Legal Case Summary

In Re Rivera

Date Argued: Fri Aug 07 2009
Case Number: 2013AP001485-D
Docket Number: 2605111
Judges:Not available
Duration: 24 minutes
Court Name: Federal Circuit

Case Summary

**Case Summary: In re Rivera, Docket Number 2605111** **Court:** [Specify Court, e.g., Superior Court, District Court, etc.] **Date:** [Insert relevant dates] **Parties Involved:** - **Petitioner:** [Name of the petitioner] - **Respondent:** [Name of the respondent] **Background:** The case involves a legal dispute concerning [briefly describe the nature of the case, e.g., custody, bankruptcy, adoption, etc.]. The petitioner filed for [describe the specific relief sought, e.g., a modification of custody, declaration of bankruptcy, etc.] citing [relevant reasons or legal grounds]. **Key Issues:** 1. [Issue 1: e.g., Whether the change in circumstances justifies the modification of custody arrangements.] 2. [Issue 2: e.g., Whether the petitioner meets the eligibility criteria under the applicable law.] 3. [Additional issue(s) if necessary.] **Facts:** - [Fact 1: Describe significant facts leading to the case, e.g., dates of events, actions taken by parties, etc.] - [Fact 2: Include details relevant to the court's decision, such as evidence presented or testimonies.] - [Additional facts as necessary.] **Court’s Findings:** The court evaluated the evidence presented, including [mention any key evidence, testimonies, or reports]. The court found that [summarize the court's analysis and rationale that led to its decision]. Key considerations included [mention any legal standards applied or precedents referenced]. **Judgment:** The court [state the decision, e.g., granted the petition, denied the petition, ordered specific relief, etc.]. The court ruled that [summarize the outcome and any conditions or stipulations that accompany the ruling]. **Conclusion:** The outcome of In re Rivera, Docket Number 2605111, reflects the court's determination regarding [summarize the essence of the decision and its implications for the parties involved]. [Optional: Include any insights on the case’s significance or potential for appeal.] **Next Steps:** - [Information on any potential appeals, further proceedings, or compliance requirements, if applicable.] **Note:** For in-depth details and specifics of legal arguments, consult the official court documents or legal database corresponding to Docket Number 2605111.

In Re Rivera


Oral Audio Transcript(Beta version)

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23 of patent 8291-812. The board below relied on extrinsic definition of the word compress to construe a claim term tamper. This extrinsic definition was not in the evidentiary record

. And by relying on this definition, the patent office exceeded its authority provided by Congress, which mandated that unpatentability be proven by the petitioner with a preponderance of evidence. So when you said it was not in the evidentiary record, I guess maybe I'm misremembering. I thought it was introduced with the reply filing by the challenger. Yes, Your Honor. So the exception? Is that not make it part of the evidentiary record? No, Your Honor, because in our position is what an attorney says a claim term means is not evidence. So for it to have been in the record, we would have had a dictionary definition that would have been labeled as an exhibit. As an example, the definition that we offered below. I'm sorry, I thought, again, I may be just confusing the details. I thought that was a Marion Webster dictionary definition

. It was so that the definition was it was written in the reply brief and then at the end of the sentence, they had a slide to Marion Webster's 2011. So when you say not in the evidentiary record, you mean that there wasn't a single-page photocopy of what was accurately inserted into the record of what was accurately quoted from that page of Marion Webster? Whether it was accurate, we don't know it because that page is not in the record. All we have to rely on is the attorney who stated the definition. And so I think one of the issues here is the board's position is, well, we think this definition is reasonable and we're allowed to conclude what the broadest reasonable interpretation is. That's a separate issue from the Chevron doctrine. The Chevron doctrine is, did the board even have authority to consider and rely on this definition? And the answer is no because Congress gave its unambiguous intent that unpatentability must be proven by the petitioner with the preponderance of evidence. And so because the definition, excuse me, or that they relied on, does not in evidence, it's not evidence. They exceeded their authority by relying on it and then using it to invalidate claim 23. And did the board expressly state that it wasn't relying on the definition? In their, in the brief on this appeal, they said that they're not relying on it

. And in our reply to that, we pointed out where in the final written decision, which is in the joint appendix, page seven. I'm not going to quote it here. Our position is the board very clearly relied on it. And from that appendix, page seven, the board said in the final written decision, a dictionary definition provided by petitioner for the word compress, i.e., to press or squeeze together is reasonable and consistent with use of the term tamper in the specification. We interpret tamper to refer to an element that compresses, i.e. presses or squeezes together coffee inside the claimed coffee holder

. So they introduced the definition provided in that reply and then use that to base their ultimate definition of tamper. Not from what you read. They said they articulated what a party had done, but then they articulated their own definition. Right. And so your honor, our position is that the pressing or squeezing, connecting that phrase to tamper, the only place that that exists in the record is from that reply brief. So, and I will also, in our reply brief, we also pointed out in the patent office's response, they also make a causal connection between the introduction of this definition or reply to the ultimate conclusion of what tamper means. And I can, you know, I'll pull that out from our reply brief where that is in the patent owner's brief. Secondly, so that our principal point on the Chevron doctrine is what I've just articulated, but there are other patent office rules that weren't followed when the patent office did not, when the patent office relied on the step edition. So one of those rules is that claim constructions have to be in the petition

. So that's part of the content of a petition is that the petitioner puts in their claim construction. They also put in their evidence supporting their challenges of unpatinability. And so that's 37 CFR 42.104B5 and 37 CFR 42.104B3. And we submit your honor that these rules were not followed because the definition associating tampering with the press or squeeze was in the reply. It was not in the petition. And that also brings up a case that the parties have talked about in their briefs, the Areosa case, where a reference had issue there was in the petition and it wasn't exited. And this court found that the patent office aired and not considering it

. That case is very similar to our position in that we have a definition that wasn't in exhibit. It wasn't in the petition. And so it should not have been considered because of the rules of claim constructions being in the petition, having your evidence in the petition. Okay. Can I just ask, isn't it right that at least as to maybe even only, I don't know, as to non-technical terms and I would consider tampering as to a non-technical term that it's not unusual for example for this court in construing a claim by ordinary language where there's no any question. So it's a very powerful factual dispute to rely on dictionaries for ordinary language terms to because other people have have thought about the right formulation of words to capture what we kind of intuitively know. And he may as well use that form of words rather than have to think of it yourself. Why is this different from that? Because assuming I'm remembering right in general about, you know, not maybe not a frequent practice but not unusual practice. So, Your Honor, I think the difference comes with agency law

. And it goes back to this issue that I think the board's position is, well, we got it right. We construed the term correctly. We take issue with that. We don't think they got it right. But they got it right and were allowed to construed terms. So there's no problem. The issue comes with the Chevron doctrine. It's not an issue whether they think they got it right. It's an issue of did they have the authority to even consider it

. So I understand in other instances before the patent office where the federal rules or evidence aren't part of a proceeding. There are some leeway there to say, okay, well, this is non-technical. I can look at a dictionary definition and I can understand this. So I'll go there in IPR. But in cases coming from district courts, ordinary, old fashioned infringement litigation, the rules of evidence apply. And so does the general rule that an appellate court is not supposed to go outside the record. Nevertheless, on legal questions and to a very large extent claim construction is a legal question. At least again, where non-technical terms are used, don't we? I mean, look outside the record in the sense that we can look publicly available, you know, ordinary English definitions. I think again, you're on a, it's an issue of district court versus an administrative agency

. It also has to do with whether Congress has unambiguously spoken on the issue. So Congress gives the patent office the authority to conduct these IPRs. And then they also have additional statutes governing what they do. So when Congress speaks unambiguously and here they have requiring unpatent ability to be proven by evidence, then the patent office doesn't have that leeway. They don't have room to interpret a statute that is unambiguously and written by Congress. So I think it's really an issue of admin law. It's a matter of could I do this? Did Congress give me the right to do this? And the answer is no. So that's our position on that. I would also add that some of what we were talking about, our principal position is the Chevron doctrine and the role of an admin agency with respect to what Congress has, the authority Congress has given the patent office

. But secondly and substantively, I think the patent office is a reply brief. Actually, I'm in my rebuttal time. So you can stop now if anyone has any other questions or. Okay. I'll just reserve my time for rebuttal. Just let me. May it please the court. In continuing the claim term tamper, the board did not commit any procedural errors as alleged by the patent owner Rivera. And two judge wallets question earlier, the board did explicitly state that it did not rely on the dictionary definition for the word compress when it construed the claim term term tamper, excuse me, honors. And that can be found on page a 30 of the appendix. And if I could just direct you there, the board specifically says. And the last paragraph, we did not rely on petitioner's definition of compress when declining to limit tamper as patent owner in its expert suggested. Rather, we gave the term tamper its broadest reasonable interpretation and view of the claim language. So that's the first issue to the extent that the court disagrees and find that the board did rely on the dictionary definition, the patent office is well within its rights to do so. Going off of what Judge Toronto said, can I just ask you, I guess I'm a little puzzled. The board got this phrase, didn't they? What is it? Press or squeeze or something you press or squeeze together from the dictionary? I mean, right? So in what sense did it not rely on it? What's the ordinary meaning of a very common in ordinary word, right? Compress what does compress mean? And the board didn't rely on the petitioner's dictionary definition. It just went with the common meaning of compress. And if the board had looked at a dictionary definition, judges have a right to look at dictionary definitions to define technical terms or to construe claim language

. And that can be found on page a 30 of the appendix. And if I could just direct you there, the board specifically says. And the last paragraph, we did not rely on petitioner's definition of compress when declining to limit tamper as patent owner in its expert suggested. Rather, we gave the term tamper its broadest reasonable interpretation and view of the claim language. So that's the first issue to the extent that the court disagrees and find that the board did rely on the dictionary definition, the patent office is well within its rights to do so. Going off of what Judge Toronto said, can I just ask you, I guess I'm a little puzzled. The board got this phrase, didn't they? What is it? Press or squeeze or something you press or squeeze together from the dictionary? I mean, right? So in what sense did it not rely on it? What's the ordinary meaning of a very common in ordinary word, right? Compress what does compress mean? And the board didn't rely on the petitioner's dictionary definition. It just went with the common meaning of compress. And if the board had looked at a dictionary definition, judges have a right to look at dictionary definitions to define technical terms or to construe claim language. So long as that construction or that definition doesn't contradict what's in the patent application. So it's more like it had an intuition about what the term meant by an intuition, didn't quite have the words for it. When it saw those words in the dictionary definition, it wasn't adopting those words because a dictionary informed it of something it didn't already know and into it, but rather found words to capture an intuition it already had. It's a sense in which it didn't rely. I don't mean to sound. I understand you're negative about that formulation, but it's a little subtle. Well, I think it's right though. If you look at what the board said, it says. I got the impression they were saying we already know that

. So long as that construction or that definition doesn't contradict what's in the patent application. So it's more like it had an intuition about what the term meant by an intuition, didn't quite have the words for it. When it saw those words in the dictionary definition, it wasn't adopting those words because a dictionary informed it of something it didn't already know and into it, but rather found words to capture an intuition it already had. It's a sense in which it didn't rely. I don't mean to sound. I understand you're negative about that formulation, but it's a little subtle. Well, I think it's right though. If you look at what the board said, it says. I got the impression they were saying we already know that. Right. Well, because they had an intuition. It's an ordinary word. We know what compress means. In fact, in the definition, they say a camper is a device that compresses i.e. press and squeeze. Sort of that is. They're just saying people know what that means

. Right. Well, because they had an intuition. It's an ordinary word. We know what compress means. In fact, in the definition, they say a camper is a device that compresses i.e. press and squeeze. Sort of that is. They're just saying people know what that means. I'm sorry, not. Yeah, I think they said i.e. press and squeeze. People know what compress means. It's not a complicated word. And the board saying, okay, well, we see the dictionary great. We don't need to look at it to know what that means. And so, again, the board didn't rely on it, but even if they had, they would not have committed any proscedural errors because the dictionary definition wasn't being offered to handle a fact and dispute

. I'm sorry, not. Yeah, I think they said i.e. press and squeeze. People know what compress means. It's not a complicated word. And the board saying, okay, well, we see the dictionary great. We don't need to look at it to know what that means. And so, again, the board didn't rely on it, but even if they had, they would not have committed any proscedural errors because the dictionary definition wasn't being offered to handle a fact and dispute. It was just being offered to sort of to show this is an ordinary word. And this is a plain and ordinary meaning. And so, as we said in our brief, it's sort of akin to deciding case law. Okay, here we have a dictionary definition. Everybody knows what it means. Let me just give you this definition. It didn't need to be provided in an exhibit. And this argument that it had to be in the petition also is an accurate because the court's decision in Belden talks about rebuttal evidence is a lot of the word. And so, as we said, it's not allowed to be considered by the board

. It was just being offered to sort of to show this is an ordinary word. And this is a plain and ordinary meaning. And so, as we said in our brief, it's sort of akin to deciding case law. Okay, here we have a dictionary definition. Everybody knows what it means. Let me just give you this definition. It didn't need to be provided in an exhibit. And this argument that it had to be in the petition also is an accurate because the court's decision in Belden talks about rebuttal evidence is a lot of the word. And so, as we said, it's not allowed to be considered by the board. It's responding to something in the Patent owner response, for example. And so, here it was put in the reply in response to something that the Patent owner said about what a tampered does. And just lastly, regardless of whether the board adopted person's squeeze as a definition for compress or Rivera's definition of compress, which I think in their briefs they explained was compact. Now, the part art that we're talking about still teaches a tamper that compresses coffee. So, based on the board's construction, we believe it was proper. The dictionary definition wasn't relied on. Even if it was relied on, we believe that was also proper. And, regardless of which construction you take for the word compress, thou anticipates in disclosives a tamper. And I respectfully ask that the court uphold the board's final right and decision

. It's responding to something in the Patent owner response, for example. And so, here it was put in the reply in response to something that the Patent owner said about what a tampered does. And just lastly, regardless of whether the board adopted person's squeeze as a definition for compress or Rivera's definition of compress, which I think in their briefs they explained was compact. Now, the part art that we're talking about still teaches a tamper that compresses coffee. So, based on the board's construction, we believe it was proper. The dictionary definition wasn't relied on. Even if it was relied on, we believe that was also proper. And, regardless of which construction you take for the word compress, thou anticipates in disclosives a tamper. And I respectfully ask that the court uphold the board's final right and decision. That was all. Very brief now. So, in terms of the issue of whether the board relied on the definition, I talked about what was in the written decision and then also in the board's brief on this appeal. So, I page 13 states, the board found that Guangdong's dictionary definition for the word compress was reasonable and consistent with the use of the term tamper in the specification. Thus, the board interpreted the term tamper to refer to an element that compresses i.e. presses or squeezes together coffee inside the claimed coffee holder. So, that's what I was alluded to earlier about this causal connection that the petitioner introduces a definition. The board says that's reasonable

. That was all. Very brief now. So, in terms of the issue of whether the board relied on the definition, I talked about what was in the written decision and then also in the board's brief on this appeal. So, I page 13 states, the board found that Guangdong's dictionary definition for the word compress was reasonable and consistent with the use of the term tamper in the specification. Thus, the board interpreted the term tamper to refer to an element that compresses i.e. presses or squeezes together coffee inside the claimed coffee holder. So, that's what I was alluded to earlier about this causal connection that the petitioner introduces a definition. The board says that's reasonable. I'm going to go with it. And am I understanding remembering the Jao prior art, right? The tamper there is a net that keeps the grounds, or I guess the, can you use grounds before it's percolated anyway, the dry stuff from floating up in the water. That's correct. That's correct. And so, in terms of the substance, the issue is, okay, so Jao has a separation that prevents coffee powder from floating. And one thing that seems pretty consistent below and on appeal is that drippleaters don't use tamper coffee. And so, why is that significant? It's significant because claim 23 talks about coffee holder that tamps coffee and it's engageable with a coffee maker. The evidence below was very consistent that a drippleater doesn't use tamper coffee. Tamper coffee is used with pressurized water systems like espresso brewing

. I'm going to go with it. And am I understanding remembering the Jao prior art, right? The tamper there is a net that keeps the grounds, or I guess the, can you use grounds before it's percolated anyway, the dry stuff from floating up in the water. That's correct. That's correct. And so, in terms of the substance, the issue is, okay, so Jao has a separation that prevents coffee powder from floating. And one thing that seems pretty consistent below and on appeal is that drippleaters don't use tamper coffee. And so, why is that significant? It's significant because claim 23 talks about coffee holder that tamps coffee and it's engageable with a coffee maker. The evidence below was very consistent that a drippleater doesn't use tamper coffee. Tamper coffee is used with pressurized water systems like espresso brewing. But, drippleaters use loose crown coffee. So, Jao doesn't identify any component as a tamper. And it also says that it can be used with a drippleater, which doesn't use tamper coffee. And there's no other coffee maker identified whether in Jao or any piece of prior art below. So, separately, it's, you know, our position was, is that there were procedural errors that the patent office succeeded as authority. But, as background, they didn't get it right either in terms of concluding that Jao preventing coffee from floating, being used in a drippleater. And it dissipates a patent that has to do with tamping coffee and engaging that with a coffee maker. Jao didn't think that it would be a drippleater, so did he? It was, it could be used independently as well. That's correct, Your Honor

. The claim 23 requires coffee maker to be used with a coffee maker. So, the coffee maker is claimed in claim 23. And I think that's also one of the issues that was going on below, which was an analysis of Jao independent of a drippleater, whereas claim 23 encompasses the coffee maker as well, not just the holder. And if there are no other questions, you're all right. Yeah. Thank you