Legal Case Summary

Okay, so we're welcome back. I guess we haven't made much of an impression on the past 10 years. He didn't make very many of them. Thank you, Aaron. I'm going to talk about this. I'm going to talk about this. I'm going to talk about this. I'm going to talk about this. What do you have to say about the official challenge to the ordinance? We are honored to point to an enduro of the paragraphs. I want to call it false. There's not a really a dichotomy between the facial and the as applied. This is an case where there is a general ordinance, general zoning, a brilliant city. The plaintiff comes in and says, if that's applied to me, it will be illegal. All of the actions here aren't directed solely and specifically at ISP. It's one group of ordinances and actions which we allege in great detail in a complaint. We're designed to take ISP's private property interests, recognized, redeveloped, and interest in the trembling boy property, and hand it over for not even any assertive public purpose. But it's not for ownership purposes. ISP was named as the redeveloper by London. My question really is, your property is not being taken away by Morris or the municipality of London. Well, sure, it's your honor in this set. We can't do anything without property. When Morris having been designated as redeveloper and with the city having authorized itself to commence ammaning domain proceedings, at any time, Morris has already asked for those to be commence. Now, we can't redevelop with that legally-armed aim of ours. We can't sell the property to a redeveloper. No one, and we try to define the value, no commercially responsible person would buy the property. So what you are looking at here is that Morris has, by city ordinance, been directed to develop your property. I guess that's going to be a huge investment of money. You've already invested a lot of money. And then you anticipate that the city of London will not simply say to ISP, there you are, nice developed property. But rather will go and seize your property via eminent domain. Is that what you anticipate so far? And that Morris will become the new owner? You're on that good habit, but what we say is happening already is, let me go back. ISP, my father was designated by London. I think that was the way to develop it. That was a ride that we had. We developed it, we did not only go challenge. I think we understand all that. I'm just trying to figure how Morris gets into the picture and what's going to happen to ISP. It's already what's happened to ISP. We are hostile. We can't do some property, we can't sell the property, we can't redevelop the property

. Because everything is subject to redevelopment agreement that Morris has designed with London. And the power that London has given itself to commence eminent domain condemnation receiving. So it's not, it's not anticipating that Morris is going to develop the property and then just leave. And leave somebody a bill. It's anticipated that Morris will remain on the property as in some form of ownership. Some form of redevelopment. And we are entitled to leave with the ones in Thailand. But we, for the ones in Thailand, go forward with a pick. The city of London is entitled to develop. Were you always ready, willing and able to develop the property? Did you have a schedule that you failed to meet? No, there's no assertion of that. And if you take the detailed facts of it and find it to be true as Geron is known, you must at least on this motion. It's missing. We weren't. The Smiths failure state. But there's never been an assertion that can't point to one even though we did it back. It can't point to one for color outside. I have one more question. Have you come to learn why Morris was selected as a developer and you were essentially told that you would not be able to develop? They have. The city of visuals have been tight left. If you look at our client, you'll see that the newspaper and town are limited. The day after they took their final action in July two all five went out of explanation after we appeared and spoke for hours by Colin Justin Walder and explained to the city council why the action was unlawful. Why there was another public purpose. Why was it unlawful? It was unlawful for this reason. Was it against any state statute? It was contrary to the United States Constitution and in the teeth of the killer. In Kilo, which is your honor is no. Controversy surrounds it. Kilo, which otherwise expanded state, government, domain, power to make economic development a public use. In that case, not least I would mean to shark the vision of a whether he could own the development of my house. Wal-Mart is something the state can build on just giving the justice compensation. What every justice agree to talk about is the state is specifically. The reality of thinking of the current and the dissent is that a state may not take action for no public purpose. It simply benefits one private act over another. Our potential and we look back on what we discovered in the show and apparently they are two in front of state that everything is possible to avoid it. Is that this was done for Mars's benefit, asked where it had political benefit of political officials for a line. Could you, I'll leave you with this, could you state in a very simple statement what your cause of action is? Yes, this is an unlawful taking. What kind of taking? Is this a regulatory taking or a physical taking? No, it's not a physical taking. It's a regulatory taking, it fits under the 10th central analysis in Easton by doing this whole, the man case decided by just at all in which the regulation, the record is us, constitutes such substantial interferon without any distinct investment-back expectation. And it's so arbitrary and precious that it has a mandate to take it. So you're not purporting to make any physical taking claim in this case

. Is your regulatory taking assertion, is this in addition to or the same thing as a substantive due process or equal protection claim? It's the same claim. If that's the same claim, did you ever argue substantive due process or equal protection to the district court? The specific words may not appear. Aren't specific words really important in what you argue to the district court? Well, you know, you're on a map. Yes, they are, but they're two points. Consistently in the first complaint and in the amendment complaint, we argue that there are violations here on that face of the fifth and 14 amendments. In the first round, with almost no argument, we have telephone conference and all respect to the district judge. At the end of the telephone conference, he said, I'm dismissing the complaint because I don't see a taking put it in a second. We may have a sleeve to put it in the amendment complaint. We did it and we tried to spell out and take it more forcefully. And then the argument shifted to right-fix and right-fix and see there which was round on which district court dismissed this case just done in fifth. If it was tied to the Supreme Court case in which two things were true that after a year, one was complaining and finding that I'm talking about Williams and four. The complaining claim did not exhaust its state administrative crime. And so it happened. And how have you exhausted state administrative remedies? When it is applied to the city of New York. Have you exhausted? I thought I maybe I misunderstood Williams. But I thought the import of Williams and what you've got to pursue your state remedies to the conclusion. You have a state case pending right now which I understand to be state. So you clearly haven't pursued state remedies to their conclusion if there's a state claims that are out there. You want to explain why. We filed a state claim after the district court dismissed our second complaint, the amended complaint specifically and it so states as a protective measure. Regardless of your motivation, you've got state claims pending now, right? Not by choice. What are the things that are pending now and they are pending as a protective measure and they've been state at the request of the defendants? And what is it you've asked the state to give you? We've asked the state to give us substantially the same relief as we seek for this court. And the state has the power to do that, right? Is that really that? Okay. And there's no dispute about that, Your Honor, but there is nothing. Nothing that requires us to go to the state court. About Williamsson. Williamsson said that if there are state administrative rallies, Williamsson was not talking about state court. Williamsson, the complaint party there said that a general zoning ward has a client to do really with violated substance and due process equal protection. Do you have any case that makes the distinction you're making that says Williamson doesn't talk about state-right. And if there are any other committees, it talks about administrative remedies only. You don't have to pursue things in state court. County concrete and white road on which position? It says that. Well, I don't know if we have it in those exact words, but it's a substantial, especially a counter-conquered and I will respect the director's honest of, in that case in particular, as well as black road. What are the remedies that you are seeking for the regulatory taking in the state court? We want to get it substantially the same as that. Well, what is, what what? We want an evaluation of what Linda has done. The ordinance, the ordinance. No. Yes, we want the ordinance truck down. The ordinance that appointed Morris

. Right, and that provided that M&D domain proceedings could be commenced against us and part and triggered whenever, whenever Linda feels that it. So you're actually open to the taking of your property via M&D domain. We're not. If you, if your honor means that we're open to it, that we're a target, that they're locked and loaded on us. The answer is yes. Yes. And in fact, one of the arguments that the other side makes, which takes form to the highest, is that because Linda has an issue of piece of paper that says declaration of commonization. I didn't want to take you too far from the point that we were discussing before, which is whether this should really be in state court. But you're on it. Let me, let me be as candid as I can. There's nothing that we can do that cannot be done in state court, I gather. Your honor, this is an attack upon some of the most politically powerful visuals and the power of the Jersey. It's an attack on the former mayor of New Jersey. I say this with all three of the same county mayor of the state, but you're referring to. A blended. I may have spoke. It's an attack on the city of Linda. It's attacked on the council persons of Linda. It's an attack on the former and current mayor of Linda. It's an attack on the Union County improvement authority, which is represented by one of the most politically powerful. The ordinances that were passed by the city of London, the ordinance that created the that approved a development plan. And then the ordinance that appointed Mars, done pursuing to New Jersey state law. That's not even that's not clear. It's been changed so many times. Well, let me ask it another way was London authorized to do what it did under state law. Yes, but not under the council. And the way they did it under the council position and the way they did it under the, the regulations and details, quite almost speaks volumes about what they, what they knew about the ethical or correct. I gather the appointment of Morris as developer was not a matter that was subject to state bidding laws. No, and they it should have been subject if they thought there was any problem. I don't know. I don't know. I mean, the last question, which I'm sure that they thought there was a problem, which is never considered. We spent over $38 million in conjunction with Linda. Not their money, our money, the cooperating with them to put in their redevelopment program to support, understand. We're not attacking their redevelopment program. That isn't a program we've not only agreed to, we were present in the creation. We paid through the surveys that Linda and Bob put it together and we've been working on it. And as I say, we've done over $38 million into it plus gotten termed by access, et cetera. And all of a sudden, in that son of the record

. Yes, okay. All of the record, all of a sudden, all of this didn't record the line. We're out of this sauce in 2004. The submarine comes up and we find out that the Morris Company is another private actor represented by the most politically powerful firm in Union County, which had represented Linda when this redevelopment plan began. That's all of the complaint. Have you made redevelopment? No, Leather. No open dead. Then you can go through the pretext as I did judge what this case that you probably remember when you sat on this period for it. The ends of the sales case against Tesla when they went through the charade of saying that they would send them the property because they wanted a public park. When they really objected to doing what's having a needed redevelopation facility and you're on a found sitting there in the superior judge, the debt was pretext and the farced debt was paid and the honors that I don't know if I found any cases that can rule out this kind of an end-of-the-main-tall-unbethate. But I'm really about it. But it's wrong. Here they have the dust in it. That's what you're done. Let me ask a question. You say in your reply brief and I want to quote that ISP has from the inception alleged and argued what in law is known as a facial constitutional challenge to Lyndon's conduct. And I have to say I'm puzzled. What's a facial challenge to conduct? Your Honor, you know, I understand the problem. But we... Help me out then. I, as I said before, am telling you that in this case to make a distinction between facial and a hazard line in order to try to argue about Williams, is to create a dichotomy that doesn't exist. It's one step of action. You have... Either you've got a facial challenge or you've gotten asked if I mean we're not making that distinction. I bet that distinction in the law. So which are you making? Facial. And even if you're making facial attacks, you're making facial attacks on the ordinance, library pass, reaffirmed in July 2005. If that's true, then what do all these background facts have to do with anything? A facial challenge is a challenge to buy its terms, an ordinance, a statute, a regulation on its face. What... What does... Don't get me wrong

. I think I understand from your briefing in the tenor of your remarks here today that your client is profoundly troubled by not to put too fine a point on it. It looks like political influence resulting in an unwarranted seizure of its property. And I don't need to denigrate those concerns at all. I understand. But we have the responsibility to try to get our arms around what it is you're arguing. And if what you're arguing is indeed a facial challenge and that's it, what does all that background have to do with it? Because you're arguing the court below, the law respect, the law is going to end. And the defendants are obviously playing, but we have a just compensation facing it. And that even if we've alleged facial challenge, there's two problems. You know, the Williams has one is an analogy, the other is just compensation. We should have gone through the procedures of just compensation. And that is part of the reason we're not allowed to be here first. Well, I thought the first party argument was about take. I mean, if what you're claiming is a taking, whether it's regulatory or physical, aren't you really saying, uh, look, if there's to be a taking, then we're entitled to have the taking comply with law. Be for public purpose and we get just compensation. That's, isn't that different and distinct from making a substantive due process challenged facially to an ordinance? You know, what we're saying is what the court, uh, that we both, I think, was saying in language that there is some action, you know, three polyphyrs, you two are respectful, and the defendants, you know, open to three. Um, the Supreme Court said there are certain government acts, you which is found to be impervisibly because it fails to meet the public use with one. Or is so arbitrary as to violate to process that is the end of the inquiry. And was that argument made to the district court? Because that's part of the part I don't want to speak to my colleagues, but part of the problem I've had with this case is understanding what you're arguing and what you argued in the district court because it appears from the record, and you could point me to where I'm wrong. And that would be a big help that the main arguments you're making here, substantive due process, any protection kinds of arguments, we're not the arguments were presented to judge Brown chief judge Brown was presented with your assertions about takings. What, where did you make the hymn, the arguments that you're making to us? Your Honor, there are certain cases that the other side said we didn't sign the bill specifically, can't concrete. If you're asking if I'm sorry that they weren't signed with questions, yes, but the argument was made to judge Brown from the beginning, from the first case I can come back and show places in the splints and greens. And that's the reason that we were seeking to invalidate the action by the against us now as the judge came down with a surprising decision in our view in which he adopted Williams, which is a spark in this case and what he did. And we've refined our argument on field to answer that point that the judge raised, relying on a case that has nothing to do with this one. If you plan to discase in Kiela, every justice in that court would say we have been deprived of rights and violation of 14 to 157. But if the amendment, the taking force doesn't give the right of government to take it and then say, well, hey, it only gives the right to a sovereign to take for a public use. And then we get into the justice compensation, because it is only because of that force, but we have the two problems that Williams and the first amendment doesn't have such a force. And we don't worry about the state saying, well, you can't go to the federal court if I'm going to block your loose paper and being public because you can always get compensation for it. That would be absurd. But that's what they're saying here. We are doing it as the reason for all the background information judge to the U.S. to doubt that they have made a defense. Through the facts that are in this complaint, detailed facts, and more on a conservative force of conduct, inconspiracy with a politically favored product party, the street bus of our rights for no public purpose. That is the one thing a government cannot do, whether you are applying, they should, whatever the words are used, the government can't pull those by house. In all respect, because it would prefer and they probably would write, but one of you's pretty good is living there. I said, my neighbor is probably in full indiscision. It depends where you live. It certainly does. It certainly does

. I don't know if he is, but he is. But seriously. What judges make me find me getting the four-year neighborhood anyhow? I don't think I've heard. I'm waiting for the government to tell me how. But that's the problem. With all respect, we've gotten caught up in semantics about how many of these respect, they should go fly. Out of point is simple. They come in, they strip us of our property rights. We put tens of millions of dollars in it. This argument that you're making now is not related to the facial balance of truth. But it is, you are. But the facial challenge is just look at the statute itself and determine whether, because of the public purpose, I argue. It is a whole course of conduct. Even if it was as a fly. I'm looking for my notes. I know I have it. I'm over here and forced by the habit. Well, you don't have the chance to look at the moon on the book. Let me just ask this. Your time is over and will certainly allow your colleagues to go over a bit. But I think I've been scratching my head since I first started reading this case. And I understand that a lot of the context that you provided, if I can call it that, is it relevant to a legal analysis? But its context which helps me wonder what in the hack is going on. The certain people should pick up and read both sides of the case and you say, I'm missing it. There's something else going on here. And at least to my perspective, when I read these briefs and looked at this, first thing I began doing was she came ahead saying, what in the hack is this case about? Because it didn't make any sense. It's crazy from one, but there's an ordinance that's fast that requires you to enter into a long-term lease and it defines the minimum term of that case. The person acts, there's Morris within 180 days of the date of the, guess the resolution. And the long-term lease has to be for 75 years. And that if that happens and that the redevelopment here, Morris, shall actually be redevelopment within 365 days of the date of the resolution. And then goes on to provide that failing that there's an obligation to sell the property. And this I'm not sure about, sell the property to Morris. And if that sale does not take place, and I think within a certain period of time, the city will then use this eminent domain right to take the property from you. Is that, am I missing something here? Not much, but is missing it what happened before that. This is a battle and it's at least the second part. That's so far, I think. Because the city did the same thing, and Morris didn't have those sheets of money. I thought they negotiated, but you couldn't come to an agreement. Well, first, there was one time when there was no negotiation at all. And there was a lot more of all the letters and said, saying, we failed to come to an agreement to mention it in domain

. There was another one in which you remember? Is that letter in the record? Yes, that is a letter in the conflite. There's a letter in the record where they say, we failed to reach an agreement to mention it in domain. Is a letter in the conflite, I don't believe it's attached to this. Right. But we have to accept it, but it's in the okay. Yes, sir, the letter in the conflite. And the other, the full negotiation, such as it was, it had a Morris brought the lives of property back in 1998, when he suddenly surfaced with submarine as the new developer of our property, where we had been giving rights to re-develop. Remembering that we had spent $37 million dollars alone on remediation to get the property ready for the redevelopment. Morris's offer was $25 million dollars. Now, that's a plus or so. The ninth thing you're asked is that's not what you offer. It's under the price we've had, under the cost-release staff, that we need to be covered for the program. And this is part of what we say is a natural, and general, old, old, and accurate, an infinite and conservative force of commonplace, to push us out for no public reason. I don't want to over time to be there on one minute. But your best cause of action then is a regulatory taking. Yes. And you are seeking invalidated. Invalidated. Are you seeking junk to relieve damages and things like that? Yes, that's our best relief we want. No public interest in being served on what we're doing is not a bureau. But you want to do that in the district court. You want an actual trial. You want an action in the district court in fact. And you're claim, your claim is that the ordinance, and I say the ordinance, by that I mean the last in the series. The ordinance on its face affects a regulatory taking. I gotcha? Yes. I can't remember. You have a notice some time and you'll be back for six minutes, and my guess is probably more than that. So why don't we hear from you of this side, and we'll certainly let that go around there time. I hope you folks have divided up the time, and we may well ask questions of you, Mr. Clark, that properly belonged to Mr. Malorian, vice versa. Bear with us on that. I'm sorry. Okay. So you have for ten minutes. So we may ask. I'm sorry. Okay

. Okay. We may ask questions of you that are better asked of Mr. Clark and vice versa. Any discussion that's far into discussion, I think, can be framed by the claim that was presented, not once, but twice, who was district folks. And the complaint was what was under claims, and the reader doesn't start to search for either to find out what close to action, this is a designated crime, right? Because at the beginning of each count, the author of the complaint, the benefit of the reader is passion, inverse condemnation. Did he raise a regulatory taking cause of action in the district court? Yes. If he does a claim, an inverse condemnation point, on the only remedy for inverse condemnation point, one, never saw a change of the claim. And a variety of mistakes, there is no new process by the subcommittee. Did the district court address the regulatory taking claim? Did the district court address it? In the first complaint, the court found that there was no insufficient allegation of any type of regulatory taking. The judge framed, chief of the frame, said that I can search, I search one, or I don't see any allegation of regulatory taking. And gave this claim that the option to attempt to deeply defend. And they made that a curious cause to complaint in this derogatory, that the fact that sensitive allegation, and the complaint contains many of the same things that the council has. But both at fact sensitive allegation, the court found the certain thing. But did they alleg that the municipality passed an ordinance that resulted in the bearing ability to use their property? Yes. They alleged a regulatory taking as a result of a course of conduct that as a result of a series of actions. But as a pleading, wasn't it sufficient? Yes. The second thing. And then the second thing, chief goes for an argument. Does this complaint on the right? Did not address what we were doing with this in the alleyway. Well, what should they have done? That's been my question. I looked at the complaint, and she used to me look at space 13 or 14. Page 14, the ordinance also eliminated the provision of the Vita Vata and the plan to recognize and confirm it, ISPs, development rights, and then it goes on for no legitimate public purpose, paragraph Y, an executive development agreement with Morris. But what, given the nature of their argument, both in the complaint and in their briefing opposition to your motions, what should have happened to make this law suit right? What needed to happen before it was right? Under the truth, through this district and the circuit and the Supreme Court, they haven't unrightened, because they haven't pursued the state just compensate. Well, what case in this circuit, are you referring to? Well, 10 and concrete for one. Number of concrete county. Okay. And this and this and concrete county saying exactly the opposite that when the nature of the attack is on an ordinance, which argues with the ordinance, arguably takes property, there is no need for an rightness or a finality analysis, because the ordinance itself is the taking. The county concrete tell that under the two-prong of the police, first-prong in finality, the second-prong in just compensation, a racial challenge satisfies the first problem. Can the concrete say, and this is the part that is controlling those in the distance? That while the fact that the county legislates a racial justice compensation, which has been what the intelligent community in this complaint is following, satisfies the final rule, if it does not lead them to the duty to seek justice compensation from the state, or before claiming the right justice compensation. Well, I don't mean maybe I'm missing something, maybe from point two, the part of the complaint that's tricking a just compensation claim, is when I read the complaint in the brief, I didn't get from that there are agreeing that property has been taken without just compensation, there are agreeing that the ordinance that was enacted is for an improper private purpose, and that basically the city government of the township has decided to take property from them and give it to Morris for no purpose. The complaint is murky, but the complaint only alleges to constitutional a taking subject, and it's an intercontinental, there is no to process planning by the right words or by table, there's no precession subject, and what anti-conquete said that if it's a just a facial claim, just compensation, I don't think it's different, you still like to satisfy the second complaint, or you say, which is to assume just compensation is taken for. I think County concrete say that exhaustion doesn't apply in the context of a regulatory taking. A exhaustion, the anti-conquete says that it is a just compensation claim, the second complaint does apply a facial channel on process for us for protection if a facial channel would be right, and they make an clear distinction there, the support between whether it's a strip and then in just compensation claim, as opposed to a process, and this complaint doesn't provide either one for that. I'm reading County concrete on page 38 of the printout, I'm not sure what page I get the site for you of the exact opinion, but it's under paragraph A where the discussion of fifth amendment, just compensation, taking claims, we said in contrast here, a premonance do not challenge any particular discussion, this decision of the talent ship or planning board applying the orders to the property, instead, they alleged that the mere enactment of the ordinance has denied them all economically viable use of their property, thus the facial fifth amendment, just compensation, taking claims, need not comply with the finality rule, and then we go into site, Sudden versus Stonehold Regional Planning, the Supreme Court saying, the facial challenges to regulation are generally right, the moment the challenge regulation or ordinance has passed, but facing uphill battle. Why isn't that exactly this case? Well, if I may, you are, in fact, exactly what I was saying is only trolling about the first problem, and it's received to the expected page at page 166, 168 is where the court empersees to say, even though the facial challenge, the final problem, you still under a facial challenge from the fifth amendment of compensation, hasn't satisfied the judge's compensation problem, and that's exactly the difficulty. Well, how can there be any just compensation for a government of taking for a private purpose? How can you just compensate? The government decides that, Judge Padeuva, who lives down at the end of my street, prefers my view of the sunset to his view, so the government comes in and takes my property and gives it to Judge Padeuva. If you're saying I have to ask for just compensation? There is the state remedy, and that's what our courts are thinking to say, if you do that initially, then the state will work. What is the remedy? Well, if the remedy can be compensation for a victim. I don't want my house, I don't want compensation, I want my house

. It will really be compensated in the high cut of case that there was an improper emotive by the Ms. Halle taking Mr. Padeuva, even if the remedy therapy can be invalidated to say action. Isn't that what he's asking? Isn't it right at the time of the action, though? The government election? This challenge is not a challenge to the mere enactment of any purpose. Rather, it's a challenge to a court, basically taking down a patient's intruder, a course of conduct. They say it's a fact that they're not challenging the mere enactment of any ordinance. They want you to consider a course of conduct, and it might end just to the... Well, that's on the issue of public purpose, isn't it? But a public purpose here isn't already resolved. But public purpose was in the designation of this property entity, the Jason property. But it sounds like you were, in fact, describing ISP's case, which is that they are challenging the ordinance because it did result in a regulatory taking. Without a... It's challenging the fact as a fact to them because the ordinance is an issue here, including not only ISP property, but a human property, a human property. Combined is a very large, very large track, and this is how we decided that they wanted an integrated, coordinated, redevelopment of public parcels with a single redeveloper and a redeveloper who has redeveloped other property in London and throughout the state. For reasons that... I got an hearing about myself. Just one question. I got the municipality has the state authority to choose who is going to develop private properties. The municipality and the binding case from the New Year's health division, beside our papers a year ago, at this point, when I did this year, said that there is no constitutional right to be the redeveloper of property and that the public purpose of the project is determined that time of the property is designated as an area in need of redevelopment. And ISP doesn't challenge that this property is in the redevelopment. That's the common phrase of the old light term nation. And there's three important milestones in the development. An area in need of education, or you can't add ISP from challenge that. A redevelopment plan of ISP is a challenge that is a combined development. The third part is getting an end to the under contract to develop property. But isn't that an argument you'd make on the merits of the case in terms of whether or not this is a public taking for a private purpose? And that's the argument you'd make. I was depositing contacts because the public purpose of the project is far out of the potential whether property is in need of redevelopment. Because from that decision, flows the authority of the panel to exercise and then come in. If necessary, to bring the property under control of property development. All your arguments seem to be keying off the assertion that this is a taking's complaint. This is a taking's case. Because as Judge McKee points out, if you don't take it as a taking's case, all the talk about just compensation and exhausting state remedies is in a positive, right? I mean, if the soon for the sake of discussion that ISP had made a substantive due process, an equal protection claim to the district court, then would these arguments about rightness have any traction at all? If this court were to conclude that there is a substantive due process for either protecting the racial and under the current jurisdiction that would make a right claim to be cut. All right. I'm reading from the brief

. This is their brief brief, brief repellent ISP services in opposition to the defendant's motions that dismiss. The brief they served in the filed and district court, PJT. This case is not about just compensation. Instead, ISP maintains that the defendant's actions are facially invalid because they do not advance a legitimate public purpose or state interest. Defendants actions are sort of private, not public interest, and skipping down to the last sentence that paragraph. Under the pretext of eminent domain, these defendants have effectively taken, markedly confiscated, confiscated, ISPs property for private benefit. Because it is raising claims that are distinct from the provision of just compensation, they are permitted to proceed directly in federal court. I don't know how they could get much clearer, and I can argue that wasn't that clear in the complaint and the complaint could have been more clear. I will not send in to that phrase, years in a brief in the district court, the complaint does not allege or present a subject that is across the truth and protect the claim. If you read the entirety of the brief, they never argue, they never argue that the claim will lie for representing a facial claim. They don't use the term facial, but... They don't say they're making a sudden process, but that is a facial challenge. The facial challenge to conformance on the Fifth Amendment in England under the County Conqueror of the County is still not a part of it. I confuse it too all the time. I just don't know how to write under the last, satisfied that they satisfied the second prime point. The other point is, I could address one of the bill, and I understand why this is, and council mentions that they spent a lot of $1,000,000,000, but they used the key word to the meat. The ISPs side interview concytes are environmental catastrophe. So, there's something that argue New Jersey isn't environmental catastrophe. I don't ensure that, do you? Even from New Jersey, this is... Oh, that's a lot of... We get a lot of spillover, Pennsylvania, Delaware. I'm going to have to sit between them. I think I'm going to raise that back. I know well, this city took action, so to New Jersey Stash, to bring these properties under control of the Vita Dalton Potion. ISP has spent $38,000,000,000, or $50,000, $100,000, to mediate its own pollution. It is a statutory obligation to get no losses. And that's all they've done. They've looked gone through. And this thing is kind of decided that they wanted this area of town, which is follow, follow, and run down to come under control of the Vita Dalton Potion. Did ISP want to be developed that they had to sign a Vita Dalton Potion? I thought they were doing it, they had been more than remediate, that they had also spent money to build the warehouse, that they had built those, they had done things beyond just to run on a clean up. I don't want to say that they hadn't built anything for all the contaminants, structures, so they certainly didn't be able to do that. And quite honestly, the city decided to bring in a poll, a shown and known redeveloper, try to get this to go. And that's what we've actually more focused on. And this one last point, Kilo, Kilo does a call for any comfort to your fellow Kilo supports the city of the law. Is not a word in Kilo that says, even a requirement to be brought in a fellow court in the personal sense, Kilo, he was a big part of the U, the state court. Yeah, but that wasn't a ripeness case, that was really about the definition of the meaning of the German public purpose. That wasn't about ripeness. Mr. Meloy, from the public records, what is the master plan for this track? There's a part of the orange and the next plan is a combination of integrated veritas and other types of uses. Certainly to get rid of what they are now because no functional use of the property is under the river and to rehabilitate it for uses that we need to be compatible with riverfront. Is that what Morris has called into this? Yes, sir. And that's what they've done before they've re-developed the open and air-ported along with other products in this city. There's no this. Now, assuming all that plays out, what happens to ISP? Two options. Under the re-developed and statute-specific structure, the implementing agency, the improvement bar has to have Morris attempt good faith negotiations to acquire parcels. And who decides whether it's good faith or not? The judge, the state court judge, they do it every day a week. You're talking about acquiring the areas within that acquiring deposit property? Yes. You are. Okay. It's a combined re-development and their behaviors are constantly. The state court judge evaluate the bona fide of the big negotiation. And then that is triggered with its mentality that the statute can use its end-to-end power. If there is no good faith negotiation, the count cannot use end-to-end. If good faith to those who use the purpose is successful, then the only thing that can be done is throw over those property. So that property and not mean use can become active use to rehabilitate the surrounding. Happen hypothetically. If ISP decided they wanted to sell the property to the Acme Crackage Act re-development company to come in and do part and agreed to sell to Acme Crackage Act to come in and redevelop this plot. How could they enter into that kind of negotiation to do the ordinance that's there and it's almost as though an equitable trust has been impressed on the land for the benefit of Morris. But they could not sell to someone to be redeveloped or they can sell to someone to be good. They won't apply to be redeveloped. But the premise they have to be redeveloped. Would anybody buy that? Would anybody buy that? Yeah. I mean, it is someone who would develop it and be satisfied with the criteria that they can develop. But the answer is good. So would they answer to Judge McKee's question is in effect? No. Nobody would buy it with the anticipation of being a redeveloper in the face of an ordinance that has already designated Morris to be the redeveloper. Yes. And precisely why the majority is actually under development requires the absence of the essentials that any, and another name must be fair, marked, valid. Realize that for property that is designated to be the development in an area pretty pretty development that has to be kept into the property owner that ultimately they would get a fair value for the property. And there is an entire period for the scheme set up just like that. But there is no right for a property owner to be designated to be redeveloped or that property, particularly when it's far, they enlarge the parcel. That's the line

. And this one last point, Kilo, Kilo does a call for any comfort to your fellow Kilo supports the city of the law. Is not a word in Kilo that says, even a requirement to be brought in a fellow court in the personal sense, Kilo, he was a big part of the U, the state court. Yeah, but that wasn't a ripeness case, that was really about the definition of the meaning of the German public purpose. That wasn't about ripeness. Mr. Meloy, from the public records, what is the master plan for this track? There's a part of the orange and the next plan is a combination of integrated veritas and other types of uses. Certainly to get rid of what they are now because no functional use of the property is under the river and to rehabilitate it for uses that we need to be compatible with riverfront. Is that what Morris has called into this? Yes, sir. And that's what they've done before they've re-developed the open and air-ported along with other products in this city. There's no this. Now, assuming all that plays out, what happens to ISP? Two options. Under the re-developed and statute-specific structure, the implementing agency, the improvement bar has to have Morris attempt good faith negotiations to acquire parcels. And who decides whether it's good faith or not? The judge, the state court judge, they do it every day a week. You're talking about acquiring the areas within that acquiring deposit property? Yes. You are. Okay. It's a combined re-development and their behaviors are constantly. The state court judge evaluate the bona fide of the big negotiation. And then that is triggered with its mentality that the statute can use its end-to-end power. If there is no good faith negotiation, the count cannot use end-to-end. If good faith to those who use the purpose is successful, then the only thing that can be done is throw over those property. So that property and not mean use can become active use to rehabilitate the surrounding. Happen hypothetically. If ISP decided they wanted to sell the property to the Acme Crackage Act re-development company to come in and do part and agreed to sell to Acme Crackage Act to come in and redevelop this plot. How could they enter into that kind of negotiation to do the ordinance that's there and it's almost as though an equitable trust has been impressed on the land for the benefit of Morris. But they could not sell to someone to be redeveloped or they can sell to someone to be good. They won't apply to be redeveloped. But the premise they have to be redeveloped. Would anybody buy that? Would anybody buy that? Yeah. I mean, it is someone who would develop it and be satisfied with the criteria that they can develop. But the answer is good. So would they answer to Judge McKee's question is in effect? No. Nobody would buy it with the anticipation of being a redeveloper in the face of an ordinance that has already designated Morris to be the redeveloper. Yes. And precisely why the majority is actually under development requires the absence of the essentials that any, and another name must be fair, marked, valid. Realize that for property that is designated to be the development in an area pretty pretty development that has to be kept into the property owner that ultimately they would get a fair value for the property. And there is an entire period for the scheme set up just like that. But there is no right for a property owner to be designated to be redeveloped or that property, particularly when it's far, they enlarge the parcel. That's the line. The line is redeveloped or they will property basically will do it exactly for your claim. Is it no we want the poor and they did partially. Let me try to sum up and make sure I understand that. You're not disputing that if what is alleged in the complaint, and I recognize that that's a big if, is a facial challenge to the ordinance as constituting a regulatory taking that that's right. Am I disputing that? Yeah. I thought I understood you earlier to say if what they're saying is that on its face the ordinance constitutes a regulatory taking that would be a right claim. Did I, did I misunderstand you? I think it might be, okay, there are things that are different for us today but I'm not quite considering it. Please. A facial escape in this point satisfies the finality from the ordinance and the ordinance. But it's still a satisfied with the just compensation, which is what many countries, unless they have to sue the just compensation for the state, it's still not right. Okay, I'm sorry I misunderstood you. So your assertion then is if they had, I got you, if they had said in the complaint that we are making a substantive due process or equal protection claim with respect to the regulation, if that had been alleged in the complaint, then that would be right. Okay, but as to the takings, they still have to pursue just compensation. All right. That is kind of a kind of concrete. And I'll just say in the same remote, the US reports that the latest ordinance, I'll give you some stories in fact, is a handy phrase of it. There is a standard order for the prosecution of the takings. Under the Fifth Amendment in the federal courts. That is of course limited jurisdiction and there is a being, there's a trend that these kinds of issues perfectly passed and are more partly what in the state. Can't, can't, can't, you were a part here. Tony Connick, though, in the push and the opinion you referred me to earlier, I once I say really referred to the part that satisfied the finality rule but not the ripeness rule. Are really from the just compensation claim. The, the, the, it's outside the final rule, not just compensation. Right. And the sentence holds open the other on the, the same thing you're looking at right now. It's the sentence after the prior medical that's at dot 16 that starts. Well, the fact that the balance of ledger facial emphasized just compensation takings claim against the ordinance may save them from the finality rule. It does not relieve them from the duty to see just compensation from the state before claiming the right to just compensation. The Fifth Amendment has been violated. Okay, but I made them one. There's so many. It's like, I don't interpret this as being any part of a just compensation claim because of the juxtaposition and concomitant argument. That the ordinance is facial invalid because it's for it's not for the did it the public purpose which goes to the merits. No, the account for the appellate says it's. The patient or else the block or the more that's a lot more easier than that. The patient's child says we don't know if he's a child. The near connect the near connect the court. Resume the use of such and such. This must have some

. The line is redeveloped or they will property basically will do it exactly for your claim. Is it no we want the poor and they did partially. Let me try to sum up and make sure I understand that. You're not disputing that if what is alleged in the complaint, and I recognize that that's a big if, is a facial challenge to the ordinance as constituting a regulatory taking that that's right. Am I disputing that? Yeah. I thought I understood you earlier to say if what they're saying is that on its face the ordinance constitutes a regulatory taking that would be a right claim. Did I, did I misunderstand you? I think it might be, okay, there are things that are different for us today but I'm not quite considering it. Please. A facial escape in this point satisfies the finality from the ordinance and the ordinance. But it's still a satisfied with the just compensation, which is what many countries, unless they have to sue the just compensation for the state, it's still not right. Okay, I'm sorry I misunderstood you. So your assertion then is if they had, I got you, if they had said in the complaint that we are making a substantive due process or equal protection claim with respect to the regulation, if that had been alleged in the complaint, then that would be right. Okay, but as to the takings, they still have to pursue just compensation. All right. That is kind of a kind of concrete. And I'll just say in the same remote, the US reports that the latest ordinance, I'll give you some stories in fact, is a handy phrase of it. There is a standard order for the prosecution of the takings. Under the Fifth Amendment in the federal courts. That is of course limited jurisdiction and there is a being, there's a trend that these kinds of issues perfectly passed and are more partly what in the state. Can't, can't, can't, you were a part here. Tony Connick, though, in the push and the opinion you referred me to earlier, I once I say really referred to the part that satisfied the finality rule but not the ripeness rule. Are really from the just compensation claim. The, the, the, it's outside the final rule, not just compensation. Right. And the sentence holds open the other on the, the same thing you're looking at right now. It's the sentence after the prior medical that's at dot 16 that starts. Well, the fact that the balance of ledger facial emphasized just compensation takings claim against the ordinance may save them from the finality rule. It does not relieve them from the duty to see just compensation from the state before claiming the right to just compensation. The Fifth Amendment has been violated. Okay, but I made them one. There's so many. It's like, I don't interpret this as being any part of a just compensation claim because of the juxtaposition and concomitant argument. That the ordinance is facial invalid because it's for it's not for the did it the public purpose which goes to the merits. No, the account for the appellate says it's. The patient or else the block or the more that's a lot more easier than that. The patient's child says we don't know if he's a child. The near connect the near connect the court. Resume the use of such and such. This must have some. The do not say that the near connect of the organization has resulted in any different. Instead they want to invite to the dual bed that they force a common. A series of actions. Who else in that? That's not a patient child. That's a lot. The wall is stubbornly clear that where is it has a line. You're going to take. People's thoughts. Thank you. I take another look at the complaint. I took a paragraph for me too. I thought that it was. I'll let you get all we don't more careful. I just put. Even. Okay, that that really is beyond that. Mr. Clark, you had some time. Thank you. It won't really matter. Will it. I agree. I said that. The terminology. The first case law in this area. Terminology. First all over one case together. What he's calling it just compensation. Requirement. County. I would call an emotional requirement. You shy away from that. That doesn't matter. The person's weekend. Not strictly speaking. An exhaustion requirement. The first circuit is invented. The terminology. The litigation requirement

. The do not say that the near connect of the organization has resulted in any different. Instead they want to invite to the dual bed that they force a common. A series of actions. Who else in that? That's not a patient child. That's a lot. The wall is stubbornly clear that where is it has a line. You're going to take. People's thoughts. Thank you. I take another look at the complaint. I took a paragraph for me too. I thought that it was. I'll let you get all we don't more careful. I just put. Even. Okay, that that really is beyond that. Mr. Clark, you had some time. Thank you. It won't really matter. Will it. I agree. I said that. The terminology. The first case law in this area. Terminology. First all over one case together. What he's calling it just compensation. Requirement. County. I would call an emotional requirement. You shy away from that. That doesn't matter. The person's weekend. Not strictly speaking. An exhaustion requirement. The first circuit is invented. The terminology. The litigation requirement. I think that's actually. But I do think. I would like to start with. What I think seems to be. The railing. The misconception about. The only county concrete. County. Not only does county concrete say that. There's an exhaustion. That the exhaustion requirement. That's what I would use. I think when you start throwing this. Just compensation. Praise input. You breathe. Confusion. Judge. What face you ask. What type of claim is it. Regular. For taking. That was a square answer. That's what we feel. That's what he said. Mr.. That's right. And county concrete. Unambiguously. Requires. Exhaustion. On a facial. Taked. That's what he's saying. Because. The court said. Well, those that district court correctly determined. That the facial just compensation

. I think that's actually. But I do think. I would like to start with. What I think seems to be. The railing. The misconception about. The only county concrete. County. Not only does county concrete say that. There's an exhaustion. That the exhaustion requirement. That's what I would use. I think when you start throwing this. Just compensation. Praise input. You breathe. Confusion. Judge. What face you ask. What type of claim is it. Regular. For taking. That was a square answer. That's what we feel. That's what he said. Mr.. That's right. And county concrete. Unambiguously. Requires. Exhaustion. On a facial. Taked. That's what he's saying. Because. The court said. Well, those that district court correctly determined. That the facial just compensation. Taked. And failed. That's why the Williamson. From. This court didn't just. Look past. Instead. On that judge. Kavanaugh got an exact right. A reasoning. So I should. Pardon. Why did it. Then do what it did. Well, during the dependency of the appeal and county concrete. The New Jersey Supreme Court had denied the. The addition for review. That the plate that been that case have pursued. In accordance with what it was supposed to do. And then. The back contrast. What the claim that this done here. All the things that. The finish finish because the last part of that paragraph seems to me. Totally undermines your argument because it concludes with. Accordingly, the second Williamson problem. No longer prevents the balance from asserting that the near enactment of the ordinance. He prived them from the economically viable use. Of their property. And thus. We were reversed. The district court's conclusion that the claim was unright. You. You went past. The string site. The court of New Jersey denied review of a pellets. State court appeals. That is why the court said. Exhausted and had been satisfied

. Taked. And failed. That's why the Williamson. From. This court didn't just. Look past. Instead. On that judge. Kavanaugh got an exact right. A reasoning. So I should. Pardon. Why did it. Then do what it did. Well, during the dependency of the appeal and county concrete. The New Jersey Supreme Court had denied the. The addition for review. That the plate that been that case have pursued. In accordance with what it was supposed to do. And then. The back contrast. What the claim that this done here. All the things that. The finish finish because the last part of that paragraph seems to me. Totally undermines your argument because it concludes with. Accordingly, the second Williamson problem. No longer prevents the balance from asserting that the near enactment of the ordinance. He prived them from the economically viable use. Of their property. And thus. We were reversed. The district court's conclusion that the claim was unright. You. You went past. The string site. The court of New Jersey denied review of a pellets. State court appeals. That is why the court said. Exhausted and had been satisfied. But. Not because of the nature of the claim. But because of the nature of the actions that. Plank of had taken to pursue the litigation. I believe in. All right. Well, maybe that's that's. Sementics again. And I always have problems with. Why isn't that. The reality. But why isn't that. The reality. If. If in Tony. Concute. We started talking about. The. A week of the folks. A week of the federal court. Could exercise for six five cases because the. State appeal. Process had ended. Why isn't that Tanta pursing. We did a? Arena. I. Certainly that. First of all, this entire discussion in. Transit. Confit bond orders. Raising under. The discussion. of the second prom in Williams in the exhaustion prom, I call it, the litigation prom, other call it, Brian calls it the just compensation prom. But it's the second half of the Williams and Kess. Your point is as a matter of fact, it was exhausted in county concrete. Exactly right. And beyond that, if that had not been the case, the court base abundant declared, expressly clear, a different result would have been required because it said Judge Kavanaugh was correct. At the time he ruled, he was correct. What happened was exhaustion occurred during the dependency of the appeal, air go reversal

. But. Not because of the nature of the claim. But because of the nature of the actions that. Plank of had taken to pursue the litigation. I believe in. All right. Well, maybe that's that's. Sementics again. And I always have problems with. Why isn't that. The reality. But why isn't that. The reality. If. If in Tony. Concute. We started talking about. The. A week of the folks. A week of the federal court. Could exercise for six five cases because the. State appeal. Process had ended. Why isn't that Tanta pursing. We did a? Arena. I. Certainly that. First of all, this entire discussion in. Transit. Confit bond orders. Raising under. The discussion. of the second prom in Williams in the exhaustion prom, I call it, the litigation prom, other call it, Brian calls it the just compensation prom. But it's the second half of the Williams and Kess. Your point is as a matter of fact, it was exhausted in county concrete. Exactly right. And beyond that, if that had not been the case, the court base abundant declared, expressly clear, a different result would have been required because it said Judge Kavanaugh was correct. At the time he ruled, he was correct. What happened was exhaustion occurred during the dependency of the appeal, air go reversal. And here, we count the red contrast to what the plaintiff counsel said. I mean, I take a second to a lot of what he said, of course, but my hands are tied behind back under the procedural plot, through where it, but he says, we've gone out of our way to stymie their efforts to blow the lid off of the political nested fibers in the unicounted, quite a contrary. Quite a contrary. In fact, in state court, we are waiting decision on the, in the case that case is going forward. There's no effort to hire conceal anything. I could pull out a whole of the technical argument and can call practical. Does, does, does, does Japan make the same arguments that ISP is making here? It's substantial. So not, I mean, I can't stand here and say their work for work, but I wouldn't know of any substantial difference in the, what they do. In fact, it wasn't ironic that plaintiff counsel stood here in Philadelphia to find this about what a great decision in state court, if you remember. State court is protected of property owners in these non-texts, every day. And that's exactly what the Supreme Court's day in saying, oh, when, when, in the United States, how does that, why not willing me and say, court, to see me, oh, for goodness sake, they've been forced to mitigate all the way through an ended question and there they attempted to preserve under England board of examiners and they said, no, you can't preserve. You're still found and the plaintiffs there, you said, wasn't that unfair? And the court said no. were very comfortable having lived against pursuities through the state courts. So if I can rewind the procedural history, this case back to the beginning, because sometimes then I think it's a phrase of page of history's work on the volume of logic. There's nothing logical about the way that this case rises to this court. And you need to understand the history, and it was at 32, but it was lost in a particular way. The complaint that was initially filed in this case, you can read it, and you will see, just as the conspiracy theory was, the centerpiece people who were playing its counsel sat down the day, the conspiracy theory was all that complaint was about. The complaint was drafted under a frank misconception that alleging a conspiracy to pay property states of federal claim doesn't happen to state if they go playing as Judge Brown pointed out, directly in the first time. And when he confronted with the fact that alleging a conspiracy to pay does not state a federal claim, plaintiffs attempt at their first effort at pure shapeshifting, even though they're complaining not on the court. If you're a white or a pure shapeshifting, never heard that. Even though their complaint did not alleged in actual taking, they argued the Judge Brown, it does alleging a actual taking. And Judge Brown read it and he says, I don't see it. If that's what your alleging pleaded, what I see is your alleging a conspiracy to pay, which is not a federal claim. So they re-plated this time, what did they plead? They pled a cadence claim. They're saying, well, if I go, it is a taking. Only problem there is they didn't draft it with, right misreformments of Williamson, but in mine. And had they done that, they would have, I think, taken Judge Brown's hint in the first instance, and gone to the forum where they should have been, at that point in the process, which is paperwork. But they didn't. But now, having drafted a complaint that was oblivious to the Williamson-re-pregnist requirements when drafted, they're here to this court saying, you can assure it to meet those, those, I'll write this requirements. And here's what I would like to finish with, because I ask you this, when we're dealing with labels, this court can put the label at once on a complaint. I think if you are being fair and liberal, the one that fits is it's an ad-splied cadence claim, a regular ad-splied, regular four-aid. Well, but he has applied a string because it can't be applied to anyone other than Morris and ISP. And I think that's the constraint that was expressed by Mr. Brown, because it's not really as applied, because this was an ordinance that was, if you were locked and loaded, someone else's phrase, on this particular situation. Not applicable, but on a factual level, the record would just prove that, because it also applies to do proper chappance to the NSA for finding the same claim. Well, I just read the ordinance. I don't know if it's a separate ordinance or not, but I just read the ordinance, but go ahead. Well, the ordinance also applies to the crime, but that's so it doesn't justify to one, but even more that so, then the question that would be posed is what is the Supreme Court telling you to do in that situation? I think you look at San Rimo and Williams, and the answer is it's still supposed to go to State Court, but my question is, you can bend over backwards, you can stretch a point here and then try to forfeit this into the label of a facial placement claim, which is not. But why would you want to do that? You could have parallel pending litigations in federal and State Court consuming to the times of two

. And here, we count the red contrast to what the plaintiff counsel said. I mean, I take a second to a lot of what he said, of course, but my hands are tied behind back under the procedural plot, through where it, but he says, we've gone out of our way to stymie their efforts to blow the lid off of the political nested fibers in the unicounted, quite a contrary. Quite a contrary. In fact, in state court, we are waiting decision on the, in the case that case is going forward. There's no effort to hire conceal anything. I could pull out a whole of the technical argument and can call practical. Does, does, does, does Japan make the same arguments that ISP is making here? It's substantial. So not, I mean, I can't stand here and say their work for work, but I wouldn't know of any substantial difference in the, what they do. In fact, it wasn't ironic that plaintiff counsel stood here in Philadelphia to find this about what a great decision in state court, if you remember. State court is protected of property owners in these non-texts, every day. And that's exactly what the Supreme Court's day in saying, oh, when, when, in the United States, how does that, why not willing me and say, court, to see me, oh, for goodness sake, they've been forced to mitigate all the way through an ended question and there they attempted to preserve under England board of examiners and they said, no, you can't preserve. You're still found and the plaintiffs there, you said, wasn't that unfair? And the court said no. were very comfortable having lived against pursuities through the state courts. So if I can rewind the procedural history, this case back to the beginning, because sometimes then I think it's a phrase of page of history's work on the volume of logic. There's nothing logical about the way that this case rises to this court. And you need to understand the history, and it was at 32, but it was lost in a particular way. The complaint that was initially filed in this case, you can read it, and you will see, just as the conspiracy theory was, the centerpiece people who were playing its counsel sat down the day, the conspiracy theory was all that complaint was about. The complaint was drafted under a frank misconception that alleging a conspiracy to pay property states of federal claim doesn't happen to state if they go playing as Judge Brown pointed out, directly in the first time. And when he confronted with the fact that alleging a conspiracy to pay does not state a federal claim, plaintiffs attempt at their first effort at pure shapeshifting, even though they're complaining not on the court. If you're a white or a pure shapeshifting, never heard that. Even though their complaint did not alleged in actual taking, they argued the Judge Brown, it does alleging a actual taking. And Judge Brown read it and he says, I don't see it. If that's what your alleging pleaded, what I see is your alleging a conspiracy to pay, which is not a federal claim. So they re-plated this time, what did they plead? They pled a cadence claim. They're saying, well, if I go, it is a taking. Only problem there is they didn't draft it with, right misreformments of Williamson, but in mine. And had they done that, they would have, I think, taken Judge Brown's hint in the first instance, and gone to the forum where they should have been, at that point in the process, which is paperwork. But they didn't. But now, having drafted a complaint that was oblivious to the Williamson-re-pregnist requirements when drafted, they're here to this court saying, you can assure it to meet those, those, I'll write this requirements. And here's what I would like to finish with, because I ask you this, when we're dealing with labels, this court can put the label at once on a complaint. I think if you are being fair and liberal, the one that fits is it's an ad-splied cadence claim, a regular ad-splied, regular four-aid. Well, but he has applied a string because it can't be applied to anyone other than Morris and ISP. And I think that's the constraint that was expressed by Mr. Brown, because it's not really as applied, because this was an ordinance that was, if you were locked and loaded, someone else's phrase, on this particular situation. Not applicable, but on a factual level, the record would just prove that, because it also applies to do proper chappance to the NSA for finding the same claim. Well, I just read the ordinance. I don't know if it's a separate ordinance or not, but I just read the ordinance, but go ahead. Well, the ordinance also applies to the crime, but that's so it doesn't justify to one, but even more that so, then the question that would be posed is what is the Supreme Court telling you to do in that situation? I think you look at San Rimo and Williams, and the answer is it's still supposed to go to State Court, but my question is, you can bend over backwards, you can stretch a point here and then try to forfeit this into the label of a facial placement claim, which is not. But why would you want to do that? You could have parallel pending litigations in federal and State Court consuming to the times of two. Yeah, but that's not a great, I mean Colorado River. Supreme Court has told us if it belongs here, and judicial efficiency does not add ground to an exercise or jurisdiction. I think, Ron, I have to take the wrong issue. Rightness is all about judicial economy and judicial action. Rightness is, but the very fact that there are two parallel proceedings with the Supreme Court has said is not a reason for a federal court to necessarily abstain in favor of the State Court. If I may, Ron. The question presented this morning is, what Judge Brown, who reckoned in holding that this was not a right case, so I go back to the basic question because as I said, when you wander around the term, the terminologies and the labels, I'm sure the Court could find its way to go either way. And I'm asking, as a practical question, is this a right case? Why, given the history of this, is it the incorrect result to have both of the property owners who are affected by this in the same form, pursuing the same plan consistent with what the Supreme Court wanted done in San Remo. Are you saying the State Deform is the correct form and that ISV is there? Dupont has already found its complaint. So, and there are no procedural impediments in the State Court to having ISV's claims addressed completely. The only procedural impediment, and it's not a disabled one, is that in public, they're a little late to the game. They could have been in it, but they chose not to be. Wait a minute, what does that mean? There are nothing left. I just said, we are waiting decision on the Dupont claim as we speak. We anticipate that the decision in that case very quickly. But ISV would have its own claim, right? Yes, yes it would. But I don't mean to this lead anybody to say that the two cases can sort of put together on the same litigation frat at this point because of the tacit of time. So, if you want to call that a procedural impediment, one final point that I wanted to make about Cuba, the assertion was made that all nine justices would be taken aback in the fall by this amendment. And I say, actually, the one thing we can be sure of as a standard today is that it's not the case. In fact, all nine justices recognize the elimination of the light is a public purpose. There is no dispute in this case that this is a lighted area, severely lighted area. And what I mean by not as good as I was to say, it's an environmental morass. And being that there is no dispute as to light under kilo, all nine justices would agree that if there's a taking here to pursue a redevelopment plan, it is as a matter of law, force, and common sense for a public purpose. The only issue that has been raised and is being raised is that they say we somehow prove them over for a private redeveloper to soon wrongly what happened. That is not what I think in the field now, or a kilo of claim, it is a claim that see this on one sentence in the concurrence of justice Kennedy. And so, Mr. Caldwell, you said finally about five minutes going now we're into kilo of case at all. And I try to, could you leave us with a black letter decision here? This is this case. Is that you can help me? It's a facial challenge to an ordinance that involves a regulatory taking and a request for just compensation that requires under county concrete exhaustion. Well, I don't have any post-counter concrete decision. Well, that helps you. You said yes. Right. Well, help me formulate what you would like the decision to be in this case. Characterize the case. The cause of action and then tell me what the decision should be. Decision in this case is that Judge Brown correctly found that this was an unright claim. All right, but you don't want to. Is it a regulatory taking? You don't disagree that there's a facial challenge to the ordinance involving a regulatory taking

. Yeah, but that's not a great, I mean Colorado River. Supreme Court has told us if it belongs here, and judicial efficiency does not add ground to an exercise or jurisdiction. I think, Ron, I have to take the wrong issue. Rightness is all about judicial economy and judicial action. Rightness is, but the very fact that there are two parallel proceedings with the Supreme Court has said is not a reason for a federal court to necessarily abstain in favor of the State Court. If I may, Ron. The question presented this morning is, what Judge Brown, who reckoned in holding that this was not a right case, so I go back to the basic question because as I said, when you wander around the term, the terminologies and the labels, I'm sure the Court could find its way to go either way. And I'm asking, as a practical question, is this a right case? Why, given the history of this, is it the incorrect result to have both of the property owners who are affected by this in the same form, pursuing the same plan consistent with what the Supreme Court wanted done in San Remo. Are you saying the State Deform is the correct form and that ISV is there? Dupont has already found its complaint. So, and there are no procedural impediments in the State Court to having ISV's claims addressed completely. The only procedural impediment, and it's not a disabled one, is that in public, they're a little late to the game. They could have been in it, but they chose not to be. Wait a minute, what does that mean? There are nothing left. I just said, we are waiting decision on the Dupont claim as we speak. We anticipate that the decision in that case very quickly. But ISV would have its own claim, right? Yes, yes it would. But I don't mean to this lead anybody to say that the two cases can sort of put together on the same litigation frat at this point because of the tacit of time. So, if you want to call that a procedural impediment, one final point that I wanted to make about Cuba, the assertion was made that all nine justices would be taken aback in the fall by this amendment. And I say, actually, the one thing we can be sure of as a standard today is that it's not the case. In fact, all nine justices recognize the elimination of the light is a public purpose. There is no dispute in this case that this is a lighted area, severely lighted area. And what I mean by not as good as I was to say, it's an environmental morass. And being that there is no dispute as to light under kilo, all nine justices would agree that if there's a taking here to pursue a redevelopment plan, it is as a matter of law, force, and common sense for a public purpose. The only issue that has been raised and is being raised is that they say we somehow prove them over for a private redeveloper to soon wrongly what happened. That is not what I think in the field now, or a kilo of claim, it is a claim that see this on one sentence in the concurrence of justice Kennedy. And so, Mr. Caldwell, you said finally about five minutes going now we're into kilo of case at all. And I try to, could you leave us with a black letter decision here? This is this case. Is that you can help me? It's a facial challenge to an ordinance that involves a regulatory taking and a request for just compensation that requires under county concrete exhaustion. Well, I don't have any post-counter concrete decision. Well, that helps you. You said yes. Right. Well, help me formulate what you would like the decision to be in this case. Characterize the case. The cause of action and then tell me what the decision should be. Decision in this case is that Judge Brown correctly found that this was an unright claim. All right, but you don't want to. Is it a regulatory taking? You don't disagree that there's a facial challenge to the ordinance involving a regulatory taking. Correct that. So, not just a position. Number one, it's not on a fair reading of the complaint that a facial claim at all, rather that's an inventive label that they've construed that they put on it after they got called on Williamson similar to the way they tried to turn the person's claim into a fake. All right, go ahead. I'm trying to get you. So, so, fair call is face. It satisfies not facial, but it fails on the exhaustion slash litigation from Williamson, which county concrete makes clear still applies to such claims. There are none. And I got one point I would disagree with my colleague on. If it's substantive due process, given the nature of the serious allegations that it made, it still amounts to five substance due process. And that would be given that this is in the land use context a subject to the exhaustion requirement as well. If there were facial, you wouldn't disagree. If there were a facial substance due process and equal protection, it'd be right. It's substantive due process, facial claim, could be right, they didn't do it. Thank you, Mr. Mr. Clark. Mr. Mollick. These are the rest of the day for your bottle, I believe. You may serve the rest of the day for your bottle. All right, now we'll try to hold you to six minutes. No. Let me start by making clear what I said before because we won't respect, I just heard in my answer, I didn't say it. In response to the questions, which Judge George and Judge George put, I said very clearly, we do say, this is a regulatory taking case. And that the ordinance of July 2005, on its face violates our constitutional rights. Has nothing to do with justice, just compensation. It is impervisible state action that stripped us of our rights. Still, why is it impervisible? Yes. It's impervisible because it was not done for any public purpose. My line is completely different. Let me address it. Well, I wasn't it done. I'm sorry. You did. I confess, this is not a field that I'm...

Okay, so we're welcome back. I guess we haven't made much of an impression on the past 10 years. He didn't make very many of them. Thank you, Aaron. I'm going to talk about this. I'm going to talk about this. I'm going to talk about this. I'm going to talk about this. What do you have to say about the official challenge to the ordinance? We are honored to point to an enduro of the paragraphs. I want to call it false. There's not a really a dichotomy between the facial and the as applied. This is an case where there is a general ordinance, general zoning, a brilliant city. The plaintiff comes in and says, if that's applied to me, it will be illegal. All of the actions here aren't directed solely and specifically at ISP. It's one group of ordinances and actions which we allege in great detail in a complaint. We're designed to take ISP's private property interests, recognized, redeveloped, and interest in the trembling boy property, and hand it over for not even any assertive public purpose. But it's not for ownership purposes. ISP was named as the redeveloper by London. My question really is, your property is not being taken away by Morris or the municipality of London. Well, sure, it's your honor in this set. We can't do anything without property. When Morris having been designated as redeveloper and with the city having authorized itself to commence ammaning domain proceedings, at any time, Morris has already asked for those to be commence. Now, we can't redevelop with that legally-armed aim of ours. We can't sell the property to a redeveloper. No one, and we try to define the value, no commercially responsible person would buy the property. So what you are looking at here is that Morris has, by city ordinance, been directed to develop your property. I guess that's going to be a huge investment of money. You've already invested a lot of money. And then you anticipate that the city of London will not simply say to ISP, there you are, nice developed property. But rather will go and seize your property via eminent domain. Is that what you anticipate so far? And that Morris will become the new owner? You're on that good habit, but what we say is happening already is, let me go back. ISP, my father was designated by London. I think that was the way to develop it. That was a ride that we had. We developed it, we did not only go challenge. I think we understand all that. I'm just trying to figure how Morris gets into the picture and what's going to happen to ISP. It's already what's happened to ISP. We are hostile. We can't do some property, we can't sell the property, we can't redevelop the property. Because everything is subject to redevelopment agreement that Morris has designed with London. And the power that London has given itself to commence eminent domain condemnation receiving. So it's not, it's not anticipating that Morris is going to develop the property and then just leave. And leave somebody a bill. It's anticipated that Morris will remain on the property as in some form of ownership. Some form of redevelopment. And we are entitled to leave with the ones in Thailand. But we, for the ones in Thailand, go forward with a pick. The city of London is entitled to develop. Were you always ready, willing and able to develop the property? Did you have a schedule that you failed to meet? No, there's no assertion of that. And if you take the detailed facts of it and find it to be true as Geron is known, you must at least on this motion. It's missing. We weren't. The Smiths failure state. But there's never been an assertion that can't point to one even though we did it back. It can't point to one for color outside. I have one more question. Have you come to learn why Morris was selected as a developer and you were essentially told that you would not be able to develop? They have. The city of visuals have been tight left. If you look at our client, you'll see that the newspaper and town are limited. The day after they took their final action in July two all five went out of explanation after we appeared and spoke for hours by Colin Justin Walder and explained to the city council why the action was unlawful. Why there was another public purpose. Why was it unlawful? It was unlawful for this reason. Was it against any state statute? It was contrary to the United States Constitution and in the teeth of the killer. In Kilo, which is your honor is no. Controversy surrounds it. Kilo, which otherwise expanded state, government, domain, power to make economic development a public use. In that case, not least I would mean to shark the vision of a whether he could own the development of my house. Wal-Mart is something the state can build on just giving the justice compensation. What every justice agree to talk about is the state is specifically. The reality of thinking of the current and the dissent is that a state may not take action for no public purpose. It simply benefits one private act over another. Our potential and we look back on what we discovered in the show and apparently they are two in front of state that everything is possible to avoid it. Is that this was done for Mars's benefit, asked where it had political benefit of political officials for a line. Could you, I'll leave you with this, could you state in a very simple statement what your cause of action is? Yes, this is an unlawful taking. What kind of taking? Is this a regulatory taking or a physical taking? No, it's not a physical taking. It's a regulatory taking, it fits under the 10th central analysis in Easton by doing this whole, the man case decided by just at all in which the regulation, the record is us, constitutes such substantial interferon without any distinct investment-back expectation. And it's so arbitrary and precious that it has a mandate to take it. So you're not purporting to make any physical taking claim in this case. Is your regulatory taking assertion, is this in addition to or the same thing as a substantive due process or equal protection claim? It's the same claim. If that's the same claim, did you ever argue substantive due process or equal protection to the district court? The specific words may not appear. Aren't specific words really important in what you argue to the district court? Well, you know, you're on a map. Yes, they are, but they're two points. Consistently in the first complaint and in the amendment complaint, we argue that there are violations here on that face of the fifth and 14 amendments. In the first round, with almost no argument, we have telephone conference and all respect to the district judge. At the end of the telephone conference, he said, I'm dismissing the complaint because I don't see a taking put it in a second. We may have a sleeve to put it in the amendment complaint. We did it and we tried to spell out and take it more forcefully. And then the argument shifted to right-fix and right-fix and see there which was round on which district court dismissed this case just done in fifth. If it was tied to the Supreme Court case in which two things were true that after a year, one was complaining and finding that I'm talking about Williams and four. The complaining claim did not exhaust its state administrative crime. And so it happened. And how have you exhausted state administrative remedies? When it is applied to the city of New York. Have you exhausted? I thought I maybe I misunderstood Williams. But I thought the import of Williams and what you've got to pursue your state remedies to the conclusion. You have a state case pending right now which I understand to be state. So you clearly haven't pursued state remedies to their conclusion if there's a state claims that are out there. You want to explain why. We filed a state claim after the district court dismissed our second complaint, the amended complaint specifically and it so states as a protective measure. Regardless of your motivation, you've got state claims pending now, right? Not by choice. What are the things that are pending now and they are pending as a protective measure and they've been state at the request of the defendants? And what is it you've asked the state to give you? We've asked the state to give us substantially the same relief as we seek for this court. And the state has the power to do that, right? Is that really that? Okay. And there's no dispute about that, Your Honor, but there is nothing. Nothing that requires us to go to the state court. About Williamsson. Williamsson said that if there are state administrative rallies, Williamsson was not talking about state court. Williamsson, the complaint party there said that a general zoning ward has a client to do really with violated substance and due process equal protection. Do you have any case that makes the distinction you're making that says Williamson doesn't talk about state-right. And if there are any other committees, it talks about administrative remedies only. You don't have to pursue things in state court. County concrete and white road on which position? It says that. Well, I don't know if we have it in those exact words, but it's a substantial, especially a counter-conquered and I will respect the director's honest of, in that case in particular, as well as black road. What are the remedies that you are seeking for the regulatory taking in the state court? We want to get it substantially the same as that. Well, what is, what what? We want an evaluation of what Linda has done. The ordinance, the ordinance. No. Yes, we want the ordinance truck down. The ordinance that appointed Morris. Right, and that provided that M&D domain proceedings could be commenced against us and part and triggered whenever, whenever Linda feels that it. So you're actually open to the taking of your property via M&D domain. We're not. If you, if your honor means that we're open to it, that we're a target, that they're locked and loaded on us. The answer is yes. Yes. And in fact, one of the arguments that the other side makes, which takes form to the highest, is that because Linda has an issue of piece of paper that says declaration of commonization. I didn't want to take you too far from the point that we were discussing before, which is whether this should really be in state court. But you're on it. Let me, let me be as candid as I can. There's nothing that we can do that cannot be done in state court, I gather. Your honor, this is an attack upon some of the most politically powerful visuals and the power of the Jersey. It's an attack on the former mayor of New Jersey. I say this with all three of the same county mayor of the state, but you're referring to. A blended. I may have spoke. It's an attack on the city of Linda. It's attacked on the council persons of Linda. It's an attack on the former and current mayor of Linda. It's an attack on the Union County improvement authority, which is represented by one of the most politically powerful. The ordinances that were passed by the city of London, the ordinance that created the that approved a development plan. And then the ordinance that appointed Mars, done pursuing to New Jersey state law. That's not even that's not clear. It's been changed so many times. Well, let me ask it another way was London authorized to do what it did under state law. Yes, but not under the council. And the way they did it under the council position and the way they did it under the, the regulations and details, quite almost speaks volumes about what they, what they knew about the ethical or correct. I gather the appointment of Morris as developer was not a matter that was subject to state bidding laws. No, and they it should have been subject if they thought there was any problem. I don't know. I don't know. I mean, the last question, which I'm sure that they thought there was a problem, which is never considered. We spent over $38 million in conjunction with Linda. Not their money, our money, the cooperating with them to put in their redevelopment program to support, understand. We're not attacking their redevelopment program. That isn't a program we've not only agreed to, we were present in the creation. We paid through the surveys that Linda and Bob put it together and we've been working on it. And as I say, we've done over $38 million into it plus gotten termed by access, et cetera. And all of a sudden, in that son of the record. Yes, okay. All of the record, all of a sudden, all of this didn't record the line. We're out of this sauce in 2004. The submarine comes up and we find out that the Morris Company is another private actor represented by the most politically powerful firm in Union County, which had represented Linda when this redevelopment plan began. That's all of the complaint. Have you made redevelopment? No, Leather. No open dead. Then you can go through the pretext as I did judge what this case that you probably remember when you sat on this period for it. The ends of the sales case against Tesla when they went through the charade of saying that they would send them the property because they wanted a public park. When they really objected to doing what's having a needed redevelopation facility and you're on a found sitting there in the superior judge, the debt was pretext and the farced debt was paid and the honors that I don't know if I found any cases that can rule out this kind of an end-of-the-main-tall-unbethate. But I'm really about it. But it's wrong. Here they have the dust in it. That's what you're done. Let me ask a question. You say in your reply brief and I want to quote that ISP has from the inception alleged and argued what in law is known as a facial constitutional challenge to Lyndon's conduct. And I have to say I'm puzzled. What's a facial challenge to conduct? Your Honor, you know, I understand the problem. But we... Help me out then. I, as I said before, am telling you that in this case to make a distinction between facial and a hazard line in order to try to argue about Williams, is to create a dichotomy that doesn't exist. It's one step of action. You have... Either you've got a facial challenge or you've gotten asked if I mean we're not making that distinction. I bet that distinction in the law. So which are you making? Facial. And even if you're making facial attacks, you're making facial attacks on the ordinance, library pass, reaffirmed in July 2005. If that's true, then what do all these background facts have to do with anything? A facial challenge is a challenge to buy its terms, an ordinance, a statute, a regulation on its face. What... What does... Don't get me wrong. I think I understand from your briefing in the tenor of your remarks here today that your client is profoundly troubled by not to put too fine a point on it. It looks like political influence resulting in an unwarranted seizure of its property. And I don't need to denigrate those concerns at all. I understand. But we have the responsibility to try to get our arms around what it is you're arguing. And if what you're arguing is indeed a facial challenge and that's it, what does all that background have to do with it? Because you're arguing the court below, the law respect, the law is going to end. And the defendants are obviously playing, but we have a just compensation facing it. And that even if we've alleged facial challenge, there's two problems. You know, the Williams has one is an analogy, the other is just compensation. We should have gone through the procedures of just compensation. And that is part of the reason we're not allowed to be here first. Well, I thought the first party argument was about take. I mean, if what you're claiming is a taking, whether it's regulatory or physical, aren't you really saying, uh, look, if there's to be a taking, then we're entitled to have the taking comply with law. Be for public purpose and we get just compensation. That's, isn't that different and distinct from making a substantive due process challenged facially to an ordinance? You know, what we're saying is what the court, uh, that we both, I think, was saying in language that there is some action, you know, three polyphyrs, you two are respectful, and the defendants, you know, open to three. Um, the Supreme Court said there are certain government acts, you which is found to be impervisibly because it fails to meet the public use with one. Or is so arbitrary as to violate to process that is the end of the inquiry. And was that argument made to the district court? Because that's part of the part I don't want to speak to my colleagues, but part of the problem I've had with this case is understanding what you're arguing and what you argued in the district court because it appears from the record, and you could point me to where I'm wrong. And that would be a big help that the main arguments you're making here, substantive due process, any protection kinds of arguments, we're not the arguments were presented to judge Brown chief judge Brown was presented with your assertions about takings. What, where did you make the hymn, the arguments that you're making to us? Your Honor, there are certain cases that the other side said we didn't sign the bill specifically, can't concrete. If you're asking if I'm sorry that they weren't signed with questions, yes, but the argument was made to judge Brown from the beginning, from the first case I can come back and show places in the splints and greens. And that's the reason that we were seeking to invalidate the action by the against us now as the judge came down with a surprising decision in our view in which he adopted Williams, which is a spark in this case and what he did. And we've refined our argument on field to answer that point that the judge raised, relying on a case that has nothing to do with this one. If you plan to discase in Kiela, every justice in that court would say we have been deprived of rights and violation of 14 to 157. But if the amendment, the taking force doesn't give the right of government to take it and then say, well, hey, it only gives the right to a sovereign to take for a public use. And then we get into the justice compensation, because it is only because of that force, but we have the two problems that Williams and the first amendment doesn't have such a force. And we don't worry about the state saying, well, you can't go to the federal court if I'm going to block your loose paper and being public because you can always get compensation for it. That would be absurd. But that's what they're saying here. We are doing it as the reason for all the background information judge to the U.S. to doubt that they have made a defense. Through the facts that are in this complaint, detailed facts, and more on a conservative force of conduct, inconspiracy with a politically favored product party, the street bus of our rights for no public purpose. That is the one thing a government cannot do, whether you are applying, they should, whatever the words are used, the government can't pull those by house. In all respect, because it would prefer and they probably would write, but one of you's pretty good is living there. I said, my neighbor is probably in full indiscision. It depends where you live. It certainly does. It certainly does. I don't know if he is, but he is. But seriously. What judges make me find me getting the four-year neighborhood anyhow? I don't think I've heard. I'm waiting for the government to tell me how. But that's the problem. With all respect, we've gotten caught up in semantics about how many of these respect, they should go fly. Out of point is simple. They come in, they strip us of our property rights. We put tens of millions of dollars in it. This argument that you're making now is not related to the facial balance of truth. But it is, you are. But the facial challenge is just look at the statute itself and determine whether, because of the public purpose, I argue. It is a whole course of conduct. Even if it was as a fly. I'm looking for my notes. I know I have it. I'm over here and forced by the habit. Well, you don't have the chance to look at the moon on the book. Let me just ask this. Your time is over and will certainly allow your colleagues to go over a bit. But I think I've been scratching my head since I first started reading this case. And I understand that a lot of the context that you provided, if I can call it that, is it relevant to a legal analysis? But its context which helps me wonder what in the hack is going on. The certain people should pick up and read both sides of the case and you say, I'm missing it. There's something else going on here. And at least to my perspective, when I read these briefs and looked at this, first thing I began doing was she came ahead saying, what in the hack is this case about? Because it didn't make any sense. It's crazy from one, but there's an ordinance that's fast that requires you to enter into a long-term lease and it defines the minimum term of that case. The person acts, there's Morris within 180 days of the date of the, guess the resolution. And the long-term lease has to be for 75 years. And that if that happens and that the redevelopment here, Morris, shall actually be redevelopment within 365 days of the date of the resolution. And then goes on to provide that failing that there's an obligation to sell the property. And this I'm not sure about, sell the property to Morris. And if that sale does not take place, and I think within a certain period of time, the city will then use this eminent domain right to take the property from you. Is that, am I missing something here? Not much, but is missing it what happened before that. This is a battle and it's at least the second part. That's so far, I think. Because the city did the same thing, and Morris didn't have those sheets of money. I thought they negotiated, but you couldn't come to an agreement. Well, first, there was one time when there was no negotiation at all. And there was a lot more of all the letters and said, saying, we failed to come to an agreement to mention it in domain. There was another one in which you remember? Is that letter in the record? Yes, that is a letter in the conflite. There's a letter in the record where they say, we failed to reach an agreement to mention it in domain. Is a letter in the conflite, I don't believe it's attached to this. Right. But we have to accept it, but it's in the okay. Yes, sir, the letter in the conflite. And the other, the full negotiation, such as it was, it had a Morris brought the lives of property back in 1998, when he suddenly surfaced with submarine as the new developer of our property, where we had been giving rights to re-develop. Remembering that we had spent $37 million dollars alone on remediation to get the property ready for the redevelopment. Morris's offer was $25 million dollars. Now, that's a plus or so. The ninth thing you're asked is that's not what you offer. It's under the price we've had, under the cost-release staff, that we need to be covered for the program. And this is part of what we say is a natural, and general, old, old, and accurate, an infinite and conservative force of commonplace, to push us out for no public reason. I don't want to over time to be there on one minute. But your best cause of action then is a regulatory taking. Yes. And you are seeking invalidated. Invalidated. Are you seeking junk to relieve damages and things like that? Yes, that's our best relief we want. No public interest in being served on what we're doing is not a bureau. But you want to do that in the district court. You want an actual trial. You want an action in the district court in fact. And you're claim, your claim is that the ordinance, and I say the ordinance, by that I mean the last in the series. The ordinance on its face affects a regulatory taking. I gotcha? Yes. I can't remember. You have a notice some time and you'll be back for six minutes, and my guess is probably more than that. So why don't we hear from you of this side, and we'll certainly let that go around there time. I hope you folks have divided up the time, and we may well ask questions of you, Mr. Clark, that properly belonged to Mr. Malorian, vice versa. Bear with us on that. I'm sorry. Okay. So you have for ten minutes. So we may ask. I'm sorry. Okay. Okay. We may ask questions of you that are better asked of Mr. Clark and vice versa. Any discussion that's far into discussion, I think, can be framed by the claim that was presented, not once, but twice, who was district folks. And the complaint was what was under claims, and the reader doesn't start to search for either to find out what close to action, this is a designated crime, right? Because at the beginning of each count, the author of the complaint, the benefit of the reader is passion, inverse condemnation. Did he raise a regulatory taking cause of action in the district court? Yes. If he does a claim, an inverse condemnation point, on the only remedy for inverse condemnation point, one, never saw a change of the claim. And a variety of mistakes, there is no new process by the subcommittee. Did the district court address the regulatory taking claim? Did the district court address it? In the first complaint, the court found that there was no insufficient allegation of any type of regulatory taking. The judge framed, chief of the frame, said that I can search, I search one, or I don't see any allegation of regulatory taking. And gave this claim that the option to attempt to deeply defend. And they made that a curious cause to complaint in this derogatory, that the fact that sensitive allegation, and the complaint contains many of the same things that the council has. But both at fact sensitive allegation, the court found the certain thing. But did they alleg that the municipality passed an ordinance that resulted in the bearing ability to use their property? Yes. They alleged a regulatory taking as a result of a course of conduct that as a result of a series of actions. But as a pleading, wasn't it sufficient? Yes. The second thing. And then the second thing, chief goes for an argument. Does this complaint on the right? Did not address what we were doing with this in the alleyway. Well, what should they have done? That's been my question. I looked at the complaint, and she used to me look at space 13 or 14. Page 14, the ordinance also eliminated the provision of the Vita Vata and the plan to recognize and confirm it, ISPs, development rights, and then it goes on for no legitimate public purpose, paragraph Y, an executive development agreement with Morris. But what, given the nature of their argument, both in the complaint and in their briefing opposition to your motions, what should have happened to make this law suit right? What needed to happen before it was right? Under the truth, through this district and the circuit and the Supreme Court, they haven't unrightened, because they haven't pursued the state just compensate. Well, what case in this circuit, are you referring to? Well, 10 and concrete for one. Number of concrete county. Okay. And this and this and concrete county saying exactly the opposite that when the nature of the attack is on an ordinance, which argues with the ordinance, arguably takes property, there is no need for an rightness or a finality analysis, because the ordinance itself is the taking. The county concrete tell that under the two-prong of the police, first-prong in finality, the second-prong in just compensation, a racial challenge satisfies the first problem. Can the concrete say, and this is the part that is controlling those in the distance? That while the fact that the county legislates a racial justice compensation, which has been what the intelligent community in this complaint is following, satisfies the final rule, if it does not lead them to the duty to seek justice compensation from the state, or before claiming the right justice compensation. Well, I don't mean maybe I'm missing something, maybe from point two, the part of the complaint that's tricking a just compensation claim, is when I read the complaint in the brief, I didn't get from that there are agreeing that property has been taken without just compensation, there are agreeing that the ordinance that was enacted is for an improper private purpose, and that basically the city government of the township has decided to take property from them and give it to Morris for no purpose. The complaint is murky, but the complaint only alleges to constitutional a taking subject, and it's an intercontinental, there is no to process planning by the right words or by table, there's no precession subject, and what anti-conquete said that if it's a just a facial claim, just compensation, I don't think it's different, you still like to satisfy the second complaint, or you say, which is to assume just compensation is taken for. I think County concrete say that exhaustion doesn't apply in the context of a regulatory taking. A exhaustion, the anti-conquete says that it is a just compensation claim, the second complaint does apply a facial channel on process for us for protection if a facial channel would be right, and they make an clear distinction there, the support between whether it's a strip and then in just compensation claim, as opposed to a process, and this complaint doesn't provide either one for that. I'm reading County concrete on page 38 of the printout, I'm not sure what page I get the site for you of the exact opinion, but it's under paragraph A where the discussion of fifth amendment, just compensation, taking claims, we said in contrast here, a premonance do not challenge any particular discussion, this decision of the talent ship or planning board applying the orders to the property, instead, they alleged that the mere enactment of the ordinance has denied them all economically viable use of their property, thus the facial fifth amendment, just compensation, taking claims, need not comply with the finality rule, and then we go into site, Sudden versus Stonehold Regional Planning, the Supreme Court saying, the facial challenges to regulation are generally right, the moment the challenge regulation or ordinance has passed, but facing uphill battle. Why isn't that exactly this case? Well, if I may, you are, in fact, exactly what I was saying is only trolling about the first problem, and it's received to the expected page at page 166, 168 is where the court empersees to say, even though the facial challenge, the final problem, you still under a facial challenge from the fifth amendment of compensation, hasn't satisfied the judge's compensation problem, and that's exactly the difficulty. Well, how can there be any just compensation for a government of taking for a private purpose? How can you just compensate? The government decides that, Judge Padeuva, who lives down at the end of my street, prefers my view of the sunset to his view, so the government comes in and takes my property and gives it to Judge Padeuva. If you're saying I have to ask for just compensation? There is the state remedy, and that's what our courts are thinking to say, if you do that initially, then the state will work. What is the remedy? Well, if the remedy can be compensation for a victim. I don't want my house, I don't want compensation, I want my house. It will really be compensated in the high cut of case that there was an improper emotive by the Ms. Halle taking Mr. Padeuva, even if the remedy therapy can be invalidated to say action. Isn't that what he's asking? Isn't it right at the time of the action, though? The government election? This challenge is not a challenge to the mere enactment of any purpose. Rather, it's a challenge to a court, basically taking down a patient's intruder, a course of conduct. They say it's a fact that they're not challenging the mere enactment of any ordinance. They want you to consider a course of conduct, and it might end just to the... Well, that's on the issue of public purpose, isn't it? But a public purpose here isn't already resolved. But public purpose was in the designation of this property entity, the Jason property. But it sounds like you were, in fact, describing ISP's case, which is that they are challenging the ordinance because it did result in a regulatory taking. Without a... It's challenging the fact as a fact to them because the ordinance is an issue here, including not only ISP property, but a human property, a human property. Combined is a very large, very large track, and this is how we decided that they wanted an integrated, coordinated, redevelopment of public parcels with a single redeveloper and a redeveloper who has redeveloped other property in London and throughout the state. For reasons that... I got an hearing about myself. Just one question. I got the municipality has the state authority to choose who is going to develop private properties. The municipality and the binding case from the New Year's health division, beside our papers a year ago, at this point, when I did this year, said that there is no constitutional right to be the redeveloper of property and that the public purpose of the project is determined that time of the property is designated as an area in need of redevelopment. And ISP doesn't challenge that this property is in the redevelopment. That's the common phrase of the old light term nation. And there's three important milestones in the development. An area in need of education, or you can't add ISP from challenge that. A redevelopment plan of ISP is a challenge that is a combined development. The third part is getting an end to the under contract to develop property. But isn't that an argument you'd make on the merits of the case in terms of whether or not this is a public taking for a private purpose? And that's the argument you'd make. I was depositing contacts because the public purpose of the project is far out of the potential whether property is in need of redevelopment. Because from that decision, flows the authority of the panel to exercise and then come in. If necessary, to bring the property under control of property development. All your arguments seem to be keying off the assertion that this is a taking's complaint. This is a taking's case. Because as Judge McKee points out, if you don't take it as a taking's case, all the talk about just compensation and exhausting state remedies is in a positive, right? I mean, if the soon for the sake of discussion that ISP had made a substantive due process, an equal protection claim to the district court, then would these arguments about rightness have any traction at all? If this court were to conclude that there is a substantive due process for either protecting the racial and under the current jurisdiction that would make a right claim to be cut. All right. I'm reading from the brief. This is their brief brief, brief repellent ISP services in opposition to the defendant's motions that dismiss. The brief they served in the filed and district court, PJT. This case is not about just compensation. Instead, ISP maintains that the defendant's actions are facially invalid because they do not advance a legitimate public purpose or state interest. Defendants actions are sort of private, not public interest, and skipping down to the last sentence that paragraph. Under the pretext of eminent domain, these defendants have effectively taken, markedly confiscated, confiscated, ISPs property for private benefit. Because it is raising claims that are distinct from the provision of just compensation, they are permitted to proceed directly in federal court. I don't know how they could get much clearer, and I can argue that wasn't that clear in the complaint and the complaint could have been more clear. I will not send in to that phrase, years in a brief in the district court, the complaint does not allege or present a subject that is across the truth and protect the claim. If you read the entirety of the brief, they never argue, they never argue that the claim will lie for representing a facial claim. They don't use the term facial, but... They don't say they're making a sudden process, but that is a facial challenge. The facial challenge to conformance on the Fifth Amendment in England under the County Conqueror of the County is still not a part of it. I confuse it too all the time. I just don't know how to write under the last, satisfied that they satisfied the second prime point. The other point is, I could address one of the bill, and I understand why this is, and council mentions that they spent a lot of $1,000,000,000, but they used the key word to the meat. The ISPs side interview concytes are environmental catastrophe. So, there's something that argue New Jersey isn't environmental catastrophe. I don't ensure that, do you? Even from New Jersey, this is... Oh, that's a lot of... We get a lot of spillover, Pennsylvania, Delaware. I'm going to have to sit between them. I think I'm going to raise that back. I know well, this city took action, so to New Jersey Stash, to bring these properties under control of the Vita Dalton Potion. ISP has spent $38,000,000,000, or $50,000, $100,000, to mediate its own pollution. It is a statutory obligation to get no losses. And that's all they've done. They've looked gone through. And this thing is kind of decided that they wanted this area of town, which is follow, follow, and run down to come under control of the Vita Dalton Potion. Did ISP want to be developed that they had to sign a Vita Dalton Potion? I thought they were doing it, they had been more than remediate, that they had also spent money to build the warehouse, that they had built those, they had done things beyond just to run on a clean up. I don't want to say that they hadn't built anything for all the contaminants, structures, so they certainly didn't be able to do that. And quite honestly, the city decided to bring in a poll, a shown and known redeveloper, try to get this to go. And that's what we've actually more focused on. And this one last point, Kilo, Kilo does a call for any comfort to your fellow Kilo supports the city of the law. Is not a word in Kilo that says, even a requirement to be brought in a fellow court in the personal sense, Kilo, he was a big part of the U, the state court. Yeah, but that wasn't a ripeness case, that was really about the definition of the meaning of the German public purpose. That wasn't about ripeness. Mr. Meloy, from the public records, what is the master plan for this track? There's a part of the orange and the next plan is a combination of integrated veritas and other types of uses. Certainly to get rid of what they are now because no functional use of the property is under the river and to rehabilitate it for uses that we need to be compatible with riverfront. Is that what Morris has called into this? Yes, sir. And that's what they've done before they've re-developed the open and air-ported along with other products in this city. There's no this. Now, assuming all that plays out, what happens to ISP? Two options. Under the re-developed and statute-specific structure, the implementing agency, the improvement bar has to have Morris attempt good faith negotiations to acquire parcels. And who decides whether it's good faith or not? The judge, the state court judge, they do it every day a week. You're talking about acquiring the areas within that acquiring deposit property? Yes. You are. Okay. It's a combined re-development and their behaviors are constantly. The state court judge evaluate the bona fide of the big negotiation. And then that is triggered with its mentality that the statute can use its end-to-end power. If there is no good faith negotiation, the count cannot use end-to-end. If good faith to those who use the purpose is successful, then the only thing that can be done is throw over those property. So that property and not mean use can become active use to rehabilitate the surrounding. Happen hypothetically. If ISP decided they wanted to sell the property to the Acme Crackage Act re-development company to come in and do part and agreed to sell to Acme Crackage Act to come in and redevelop this plot. How could they enter into that kind of negotiation to do the ordinance that's there and it's almost as though an equitable trust has been impressed on the land for the benefit of Morris. But they could not sell to someone to be redeveloped or they can sell to someone to be good. They won't apply to be redeveloped. But the premise they have to be redeveloped. Would anybody buy that? Would anybody buy that? Yeah. I mean, it is someone who would develop it and be satisfied with the criteria that they can develop. But the answer is good. So would they answer to Judge McKee's question is in effect? No. Nobody would buy it with the anticipation of being a redeveloper in the face of an ordinance that has already designated Morris to be the redeveloper. Yes. And precisely why the majority is actually under development requires the absence of the essentials that any, and another name must be fair, marked, valid. Realize that for property that is designated to be the development in an area pretty pretty development that has to be kept into the property owner that ultimately they would get a fair value for the property. And there is an entire period for the scheme set up just like that. But there is no right for a property owner to be designated to be redeveloped or that property, particularly when it's far, they enlarge the parcel. That's the line. The line is redeveloped or they will property basically will do it exactly for your claim. Is it no we want the poor and they did partially. Let me try to sum up and make sure I understand that. You're not disputing that if what is alleged in the complaint, and I recognize that that's a big if, is a facial challenge to the ordinance as constituting a regulatory taking that that's right. Am I disputing that? Yeah. I thought I understood you earlier to say if what they're saying is that on its face the ordinance constitutes a regulatory taking that would be a right claim. Did I, did I misunderstand you? I think it might be, okay, there are things that are different for us today but I'm not quite considering it. Please. A facial escape in this point satisfies the finality from the ordinance and the ordinance. But it's still a satisfied with the just compensation, which is what many countries, unless they have to sue the just compensation for the state, it's still not right. Okay, I'm sorry I misunderstood you. So your assertion then is if they had, I got you, if they had said in the complaint that we are making a substantive due process or equal protection claim with respect to the regulation, if that had been alleged in the complaint, then that would be right. Okay, but as to the takings, they still have to pursue just compensation. All right. That is kind of a kind of concrete. And I'll just say in the same remote, the US reports that the latest ordinance, I'll give you some stories in fact, is a handy phrase of it. There is a standard order for the prosecution of the takings. Under the Fifth Amendment in the federal courts. That is of course limited jurisdiction and there is a being, there's a trend that these kinds of issues perfectly passed and are more partly what in the state. Can't, can't, can't, you were a part here. Tony Connick, though, in the push and the opinion you referred me to earlier, I once I say really referred to the part that satisfied the finality rule but not the ripeness rule. Are really from the just compensation claim. The, the, the, it's outside the final rule, not just compensation. Right. And the sentence holds open the other on the, the same thing you're looking at right now. It's the sentence after the prior medical that's at dot 16 that starts. Well, the fact that the balance of ledger facial emphasized just compensation takings claim against the ordinance may save them from the finality rule. It does not relieve them from the duty to see just compensation from the state before claiming the right to just compensation. The Fifth Amendment has been violated. Okay, but I made them one. There's so many. It's like, I don't interpret this as being any part of a just compensation claim because of the juxtaposition and concomitant argument. That the ordinance is facial invalid because it's for it's not for the did it the public purpose which goes to the merits. No, the account for the appellate says it's. The patient or else the block or the more that's a lot more easier than that. The patient's child says we don't know if he's a child. The near connect the near connect the court. Resume the use of such and such. This must have some. The do not say that the near connect of the organization has resulted in any different. Instead they want to invite to the dual bed that they force a common. A series of actions. Who else in that? That's not a patient child. That's a lot. The wall is stubbornly clear that where is it has a line. You're going to take. People's thoughts. Thank you. I take another look at the complaint. I took a paragraph for me too. I thought that it was. I'll let you get all we don't more careful. I just put. Even. Okay, that that really is beyond that. Mr. Clark, you had some time. Thank you. It won't really matter. Will it. I agree. I said that. The terminology. The first case law in this area. Terminology. First all over one case together. What he's calling it just compensation. Requirement. County. I would call an emotional requirement. You shy away from that. That doesn't matter. The person's weekend. Not strictly speaking. An exhaustion requirement. The first circuit is invented. The terminology. The litigation requirement. I think that's actually. But I do think. I would like to start with. What I think seems to be. The railing. The misconception about. The only county concrete. County. Not only does county concrete say that. There's an exhaustion. That the exhaustion requirement. That's what I would use. I think when you start throwing this. Just compensation. Praise input. You breathe. Confusion. Judge. What face you ask. What type of claim is it. Regular. For taking. That was a square answer. That's what we feel. That's what he said. Mr.. That's right. And county concrete. Unambiguously. Requires. Exhaustion. On a facial. Taked. That's what he's saying. Because. The court said. Well, those that district court correctly determined. That the facial just compensation. Taked. And failed. That's why the Williamson. From. This court didn't just. Look past. Instead. On that judge. Kavanaugh got an exact right. A reasoning. So I should. Pardon. Why did it. Then do what it did. Well, during the dependency of the appeal and county concrete. The New Jersey Supreme Court had denied the. The addition for review. That the plate that been that case have pursued. In accordance with what it was supposed to do. And then. The back contrast. What the claim that this done here. All the things that. The finish finish because the last part of that paragraph seems to me. Totally undermines your argument because it concludes with. Accordingly, the second Williamson problem. No longer prevents the balance from asserting that the near enactment of the ordinance. He prived them from the economically viable use. Of their property. And thus. We were reversed. The district court's conclusion that the claim was unright. You. You went past. The string site. The court of New Jersey denied review of a pellets. State court appeals. That is why the court said. Exhausted and had been satisfied. But. Not because of the nature of the claim. But because of the nature of the actions that. Plank of had taken to pursue the litigation. I believe in. All right. Well, maybe that's that's. Sementics again. And I always have problems with. Why isn't that. The reality. But why isn't that. The reality. If. If in Tony. Concute. We started talking about. The. A week of the folks. A week of the federal court. Could exercise for six five cases because the. State appeal. Process had ended. Why isn't that Tanta pursing. We did a? Arena. I. Certainly that. First of all, this entire discussion in. Transit. Confit bond orders. Raising under. The discussion. of the second prom in Williams in the exhaustion prom, I call it, the litigation prom, other call it, Brian calls it the just compensation prom. But it's the second half of the Williams and Kess. Your point is as a matter of fact, it was exhausted in county concrete. Exactly right. And beyond that, if that had not been the case, the court base abundant declared, expressly clear, a different result would have been required because it said Judge Kavanaugh was correct. At the time he ruled, he was correct. What happened was exhaustion occurred during the dependency of the appeal, air go reversal. And here, we count the red contrast to what the plaintiff counsel said. I mean, I take a second to a lot of what he said, of course, but my hands are tied behind back under the procedural plot, through where it, but he says, we've gone out of our way to stymie their efforts to blow the lid off of the political nested fibers in the unicounted, quite a contrary. Quite a contrary. In fact, in state court, we are waiting decision on the, in the case that case is going forward. There's no effort to hire conceal anything. I could pull out a whole of the technical argument and can call practical. Does, does, does, does Japan make the same arguments that ISP is making here? It's substantial. So not, I mean, I can't stand here and say their work for work, but I wouldn't know of any substantial difference in the, what they do. In fact, it wasn't ironic that plaintiff counsel stood here in Philadelphia to find this about what a great decision in state court, if you remember. State court is protected of property owners in these non-texts, every day. And that's exactly what the Supreme Court's day in saying, oh, when, when, in the United States, how does that, why not willing me and say, court, to see me, oh, for goodness sake, they've been forced to mitigate all the way through an ended question and there they attempted to preserve under England board of examiners and they said, no, you can't preserve. You're still found and the plaintiffs there, you said, wasn't that unfair? And the court said no. were very comfortable having lived against pursuities through the state courts. So if I can rewind the procedural history, this case back to the beginning, because sometimes then I think it's a phrase of page of history's work on the volume of logic. There's nothing logical about the way that this case rises to this court. And you need to understand the history, and it was at 32, but it was lost in a particular way. The complaint that was initially filed in this case, you can read it, and you will see, just as the conspiracy theory was, the centerpiece people who were playing its counsel sat down the day, the conspiracy theory was all that complaint was about. The complaint was drafted under a frank misconception that alleging a conspiracy to pay property states of federal claim doesn't happen to state if they go playing as Judge Brown pointed out, directly in the first time. And when he confronted with the fact that alleging a conspiracy to pay does not state a federal claim, plaintiffs attempt at their first effort at pure shapeshifting, even though they're complaining not on the court. If you're a white or a pure shapeshifting, never heard that. Even though their complaint did not alleged in actual taking, they argued the Judge Brown, it does alleging a actual taking. And Judge Brown read it and he says, I don't see it. If that's what your alleging pleaded, what I see is your alleging a conspiracy to pay, which is not a federal claim. So they re-plated this time, what did they plead? They pled a cadence claim. They're saying, well, if I go, it is a taking. Only problem there is they didn't draft it with, right misreformments of Williamson, but in mine. And had they done that, they would have, I think, taken Judge Brown's hint in the first instance, and gone to the forum where they should have been, at that point in the process, which is paperwork. But they didn't. But now, having drafted a complaint that was oblivious to the Williamson-re-pregnist requirements when drafted, they're here to this court saying, you can assure it to meet those, those, I'll write this requirements. And here's what I would like to finish with, because I ask you this, when we're dealing with labels, this court can put the label at once on a complaint. I think if you are being fair and liberal, the one that fits is it's an ad-splied cadence claim, a regular ad-splied, regular four-aid. Well, but he has applied a string because it can't be applied to anyone other than Morris and ISP. And I think that's the constraint that was expressed by Mr. Brown, because it's not really as applied, because this was an ordinance that was, if you were locked and loaded, someone else's phrase, on this particular situation. Not applicable, but on a factual level, the record would just prove that, because it also applies to do proper chappance to the NSA for finding the same claim. Well, I just read the ordinance. I don't know if it's a separate ordinance or not, but I just read the ordinance, but go ahead. Well, the ordinance also applies to the crime, but that's so it doesn't justify to one, but even more that so, then the question that would be posed is what is the Supreme Court telling you to do in that situation? I think you look at San Rimo and Williams, and the answer is it's still supposed to go to State Court, but my question is, you can bend over backwards, you can stretch a point here and then try to forfeit this into the label of a facial placement claim, which is not. But why would you want to do that? You could have parallel pending litigations in federal and State Court consuming to the times of two. Yeah, but that's not a great, I mean Colorado River. Supreme Court has told us if it belongs here, and judicial efficiency does not add ground to an exercise or jurisdiction. I think, Ron, I have to take the wrong issue. Rightness is all about judicial economy and judicial action. Rightness is, but the very fact that there are two parallel proceedings with the Supreme Court has said is not a reason for a federal court to necessarily abstain in favor of the State Court. If I may, Ron. The question presented this morning is, what Judge Brown, who reckoned in holding that this was not a right case, so I go back to the basic question because as I said, when you wander around the term, the terminologies and the labels, I'm sure the Court could find its way to go either way. And I'm asking, as a practical question, is this a right case? Why, given the history of this, is it the incorrect result to have both of the property owners who are affected by this in the same form, pursuing the same plan consistent with what the Supreme Court wanted done in San Remo. Are you saying the State Deform is the correct form and that ISV is there? Dupont has already found its complaint. So, and there are no procedural impediments in the State Court to having ISV's claims addressed completely. The only procedural impediment, and it's not a disabled one, is that in public, they're a little late to the game. They could have been in it, but they chose not to be. Wait a minute, what does that mean? There are nothing left. I just said, we are waiting decision on the Dupont claim as we speak. We anticipate that the decision in that case very quickly. But ISV would have its own claim, right? Yes, yes it would. But I don't mean to this lead anybody to say that the two cases can sort of put together on the same litigation frat at this point because of the tacit of time. So, if you want to call that a procedural impediment, one final point that I wanted to make about Cuba, the assertion was made that all nine justices would be taken aback in the fall by this amendment. And I say, actually, the one thing we can be sure of as a standard today is that it's not the case. In fact, all nine justices recognize the elimination of the light is a public purpose. There is no dispute in this case that this is a lighted area, severely lighted area. And what I mean by not as good as I was to say, it's an environmental morass. And being that there is no dispute as to light under kilo, all nine justices would agree that if there's a taking here to pursue a redevelopment plan, it is as a matter of law, force, and common sense for a public purpose. The only issue that has been raised and is being raised is that they say we somehow prove them over for a private redeveloper to soon wrongly what happened. That is not what I think in the field now, or a kilo of claim, it is a claim that see this on one sentence in the concurrence of justice Kennedy. And so, Mr. Caldwell, you said finally about five minutes going now we're into kilo of case at all. And I try to, could you leave us with a black letter decision here? This is this case. Is that you can help me? It's a facial challenge to an ordinance that involves a regulatory taking and a request for just compensation that requires under county concrete exhaustion. Well, I don't have any post-counter concrete decision. Well, that helps you. You said yes. Right. Well, help me formulate what you would like the decision to be in this case. Characterize the case. The cause of action and then tell me what the decision should be. Decision in this case is that Judge Brown correctly found that this was an unright claim. All right, but you don't want to. Is it a regulatory taking? You don't disagree that there's a facial challenge to the ordinance involving a regulatory taking. Correct that. So, not just a position. Number one, it's not on a fair reading of the complaint that a facial claim at all, rather that's an inventive label that they've construed that they put on it after they got called on Williamson similar to the way they tried to turn the person's claim into a fake. All right, go ahead. I'm trying to get you. So, so, fair call is face. It satisfies not facial, but it fails on the exhaustion slash litigation from Williamson, which county concrete makes clear still applies to such claims. There are none. And I got one point I would disagree with my colleague on. If it's substantive due process, given the nature of the serious allegations that it made, it still amounts to five substance due process. And that would be given that this is in the land use context a subject to the exhaustion requirement as well. If there were facial, you wouldn't disagree. If there were a facial substance due process and equal protection, it'd be right. It's substantive due process, facial claim, could be right, they didn't do it. Thank you, Mr. Mr. Clark. Mr. Mollick. These are the rest of the day for your bottle, I believe. You may serve the rest of the day for your bottle. All right, now we'll try to hold you to six minutes. No. Let me start by making clear what I said before because we won't respect, I just heard in my answer, I didn't say it. In response to the questions, which Judge George and Judge George put, I said very clearly, we do say, this is a regulatory taking case. And that the ordinance of July 2005, on its face violates our constitutional rights. Has nothing to do with justice, just compensation. It is impervisible state action that stripped us of our rights. Still, why is it impervisible? Yes. It's impervisible because it was not done for any public purpose. My line is completely different. Let me address it. Well, I wasn't it done. I'm sorry. You did. I confess, this is not a field that I'm..