I appreciate your enthusiasm. Thank you Chief Judge Rackler. And may it please the court. My name is Stephen Goldblatt. I'm a professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center. And I was assigned by the court to represent Mr. Muhammad in this petition for review. The first issue I would like to raise this morning is whether or not Mr. Muhammad is removable. That turns on the question of whether or not his conviction under Virginia State law for a misdemeanor failure to register as a sex offender is a crime involving moral turpitude. And I would ask the court to conclude that it is not and join the third and the 10 circuits, both of which have reviewed this issue before this court has and concluded that even with Chevron deference this is an unreasonable interpretation of what is a crime involving moral turpitude. And if the court so holds that Mr. Muhammad is not removable. Start with the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude, which is the BIA's definition of it, not what I'm asking the court to take, but they have defined it as inherently base, vile or depraved and contrary to accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or two societies. We also know that we're using the categorical approach, which means in order for this crime to be a crime involving moral turpitude, it must necessarily meet the BIA's own definition
. It is a regulatory offense. It is prophylactic in its form. And it is very easy to come up with any number of situations where it simply is not a crime involving moral turpitude. What the BIA essentially did in its reasoning that was rejected by the two circuits that looked at it, essentially equated the failure to register with the underlying crimes that are involved with your sexual offenses. It's just not a sexual offense. It is a registration. It's not even in the criminal code in Virginia. And these laws are all over the country. They're required by SORNA. And in both instances, in both the third and the 10th circuit, they both had a knowing component, which this one does as well. But that doesn't... You don't need that argument whether it's knowing or not, because even a traffic violation can be done knowing or any kind of regulation going on one way street or making a legal U-turn
. You're doing it deliberately. It doesn't make it a crime moral turpitude. That's correct, good thing. It seems to me if you take away the law itself and see whether the underlying conduct would violate a moral value, then you have a crime involving moral turpitude. That's correct. And in this case, if you took away the statute, the idea that you have to register is not a moral norm. That's correct. But I don't think it turns on whether the registration is deliberate or not. It seems to me if your argument has to be that the conduct itself is registration, which is an administrative function and not it doesn't involve morality. That's correct, Judge Neymar. And the only thing to add to it, and then I'm basically... I'm going to stop
. It has to necessarily be a crime involving moral turpitude. It's not enough to just come up with a situation where that might work. That's not enough. And that the Supreme Court has made clear. This Court made the same thing clear in Prudenceo. I mean, that's settled law at this point. It's not a crime involving moral turpitude. And when you realize the consequences, he's been in detention for three years on this basis. Well, like a word of crime of moral turpitude. Yeah, I understand what you're saying is that because your view of criminal turpitude is unjustly detained. But obviously, if it... To be sure
. The BIA follows its own rulings. He's there legally until we say otherwise, I get it. To be sure. My only point is the way the analysis that they used in Tobar Lobo and evaluating whether it's reasonable, it's just not reasonable. And I'm going to stop now because the both attempts and the third circus have laid it out. We've laid it out in our brief. I don't... I don't think I can add anything to it at this point. It's just a very strong argument. This is unreasonable law. And it should be taken off the books as soon as possible. That would then get me
... Assuming we lose on that issue, you then have to look at his sexual battery conviction. And the question in the court is... You went on that, though. We're done. We're done. And the case is over. But if some reason, we lose on that issue, the other issue that we were asked to brief is the question of whether or not sexual battery in Virginia was properly analyzed by the BIA as a modified... Under the modified categorical approach
. We think it is absolutely clear under royal. And if you look at the statutory instructions that are used in Virginia, this isn't a divisible offense. It is a... It offenses... It's a touching that takes place by force, threat, intimidation, or ruse. They are separated by commas. We know that under royal. We know that under the camp. You have to look and see whether they're.
.. Separate elements or their means. And... What's the most benign offense that you think is not a moral opportunity? It seems to me, even if you trick someone into a situation that's called sexual abuse, that violates a moral, no matter whether it's a statute or not, doesn't it? That's quite correct, Judge Neymar, but that's crime involving moral turpitude. Now we're talking about aggravated felonies and crimes of violence. Of course, I got you. So we're into crime of violence now. But we can see that he has that one. It is a CIA. You do have that argument on the..
. But on this, it is just not a crime of violence and by any definition. And what you look for and you have it in the registration crime, what you're looking for for separate elements, you're looking for brackets and semi-colons. That is the way when you look at jury instructions, you can see where there's a choice to be made. There are no brackets or semi-colons here. It's force intimidation. There's one of those areas that gets more confusing year after year. There are as the cases come out, what's divisible and what's not divisible, what's a separate crime, what are elements, what are means, seems to me it's a little bit like the way you look at it. I'm not going to argue with you. This is a personal observation. Yes, it's not a legal one. But it's one of those things where the Supreme Court has come down and said, this is what you do, so we do it. But I think in this case, actually, despite all the problems that there are, this isn't one of them. This to me is not a divisible offense. The Rue's element was added, I think, in 1997, and it's just common as between for it
. It's disjunctive for ways that are going to be committed. That to me is the least persuasive way to argue that. The most persuasive way is whether a jury has to agree on the means. If the jury can pick any one of the means and they can be discreet, members of the jury coming to a verdict, then it's a single crime. But the commas don't help much, because all you have to do is put in separate sections. And all of a sudden, you're saying because it doesn't have A, B, C, D, rather it has commas. It's not separate crimes. So I don't think the structure itself is as persuasive as the notion as how the state treats it. And when you go to the jury apparently in Virginia, a jury could convict on this crime by any one of those words, couldn't they? But the way we're drawing that is from the jury. In other words, I think we're both in a sense, we're both saying the same thing. No, but that's your better argument than the commas business. But you've got to, in other words, and again, perhaps this is going back to this is what basically the camp tells us to do is look at this provision in the statute and decide whether it is more different means to do the same thing or four separate elements to be elected. No election was major. If you look at the, what amounts to the judgment of conviction here, he's convicted of doing it by any one of the four means
. And so, which is consistent with a view that it was never divided, it's not divisible. If you get to this issue, we win on that one as well. But that would be cancellation removal. That would require remand. If he is not removable, that should be vacated and then he can be released. And if they refer the questions. Okay, thank you. Let's hear from Mr. Joseph. Good morning, Your Honours. May I please the court, Bernard Joseph, on behalf of the Attorney General. I'd like to apologize in advance my allergies have been bothering me and I woke up and have less than my full voice. There are two issues in this case. The first issue is whether the petitioner's removable is charged for failing to register as a sex offender, which would be a second crime involving moral perpetude, not arising how the same scheme of criminal life. If you want to get some water, be on the agenda. You know, take it up there with you. More and more have been talking about it. Well, I have allergies too, so I sympathize with your struggle. Again, the petitioner concedes that the sexual battery is a crime involving moral perpetude. Therefore, the issue is whether or not the failure to register as a sex offender is a crime against moral perpetude. The government contends that this court, giving the board's presidential decision a matter of Tobar Lobo, the Chevron deference that should be accorded, should disagree with the third and the tenth and find that. I'm trying to figure out how there is a moral issue when you tell somebody to be after register. Register for the draft, register for anything, a file report, a file attach return. These all can be done deliberately and cause violations of law, which in and of itself may be moral, but I think you don't look at the crime that makes it. You have to ask the crime whether the crime involves moral perpetude. So you set aside the prohibition of the crime and see whether there's any moral component in failing to register. And I just have very, it's very difficult for me to figure that that isn't anything more than an administrative function to assist in enforcing the sex laws and following people who have passed violations but the registration requirement. And that's all that's involved here
. If you want to get some water, be on the agenda. You know, take it up there with you. More and more have been talking about it. Well, I have allergies too, so I sympathize with your struggle. Again, the petitioner concedes that the sexual battery is a crime involving moral perpetude. Therefore, the issue is whether or not the failure to register as a sex offender is a crime against moral perpetude. The government contends that this court, giving the board's presidential decision a matter of Tobar Lobo, the Chevron deference that should be accorded, should disagree with the third and the tenth and find that. I'm trying to figure out how there is a moral issue when you tell somebody to be after register. Register for the draft, register for anything, a file report, a file attach return. These all can be done deliberately and cause violations of law, which in and of itself may be moral, but I think you don't look at the crime that makes it. You have to ask the crime whether the crime involves moral perpetude. So you set aside the prohibition of the crime and see whether there's any moral component in failing to register. And I just have very, it's very difficult for me to figure that that isn't anything more than an administrative function to assist in enforcing the sex laws and following people who have passed violations but the registration requirement. And that's all that's involved here. How you, what argument can be made that that's a moral norm which can be subject to perpetude, debasement. And the INS just seemed to say because it involves sex. Your past conduct was sexual. It's such an offensive conduct in societies, therefore more, but that's pretty loosey goosey, isn't it? I believe that what the board decided was that when you look at the reasons that you need to register as a sex offender, which help prevent recidivism and also a law enforcement based on... Well, that's not the conduct prohibited. And what's the language in Toba, Lobo, where they include, I think they use some expansive language about the... the offensiveness of sexual conduct in society. Yeah, you can't find it. I don't want to take up your time. Well, I'll find it
. How you, what argument can be made that that's a moral norm which can be subject to perpetude, debasement. And the INS just seemed to say because it involves sex. Your past conduct was sexual. It's such an offensive conduct in societies, therefore more, but that's pretty loosey goosey, isn't it? I believe that what the board decided was that when you look at the reasons that you need to register as a sex offender, which help prevent recidivism and also a law enforcement based on... Well, that's not the conduct prohibited. And what's the language in Toba, Lobo, where they include, I think they use some expansive language about the... the offensiveness of sexual conduct in society. Yeah, you can't find it. I don't want to take up your time. Well, I'll find it. Here, honor. The board here relied on Toba, Lobo, and pointed out that there are no fourth circuit cases that are to the contrary. It claims like. So, and again, the board's reasoning was that, because of the underlying offense, the failure to register, is a violation. It does violate society morals. And duties... The failure to register. The failure to register would violate that. What moral norm is that a register, if there's no statute that says you have to? Is there an aspect of morality and moral norm that society has recognized in registration? I would say that there is an norm to allow to put people on alert or dangerous people. That isn't that. The statute imposes registration, nothing more. The registration would put society on alert that one, there's a sex offender out there
. Here, honor. The board here relied on Toba, Lobo, and pointed out that there are no fourth circuit cases that are to the contrary. It claims like. So, and again, the board's reasoning was that, because of the underlying offense, the failure to register, is a violation. It does violate society morals. And duties... The failure to register. The failure to register would violate that. What moral norm is that a register, if there's no statute that says you have to? Is there an aspect of morality and moral norm that society has recognized in registration? I would say that there is an norm to allow to put people on alert or dangerous people. That isn't that. The statute imposes registration, nothing more. The registration would put society on alert that one, there's a sex offender out there. And two, it would also aid in the law enforcement and the prevention of recidivism. If the court finds that the failure to register as a sex offender is not a crime of loathing moral perpetude, then petitioners no longer removable. And the case should be remanded to the board for proceedings consistent with that opinion. However, the government can... You agreed with the petitioner that if we were to prove concluded, it doesn't involve moral perpetutes them. That ends with an act of murder. Correct. There's nothing else left in the case. If there aren't two CIMTs, the petitioner is not removable. It's remanded to the board and the board consistent with this opinion. It does have a basis for removing, building, and determining the proceedings. However, should the court decide that it is a crime involving moral perpetude, the government contends that at this point, the case should be remanded back to the board for the board to determine based on its new decision in matter of charez and the intervening decision in royal, whether or not it actually is an aggravative felony
. And two, it would also aid in the law enforcement and the prevention of recidivism. If the court finds that the failure to register as a sex offender is not a crime of loathing moral perpetude, then petitioners no longer removable. And the case should be remanded to the board for proceedings consistent with that opinion. However, the government can... You agreed with the petitioner that if we were to prove concluded, it doesn't involve moral perpetutes them. That ends with an act of murder. Correct. There's nothing else left in the case. If there aren't two CIMTs, the petitioner is not removable. It's remanded to the board and the board consistent with this opinion. It does have a basis for removing, building, and determining the proceedings. However, should the court decide that it is a crime involving moral perpetude, the government contends that at this point, the case should be remanded back to the board for the board to determine based on its new decision in matter of charez and the intervening decision in royal, whether or not it actually is an aggravative felony. If the... It's important at this point to recognize a matter of charez. Unlike the board decision, in our case, dealt with procedures to determine how to determine whether or not a violation of a state law is an aggravative felony. And so at this juncture, it's important, I think, to let the board in the first instance look at this crime and determine whether or not it is an aggravative felony. If the board decides that it is not, the case would have to be remanded in any event to go forward on relief to determine whether or not the petitioner can satisfy the other requirements necessary for cancellation of removal. The board didn't decide this issue. The issue of means and jury anonymity? It did not. We have a generally problem that instead of us deciding that, we'd have to send it back. Correct. So at this point, the government's position is if the court finds that a felony to register as a sex offender was the second CIT, which renders petitioner removable, that the case should be remanded back to the board for the board to determine in the first instance whether under this court's decision of royal or the board's decision of matter of charez, which DHS is petitioning for rehearing on bonk with the board. This is an aggravative felony. So at this point, I think it's premature for the court to roll on it because the board in our case did not make any findings concerning whether it's an aggravative felony in light of the new decisions
. If the... It's important at this point to recognize a matter of charez. Unlike the board decision, in our case, dealt with procedures to determine how to determine whether or not a violation of a state law is an aggravative felony. And so at this juncture, it's important, I think, to let the board in the first instance look at this crime and determine whether or not it is an aggravative felony. If the board decides that it is not, the case would have to be remanded in any event to go forward on relief to determine whether or not the petitioner can satisfy the other requirements necessary for cancellation of removal. The board didn't decide this issue. The issue of means and jury anonymity? It did not. We have a generally problem that instead of us deciding that, we'd have to send it back. Correct. So at this point, the government's position is if the court finds that a felony to register as a sex offender was the second CIT, which renders petitioner removable, that the case should be remanded back to the board for the board to determine in the first instance whether under this court's decision of royal or the board's decision of matter of charez, which DHS is petitioning for rehearing on bonk with the board. This is an aggravative felony. So at this point, I think it's premature for the court to roll on it because the board in our case did not make any findings concerning whether it's an aggravative felony in light of the new decisions. Thank you. If there are no further questions. Thank you, Mr. President. Go ahead. Very quickly, there's no Chenery issue here. The board found that it was a divisible crime. The IJ found it was a divisible crime. It's the only way it could find that it was an aggravated felony to begin with because it had to get ruse out of it. Ruse stays in it. It's not an aggravated felony using a categorical approach. So the issue has been decided. They changed the way they look at it. But we're not talking of
. Thank you. If there are no further questions. Thank you, Mr. President. Go ahead. Very quickly, there's no Chenery issue here. The board found that it was a divisible crime. The IJ found it was a divisible crime. It's the only way it could find that it was an aggravated felony to begin with because it had to get ruse out of it. Ruse stays in it. It's not an aggravated felony using a categorical approach. So the issue has been decided. They changed the way they look at it. But we're not talking of... There's enough there that we... If we rule against your first issue, then we have to reach the... I think you have to reach the legal issue. If you agree with us, then you'd have to remand it back for the discretionary part of cancellation removal. But the question whether it's a divisible offense or not is that you don't defer on that anyway. No, but if they had not decided or arrested them, we'd have to let them do it the first time. That's correct. They decided what they're saying now is we changed the way we decide these things
... There's enough there that we... If we rule against your first issue, then we have to reach the... I think you have to reach the legal issue. If you agree with us, then you'd have to remand it back for the discretionary part of cancellation removal. But the question whether it's a divisible offense or not is that you don't defer on that anyway. No, but if they had not decided or arrested them, we'd have to let them do it the first time. That's correct. They decided what they're saying now is we changed the way we decide these things. And in fairness, the camp was decided while it was pending and Royal came out afterwards. But they unquestionably had to reach the divisibility question order to decide it. The only thing I would say, and I don't do this normally, I may just say it, on the first issue, I don't think there is a plausible basis for upholding Tobar Lobo. I haven't heard anything today from the government. It's the same reasoning that's in Tobar Lobo. No court has accepted that. He's been in custody for three years. If there's any possibility of the court, if the court agrees, if there's any way to issue order as soon as possible vacating the final order of removal so we can try and get him released, there's a habeas petition pending that we're not representing him, but there is one pending in Virginia as a federal court as well. But this has really been three years and this is what's holding him in. And if there's any way to issue an order with an opinion to follow, we would ask that that be done. Any other questions? Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Govlog. We appreciate very much your undertaking representation this client
. And in fairness, the camp was decided while it was pending and Royal came out afterwards. But they unquestionably had to reach the divisibility question order to decide it. The only thing I would say, and I don't do this normally, I may just say it, on the first issue, I don't think there is a plausible basis for upholding Tobar Lobo. I haven't heard anything today from the government. It's the same reasoning that's in Tobar Lobo. No court has accepted that. He's been in custody for three years. If there's any possibility of the court, if the court agrees, if there's any way to issue order as soon as possible vacating the final order of removal so we can try and get him released, there's a habeas petition pending that we're not representing him, but there is one pending in Virginia as a federal court as well. But this has really been three years and this is what's holding him in. And if there's any way to issue an order with an opinion to follow, we would ask that that be done. Any other questions? Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Govlog. We appreciate very much your undertaking representation this client. I guess it's too early in the school year for you to give him this to him. I've gotten too old to take a student this early in the school year and get them ready for argument. It was nothing to get me ready for argument. I wasn't about that. So we appreciate you're taking it. Thank you, responsibility on yourself. Thank you very much. Thank you. You want to keep going, Paul? You want to keep going? Okay, we'll come back in Greek Council.
I appreciate your enthusiasm. Thank you Chief Judge Rackler. And may it please the court. My name is Stephen Goldblatt. I'm a professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center. And I was assigned by the court to represent Mr. Muhammad in this petition for review. The first issue I would like to raise this morning is whether or not Mr. Muhammad is removable. That turns on the question of whether or not his conviction under Virginia State law for a misdemeanor failure to register as a sex offender is a crime involving moral turpitude. And I would ask the court to conclude that it is not and join the third and the 10 circuits, both of which have reviewed this issue before this court has and concluded that even with Chevron deference this is an unreasonable interpretation of what is a crime involving moral turpitude. And if the court so holds that Mr. Muhammad is not removable. Start with the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude, which is the BIA's definition of it, not what I'm asking the court to take, but they have defined it as inherently base, vile or depraved and contrary to accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or two societies. We also know that we're using the categorical approach, which means in order for this crime to be a crime involving moral turpitude, it must necessarily meet the BIA's own definition. It is a regulatory offense. It is prophylactic in its form. And it is very easy to come up with any number of situations where it simply is not a crime involving moral turpitude. What the BIA essentially did in its reasoning that was rejected by the two circuits that looked at it, essentially equated the failure to register with the underlying crimes that are involved with your sexual offenses. It's just not a sexual offense. It is a registration. It's not even in the criminal code in Virginia. And these laws are all over the country. They're required by SORNA. And in both instances, in both the third and the 10th circuit, they both had a knowing component, which this one does as well. But that doesn't... You don't need that argument whether it's knowing or not, because even a traffic violation can be done knowing or any kind of regulation going on one way street or making a legal U-turn. You're doing it deliberately. It doesn't make it a crime moral turpitude. That's correct, good thing. It seems to me if you take away the law itself and see whether the underlying conduct would violate a moral value, then you have a crime involving moral turpitude. That's correct. And in this case, if you took away the statute, the idea that you have to register is not a moral norm. That's correct. But I don't think it turns on whether the registration is deliberate or not. It seems to me if your argument has to be that the conduct itself is registration, which is an administrative function and not it doesn't involve morality. That's correct, Judge Neymar. And the only thing to add to it, and then I'm basically... I'm going to stop. It has to necessarily be a crime involving moral turpitude. It's not enough to just come up with a situation where that might work. That's not enough. And that the Supreme Court has made clear. This Court made the same thing clear in Prudenceo. I mean, that's settled law at this point. It's not a crime involving moral turpitude. And when you realize the consequences, he's been in detention for three years on this basis. Well, like a word of crime of moral turpitude. Yeah, I understand what you're saying is that because your view of criminal turpitude is unjustly detained. But obviously, if it... To be sure. The BIA follows its own rulings. He's there legally until we say otherwise, I get it. To be sure. My only point is the way the analysis that they used in Tobar Lobo and evaluating whether it's reasonable, it's just not reasonable. And I'm going to stop now because the both attempts and the third circus have laid it out. We've laid it out in our brief. I don't... I don't think I can add anything to it at this point. It's just a very strong argument. This is unreasonable law. And it should be taken off the books as soon as possible. That would then get me... Assuming we lose on that issue, you then have to look at his sexual battery conviction. And the question in the court is... You went on that, though. We're done. We're done. And the case is over. But if some reason, we lose on that issue, the other issue that we were asked to brief is the question of whether or not sexual battery in Virginia was properly analyzed by the BIA as a modified... Under the modified categorical approach. We think it is absolutely clear under royal. And if you look at the statutory instructions that are used in Virginia, this isn't a divisible offense. It is a... It offenses... It's a touching that takes place by force, threat, intimidation, or ruse. They are separated by commas. We know that under royal. We know that under the camp. You have to look and see whether they're... Separate elements or their means. And... What's the most benign offense that you think is not a moral opportunity? It seems to me, even if you trick someone into a situation that's called sexual abuse, that violates a moral, no matter whether it's a statute or not, doesn't it? That's quite correct, Judge Neymar, but that's crime involving moral turpitude. Now we're talking about aggravated felonies and crimes of violence. Of course, I got you. So we're into crime of violence now. But we can see that he has that one. It is a CIA. You do have that argument on the... But on this, it is just not a crime of violence and by any definition. And what you look for and you have it in the registration crime, what you're looking for for separate elements, you're looking for brackets and semi-colons. That is the way when you look at jury instructions, you can see where there's a choice to be made. There are no brackets or semi-colons here. It's force intimidation. There's one of those areas that gets more confusing year after year. There are as the cases come out, what's divisible and what's not divisible, what's a separate crime, what are elements, what are means, seems to me it's a little bit like the way you look at it. I'm not going to argue with you. This is a personal observation. Yes, it's not a legal one. But it's one of those things where the Supreme Court has come down and said, this is what you do, so we do it. But I think in this case, actually, despite all the problems that there are, this isn't one of them. This to me is not a divisible offense. The Rue's element was added, I think, in 1997, and it's just common as between for it. It's disjunctive for ways that are going to be committed. That to me is the least persuasive way to argue that. The most persuasive way is whether a jury has to agree on the means. If the jury can pick any one of the means and they can be discreet, members of the jury coming to a verdict, then it's a single crime. But the commas don't help much, because all you have to do is put in separate sections. And all of a sudden, you're saying because it doesn't have A, B, C, D, rather it has commas. It's not separate crimes. So I don't think the structure itself is as persuasive as the notion as how the state treats it. And when you go to the jury apparently in Virginia, a jury could convict on this crime by any one of those words, couldn't they? But the way we're drawing that is from the jury. In other words, I think we're both in a sense, we're both saying the same thing. No, but that's your better argument than the commas business. But you've got to, in other words, and again, perhaps this is going back to this is what basically the camp tells us to do is look at this provision in the statute and decide whether it is more different means to do the same thing or four separate elements to be elected. No election was major. If you look at the, what amounts to the judgment of conviction here, he's convicted of doing it by any one of the four means. And so, which is consistent with a view that it was never divided, it's not divisible. If you get to this issue, we win on that one as well. But that would be cancellation removal. That would require remand. If he is not removable, that should be vacated and then he can be released. And if they refer the questions. Okay, thank you. Let's hear from Mr. Joseph. Good morning, Your Honours. May I please the court, Bernard Joseph, on behalf of the Attorney General. I'd like to apologize in advance my allergies have been bothering me and I woke up and have less than my full voice. There are two issues in this case. The first issue is whether the petitioner's removable is charged for failing to register as a sex offender, which would be a second crime involving moral perpetude, not arising how the same scheme of criminal life. If you want to get some water, be on the agenda. You know, take it up there with you. More and more have been talking about it. Well, I have allergies too, so I sympathize with your struggle. Again, the petitioner concedes that the sexual battery is a crime involving moral perpetude. Therefore, the issue is whether or not the failure to register as a sex offender is a crime against moral perpetude. The government contends that this court, giving the board's presidential decision a matter of Tobar Lobo, the Chevron deference that should be accorded, should disagree with the third and the tenth and find that. I'm trying to figure out how there is a moral issue when you tell somebody to be after register. Register for the draft, register for anything, a file report, a file attach return. These all can be done deliberately and cause violations of law, which in and of itself may be moral, but I think you don't look at the crime that makes it. You have to ask the crime whether the crime involves moral perpetude. So you set aside the prohibition of the crime and see whether there's any moral component in failing to register. And I just have very, it's very difficult for me to figure that that isn't anything more than an administrative function to assist in enforcing the sex laws and following people who have passed violations but the registration requirement. And that's all that's involved here. How you, what argument can be made that that's a moral norm which can be subject to perpetude, debasement. And the INS just seemed to say because it involves sex. Your past conduct was sexual. It's such an offensive conduct in societies, therefore more, but that's pretty loosey goosey, isn't it? I believe that what the board decided was that when you look at the reasons that you need to register as a sex offender, which help prevent recidivism and also a law enforcement based on... Well, that's not the conduct prohibited. And what's the language in Toba, Lobo, where they include, I think they use some expansive language about the... the offensiveness of sexual conduct in society. Yeah, you can't find it. I don't want to take up your time. Well, I'll find it. Here, honor. The board here relied on Toba, Lobo, and pointed out that there are no fourth circuit cases that are to the contrary. It claims like. So, and again, the board's reasoning was that, because of the underlying offense, the failure to register, is a violation. It does violate society morals. And duties... The failure to register. The failure to register would violate that. What moral norm is that a register, if there's no statute that says you have to? Is there an aspect of morality and moral norm that society has recognized in registration? I would say that there is an norm to allow to put people on alert or dangerous people. That isn't that. The statute imposes registration, nothing more. The registration would put society on alert that one, there's a sex offender out there. And two, it would also aid in the law enforcement and the prevention of recidivism. If the court finds that the failure to register as a sex offender is not a crime of loathing moral perpetude, then petitioners no longer removable. And the case should be remanded to the board for proceedings consistent with that opinion. However, the government can... You agreed with the petitioner that if we were to prove concluded, it doesn't involve moral perpetutes them. That ends with an act of murder. Correct. There's nothing else left in the case. If there aren't two CIMTs, the petitioner is not removable. It's remanded to the board and the board consistent with this opinion. It does have a basis for removing, building, and determining the proceedings. However, should the court decide that it is a crime involving moral perpetude, the government contends that at this point, the case should be remanded back to the board for the board to determine based on its new decision in matter of charez and the intervening decision in royal, whether or not it actually is an aggravative felony. If the... It's important at this point to recognize a matter of charez. Unlike the board decision, in our case, dealt with procedures to determine how to determine whether or not a violation of a state law is an aggravative felony. And so at this juncture, it's important, I think, to let the board in the first instance look at this crime and determine whether or not it is an aggravative felony. If the board decides that it is not, the case would have to be remanded in any event to go forward on relief to determine whether or not the petitioner can satisfy the other requirements necessary for cancellation of removal. The board didn't decide this issue. The issue of means and jury anonymity? It did not. We have a generally problem that instead of us deciding that, we'd have to send it back. Correct. So at this point, the government's position is if the court finds that a felony to register as a sex offender was the second CIT, which renders petitioner removable, that the case should be remanded back to the board for the board to determine in the first instance whether under this court's decision of royal or the board's decision of matter of charez, which DHS is petitioning for rehearing on bonk with the board. This is an aggravative felony. So at this point, I think it's premature for the court to roll on it because the board in our case did not make any findings concerning whether it's an aggravative felony in light of the new decisions. Thank you. If there are no further questions. Thank you, Mr. President. Go ahead. Very quickly, there's no Chenery issue here. The board found that it was a divisible crime. The IJ found it was a divisible crime. It's the only way it could find that it was an aggravated felony to begin with because it had to get ruse out of it. Ruse stays in it. It's not an aggravated felony using a categorical approach. So the issue has been decided. They changed the way they look at it. But we're not talking of... There's enough there that we... If we rule against your first issue, then we have to reach the... I think you have to reach the legal issue. If you agree with us, then you'd have to remand it back for the discretionary part of cancellation removal. But the question whether it's a divisible offense or not is that you don't defer on that anyway. No, but if they had not decided or arrested them, we'd have to let them do it the first time. That's correct. They decided what they're saying now is we changed the way we decide these things. And in fairness, the camp was decided while it was pending and Royal came out afterwards. But they unquestionably had to reach the divisibility question order to decide it. The only thing I would say, and I don't do this normally, I may just say it, on the first issue, I don't think there is a plausible basis for upholding Tobar Lobo. I haven't heard anything today from the government. It's the same reasoning that's in Tobar Lobo. No court has accepted that. He's been in custody for three years. If there's any possibility of the court, if the court agrees, if there's any way to issue order as soon as possible vacating the final order of removal so we can try and get him released, there's a habeas petition pending that we're not representing him, but there is one pending in Virginia as a federal court as well. But this has really been three years and this is what's holding him in. And if there's any way to issue an order with an opinion to follow, we would ask that that be done. Any other questions? Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Govlog. We appreciate very much your undertaking representation this client. I guess it's too early in the school year for you to give him this to him. I've gotten too old to take a student this early in the school year and get them ready for argument. It was nothing to get me ready for argument. I wasn't about that. So we appreciate you're taking it. Thank you, responsibility on yourself. Thank you very much. Thank you. You want to keep going, Paul? You want to keep going? Okay, we'll come back in Greek Council