All rise. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is now open in session. God save the United States and so on before. Thank you. Good morning. You see, do you? First case this morning, it was number 061012. IP Venture against ProStar Computer. Mr. Berryhouse. Name please the court. Good morning, Your Honours. Richard Bernholz, the plan for the Palinitie Venture. The key issue presented on this appeal is whether a plaintiff IP Venture had standing to suit as the sole holder of legal title to the 235 patent. The court's decision in a ratnet and film tech in the cases of applying it establish and confirm that IP Venture is the sole holder of legal title to the patent with standing to suit. The resolution of this ownership issue disposes and resolves all issues on the appeal. In March of 2003, before the suit was filed, both inventors Douglas Thomas and his father Alan Thomas, assigned the patents in writing to IP Venture
. Defendants in the district court and on appeal concede that IP Venture is a successor entitled to the 235 patent, at least via the interest from inventor Alan Thomas. Were there any documents filed on behalf of the past employer or whatever else to clarify the issue that we're arguing about? There are three documents in question with the interest of Hula Packer, the Douglas Thomas' former employer, which defendants argued was a holder of legal title, which was the basis for the district court's ruling, dismissing the case for lack of standing. There's the 1992 employment agreement, which the defendants... I understand that that's what's causing the problem, but did Hula Packer file something where they asked to file something, which they say we understand that we have no interest to the right to this invention? So there are two documents that are a record and agreement in 2003 between IP Venture and Hula Packer. Well, I have the same question as to just Newman to make sure that we're all on the same page here. Hula Packer did not enter an appearance or otherwise file a document on its own as a participant in this lawsuit. Everything, as I understand it, correct? Everything that is being said about Hula Packer is vis-a-vis a document that was in a contract with a third party, in this case. Hula Packer. Yes, Hula Packer. An awkward position about speculating about Hula Packer's interest in this case based not on something that Hula Packer has said to the court, but rather things that Hula Packer has said to you. No, Your Honor, there are two documents. There are contracts from Hula Packer that were submitted in the district court in the 2003 contract between IP Venture and Hula Packer. There's no dispute as to if it's authenticity
. No, I understand, but it is still, it's a contract. It's not a representation made by Hula Packer in court. That's correct, right? Well, but whether they've made a representation in court, I'm still interested in knowing the status between Hula Packer and his ex-employee was there ever, some kind of follow-on document with respect to this particular invention when it was made and how it might have fit into the employment company. So the only documentation from Hula Packer are two written representations that IP Venture is the owner and sole owner of the 235 pack. In 2003 before the lawsuit was filed, Hula Packer confirmed in writing that it was in fact that IP Venture was the sole owner of the 235 packer in response to defendants ownership of the application in 2005, which created a conflict of interest for IP Venture plaintiffs counsel. That dispute was resolved in his further agreement in 2005 where Hula Packer again represented that IP Venture was the sole assinate and released any claims related to the enforcement of the 235 packer. That 2005 agreement, which is a disclaimer of any interest in the patent, was expressed and not considered by the district court. In terms of, there are no other documents that were filed, but at every turn, Hula Packer has disclaimed an interest in the patent and has never asserted ownership. Why was it not considered? The district court in its order, in its order dated July 27, expressly refused to consider the 2005 agreement simply because it post-dated the complaint, relying solely on decisions relating to constitutional standing, which say the constitutional standing defects can't be cured because of with respect to events that post-ated complaint. Constitutional standing in this case was never a dispute and the district court should have considered. Did you raise that specific point with the district court, the distinction between constitutional and prudential standing and arguing that at least one of your two, I understand your principal argument as a Hula Packer was never in the picture because there was never an assignment. But your secondary argument in your brief, of course, now is that even if they were, then the most they had was part ownership at some point, and that you had part ownership through one of your two inventors, and that as such, you had constitutional standing. And therefore, this becomes a rule 19 question, not a dismissal for a consulate of constitutional standing question. Did you raise that argument for the district court? Absolutely, Your Honor. The issue was very crisply frame and constitutional standing was never in dispute
. The fact that Ike Venture is a patentee at least as a co-owner was never in dispute. The issue solely that arose below was the assignment issue that the 1992 employment agreement between Douglas Thomas and Hula Packer as a matter of law constituted an assignment of legal title. We believe that is wrong under the governing cases, under a rapid film tech and all the cases that apply that standard as to who has legal title. There in all those cases there is an active conveyance. And when you look at all those cases, they all line up that when there is a grant, a conveyance and an assignment, when that language is present, then the document is found to be an assignment. And when it's missing, it is not found to be an assignment. Except for film tech. In film tech, that language was expressed in present, Your Honor. The film tech, the contract said that the, for the inventor, at the East of Grandin does hereby grant the rights to the full right title interest. Well, the statute said it shall best. And the statute is a further reason why there was an express conveyance that the statute the FNERDA said the title shall best in the government. So there were both contractual basis for an assignment and a statutory basis. In terms of Your Honor's question as to the constitutional versus credential standing, so constitutional standing was never in dispute. And the, when you say it was never in dispute, I mean you specifically raised it, you said, Your Honor, you can't throw us out because we at least have constitutional standing. Yes, Your Honor
. You made that, aren't you? Absolutely. And that's considered on appeal in the defense case. And in terms of the rule 19, credential standing issue, first, the court never gets to that issue because HP never had legal title and is not a co-owner of the patent in the first place. Second, if you assume that they are a co-owner, we believe that's wrong as a matter of law. If you assume that they're a co-owner, then the proper question is, join her in the rule 19, whether an absent party should be joined, particularly a party who's disclaimed an interest. Now, the District Court applied a per se rule dismissing the case under Ethicon. Now Ethicon, when you read the case, doesn't announce a per se rule. If the district court, the district court's application of Ethicon as a per se rule should cannot stand because in circumstances when you have an absent co-owner, assuming they're co-owner, and I believe that's incorrect, you need to consider the circumstances, the present circumstances, and District Court cases who have been confronted with that exact circumstance of how that the absent party who's disclaimed an interest is not a necessary party and need not be joined. And here, Hula Packard not only didn't have legal title, they've never expressed an interest, a legally protectable interest that would get them in the door as being a necessary party in the first instance. So they fail under the basic threshold test in the ultimate case as an example for a necessary party. I see them into my rebuttal time. Well, the expression of interest is subordinate to the actual issue of transfer or not. If you've transferred it, then the expression of interest is irrelevant. If you haven't transferred it, then the expression of interest doesn't carry the day. No, not quite, because to decide whether the absent party is a necessary party, rule 19 provides a framework
. And the question of joiner should be analyzed under rule 19. Was there any proposal under rule 19 to the district court, whether that would be accepted? You're on our assignment to my rebuttal time. You are. Thank you. The at oral argument, the district court asked if there was any, if she could join Hula Packard and the question was squarely presented to her, then yes, you could if you believe that they were a necessary party. Now, none of that analysis ever took place because the district court applied a per se rule. Well, but your speaking is if it was up to the district court spontaneously to enter such a joiner that there was no motion, no request, no. Well, our position was that Hula Packard had no interest in the case, was not a co-owner, and therefore you don't even reach the joiner question. So it wouldn't make sense for us to bring a motion to join Hula Packard, given the judges, legal ruling, which was incorrect based on a rapid and the film tech line of cases. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Greenhouse. Thank you, Your Honours. Mr. Fineberg
. May I please the court? I mean, you can find work for the defendant, Apple Lee's, Prostar and Minor. There are three issues before this court. We've addressed two of them already. The first question is whether the Thomas employment agreement assigned Doug Thomas's interest in the 235 Act to Hula Packard. The second issue was whether the court was obligated somehow, if that were true, to make a so-a-span-tay rule 19 analysis as to whether HB needed to be added to the case, because there was in fact no motion as this court has pointed out. And the third issue was— Well, but I take it that the issue of constitutional versus prudential standing was raised— It wasn't on it. —and others. —that the contention was made that you can't dismiss the case without considering the 2005 agreement, for example, because we have constitutional standing and therefore the issue becomes a rule 19 issue, whether Hula Packard ultimately—whether the disposition of that issue is that Hula Packard gets joined or not, correct? It got sort of raised at oral argument. It was never briefed. And the issue came up as to whether or not the court could perform a rule 19 analysis. The court was never asked to perform a rule 19 analysis below. The court did. The fun that not the question that the court reached was—and before I go there, you're on the third issue—is assuming the case is affirmed on the merits, which I commend you, certainly right, if the case is reversed, the issue of prevailing party does go away. But if the case is affirmed, then the question is whether a defendant who obtains a dismissal without prejudice—and thereby, at least for a time, disposing of the case, and at least bar in three years of damages can be a prevailing party—the disparate court held that this precedent, or that this works precedent, or that it does not matter who's wrong. The first thing I want to address is plaintiff's argument on a rat net
. plaintiff spent the first 13 pages of its brief talking about a rat net, and it spent its entire argument on ownership talking about a rat net. But this court has held that ownership is a matter of state law, not federal law. Regents versus night is clear, so King Court precedent is clear. Ownership of a patent isn't a question of federal law. It's a question of state law in the ordinary case. If there's a federal statute, it would be— Would we understand that? But your position is not that titled past automatically, is it? Our position is that title passed automatically by virtue of the employment agreement between Mr. Thomas and his employer, Hillary Patrick. That agreement sets your mind. Such proprietary developments are the sole property of H.K. But you get—we still have the issue of whether or not this is one of such proprietary developments. We do not—it was conceded by IP venture in the district court. We believe it was conceded, so it would not expose Douglas Thomas a patent attorney and a member of the bar of the Register of Patent Attorney across examination. What does the agreement say after it says the sole property of H.P
.? It then has a series of clauses as a district court held to affect any needed paperwork to make the assignment a factor. Meary paperwork. Yes, what does it mean? Rather than operative act, I agree to assign and to H.P. In other words, they had not been assigned until that act occurred. Your honor to read it back, which is what IP venture proposes to reading, is inconsistent with California law. There has never been a California case which has held that any agreement that does not contain some kind of conditioning proceeding, like Shaw, isn't the present assignment the law rights. Well, what has California law held? California law has held in drove and true. A mere statement that certain inventions shall be the property of X is sufficient? It has, and your honor not only shall be, this is all. This is such property development's artisal property of H.P. The only way to read this agreement as something other than a present assignment is to put a word that is not in that sentence, and that word of course is not. If you say such property that owns or not the sole property of H.P., then perhaps there isn't a present assignment
. But unless you add the word not that that sentence, you render that sentence, newgatory, that is inconsistent with California law. There's a clear that California law applies because we have federal statutory provisions relating to the assignment of patents, right? Those statutes, you want to record in statutes, they are designed to give notice to someone who purchases for value without notice of a prior assignment. They are not, there has been no case that I'm aware of that has handled that assignment of inventions or otherwise. Was a racnid based on state law? Yes, your honor. We don't know what it is based on. It doesn't tell us what agreement, what law applies. Presumably for state law, it wouldn't be California. There's no California contact in the right hand. It's either Illinois or Wisconsin law, but the district court did not tell us in the federal circuit did not tell us what law it was. In other words, it sounded like it was federal law? It sounded like the issue wasn't raised to us. Nobody raised the issue, wasn't it? In other words, under the various possibilities there wasn't a difference in the law. Well, we don't know that law because nobody raised the issue of what the apple of a law was. Here it is clear that California law, there is a difference. The district court held correctly that in California you have to interpret all the words in that agreement to give them a fact. By the way, that's law, this circuit as well
. And the only way that this court held to interpret this agreement consistently was to say there was a present assignment. I should note, Your Honor, that by most states, California also requires its contracts to be interpreted reasonably. This is the standard assignment agreement. The evidence of record is this is the standard Hewlett-Packard employment agreement. Hundreds of thousands of people have signed this agreement. People who invent as part of their work and presumably the creation of inventions is followed up by an assignment. I think it may well be so that the paper, so HP doesn't have to go through the process. It's almost a matter of judicial notice. It knows well-run corporations, isn't it? But the only thing that is agreeing with the signs of proprietary developments, which I believe in, is that the standard HP employment agreement is not actually assigned anything to HP invented by anyone. I would argue that is an unreasonable interpretation of the agreement. I'm assuming that it's at least arguable, not more likely than not, that HP has an interest, had an interest in this invention at the time it was made. If you have such an interest, you can certainly disclaim it, transfer it. You could transfer your honor, but they never put forth to do that. The 2003 agreement, which... Oh, they can disclaim it. You're saying it can't be disclaiming? It can't be disclaiming, which isn't the nature of a quick claim deed. It has to be in the nature of a quick claim, your honor, because if they licensed the patent, which HP did under ACPI, if you licensed the patent before you disclaim it, you can't go back to the future of the words of this court. You can't eviscerate licenses you granted before you disclaim it. Well, but that has to do with the downstream effect. I mean, one of the problems that I'm having with this case is that everybody's really got at least one eye, maybe two, on that licensing issue. And we're... The train is being driven, I think, on this so-called standing issue by focus on that. But if you divorce the licensing issue for a moment, from the question of whether HP is in the case or not, since it's HP's position that they never did have an interest, then they presumably in any document in which they are expressing their lack of interest, they wouldn't transfer an interest that they don't think they have. But they could disclaim it. They could say to the extent that anybody thinks that we have an interest, it's not so. That's what, as I read it, the 2005 agreement, at least arguably, seems to say
.. Oh, they can disclaim it. You're saying it can't be disclaiming? It can't be disclaiming, which isn't the nature of a quick claim deed. It has to be in the nature of a quick claim, your honor, because if they licensed the patent, which HP did under ACPI, if you licensed the patent before you disclaim it, you can't go back to the future of the words of this court. You can't eviscerate licenses you granted before you disclaim it. Well, but that has to do with the downstream effect. I mean, one of the problems that I'm having with this case is that everybody's really got at least one eye, maybe two, on that licensing issue. And we're... The train is being driven, I think, on this so-called standing issue by focus on that. But if you divorce the licensing issue for a moment, from the question of whether HP is in the case or not, since it's HP's position that they never did have an interest, then they presumably in any document in which they are expressing their lack of interest, they wouldn't transfer an interest that they don't think they have. But they could disclaim it. They could say to the extent that anybody thinks that we have an interest, it's not so. That's what, as I read it, the 2005 agreement, at least arguably, seems to say. And if that's true, and if there is constitutional standing on the part of IP, IP venture, why isn't the right way for the district court to have looked at this case is to say, IP venture is a valid plaintiff in this case, subject to the question of whether it needs to join HP. Let's look at all the materials, including the 2005 agreement, to decide whether HP does have to be joined. Why isn't that the correct procedure, which wasn't followed, as I understand it in this case? Because that wasn't followed, the court was tangential and invited to do that in the oral argument. And it wasn't followed because the district court correctly said, you gotta have standing at the start of the case. But you have to have constitutional standing as I understand the rules, and tell me if I'm misunderstanding them. Once you have that, then the question of whether you join somebody else is a question for rule 19. So that, since it's appears to be undisputed that at least one of the inventors is not subject to whatever the arrangement, the other made with HP, that IP does have at least standing as a co-owner of this patent, correct? It has standing with its other co-owner. This court has never allowed jurisprudential standing, and that is what we're talking about, not constitutional, to be fixed two years after the fact. Well, you've added a third category. We always talk about it in terms of constitutional or prudential. And you say jurisprudential, I mean, with prudential, you say, okay. There's never been a case where this court has allowed somebody to retroactively two years after the case began, fixed prudential standing by bringing somebody in new. I point out to you, your owner, and then I want at least briefly addressed the cross appeal, that if the court had done a rule 19 analysis, they would have discovered in fact that there was a missing party all right in that word in Doug Thomas. Even if the 2005 agreement was effective to display an HP's agreement as of that date, who would have done it? Not IP venture, but Doug Thomas, because that was the other party to the employment agreement. IP venture wasn't a part of it
. And if that's true, and if there is constitutional standing on the part of IP, IP venture, why isn't the right way for the district court to have looked at this case is to say, IP venture is a valid plaintiff in this case, subject to the question of whether it needs to join HP. Let's look at all the materials, including the 2005 agreement, to decide whether HP does have to be joined. Why isn't that the correct procedure, which wasn't followed, as I understand it in this case? Because that wasn't followed, the court was tangential and invited to do that in the oral argument. And it wasn't followed because the district court correctly said, you gotta have standing at the start of the case. But you have to have constitutional standing as I understand the rules, and tell me if I'm misunderstanding them. Once you have that, then the question of whether you join somebody else is a question for rule 19. So that, since it's appears to be undisputed that at least one of the inventors is not subject to whatever the arrangement, the other made with HP, that IP does have at least standing as a co-owner of this patent, correct? It has standing with its other co-owner. This court has never allowed jurisprudential standing, and that is what we're talking about, not constitutional, to be fixed two years after the fact. Well, you've added a third category. We always talk about it in terms of constitutional or prudential. And you say jurisprudential, I mean, with prudential, you say, okay. There's never been a case where this court has allowed somebody to retroactively two years after the case began, fixed prudential standing by bringing somebody in new. I point out to you, your owner, and then I want at least briefly addressed the cross appeal, that if the court had done a rule 19 analysis, they would have discovered in fact that there was a missing party all right in that word in Doug Thomas. Even if the 2005 agreement was effective to display an HP's agreement as of that date, who would have done it? Not IP venture, but Doug Thomas, because that was the other party to the employment agreement. IP venture wasn't a part of it. But isn't all this material to be sorted out in the rule 19 inquiry? Which then could be resolved by having Doug Thomas do whatever he needed to do. I mean, we've had several cases in which somebody had constitutional but not prudential standing at the outset, and it was fixable. I'm aware of no case in which this court has actually allowed somebody to come back two years later and fix prudential standing by adding a plaintiff as a co-pattern. And there are reasons for that. Well, perhaps it hasn't come up in exactly the terms that you're stating such as a two-year gap. But rule 19 in the rules in general are designed to enable and facilitate not to bar fixable issues. But the problem around this is that with the truth and that two-year interim, HP will have for example licensed a patent, in fact the district court is right, that it owned it. And so what we have, the reason we have all of the patent numbers present, the justification for that rule, is so that all of the issues can be addressed to the outset. So there can't be intervening licensing issues so that all of the issues can be resolved and they can only be resolved if all of the owners are joined from the start. I'm into rebuttal, but I do want to raise an issue on our cross-eating. Certainly the case is affirmed that the district court held that as a matter of this circuits law, a party who obtains a dismissal without prejudice can never be a prevalent party. But HR technologies clearly, at least implicitly holds to the contrary, since it affirmed a dismissal with prejudice for lack of a potential standing, and yet sent the case back for a determination whether the prevailing defendant on a dismissal without prejudice could be a prevailing party under Section 25. And here's a classic example, at a minimum, at a minimum, defendants have obtained the following two kinds of relief, which permanently change their relationship between the parties. First, IP venture can never bring lawsuit against defendants without obtaining HP's interest in the patent somehow. Second, three years of damages are gone
. But isn't all this material to be sorted out in the rule 19 inquiry? Which then could be resolved by having Doug Thomas do whatever he needed to do. I mean, we've had several cases in which somebody had constitutional but not prudential standing at the outset, and it was fixable. I'm aware of no case in which this court has actually allowed somebody to come back two years later and fix prudential standing by adding a plaintiff as a co-pattern. And there are reasons for that. Well, perhaps it hasn't come up in exactly the terms that you're stating such as a two-year gap. But rule 19 in the rules in general are designed to enable and facilitate not to bar fixable issues. But the problem around this is that with the truth and that two-year interim, HP will have for example licensed a patent, in fact the district court is right, that it owned it. And so what we have, the reason we have all of the patent numbers present, the justification for that rule, is so that all of the issues can be addressed to the outset. So there can't be intervening licensing issues so that all of the issues can be resolved and they can only be resolved if all of the owners are joined from the start. I'm into rebuttal, but I do want to raise an issue on our cross-eating. Certainly the case is affirmed that the district court held that as a matter of this circuits law, a party who obtains a dismissal without prejudice can never be a prevalent party. But HR technologies clearly, at least implicitly holds to the contrary, since it affirmed a dismissal with prejudice for lack of a potential standing, and yet sent the case back for a determination whether the prevailing defendant on a dismissal without prejudice could be a prevailing party under Section 25. And here's a classic example, at a minimum, at a minimum, defendants have obtained the following two kinds of relief, which permanently change their relationship between the parties. First, IP venture can never bring lawsuit against defendants without obtaining HP's interest in the patent somehow. Second, three years of damages are gone. The statute of limitations are gone, have rolled up. So three years of damages, that is more than six years before the filing of the next complaint, are forever barred. So in fact, there has been a fundamental change in the relationship of the parties, and the case should be remanded if the district court is solid on the question of whether or not defendants are prevailing parties in the conduct of those areas of the remaining sections. Okay, give Mr. Palington a bit. Mr. Palington, please. Thank you, owners. Just like we addressed a few points. The critical threshold issue is whether HP, as of the 1992 agreement, had legal title, whether legal title passed, pursuant to that 1992 employment agreement, the operative language in that agreement is agreed to a sum. All the cases confirmed that does not transfer legal title, and that is dispositive of the appeal in argue. The California cases that Mr. Feinberg eludes to, that none of those cases address the federal question of whether legal title has passed for purposes of standing. And in fact, a close inspection of those cases shows that legal title does not transfer in an agreement of this sort. The the Grove case, the court, the California court, ordered an assignment after holding that the inventions belong to the company
. The statute of limitations are gone, have rolled up. So three years of damages, that is more than six years before the filing of the next complaint, are forever barred. So in fact, there has been a fundamental change in the relationship of the parties, and the case should be remanded if the district court is solid on the question of whether or not defendants are prevailing parties in the conduct of those areas of the remaining sections. Okay, give Mr. Palington a bit. Mr. Palington, please. Thank you, owners. Just like we addressed a few points. The critical threshold issue is whether HP, as of the 1992 agreement, had legal title, whether legal title passed, pursuant to that 1992 employment agreement, the operative language in that agreement is agreed to a sum. All the cases confirmed that does not transfer legal title, and that is dispositive of the appeal in argue. The California cases that Mr. Feinberg eludes to, that none of those cases address the federal question of whether legal title has passed for purposes of standing. And in fact, a close inspection of those cases shows that legal title does not transfer in an agreement of this sort. The the Grove case, the court, the California court, ordered an assignment after holding that the inventions belong to the company. They didn't already had, they hadn't already been assigned, they had ordered an assignment, and in order to assignment subject to a payment of expenses, something that hasn't happened here, HP hasn't paid a dime for these for the work that went into these passes. Does California law apply? California law on contract interpretation will of course apply to those basic contract interpretation principles, but the law is not unique in any respect on this point. And the question here is constitutional and prudential standing. For whether a prudential standing can be fixed, there are absolutely are cases where circumstances arise later after the complaint where that defect is fixed. The abdication, the mentor case, the case where the defect was addressed on appeal. The Schreiber case where there was a gap in standing and then the complaint re-applied rights so that the issue is absolutely fixable. A point I think that you're on a made. In terms of the the fee question that Mr. Feinberg raised is the defendant's citation to the HR Technologies case, that case does not support the position that defendants have announced. That case involved a dismissal of account of defendant's counterclams that were asserted that included a prayer for relief that asked for a declaration of an exceptional case. And this court on appeal held that those counterclams should not have been dismissed. And in the unusual facts of that case, in this case there are no counterclams. It's simply a motion for attorney's fees after a dismissal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. So the HR Technologies case has no bearing on this case. And the district court was corrected holding that there was no preventive party
. They didn't already had, they hadn't already been assigned, they had ordered an assignment, and in order to assignment subject to a payment of expenses, something that hasn't happened here, HP hasn't paid a dime for these for the work that went into these passes. Does California law apply? California law on contract interpretation will of course apply to those basic contract interpretation principles, but the law is not unique in any respect on this point. And the question here is constitutional and prudential standing. For whether a prudential standing can be fixed, there are absolutely are cases where circumstances arise later after the complaint where that defect is fixed. The abdication, the mentor case, the case where the defect was addressed on appeal. The Schreiber case where there was a gap in standing and then the complaint re-applied rights so that the issue is absolutely fixable. A point I think that you're on a made. In terms of the the fee question that Mr. Feinberg raised is the defendant's citation to the HR Technologies case, that case does not support the position that defendants have announced. That case involved a dismissal of account of defendant's counterclams that were asserted that included a prayer for relief that asked for a declaration of an exceptional case. And this court on appeal held that those counterclams should not have been dismissed. And in the unusual facts of that case, in this case there are no counterclams. It's simply a motion for attorney's fees after a dismissal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. So the HR Technologies case has no bearing on this case. And the district court was corrected holding that there was no preventive party. There was no relief on the merits the patent claims have never been eliminated. So in some the rule 19 issue, the court need not reach that issue because of the ownership question and which disposes of all issues on appeal and the dismissal without prejudice should be reversed. But if we do reach, I mean I can see again, I think if I read between the lines correctly, I can see why the parties are focused on this. Ultimately the ownership issue at the outset because it may have implications for this licensing question that goes to the substance of the case. But for purposes of just standing, we don't really need to reach the question. Do we have whether HP actually did obtain ownership in light of the rule 19 question? It's an excellent question, Your Honor. And the court absolutely has to reach the ownership question. Because you don't reach rule 19 at all until you decide that there's an absent code. If HP is not a co-owner, rule 19 has no bearing because IP venture is the sole goal of the organization. Well, but isn't that, yeah, but isn't that the question, look at this way. You have no doubt that you have constitutional standing by virtue of one of your two owners at least. Correct. You think you've got both, but one at least. Okay, so the court looks at this and says, okay, I know that you've got constitutional standing. And therefore, let's see if we need to get to the question of whether HP at any point back in back when, at least for purposes of deciding standing, whether HP was an owner or not
. There was no relief on the merits the patent claims have never been eliminated. So in some the rule 19 issue, the court need not reach that issue because of the ownership question and which disposes of all issues on appeal and the dismissal without prejudice should be reversed. But if we do reach, I mean I can see again, I think if I read between the lines correctly, I can see why the parties are focused on this. Ultimately the ownership issue at the outset because it may have implications for this licensing question that goes to the substance of the case. But for purposes of just standing, we don't really need to reach the question. Do we have whether HP actually did obtain ownership in light of the rule 19 question? It's an excellent question, Your Honor. And the court absolutely has to reach the ownership question. Because you don't reach rule 19 at all until you decide that there's an absent code. If HP is not a co-owner, rule 19 has no bearing because IP venture is the sole goal of the organization. Well, but isn't that, yeah, but isn't that the question, look at this way. You have no doubt that you have constitutional standing by virtue of one of your two owners at least. Correct. You think you've got both, but one at least. Okay, so the court looks at this and says, okay, I know that you've got constitutional standing. And therefore, let's see if we need to get to the question of whether HP at any point back in back when, at least for purposes of deciding standing, whether HP was an owner or not. Why can't the court simply say, I don't have to address that question because I've looked at the 2005 document and I think whatever HP may or may not have had, they gave up. And therefore, you now have both constitutional and now thanks to the 2005 document, complete credential standing, you're in charge. Go forward now. What, as I understand it, what you don't like about that is it doesn't then solve the problem of whether HP had ownership back when licenses were being given. And therefore, you may have a license problem with respect to your defendant in this suit. But I don't see why it gets in the way of the court answering the question of standing. And therefore, to come back to the original point, why that's a necessary question to be resolved for purposes of the question that's before us right now. As opposed to for the licensing. The question clearly are intertwined as to IPV Venture standing today, as I stand here before you. And there also is the same question as to IPV Venture standing on the date the complaint was filed. And the ownership question has been ruled on by the district court as a matter of law. That does have consequences in terms of defenses or claims that the defendants may raise. And that is the threshold question in terms of getting to the rule 19 analysis. And if the court does not reach it, it's a very different lawsuit that flows from the nature of this legal ruling, which is erroneous as a matter of law. So it is critical that the court reach that threshold ownership question
. Why can't the court simply say, I don't have to address that question because I've looked at the 2005 document and I think whatever HP may or may not have had, they gave up. And therefore, you now have both constitutional and now thanks to the 2005 document, complete credential standing, you're in charge. Go forward now. What, as I understand it, what you don't like about that is it doesn't then solve the problem of whether HP had ownership back when licenses were being given. And therefore, you may have a license problem with respect to your defendant in this suit. But I don't see why it gets in the way of the court answering the question of standing. And therefore, to come back to the original point, why that's a necessary question to be resolved for purposes of the question that's before us right now. As opposed to for the licensing. The question clearly are intertwined as to IPV Venture standing today, as I stand here before you. And there also is the same question as to IPV Venture standing on the date the complaint was filed. And the ownership question has been ruled on by the district court as a matter of law. That does have consequences in terms of defenses or claims that the defendants may raise. And that is the threshold question in terms of getting to the rule 19 analysis. And if the court does not reach it, it's a very different lawsuit that flows from the nature of this legal ruling, which is erroneous as a matter of law. So it is critical that the court reach that threshold ownership question. Because once you decide that there are or are not co-owners, that all further questions flow from that principle. Okay. Any more questions? Mr. Brinnells? Thank you, Mr. Brinnells. Thank you very much, Your Honours. Mr. Binder, you have some time on the press appeal. Your Honour, there is a problem. There is no question that, assuming this case is affirmed, that defendants obtain substantial relief. And HR technologies is right on point. Because there is no question that the district court had jurisdiction over the underlying case. It's a patent case, of course, of the jurisdiction. Are you responding to something that, uh, Pellund? Yes. It was not even his argument on HR technologies
. Because once you decide that there are or are not co-owners, that all further questions flow from that principle. Okay. Any more questions? Mr. Brinnells? Thank you, Mr. Brinnells. Thank you very much, Your Honours. Mr. Binder, you have some time on the press appeal. Your Honour, there is a problem. There is no question that, assuming this case is affirmed, that defendants obtain substantial relief. And HR technologies is right on point. Because there is no question that the district court had jurisdiction over the underlying case. It's a patent case, of course, of the jurisdiction. Are you responding to something that, uh, Pellund? Yes. It was not even his argument on HR technologies. I'm not, I'm across from here. I'm across from here. So on HR technology? On prevailing party. Yes. I believe that's what I'm willing to respond to. Right. So there's no question that in HR technologies, the case was remanded by this court, including on the Section 285, which would have been unnecessary. In fact, a New Services Act, it's the defendant, who would have obtained that this missile without prejudice, could never be a prevailing party. We simply say it could be prevailing party, not necessarily, but could be. And that district court should consider the question of whether the defendants are, in fact, a prevailing party. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Feinberg. Mr. Breinhaus, the case was taken in this position