Long, Gateway versus Gateway 2000. Just a long one of you ready to give the rest of the members of the other side the opportunity to sit. You kept it long, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw, Pitman representing the two-pallons first, Dr. Lawns and second, Univore, the Swedish Company. May it please the Court. Let me begin by addressing first the appeal of Dr. Lawns, who is a Swedish scientist. He's not a lawyer. His American lawyers, the Aduci Law firm, had sold discretion in deciding whether or not to pursue litigation under the terms of their engagement letter at A207. His American lawyers then decided who should be the plaintiffs in the lawsuit. And on several occasions they filed complaints without giving either Dr. Lawns or Univore a copy at A1173 and A1181. What about the fact that they did send a copy of that to his Swedish lawyers to review? Did they send a copy of that to the first complaint? The first complaint. Lawns complaint. Dr. Lawns' testimony, which I believe is undisputed, is that he never saw a copy of that. So there may be evidence in the record that it went from AMS to law firm to Delphi. But Dr. Lawns' testimony is that he never saw a copy of the complaint filed in his name until after it was actually filed. Is that an initial credibility determined by the law of court? Just to whether or not he saw it? Even if the trial court were to totally disbelieve Dr
. Lawns' testimony, there's still no evidence that it actually got into its hands. You could wipe out his testimony that he never saw it, but there's still no documentation of the transmittal from either Delphi or AMS to Dr. Lawns. I think you would be left with essentially a void in the record under those circumstances. So eight years, essentially, after all of this happened, the district court awarded a million dollars in attorney fees against Dr. Lawns. But not the law firm, the Aducy Law firm that had represented them. We submit this as clear error and an abusive discretion. The two steps in the standard of review for an award of fees under Section 285. It's clear error because a review of the record should leave a, quote, firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. That's from the Stevens case. And turning to the second prong, it's an abusive discretion because the result is clearly unreasonable, which is from the Forest Labs case. There are two undisputed facts. First, prior to the filing of the Lawns lawsuit, Dr. Lawns sent Mr. Mastriani, his lawyer, a letter stating, quote, the patent has been transferred to the company for many years ago. And the agreement with IBM was made with Unibor. That's an A266. It's a February 19th, 97 facts, which was marked and admitted into evidence as AMS exhibit four in the proceedings below
. Similarly, after the filing of the Lawns complaint, Dr. Lawns suggested to the Aducy Law firm that a particular interrogatory response be changed to read. And here's how he suggested it be changed. The company Unibor A.B. is the owner of the 986 patent rights, but the patent is still registered in Mr. Hockenlanz's name. That's an A394 of the record. It's a January 29th, 99th email, again, marked and admitted into evidence as AMS exhibit eight. So, was that a sign I never registered with the patent office? Apparently not. There's no evidence that there's ever registered with the patent office. As Dr. Lawns had argued on the motion to reconsideration in his motion for judicial notice, if one looks today on the patent office website, there is no assignment seen. So, I don't think any of the parties dispute that it was never the fact that it, in fact, never was registered with the patent office. But you can still assign a patent without listening into the patent office, can't you? I think so. I think that's the testimony of Mr. Maustrowni. He acknowledges that there, in fact, could be an assignment even if nothing shows up on the patent office website. He's Mr
. Maustrowni was aware of that possibility. What's the status, in your briefs, you list a pending case or someone list a pending case between your client and the law firm. What's the status of that case? It's still pending a state for the time being. So, it's still an active case in the PSE superior court. State pending the outcome of this case or state, what's the basis for this day? As a practical matter at state pending the outcome in this case, I'm not sure because I'm not counseling that action, whether, in fact, the state expressly says it's pending a resolution. But for all practical purposes, that's the reasoning behind it. It's in D.C. Superior Court or Federal Court? I believe it is D.C. Is it federal court? It's not federal court? I believe it's D.C. Superior Court, but I will check. No. It's D.C. District Court, I'm not sure. I'm not sure. D
.C. District Court, the District Court, or the District Court, go on again. At the very least, the District Court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees, assuming that this is an exceptional case for a move. It was an abuse of discretion called Dr. Lund and Unibord libel for the defendants' fees while holding that the D.C. law firm is not libel. Because on this record, the D.C. law firm had sufficient information to put it on notice that there was at least an issuance to whom should be named as plaintiffs. Because after all, as you know, I've said Dr. Lund did inform his attorneys that the 986 patent had been transferred to Unibord on at least two occasions. But one of the findings, as I recall, by the District Court was that the firm did a title search, did a title search, to convince themselves that he was the owner, and that the assignment was locked up in some file cabinet belonging to Mr. Lund as a counter. Right? You don't take issue with those factual findings. That's slightly different from the focus of our argument on abuse of discretion on the issue of who had or who should have had the actual assignment that would have shown that... But I thought this went to what they knew or should have known, which I thought was the point you were arguing with here
. Right? And as to what they knew or should have known, if you disregard Dr. Lund's testimony and focus solely on Mr. Mosteriani's testimony at 1428-29, that testimony, which was live testimony before the District Court, shows that Mr. Mosteriani and the AMS law firm knew that he didn't have a key document. Let me read just a brief passage which shows Mr. Mosteriani's words, what he knew or didn't know. I'll skip the context on 1428, but picking up on 1429, A1429, line 7. Question. So you read the IBM license agreement and you see that there is a document evidencing Univore's right to license and you don't have that document from Dr. Lund's correct answer. That's correct. He knew he didn't have a key document. That is Mr. Mosteriani knew he didn't have a key document. Here's what he did to. And in fairness, I should set forth what Mr. Mosteriani says that he did to. He continues to say, and you know that Dr. Lund's was represented by a lawyer named Berg
. And I think that's what the question was directed to, the lawyer named Berg continuing. And you asked Delphi to contact Berg correct answer, yes, question. And they told you they did and he didn't have anything correct answer. That's correct. And then question. And you did not contact Berg yourself to see whether this document evidencing the right of Univore's license, the patent existed in Berg's files, did you? Answer. No, no, there was no need to because Delphi had already done that and I trusted Delphi in that regard. So the essence of this is Mr. Mosteriani knew before he filed the complaint. There was a missing document. One might ask that he asks Dr. Lund to track down that document from a lawyer Berg. That's answered on the previous page 1428. Mr. Fong, how do you answer the response in a thinner auditorium number five, which is listed on the appendix 864-52? That's under oath. And said Mr. Lund's objection to the center of the auditorium, at least in the following grounds. Subject to these objections, Mr. Lund's response is follows
. There has been no assignment of the 986 patent. How do you answer that under oath? This is Mr. Lund saying there's been no assignment of the 986 patent. Is there is that conflict? Look, he had told his attorneys about a transfer. He had told them that the patent was the patent rights were owned by Unibord. Given that, he had told his attorneys the information that they needed to help him craft the answer to that. But he answered under oath that there's been no assignment of the 986 patent. Period. No qualifications or otherwise. There's been no assignment of the patent, according to Mr. Lund. So how do we say that there's been an assignment of the patent? If he answers under oath that there's been no assignment? In fact, the documentary evidence shows that there was a assignment. One thing which is undisputed here is that there was simultaneous with the IBM agreement and assignment. Well, there's also a document that came out of evidence subsequently signed by Mr. Lund as the individual and signed by himself. All says a representative. The clarification. The district court discredited. So for present purposes, we're assuming as we must that the district court was correct in assuming that that document either never existed or in fact wasn't, you know, wasn't a credible document
. And for present purposes, we're assuming that that's the case. So we to believe that there's been no assignment of 96 patent as tested to by Mr. Lund. I think the evidence now that all the evidence has come in including the assignment itself and subsequent emails and the subsequent facts. What basis was the patent assignment? What is that document showing the assignment? A clarification? No, no, no. The assignment that was signed simultaneous with the IBM agreement back in 1990s. So we're not relying upon the clarification agreement at all. Mr. Lund knew about that assignment when he made the statement that there's been no assignment of 96 patent to the answer to the inner rock in the rock. Well, in fact, he told his lawyers when he suggested how he thought the inner rock of the response should be framed. He told his lawyers that he thought the inner rock of the response should be framed to say the company uniform is the owner of the 986 patent rights, but the patent is still registered in Mr. Hock and these lines is named. That's what he told his lawyers that he thought the proper response should be. As it ended up, that's not what was filed with the court, obviously. But he submitted that under oath. Yes. Thank you. Will it reserve your time? We'll add some time to your reply once you add about two minutes to the reply time. Okay, let me just finish the thought I had dropped a few minutes ago, which is on 1428, Mr
. Maustrionis specifically asked, did you call Dr. Lundt and ask him if he had any of the Bergs files? And the answer was no, because in Mr. Maustrionis' mind, that was the charge of the Delphi firm. He never asked Dr. Lundt to contact lawyer Bergs directly. I will reserve my time. Thank you. Mr. Anderson, Mr. Mayor, the queue will be arguing for nine minutes. Yes. Mr. Anoman, you have six. Thank you. May I please the court? My name is Amanda Mayer, and I am here on behalf of Apleese, Dell, and Gateway. I believe the best place to start is the issue that was just troubling the panel, and that is the stark inconsistencies before the District Court that lawns made and that are throughout the record. As Your Honor mentioned earlier, there is an issue of whether or not certain credibility determinations were made by the court, and while we believe that the Apleese brief fully supports the affirmance of the District Court's determination, the appellance briefing, and the intervener's briefing in this appeal, and Mr. Fawn's argument just a few minutes ago, highlight that this really is just a third bite of the apple for a pellance, and that the issue before the court is just a rehashing of credibility determinations made by the District Court before. Indeed, the briefs on appeal go into the evidentiary minutia that the court dealt with before on a cold record once, affidavits, emails, documentary evidence, judgepin addressed that type of evidence, and found that an award of fees was appropriate
. A Pellance Council then moved for reconsideration of that fee award, and asked that the court not award fees on a cold record like that before this court, but instead considered live testimony. Judgepin granted that request and held a two-day evidentiary hearing to which counsel for appellance referred earlier. That evidentiary hearing took place in March of last year, both Mr. Lines and Mr. Mosterdani were questioned for two full days, even judgepin asked questions of Dr. Lines. After a review of deposition testimony, the live testimony that was before the court in that evidentiary hearing, and the documentary evidence, the court again found that a fee award was appropriate. We are now on appeal rehashing the very same evidence. On this appeal in this argument a few minutes ago, transcript portion were read to this court trying to show that there were some error below and what is fundamentally a credibility determination. But I think what they're also alleging is that this case is not exceptional in nature, which is really a legal determination that can be reviewed to noble. It is a legal determination that this court can review to no vote, but believe that the bulk of their briefing and their argument of appeal has been on the credibility issues. I believe if you see page 46 of the appellance brief, you will see that they say something to the effect of setting aside issues of credibility. And then they start to turn to some other things that they characterize as abusive discretion issues. There is no evidence that the district court aired in finding that this case was exceptional under 285. The recorders were pleaded with Dr. Lines litigation misconduct, with inconsistent statements that are the basis for the court's determination, that the lawsuits were frivolous, that he had engaged in litigation misconduct. And then they start to say that the factual determinations which are reviewed for a clear error are the underpinning for his determination that this case was exceptional under 285. And so at court this becomes an issue of whether or not he made correct credibility determinations, which is not clear error on appeal to choose between two competing interpretations of facts. Well credibility determinations are very difficult to overturn on appeal. Absolutely. The witnesses are not here. And that is an opportunity. And that is highlighted by a court's reading of the code record in its argument to highlight some alleged inconsistency that the court has already addressed below. The court here has a cold record. This court in the United States Supreme Court have found that credibility determinations for the province of the trial court who has the ability to judge the credibility and the demeanor of the witnesses and that credibility determinations are entitled to great deference. Further this court and the Supreme Court have found that it is not clear error cannot be clear error for the fact finder to choose one version, one interpretation of competing evidence when two conflicting stories have been presented. And that is what we had below and that is what we have here. The appellants and the interveners have focused this appeal on a rehash of evidence that court below already considered. The record is repeat with inconsistencies by Dr. Lawns. Your honor addressed one of those inconsistencies in terms of an interrogatory answer earlier. There is also a great deal of motivation that is demonstrated by the record evidence below that forms the basis for those inconsistencies. As this court previously found the reason Dr. Lawns entered into the agreement had the win award interim to the agreement with IBM was for tax reasons. Well Dr. Lawns is a layman he is not ignorant of business and he is not ignorant of the impact of his actions on his income and on his personal position. He made a studied decision to have a uniformed execute that license and executed an assignment to unibording connection with that to save himself close to a million dollars in taxes. Later when he was personally named as a defendant in a declaratory judgment action he told his attorneys get me out of this I assigned this to unibord years ago
. Absolutely. The witnesses are not here. And that is an opportunity. And that is highlighted by a court's reading of the code record in its argument to highlight some alleged inconsistency that the court has already addressed below. The court here has a cold record. This court in the United States Supreme Court have found that credibility determinations for the province of the trial court who has the ability to judge the credibility and the demeanor of the witnesses and that credibility determinations are entitled to great deference. Further this court and the Supreme Court have found that it is not clear error cannot be clear error for the fact finder to choose one version, one interpretation of competing evidence when two conflicting stories have been presented. And that is what we had below and that is what we have here. The appellants and the interveners have focused this appeal on a rehash of evidence that court below already considered. The record is repeat with inconsistencies by Dr. Lawns. Your honor addressed one of those inconsistencies in terms of an interrogatory answer earlier. There is also a great deal of motivation that is demonstrated by the record evidence below that forms the basis for those inconsistencies. As this court previously found the reason Dr. Lawns entered into the agreement had the win award interim to the agreement with IBM was for tax reasons. Well Dr. Lawns is a layman he is not ignorant of business and he is not ignorant of the impact of his actions on his income and on his personal position. He made a studied decision to have a uniformed execute that license and executed an assignment to unibording connection with that to save himself close to a million dollars in taxes. Later when he was personally named as a defendant in a declaratory judgment action he told his attorneys get me out of this I assigned this to unibord years ago. Then facing dismissal below he submitted an internally inconsistent affidavit to the court that said one that he didn't remember the assignment to unibord and two that he thought it was invalid. There are other instances of inconsistencies on the record below. For example the interrogatory answer that he suggested could have been changed was in January of 99. Just months later in August of 99 he submitted an affidavit to the court saying that he had forgotten about the assignment to unibord. It's a mere eight months. The inconsistencies were just too great. The court below determined that Dr. Lawns simply was not credible. He said in his opinion below that this was an issue the main issue before the court was Dr. Lawns' credibility. He found the inconsistencies too great. It constituted litigation was conduct, showed that the litigation was frivolous and that was the basis for the 285 finding. Can this court take a look at those evaluations of the inconsistencies and say that the lower court was wrong and weighing them that way? I do not believe that that is appropriate. At this level of review I believe that just recently in one of the cases cited I believe it was you would pronounce it cow. This court has found that it cannot reverse the lower court simply because it would have made a different decision on factual determinations and credibility determinations at the court. Even on documentary evidence. On documentary evidence I believe that the court does have the same record in that regard. But this is not an instance where this case was determined merely on documentary evidence. It was determined on live witness testimony which is not possible
. Then facing dismissal below he submitted an internally inconsistent affidavit to the court that said one that he didn't remember the assignment to unibord and two that he thought it was invalid. There are other instances of inconsistencies on the record below. For example the interrogatory answer that he suggested could have been changed was in January of 99. Just months later in August of 99 he submitted an affidavit to the court saying that he had forgotten about the assignment to unibord. It's a mere eight months. The inconsistencies were just too great. The court below determined that Dr. Lawns simply was not credible. He said in his opinion below that this was an issue the main issue before the court was Dr. Lawns' credibility. He found the inconsistencies too great. It constituted litigation was conduct, showed that the litigation was frivolous and that was the basis for the 285 finding. Can this court take a look at those evaluations of the inconsistencies and say that the lower court was wrong and weighing them that way? I do not believe that that is appropriate. At this level of review I believe that just recently in one of the cases cited I believe it was you would pronounce it cow. This court has found that it cannot reverse the lower court simply because it would have made a different decision on factual determinations and credibility determinations at the court. Even on documentary evidence. On documentary evidence I believe that the court does have the same record in that regard. But this is not an instance where this case was determined merely on documentary evidence. It was determined on live witness testimony which is not possible. Hypothetically if there were two documents, not only two documents and they were inconsistent with each other. And you could draw different conclusions from those documents. But an affiliate court had the ability to say well they drew the wrong conclusions. If it is a conclusion as to the credibility of the documents and what those documents say I do not believe that it would be appropriate to go that far. Well the credibility of the documents I do not think the credibility of the documents are inconsistent documents. People can read them differently. Well given that choice then the trial fact the fact finder in this case being the judge had the opportunity to go that far. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Randleman. Good morning Your Honours. May I please the court. My name is Aaron Handleman and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here, on behalf of the law firm of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm, of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here in behalf of the law firm on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey I would say this that the Council has, in essence, admitted the credibility finding problems that his client has. When he submitted in response to your honours' question, that the clarification agreement, we accept the premise that that was discredited by the Court. That's the very point here. Judge Penn held the evidentiary hearing, again after allowing the depositions of both Mr. Lawns and Mr
. Hypothetically if there were two documents, not only two documents and they were inconsistent with each other. And you could draw different conclusions from those documents. But an affiliate court had the ability to say well they drew the wrong conclusions. If it is a conclusion as to the credibility of the documents and what those documents say I do not believe that it would be appropriate to go that far. Well the credibility of the documents I do not think the credibility of the documents are inconsistent documents. People can read them differently. Well given that choice then the trial fact the fact finder in this case being the judge had the opportunity to go that far. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Randleman. Good morning Your Honours. May I please the court. My name is Aaron Handleman and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here, on behalf of the law firm of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm, of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here in behalf of the law firm on behalf of the law firm of Aducey, and I'm here on behalf of the law firm of Aducey I would say this that the Council has, in essence, admitted the credibility finding problems that his client has. When he submitted in response to your honours' question, that the clarification agreement, we accept the premise that that was discredited by the Court. That's the very point here. Judge Penn held the evidentiary hearing, again after allowing the depositions of both Mr. Lawns and Mr. Maustriani, two-day evidentiary hearing, he took evidence. And he heard the testimony of Mr. Lawns. And in effect, his findings show, and he was very patient. It was like a shell game. As new facts were discovered, coming from Lawns, he shifted his story. So first, he says, as he says in the answer to interrogators, no assignment. No assignment. And then when Council made reference to, I believe it was the email that said, I have assigned the patent. That's incorrect. The document, as we know it in our brief, it's, I've assigned the patent rights. And when Mr., the evidence showed, and Mr. Maustriani testified, when he got that email, he said, he called the client, he testified to that. He said, what are you talking about? But if you look at the district court's opinion, he concludes initially, based on the facts, he draws, it makes quite a number of observations about the firm's conduct, all of which are quite negative, right, in terms of the failure to investigate the ownership or whatever. So based on the facts, his conclusions with respect to the evidence were a failure to investigate properly, correct? What all we do to respect that is not entirely correct because that's Lawns I. In other words, when the case came out, and the judge looked at it, and he said, as actually was the motion for the motion for attorneys, that would have been the September 26, 2001 opinion. And he said, as he evaluated 285 versus 1927, and he said, I am troubled, I am troubled by the investigation issue. And that's really the only thing I think he was troubled by
. Maustriani, two-day evidentiary hearing, he took evidence. And he heard the testimony of Mr. Lawns. And in effect, his findings show, and he was very patient. It was like a shell game. As new facts were discovered, coming from Lawns, he shifted his story. So first, he says, as he says in the answer to interrogators, no assignment. No assignment. And then when Council made reference to, I believe it was the email that said, I have assigned the patent. That's incorrect. The document, as we know it in our brief, it's, I've assigned the patent rights. And when Mr., the evidence showed, and Mr. Maustriani testified, when he got that email, he said, he called the client, he testified to that. He said, what are you talking about? But if you look at the district court's opinion, he concludes initially, based on the facts, he draws, it makes quite a number of observations about the firm's conduct, all of which are quite negative, right, in terms of the failure to investigate the ownership or whatever. So based on the facts, his conclusions with respect to the evidence were a failure to investigate properly, correct? What all we do to respect that is not entirely correct because that's Lawns I. In other words, when the case came out, and the judge looked at it, and he said, as actually was the motion for the motion for attorneys, that would have been the September 26, 2001 opinion. And he said, as he evaluated 285 versus 1927, and he said, I am troubled, I am troubled by the investigation issue. And that's really the only thing I think he was troubled by. But that was corrected when the judge, I'm considering the motion for reconsideration filed by Lawns with new counsel. He then heard the testimony, and we filed a motion to intervene because there are documents that we wanted the court to see that were subject to attorney client privilege when the judge penned. Ranted that motion, judge penned, allowed us to provide the documents, and when he saw it, that's why you don't see in the opinion that he's troubled anymore. He's not troubled anymore because he saw that the evidence show that the adducee law firm interviewed him. They went to database, they checked the things out, they certainly checked out if there was an assignment. They went back to the original patent files, they looked at the European counterpart patent, and they filed Lawns was the owner. And then the record shows that they had this attachee agreement. That was a year before they were hired, which Lawns licensed himself. And so what happened was they did everything possible, and the court recognized that, and the significant point. What is attorney's responsibility, ethical responsibilities, making a due diligence search of determining ownership of a patent? I think an attorney has to evaluate how sophisticated what kind of intelligence his client has. You know, what level of sophistication an attorney then interviews his client and obtains all of the information and then goes around to check all publicly available information. I don't think it's any different. I'm not a patent attorney. I think it's the same standard. And they did that. They checked everything out. And the fact is, and of course here they had a Swedish council. Everyone checked out everything and Lawns insisted and moreover. So I think that's the responsibility
. But that was corrected when the judge, I'm considering the motion for reconsideration filed by Lawns with new counsel. He then heard the testimony, and we filed a motion to intervene because there are documents that we wanted the court to see that were subject to attorney client privilege when the judge penned. Ranted that motion, judge penned, allowed us to provide the documents, and when he saw it, that's why you don't see in the opinion that he's troubled anymore. He's not troubled anymore because he saw that the evidence show that the adducee law firm interviewed him. They went to database, they checked the things out, they certainly checked out if there was an assignment. They went back to the original patent files, they looked at the European counterpart patent, and they filed Lawns was the owner. And then the record shows that they had this attachee agreement. That was a year before they were hired, which Lawns licensed himself. And so what happened was they did everything possible, and the court recognized that, and the significant point. What is attorney's responsibility, ethical responsibilities, making a due diligence search of determining ownership of a patent? I think an attorney has to evaluate how sophisticated what kind of intelligence his client has. You know, what level of sophistication an attorney then interviews his client and obtains all of the information and then goes around to check all publicly available information. I don't think it's any different. I'm not a patent attorney. I think it's the same standard. And they did that. They checked everything out. And the fact is, and of course here they had a Swedish council. Everyone checked out everything and Lawns insisted and moreover. So I think that's the responsibility. And they carried it out in total. In fact, every time Lawns raised the question, they raised the question back. Are you sure? And he reiterated, I am the owner. And let's not mistake this. Mr. Lawns is in fact a sophisticated inventor. As the record shows and as the judge found, he had been involved in patents ten years, a decade before he ever met the aducius law firm. He dealt with lawyers in this country. He dealt with lawyers in Europe. He was sophisticated enough such that he drafted the clarification contract. That so-called document that said eight days after the assignment, he drafted the document from Unibor to himself. He drafted that document. So we're talking about sophisticated client. The problem that Mr. Lawns has and the problem on this appeal is very simple. When the judge allowed there to be another entry hearing, Mr. Lawns had his full day in court, due process, testimony, and what happened is there's a July 9th, 2001 email, which is in the record referred to in the briefs, I would submit it's at A808, where Mr. Lawn sends an email, July 19th, 2001, to the aducius law firms. And he says, I have not forgotten the assignment
. And they carried it out in total. In fact, every time Lawns raised the question, they raised the question back. Are you sure? And he reiterated, I am the owner. And let's not mistake this. Mr. Lawns is in fact a sophisticated inventor. As the record shows and as the judge found, he had been involved in patents ten years, a decade before he ever met the aducius law firm. He dealt with lawyers in this country. He dealt with lawyers in Europe. He was sophisticated enough such that he drafted the clarification contract. That so-called document that said eight days after the assignment, he drafted the document from Unibor to himself. He drafted that document. So we're talking about sophisticated client. The problem that Mr. Lawns has and the problem on this appeal is very simple. When the judge allowed there to be another entry hearing, Mr. Lawns had his full day in court, due process, testimony, and what happened is there's a July 9th, 2001 email, which is in the record referred to in the briefs, I would submit it's at A808, where Mr. Lawn sends an email, July 19th, 2001, to the aducius law firms. And he says, I have not forgotten the assignment. I did not have it, but I have not forgotten it. That's key and that was key I would submit in part of the credibility decisions of the judge, because this very document, totally, completely contradicted his affidavit under oath, August 22, 1999, to Judge Pet, where he said, I forgot about the assignment. So he starts off the case. He knows the assignment. He then, oh, I see my time is up. I went fast. You have any further to add questions? I thank you very much. I'm sorry, I did go down. Thank you for your presentation. Mr. Lawns, it's good Mr. Lawn for four minutes. I'm sorry, Mr. Lawns. What? Four minutes. Four minutes. Right. Thank you, Mr. Lawns
. I did not have it, but I have not forgotten it. That's key and that was key I would submit in part of the credibility decisions of the judge, because this very document, totally, completely contradicted his affidavit under oath, August 22, 1999, to Judge Pet, where he said, I forgot about the assignment. So he starts off the case. He knows the assignment. He then, oh, I see my time is up. I went fast. You have any further to add questions? I thank you very much. I'm sorry, I did go down. Thank you for your presentation. Mr. Lawns, it's good Mr. Lawn for four minutes. I'm sorry, Mr. Lawns. What? Four minutes. Four minutes. Right. Thank you, Mr. Lawns. Looking back, here oners, the turning point in the case was August 1999, when the defendant moved for summary judgment. From that point on, the aducius law firm had an inherent conflict of interest, because there was always the potential for a malpractice action, and there was also the potential for the aducius law firm being liable for the defendant's fees. That colored everything that happened thereafter, for example, a 582. After the conflict arose, Maastriani told the district court that he had been repeatedly informed by Mr. Lawns that no assignment had taken place. That's what he told them. But it wasn't true. There was documentary evidence that he had been told about a transfer. In fact, looking at A281, in his handwritten notes, he noted on the very day that he received the February 19 facts from Dr. Lawns, his notes say, unibored assignments. So, he knew from at the very latest, February 1997, that there was an issue as to unibored assignments. The whole presumption of the district court was that there was some intentional, malicious concealment by Dr. Lawns, but that just wasn't the case. There are at least two instances in which Dr. Lawns informed his American lawyers about the existence of a transfer and that unibored as the owner of the patent rights, and the attorneys received that because that's what the attorneys handwritten. No, say, unibored assignments. Excuse me. How do we re-way all of the sevens? We're supposed to pause through the record and make a determination and re-way it, which has already been done by Judge Penn-Bullock. You're supposed to certainly look at the whole record, but look at it through the lens of clear error
. Looking back, here oners, the turning point in the case was August 1999, when the defendant moved for summary judgment. From that point on, the aducius law firm had an inherent conflict of interest, because there was always the potential for a malpractice action, and there was also the potential for the aducius law firm being liable for the defendant's fees. That colored everything that happened thereafter, for example, a 582. After the conflict arose, Maastriani told the district court that he had been repeatedly informed by Mr. Lawns that no assignment had taken place. That's what he told them. But it wasn't true. There was documentary evidence that he had been told about a transfer. In fact, looking at A281, in his handwritten notes, he noted on the very day that he received the February 19 facts from Dr. Lawns, his notes say, unibored assignments. So, he knew from at the very latest, February 1997, that there was an issue as to unibored assignments. The whole presumption of the district court was that there was some intentional, malicious concealment by Dr. Lawns, but that just wasn't the case. There are at least two instances in which Dr. Lawns informed his American lawyers about the existence of a transfer and that unibored as the owner of the patent rights, and the attorneys received that because that's what the attorneys handwritten. No, say, unibored assignments. Excuse me. How do we re-way all of the sevens? We're supposed to pause through the record and make a determination and re-way it, which has already been done by Judge Penn-Bullock. You're supposed to certainly look at the whole record, but look at it through the lens of clear error. Does this court, looking at the entire record, come away with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made? We submit that, in fact, at the end of the day a mistake has been made. There's only one reasonable result in this case, and that is that the award of attorney's fees must be reversed. Interesting. The difficulty that I'm having, and maybe it's a similar concern of Judge Gaiars. I don't know, but the difficulty I'm having with your argument is that you select the correctively pick and choose little snippets of information from the record at various points, which, if looked at in isolation, might suggest an outcome different from the outcome in the case. But that's not a proper analysis. The district court quite properly looked at all of the evidence and weighed and evaluated and considered the credibility of the witnesses that testified and came to a conclusion based on the overall record. And it's very difficult, I think, to say that the district court's actions in this regard were wrong in evaluating all of this evidence. Picking and choosing, but picking and choosing the evidence that is undisputed, or in the case of Mr. Maustreani's testimony at 1428, the testimony of Mr. Maustreani came himself. I mean, this is not testimony that the district court overlooked, isn't it? I mean, all of this was before Judge Pett. Well, some of it certainly wasn't explained. There's no explanation in the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the documentary evidence, the facts, and the email putting the Maustreani firm on notice. So just one sentence to conclude here, at a minimum, the district court was working under a clearly erroneous assumption. The district court opinion rises or falls on the assumption that there was a concealment by Dr. Lawns of the assignment from his attorneys. I think that is clearly erroneous. That one assumption, which is pivotal to all of the district court's analysis, is clearly erroneous
. This court should be left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed here. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Mr. Fawn. Case is submitted