Good afternoon, Your Honor. May it please the Court. My name is Interesting. I represent the plaintiff of Pellent, John Lofton. This case is- My name is moving your microphone up a little closer. Please, thank you. This case is on all fours with arms strong versus status. Well, it's a private matter, as opposed to the government. That's one reason I thought that all fours. The names are different, too. But when we look at what arms strong versus status actually said about proving how do you show a likelihood of irreparable injury recurring? And it gave you two methods. I don't have not found any case that would restrict arms strong versus status to private, to public litigation. You have two methods to prove a continuing risk of recurring irreparable harm. You have a written policy, Verizon had a written policy which did not require disclosure of recording on these outgoing calls to wrong numbers. Because of that policy, my client's rights and the rights of other Californians were violated, the rights under the invasion of privacy act
. And you have- Armstrong also talked about repeated violations. Well, we have clearly the scope of the call center operations here. We have repeated violations. We know that that happened not just once, not twice, but a lot of times. The courts, district courts order, in this case, depends entirely on a distinction between constitutional standing and irreparable harm or prudentials, lootness. That's a really significant distinction, isn't it, Council? Well, it's interesting that you say that, Your Honor. Here's why I say it. When we look at irreparable harm or the likelihood of harm for purposes of standing, we're looking at the outset of the suit, right at the beginning. It's a temporal distinction that I'm making. That's different. At this point, what's the strongest, what did the district court in this case have? What was the strongest indication that there was a risk that this harm would be repeated? The strongest risk of harm is that they didn't change the policy. It's not just they didn't change the policy when they were sued. They only changed the policy after discovery was served, saying, hey, have you guys changed your policy? Is this still the same policy? So for purposes of my hypothetical, I'm fine with, with assuming that the policy could be changed again, absolutely, which I don't really think is contested in this case. And so my question is, again, at the time this injunctive relief was requested, well, this is the strongest indication the district court had that there was a risk that the policy would be reversed
. And again, I'm going to refer your honor to Armstrong, which talks about how I prove that. It gives me opportunities to prove that. And if you want to talk about other evidentiary facts, it's the timing of the change. They only changed the policy because the discovery was served. The distinction that we're drawing between constitutional standing and irreparable harm in this context, I'm going to suggest is not that clear. Armstrong reads system wide injunctive relief in the context of safety and wide injunctive relief, issues of standing, class certification, and type of priority and scope of injunctive relief are often intermingled. The neat distinction that's being drawn here between constitutional muteness and prudential muteness, it doesn't make a whole lot of sense. Why would you have a burden shifting for constitutional muteness? It gets people into court. But then if there's a voluntary cessation, they can't get relief. It doesn't make a sense. It leaves people stranded in court with no way to actually vindicate their rights. Kagan, but we're talking about a preliminary injunction here. Sotomayor, and so you know, you could, you can lose a motion for preliminary injunction and get injunctive into cleric or relief relief. Kagan, but that's hard to do
. Sotomayor, I agree with it. It's not impossible. Kagan, well, let's talk about that because I've got an obligation to prove injunctive relief for both at the preliminary injunctive stage and at the final relief stage. I don't see a distinction between the two. I think my obligation is the same throughout the end of the case. So I don't have other options to achieve injunctive relief. So let's say you go to trial on this. The motion for preliminary injunction is the orders affirmed you go to trial. What's your evidence? What evidence are you going to put on that would show the probability of future irreparable harm? I think I've discussed it, but it's the timing. I mean, that's it. What you have is on the table. I, in theory, I guess I could take discovery has been fraught in this case, and I hesitate to really talk about what I think I could get in the list of from the defendants in this case. That would be pure speculation, really. But there are two possibilities
. I mean, sometimes people come on a preliminary injunction, and that's all there is. And then you can stipulate that the preliminary is the same as the final. Then you answer to the judge, Thomas's question would be, well, there's no point in the trial. I put on everything I had. And then, you know, we, it's either enough for an injunction or it isn't. Or as in most cases, after a preliminary you go to trial. And then you, you're not bound by the results of the preliminary because you put on evidence and that changes the issues. What evidence do you need? I mean, I have no idea what your evidence will be. No, no, no, no, no, that's not the question, sir. You've got discovery. I assume you haven't done much discovery yet. You've got some. But, no, you, let me ask you this, is the discovery deadline closed? No, it has not. Do you anticipate it further discovery? Yeah, where I have a motion for sanctions pending Thursday
. There's been problems. Discovery sanction? Yes, ma'am. You've found? Yes, sir. The most. There's, as I say, there's been problems. Look, this court has given guidance about how do you go about proving a likelihood of continuing or recurring irreparable harm. The guidance is Armstrong. Right. So, there is a distinction in Armstrong in this case because Armstrong is primarily concerned with constitutional standing. And that's, that's different from satisfying the winter test. I, I mean, I appreciate your argument. You say you're out of court, have no recourse if we're talking about Armstrong in constitutional standing. But when you say you have no recourse in the context of plumber intraction, that's, I see that in different ways. So, if we don't have Armstrong, what method do private litigants have to prove a likelihood of recurring harm? And I've got to tell you, the only thing that I've found is Armstrong
. And, and let's also consider the aspects of the brief where we talked about the difficulties. One, we have, this is a hotly contested case and yada yada yada. I have to prove their state of mind, they're likely to recur. If a defendant is clever enough to voluntarily cease violentive conduct, they're also probably clever enough not to give you a whole lot of evidence that they intend to restart the conduct as soon as your case is over. Or maybe they don't intend to, that's the problem. I, they would have to be proof of that. Sometimes that's why the proof, burden of proof should be on them. How can that be for a plumber intraction? I mean, the burden is on you, on a plumber intraction. I, I agree that the burden is on me to show the prime of face a case. I believe I did that under Armstrong. If you guys are kicking Armstrong out from underneath me, I hope that you place it with something else. But there's also the issue of, yeah, the burden, the burden of persuasion in injunctive relief cases on, on a motion for preliminary injunction. The allocation of the burden of proof remains the same as it does a trial. You have Gonzalez versus, and I'm going to mangle this name of Centra Spirata, Supreme Court, toward a case saying, yes, you have the burden of proving your affirmative defense on a preliminary injunction
. And the same thing with the Ikeiri versus Tula Vista, School District. So the allocation of the burden of proof remains the same. The question then becomes, how do you prove a likelihood of recurring irreparable harm? I submit your honors that you gave us a road map in Armstrong versus Davis. If you're not going to permit private litigants to take that road map, you're going to hamstrung private litigants to a degree that I think is not what you necessarily want to do. It seems it will consider. In any event, I think your honors have possibly an obligation to come back and tell us, so what is the road map? How do you get there? Because you do have evidentiary problems. You're proving someone else's state of mind. And you can do that. You do that in fraud cases by circumstantial evidence. I would submit that as what Armstrong is. My time is running out, and I'd like to reserve what I have. Do your honors have remaining questions for me? No, we'll wait until you're revetal. Yes, sir. Thank you, Your Honors
. Charles Messer for the Defender and Applied Verizon Wireless. The key distinction of Armstrong is that an Armstrong, the difficult certified a class, and could then consider the class members potential claims for irreparable harm. In this case, no class has ever been certified. There's been no determination that Mr. Lawton's personal claims are typical or common to the claims of the Injunct of Relief class that he wants to represent. There's been no determination that he is an adequate class representative. And the class certification issue under Rule 23 is crucial to whether or not there is even a case or controversy between the class and Verizon Wireless because a Supreme Court ruled in an Indianapolis School Board case that until a class is certified, there is no case or controversy between the class and the defendant. So the plaintiff's references to alleged repeated recordings of others are not relevant to anything. And the district court properly focused on what are Mr. Lawton's individual claims? What is the basis for his individual claim before Injunct of Relief? And when a plaintiff files a complaint and is a search claim not only for damages, but also for Injunct of Relief and then waits 19 months to file a motion for a preliminary injunction, I think the Court's kept- But Council in fairness, his response to that is in the briefing as you know. He said that he, that's his representation and that's what we've got, that discovery was really a hard, hard fought battle in this case. And it's- Sotomayor, that's going to be very helpful. Okay. That's a summy's right
. But that goes to the whether or not the class was injured, not to whether he himself had any realistic threat of imminent harm. And for example, even the Armstrong case that he cites, pages 860 to 861, that's some very cogent language that supports Verizon Wireless. Moreover, whereas here a plaintiff seeks perspective in Injunct of Relief, he must demonstrate that he is realistically threatened by a repetition of the violation. Right. So his position, again, not just to make sure that I get your- the benefit of your response. His position is that he was called more than once after telling, you know, asking that they stop calling. Yes. And that continued and the policy was only changed after Verizon was sued and that it could be changed back. So what's your response to that? Well, a couple of responses. The calls were on Jun2, he called and was told, in fact, the calls were monitored recorded. And then when he was called on Jun46, don't call me. Jun7, he was called again. So those were those three calls. Right
. He filed suit a week later, Jun14, 2012. In August of 2012, he was provided a declaration of Craig Batnelli that had Verizon policy, that showed that, in fact, Verizon has a robust disclosure policy for its customers because all of its customers are going to have comfortable, private conversations, you know, this call may be monitored or recorded for quality purposes, but that long number calls would not have a disclosure. And that's as complete. And that's part of our really strongest agreement with the trial courts, really, on the merits of this, that to impose statutory damage to the $5,000 for a recording of this type, when there's no invasion of privacy, no even allegation that Mr. Walton had a reason to have an expectation of privacy is an impossible reading of that. But that aside, to get into your question, he, he, he, in August of 2012, about the old policy that he claims is unlawful. And yet, when I plaint the files, a case for, in Dr. Relief, you would expect a fairly prompt motion, at least on behalf of himself, saying, look, Your Honor, I think that there's an imminent threat of irreparable harm. Okay. So he delayed, and that's part of the hypothetical that I'm asking you to respond to. Whether it was because of a discovery battle or whatever it was, there was a delay. His position is that the policy could be changed right back, that the horizon only changed it because it was sued, and that it could be changed right back. I'm just looking for your response to that. The policy was changed after the Superior Court ruled that the service of their main exception did not apply, and that the policy was potentially unlawful. And to be you, there are no cases out of the courts of appeal or California Supreme Court physicist unsuddled area of law, and it really depends on future developments out of the California, a fellow court to the California Supreme Court as well. So are you all going to continue to oppose it? I'm sorry? Are you, are you going to continue to litigate the matter then? Are you, is that what you're telling us? You lost. Are you going to keep litigating it so you can change the rule? Is that what your position is today? We will not change the rule unless there is a clarification of law in our favor. Let me say that. Right. And so are you going to keep litigating the issue? Oh, yes. Who won? So if you win, then you will change it back. Good. What? It seems like you're, he's got a case then. That might change things. My, my, my earlier hypothetical positive that it seemed to me that, that what defendant or a plaintiff has shown is that Verizon got sued, Verizon changed the policy, and there wasn't any reason to think that Verizon wanted to change it back. If we're, Verizon is litigating this, going to Thomas' question. Sounds to me like Verizon wants to change it back. Verizon does not want to do a face-say, a liability or a class act or a class wide liability on these kinds of coins
. And to be you, there are no cases out of the courts of appeal or California Supreme Court physicist unsuddled area of law, and it really depends on future developments out of the California, a fellow court to the California Supreme Court as well. So are you all going to continue to oppose it? I'm sorry? Are you, are you going to continue to litigate the matter then? Are you, is that what you're telling us? You lost. Are you going to keep litigating it so you can change the rule? Is that what your position is today? We will not change the rule unless there is a clarification of law in our favor. Let me say that. Right. And so are you going to keep litigating the issue? Oh, yes. Who won? So if you win, then you will change it back. Good. What? It seems like you're, he's got a case then. That might change things. My, my, my earlier hypothetical positive that it seemed to me that, that what defendant or a plaintiff has shown is that Verizon got sued, Verizon changed the policy, and there wasn't any reason to think that Verizon wanted to change it back. If we're, Verizon is litigating this, going to Thomas' question. Sounds to me like Verizon wants to change it back. Verizon does not want to do a face-say, a liability or a class act or a class wide liability on these kinds of coins. But it's going to keep litigating this. The other choice is what? It's not a trick question. I just want to make sure that I understand that landscape. But you would like to be able to have the policy back, right? The one that you've abandoned. Verizon, why are us wants to have a policy that complies with California law? The policy that complies with California law? We want to have a policy that complies with California law. But what would you do if California, a public court said it was okay? Would you immediately go back? I don't know. I don't know, Your Honor. I'm, I'm, I'm out, Psychian, so I don't know. Well, that's, that was the unknown. Well, it's a, it's a, someone unknown, it's a known unknown, I suppose. Yeah. But you, you can appreciate the argument because in voluntary cessation cases a lot of times we, we, we, we living in so say, look, we are not going back. We've changed our policy and then you, then you gauge the, the potential that could they change back to policy. What they're saying, if I understand what you're saying, your argument is, look, the State Court ruled we, we feel we might be at risk for changing our policy
. But it's going to keep litigating this. The other choice is what? It's not a trick question. I just want to make sure that I understand that landscape. But you would like to be able to have the policy back, right? The one that you've abandoned. Verizon, why are us wants to have a policy that complies with California law? The policy that complies with California law? We want to have a policy that complies with California law. But what would you do if California, a public court said it was okay? Would you immediately go back? I don't know. I don't know, Your Honor. I'm, I'm, I'm out, Psychian, so I don't know. Well, that's, that was the unknown. Well, it's a, it's a, someone unknown, it's a known unknown, I suppose. Yeah. But you, you can appreciate the argument because in voluntary cessation cases a lot of times we, we, we, we living in so say, look, we are not going back. We've changed our policy and then you, then you gauge the, the potential that could they change back to policy. What they're saying, if I understand what you're saying, your argument is, look, the State Court ruled we, we feel we might be at risk for changing our policy. But if the, if the State goes in a different direction, we're going to go back. Or that there's a likelihood. But, but also I don't, I, I think there's an undue emphasis, Franklin, on the voluntary cessation argument because there are, because the, the, the test on appeal should be, are there facts in the record to support the district court's determination? And there are ample facts to say that there was no, imminent threat of irreparable harm to Mr. Loft and based on fast end-dependent of the policy. He was not getting the old policy was in effect until March the 2013. He was not called again. He, and he didn't the legitimacy, there was a threat that he would be called again. And there's evidence that the electoral block this telephone number and that Verizon Wireless terminated the contract of Collector and that Verizon Wireless has no motive to, wasn't even trying to call law for trying to call a, a customer named KB. So there is independent evidence in the record that supports, it just records ruling. And you know, it's always possible for an appellant to, to cherry pick a record and say, well, I can select a record that will, that could possibly support a different result. But I don't think that that is the, is a rule on, on review of a ruling on preliminary junction, particularly a factual finding, is there a, is there an imminent threat of irreparable harm to the name to point of? I take your point. Let me ask you another question. That's probably one of your prior responses. I gather that, from your response, that Verizon has only changed this policy as to the state of California and no one else in the nation
. But if the, if the State goes in a different direction, we're going to go back. Or that there's a likelihood. But, but also I don't, I, I think there's an undue emphasis, Franklin, on the voluntary cessation argument because there are, because the, the, the test on appeal should be, are there facts in the record to support the district court's determination? And there are ample facts to say that there was no, imminent threat of irreparable harm to Mr. Loft and based on fast end-dependent of the policy. He was not getting the old policy was in effect until March the 2013. He was not called again. He, and he didn't the legitimacy, there was a threat that he would be called again. And there's evidence that the electoral block this telephone number and that Verizon Wireless terminated the contract of Collector and that Verizon Wireless has no motive to, wasn't even trying to call law for trying to call a, a customer named KB. So there is independent evidence in the record that supports, it just records ruling. And you know, it's always possible for an appellant to, to cherry pick a record and say, well, I can select a record that will, that could possibly support a different result. But I don't think that that is the, is a rule on, on review of a ruling on preliminary junction, particularly a factual finding, is there a, is there an imminent threat of irreparable harm to the name to point of? I take your point. Let me ask you another question. That's probably one of your prior responses. I gather that, from your response, that Verizon has only changed this policy as to the state of California and no one else in the nation. No, it's national. So would you explain your prior answer when you said you want to carve out for California? Well, actually, you see, that's, that's actually an, and at some point, I, I, I not thought of. Because I'm skeptical, but they would ever have state by state policies. Because the company's too big and it's too unmanageable. And so, actually, that, and now that you point that out in honor, I would say it may be very unwieldy to change, because the company does not have state-specific policies on this. Right. But would you explain, and about 35 states are two-parties of states? I take your answer, but what did you mean earlier when you said that you wanted to carve out for California? I don't want to carve out for California. I did not mean to, to say that we wanted to carve out for California. My question was, are we going to pick the question to me that was trying to answer in a fourth-right way is are we going to continue to litigate the issue of whether or not the old policy violated the California Act? The answer is yes. Yes, and then, and perhaps you spoke to hastily, but I thought your other answer was, we want, we want the law just to apply to California and nowhere else. Well, we want, what we hope is that the California Court's construed the invasion of privacy act in the way that we believe that it's intended to really protect the tangible privacy rights, not these wrong number calls or a call to my son who answers my cell phone and my son hands it to me, and let's call maybe monitor recorded, and now he has to claim for $5,000. I don't think that's plausible reading, but that's the class. But the point of, but your, but your, but your, just as Thomas, I think you're point about the state-specific nature is an excellent one because the policies are national. And so, even if my dream comes true, and I win this case on my building California, I'm skeptical without a cause of changing in the national policy because it's just, it's not how Verizon does it, and there are a lot of other states with similar statutes
. No, it's national. So would you explain your prior answer when you said you want to carve out for California? Well, actually, you see, that's, that's actually an, and at some point, I, I, I not thought of. Because I'm skeptical, but they would ever have state by state policies. Because the company's too big and it's too unmanageable. And so, actually, that, and now that you point that out in honor, I would say it may be very unwieldy to change, because the company does not have state-specific policies on this. Right. But would you explain, and about 35 states are two-parties of states? I take your answer, but what did you mean earlier when you said that you wanted to carve out for California? I don't want to carve out for California. I did not mean to, to say that we wanted to carve out for California. My question was, are we going to pick the question to me that was trying to answer in a fourth-right way is are we going to continue to litigate the issue of whether or not the old policy violated the California Act? The answer is yes. Yes, and then, and perhaps you spoke to hastily, but I thought your other answer was, we want, we want the law just to apply to California and nowhere else. Well, we want, what we hope is that the California Court's construed the invasion of privacy act in the way that we believe that it's intended to really protect the tangible privacy rights, not these wrong number calls or a call to my son who answers my cell phone and my son hands it to me, and let's call maybe monitor recorded, and now he has to claim for $5,000. I don't think that's plausible reading, but that's the class. But the point of, but your, but your, but your, just as Thomas, I think you're point about the state-specific nature is an excellent one because the policies are national. And so, even if my dream comes true, and I win this case on my building California, I'm skeptical without a cause of changing in the national policy because it's just, it's not how Verizon does it, and there are a lot of other states with similar statutes. Is that in the record? I'm sorry? Is that in the record, that point, and maybe we've taken your field here, but that this would be, this would be national policy, not a state-specific policy, do we have that anywhere? It is in my 12-B6 motion to dismiss. Thank you. And, after any other questions, Your Honor, I will submit. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. I know your Honor, I have other questions. I'd like to address a couple of points first. Verizon puts great weight on Mr. Lofton's personal interest in a disclosure. I'm going to suggest the nature of the interest here where it's an undisclosed recording when a call to a wrong number, most of those people are not going to know that they've been injured. And so- I accept your point, but the class doesn't certify yet, so we just have to look at it. Well, you have Hawkins versus Campret Cassani, which talks about when you have a class membership that's so inherently transitory, that there's not enough time to move for class certification before the class reps. Personal interest expires
. Is that in the record? I'm sorry? Is that in the record, that point, and maybe we've taken your field here, but that this would be, this would be national policy, not a state-specific policy, do we have that anywhere? It is in my 12-B6 motion to dismiss. Thank you. And, after any other questions, Your Honor, I will submit. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. I know your Honor, I have other questions. I'd like to address a couple of points first. Verizon puts great weight on Mr. Lofton's personal interest in a disclosure. I'm going to suggest the nature of the interest here where it's an undisclosed recording when a call to a wrong number, most of those people are not going to know that they've been injured. And so- I accept your point, but the class doesn't certify yet, so we just have to look at it. Well, you have Hawkins versus Campret Cassani, which talks about when you have a class membership that's so inherently transitory, that there's not enough time to move for class certification before the class reps. Personal interest expires. And I'd submit to you that's what's happened here in part because of the discovery problems that we've run into. We couldn't move. We haven't still haven't been able to move for class certification. You know, I don't know if it helps to submit the motion for sanctions that kind of goes through the problems we've had with classification discovery, but it's been tremendous. It has been a hard-fought hammer and tongue bow. If you have that situation, it falls within the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to standing. To standing. Yeah. What do you have anything with respect to your client alone that would indicate that he's an imminent danger of this reoccurring other than what you have in your brief? Sure. Look, he has this number that has been skipped traced several times. He's gotten other calls from other people. It is possible that somebody's skipped traces the person they're trying to find and pulls up with his number again. That could happen. It happened before
. And I'd submit to you that's what's happened here in part because of the discovery problems that we've run into. We couldn't move. We haven't still haven't been able to move for class certification. You know, I don't know if it helps to submit the motion for sanctions that kind of goes through the problems we've had with classification discovery, but it's been tremendous. It has been a hard-fought hammer and tongue bow. If you have that situation, it falls within the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to standing. To standing. Yeah. What do you have anything with respect to your client alone that would indicate that he's an imminent danger of this reoccurring other than what you have in your brief? Sure. Look, he has this number that has been skipped traced several times. He's gotten other calls from other people. It is possible that somebody's skipped traces the person they're trying to find and pulls up with his number again. That could happen. It happened before. It could happen again. We know there's been other people calling for that individual. That's not on the record because, again, I thought I could rely on Armstrong versus Davis. But that tells me that your client has a cell phone number that used to belong to somebody who doesn't pay his bills. I'm not even sure. It doesn't tell me that Verizon is likely to re-institute its policy. It doesn't relate to its specific policy. That's true. The only people who can tell you whether or not Verizon is going to revert its policy is Verizon. Let's assume that the sake of argument is the sake of argument that Verizon does change its policy back. Your client is not a Verizon customer. So what is the likelihood of irreparable harm to him in the future? They call them once. They can certainly skip traces number and call them again. What's more, it's a class action
. It could happen again. We know there's been other people calling for that individual. That's not on the record because, again, I thought I could rely on Armstrong versus Davis. But that tells me that your client has a cell phone number that used to belong to somebody who doesn't pay his bills. I'm not even sure. It doesn't tell me that Verizon is likely to re-institute its policy. It doesn't relate to its specific policy. That's true. The only people who can tell you whether or not Verizon is going to revert its policy is Verizon. Let's assume that the sake of argument is the sake of argument that Verizon does change its policy back. Your client is not a Verizon customer. So what is the likelihood of irreparable harm to him in the future? They call them once. They can certainly skip traces number and call them again. What's more, it's a class action. You have to consider not just him. But look, if you just focus on his relief, there is no class representative. And if there's no class representative, there's no injunctive relief for all the other people that they're going to call, all the other wrong numbers, they're going to call it. It's a massive call center operation operated with something like, 27 different debt collectors. Sotomayor, you're in a position that the district court was required to consider these folks who aren't yet in this uncertified class. At the time she was looking at whether your client had satisfied the winter factors, or is she supposed to look at your client's claim? I think she has to look at everybody's claim because it's a class action. If I may, one of the other things that we've talked about in the briefs is that there is an abuse of discretion if you fail to consider all the pertinent factors. Park Davis and Korakorp and all those other cases where they counsel district courts look, don't presume that a voluntary change in policy means that the case is over. It means that there's no more need for a juctive relief. You have to look at the timing and the motivation. And I would suggest if you look at those cases, they set a standard where they have to look at the motivation. And that wasn't done here, where if it was done, there's not sufficient record to show that it was done. And for those reasons, there is a separate grounds for reversal. Do you have any case that says whether it is proper, that it is proper to consider the other members of the future class when there is not yet been a class? I think that's Hawkins versus Camp Racket Sounding, where, you know, the idea is if you have a class and conquer Hawkins, it was pretrial detention where nobody stays in that situation for very long
. You have to consider not just him. But look, if you just focus on his relief, there is no class representative. And if there's no class representative, there's no injunctive relief for all the other people that they're going to call, all the other wrong numbers, they're going to call it. It's a massive call center operation operated with something like, 27 different debt collectors. Sotomayor, you're in a position that the district court was required to consider these folks who aren't yet in this uncertified class. At the time she was looking at whether your client had satisfied the winter factors, or is she supposed to look at your client's claim? I think she has to look at everybody's claim because it's a class action. If I may, one of the other things that we've talked about in the briefs is that there is an abuse of discretion if you fail to consider all the pertinent factors. Park Davis and Korakorp and all those other cases where they counsel district courts look, don't presume that a voluntary change in policy means that the case is over. It means that there's no more need for a juctive relief. You have to look at the timing and the motivation. And I would suggest if you look at those cases, they set a standard where they have to look at the motivation. And that wasn't done here, where if it was done, there's not sufficient record to show that it was done. And for those reasons, there is a separate grounds for reversal. Do you have any case that says whether it is proper, that it is proper to consider the other members of the future class when there is not yet been a class? I think that's Hawkins versus Camp Racket Sounding, where, you know, the idea is if you have a class and conquer Hawkins, it was pretrial detention where nobody stays in that situation for very long. And so the idea is if you're only in pretrial detention for a day or an hour, there's no way to give relief to those people. You have to have, consider, some way to give relief to those people. And that's the issue that we're dealing with here. A lot of these people aren't going to know that they were recorded. Your Honours, I'll have to move a little more time. If you don't provide some way forward, there is no means for anyone to plausibly achieve and jump to believe, which is a primary goal of this litigation to stop these practices. Mr. Master Complains, you know, they cost $5,000. That's what the statute sets. But they set that price simply because you can't really put a price on invading somebody's privacy. If that's the only remedy these people get, you can have some scofflaw out there, presumably very wealthy, and he's just buying a license to violate the law. I'm going to suggest you that's not the jurisprudence we want to have. We want to be able to stop people who violate the law. Thank you, Your Honours
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