I'm here having represented my husband, which everyone knows, in a lawsuit filed in Kamala County, Texas, subsequently removed to the Western District of Texas in San Antonio. The issues in this case are pretty cut and dry. The law is pretty clear on both. The first issue is whether the removal of this case from Kamala County, Texas to the Western District was compliant with the removal statutes, which 28 U.S.C. 1446. It's clear that a federal judge, a federal court, has to have jurisdiction in order to consider a lawsuit. There's two ways that the court can get that jurisdiction. One is federal question. The other is diversity, jurisdiction. It's my contention that straight-up diversity is controlled more readily by 1332. That's an instance where an individual anticipates a diversity situation and files initiates a law suit in federal court under 1332. That's not what happened in this instance. In this instance, George Matassorin asserted his right to proceed in Kamala County, Texas, with the lawsuit that he filed under the Texas Long Arm Statute. I see today that there's two cases before you that have some long arm aspects to them
. Now, my contention is that when a case is improved and removed from a court that already, a state court that already has assumed jurisdiction to federal court, that it imposes a wrongful burden on the plaintiff. Clearly, the plaintiff has the right to select the forum. That's established by the Caterpillar case. The US Supreme Court has said, you know, a plaintiff has the right to choose the forum. He chose a state court. When his case is removed to federal court, then the federal court's jurisdiction is imposed on the plaintiff. It's not something he selected. The obvious issue that everyone thinks, when I say this, is, well, but a federal court has, Congress has given a federal court the right to consider a matter that is a diversity matter. I'm contending though that it has to be in compliance with the legislated removal requirements. So those requirements operate almost like a statute of limitations. They're very specific. Here's what you must do. You must file the removal petition. You must attach to it a copy of all process served on the defendants. And since Getty Oil, the Getty Oil case, which is a very similar case, not only in the Fifth Circuit, but nationally, that was decided in 1988
. You must include written concerns from each removing defendant. And it doesn't matter whether they are an individual who owns a company, and both the individual and the company have been sued, the consistent case law in the Fifth Circuit has been. If you don't get a separate written consent signed by each defendant, the removal's improper. Now you have 30 days from the last serve defendant now after the Clarification Act to gather up this information, put it together and seek the removal. Some courts in other circuits have found that, well, if you don't get the process papers included for each defendant or every defendant that's removing, that's not really a serious enough defect to deny the continued jurisdiction, the removal jurisdiction. I contend that it is, and here's why. The statute reads that you need to include the process documents, which indicate that there's been proper service on the defendants. Well, the operative burden that is proper. And a defendant who chooses maybe not to include a document as in this case, Dennis Grozener, as an individual, at his process documents, to say, well, L.C. did not. It goes together with the reasoning that the Fifth Circuit has had for requiring separately signed consent. And that's because you want to be able to bind these defendants to the federal courts jurisdiction, because if they're not bound properly, if they haven't consented, maybe the process wasn't proper. They go ahead, they go into federal court, maybe they don't like the judge, they get, maybe they don't like the result that they get. And they can come back and say, oh, well, gee, I'm a New Mexico corporation or company
. And the person who was supposed to sign for me or the person who was supposed to have been served on my behalf was not. Therefore, I really wasn't properly served. Now, these requirements for removal are very specific. And the language used mentions that these two particular things include the process and include a written, I mean, and that each of the defendants must consent. I thought you have another argument that you need to spend some time on. Do you have another argument besides this one that you need to spend some time on in this case? On the personal jurisdiction, yes. Under the long-arm statute. Would you like for me to move on to that one? All right. I think that the case law that I've cited in my brief, both in the initial brief and in my reply brief, clearly demonstrate that the Texas long-arm statute, the language of the statute, and the statute as it has been applied in the state of Texas, and in courts here in the fifth circuit, is constitutional. I mean, it's been said that it extends to the length of the Constitution within the due process requirements. And it simply says, and the Supreme Court case that I cited in my brief along with the one that was just cited by Mr. Y. Gannon-Mundy, those cases do not eliminate a state's prerogative under a long-arm statute to protect individual state citizens from malfeasance or fraud committed by out-of-state operators. It's clear in the fifth circuit, it's been clear in the state of Texas for a long time, that there must be minimum context, there must be purposeful available. In the government, it can't be inadvertent or unintended, and that the defendant has to make some sort of effort to target the society and economy of a given solver
. And by targeting the society, they mean an individual. And one particular act of purposeful available, particularly when there is an allegation of fraud, will suffice in the Texas long-arm statute. And we have cited multiple instances where the defendant's came into the state, purposely targeted Mr. Matassorin, in the state of Texas, in Kamal County, sent him a contract, an offer, to buy a piece of real estate in New Mexico, that offer was sent to Texas. It was accepted by Mr. Matassorin in Kamal County, Texas. It required that he perform within a certain period of time, he had to make an application for a loan within three days, he needed to be able to qualify for the loan within a short period of time. He made all of that a curtain Texas, the money that was put down on the property, which was 25% on a property that was sold for $175,000, quite a bit of cash, and he had to be able to qualify for the loan. Well, his job was in the state of Texas, he's continuing to work to this day. So all of what was necessary to compile the consideration necessary to close on this particular transaction, according to Texas. On top of that, the closing documents were sent to him in the state of Texas by courier, received at his home in Kamal County, Texas, and he went to a fidelity national title company office in Texas to accomplish his closing of this particular property. The allocations in the state petition were sufficient under Texas law. It's clear from Mr. Y. Gens response from the defendant's response that they know exactly what the complaint is
. There was some initial complaint that the Texas state court pleading, consisting of 10 pages, did not comply with federal pleading requirements. There was a, you know, some discussion about emotion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under federal pleading standards. Well, it's clear in Texas that notice pleading is sufficient. If you end up with Texas, you know, involuntarily a Texas pleading in federal court, the federal pleading standards obviously cannot be imposed because the plaintiff didn't intend to be in federal court. Now, ultimately, that particular part of it wasn't specifically addressed by the court, but I think that the court may have been influenced somewhat by that. Well, you didn't, please, with specific, with specific, Mr. Matassard made an allegation that specific representations of fraud were made not only by the defendant's in this case, but also by their counsel. In the state of Texas, this was all sent to Texas. And the cases that have addressed this issue generally focus on the, given the type of case it is, I mean, again, it can be one contact. The most courts now try to look at the cases of a whole. What happened in this particular instance and clearly undeniably multiple specific contacts were made by the defendant's into the state of Texas to induce Mr. Matassard to enter into a contract, which excluded a portion of property, which would have been very valuable to him. On top of that, and I want to emphasize this too, because I think it's important that during the process of this, the New Mexico Council specifically represented against a letter set to come all county Texas. That well, if you're going to continue to complain about this, you need to understand that under New Mexico law, once this merger happens, then you're stuck with something. You don't really get to challenge it later
. That's not the case in Texas law. All the more reason for the Texas long arm statute to be invoked. On top of that, as well, this layer intimated that there would be trouble. You're not going to get out of the law so there's going to be an assertion by the defendants that you need to perform under this contract, because we're not going to let you out of it. Mr. Matassard was looking, he's a man who will be 71 in November, looking to buy some property and a vacation area. Doesn't want to be intimidated and coercive. Okay, well, this is a lawyer telling us this is going to be okay. And I'm a lawyer and I understand that because I would not tell someone something that was false. Why? Because I can be sanctioned for it and where I'm licensed. But the question then becomes that they're going to intime that well, we're not going to let you out of this. We want, we're going to pursue specific performance. Where would that be? Would they follow along suit in New Mexico? Mr. Matassard had never been in New Mexico in connection with this transaction. So if they were going to have to pursue something, they never indicated where
. But he resides in Texas, works in Texas. I would assume that they would sue him in Texas for specific performance. You have to remember that if you qualify for these loans under the terms of the contract, you generally are required to go forward and close on the transaction. And that's why we think the court aired in the removal procedure. The case should have been remanded immediately and the court's analysis for personal jurisdiction under Long Arm was incorrect as well. Thank you, Mr. Tennis. Any ask some time on the bottle? Mr. Ranzel. May I please the court? My name is Mark Wigan. I represent the defendant's Dennis Grovner, who is a citizen of Colorado and a part-time resident of New Mexico and defendant Deseo LLC, which is a New Mexico Limited liability company. I'd like to direct my argument on three issues. First, the defendants do not have minimum contacts with Texas. Second, the defendants have not committed a tort in Texas. And third, the plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden of proof as to minimum contacts or a tort
. As to the minimum contacts specific personal jurisdiction inquiry, the court has given us a three-part test in Cyforth versus Helicopter, Satooneros. And that case was recently reaffirmed by the courts in last month's decision in Monkton versus Ritter versus Butterfield Bank. And I'll come back to the Monkton case in a moment that I would like to review the, a broad overview of the facts in the light of the three-part test in Cyforth. First, the point is on three points. Basically, first, the defendants have no purposely directed activities into Texas. They have made no solicitations and no marketing trips into Texas or to Texas. The defendants have mailed no marketing materials to Texas and they have no website. The defendants real estate agent did have a website, but under the ZIPO case analysis, it is a passive website and so it doesn't count as a for minimum contacts purposes. The second point is that the defendants have not purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of doing business in Texas. I thought they went there to have meetings. No, you're on a big notch. Didn't they make threats to Mr. Matassarun? No, they did not. The allegation was that they were intimidating him, forcing him to go through with the contract, even without this specific property that had been admitted. Was that not true? That's not true, you're on a
. There were no threats made. No. I don't see any in the record. Well, you heard the argument this morning. Yes, it's simply not supported by the record. So there were no contacts, no physical visits by either of these defendants? No, you're on a not to Texas and not with the plaintiff. And not what? Not not with the plaintiff and no physical visits by these defendants to Texas and no physical visits of these defendants with the plaintiff. Well, there were allegations about misrepresentations by your client, fraud. That was directed to a Texas resident, wasn't it? I mean, allegedly. With regard to fraud, your honor, the allegations are in three categories. Basically, the defendant has alleged that there were numerous emails and faxes related to him in Texas by various agents, he says. And he says that those representations are those emails and faxes induced him to sign the contract, but he does not tell us your honor how those emails or faxes are inducements and how he was damaged by them. So they do not rise to the level of evidence of fraud because they're not pled with the particularity required by rule 9B. And there's simply no color. There's no description of what these emails or faxes say
. The second category that he refers to is post-judgment, and I'm sorry, post-sale. He alleges that after the sale he discovered that there had been misuse of the funds of the HOA corporation. That's not evidence of fraud in this case or misrepresentation because Mr. Matassorin does not have standing to bring that claim. That claim could only be brought by the HOA nonprofit corporation regarding mismanagement of its funds, if in fact there were any. But again, he provides no evidence of what this mismanagement is. There's no disclosure of no evidence of the bank accounts or checks or minutes of the meetings of HOA meetings. So we're given nothing. It's so vague that it doesn't rise to the level of primatasia evidence, honor. The third category that he alleges that council addressed was a letter sent to Mr. Matassorin's council, Mr. Matassorin council in this case. In that letter he alleges that there were statements made that were misrepresentations. But the issue there was Mr. Matassorin wanted two covered parking spaces. And in defendant's attorney's letter to the plaintiff's attorney, the defendant's attorney says, no, you only get one covered parking space. You get another space, but it's uncovered and it's in the common area. This allegation of Mr. Matassorin is futile because he acknowledges in his declaration that he understood Mr. Matassorin's letter to say, I only get one parking space. And so he has essentially admitted and acknowledged that he knew what he was buying, which was one parking space, covered. And he understood that. And in addition, I think it's important to note that the contract has a disclaimer paragraph, a standard merger clause. And I'm going to quote from that in pertinent part, it says the buyer is purchasing property based solely upon buyer's inspection and judgment. And not by reason of any representation made to the buyer by the seller, unless expressedly set forth in this agreement. So in that the plaintiff was represented by counsel and all of these issues were clearly addressed in the letter from the defendant's attorney, in which the issue of condominium declarations, the effect of the condominium declarations, the fact that he only gets one covered parking space. All these are addressed in the letter to counsel. And I think that it simply doesn't rise to the level of a misrepresentation. And if we turn to the, if we look at the case of Monkton, if I may go back to your honor to the minimum contacts assertion, the, the, the, the, the Monkton case, well, I'd first like to point out that the Burger King versus Roods Lewis case, a Supreme Court decision in 1985, was embodied by this court in its steward versus Spademan decision. In that case, the court said an individual's contract with an out-of-state party alone cannot establish minimum contacts
. And in defendant's attorney's letter to the plaintiff's attorney, the defendant's attorney says, no, you only get one covered parking space. You get another space, but it's uncovered and it's in the common area. This allegation of Mr. Matassorin is futile because he acknowledges in his declaration that he understood Mr. Matassorin's letter to say, I only get one parking space. And so he has essentially admitted and acknowledged that he knew what he was buying, which was one parking space, covered. And he understood that. And in addition, I think it's important to note that the contract has a disclaimer paragraph, a standard merger clause. And I'm going to quote from that in pertinent part, it says the buyer is purchasing property based solely upon buyer's inspection and judgment. And not by reason of any representation made to the buyer by the seller, unless expressedly set forth in this agreement. So in that the plaintiff was represented by counsel and all of these issues were clearly addressed in the letter from the defendant's attorney, in which the issue of condominium declarations, the effect of the condominium declarations, the fact that he only gets one covered parking space. All these are addressed in the letter to counsel. And I think that it simply doesn't rise to the level of a misrepresentation. And if we turn to the, if we look at the case of Monkton, if I may go back to your honor to the minimum contacts assertion, the, the, the, the, the Monkton case, well, I'd first like to point out that the Burger King versus Roods Lewis case, a Supreme Court decision in 1985, was embodied by this court in its steward versus Spademan decision. In that case, the court said an individual's contract with an out-of-state party alone cannot establish minimum contacts. And then last, or this year in the Walden versus Fiore, the Supreme Court held that the minimum contacts analysis looks to the contacts with the forum, not the individual. So I'll give an example. If, if the defendants had reached out into Texas and they had had established a call center or a sales office in Texas to sell condominiums, and that's how they had contacted the plaintiff, that would be a contact with the forum. Here, all of the, all every one of the contacts, which the plaintiff alleges, are contacts with the plaintiff himself. And those are not contacts that are counted for the minimum contacts analysis under specific personal jurisdiction. It's contacts with the forum. So there were communications fraudulent, allegedly fraudulent communications sent into Texas. We don't know what those communications were. They've not been articulated as to what was fraudulent about them. Apparently, whatever you sent. And the plaintiff hasn't offered those into evidence. They've not been proffered. They've just, just the bald statement that it's fraudulent. But if the plaintiff cries fraud, that does not, that does not satisfy the primafacia evidence requirement for establishing a tort. He has to do it with particularity as required by, as required by rule 9b
. And then last, or this year in the Walden versus Fiore, the Supreme Court held that the minimum contacts analysis looks to the contacts with the forum, not the individual. So I'll give an example. If, if the defendants had reached out into Texas and they had had established a call center or a sales office in Texas to sell condominiums, and that's how they had contacted the plaintiff, that would be a contact with the forum. Here, all of the, all every one of the contacts, which the plaintiff alleges, are contacts with the plaintiff himself. And those are not contacts that are counted for the minimum contacts analysis under specific personal jurisdiction. It's contacts with the forum. So there were communications fraudulent, allegedly fraudulent communications sent into Texas. We don't know what those communications were. They've not been articulated as to what was fraudulent about them. Apparently, whatever you sent. And the plaintiff hasn't offered those into evidence. They've not been proffered. They've just, just the bald statement that it's fraudulent. But if the plaintiff cries fraud, that does not, that does not satisfy the primafacia evidence requirement for establishing a tort. He has to do it with particularity as required by, as required by rule 9b. And there's simply no particularity here. So the, in addition, the Walden versus Fury court says, the plaintiff himself cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. And that's the only link we have here. So if the, if we look at the Burger King court's articulation of the philosophy behind personal jurisdiction, the court said that the contract is merely an intermediate step serving to tie up prior business negotiations with future consequences, which themselves are the real object of the transaction. And I think a real estate contract is the best and simplest example of what the Burger King court is talking about because there is plaintiff and defendant sign a contract, but nothing happens because it's the future consequences of that contract, the paying of the consideration and the passing of the title from the seller to the defendant that is the, are the future consequences, which are the real object. And that real object, those future consequences, those two transactions, the peppercorn for the property took place in New Mexico, and we have the New Mexico escalation declaration stating that it was closed in New Mexico at the title company in New Mexico. And moreover, the plaintiff says in his declaration that he paid for the, for the transaction in Texas, but the, the HUD one settlement statement to catch to the, he hasn't a plaintiff pleaded that, that he was defrauded by mail or by, by your client from in Texas. I mean, he hasn't pleaded intentional toward upon himself in Texas by your client. He has pleaded that, Your Honor, but it does not constitute primafacial evidence of fraud under the Walden, under the Wyatt versus Kaplan case, the court held that this court held that you have to look at the, the elements of the cause of action implicate what the minimum contacts are. In other words, the plaintiff has to put on primafacial evidence of his cause of action in order to withstand a motion to dismiss under rule 12b2. And here there is, there is nothing in the, in the record that rises to the level of unbisrepresentation. The, the only piece of evidence which the, the plaintiff has provided is the letter from the attorney to his attorney. And that letter states nothing misrepresentational, nothing fraudulent. It just says, you're only going to get one parking space that's covered and you get another one that's uncovered. It says that based on the condominium declarations, that's all that any buyer at this time would be entitled to
. And there's simply no particularity here. So the, in addition, the Walden versus Fury court says, the plaintiff himself cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. And that's the only link we have here. So if the, if we look at the Burger King court's articulation of the philosophy behind personal jurisdiction, the court said that the contract is merely an intermediate step serving to tie up prior business negotiations with future consequences, which themselves are the real object of the transaction. And I think a real estate contract is the best and simplest example of what the Burger King court is talking about because there is plaintiff and defendant sign a contract, but nothing happens because it's the future consequences of that contract, the paying of the consideration and the passing of the title from the seller to the defendant that is the, are the future consequences, which are the real object. And that real object, those future consequences, those two transactions, the peppercorn for the property took place in New Mexico, and we have the New Mexico escalation declaration stating that it was closed in New Mexico at the title company in New Mexico. And moreover, the plaintiff says in his declaration that he paid for the, for the transaction in Texas, but the, the HUD one settlement statement to catch to the, he hasn't a plaintiff pleaded that, that he was defrauded by mail or by, by your client from in Texas. I mean, he hasn't pleaded intentional toward upon himself in Texas by your client. He has pleaded that, Your Honor, but it does not constitute primafacial evidence of fraud under the Walden, under the Wyatt versus Kaplan case, the court held that this court held that you have to look at the, the elements of the cause of action implicate what the minimum contacts are. In other words, the plaintiff has to put on primafacial evidence of his cause of action in order to withstand a motion to dismiss under rule 12b2. And here there is, there is nothing in the, in the record that rises to the level of unbisrepresentation. The, the only piece of evidence which the, the plaintiff has provided is the letter from the attorney to his attorney. And that letter states nothing misrepresentational, nothing fraudulent. It just says, you're only going to get one parking space that's covered and you get another one that's uncovered. It says that based on the condominium declarations, that's all that any buyer at this time would be entitled to. And there's, there's nothing in this letter which constitutes an inducement. And, in, in fact, it, it says, you know, I hope you make the decision to purchase, but it's up to you. The plaintiff could have withdrawn from the transaction at that time. You know, this, this is sort of like buying a lawsuit. The, the plaintiff says, I guess the best way to look at it, your honor would be to say, if this letter had said you don't get, or you are, if the letter had said you are going to get two parking spaces. And then later the, the plaintiff has denied the second parking space. That would be fraudulent. Here the letter says you only get one and he acknowledges that. And it also sets out clearly the defendant's attorney's interpretation of the condominium declarations. We haven't been provided by the plaintiff with any evidence that that's incorrect. So there's no evidence in this record that there was any fraud in, in Texas. And moreover, if we look at the, at the, at the. The third part of the test under Cypherthesis helicopter, sataneros, that's the fairness and reasonable the test. If the plaintiff has established minimum contacts or a tort, then the court moves to an analysis of whether it would be fair and reasonable to assert jurisdiction over these foreign defendants in Texas. And there are five factors given by the Burger King Court for that analysis
. And there's, there's nothing in this letter which constitutes an inducement. And, in, in fact, it, it says, you know, I hope you make the decision to purchase, but it's up to you. The plaintiff could have withdrawn from the transaction at that time. You know, this, this is sort of like buying a lawsuit. The, the plaintiff says, I guess the best way to look at it, your honor would be to say, if this letter had said you don't get, or you are, if the letter had said you are going to get two parking spaces. And then later the, the plaintiff has denied the second parking space. That would be fraudulent. Here the letter says you only get one and he acknowledges that. And it also sets out clearly the defendant's attorney's interpretation of the condominium declarations. We haven't been provided by the plaintiff with any evidence that that's incorrect. So there's no evidence in this record that there was any fraud in, in Texas. And moreover, if we look at the, at the, at the. The third part of the test under Cypherthesis helicopter, sataneros, that's the fairness and reasonable the test. If the plaintiff has established minimum contacts or a tort, then the court moves to an analysis of whether it would be fair and reasonable to assert jurisdiction over these foreign defendants in Texas. And there are five factors given by the Burger King Court for that analysis. First, would it be burdensome for these defendants to come from New Mexico to defend in Texas? Well, they don't have any business activities in Texas. And it would be burdensome. The second one is does the forum states interest, what is the forum states interest in adjudicating the matter? Well, Texas courts have no interest in adjudicating the rights of parties under a New Mexico real estate contract in which the properties in New Mexico, New Mexico, the contract states that it's governed by New Mexico law and the plaintiff himself owns property in New Mexico. The third element of that test is whether the plaintiff's interest in securing relief. Here, the plaintiff's spouse has filed suit in federal district court in Santa Fe on the same claims that are in this case and against the same defendants. So these two defendants here before this court are also defendants in a similar case in New Mexico where they've also added the defendant's attorney as a defendant and another homeowner that doesn't agree with the plaintiffs view of these matters. So it can't be disputed that the plaintiff needs the Texas forum to adjudicate his dispute. Why? Because the plaintiff's attorney has spouse and the plaintiff have a complete identity of interest. They both are owners of this property. One month after the property was transferred to the plaintiff, the Mr. Matassarin quit claimed a half interest to his wife. So now they're both owners. So now we have one owner filing suit in federal court in Santa Fe, New Mexico and the other owner filing suit in Texas on the same issues. So the plaintiff doesn't need the Texas forum and that brings us to the element of the interstate judicial system's interest in efficient administration of justice. Well, as I've just articulated, there's no efficiency in having a Texas case and a New Mexico case on the same matter and the Texas case is unnecessary
. First, would it be burdensome for these defendants to come from New Mexico to defend in Texas? Well, they don't have any business activities in Texas. And it would be burdensome. The second one is does the forum states interest, what is the forum states interest in adjudicating the matter? Well, Texas courts have no interest in adjudicating the rights of parties under a New Mexico real estate contract in which the properties in New Mexico, New Mexico, the contract states that it's governed by New Mexico law and the plaintiff himself owns property in New Mexico. The third element of that test is whether the plaintiff's interest in securing relief. Here, the plaintiff's spouse has filed suit in federal district court in Santa Fe on the same claims that are in this case and against the same defendants. So these two defendants here before this court are also defendants in a similar case in New Mexico where they've also added the defendant's attorney as a defendant and another homeowner that doesn't agree with the plaintiffs view of these matters. So it can't be disputed that the plaintiff needs the Texas forum to adjudicate his dispute. Why? Because the plaintiff's attorney has spouse and the plaintiff have a complete identity of interest. They both are owners of this property. One month after the property was transferred to the plaintiff, the Mr. Matassarin quit claimed a half interest to his wife. So now they're both owners. So now we have one owner filing suit in federal court in Santa Fe, New Mexico and the other owner filing suit in Texas on the same issues. So the plaintiff doesn't need the Texas forum and that brings us to the element of the interstate judicial system's interest in efficient administration of justice. Well, as I've just articulated, there's no efficiency in having a Texas case and a New Mexico case on the same matter and the Texas case is unnecessary. And in that the witnesses, except for the plaintiff, all the witnesses are in New Mexico. The two real estate agents, one for the plaintiff, one for the defendant are in New Mexico. The title companies in New Mexico, the documents are in New Mexico. The defendant's attorney will be a witness in New Mexico. And then the final fairness and reason with this test is whether there's a shared interest of the several states in furthering a fundamental social policy. I see no fundamental social policy that is advanced by a suit in Texas. So looking at all of those factors, it would be unfair and unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over these defendants in Texas. And I think since the court's questions have focused on whether or not there's a tort, I think the court has to view that through the lens of Wyatt versus Kaplan. And look at whether or not there is evidence of a tort. And there simply is no evidence that has been proffered by the plaintiff of torsus conduct. And the pleading is so vague and there's no documentary evidence provided that there was something misrepresented. And this court has upheld in the Monkton case that the plaintiff's own contacts with the form. One of the points that the plaintiff alleged was fraudulent was that he sent his dues from Texas to New Mexico and then he claims the dues were mismanaged. Well, again, that's a claim that only the HOA corporation can bring. But the Monkton court, a decision last month by this court, states that the plaintiff's own contacts with the forum, cannot be counted as minimum contacts against the defendant
. And in that the witnesses, except for the plaintiff, all the witnesses are in New Mexico. The two real estate agents, one for the plaintiff, one for the defendant are in New Mexico. The title companies in New Mexico, the documents are in New Mexico. The defendant's attorney will be a witness in New Mexico. And then the final fairness and reason with this test is whether there's a shared interest of the several states in furthering a fundamental social policy. I see no fundamental social policy that is advanced by a suit in Texas. So looking at all of those factors, it would be unfair and unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over these defendants in Texas. And I think since the court's questions have focused on whether or not there's a tort, I think the court has to view that through the lens of Wyatt versus Kaplan. And look at whether or not there is evidence of a tort. And there simply is no evidence that has been proffered by the plaintiff of torsus conduct. And the pleading is so vague and there's no documentary evidence provided that there was something misrepresented. And this court has upheld in the Monkton case that the plaintiff's own contacts with the form. One of the points that the plaintiff alleged was fraudulent was that he sent his dues from Texas to New Mexico and then he claims the dues were mismanaged. Well, again, that's a claim that only the HOA corporation can bring. But the Monkton court, a decision last month by this court, states that the plaintiff's own contacts with the forum, cannot be counted as minimum contacts against the defendant. And so when the plaintiff says, I sent my funds from Texas, well, that's just his own contact with Texas. And just to be clear, there's no record or there's no evidence of any intimidation, there's no evidence of any direct contact between the defendant's and the plaintiffs. The only thing that the plaintiffs have proffered is the letter of the defendant's attorney, which invites the plaintiff's attorney if you wish to discuss this further, please do not hesitate to contact me. All of these declarations of the condominium association are in the public record, in the Tows County public registry, they have public notice of them. They've not been shown to, they have a profit any reason as to why those declarations are misrepresentational. Thank you. Mr. Matassarin? Mr. Matassarin? The first informant I wanted to stress that the plaintiff was not in position to obtain evidence. This case was removed to the Federal District Court and the Western District in San Antonio. Mr. Matassarin filed a motion for a remand. Within 30-day period he was challenging the court's continued jurisdiction of the case. Generally in federal courts you may not ask the court, you may not ask for any affirmative action in the court without acquiescing in the court's jurisdiction. And what the defendants have repeatedly stated is, well, you didn't get evidence of this
. And so when the plaintiff says, I sent my funds from Texas, well, that's just his own contact with Texas. And just to be clear, there's no record or there's no evidence of any intimidation, there's no evidence of any direct contact between the defendant's and the plaintiffs. The only thing that the plaintiffs have proffered is the letter of the defendant's attorney, which invites the plaintiff's attorney if you wish to discuss this further, please do not hesitate to contact me. All of these declarations of the condominium association are in the public record, in the Tows County public registry, they have public notice of them. They've not been shown to, they have a profit any reason as to why those declarations are misrepresentational. Thank you. Mr. Matassarin? Mr. Matassarin? The first informant I wanted to stress that the plaintiff was not in position to obtain evidence. This case was removed to the Federal District Court and the Western District in San Antonio. Mr. Matassarin filed a motion for a remand. Within 30-day period he was challenging the court's continued jurisdiction of the case. Generally in federal courts you may not ask the court, you may not ask for any affirmative action in the court without acquiescing in the court's jurisdiction. And what the defendants have repeatedly stated is, well, you didn't get evidence of this. Well, there is no evidence of that. Well, you need evidence. It appears from the magistrate's evaluation that she and subsequently the court who adopted her analysis is that they required from the plaintiff's attorney. The plaintiff, a level of evidence which would be expected after an emotion for summary judgment or even in a motion to dismiss under rule 12b, you generally are given the opportunity before dismissal to replete your case. Sometimes the court will order you to do so. They don't just take a bad federal pleading and dismiss a cause of action. Well, again, in this particular instance, you're challenging the jurisdiction for anything to be going on there, so we weren't in a position to provide evidence. And I think what the case law requires is a prime of fascia showing of what we're arguing versus specific evidence, a case, a prime of fascia case. How would you prove the fraud and the inducement claims? I would take people's depositions and what facts you were lying on now. The facts we're relying on now are specific documentation discovered after this in the that you haven't discovered yet. No, yes, we have the Tows County records and that's part of the Santa Fe lawsuit. The defendants have also filed a lawsuit in Tows County against stiff team people, all of the owners of the apportion of this condiment. When you made these claims that were being considered by the magistrate, what evidence, what facts were you relying on to make a fraudulent inducement claim? The facts as asserted in the complaint, which is that they told us specifically that amendments that had been made and filed in Tows County, were comported with the Tows County, the New Mexico condiment and act which they did not. In one particular instance, there was a failure which we found out that there was a perpetual exclusive easement to the second carport filed by a companion company of Mr. Jeff Niles called Paradiso
. Well, there is no evidence of that. Well, you need evidence. It appears from the magistrate's evaluation that she and subsequently the court who adopted her analysis is that they required from the plaintiff's attorney. The plaintiff, a level of evidence which would be expected after an emotion for summary judgment or even in a motion to dismiss under rule 12b, you generally are given the opportunity before dismissal to replete your case. Sometimes the court will order you to do so. They don't just take a bad federal pleading and dismiss a cause of action. Well, again, in this particular instance, you're challenging the jurisdiction for anything to be going on there, so we weren't in a position to provide evidence. And I think what the case law requires is a prime of fascia showing of what we're arguing versus specific evidence, a case, a prime of fascia case. How would you prove the fraud and the inducement claims? I would take people's depositions and what facts you were lying on now. The facts we're relying on now are specific documentation discovered after this in the that you haven't discovered yet. No, yes, we have the Tows County records and that's part of the Santa Fe lawsuit. The defendants have also filed a lawsuit in Tows County against stiff team people, all of the owners of the apportion of this condiment. When you made these claims that were being considered by the magistrate, what evidence, what facts were you relying on to make a fraudulent inducement claim? The facts as asserted in the complaint, which is that they told us specifically that amendments that had been made and filed in Tows County, were comported with the Tows County, the New Mexico condiment and act which they did not. In one particular instance, there was a failure which we found out that there was a perpetual exclusive easement to the second carport filed by a companion company of Mr. Jeff Niles called Paradiso. This is a perpetual easement meant never to expire, which gave unit A to the unit George Matassar and bought exclusive use of this particular carport into perpetuity. That was never mentioned. We haven't conducted a complete discovery in New Mexico yet, but that Mr. Nostafano is the one that drafted the amendment, which included this particular perpetual exclusive use. This is a legal easement meant never to expire. There are two law firms that are involved in the Tows County litigation. I think that they keep asserting that I have exactly the same interest as George Matassar in pursuing a cause of action in Kamal County, not so. I don't, I'm not obligated for one penny of the mortgage on the condiment and Tows County. In sign the documents, wasn't required to qualify, he is solely obligated under that. I think that there is a mission that under New Mexico law, there is this disclaimer of anything that went wrong or anything that was misrepresented in a real estate transaction. That's not the case in Texas. If you make an express misrepresentation in connection with a real estate transaction that's subsequently found to be fraudulent, you are obligated to pay damages. And that's why continuing the lawsuit in Texas is completely different from any assertion that it will be taken care of in New Mexico. I believe my time is there. Thank you, Maverick
. I conclude all the argued cases today. Take these cases and call the others to file for this panel under the title. And of course, we'll ask John. 7th of July