A random octane authour is eleven E Answer points. Thank you, Your Honor. May it please depart. The standards in principle are well known. The record is not complex. I hope to have the opportunity to speak to a few points of emphasis briefly. The first involves the significance of the mission in PJ-18 of the Revenue League. The game co-stand in to bring this action is not predicated on having an exclusive license in any definable territory. That should be failed. The concept, a part of the United States, which is now in Section 261, goes back at least to 1836 in one. So, if you can see that geographic territorial limitations to an otherwise exclusive license that's the only limitation, it would be okay, and that person was still standing to bring a suit correct? I do not concede that energy-ographical limitation is sufficient. The court has been clear that minestual geographic territories won't make it. I am saying that... The court hasn't actually helped at that
. That wasn't an issue in that case. There were no territorial limitations. This issue in Prima-Tap, where they're... You're correct, did it? The word minestual is dictated. Okay, and the very statute you cited suggests that there can be territorial limitations for assignment purposes, and that would still convey an assignment. Section 261, is that correct? Yes, it says a part of the United States. Here's the one thing that really concerned me, though, is everyone seems to concede, at least the District Court said it, and I didn't really see if they were recommending it from you all, that a field of use license would similarly convey standing. And that's the part that really baffled me, because we have an oppressor that says that, and in fact, I think there are some Supreme Court cases that say that commentary. So, are you appealing on that basis? Are you focusing on just the exclusive enterprise concept, or are you going to argue to me too, that field of use, similarly, to bar them? Let me start with, as I understand Game Coast's position, it has never been justified on a field of use basis, and on the record you couldn't be, because the New York lottery is such a limited part of the field of use of gaming, and even such a limited part of the field of use of lottery gaming, that that principle just couldn't apply. What field of use? Absolutely, could not be used to justify standing in this case. Okay, but I don't think you, I don't think you understood what I was saying. More generally, which is, the District Court suggested that patent licensees, with a field of use license, could have standing. Do you agree with that concept? I do not agree with that concept
. Does not question whether your case involves field of use. Yes, I understand that, and I intend to get there. I simply wanted to clarify. Let me ask you a high profile, which is a little bit of a great question for all of these cases. What is the high profile? A new technique for what a field breaks, one which only what a field manufacturer would want. Why should not be allowed to say to one person? I will give you an exclusive license with respect to this new product, in dealing with a Ford Motor Company. But I'm going to retain for myself the right to deal with General Motors and price-footing. What's the matter with Section O'Rain? There is nothing to matter with that arrangement. The question is whether your licensee at that point would have standing to sue in its own name. Why should the licensee sue? Let us assume that it's an exclusive license. And the licensee has the exclusive right to sue for infringement. Why should the licensee in that situation be allowed to sue for infringement? By in dealing with the Ford? If I may, I'd like to start the answer to that question with precedent of this court. Because I'm happy you're on the court. Do we have any precedent that says that the only two situations in which someone arrives less than a complete exclusive license may sue for infringement in its own name is if one is a geographical limitation or two is a field of useful limitation. The cases have recognized the right and that's a few
. If you will, they have a said, that's all. I don't think we know the set for put up the notes. And we have. I would say that the entire line of jurisprudences to that point. But until this case, no plaintiff has ever attempted to author the kind of theory that the district court authored here that there is a third way. So that all of the precedent is confined, in my view, all of this court's precedent is confined to geographic territories. And the issues in the cases are whether certain factors in a license for a geographic territory are sufficient. What we're talking about, what we're talking about here really is, what extent may you give someone the right to sue for infringement by carving out a part of your basic patent right? You basically like to exclude competitors and you say, well, I'm not going to give you the same rights that I have. I'm going to give you a part of what it's like. So the question is, what part is enough to have someone consider? Correct your honor. And I want to go back to the press against the fact that I proposed to give you and that this actually what was going to be my second point is spontaneous nature, what is it with the court? And that is the textile production space, which actually involves the Ford Motor Company. It involves a line of shipping for wires in a car that was invented by me, licensed to textile, textile, undertook a requirements contract to fulfill needs in supply and Ford. And the question was whether textile was an exclusive licensee that had the right to sue and its own name and textile based that on its exclusive dealings with me under the requirements contract. And this court's opinion repeatedly says that does not make any difference because me retain the right to license the patent for use, for sale, for anything else, for any requirements other than its own in dealing with Ford. And therefore textile was not an exclusive licensee and had no standing
. So the fact is, while we look at this as a case of first impression in the sense that the district court used a new theory, textile production as I view it is absolutely on point in the facts because that was an enterprise license. And the court said that isn't enough and precisely for the reasons we have argued here, that within both any territory or any field of use, if field of use is a reason to allow standing, me could have licensed that product to anybody else to do anything except supply me. Mr. Berg, why don't we view this as a territory? Assignment. Well, first, it's New York. It's not New York. It is not even really a part of New York. It's wherever the New York lottery contracts with right now, eight race tracks, because when any of us like that, wherever that territory is defined by where the New York lottery operates, why isn't that our territory restriction? And first I think it's the case right there. First, I would start with game closed concession on page 18 of the red brief that it is not attempting to justify its standing. It's not predicated on its having an exclusive license in a definable geographic region. Well, they're just saying to have other arguments. You can see this is a territory restriction. I'm not sure I wouldn't say that, but I don't read that. It's giving away the case. What's essential in response to your owner's question in their language, and it would be mine too, is a definable geographic region
. The New York lottery is not a definable geographic region. It's not New York. There is other gaming, any gaming. You have a lot of objection to operate tracks and new furiously, or it's fun to land itself. Actually, the New York, right now it doesn't, but the New York lottery authorizing statute allows it to contract with other states for that purpose. But with this license, it's a really limited tune in New York. It says authorized by the New York State Library in the state of New York. So this license doesn't give these folks the right to do it, even if the New York lottery contracts and has terminals in New York. Which would make my point, because if the New York lottery decided to contract with New Jersey, this license wouldn't be an exclusive dealing license, even with the New York lottery. But this license would authorize them to do anything in the state of New York. No, but if your owner takes this, this is a case of, as we can ascertain the territory, why is this all? Why is that made? But in some way, it has to attain the territorial limitations of the license. Why is that? And that and not the conversion. And what I'm saying, your owner, is you cannot ascertain the territorial limits of the license. The license is any place the New York lottery may or may not choose to do business. But when you're buying it, what do they do? That's where it operates
. Then what's the problem? Well, why are the problems that are so little? Isn't the problem that other people in New York see? For me, the territorial limitation is clear. And I don't think that's problematic, because the idea behind the prudential standard concerns is one person ought to be able to be sued for the so-lactic infringement. So you don't want multiple people being able to bring sued. So if somebody is infringing this by the New York State lottery in New York, those acts of infringement would be one that this person could bring sued under this licensee. And if someone is infringing by selling New York lottery tickets outside of the state of New York, that's a separate act of infringement where the patent sheet could bring sued, presumably, if he still has those rights to bring sued, it hasn't given those to someone else. So that's why we have territorial limitations. Correct. So this is limited to New York. The problem that I see, though, one that I think that you're bringing up, is that this is a field of use and a territory combined, which is really where we're in new territory, though kind of intended. And the field of use part is the New York State lottery. And here's my concern. This kiosk patent claims, and I call it kiosks, because that's the way I look at what they're really doing. Well, that kiosk could do a lot more than just the New York lottery, and it's still in French, multimedia doesn't. But it could. You're absolutely right
. It's system. So for one system, which would constitute a single act of infringement, both the patent sheet and the licensee, you would be able to sue. That's absolutely correct. And that's the problem that I see here. Is that right? That the way you see it? You correctly see a problem. My view includes multiple problems, and I'd like to go back to you, to your earlier question, about field of use. I think that a psychomic case, which is cited in the briefs, is really rather interesting, because that's the case that involves a license from Canada, and it involves what's called commercial use of a product. And the court said there is no standing to sue because there can be governmental use and philanthropic use. I think the fact that psychomic did not even discuss field of use speaks volumes, and I would not support the field of use. Do you want to say a few further comments from the Board? Yes, thank you, Judge Radar. Thank you. Mr. Rhodes. Good morning. Thank you, Mayor
. Please, the court. With me, the Capitol table is Mr. John Adams, General Counsel of Florida National Inc. And I'd like to thank the Court for granting this in a mockery court appeal. I know that this court has limited resources, and it's not only get this court even on an after full trouble in the Mar incident. The Apple of International Inc. Thank you. I believe we have to start with the contract documents. I think this court's precedent, and this report's precedent, is that as you start with the contract, the intent of the parties and the substance of the transaction. And in this case, it's clear it's a territorial restraint with arguably a field of use restriction. I do believe that... Is the field of use going to lead to some confusion is to consider where? I go kick some, Your Honor, and I think that gets back to this court, or the.
.. Well, as we were just discussing, the lottery can sell in various places in various ways that might raise questions as to who is in the title of the suit. In this case, more than any, Your Honor, I would say that it's going to be very clear what the scope of this license is because the New York... who legislated through the New York lottery is going to define it. It's not a question of the scope of the license. The patent claims are not to the New York lottery. They're much broader than that. And so the patent claims would cover a system that has one of the options, in fact, your D-Pinent Climb 14, is a lottery as one of the systems that can be run on these machines. Correct? Correct, Your Honor. So if the lottery is one of the systems, I couldn't envision they could also do Kino or other things, and then you would be in here telling me that someone who does those things in fringes. Oh, that's in a lottery context. Otherwise, we wouldn't have that in the signing. Beautiful, exactly my point
. So you wouldn't be able to come in here and tell me that in French. So suppose that there's a chaos that's capable of offering both New York lottery tickets and Kino tickets. So for a single active infringement, IE1 system, you would come in here and you would sue that person up for doing it at the lottery ticket, and the patent D would have to bring a separate, for all the other acts of infringement constituted in that system. I would argue, Your Honor, the record does not support that there is that potential. And, and, and, and, and, what do you think applies to sex specifying how the system could be used for particular and different kinds of game-match? But since gambling is un, is illegal except in very restricted applications and our license, our assignment, I should say, applies only to a very narrow application. And if they practice that application, they in French, where the only ones that can sue it. If they, if they, if they practice multiple applications, yeah, they may have exposure only to us for that one narrow application, this lottery application. But that would be no different. And by the way, Your Honor, I do think field of use is... So, wait, but that's the point. They would have potential liability to both you and the original patent holder for the same act of infringement. They would be potentially subject to multiple suits, and that's what our prudential standing requirements say is one of the important considerations. I, I agree with you, you've got a constitutional standing, you've got legal injury effect. But you've got to have both constitutional and prudential standing to get standing. And the prudential one is the one that comes into the problem here. I, I would refer you to the textile products case, Your Honor, on page, which says, a licensee is an exclusive licensee only if the patent is promised expressly or applyably that others shall be excluded from practicing the invention, quote, within the field covered by the license. That's this court precedent. And it's like it's too bright height. And I could be honest with you, I did not. I read right, I didn't, what it's someone I didn't read it because it wasn't cited by an any of the briefs. But field of use is a authorized scope of license that provides standing. And, and in your case, Your Honor, I would think that you're either going to, you're either going to be in a lottery application in which case were the owner, were the assumee in the lottery. Or you're going to be in charitable, or you're going to be in gaming. And, and, and I would argue Your Honor that those, I can't conceive of a situation where you can be sued by multiple of what is the field of use under this game system. I would, I would say it's game systems authorized by the New York Library. Now, if 100 games authorized by the New York State Library, is that even narrow? Well, I'm not going to expand too. I mean, the New York legislature can expand that. And, and, and this court construing the intent of the parties would say that it would, it would cover anything that if the New York lottery became authorized to put these things in river boats in bars, restaurants, art, the scope of our license
. But you've got to have both constitutional and prudential standing to get standing. And the prudential one is the one that comes into the problem here. I, I would refer you to the textile products case, Your Honor, on page, which says, a licensee is an exclusive licensee only if the patent is promised expressly or applyably that others shall be excluded from practicing the invention, quote, within the field covered by the license. That's this court precedent. And it's like it's too bright height. And I could be honest with you, I did not. I read right, I didn't, what it's someone I didn't read it because it wasn't cited by an any of the briefs. But field of use is a authorized scope of license that provides standing. And, and in your case, Your Honor, I would think that you're either going to, you're either going to be in a lottery application in which case were the owner, were the assumee in the lottery. Or you're going to be in charitable, or you're going to be in gaming. And, and, and I would argue Your Honor that those, I can't conceive of a situation where you can be sued by multiple of what is the field of use under this game system. I would, I would say it's game systems authorized by the New York Library. Now, if 100 games authorized by the New York State Library, is that even narrow? Well, I'm not going to expand too. I mean, the New York legislature can expand that. And, and, and this court construing the intent of the parties would say that it would, it would cover anything that if the New York lottery became authorized to put these things in river boats in bars, restaurants, art, the scope of our license. And, and it would be incumbent upon a trial court and this court to constru the intent of the parties and the substance of the transaction. But, it is a substantial amount of commerce. I mean, in the record of page 313, they're putting in 11,000 of these machines. And, if you look at the water in case, the United States Supreme Court case, that I think all of the cases in this court have been faithful to, they talked about, for instance, a grant of an exclusive right to make use and then two patented machines within a certain district is an assignment. And, under that standard, under the waterman standard, the United States Supreme Court makes it very clear this, the scope of this license exceeds that by volume 11,000 video machines, just in the New York proposal that is before the court and, and I would argue that can only expand as they open up. So, is it the right to limit it to the other eight race tracks? No. Well, it is today because the legislature deems that to be, if the legislature changes that, the scope of this license expands and my virtue of the intent of parties. I've talked to Moment of limited eight race tracks in the state of New York. Yes, 11,000 machines in eight race tracks. And, I would argue that it's a geographical skill of New York with the limitation that to be placed upon the New York lottery. Which is still abuse. Which introduces the field of abuse. Right to remember, you know, you cited it in a faculty. There's a case that was the Supreme Court, Pope manufacturing versus Gormulli, which is directly on point of field of use, and in which they say, the legal right, the monopoly remains in the patent D and he alone can maintain an action against a third party. Now, the case is slightly different from the facts here
. And, and it would be incumbent upon a trial court and this court to constru the intent of the parties and the substance of the transaction. But, it is a substantial amount of commerce. I mean, in the record of page 313, they're putting in 11,000 of these machines. And, if you look at the water in case, the United States Supreme Court case, that I think all of the cases in this court have been faithful to, they talked about, for instance, a grant of an exclusive right to make use and then two patented machines within a certain district is an assignment. And, under that standard, under the waterman standard, the United States Supreme Court makes it very clear this, the scope of this license exceeds that by volume 11,000 video machines, just in the New York proposal that is before the court and, and I would argue that can only expand as they open up. So, is it the right to limit it to the other eight race tracks? No. Well, it is today because the legislature deems that to be, if the legislature changes that, the scope of this license expands and my virtue of the intent of parties. I've talked to Moment of limited eight race tracks in the state of New York. Yes, 11,000 machines in eight race tracks. And, I would argue that it's a geographical skill of New York with the limitation that to be placed upon the New York lottery. Which is still abuse. Which introduces the field of abuse. Right to remember, you know, you cited it in a faculty. There's a case that was the Supreme Court, Pope manufacturing versus Gormulli, which is directly on point of field of use, and in which they say, the legal right, the monopoly remains in the patent D and he alone can maintain an action against a third party. Now, the case is slightly different from the facts here. And I'll tell you how it's different since nobody cited it is that it talks about not being able to break up a patent claim by claim rather than purely feel abuse. But the idea is the same. The idea is that when you break it up claim by claim, you could have a single act of infringement that would suggest people to suit by more than one person. And so, you know, in a second, at the same time, the fit circuit and the circuit in New Jersey went on to interpret Pope as applying exactly to field of use licenses. No one's like those here either. They're not fighting on us. Well, the Supreme Court will close this. But the fit circuit in New Jersey ones aren't, but they're directly on point. I just am factful where, why they're not excited to us. If you can sue that in conjunction with Waterman, to me, it seems to suggest, and I haven't read the case, so I'm shooting from the hip here. But I think Waterman sets the back drop and then this court has always remained faithful to Waterman. And basically saying, the patent is a bundle of rights to exclude. And you can take one of those exclusion rights. Well, Waterman, I agree with you. And I don't think Pope of rules, Waterman or Waterman or Rose Pope
. And I'll tell you how it's different since nobody cited it is that it talks about not being able to break up a patent claim by claim rather than purely feel abuse. But the idea is the same. The idea is that when you break it up claim by claim, you could have a single act of infringement that would suggest people to suit by more than one person. And so, you know, in a second, at the same time, the fit circuit and the circuit in New Jersey went on to interpret Pope as applying exactly to field of use licenses. No one's like those here either. They're not fighting on us. Well, the Supreme Court will close this. But the fit circuit in New Jersey ones aren't, but they're directly on point. I just am factful where, why they're not excited to us. If you can sue that in conjunction with Waterman, to me, it seems to suggest, and I haven't read the case, so I'm shooting from the hip here. But I think Waterman sets the back drop and then this court has always remained faithful to Waterman. And basically saying, the patent is a bundle of rights to exclude. And you can take one of those exclusion rights. Well, Waterman, I agree with you. And I don't think Pope of rules, Waterman or Waterman or Rose Pope. Waterman creates the category of allowing limited geography. And on that point, you've got no problem with me understanding. It's the field of use part. It's limited to two machines. No, no. Limited to the patented machines, which is what the entire school would claim and hovered. The claim wasn't any broader in Waterman than what the people got in the license. There was no additional breadth. Look at the claims. I understand your argument. It wasn't a field of use restriction in Waterman. They got everything. They got all uses. The entire school to the patent. What about this court's decision in the textile? Specifically recognizes a field of use
. Waterman creates the category of allowing limited geography. And on that point, you've got no problem with me understanding. It's the field of use part. It's limited to two machines. No, no. Limited to the patented machines, which is what the entire school would claim and hovered. The claim wasn't any broader in Waterman than what the people got in the license. There was no additional breadth. Look at the claims. I understand your argument. It wasn't a field of use restriction in Waterman. They got everything. They got all uses. The entire school to the patent. What about this court's decision in the textile? Specifically recognizes a field of use. Why in the world didn't you just join the patent? You've got no problems then. There's no credentials to any problems. You joined the patent. We should be involved. We're really joined off. They don't have to. You've never even agreed. We certainly can do that in this court, obviously, through the Green Man can require that. But to be honest, I think we're the lawful assignee in this limited geography with the field of use restriction. We don't need to. Any parties, especially. Was this case the only difference the license agreement didn't have the limitation limiting it to the New York State law? It had no reference to the law, and I could have didn't include the use and the entry of the lawful area. I think the answer to that is because the parties are in this industry and they knew about the restriction, they drafted a contract that accepted as a fact, the fact that the New York law agreed limited where these can be sold. I think if you can screw the contract, it basically said the whole state of New York, but everybody that was part of the contract knew that there was this restriction and so they incorporated it in the contract. That's why I really think this should be viewed as a geographic license, and the only thing that makes it a field of use restriction is the legality because you can only use these insert magnifications
. Why in the world didn't you just join the patent? You've got no problems then. There's no credentials to any problems. You joined the patent. We should be involved. We're really joined off. They don't have to. You've never even agreed. We certainly can do that in this court, obviously, through the Green Man can require that. But to be honest, I think we're the lawful assignee in this limited geography with the field of use restriction. We don't need to. Any parties, especially. Was this case the only difference the license agreement didn't have the limitation limiting it to the New York State law? It had no reference to the law, and I could have didn't include the use and the entry of the lawful area. I think the answer to that is because the parties are in this industry and they knew about the restriction, they drafted a contract that accepted as a fact, the fact that the New York law agreed limited where these can be sold. I think if you can screw the contract, it basically said the whole state of New York, but everybody that was part of the contract knew that there was this restriction and so they incorporated it in the contract. That's why I really think this should be viewed as a geographic license, and the only thing that makes it a field of use restriction is the legality because you can only use these insert magnifications. What is a geographic way with the old views is both of them together. I mean, there are certainly other ways to practice this patent in the state of New York, theologist's line of issues. I cannot argue with your honor in that it doesn't just say that state of New York. It has some limitation. It's a high limitation. Limited to the lottery? The patent claims are not limited to lottery's car sign. Thank you for sending text to us, written by one of my student colleagues, we sit next to me. I'm sure he's really familiar with it, but let me just throw this out there so that I can make sure I'm familiar with it. In that particular case, as I understood it, our court held that in fact textile products with its field of use license would not in fact have standing to sue in their own name, except in this one weird little circumstance, because me, the person that we're suing happens to be the patent A, so there's no way to join as a play, but the person you're actually suing. So they gave the narrow exception in that case for that circumstance? And the reason it found no standing is it was not an excuse for license. There were a lot. It raised the concerns you do, but in this case, in this application, there is no doubt we're the only owners. We are the assent in a lottery application in the state of New York. And so the concern about multiple litigation that you're really concerned with, Your Honor, I just don't think is a legitimate concern under the facts of this case when you can sue the patent thing. Why? I mean, this product could be used to sell other things
. What is a geographic way with the old views is both of them together. I mean, there are certainly other ways to practice this patent in the state of New York, theologist's line of issues. I cannot argue with your honor in that it doesn't just say that state of New York. It has some limitation. It's a high limitation. Limited to the lottery? The patent claims are not limited to lottery's car sign. Thank you for sending text to us, written by one of my student colleagues, we sit next to me. I'm sure he's really familiar with it, but let me just throw this out there so that I can make sure I'm familiar with it. In that particular case, as I understood it, our court held that in fact textile products with its field of use license would not in fact have standing to sue in their own name, except in this one weird little circumstance, because me, the person that we're suing happens to be the patent A, so there's no way to join as a play, but the person you're actually suing. So they gave the narrow exception in that case for that circumstance? And the reason it found no standing is it was not an excuse for license. There were a lot. It raised the concerns you do, but in this case, in this application, there is no doubt we're the only owners. We are the assent in a lottery application in the state of New York. And so the concern about multiple litigation that you're really concerned with, Your Honor, I just don't think is a legitimate concern under the facts of this case when you can sue the patent thing. Why? I mean, this product could be used to sell other things. They don't happen to you right now, but they could. They could expand the use of those machines to sell Kino or something else that would go beyond your assignment. And then the patent team would be able to sue them, and you'd be able to sue them for the same accident. We would only be able to sue them if they used in a lottery, and the other patent you would not. And they would only be able to sue them in a non-lot of application and we would not. So there's no threat of multiple litigation, no threat of double bail. They just are covering both. So there's a claim that covers both. And so one use and then she clean her machine claims. It's not the application, it's a machine that does these things. So you would sue them for machine claims, and the patent team would sue them for machine claims. But doesn't our assignment limit us as to what we can recover for? And see, again, the bundle of rights, ours is one of those rights. They can't be sued by anybody else in a lottery application period. But they still be subject to the threat of multiple suites, which potential standing says we don't avoid it? Is it a threat of multiple suites or is it through a threat of multiple damages? Because there's no multiple damages, because if they're not practicing a lottery, where are the only ones that can sue? Is there a practice in charitable? Is there using this application in charitable gaming application? We can't sue it, or we can't recover. So I really think when you look at the record as applied to the law, the concern you are expressing is not applicable in giving the scope of the license
. They don't happen to you right now, but they could. They could expand the use of those machines to sell Kino or something else that would go beyond your assignment. And then the patent team would be able to sue them, and you'd be able to sue them for the same accident. We would only be able to sue them if they used in a lottery, and the other patent you would not. And they would only be able to sue them in a non-lot of application and we would not. So there's no threat of multiple litigation, no threat of double bail. They just are covering both. So there's a claim that covers both. And so one use and then she clean her machine claims. It's not the application, it's a machine that does these things. So you would sue them for machine claims, and the patent team would sue them for machine claims. But doesn't our assignment limit us as to what we can recover for? And see, again, the bundle of rights, ours is one of those rights. They can't be sued by anybody else in a lottery application period. But they still be subject to the threat of multiple suites, which potential standing says we don't avoid it? Is it a threat of multiple suites or is it through a threat of multiple damages? Because there's no multiple damages, because if they're not practicing a lottery, where are the only ones that can sue? Is there a practice in charitable? Is there using this application in charitable gaming application? We can't sue it, or we can't recover. So I really think when you look at the record as applied to the law, the concern you are expressing is not applicable in giving the scope of the license. Any other questions? Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Let's burn you at two minutes left. Thank you, Your Honor. First of all, I hate to correct any judge, and I do want to say that. Oh, when they be wrong. Textile productions held that the patent, that the acidity, licensee did not have standing even to sue the patent owner. So the holding is no standing at all. Second, a bit about the behavior here. Our view has always been that there is no prospect of a criminal argument for a field of use here. And our position has always been that there is a lack of constitutional standing. Council read the critical language from Waterland, which turns part of the United States into the word district. Our position is and remains. That district means it can be state lines, it can be meets and bounds. There must be an ascertainable physical territory, which does not a movable field here
. Any other questions? Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Let's burn you at two minutes left. Thank you, Your Honor. First of all, I hate to correct any judge, and I do want to say that. Oh, when they be wrong. Textile productions held that the patent, that the acidity, licensee did not have standing even to sue the patent owner. So the holding is no standing at all. Second, a bit about the behavior here. Our view has always been that there is no prospect of a criminal argument for a field of use here. And our position has always been that there is a lack of constitutional standing. Council read the critical language from Waterland, which turns part of the United States into the word district. Our position is and remains. That district means it can be state lines, it can be meets and bounds. There must be an ascertainable physical territory, which does not a movable field here. What's unequivable about this in the state of New York? Period. Because the lottery can do business outside the state of New York. And we are still subject to my actions. If they do a business outside the state, Joseph? No, but if the New York lottery does business in New Jersey, and my client is alleged to have infringed by competing in New Jersey, the owner of the patent, IGT, can sue my client for a New Jersey competition, while Gamecoe can sue my client for a New York competition, both dealing with the New York lottery. So, but based on religion, condo. No, same condo. Same old, allegedly infringing technology. One of the two of them, one of them, the infringing conduct is in New Jersey and the other one in New York. Which teaches why this is not a legitimate geographic limitation. I don't want to bog down in that sense that the court does not want to go that direction, but I want to make absolutely certain... No, do I have any answers from the question? I do not concede the territorial points. May I close very briefly on one other item, sir? Another reason for the structure of this case, and it goes to remedy, our viewpoint is that this license, as initially granted, was a naked hunting license. That is critical to what the court's disposition should be
. We have a mid litigation amendment, which changed nothing on the ground. It did not allow this licensee to do anything else that it could not have done under the original asset purchase agreement. It simply took some language of this court's case law and tried to cure a standing problem. And under those circumstances, I think the court should look at the economic reality on the undisputed record, and the remedy should be there's no constitutional standing, or even if it's credential standing, the matter should be reversed with directions to dismiss. Thank you, Your Honor