removal, which is in this case, as responded home people. The burden was never on us as the penalty or the plaintiffs to do anything having to do with the amount of controversy. That's always, I submit that, has always been the burden of the burden of removal, which is always going to be the defendant. Sir, I know it's a burden, but we're talking about the extent of the burden now. I use saying it was always on the burden on the person seeking removal to prove jurisdiction by legal certainty. I believe that's the case on our convenience taking, but my understanding of that, yes. Give me a couple, give me a case before Morgan. I'm sorry. And prior to the four, the seven bastard case. I'm just going to write down, I don't know, but if you're just getting some time to write a time, I come to the revert about a moment, pull that one of these cases for you
. I, a council, we ask you folks to be prepared to argue because whether the Morgan case reflected a proper statement of the law. Now, are you prepared to say to make a comment on that? I'm prepared to say that the Morgan case is the current state of the law and the Third Circuit, your honor. I know what we are asking you to comment on it because although this court does not have the power to alter that decision, we have a power to request an in bank reconsideration of that case. Now, I'm asking you that before that case, what was the state of the law? I believe your honor that before that case, the state of the law was that the burden was always going to be on the prior request of removal. I'm going to ask you to comment and I'm going to ask you, please do not say burden. I'm talking about the quantity of the burden burden. I'm talking about good faith and legal certainty. Now, do you understand this? I believe I'm your honor and I believe I'm. I asked your people to be prepared to talk to them and we're not talking about the standard. I should say that. We asked your people to be able to discuss that. Yeah, I should say, really, that partly because of the time difference, I request the council probably didn't reach them until late yesterday afternoon. So that if they have other clients or other things to do, they may not have the name of to respond as quickly because you are on a different time level. Now, let me ask you one other question before you sit down. Yes, Your Honor. It's an entirely different question. If this case gets remanded, now it came out of New Jersey. Yes, Your Honor
. Would the New Jersey Court be bound by collateral or I guess collateral or to the decision of the district court in the federal case? I believe your honor that if it's remanded as is actually no, no, no, no, I think that if the federal court never had jurisdiction in the first case, then the opinion of the lower district court would have been essentially after years. At least at least that would be my understanding. Yeah, I don't know the answer to that. They just accursed me, so we ask you to be prepared for that. Something we may have to look at. Okay, you've reserved the big chunk of time, so we'll get you back for your six minutes. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Yes, please, of course. Ladies and gentlemen, my name is Dwight Davis. I'm Council for Home Depot in this matter. And I would like to go right ahead and start a request in the city of the $5 million in controversy. And so I think our first letter said, while I'm interested in your requirement under rule 11 to plead in good faith, and as I see your response to our original inquiry, it is well, we talk what plaintiff said at face value. And I'm not sure that under rule 11 you can avoid your own responsibility. You made an affirmative move, you find. Made an affirmative move to remove the case to federal court. But what did you do to me, your rule 11 requirement, that in order to assert that $5 million is an issue? Your honor, let me address that straight away
. First, let me start with the proposition that in Judge O'Warth, once it said, in the opinion, I think it was Spellman versus Moridian. There is great confidence placed in the plebix, the complaint. And we do start with that proposition. The plaintiffs alleged that there were tens of thousands, not hundreds of thousands of members of the class, and that they then set out what their actual damages were, and the punitive damages now. But they never said in the complaint which I have in front of me that the amount of, they never let the amount of controversy. Correct, Your Honor. Therefore, did Home Depot have a rule 11 obligation to do, as rule 11 says, an investigational investigation under the circumstances. And the answer that is, yes, Your Honor, we did, and we address that in our submission to you. Let me take an example, if you will. If in the complaint, they said that there were hundreds of thousands of people in this class, and yet our record showed that we only rented five trucks in five years. Well, we know then that they could not be. It could not be. It would be illegal, certainly, that it could not be. In this particular case, we checked our records, and we knew that we had rented over 50,000 trucks per year. During a four-year class period, there are well over 200,000 people that rented trucks. Now, I could not take the next step, however. Again, line goal of my rule 11 obligations, but also I can't take the next step and try to prove the case against my client, because they say that the class consists of people who were deceived. We would say there were zero people who said, you understand? Let's assume that the cleaning has a minimal diversity, and the cleaning has to be more than 100, which is what you need for cash
. For the hunger is a given. The question remains the amount of controversy. Do you record shows how many of the rangers have to pay a penalty, and how much of the penalty? I could not determine that, and therefore I... You can use your hum-deep-hoes records if you go up toward the Senate to the District Court to determine how hum-deep-hoes records wouldn't show how much of a penalty-truck rangers have to pay. It's simply having to rent a truck overnight as a close-day call for that. I could not, particularly on the short notice of our removal time period, we could not determine, again, what's someone deceived? Why would they... Remember, there's two qualifications to be in the class out of your combat. I'm not concerned about the merits, about the deception. Well, let me... That's not the question. The question is, is in good faith, how does the $279 fee come into $5 million? And we laid that out in our removal papers, which is very important to realize. The exact number, by the way, is 286 dollars. Those are the compensatory damages. Then they had a claim for punitive damages under the New Jersey law. They're entitled to five times actual damages, not the three times under the New Jersey consumer protection statute, but five times. We multiply that. We tried to be reasonable. We didn't say that it was an open-ended as some had argued in the golden regulant case, it's just because there's a punitive damage. As we said, no, it's only five times. And then, they're entitled to attorney's fees under the New Jersey consumer law statute. Once again, we did not overreach. We tried to look at what was reasonably reasonable under the circumstances, and that would be 25%. So, the time you run the numbers, you realize that there would only have to be somewhere between 2200 and 2900 members of this class. Again, subject to mindful of our rule 11 obligations, we looked to see that there had been over 200,000 truck rentals during this time. Plaintiffs of legend, they're complaint that there's a pattern in practice. So, there would not be much of a pattern if there wasn't at least 2% of the people that would fall into this theoretical class that they've outlined here. And so, therefore, the potential class could well have been 4,000 or more people. So, saying all that methodology out, we more than met our burden of pleading. How it wasn't that we got to $5 million. And you say all of that is set forth in your debtors are removal
. Those are the compensatory damages. Then they had a claim for punitive damages under the New Jersey law. They're entitled to five times actual damages, not the three times under the New Jersey consumer protection statute, but five times. We multiply that. We tried to be reasonable. We didn't say that it was an open-ended as some had argued in the golden regulant case, it's just because there's a punitive damage. As we said, no, it's only five times. And then, they're entitled to attorney's fees under the New Jersey consumer law statute. Once again, we did not overreach. We tried to look at what was reasonably reasonable under the circumstances, and that would be 25%. So, the time you run the numbers, you realize that there would only have to be somewhere between 2200 and 2900 members of this class. Again, subject to mindful of our rule 11 obligations, we looked to see that there had been over 200,000 truck rentals during this time. Plaintiffs of legend, they're complaint that there's a pattern in practice. So, there would not be much of a pattern if there wasn't at least 2% of the people that would fall into this theoretical class that they've outlined here. And so, therefore, the potential class could well have been 4,000 or more people. So, saying all that methodology out, we more than met our burden of pleading. How it wasn't that we got to $5 million. And you say all of that is set forth in your debtors are removal. In the removal paper, Cheshire. I'm looking at those now. Go ahead. The very important thing you said that I wanted to emphasize, and I think William Judge Ollister said the same thing, why didn't the plaintiffs come forward with this? And I want to make sure that the records are very clear. This was not just silence on the plaintiffs' court. The plaintiffs were asked, after we filed our removal papers by Judge Pazano, how is it that this case has been removed? And the plaintiffs, again, alleged there are hundreds of thousands of people in this class. One other very important thing in the record, sometimes this is overlooked. I know even throw clerks, sometimes we'll overlook this. Page one of the plaintiffs' brief in this court says that jurisdiction was propped in the court bill. The first time, at any time in this record, that anyone from the plaintiffs side said that jurisdiction was improper, was today at this podium. And that is improper. But you understand we have a modification to check our subject matter 26. I agree with that. Let's get to Judge Ollister's point, which I thought was a very good one. As I understand, he doesn't want to use the word burden. But I think, let's say, whose responsibility or what is the standard, maybe that's the better word in the burden. I think the standard is better. You want to ask your question then, movie? The doctor said, what is the standard by which we judge, whether the amount in controversy allegations lead to federal jurisdiction under CAFER? I do understand the question, and I am prepared to address it
. In the removal paper, Cheshire. I'm looking at those now. Go ahead. The very important thing you said that I wanted to emphasize, and I think William Judge Ollister said the same thing, why didn't the plaintiffs come forward with this? And I want to make sure that the records are very clear. This was not just silence on the plaintiffs' court. The plaintiffs were asked, after we filed our removal papers by Judge Pazano, how is it that this case has been removed? And the plaintiffs, again, alleged there are hundreds of thousands of people in this class. One other very important thing in the record, sometimes this is overlooked. I know even throw clerks, sometimes we'll overlook this. Page one of the plaintiffs' brief in this court says that jurisdiction was propped in the court bill. The first time, at any time in this record, that anyone from the plaintiffs side said that jurisdiction was improper, was today at this podium. And that is improper. But you understand we have a modification to check our subject matter 26. I agree with that. Let's get to Judge Ollister's point, which I thought was a very good one. As I understand, he doesn't want to use the word burden. But I think, let's say, whose responsibility or what is the standard, maybe that's the better word in the burden. I think the standard is better. You want to ask your question then, movie? The doctor said, what is the standard by which we judge, whether the amount in controversy allegations lead to federal jurisdiction under CAFER? I do understand the question, and I am prepared to address it. And I do believe that Morgan V. Gay was a departure from well-established procedure. We can't change it. I understand. We have to go back to changing it. I'm still right, even under Morgan V. Gay. But I do think that it was a departure in a very important way. It was too broad and saying that it applied to all circumstances. Judge Ollister, I think the correct analysis would be if the plaintiff in their complaint is either ambiguous or clearly leaves open the opportunity that there is more than $5 million in controversy. I think that it is the removing parties, the standard of proof that they have to come up with. If you do the right, I'm trying to avoid the burden that they're standard. I have to go all the way so I'll come down on you. I'll just come up with making the statement in good faith, subject of your obligations under rule, to say whether or not the $5 million in controversy has been met. Now the issue has been joined. As the court in Brill said, in this particular case, it would be complaint in vague and ambiguous or leaves open the possibility that there is $5 million in stake. And the defendant now removes that removal paper takes the place of the complaint. It serves the function of the complaint
. And I do believe that Morgan V. Gay was a departure from well-established procedure. We can't change it. I understand. We have to go back to changing it. I'm still right, even under Morgan V. Gay. But I do think that it was a departure in a very important way. It was too broad and saying that it applied to all circumstances. Judge Ollister, I think the correct analysis would be if the plaintiff in their complaint is either ambiguous or clearly leaves open the opportunity that there is more than $5 million in controversy. I think that it is the removing parties, the standard of proof that they have to come up with. If you do the right, I'm trying to avoid the burden that they're standard. I have to go all the way so I'll come down on you. I'll just come up with making the statement in good faith, subject of your obligations under rule, to say whether or not the $5 million in controversy has been met. Now the issue has been joined. As the court in Brill said, in this particular case, it would be complaint in vague and ambiguous or leaves open the possibility that there is $5 million in stake. And the defendant now removes that removal paper takes the place of the complaint. It serves the function of the complaint. Now it is up to the plaintiff to come forward with evidence that shows to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy must be less than $5 million. And here they would have said, Morgan holds that you have to prove this to a legal certainty. You are yet to say that, but in the context of a very important fact, Morgan, in the Morgan case, the plaintiffs said in their complaint that the amount in controversy was less than $5 million. I believe that under those circumstances, it would be the defendant's obligation to comment to prove to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy cannot be less than $5 million. That's not our situation. The ninth circuit recently said that Laverneville, a dominant political certainty said, your standard, are you saying as the issue whether the standard should be legal certainty or whether it's the party removing who has the responsibility? I don't think that it's the legal certainty standard at all. So you accept the fact that whoever has to, and I will use burden because I'm using all the time, whoever has the burden has to prove it or disprove it by a legal certainty. I'm going to agree with Judge Alcerto that it's not the question of burden. This is a question of shitting burdens. I think that the Morgan case and the real case set up the situation perfectly and showed why Louisville was brought here. But this standard is legal certainty to accept that. I do accept that. That's clear. That's the point. That's the point. Now, Judge Slomitor has referred to the ninth circuit case. The ninth circuit case relied on our case in Morgan. So it's very important for this court to have been right in Morgan
. Now it is up to the plaintiff to come forward with evidence that shows to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy must be less than $5 million. And here they would have said, Morgan holds that you have to prove this to a legal certainty. You are yet to say that, but in the context of a very important fact, Morgan, in the Morgan case, the plaintiffs said in their complaint that the amount in controversy was less than $5 million. I believe that under those circumstances, it would be the defendant's obligation to comment to prove to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy cannot be less than $5 million. That's not our situation. The ninth circuit recently said that Laverneville, a dominant political certainty said, your standard, are you saying as the issue whether the standard should be legal certainty or whether it's the party removing who has the responsibility? I don't think that it's the legal certainty standard at all. So you accept the fact that whoever has to, and I will use burden because I'm using all the time, whoever has the burden has to prove it or disprove it by a legal certainty. I'm going to agree with Judge Alcerto that it's not the question of burden. This is a question of shitting burdens. I think that the Morgan case and the real case set up the situation perfectly and showed why Louisville was brought here. But this standard is legal certainty to accept that. I do accept that. That's clear. That's the point. That's the point. Now, Judge Slomitor has referred to the ninth circuit case. The ninth circuit case relied on our case in Morgan. So it's very important for this court to have been right in Morgan. I think that in the abstract... If you had your brothers, if you had your brothers speaking before us, and then this panel had the power. The only part we have is to make a sort of recommendation if we want to go and bang. But if you had your brothers, how would you argue that the party seeking removal has to meet a standard of legal certainty? I'm going to answer your question and then I want to make sure I explain something. I would say that is too high a burden in all cases and in all circumstances. It is in practical. It is not consistent with the letter and the spirit of Kappa in that we were supposed to be able to remove cases that had drastic impact on interstate commerce and had large amounts at the removal stage. I've got to come in and prove to a legal certainty that the amount is absolutely going to be more than $5 million. I think it's too high. But that's generally been the rule. That's been the rule in not only the ninth circuit but also the third but also the eleventh. The eleventh and the eleventh versus the made-tack holding that Kappa does not alter the traditional rule that the proponent of federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving the amount of controversy. The rule was a seventh circuit case so that the general accepted rule is that the proponent and I think you've sorted that at the beginning. The proponent of federal jurisdiction bears what the courts have always referred to as the burden of proving the amount of controversy. Let's just one hand. Just one hand
. I think that in the abstract... If you had your brothers, if you had your brothers speaking before us, and then this panel had the power. The only part we have is to make a sort of recommendation if we want to go and bang. But if you had your brothers, how would you argue that the party seeking removal has to meet a standard of legal certainty? I'm going to answer your question and then I want to make sure I explain something. I would say that is too high a burden in all cases and in all circumstances. It is in practical. It is not consistent with the letter and the spirit of Kappa in that we were supposed to be able to remove cases that had drastic impact on interstate commerce and had large amounts at the removal stage. I've got to come in and prove to a legal certainty that the amount is absolutely going to be more than $5 million. I think it's too high. But that's generally been the rule. That's been the rule in not only the ninth circuit but also the third but also the eleventh. The eleventh and the eleventh versus the made-tack holding that Kappa does not alter the traditional rule that the proponent of federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving the amount of controversy. The rule was a seventh circuit case so that the general accepted rule is that the proponent and I think you've sorted that at the beginning. The proponent of federal jurisdiction bears what the courts have always referred to as the burden of proving the amount of controversy. Let's just one hand. Just one hand. The bill did not hold that bill held the exact opposite. Saying the only time you talk about legal certainty is where the plaintiff wishes to say we do not meet the statutory of all the cases. Every one of the cases that we have in the Honduras evidence and I'm speaking United States Court's jurisprudence until Morgan and possibly a statement made by Judge Wise in what is in the Kappa event. The senior basic case has your research discovered any other case saying that the legal certainty test is on the person seeking removal. No one stepped for an any case in the Supreme Court in the case of Justice Black following the red cap case in all referred to the limited situation where the plaintiff who originally had asserted federal jurisdiction. Now wants to say there is not enough and the courts have said look you have to prove it's not enough in order to establish good faith you have to prove it by legal certainty. Am I exaggerating the case of the law? Your honor, I think. Judge Svopritor was right. We got this lady yesterday. I think we did look at that thoroughly enough to we just say I agree with you in in that analysis. There's one thing I did in my time as a man. Sure. I'm not sure that this is the case to take on Morgan though and it is for the simple reason that Morgan was a case where the plaintiff joined the issue by saying the amount in controversy is not $5 million. The brutal case on the other hand was a situation where it was ambiguous and their brutal articulated the correct rule which is and those circumstances is the defendant that has now raised the issue and shifts the burden if you will to the plaintiff now to come and improve that he could not be less. And that's why it's so important that they waived that judge Roth in the Korean the Korean bank case you said that the question is is it just as you know proceduralist could they have bought this case in federal court and if it is if they could have that it is a procedural issue and you can waive subject matter jurisdiction. I mean I'm not raising it. It's just I mean and I think judge will the certain would agree with that. I mean that you just subject matter jurisdiction can be raised and I thought some procedure at any time until the case is finished
. The bill did not hold that bill held the exact opposite. Saying the only time you talk about legal certainty is where the plaintiff wishes to say we do not meet the statutory of all the cases. Every one of the cases that we have in the Honduras evidence and I'm speaking United States Court's jurisprudence until Morgan and possibly a statement made by Judge Wise in what is in the Kappa event. The senior basic case has your research discovered any other case saying that the legal certainty test is on the person seeking removal. No one stepped for an any case in the Supreme Court in the case of Justice Black following the red cap case in all referred to the limited situation where the plaintiff who originally had asserted federal jurisdiction. Now wants to say there is not enough and the courts have said look you have to prove it's not enough in order to establish good faith you have to prove it by legal certainty. Am I exaggerating the case of the law? Your honor, I think. Judge Svopritor was right. We got this lady yesterday. I think we did look at that thoroughly enough to we just say I agree with you in in that analysis. There's one thing I did in my time as a man. Sure. I'm not sure that this is the case to take on Morgan though and it is for the simple reason that Morgan was a case where the plaintiff joined the issue by saying the amount in controversy is not $5 million. The brutal case on the other hand was a situation where it was ambiguous and their brutal articulated the correct rule which is and those circumstances is the defendant that has now raised the issue and shifts the burden if you will to the plaintiff now to come and improve that he could not be less. And that's why it's so important that they waived that judge Roth in the Korean the Korean bank case you said that the question is is it just as you know proceduralist could they have bought this case in federal court and if it is if they could have that it is a procedural issue and you can waive subject matter jurisdiction. I mean I'm not raising it. It's just I mean and I think judge will the certain would agree with that. I mean that you just subject matter jurisdiction can be raised and I thought some procedure at any time until the case is finished. I've completely agree on it but I made one more more quote though. But in trying to determine whether someone has met their burden of proof you can you can say you did not come at the appropriate time you did not come for the evidence of proof that was in the paper. But we're asking in that whole. And I told you I've explained to you how it is that we got over the $5 million. I think that's thank you. Thank you very much. All right is that all right with you? The letter is the top. That's fine. That's fine. Thank you. The first thing I'd like to address your honor is they should have the left thing that was addressed by by Home Depot which is that as far as subject matter jurisdiction and in bril specifically addressing capital. So in noted that a proponent of removal cannot leave it to an opponent to refuse the monetary basis for calf adjuristician, the amount of controversy. The burden at least according to bril. And I thought it was on the standard according to bril. This purpose on the side of the plate that has no way of showing would be actual amount in controversy is in their own stages of litigation. And very much in this case. So far this case was dismissed at the 12 b six stage. There has been no discovery
. I've completely agree on it but I made one more more quote though. But in trying to determine whether someone has met their burden of proof you can you can say you did not come at the appropriate time you did not come for the evidence of proof that was in the paper. But we're asking in that whole. And I told you I've explained to you how it is that we got over the $5 million. I think that's thank you. Thank you very much. All right is that all right with you? The letter is the top. That's fine. That's fine. Thank you. The first thing I'd like to address your honor is they should have the left thing that was addressed by by Home Depot which is that as far as subject matter jurisdiction and in bril specifically addressing capital. So in noted that a proponent of removal cannot leave it to an opponent to refuse the monetary basis for calf adjuristician, the amount of controversy. The burden at least according to bril. And I thought it was on the standard according to bril. This purpose on the side of the plate that has no way of showing would be actual amount in controversy is in their own stages of litigation. And very much in this case. So far this case was dismissed at the 12 b six stage. There has been no discovery. There has been nothing that would allow us to ascertain what the actual amounting controversy is. And I so even that both bril and wargon are correct in keeping that burden, keeping that standard requirement with the proponent of removal. What do you want us to do if we want what do you think this court should do? Since it does not have to subject matter jurisdiction, it should simply remain the case back to state court. But we don't know what we have to restate. Why shouldn't we just send back and let the district court hearing on after giving whoever needs discovery limited just to the court? What's to the question of amount of controversy? Is there any reason why we shouldn't do that? I don't see any other reason why that kind of me done. Mr. Crutchlow, I just want to make it clear. No, the Ruby, the council has changed. You didn't get the change. He's not Mr. Crutchlow. He's Mr. Allison. Oh, I'm very sorry. Okay. Excuse me. What is your name, sir? Allison, Colleen. Allison, your honor
. There has been nothing that would allow us to ascertain what the actual amounting controversy is. And I so even that both bril and wargon are correct in keeping that burden, keeping that standard requirement with the proponent of removal. What do you want us to do if we want what do you think this court should do? Since it does not have to subject matter jurisdiction, it should simply remain the case back to state court. But we don't know what we have to restate. Why shouldn't we just send back and let the district court hearing on after giving whoever needs discovery limited just to the court? What's to the question of amount of controversy? Is there any reason why we shouldn't do that? I don't see any other reason why that kind of me done. Mr. Crutchlow, I just want to make it clear. No, the Ruby, the council has changed. You didn't get the change. He's not Mr. Crutchlow. He's Mr. Allison. Oh, I'm very sorry. Okay. Excuse me. What is your name, sir? Allison, Colleen. Allison, your honor. All right, sir. I didn't want you to give the notion for my original questioning of you that I felt that you had a burden of proving no jurisdiction by a high standard of legal certainty. Because you never did assert that a jurisdiction did you? No, Your Honor. We never did. We followed this case in state court. And so the legal certainty rule would never apply to you to establish or not establish jurisdiction. I just want to make that clear. I agree with your whole heart of the honor. Yeah. Go ahead. I saw that time. If you want to use it. Actually, I think we've covered just that. I think we've covered everything in right now in this court. To say something more, just be safe, so it's safe, so it's okay, so unless the panel has any more. So why is man, I hope everybody in the audience realized that not all that, good lawyer sometimes say, you know, I have nothing more to say. Okay. Thank you
. Thank you, Your Honor. We will take this interesting matter under advisement. It wasn't raised by the party's side point out, but it was raised, it was sponsored by the court. Because it's an essence of federal courts that we are courts of limited jurisdiction, my little civil procedure teaching for the day. Thank you, Council. And we will hear the next case. Which is CSX Transportation Company versus Movelong