Legal Case Summary

Good morning, your honor. My name is Lenore Elbert and I represent the appellant Helen Galope. I'd like to reserve five minutes for rebuttal. I received the court's order and I have, on looked at the three cases, is regard to Article 3 standing in the issue of live or in this case. When you look at Hanojo's case, they clearly said and decided to look at the case of Mata that if the borrower either would not have purchased the product in question or if the product was more expensive, then Article 3 standing would be met. Because we were talking about the injury in fact, prong, which was that issue in the district court. Here we do have the allegation by Miss Galope, which is in the third amended complaint, which would be at page 684 of the fourth volume of the excerpts of transcript. Where she alleged she would have never taken out the loan under the fall cause of action. And then we also had her declaration with regard to the motion for summary judgment, where she had said the same thing that can be found in the record on page 2070. Third, we had an expert, Mr. Mott, who had also declared in his expert capacity that no reasonable consumer would take out a loan knowing that the lender was actually manipulating the live or rate against them on a live or loan. Just as some background, this case was a live or loan case where Miss Galope and potential others similarly situated received loans during the mid-2000s. And that loan was based on the live or rate at the time on being known as the consumers. Well, let me make sure I understand that correctly, because she had started with a fixed rate loan. Correct? Her loan was fixed, right? And eventually, it would then adjust? Yes, it was locked

. That's a lock, right? And did she default prior to the end of that lock period? The default did occur before that lock period ended. Correct. So with regard to the cases that the court had asked you to discuss, Hinozomaza and Maya, those are all false advertising claims, misrepresentation type cases, basically, standing for what to me is a very common sense of goal proposition that if you pay for something based on a misrepresentation or bought something based on a misrepresentation that you otherwise wouldn't have purchased, then you have a claim of you paid more for something based on a misrepresentation or false advertising than you wouldn't have a claim. But in this case, I'm trying to understand how she was injured if she defaulted before the fixed loan adjusted under LIBOR. Doesn't she have to enleg some nexus between the product that she claims she wouldn't have bought? In other words, if she had a fixed rate and she never ties the LIBOR rate manipulation to her fixed rate loan, then where is the injury there for purposes of Article 3 standing? Even though it was a fixed rate, it still was a LIBOR loan. The loan was still a crewing interest at the LIBOR rate. What she was paying has no relation to what she owed. So although you have these exotic loan products that might have an initial two-year period rate lock like this one did, and it was an interest only note, her note was still a crewing, it was still a LIBOR, no, it was still a LIBOR rate note. However, the conjunction here is OR, and the conjunction here on standing is whether you pay more or whether you wouldn't have purchased it, but for the fact if you had known whatever that misrepresentation was. And here the misrepresentation was that this loan was based on an independent market rate. This loan was not based on some third independent market rate. It was actually being manipulated by the very lender that was giving them the loan, and this was not a fixed rate loan. It was on the life of the loan. It was just a rate lock, meaning you will pay the same amount of dollars allegedly for the first two years

. However, when you look at these exotic loan products, they can actually accelerate within that time period, which then changes what you actually pay in that period of time. And what was interesting about this loan product is that the mortgage-backed securitized trust that this one into was also a Barclays-made trust vehicle. So Barclays not only lent the money and fixed the rate and manipulated the rate, they put it into their own trust, which then they bet against the same homeowners. So the misrepresentation, what kind of relief are you seeking from Barclays? In this one, what we have, the fall cause of action, the UCL, the fraud, and so they each give different relief. First one gives a restitution under the UCL and the fall, but the fraud also gives damages, and you also can get obviously injunctive relief under the UCL too. And would you have to give back the money that you would need to tender the principal balance back to Barclays? We never, to get to that, the court never ruled on that tender issue in the court below. It would appear here that what would occur if we apply the reasoning, it isn't like buying keys and quicksets that says made in the USA where you would get just the money back. No one ever gives the home back. But what occurred here was if you take away the manipulation, because we're talking about a long term investment, you're talking about someone's home, it isn't a product that you would just readily consume or give back, everybody wants to keep their homes. But restitution to put them back in the same place that they would be would be whatever money that they loan they would be put back either into a proper vehicle, which then would be a loan modification, which you've seen a lot of in other scenarios, the government can try devices for that, and you've seen other lawsuits where that device has been employed. The reason for my question, I could discern about your standing, whether you satisfy the redress ability requirement. Correct. And then there's a second option, so there can be this modification of the loan, or you can, as we've shown, is you could give back the money that was paid. Because when you're looking at a false advertising claim, that's usually what is given in any other type of product scenario

. So here we had almost, it was like approximately $100,000 in interest only payments, that was paid towards this rigged liber market interest, because it didn't go towards the principal of her home. So hers was easy and most of these are, as a matter of fact, the whole mortgage backed securitized trust in this case was set up to have an interest only until 2012. And we know the rigging ended around 2009, so for everybody it would be the same. It would be that same mortgage interest rate. Because most of these people were for closed upon. A lot of them, you only had in this trust, approximately 15% of the homeowners that could even sustain this type of exotic vehicle. This trust was truly set up to fail. The liboard, the market rigging was set up purposefully to only make money for the banks. And they made it on every single side in this case. There was no way that the average homeowner could succeed no matter what they did in the song. Even if you were going to pay your interest rate under these types of vehicles, you would still default. So the loan was created, this mortgage backed securitized trust was created to default. How the 15% survived, it's just more of an anomaly than what would be expected. Can you talk about your claim based on violation of the automatic stay and before you answer that clarify for me, which defendants you're going against with regard to those claims and whether there was notice

. There's evidence in the record of notice that there was an automatic stay in place. With regard to the claim of violating the automatic stay that goes to Western progressive, the trustee and Oppen who was the current service, they were both from head notice through the bankruptcy court that there was a bankruptcy petition filed. During that course, the bankruptcy court disnested for lack of filing something. The debtor was able to get that bankruptcy stay reinstated before the sale. There was a courtesy notice that was filed by the banks attorneys themselves, so they received notice as soon as that vacate order came through, which was a few days before the actual day of the sale. Then the debtor, as alleged, had also given notice after she learned of the sale that the bankruptcy stay was in bankruptcy shoes back in place and that they had violated the stay. Yet the bank continued to hold on to the title and refuse to give the title back, neither the service or awkward nor Western progressive, will give the title back until after this case was filed. The court found it to be moot because once they were facing the TRO impossible preliminary injunction, they decided they sent in a declaration that the banks were going to go ahead and give title back to Ms. Galloway. My point is that standing occurs at the date that the lawsuit is filed. If you do that, then most defendants could moot out almost every single action. It's an involuntary settlement and there's some case that, case law that is cited in the brief with that proposition. And here, at the time, the lawsuit was filed, she still did not have title to her home. She was entitled since she went that route to receive damages that she incurred because she still incurred attorney's fees

. She still incurred other costs and other time and expense. And her title was clouded for was like six to I believe was almost six months, maybe nine months. And where she couldn't use her equity, she couldn't use her own, she couldn't use it for any credit purposes. And so there was a real damage there. Back to the standing under the three cases, it shouldn't make a difference because this is a long term loan. I know it's different because it is a long term loan. But because the injury is, it's actually more severe because it's so injurious, doesn't mean now you lack standing. It shouldn't mean now there is some redressability here. It isn't like a political question. Usually when you're talking about article three standing, you're asking, am I usurping another branch of the government? And I get it that all courts are struggling with the concept in this foreclosure crisis. What kind of damages? Because the damages seem like they're so large. But yes, they are. And we're seeing settlements like that all the time. We're seeing settlements in the billions of dollars

. And even with these billions of dollars of settlements, the economic reality is the financial institutions have grown enormously during this period. It's only a portion of their profits that they're even losing in these settlements. So although damages are enormous, they're justified. There is redressability here. Did you want to save about three minutes for a rebuttal? They here. Okay. Good morning, Your Honors. May I please the Court? My name is Matthew Papura of Sullivan and Cromwell appearing on behalf of the Barclays of Pellies. Here. Your Honors, I've consulted with Council for the other Appellies and agreed to split our time in half. So I'll be taking seven and a half minutes and then Council for the other Appellies will round out the argument. Your Honors, in a well-reasoned decision, the District Court dismissed each of the appellants six claims against the Barclays of Pellies and it did so for several reasons. Most fundamentally though, it dismissed because the appellant has failed to adequately allege that she suffered any injury whatsoever as a result of the conduct she alleges against the Barclays of Pellies. Well, what about the case of my versus Sintex? Doesn't she allege and declare that but for Barclays failure to disclose its ability to manipulate labor, she would have done business with someone else

. She does allege that, Your Honor. Let me draw distinction between Maya and the other cases that this Court brought to the attention of the parties, the Mazza case and the Anorjo case. In each of those three cases, the plaintiff had adequately allege number one that he or they were induced into entering into transactions as a direct result of misrepresentations made by the defendant to the plaintiff, that induced the plaintiff to enter into the transaction. The plaintiff also adequately allege that by entering into that transaction they were injured at the moment they entered into the contract. They suffered a real injury in fact. In Maya, for instance, they paid more for the homes than those homes were worth because they believed they were paying for homes that actually were stable neighborhoods. Neither of those two circumstances, the inducement by the defendant or injury in fact are present here, Your Honor. No, explain why. She signed her name to have, she committed herself to a long term. No. She did, Your Honor. I mean, having done that, why isn't that injury? Economic injury. Your Honor, she said she wouldn't have done it that she know. You're correct, Your Honor

. But number one, with regard to her saying that she wouldn't have engaged in the loan transaction, she didn't transact with either of the Barclays of Pellies. She transacted with new home century, new mortgage corporation, Your Honor's. And that's expressly allege that paragraph 15 of the third amended complaint, the complaint that the district court properly dismissed. She expressly alleges that she purchased the loan from new century, that new century was the seller of the loan, that it sold her the loan. The only entity that could have made any representations that would have induced her to enter into that transaction was new century. And she does an alleged that new century made any such allegations. Now, getting back to your question, Judge Files, about whether there was actually any injury, regardless of the fact that any misrepresentation could not have been made by a Barclays of Pellies, this appellant did not suffer injury when she entered into the loan. As Judge Wynn pointed out previously, this was a loan that employed a fixed interest rate on the front end. It was undeniably a fixed interest rate of 8.775%. She contracted to get that fixed interest rate. She got that fixed interest rate. Now, she contracted also to get a loan that would at some point in the future, January 1st, 2009, to be precise. Would switch from a fixed interest rate loan to a floating interest rate loan that would be calculated in accordance with LIBOR

. But, Your Honor, is any claim that she would have been injured if and when the loan actually did link to LIBOR, if she had not defaulted on her payments. Any allegation that she would have been injured is absolutely speculative and typothetical. There's nothing in the complaint that suggests that she would have suffered injury if and when that loan did link to LIBOR. Your Honor, each one of the three cases, the Maya case, the Mazda case, and the Innohoes case, rely on similar facts. They all require that there be a misrepresentation from the defendant to the plaintiff inducing the plaintiff to enter into the transaction that didn't occur here. They all require that the plaintiff alleges adequately that he suffered an injury in fact that did not occur. Yes, Your Honor. Yes, Your Honor. Barkley stepped in as a servicer actually months after the appellant even entered into the loan. It's undisputable, Your Honor, from the allegations of the complaint and also from the loan documentation submitted by the appellant that was known at the time of the transaction that Barkley was going to be the servicer. The record is not clear on that and certainly the appellant doesn't allege it. The appellant alleges that she entered into the loan with new century and that months later in April of 2007, Barkley's took over as the servicer. In any event, the Barkley's appellate that took over as servicer was homec servicing. And homec servicing is a corporate affiliate of Barkley's capital real estate incorporated

. That entity does not sit on the dollar LIBOR panel on any LIBOR panel. It's not responsible for making LIBOR submissions. To the extent that the appellant is making any suggestion whatsoever that homec servicing could have made a representation, there's nothing in the complaint that suggests that homec servicing would have had any knowledge whatsoever about any LIBOR manipulation. And it's well established under Black Letter Law that you cannot impute the knowledge of a parent company to a subsidiary merely because of the corporate form. There's nothing in the allegation that suggests even if she had alleged that homec made any representations whatsoever that it would have done so in an only false manner. Your honors, going back to the reasons that the district court correctly dismissed the claim, the appellant has not alleged that she ever made a single payment based on LIBOR. Again, a review of the appellant's own allegations and the loan agreements show unequivocally that she made only fixed interest rate payments both on the December 2006 loan and also on the modified 2008 loan. It is also undisputed that the appellant defaulted on each of those loans long before they were set to recalculate in accordance with LIBOR. Again, to the extent that there's any suggestion whatsoever that this appellant could have suffered any kind of injuries or result of LIBOR manipulation that can't be. It's not a factual possibility and therefore the district court correctly determined she has neither Article III nor statutory standing to bring her claims. There's a separate set of allegations that I'll refer to as the fact scheme allegations that the appellant presents. And those allegations essentially boiled down to a simple claim that HOMEC servicing in April of 2008, facts the appellant, a copy of the modified loan agreement, and did so in a purposely misleading way so as to obfuscate certain terms on the agreement. I think the common sense way to put this is the appellant alleges that when the facts was transmitted through the bottom three inches was locked off of the one or two of the pages of the agreement. The appellant alleges that as a result of that she was falsely led into believing that she was achieving terms that were more favorable than those that were employed by the initial loan agreement. But your honors that is precisely what happened by entering into the modified loan agreement the appellant was materially benefited. She most certainly did not suffer any injury whatsoever. She achieved a significantly decreased monthly interest rate. It went down from 8.775% to 5.5% and that immediately translated into roughly $800 of savings on her monthly loans. In addition to that, as the appellant herself alleges a paragraph 54 of the third amended complaint by entering into the modified loan agreement, she staved off for closure. She herself expressly states that she cured the then existing default on her December 2006 loan by entering to the modified loan agreement. In short, your honors, there's nothing that the appellant alleges that establishes any injury in fact. She does not have Article 3 nor statutory standing to bring any of her claims against the Barclays of Pellies. We would ask the district court to affirm that this court affirm the district court. Thank you. Let's see who's next. Good morning, May please the court

. But your honors that is precisely what happened by entering into the modified loan agreement the appellant was materially benefited. She most certainly did not suffer any injury whatsoever. She achieved a significantly decreased monthly interest rate. It went down from 8.775% to 5.5% and that immediately translated into roughly $800 of savings on her monthly loans. In addition to that, as the appellant herself alleges a paragraph 54 of the third amended complaint by entering into the modified loan agreement, she staved off for closure. She herself expressly states that she cured the then existing default on her December 2006 loan by entering to the modified loan agreement. In short, your honors, there's nothing that the appellant alleges that establishes any injury in fact. She does not have Article 3 nor statutory standing to bring any of her claims against the Barclays of Pellies. We would ask the district court to affirm that this court affirm the district court. Thank you. Let's see who's next. Good morning, May please the court. My name is Robert Norman. I represent the defendant's Deutsche Bank National Trust company as trust the Aquin Loan Services and Western Progressive. Your honors, I do want to avoid some of the overlap because we share a lot of the arguments with Barclays. But there's a few important distinctions that I would like to make in focusing on the LIBOR standing claims. In particular Deutsche Bank National Trust company or DBNTC, that entity, like the homeic servicing entity, was not a LIBOR company that sat on the panel submitting rates. That's Deutsche Bank AG, a separate legal entity organized under the Republic of Germany, who was never a party to this case. So I think that's an important distinction to make for Deutsche Bank National Trust company. Focusing on the injury in fact, again there are some similarities but as Judge Nguyen pointed out, the original loan was not tied to LIBOR. I mean this was a fixed rate from New Century, another entity not before this court. There's an allegation that she would not have obtained this loan but there has to be a misrepresentation from the defendant, Appellies. I believe to rely on, let's say the Hanoho Smoz over my cases and that didn't happen in this case. With respect to the causation type argument under Article 3 and could this injury be traceable to any of the challenge conduct? Again there's some overlap with the fact that there was no actual injury in that there could be no causation because Deutsche Bank National Trust company was not on the LIBOR panel. Deutsche Bank National Trust company, there's no evidence, there's no allegations that that entity ever made a single allegation to Ms. Golope and that makes sense because they were a trustee for a trust

. My name is Robert Norman. I represent the defendant's Deutsche Bank National Trust company as trust the Aquin Loan Services and Western Progressive. Your honors, I do want to avoid some of the overlap because we share a lot of the arguments with Barclays. But there's a few important distinctions that I would like to make in focusing on the LIBOR standing claims. In particular Deutsche Bank National Trust company or DBNTC, that entity, like the homeic servicing entity, was not a LIBOR company that sat on the panel submitting rates. That's Deutsche Bank AG, a separate legal entity organized under the Republic of Germany, who was never a party to this case. So I think that's an important distinction to make for Deutsche Bank National Trust company. Focusing on the injury in fact, again there are some similarities but as Judge Nguyen pointed out, the original loan was not tied to LIBOR. I mean this was a fixed rate from New Century, another entity not before this court. There's an allegation that she would not have obtained this loan but there has to be a misrepresentation from the defendant, Appellies. I believe to rely on, let's say the Hanoho Smoz over my cases and that didn't happen in this case. With respect to the causation type argument under Article 3 and could this injury be traceable to any of the challenge conduct? Again there's some overlap with the fact that there was no actual injury in that there could be no causation because Deutsche Bank National Trust company was not on the LIBOR panel. Deutsche Bank National Trust company, there's no evidence, there's no allegations that that entity ever made a single allegation to Ms. Golope and that makes sense because they were a trustee for a trust. Communications are going to start with either your original lender which in this case was New Century and then eventually transition to perhaps a loan servicer. That's the way the industry is set up so there would have been no communications or a link to show some sort of causation. With regard to the violation of the automatic stay, can you tell us why it took so long for the sale to be rescinded? Yes, Your Honor, there's a few reasons. Number one, and I think the opening brief was a little misleading in that there wasn't this notice to Western progress if it was the foreclosure trustee. And what had happened in this case is when the second bankruptcy was filed it was dismissed shortly thereafter because it was proper schedules weren't filed. Ms. Golope moved to reinstate that that happens on August 30th. There's an allegation that notice was provided to other entities but not the foreclosure trustee Western Progressive and that's the in the record the declaration from Ms. Spurlock indicates that they had not received that notice of the bankruptcy had been reinstateed. Once the bankruptcy- The awkwardness get notice. There's an allegation that notice was provided to counsel for Aquin but still not to the foreclosure trustee. But I think what was more important for the district court's reasoning is that the sale was rescinded and the other fact that's a little bit unique and when you have to look it from the industry's perspective after the foreclosure sale. Let me eliminate the need for injunctive and declaratory. But what does that- there doesn't eliminate her claim for damages

. Communications are going to start with either your original lender which in this case was New Century and then eventually transition to perhaps a loan servicer. That's the way the industry is set up so there would have been no communications or a link to show some sort of causation. With regard to the violation of the automatic stay, can you tell us why it took so long for the sale to be rescinded? Yes, Your Honor, there's a few reasons. Number one, and I think the opening brief was a little misleading in that there wasn't this notice to Western progress if it was the foreclosure trustee. And what had happened in this case is when the second bankruptcy was filed it was dismissed shortly thereafter because it was proper schedules weren't filed. Ms. Golope moved to reinstate that that happens on August 30th. There's an allegation that notice was provided to other entities but not the foreclosure trustee Western Progressive and that's the in the record the declaration from Ms. Spurlock indicates that they had not received that notice of the bankruptcy had been reinstateed. Once the bankruptcy- The awkwardness get notice. There's an allegation that notice was provided to counsel for Aquin but still not to the foreclosure trustee. But I think what was more important for the district court's reasoning is that the sale was rescinded and the other fact that's a little bit unique and when you have to look it from the industry's perspective after the foreclosure sale. Let me eliminate the need for injunctive and declaratory. But what does that- there doesn't eliminate her claim for damages. But her claim for damages, Your Honor, was under wrongful foreclosure and as the district court looked at- Well, it's essentially a claim- which is essentially claiming as a violation of the automatic stay which results in the wrongful foreclosure. That's the core of her claim. Your Honor, I would think that the difference here is that she did not allege a violation of the automatic stay as a borrow or a debtor could have done so. And then I think that changed- Well, essentially. I mean, you don't have to use all these fancy labels. If you look at the factual allegations, she alleges there was a violation of the automatic stay which resulted in a improper foreclosure. Well, I believe the way the district court had focused its analysis was that it was a wrongful foreclosure claim. Well, it styled us wrongful foreclosure claim but all of the allegations focus on the violation of the automatic stay. So I think it's a fair construction of the claim that the claim is based on an allegation that there was a violation of the automatic stay which could give rise to the claim for damages. And I don't see how the damages claim really goes away given those allegations. So what evidence would contravene that claim for damages? Well, Ms. Gullop had an opportunity at the trial court to oppose a summary judgment to bring forth evidence of damages. And I don't believe that she did that. I believe that the focus that was there was that there was no equity in the property

. But her claim for damages, Your Honor, was under wrongful foreclosure and as the district court looked at- Well, it's essentially a claim- which is essentially claiming as a violation of the automatic stay which results in the wrongful foreclosure. That's the core of her claim. Your Honor, I would think that the difference here is that she did not allege a violation of the automatic stay as a borrow or a debtor could have done so. And then I think that changed- Well, essentially. I mean, you don't have to use all these fancy labels. If you look at the factual allegations, she alleges there was a violation of the automatic stay which resulted in a improper foreclosure. Well, I believe the way the district court had focused its analysis was that it was a wrongful foreclosure claim. Well, it styled us wrongful foreclosure claim but all of the allegations focus on the violation of the automatic stay. So I think it's a fair construction of the claim that the claim is based on an allegation that there was a violation of the automatic stay which could give rise to the claim for damages. And I don't see how the damages claim really goes away given those allegations. So what evidence would contravene that claim for damages? Well, Ms. Gullop had an opportunity at the trial court to oppose a summary judgment to bring forth evidence of damages. And I don't believe that she did that. I believe that the focus that was there was that there was no equity in the property. So there could not have been any damages. And that because- Well, she's not just limited to equity in the property as they only basis for damages. Under- I think under a pure 362 violation, I think there could be other damages. There could be emotion or distress, potentially. Correct. Other claims. But I just don't think that was the way it was fashioned before the trial court. That's not how it was pledged. And this was her third amended complaint. I mean, if she wanted to allege a specific claim for violation. There were so many- There were so many- We're dealing with so many claims, right? I can't remember. Was this claim knocked out on summary judgment or on a motion to dismiss? All of the claims you're on are from my client, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, AQUIN and Western Progressive. We're done on summary judgment. Yeah

. So there could not have been any damages. And that because- Well, she's not just limited to equity in the property as they only basis for damages. Under- I think under a pure 362 violation, I think there could be other damages. There could be emotion or distress, potentially. Correct. Other claims. But I just don't think that was the way it was fashioned before the trial court. That's not how it was pledged. And this was her third amended complaint. I mean, if she wanted to allege a specific claim for violation. There were so many- There were so many- We're dealing with so many claims, right? I can't remember. Was this claim knocked out on summary judgment or on a motion to dismiss? All of the claims you're on are from my client, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, AQUIN and Western Progressive. We're done on summary judgment. Yeah. Where she had to come forward with the evidence to create the tribal issue and the district court didn't find that she did so. She was seeking attorney's fees also. Was she not? She was generally seeking attorney's fees. But there wasn't a showing, I think again, the court focused here that it didn't view this in the scope of a 362 claim. And I appreciate the court saying that that was sort of the genesis of why wrongful foreclosure. But she didn't count it as a violation of 362. It was a wrongful foreclosure claim and her other claims against my clients with no offer damage. It's excuse me, attorney's fees. For example, the UCL claims, I mean, that's a restitution based remedy where she's not going to get attorney's fees. Thank you. Your Honor, just to conclude on the fraudulent inducement, excuse me on the redressability by an order, Judge Nelson, you asked about that. And I think that there would be a problem here back to the standing argument because what would there be to redress where none of the appellees were involved in making the communications to Ms. DeLogue, which was the exact opposite in the Hanoho Smaza and Maya. But there were those representations, the direct involvement

. Where she had to come forward with the evidence to create the tribal issue and the district court didn't find that she did so. She was seeking attorney's fees also. Was she not? She was generally seeking attorney's fees. But there wasn't a showing, I think again, the court focused here that it didn't view this in the scope of a 362 claim. And I appreciate the court saying that that was sort of the genesis of why wrongful foreclosure. But she didn't count it as a violation of 362. It was a wrongful foreclosure claim and her other claims against my clients with no offer damage. It's excuse me, attorney's fees. For example, the UCL claims, I mean, that's a restitution based remedy where she's not going to get attorney's fees. Thank you. Your Honor, just to conclude on the fraudulent inducement, excuse me on the redressability by an order, Judge Nelson, you asked about that. And I think that there would be a problem here back to the standing argument because what would there be to redress where none of the appellees were involved in making the communications to Ms. DeLogue, which was the exact opposite in the Hanoho Smaza and Maya. But there were those representations, the direct involvement. Here, there's just not that connection that next this I don't know what the redressability would be. I have nothing further than listening to the questions. Okay. Get a few minutes for a rebut. Thank you, Your Honor. With regard to new century mortgage, they were considered a loan center. They were never alleged to be a lender. They're not a lender. They're listed in the mortgage back secure ties trust. They're in the record. The judges can, the panel can judicially recognize that. They were, they were what? They were a loan seller, not a lender. A loan seller is someone that, well, does it include that they were selling on behalf of Barclays? Yes. They are listed in the mortgage back secure ties trust as one of their loan sellers, one of the people that would be peddling their loans rather than a bank traditionally banks used to have their own desks and their own sellers inside their banks

. Here, there's just not that connection that next this I don't know what the redressability would be. I have nothing further than listening to the questions. Okay. Get a few minutes for a rebut. Thank you, Your Honor. With regard to new century mortgage, they were considered a loan center. They were never alleged to be a lender. They're not a lender. They're listed in the mortgage back secure ties trust. They're in the record. The judges can, the panel can judicially recognize that. They were, they were what? They were a loan seller, not a lender. A loan seller is someone that, well, does it include that they were selling on behalf of Barclays? Yes. They are listed in the mortgage back secure ties trust as one of their loan sellers, one of the people that would be peddling their loans rather than a bank traditionally banks used to have their own desks and their own sellers inside their banks. So they make a distinction between Barclays, I think what they call the local one is opposed to the Barclays who is sat on the library panel. There is a, there's a Deutsch Bank in America, Barclays in America, and then there's a Deutsch Bank in England, and I mean a Deutsch Bank in Germany and a Deutsch Bank in England. They're just subsidiaries of each other. Although they're subsidiaries and affiliates, they're still agents of each other. They just have different units. When the Libor scandal broke, we have 16 banks, at least 16 banks, approximately they make up the Libor loan. That would be Deutsch Bank AG and Barclays, PLC, London and Germany. They have subsidiaries. So they have all their little bank or all their little financial institutions spread out throughout the world. What they're saying is that they're trying to break the nexus between their subsidiaries and between Barclays proper. Now Barclays, PLC and London is the same Barclays in this mortgage-backed securities trust. Deutsch Bank National Trust Company, Deutsch Bank Trust Companies of America's are the two American created entities of actually the subsidiaries of Deutsch Bank in Germany. But that doesn't cut off the nexus. That would be like saying, for example, in the other case, somehow you have a subsidiary of Ford Motor Company or GM and Chrysler

. So they make a distinction between Barclays, I think what they call the local one is opposed to the Barclays who is sat on the library panel. There is a, there's a Deutsch Bank in America, Barclays in America, and then there's a Deutsch Bank in England, and I mean a Deutsch Bank in Germany and a Deutsch Bank in England. They're just subsidiaries of each other. Although they're subsidiaries and affiliates, they're still agents of each other. They just have different units. When the Libor scandal broke, we have 16 banks, at least 16 banks, approximately they make up the Libor loan. That would be Deutsch Bank AG and Barclays, PLC, London and Germany. They have subsidiaries. So they have all their little bank or all their little financial institutions spread out throughout the world. What they're saying is that they're trying to break the nexus between their subsidiaries and between Barclays proper. Now Barclays, PLC and London is the same Barclays in this mortgage-backed securities trust. Deutsch Bank National Trust Company, Deutsch Bank Trust Companies of America's are the two American created entities of actually the subsidiaries of Deutsch Bank in Germany. But that doesn't cut off the nexus. That would be like saying, for example, in the other case, somehow you have a subsidiary of Ford Motor Company or GM and Chrysler. You don't cut off from each other unless if there's some legal reason to do so and there wouldn't be in this case. But new century is listed in the mortgage-backed securities trust. They're a loan seller. They're just a seller for that loan pool. So you would have new century mortgage or a couple other peddlers on the papers, but it doesn't mean that it wasn't representation made by the people in that mortgage-backed securities trust. That's the whole point of these trusts. As far as the faxing goes, there were damages because the material term was anything past a certain year was not disclosed in the bottom three inches. And therefore she stopped paying after advice, the council to stop paying because they weren't giving her all the material terms of her loan modification, which resulted in the second default. And then finally on the automatic stage, there was a declaration from page 2007 to 1970 where she does elect her damages. So the damages were in the record for the court with regard to the type of damages that resulted with regard to the automatic state and everything else. But going back to standing, this is redressable. It is redressable. I think Barclays is getting away with this whole live-or-rigging across the board. This is the last stand

. These are the direct purchasers. If the direct purchasers don't have standing, then who does? And we see the kind of financial crisis and the greed that occurred here and how the rest of the economy and everyone else has to live with it. And if there is something technical, it is just a technical pleating error. If you need to plead that new century morbid is an agent of Barclays that can be pladdened, it can be proven through the own morbid back securitized trust agreements. Thank you, Your Honours. Thank you, Councilor. We appreciate your arguments in this interesting case and matter is submitted in that will end our session for today