Oral Argument Legal Case Summary

Case Summary

**Case Summary: Immunocept v. Fulbright & Jaworski** **Docket Number:** 2605539 **Court:** [Specify Court] **Date:** [Specify Date] **Overview:** Immunocept, a biopharmaceutical company, brought a legal action against Fulbright & Jaworski, a law firm, alleging professional malpractice and breach of contract. The case centers on claims that Fulbright & Jaworski failed to adequately represent Immunocept in a legal matter related to intellectual property, leading to financial losses and setbacks in Immunocept's business operations. **Background:** Immunocept engaged Fulbright & Jaworski to provide legal counsel regarding patent applications and protection of proprietary technology. The company relied on the firm's expertise to navigate complex regulatory environments and secure its intellectual property rights. However, following adverse outcomes in critical patent filings, Immunocept contended that Fulbright & Jaworski's actions (or lack thereof) resulted in significant harm. **Claims:** Immunocept alleged that Fulbright & Jaworski: 1. Failed to meet industry standards of competence and diligence in managing the patent prosecution process. 2. Missed critical deadlines for patent applications, jeopardizing Immunocept's market position and potential revenue. 3. Failed to provide timely and effective counsel during negotiations related to licensing agreements. **Defendant’s Position:** Fulbright & Jaworski denied the allegations, arguing that they acted within reasonable professional standards and that any perceived failures were not the direct cause of Immunocept's losses. The firm maintained that external factors beyond their control contributed to the negative outcomes. **Legal Arguments:** The case involved extensive examination of legal standards governing attorney-client relationships, the duty of care owed by legal professionals, and the implications of alleged malpractice in the context of intellectual property law. Both parties presented expert witnesses to substantiate their claims and defenses regarding the expected standards of legal representation. **Outcome:** [Insert information regarding the verdict, settlement, or any other resolution reached in the case, along with any legal precedents established or implications for future cases in the realm of intellectual property and legal malpractice.] **Conclusion:** The case of Immunocept v. Fulbright & Jaworski underscores the critical importance of legal counsel in the biotechnology sector and the potential consequences of legal missteps. It also highlights the complexities involved in adjudicating claims of professional negligence within specialized fields such as intellectual property. (Note: Please insert any specific dates, outcomes, and additional details as necessary to complete the summary. A more detailed understanding of the actual case would be required for precise information.)

Immunocept v. Fulbright & Jaworski

Oral Audio Transcript(Beta version)

Mr. Stark and Mr. Rungin. We turn on his room. Thank you for the cooperation on changing the sequence. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr

. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry

. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr. Stark, I'm sorry. Mr

. Stark, I'm sorry. But more importantly, you're honored. The court below never specified exactly what duties Mr. Felbert had, which would have imposed a basis for achieving the knowledge of the client here. We're a similar, Mr. Felbert, on his own. What a God, dealing with that basis. He was not charged with doing so. He was never instructed to do so. It wasn't his duty to do so. It wasn't his duty to do so. It wasn't his duty to do so. It wasn't his duty to do so. It wasn't his duty to do so. It wasn't his duty to do so. It wasn't his duty to do so. It wasn't his duty to do so. It wasn't his duty to do so. We assert there's no basis for imputing it. The judge below actually did no duty analysis whatsoever. In terms of scope of employment, we made two comments. One of them was that it doesn't matter. He said we have two contours, one for the summary judgment, one upon the within the mind of the person. One, he said it doesn't, it makes no matter. And the other, he says, regardless of what the scope of the duty was. Regardless of the possible limit of scope of Felbert's duties, he does the imputation of knowledge. And in the other order, he says, according to no matter what the terms of filbert's disciples were couched, his mere review was sufficient to treat the limitations period. So the fact that Mr. Felbert really looked at the document, was that after this Mr. Court to assume there was a duty to investigate this and to report to the client that there's a scope issue with respect to the substitution of the word consisting where a crisis made it and used instead and had an unspecification in the file. Well, listen there, and not not matter. And that is that the damages in the settlement were too speculative. It didn't have a product

. You were approved by the FDA from much really had the clinical test. It's a long way from where you work to what you allege you would have had. That is the other primary issue you are. And as it stands, it's going to be this characterized by the court blow. Because there are excellent products, there are filters, there are hundreds of them that they had been used, and they hadn't been tested. They had been tested on humans. They had been tested on human blood. But what about your primary? Your primary? Yes, your district. I mean, that's not a huge look. They had been tested in humans. In humans, the declaration that Dr. Belomo attaches many references to the honor is for disregarding entirely by the district court, which established what was going on in humans. They found that they had a therapeutic effect that reduced the need for blood pressure supporting mechanism. That it increased self-consciousness. Safety was also tested as well. You're on safety in Africa, so you're also tested in humans. In humans. What is a filtration and then return to the filtered blood? What is lacking, Your Honor, is one randomized, large-steel clinical trial, which could statistically measure a survived of women. That's the difference. That's the finest step for anyone. The FDA has to decide. That's correct. The FDA will decide that we have evidence, which one of the percentage of drugs that take that last step, as opposed to those that start that last step. To begin with, Your Honor, this is a device motor drug. We do not have the record statistically in the basics in the records statistically to cope with that particular question to see what it is. But we do have evidence from FDA experts who say, if the product works, it will pass that review. And we have, at the same time, some substantial evidence, particularly in the spirit of Dr. Belomo's evidence, which cite many, many peer-reviewed studies, which make it look very, very likely that this does work in the same and will provide us a run of better. The question then becomes, what's the standard? Do we have to show it absolutely? Or is it always only necessary for us to show a reasonable probability of success? We believe the lab is the case. You perhaps listen to the argument we had before and then there are several references to your case. And they said, well, we're different from you because you didn't have a trial on the FDA. Is that a distinction with the difference? You mean that a poor haven't had any trial? Any infringement trial in your... Was that... Are you referring to an infringement trial? Yes, a patent trial on an FDA. That's a right goal issue. Remember in the case we just heard, there have been more than preceding, and so have it been, considerable amount of patent activity. That's correct. No, the error is that a distinction that makes a difference with regard to jurisdiction. We still have a need for resulting patent law issues here here on the DITMUSP trial, although it's not against the decision infringement. In this case, to establish the standard of care was not met by the prosecuting attorney. We have to consider, was the amendment to took out the work comprised and put in consisting necessary and faced with the rejections and faced with the part around who was there? Is it a horizontal record, by the way? I believe so, yet, if you recouped the file, did you have, but what rejection was its state that required the amendment, and where is it in the record, so that if it's such a big patent issue, you would have provided it to us. The issue you're wrong is the presence of the word consistent versus guidance. The details of the rejection that called for that narrow. The details of the rejection I do not believe were just a narration. Why not? It seems to not be, if you want to convince us that this is a big patent issue, that we need to delve into what we would you have presented that issue to us. Well, under the well-being and complaint, what we did was we complained under 1338A, saying that it was an adequate draft, and did not provide the scope that we were entitled to, and this caused the harm. Is it due to you that whether it was a responsible citation of priori of subvenge voluntarily, or a minor to the same thing, narrowing the claim? The issue here is, what's this? Is there two of us amendment, or was it actually required? Am I answering your questions? You're saying there's a difference. There's a difference between out of your pay. There's a difference between a amendment, which is required by the priori of our amendment, which is not. This one was definitely not required by the priori of our amendment. You say so, but how do we have any clue whether it was or wasn't one? Well, that's the subject for proof of trial and error. That's what we have to prove. That's our burden on the merits once we're back in court at the trial level to show that there was a breach of the standard of care. What we've alleged is that the insertion was to me that if you wanted to convince us that we have a patterned lock issue of the state, you might have wanted to show us that there was a credible issue of patterned lock mistake. We believe you're on the presence of the consisting where comprising had been, under the circumstances of the wedge, and assuming that the diversity was... I have been the most logical thing to do, and the only thing that could have been down to say what little was left to the patterns under the circumstances. Well, that is exactly the pattern lock issue, which is necessary for us in the issue in order that we have to examine it in the court of law. If it's there at all, and you haven't shown us that the issue is there at all, well, you have alleged that it's there. I see nothing in the record that shows me that there's an actual issue, except your allegation. Well, based on the complaint that Arnabla complaint puts that in issue, the complaint says that it was too narrowly drafted, and we believe that's a resettition, others are keeping 38 when we were in the standard of

.. Was that... Are you referring to an infringement trial? Yes, a patent trial on an FDA. That's a right goal issue. Remember in the case we just heard, there have been more than preceding, and so have it been, considerable amount of patent activity. That's correct. No, the error is that a distinction that makes a difference with regard to jurisdiction. We still have a need for resulting patent law issues here here on the DITMUSP trial, although it's not against the decision infringement. In this case, to establish the standard of care was not met by the prosecuting attorney. We have to consider, was the amendment to took out the work comprised and put in consisting necessary and faced with the rejections and faced with the part around who was there? Is it a horizontal record, by the way? I believe so, yet, if you recouped the file, did you have, but what rejection was its state that required the amendment, and where is it in the record, so that if it's such a big patent issue, you would have provided it to us. The issue you're wrong is the presence of the word consistent versus guidance. The details of the rejection that called for that narrow. The details of the rejection I do not believe were just a narration. Why not? It seems to not be, if you want to convince us that this is a big patent issue, that we need to delve into what we would you have presented that issue to us. Well, under the well-being and complaint, what we did was we complained under 1338A, saying that it was an adequate draft, and did not provide the scope that we were entitled to, and this caused the harm. Is it due to you that whether it was a responsible citation of priori of subvenge voluntarily, or a minor to the same thing, narrowing the claim? The issue here is, what's this? Is there two of us amendment, or was it actually required? Am I answering your questions? You're saying there's a difference. There's a difference between out of your pay. There's a difference between a amendment, which is required by the priori of our amendment, which is not. This one was definitely not required by the priori of our amendment. You say so, but how do we have any clue whether it was or wasn't one? Well, that's the subject for proof of trial and error. That's what we have to prove. That's our burden on the merits once we're back in court at the trial level to show that there was a breach of the standard of care. What we've alleged is that the insertion was to me that if you wanted to convince us that we have a patterned lock issue of the state, you might have wanted to show us that there was a credible issue of patterned lock mistake. We believe you're on the presence of the consisting where comprising had been, under the circumstances of the wedge, and assuming that the diversity was... I have been the most logical thing to do, and the only thing that could have been down to say what little was left to the patterns under the circumstances. Well, that is exactly the pattern lock issue, which is necessary for us in the issue in order that we have to examine it in the court of law. If it's there at all, and you haven't shown us that the issue is there at all, well, you have alleged that it's there. I see nothing in the record that shows me that there's an actual issue, except your allegation. Well, based on the complaint that Arnabla complaint puts that in issue, the complaint says that it was too narrowly drafted, and we believe that's a resettition, others are keeping 38 when we were in the standard of... Then under your authorities, we really are in a situation where every single patterned malpractice case belongs in federal court. There is no such thing as a state lock malpractice claim when it involves a pattern attorney. Is it not interesting? I would not go so broadly, I'm not in a position to state that. This case in particular, I can tell you, has substantial pattern on issues. In order to resolve two things, one is whether the standard of court is breached, and the other is whether the consul in damages, what scope damage was done, and what financial impact is that had? Then the same question we asked before, what case would raise that? How would you avoid that issue if patterned malpractice is at stake? I'm not in a position to crack the rule for this court here on earth. All I know is that the WebPTA to complaint rule, and the case law of the 1338 sets out that if there is an issue, this is the corporate belongers. My fear is the alternative to what, and then discuss your own. That's what we have, Mark and hearings, and we have all sorts of things going on in the state courts, getting anything from uniform decisions, rather than federal court-wide decisions for long. Your Honor, it's not that simple, because the pre-court is not simple. It's not that the issue is belong in federal court, because it's a pattern issue. It's actually said the opposite. Depending on the context, those issues, even though they're fewer in difficult patterns, it's a belonging statement. Well, Your Honor, this is not a typical contract case. I get a pattern, and Judge Grader has a manufacturing company. I think he's infringing my pattern. We negotiate, he takes a license. The later he verifies his product. He says, well, now I'm not going to pay the royalties anymore, because we're showing because our legislative agreement only covers your pattern, and I'm doing something that's not covered by our pattern anymore. So I filed a breach of contract action in the state court against the other party in the contract, and we've held it. That's a state issue. That's speed-code of the cases. And yet it turns entirely on his own infringement or not, and it's clearly those in state court. The only issue in the case of any court is in infringement or no. The infringement decided by a state of judge and jury. Well, Your Honor, I'm willing to run the votes on the vote to expire. My preference would be that I'd discuss the merits and there's some time for it for the vote of the court will permit that. You're welcome. Give me a little bit of the vote of time back, too, so you're not prejudiced. Thank you, Mr. Stark, for here for Mr. Stark

... Then under your authorities, we really are in a situation where every single patterned malpractice case belongs in federal court. There is no such thing as a state lock malpractice claim when it involves a pattern attorney. Is it not interesting? I would not go so broadly, I'm not in a position to state that. This case in particular, I can tell you, has substantial pattern on issues. In order to resolve two things, one is whether the standard of court is breached, and the other is whether the consul in damages, what scope damage was done, and what financial impact is that had? Then the same question we asked before, what case would raise that? How would you avoid that issue if patterned malpractice is at stake? I'm not in a position to crack the rule for this court here on earth. All I know is that the WebPTA to complaint rule, and the case law of the 1338 sets out that if there is an issue, this is the corporate belongers. My fear is the alternative to what, and then discuss your own. That's what we have, Mark and hearings, and we have all sorts of things going on in the state courts, getting anything from uniform decisions, rather than federal court-wide decisions for long. Your Honor, it's not that simple, because the pre-court is not simple. It's not that the issue is belong in federal court, because it's a pattern issue. It's actually said the opposite. Depending on the context, those issues, even though they're fewer in difficult patterns, it's a belonging statement. Well, Your Honor, this is not a typical contract case. I get a pattern, and Judge Grader has a manufacturing company. I think he's infringing my pattern. We negotiate, he takes a license. The later he verifies his product. He says, well, now I'm not going to pay the royalties anymore, because we're showing because our legislative agreement only covers your pattern, and I'm doing something that's not covered by our pattern anymore. So I filed a breach of contract action in the state court against the other party in the contract, and we've held it. That's a state issue. That's speed-code of the cases. And yet it turns entirely on his own infringement or not, and it's clearly those in state court. The only issue in the case of any court is in infringement or no. The infringement decided by a state of judge and jury. Well, Your Honor, I'm willing to run the votes on the vote to expire. My preference would be that I'd discuss the merits and there's some time for it for the vote of the court will permit that. You're welcome. Give me a little bit of the vote of time back, too, so you're not prejudiced. Thank you, Mr. Stark, for here for Mr. Stark. Thank you. Good afternoon, my name is Gordon David Gunner, I present the Popeye of Immersity. And to start with jurisdiction, I agree entirely with the remarks that my friend Mr. Stark has made that we do look to complain that's the end of the video. It may have consequences that some cases end up in the federal system. And that is one of the sharp edges of the well-plated complaint rule. The consequences work both ways as the court and the House. It doesn't bring any counterplates and so on. And if that's what we did, I argued that your jurisdiction issue in your brief at all that I saw. I guess your Honor, it's case is 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 in the bread brief. And the timing explanation you just heard is because the reason it didn't come up in the delivery, the briefing was already underway when the court asked police aggressive. So the only great select to address it in the delivery and the reply brief. And we do agree, I don't know if the court has seen the AIP-LA quarterly journal article from last fall that proposes one broad solution. It's the Sean Seymour article from the fall of 2006 entitled, The Competency of State Courts to a Juicy Pack-Faced Mount Practice Planes. That's H-443 of Volume 34 last fall. It's a long synthesis of great old Christians and Maral Dallin, and a lot of other cases the courts familiar with, that may help give the court some comfort, that at least under one writer's analysis, not all cases imaginable will end up in federal court. I do it to court, no case by case. I guess the issue for us is not whether it's all cases versus something less than all. It's just whether it's going to be hell of a lot. That's a fair concern, but 1338, let's remember, says exclusive and puts, hadn't highlighted questions exclusively in federal court, which is not true in 1331 cases like regular. The balancing that we've heard about today in the other case, a federal state balancing, Congress has done the balancing in 1338. There seems to be a fact here that the U-Pat and attorneys like to be in federal court, that's where you've always been. You know the judges there. You want to all stay in federal court, says evidence by the reluctance to raise that issue at any point. At what point do we have to intervene and say, knowing belong in state court? I would start with you opinion, your honor, and add to the controls that might have my history to write. Let's not let parties stray from the well-plated complaint rule. And you're quite right. The only path issue comes up in a counterclimbed, and that doesn't count. I say let's just stick with the line that we have had, certainly for tort cases for a long time, add to the controls under Douglas and so on. Court has a stable law. The law is, all you just told me is that every one of these is going to end up in federal court in the future, because it's easy for me to write a patent law complaint and be any patent and not practice cases. Well, it's easy to write in the world without real learning where you have no constraints on what you can alleged, but if you have a well-founded, there's an alleged mistake of patent law that I'm not going to have any trouble stating a patent law question. I think that is correct

. Thank you. Good afternoon, my name is Gordon David Gunner, I present the Popeye of Immersity. And to start with jurisdiction, I agree entirely with the remarks that my friend Mr. Stark has made that we do look to complain that's the end of the video. It may have consequences that some cases end up in the federal system. And that is one of the sharp edges of the well-plated complaint rule. The consequences work both ways as the court and the House. It doesn't bring any counterplates and so on. And if that's what we did, I argued that your jurisdiction issue in your brief at all that I saw. I guess your Honor, it's case is 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 in the bread brief. And the timing explanation you just heard is because the reason it didn't come up in the delivery, the briefing was already underway when the court asked police aggressive. So the only great select to address it in the delivery and the reply brief. And we do agree, I don't know if the court has seen the AIP-LA quarterly journal article from last fall that proposes one broad solution. It's the Sean Seymour article from the fall of 2006 entitled, The Competency of State Courts to a Juicy Pack-Faced Mount Practice Planes. That's H-443 of Volume 34 last fall. It's a long synthesis of great old Christians and Maral Dallin, and a lot of other cases the courts familiar with, that may help give the court some comfort, that at least under one writer's analysis, not all cases imaginable will end up in federal court. I do it to court, no case by case. I guess the issue for us is not whether it's all cases versus something less than all. It's just whether it's going to be hell of a lot. That's a fair concern, but 1338, let's remember, says exclusive and puts, hadn't highlighted questions exclusively in federal court, which is not true in 1331 cases like regular. The balancing that we've heard about today in the other case, a federal state balancing, Congress has done the balancing in 1338. There seems to be a fact here that the U-Pat and attorneys like to be in federal court, that's where you've always been. You know the judges there. You want to all stay in federal court, says evidence by the reluctance to raise that issue at any point. At what point do we have to intervene and say, knowing belong in state court? I would start with you opinion, your honor, and add to the controls that might have my history to write. Let's not let parties stray from the well-plated complaint rule. And you're quite right. The only path issue comes up in a counterclimbed, and that doesn't count. I say let's just stick with the line that we have had, certainly for tort cases for a long time, add to the controls under Douglas and so on. Court has a stable law. The law is, all you just told me is that every one of these is going to end up in federal court in the future, because it's easy for me to write a patent law complaint and be any patent and not practice cases. Well, it's easy to write in the world without real learning where you have no constraints on what you can alleged, but if you have a well-founded, there's an alleged mistake of patent law that I'm not going to have any trouble stating a patent law question. I think that is correct. So all of these are in federal court from year on out. Is that what you're suggesting? Well, I'm not certain about all. I think a large number. I'm not looking. And there's always the exception. But if you're putting the exception on the exception is going to be in state court rather than the exception being in federal court. I've qualified yes to that. I have misgivings about the diminished settlement of that theory that I heard a few minutes ago in the previous case. I'm not sure they had a long budget case too. That's a good review. Everybody was going to be able to take the ball. Judge Reader, you've asked about a part of the five history of five history questions. Yeah, I was wondering why the reject what, why did they narrow? Well, it wasn't the right. Part of that is in the record at page 548. I don't think there is a complete answer to that. The reason being the federal health systems rules for creating an opinion. We frankly did not anticipate a dispute about federal jurisdiction. We tried to keep the record of Trump and designated what was going to go into it based on the issues that were before us. And one of the side effects of the wealthy, the complaint, the affirmative defense, actually, limitations happens to be an issue. The lead issue on a deal. And that's part of the answer. It was not an effort to conceal the file history. It might have been helpful to have more to be able to make my permanent defense. What can you say to this sentence just as background information? What the rejection was that led to the substitution of... It's just being out of place of compropriation. I believe part of it was a business need on behalf of the client to get a patent issued as quickly as possible. There were rejections based on Prior Art called Mosay under Section 102. I think was in one of three rejections based on a Prior Art, but I can't recall. Whether that justifies consisting of item, but that's what I saw. But if you're talking about.

. So all of these are in federal court from year on out. Is that what you're suggesting? Well, I'm not certain about all. I think a large number. I'm not looking. And there's always the exception. But if you're putting the exception on the exception is going to be in state court rather than the exception being in federal court. I've qualified yes to that. I have misgivings about the diminished settlement of that theory that I heard a few minutes ago in the previous case. I'm not sure they had a long budget case too. That's a good review. Everybody was going to be able to take the ball. Judge Reader, you've asked about a part of the five history of five history questions. Yeah, I was wondering why the reject what, why did they narrow? Well, it wasn't the right. Part of that is in the record at page 548. I don't think there is a complete answer to that. The reason being the federal health systems rules for creating an opinion. We frankly did not anticipate a dispute about federal jurisdiction. We tried to keep the record of Trump and designated what was going to go into it based on the issues that were before us. And one of the side effects of the wealthy, the complaint, the affirmative defense, actually, limitations happens to be an issue. The lead issue on a deal. And that's part of the answer. It was not an effort to conceal the file history. It might have been helpful to have more to be able to make my permanent defense. What can you say to this sentence just as background information? What the rejection was that led to the substitution of... It's just being out of place of compropriation. I believe part of it was a business need on behalf of the client to get a patent issued as quickly as possible. There were rejections based on Prior Art called Mosay under Section 102. I think was in one of three rejections based on a Prior Art, but I can't recall. Whether that justifies consisting of item, but that's what I saw. But if you're talking about... ...definitely prior art type rejections. Not indefinitely sort of anything on the phone. As far as I recall, that's correct to you. And I wish I had a better answer just as it been focused on Barbeys. You know we focused on limitations and damages. I'm relatively contented with the state of the briefing by both parties. I would highlight with it for just a couple of points. Number one, on limitations, our best case in my judgment is the perk case on imputation. We don't have a fight about how statute limitations works. We have a fight about the imputation rule. And I would call to the court's attention our perk case, which the district purple item is $59,000, which is nowhere side of any of the other signs of briefing. And I think that sign on is a pistilum. Second point, I would have for a moment, you remind me about the perk. The perk is a case of essentially evidence destruction. It was you had a person who was smashed up in a car wreck. And I wanted to sue the carmaker for a crash work. It's for making a lot of a car. And in this case, you cite one in your brief. You've faced a danger on this citation. Oh, by no means in honor. It is perhaps as close as any as summing up the problem in the district purple item. I just want to use it to establish a rule of imputation. The attorneys' knowledge is imputed to the client. We have a great invite clash about that. And in our view, there's a century of Texas law that supports strong imputation. The exception for lying on the plaintiffs under Section 275 of the Old Restatio of Agency is not the law in Texas. It has never been adopted. And I just pulled off your library shelf, the new restatio that came out last year, which is even stronger in its rule of imputation. 275 is no longer accepted by the A&I

.. ...definitely prior art type rejections. Not indefinitely sort of anything on the phone. As far as I recall, that's correct to you. And I wish I had a better answer just as it been focused on Barbeys. You know we focused on limitations and damages. I'm relatively contented with the state of the briefing by both parties. I would highlight with it for just a couple of points. Number one, on limitations, our best case in my judgment is the perk case on imputation. We don't have a fight about how statute limitations works. We have a fight about the imputation rule. And I would call to the court's attention our perk case, which the district purple item is $59,000, which is nowhere side of any of the other signs of briefing. And I think that sign on is a pistilum. Second point, I would have for a moment, you remind me about the perk. The perk is a case of essentially evidence destruction. It was you had a person who was smashed up in a car wreck. And I wanted to sue the carmaker for a crash work. It's for making a lot of a car. And in this case, you cite one in your brief. You've faced a danger on this citation. Oh, by no means in honor. It is perhaps as close as any as summing up the problem in the district purple item. I just want to use it to establish a rule of imputation. The attorneys' knowledge is imputed to the client. We have a great invite clash about that. And in our view, there's a century of Texas law that supports strong imputation. The exception for lying on the plaintiffs under Section 275 of the Old Restatio of Agency is not the law in Texas. It has never been adopted. And I just pulled off your library shelf, the new restatio that came out last year, which is even stronger in its rule of imputation. 275 is no longer accepted by the A&I. That due to this close discussion in the Old Restatio from four years ago is not the position of the A&I today. It has never been the position in Texas. And the party has briefed it. I trust the court to get that issue right. But I would just want to make clear we are very strongly opposed to the plaintiffs' position on imputation. Or is simply an emblematic case. It must have brought us other questions on the notations. I will move on with that to the briefing. The remaining issue on merits is the speculative, the damage rule. And I think the briefing covers that as well. You heard an argument made that there is facts to be found in the Declaration of Dr. Belomo. We will just have to disagree about that. And it's the court to read Dr. Belomo's. Were there any tests showing that the device was affected? And I would, and I would, you absolutely not, right? If I might read a portion of the wrap around that, we ask about the plaintiff and that's him. The inventor of that on page 1056 of the record. And summed it up in one question in his deposition. So it's fair to say that no one in the world has ever shown there's a survival advantage for sexist for the 100 kilo-dolts and 150 kilo-dolts and filter range in humans. Answer, that's correct. That is the end of Dr. Belomo's evidence talks about a very abstract, raises the level of abstractions, says, Well, filtration in the abstract has been tried in animals and in people. A lot of this evidence is about animals. But the end of the dispute is back to the main point. It was still a flow of any advantage of humans. We have yet to do the clinical testing. That's why Dr. Belomo says, I think the technology shows prompt. Well, there actually some evidence that the immunoset filter worked worse than the traditional filter. There is some evidence of that in our, it's contested how convincing that study is. Yes, the evidence is that the mortality rate went from 60 to 79 percent in a few people. Not a huge randomized clinical trial, but it is some suggested that you can't, as we all know, extrapolate animals to humans. You can't make that last step

. That due to this close discussion in the Old Restatio from four years ago is not the position of the A&I today. It has never been the position in Texas. And the party has briefed it. I trust the court to get that issue right. But I would just want to make clear we are very strongly opposed to the plaintiffs' position on imputation. Or is simply an emblematic case. It must have brought us other questions on the notations. I will move on with that to the briefing. The remaining issue on merits is the speculative, the damage rule. And I think the briefing covers that as well. You heard an argument made that there is facts to be found in the Declaration of Dr. Belomo. We will just have to disagree about that. And it's the court to read Dr. Belomo's. Were there any tests showing that the device was affected? And I would, and I would, you absolutely not, right? If I might read a portion of the wrap around that, we ask about the plaintiff and that's him. The inventor of that on page 1056 of the record. And summed it up in one question in his deposition. So it's fair to say that no one in the world has ever shown there's a survival advantage for sexist for the 100 kilo-dolts and 150 kilo-dolts and filter range in humans. Answer, that's correct. That is the end of Dr. Belomo's evidence talks about a very abstract, raises the level of abstractions, says, Well, filtration in the abstract has been tried in animals and in people. A lot of this evidence is about animals. But the end of the dispute is back to the main point. It was still a flow of any advantage of humans. We have yet to do the clinical testing. That's why Dr. Belomo says, I think the technology shows prompt. Well, there actually some evidence that the immunoset filter worked worse than the traditional filter. There is some evidence of that in our, it's contested how convincing that study is. Yes, the evidence is that the mortality rate went from 60 to 79 percent in a few people. Not a huge randomized clinical trial, but it is some suggested that you can't, as we all know, extrapolate animals to humans. You can't make that last step. Well, the animal human point, which is appearing up, but I understood Mr. Stark and the Ocidon, that there were tests posed on human blood in the lab and tests on human patients, where after the filtration of blood was returned to the body of the patient, do you agree on that? I don't understand the record to represent this device being used in humans that way. Certainly not that led to any survival advantage, perhaps. You're mentioning about survival. What he said, and the library poll was, there were uses of an insect's patient of the claimed filtration method, using that large core filtration, which showed certain biophysical benefits when lab tested, and which showed clinically discernible advantages on the human patient. Not too valuable, but other ingredients. That's what I understood in this set. You don't know if any such evidence. I don't believe so, you're honoring. When I was preparing for argument, I read the time briefing fairly carefully, and you looked for pinpoint citations to take me to that. Perhaps we'll hear about the citations on the go, but I don't recall any such evidence. The court has no further questions, so I'm going to turn the balance of my talk to you. All right, can you just control Mr. Rosencrantz? Pardon me, Mr. Stark. Four minutes. Mr. Stark, was there any original claim? No, it was not. Excuse me. Comprising was your honor. There was a rejection under the law, correctly, a reference report from his mosaic, which did not require the amendment that was made. It was unconnected to him. We think the amendment was gratuitous at the time it was significant. That state should have come to that. There were plenty of other miscellaneous claims. The price of that claim had expired. The original one? The original one. The original one. The original one. The rejection was received on the arc for a reference name mosaic. The record? Where in the record? I cannot back to that record. Sorry, your honor. We didn't address this

. Well, the animal human point, which is appearing up, but I understood Mr. Stark and the Ocidon, that there were tests posed on human blood in the lab and tests on human patients, where after the filtration of blood was returned to the body of the patient, do you agree on that? I don't understand the record to represent this device being used in humans that way. Certainly not that led to any survival advantage, perhaps. You're mentioning about survival. What he said, and the library poll was, there were uses of an insect's patient of the claimed filtration method, using that large core filtration, which showed certain biophysical benefits when lab tested, and which showed clinically discernible advantages on the human patient. Not too valuable, but other ingredients. That's what I understood in this set. You don't know if any such evidence. I don't believe so, you're honoring. When I was preparing for argument, I read the time briefing fairly carefully, and you looked for pinpoint citations to take me to that. Perhaps we'll hear about the citations on the go, but I don't recall any such evidence. The court has no further questions, so I'm going to turn the balance of my talk to you. All right, can you just control Mr. Rosencrantz? Pardon me, Mr. Stark. Four minutes. Mr. Stark, was there any original claim? No, it was not. Excuse me. Comprising was your honor. There was a rejection under the law, correctly, a reference report from his mosaic, which did not require the amendment that was made. It was unconnected to him. We think the amendment was gratuitous at the time it was significant. That state should have come to that. There were plenty of other miscellaneous claims. The price of that claim had expired. The original one? The original one. The original one. The original one. The rejection was received on the arc for a reference name mosaic. The record? Where in the record? I cannot back to that record. Sorry, your honor. We didn't address this. Our... I have confirmed our initial brief was submitted before the jurisdiction. We should claim that the briefing was saved while that was pending. And we were told by the clerk we should address the similar brief. And so that's why you got to the same record you did for us. Is there anything in the record, by the way, to show the point that you made about the use of your device on humans? Yes, Your Honor. In the declaration about the Belomone, I can put you from paragraph 19. I believe I have the right face, I believe, as it's a joint-pentic 737. I believe it's where that starts. I have the actual copy of this, but I don't know the joint-pentic 737. I'm not a fault for this for that. But there is a paragraph 19 in Dr. Belomone's declaration, which says, LPHF technology that's large-porting of filtration has also been tested numerous times, both on the bench, using cold human blood and on human beings. These purer-due studies have uniformed shown that LPHF clear-septic cytokine to the blood more effectively than has been shown with any other blood purification device. Moreover, the larger the pore size, the more effective the cytokine clearance will remove. The study also found that in human patients with severe sepsis, treatment with LPHF technology went with significant improvement in white cell function and improved physiological benefits. No survival data, though. There is no statistical survival rate in this year onwards. My own name is Winnie-Columbia. They're not the virus theory of disease. There's not the goal of these particular studies to establish the statistics for that year onwards. And that's what Dr. Matsum is referring to when he said that the study had not established that. That's what the final clinical study would do in the morning. That's what we would have if we had the chance to go for and get the funding, which Johnson and Johnson's prepared for body, would not once they discovered the weaknesses in his path. We can't help any of that. All we can decide is whether it could safely be predicted that the FDA would definitely find sufficient efficacy and sufficient safety when such a large, ill-reinvamed test of survivability was done. And so you have to be saying, well, just from what Dr. Gollum just said, as you read it, we've a court-conquered and concluded that the safety efficacy test at FDA would pass muster. It looks to be like it's awfully speculative. All we need to establish around it in Texas law is that we have a good chance

. Our... I have confirmed our initial brief was submitted before the jurisdiction. We should claim that the briefing was saved while that was pending. And we were told by the clerk we should address the similar brief. And so that's why you got to the same record you did for us. Is there anything in the record, by the way, to show the point that you made about the use of your device on humans? Yes, Your Honor. In the declaration about the Belomone, I can put you from paragraph 19. I believe I have the right face, I believe, as it's a joint-pentic 737. I believe it's where that starts. I have the actual copy of this, but I don't know the joint-pentic 737. I'm not a fault for this for that. But there is a paragraph 19 in Dr. Belomone's declaration, which says, LPHF technology that's large-porting of filtration has also been tested numerous times, both on the bench, using cold human blood and on human beings. These purer-due studies have uniformed shown that LPHF clear-septic cytokine to the blood more effectively than has been shown with any other blood purification device. Moreover, the larger the pore size, the more effective the cytokine clearance will remove. The study also found that in human patients with severe sepsis, treatment with LPHF technology went with significant improvement in white cell function and improved physiological benefits. No survival data, though. There is no statistical survival rate in this year onwards. My own name is Winnie-Columbia. They're not the virus theory of disease. There's not the goal of these particular studies to establish the statistics for that year onwards. And that's what Dr. Matsum is referring to when he said that the study had not established that. That's what the final clinical study would do in the morning. That's what we would have if we had the chance to go for and get the funding, which Johnson and Johnson's prepared for body, would not once they discovered the weaknesses in his path. We can't help any of that. All we can decide is whether it could safely be predicted that the FDA would definitely find sufficient efficacy and sufficient safety when such a large, ill-reinvamed test of survivability was done. And so you have to be saying, well, just from what Dr. Gollum just said, as you read it, we've a court-conquered and concluded that the safety efficacy test at FDA would pass muster. It looks to be like it's awfully speculative. All we need to establish around it in Texas law is that we have a good chance. That's actually the standard for the court below is stated, but didn't use properly. There's other Texas case law that says, you can hear the nearly-be probable. What's happening is the problem is you have a chain of entrances here. One link in the chain is that the FDA would allow the product as method to be used. And that would depend on a survivability test that hasn't been attempted yet. If that test were done, you're on it, we would have no probability to talk about law there, we know speculation, we would have absolute certainty. And the law of this case does not require absolute certainty. It requires a good chance of state by the court below or probable as stated by the Texas court. So now, how do we have any way to assess the chances of survivability test just based on paragraph 19 of the law? The perfect 19 is what I quoted to you, Your Honor. What Dr. Belombo does is he cites scores and references these appear-reduced studies. There is a wealth of scientific evidence where this has been tested to see effect or effect or test of the filtrate on other cells to see what it does to them when they're removed. It's a confirmed link to actually within this creating a subject reaction. There's a wealth of scientific knowledge, Your Honor, which got the back of the hand in the court below. We completely disregard it, declared the entire wealth of scientific knowledge as mere speculation and wouldn't cope with it. We think we have the right to actually have this test of your honor to see if this link can be made. We think that probable is established by our scientific background. And we think that it's incumbent upon the court below to draw the inferences in our favor on that question since this is on summary judgment. No jury, no judge, got to see all of this and make a factory determination all delightly with on the basis of the wealth of scientific evidence that Dr. Belombo cites as well as summarizes. The patent really only covers the narrow range, not all LPHF as a technology. Well, there are claim interpretation issues to be done, which is part of that. No, that factory or jurisdiction. The judge read the point, I suppose, is if the test to Dr. Belombo was referring, where at the rate of 500, a killer of all, does it have no relevance at all to this case because this patent has a very narrow claim for anything. And that's only been Johnson backed out from a large number of reasons. Is your brief itself tends to say beyond just what's the issue in this case? Your honor, we have evidence from Johnson, Johnson, that the technology did not scare him away, that their basis for backing off the steward off the intellectual property, we've cited that. I won't be here. We think that any inferences with respect to that need to be drawn in our favor since we're even on the new party in this case. And that this probability should be weighed by a finer fact, not dismissed without any discussion of the technology, but any discussion of all these references that Dr. Belombo has provided. Without even mentioning whether people fall within the claims or not, because that record wasn't developed, we never got the chance, we never got our data in court to do that. All right, I think we have the position to both sides

. Thank you very much. Thank you, and we'll take some of your questions

Legal Case Summary

Immunocept v. Fulbright & Jaworski

Date Argued: Mon Jun 11 2007

Case Number: 43900-0

Docket Number: 2605539

Judges:Not available

Duration: 35 minutes

Court Name: Federal Circuit

Case Summary

Immunocept v. Fulbright & Jaworski

Oral Audio Transcript(Beta version)