Good morning, Your Honors. My name is Tom Chicarro. I'm a member of the Central Rossism National Fuel and Josephal Rossism. It's interesting that such a complex set of legal analysis become out of a relatively straightforward fact. In this situation, the lorosis entities were subjected to a jeopardy assessment as a result of that jeopardy assessment. How do you think around the roles and men? I get around it by the fact that a levy is preceded to the escrow count. The levy is preceded to the escrow count and the levy reduced cash assets, liquid assets only, to the control of the general revenue service. And under the cases that we cited, there's a distinction between a... But we go into an escrow count, right? Later, we go into an escrow count, after which the lorosis is able to withdraw $2 million on one occasion to keep themselves solid. Right. Now, over the course of the five-year period, in the Rosemann case, we're dealing with an advanced payment of estimate taxes, which go into some kind of suspense account, right? And the court makes an interesting statement. The court says they are..
. This funds in this suspense account, they are as a world payments in escrow. So the Supreme Court seems to be saying an escrow count would also be subject to interest until the taxes find the pay as it happened in Rosemann's. Well, we did come up with the two cases to say that interest in an escrow count is subject to... I'm sorry, deposits in a escrow count are subject to IRS interest. And basically... No, we're not... Those were lower court-owned businesses. Tax worth. And we, I guess, the second circuit
. I say that... But in any way, as far as... Can you say something to I on our interest, for exactly what do you mean? I'm using that as shorthand to mean that the IRS would have to be obligated to pay interest on funds that are subject to the escrow count of the certain taxes. Well, in fact, it's a good money currency. And the money leads to the extent that they are interested on the escrow count and the liquid portion of the escrow count. That interest would be offset against any other interest that the IRS would be required to pay. Mr. Ducar, are you seeking overpayment interest or underpayment interest? Well, I would say we're seeking... I would say we're entitled to both, because interest is interest in the sentence, because if you take a look at the situation, okay, there's a jeopardy assessment, then there's a levy
. So you've been attending that the... The monies that were the subject of the levy that were placed in escrow, the monies that you believed were subject to overpayment interest, in the fact that all of the dissettlement that was reached showed a much lower tax line bill. That's the argument for overpayment interest. And as far as underpayment interest, you're underpeachable. Now you said that was greater than the actual interest that accrued on the escrow funds, and then you should therefore get the difference. Based on my calculations, it was greater if you're honest. And here's how I would compute it. I would say, okay, there's a jeopardy assessment of the levy. The levy starts the running of interest and the settlement. In other words, the actual tax that was finally determined to lay back to the date of the jeopardy assessment. So the lorosis would owe interest from the period of the jeopardy assessment until the funds were levy. And then they would get credit against the underpayment from the time the funds were levy until the resolution and the case. And they would also get paid for over the overpayment
. Now, the escrow account accrues interest, right? The escrow account was invested in interest bearing. So there is interest flowing into that account. Interest flowing into that account. And at the conclusion of the investigation after the taxable amount has been withdrawn from that, it's returned to the Rosas, right? The Rosas wrote a check for some reason. I don't know why they wrote a check to the IRS. And then got the whole escrow account back. In that instance, they cut the interest. In that case, the escrow account. And they must account for that interest in the computation of the interest that the IRS would owe them. Because the amount of interest running during that period, you're looking at double digit, in some cases, interest accrues. And the interest that was earned in the escrow account significantly less than that. You're saying this is a product we would agree with you and send it back for a account if you will. There would be all set against what the IRS would be deemed to owe the Rosas the amount that your clients would see. That's correct. Not just the amount they received, if that's a different than the amount of the crew, but the amount of interest that was earned on that time, well, object cash
. I remember the time I said, this case ended when the litigation of the tax court set. Right. And at that point, as you pointed out, the Rosas made a payment to the IRS principle and interest, correct? And whatever penalties I believe there may be any penalties in there. And the interest that was paid was interest, the IRS said was due on the unpaid or underpaid taxes, correct? That is not understanding. Okay. So that is the interest that you're claiming your clients should not have had to pay. We should not have had to pay that interest. That was one component. Right. They didn't pay any interest on their debt during the period of the escrow group. There were some payments for the escrow agreement, which are not part of this case. Right. But I mean, in other words, the interest payment about which your clients are complaining was the payment that was made in the settlement. That is one of the things. And also they're saying that because the settlement was about seven times, almost seven times the final assessment, that their entitled interest on the cash portion
. And this is an complicated accounting. The cash portion of the escrow account that would have been paid as an overpayment. So in other words, if you look at the, if you look at the, if you're going to have an account that's going to have to figure out the earnings on the non-cash and cash portion of the escrow account. And then they're going to have to compare that to the amount of interest that accrued on the tax law. But they've got to pay the interest. I've had to pay the interest. And then subtract from, well, I know when you come to that gross determination and gross amount of interest, you're going to have to subtract that interest that they got on the escrow account. Because the according to second circuit is, I mean, I don't see, I don't see how, how there can be any claim you're for any overpayment interest. If you look at the appendix page 165, this is the seven degree agreement. The bottom of the page is the agreement is an entity solely for the purpose of securing the payment of the tax payers tax liability. And it's not to be considered as payments of such a wide role. So in what sense can you condemn that the amount placed in escrow represent an overpayment of interest? Well, in the sense that it does not apply to tax, but it was even though it was seized by the IRS under a levy, and it's therefore, in our view, you don't need to discuss subject to the paid interest by the IRS. It doesn't really matter whether it's applied to tax or not in the ultimate computation. In other words, it doesn't matter the underpayment interest. Well, the underpayment is not considered by agreement
. It's not to be considered as a payment of any liability tax liability. And it's placed at your client's suggestion in escrow account in order to both satisfy the government's interest in securing those funds and your client's interest in having some access to it. The arrangement is one that your client's requested, an arrangement that provided for interest to a crew, and agreement makes clear that that interest is taxable to your client's interest. And the agreement makes it perfectly clear that these funds are not to be considered as a payment of any tax liability. It seems to me that leads you with no wiggle room for an overpayment client. Well, actually it does, because the levy isn't paying the tax liability. The putting the money in the escrow account is, if you know, it's not a payment of tax liability. Because while I'm in the answer to your question based on what I've been able to discern from my entry to this case, okay. The levy, in our view, the levy is the payment of the tax liability. Setting up the escrow account is not a payment of the tax liability because it had been a payment of tax liability. Then the levy would have possibly lost a right to get a tax liability. That's, of course, how you get around the statute is to say the levy is the date on which the tax was paid. But what if they had been found that there was no liability? What if the whole thing, there was no payment to be made? Well, how would the levy then have been a payment of the taxes? Well, actually there was a payment of tax, because there was a jeopardy assessment. Geppery assessments are a client with subject to being accepted aside. And there are certain rates of tax payers having to go to district court to try to have your assets rearranged under the jeopardy assessment and so forth
. But a jeopardy assessment is an assessment of tax. And so once the jeopardy assessment occurred, even if it turns out to be zero later on, at the time of the payment there was an assessment of tax. Would you like to say the remains of the payment? Yes, yes, Mr. Kroch. Yes, I have two questions. First of all, you say that the levy was a payment, right? Yes, how was that? The government, the IRS didn't get anything from the levy, the money. You read the escrow agreement, which just was a pretty good deal. It shows, says, any money is obtained by the IRS going here. Well, the IRS did. I mean, as soon as there's a levy according to the cases, the money is reduced to the possession of the IRS. Actually, under the later statute, the came in later, I don't remember the exact date of the statute, but there's a 21-day period between the filing of the levy on liquid assets and the time has to be paid over to the IRS. That's under the tax pay and bill of price or so forth. In this particular situation, the assets that are levy are reduced to the IRS. Well, they did have them eventually, when they took the asset, they had some to begin with, and then later on they got some more and put them as a bank's graduate process. The other question I want to ask was, I, one thing you said confusingly, I understood coming into argument today, and what happened was there was an attack of debtiness
. The IRS puts money in the escrow account, and that money produces interest, is paid to the tax pay, is great. Then there's the settlement of the tax court litigation. At that point, the tax payers pay the interest, the IRS said they owed, but the settlement agreement retains for them the right to challenge that interest payment. That's the litigation that we see in the court of federal claims. In other words, your claim to be against that interest payment that was made at the time of the settlement. That's only part of our claim. The rest of the claim is the fact that $10 million of assets were levy, and ultimately $4 million, $3.30, or something, or it was ultimately paid. Well, how does that get rusted? You got interest on everything that was in the account, but we didn't get IRS interest. We only got interest. IRS interest is a much higher interest on key bills during the period of time. You say you're saying the interest rate that you were paid by the United States Treasury, it wasn't high enough, but on the United States Treasury on a key bill was different than the amount that we claim the lorosis are entitled to, but under the statute provides a close settlement. Now what your contention is, number one, we're entitled to get the interest rate paid in the settlement. And number two, we're entitled to mortgage it because the IRS didn't compute it. It's high enough for it to be interested to pay to some of the funds that we can
. That's right. Okay, that's our potential. I think one more question that's not in the settlement agreement for the paid $1.30 of the appendix. The stipulation was that you reserved the right to sue an action with respect to interest claim to be due by the IRS on the deficiencies. That's underpayment. Most of the co-oply that has taken place here is with respect to some contention that we're entitled to overpayment interest, but as I read this, the only right you reserved was to pursue an action. To recover interest claim to be due by the IRS on the deficiencies. That's right. And that's because there was a payment being made on the deficiency, but under the law when the money receives the right to interest began to approve. And so in order to reserve the right for unfair for underpayment deficiency, we had to put that in the settlement agreement. However, the little roses are also entitled under the law governing payment interest on. Thank you, Mr. Justice. Thank you very much. We'll give you two minutes to re-bullet that. Thank you. And could you give Ms. DeSoul 17 minutes an extra two, which you can use them? Thank you, Robert. I'll take the time, and probably cool. Can I please the court? Let's start by clearing up what interest in the district here. It would be helpful. It would be helpful. It would be helpful. It would be helpful. It would be helpful. The only thing that this court can consider is whether taxpayer is entitled to additional underpayment interest and the court of the court of the claim is correctly held and they are not entitled to that underpayment interest. To the extent that taxpayers are arguing that they are entitled to interest on the assets in escrow, the interest that was earned by the assets were given as already been distributed taxpayers as the extroverted calls for. To the extent that the assets earned money was earned by the cash assets in escrow that were invested in treasury bills, and they did earn that interest and received that interest. While the assets were not escrowed, the government didn't get any benefit of that money, including earning any interest
. We'll give you two minutes to re-bullet that. Thank you. And could you give Ms. DeSoul 17 minutes an extra two, which you can use them? Thank you, Robert. I'll take the time, and probably cool. Can I please the court? Let's start by clearing up what interest in the district here. It would be helpful. It would be helpful. It would be helpful. It would be helpful. It would be helpful. The only thing that this court can consider is whether taxpayer is entitled to additional underpayment interest and the court of the court of the claim is correctly held and they are not entitled to that underpayment interest. To the extent that taxpayers are arguing that they are entitled to interest on the assets in escrow, the interest that was earned by the assets were given as already been distributed taxpayers as the extroverted calls for. To the extent that the assets earned money was earned by the cash assets in escrow that were invested in treasury bills, and they did earn that interest and received that interest. While the assets were not escrowed, the government didn't get any benefit of that money, including earning any interest. The case kind of turns on the date paid. The statute very clearly says that the interest runs up until the date the tax is paid. Is the levy a payment of the tax? Your honor, it's not. I think when you look at the provisions of the court to obtain the levy, it makes clear that the levy and its court decisions are a white equal decision and the national microcomers decision that have addressed levy's, those decisions make clear that the levy is a provisional remedy. It's a step in the collection process and there's a process through which the IRS issues a notice of levy to the taxpayer and the court party won't be levy saying it's going to issue a levy, an issue is a levy, and then there's a time period during which the IRS has to actually go in, get that money, and it has constructed what the Supreme Court is called a constructive interest in the money once it's levy, but it doesn't actually have the money. The court disputes that he says that you have all control over those funds once you have levy done more. I think that's inconsistent with Supreme Court President and the internal revenue code, which in the way it holds case for example, the IRS had levy done money and then the court had elevated the bankruptcy code until the money was actually applied to pay attack, the IRS could be forced to return that money to the bankruptcy code under Section 532, I believe the bankruptcy code. And for example, Section 632, the internal revenue code, the actually when the IRS issues the levy, then what happens is for example it's to a ban for cash, the cat bank has 21 days in which to turn over that money. So they're actually in the code generally, all the levy provisions, the kind of lights, the periods of time where the IRS and levy and then at some such point of time realize the assets and actually apply it to a specific payment. So that's all the 6332 code provisions? I think one of the series of key code provisions, I think the fact that you have several different code provisions, one off of 16331, one off of rising a levy, and the 6342 clarifies that... The 6332 spells out when it's levy, a levy for cash, the entity holding the levy has a period of time for it to turn over the money to the IRS and to the bank. So the IRS is in 21 days later, may not even have the money yet. And then 6342 clarifies that the money realized from the levy, contemplating if something other than the levy itself, will occur at some such a time and then the proceeds from the levy have to actually be applied to pay the tax
. The case kind of turns on the date paid. The statute very clearly says that the interest runs up until the date the tax is paid. Is the levy a payment of the tax? Your honor, it's not. I think when you look at the provisions of the court to obtain the levy, it makes clear that the levy and its court decisions are a white equal decision and the national microcomers decision that have addressed levy's, those decisions make clear that the levy is a provisional remedy. It's a step in the collection process and there's a process through which the IRS issues a notice of levy to the taxpayer and the court party won't be levy saying it's going to issue a levy, an issue is a levy, and then there's a time period during which the IRS has to actually go in, get that money, and it has constructed what the Supreme Court is called a constructive interest in the money once it's levy, but it doesn't actually have the money. The court disputes that he says that you have all control over those funds once you have levy done more. I think that's inconsistent with Supreme Court President and the internal revenue code, which in the way it holds case for example, the IRS had levy done money and then the court had elevated the bankruptcy code until the money was actually applied to pay attack, the IRS could be forced to return that money to the bankruptcy code under Section 532, I believe the bankruptcy code. And for example, Section 632, the internal revenue code, the actually when the IRS issues the levy, then what happens is for example it's to a ban for cash, the cat bank has 21 days in which to turn over that money. So they're actually in the code generally, all the levy provisions, the kind of lights, the periods of time where the IRS and levy and then at some such point of time realize the assets and actually apply it to a specific payment. So that's all the 6332 code provisions? I think one of the series of key code provisions, I think the fact that you have several different code provisions, one off of 16331, one off of rising a levy, and the 6342 clarifies that... The 6332 spells out when it's levy, a levy for cash, the entity holding the levy has a period of time for it to turn over the money to the IRS and to the bank. So the IRS is in 21 days later, may not even have the money yet. And then 6342 clarifies that the money realized from the levy, contemplating if something other than the levy itself, will occur at some such a time and then the proceeds from the levy have to actually be applied to pay the tax. And if those series of sections together with the Supreme Court precedent make very clear that a levy is not equivalent to a paying the tax. And the version then makes clear that even though the IRS may have some possessory interest in that money after the levy occurs and it's not controlled over it, it's not enough to make it a payment. And to let payment occurs, unpayment interest continues to accrue because there could be a situation where somehow a third party of scones with the money or whatever in the various different situations where the IRS might decide to release the levy or to provision for release the levy, for whatever reason the IRS might never realize those funds. And here the IRS never actually realized funds and got the benefit of the government to use it for government purposes like fighting a war, building a bridge, whatever government wants to spend it on. The government then did that while the levy was executed and the funds for them seized pursuant the levy that in accordance with the agreement reached in the escrow agreement those funds were not applied to any tax assessment they were instead placed in escrow. And under the Roseman case that's not the equivalent of a payment where funds are affected by the placed in escrow which is exactly what we have here. We have a party spelling out that this is an escrow and not a payment in their agreement. Then no payment of tax occurs and under payment interest continues to accrue. And that makes sense here in terms of the relative price for parties because tax payers here got the benefit that was our levy fund, they got a chance to have their funds not be immediately liquidated to pay their tax but rather to have the value preserve which was a deal. So according to the escrow agreement and the stipulation here was reserved for them and they got the ability to access those funds for the personal and business expenses up to about $2 million so of course the escrow. Whereas the government got no interest on the levy that was held in escrow and no benefit from that money except for security. Still something, I even had the question I asked the Carl and I said that my understanding was that his claim was for the interest that the tax payers paid times the settlement, the tax court litigation and the stipulation had given them the rights to claim that interest. That is correct. That was the interest on the under payment. On the under payment tax
. And if those series of sections together with the Supreme Court precedent make very clear that a levy is not equivalent to a paying the tax. And the version then makes clear that even though the IRS may have some possessory interest in that money after the levy occurs and it's not controlled over it, it's not enough to make it a payment. And to let payment occurs, unpayment interest continues to accrue because there could be a situation where somehow a third party of scones with the money or whatever in the various different situations where the IRS might decide to release the levy or to provision for release the levy, for whatever reason the IRS might never realize those funds. And here the IRS never actually realized funds and got the benefit of the government to use it for government purposes like fighting a war, building a bridge, whatever government wants to spend it on. The government then did that while the levy was executed and the funds for them seized pursuant the levy that in accordance with the agreement reached in the escrow agreement those funds were not applied to any tax assessment they were instead placed in escrow. And under the Roseman case that's not the equivalent of a payment where funds are affected by the placed in escrow which is exactly what we have here. We have a party spelling out that this is an escrow and not a payment in their agreement. Then no payment of tax occurs and under payment interest continues to accrue. And that makes sense here in terms of the relative price for parties because tax payers here got the benefit that was our levy fund, they got a chance to have their funds not be immediately liquidated to pay their tax but rather to have the value preserve which was a deal. So according to the escrow agreement and the stipulation here was reserved for them and they got the ability to access those funds for the personal and business expenses up to about $2 million so of course the escrow. Whereas the government got no interest on the levy that was held in escrow and no benefit from that money except for security. Still something, I even had the question I asked the Carl and I said that my understanding was that his claim was for the interest that the tax payers paid times the settlement, the tax court litigation and the stipulation had given them the rights to claim that interest. That is correct. That was the interest on the under payment. On the under payment tax. I understood that you were saying his briefs, we are in time to have that fact. He is saying I think yes, but he is in time to have the time to have the payment back. Because the payment had been made and therefore as of the day of the levy the under payment interest should have ceased to accrue and so for these five years between the levy and the time a check was actually should have paid the tax. There should be no under payment interest. I understand. I would have thought this claim he is making with the, as I understood he is saying that he is also as a claimer. I don't recall seeing this. Maybe I missed it. Did you hear him saying when he was up to podium that there is also a claim for additional interest on the funds that were in the escrow account because the IRS wasn't using the high enough interest rate? I did hear him say that at the podium I don't think he can assert that claim on a appeal. First of all, I don't think it was raised in the refund claims or in the court's below or in its complaint or in any of those arguments. Do you see the low of a brief? I think there was some language in the brief that I thought could possibly have been read that way. But I was not sure that was what he was saying when I was reading a brief. But hearing him say it here, I think that is what he is saying. But it definitely was not raised in the refund claim or in the court's below. So you guys saying this claim, whatever illusions there made me to it in the brief before us, was not raised below? I have not really raised below your honor
. I understood that you were saying his briefs, we are in time to have that fact. He is saying I think yes, but he is in time to have the time to have the payment back. Because the payment had been made and therefore as of the day of the levy the under payment interest should have ceased to accrue and so for these five years between the levy and the time a check was actually should have paid the tax. There should be no under payment interest. I understand. I would have thought this claim he is making with the, as I understood he is saying that he is also as a claimer. I don't recall seeing this. Maybe I missed it. Did you hear him saying when he was up to podium that there is also a claim for additional interest on the funds that were in the escrow account because the IRS wasn't using the high enough interest rate? I did hear him say that at the podium I don't think he can assert that claim on a appeal. First of all, I don't think it was raised in the refund claims or in the court's below or in its complaint or in any of those arguments. Do you see the low of a brief? I think there was some language in the brief that I thought could possibly have been read that way. But I was not sure that was what he was saying when I was reading a brief. But hearing him say it here, I think that is what he is saying. But it definitely was not raised in the refund claim or in the court's below. So you guys saying this claim, whatever illusions there made me to it in the brief before us, was not raised below? I have not really raised below your honor. Either in the refund claim or in the complaint or in the argument below. I guess I also point out that in the tax court litigation that finally resolved tax payers tax liability to these years of issue including interest claims. And in fact, the court's federal claim is one of its decisions below the government action made an argument that it should be a begin additional interest. And that was rejected. And we are going to appeal that issue. I think we concluded that that is the correct result. Because the tax court stipulation resolves all issues regarding to the tax tax liability. Except this is one reserved issue where they reserve the right to dispute the amount of interpayment interest to do. And that is the only thing that is not raised due to the cost of respect to how much interest was out here. And so I think that is what we are left with. The only thing that they could raise is the interpayment interest. There is no claim, there is also no claim below that they were entitled to additional interest on the S-curve funds. They received all the S-curve, all the women that were earned by the cash in S-curve. And that is all they were entitled to and all the claim below. I just like to point out that this is not raised on a plain slate here
. Either in the refund claim or in the complaint or in the argument below. I guess I also point out that in the tax court litigation that finally resolved tax payers tax liability to these years of issue including interest claims. And in fact, the court's federal claim is one of its decisions below the government action made an argument that it should be a begin additional interest. And that was rejected. And we are going to appeal that issue. I think we concluded that that is the correct result. Because the tax court stipulation resolves all issues regarding to the tax tax liability. Except this is one reserved issue where they reserve the right to dispute the amount of interpayment interest to do. And that is the only thing that is not raised due to the cost of respect to how much interest was out here. And so I think that is what we are left with. The only thing that they could raise is the interpayment interest. There is no claim, there is also no claim below that they were entitled to additional interest on the S-curve funds. They received all the S-curve, all the women that were earned by the cash in S-curve. And that is all they were entitled to and all the claim below. I just like to point out that this is not raised on a plain slate here. This is the exact same argument with raise and litigation that just for the dominant asserted in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, the case that you are currently pursuing are for the reason why I am here. And that was affirmed by the court circuit. And he made the exact same claims under the exact same S-curve movement that he was entitled to recover under claim interest and the District Court for the District of Maryland and for the Circuit rejected that argument. And I think there is no reason to reach a different result here and create a circuit split in that regard. And Mr. DiPierre has briefed that he makes an argument that somehow this case is different because this case is involved cash levies, where the divorce of one opinion involved non-cash assets. But I think there is no factual basis for that distinction because if you look at the S-curve agreement, all three of the divorce of taxpayers, the two brothers and the corporation, all had a variety of assets, including cash bank accounts as well as brokerage accounts, real estate, partnership interest. So I think there is not a factual distinction on that basis. And even if we were just dealing with cash here, it fact remains that the cash remember applied paid tax instead of partying to this S-curve agreement in the place of the money that was led to the crime or all the assets that were led to the crime in S-curve before they actually got to the point of applying money to pay tax. I don't like to just briefly touch on the suggestion that the cash-the-cash-bond provisions are relevant here. In the order of one, the district court for the district of Maryland concluded that this was not a cash-bond arrangement and the government's never continued this is a cash-bond arrangement. The cash-bond is specialized in the stance for a taxpayer who wants to litigate the tax court, can avoid unpayment expenses accruing by taking certain steps to post a cash-bond. And that wasn't what happened here, so this is not a cash-bond situation. And to the extent that the tax-bearer is briefed to just, then it has to be their payment cash-bond. It's not
. This is the exact same argument with raise and litigation that just for the dominant asserted in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, the case that you are currently pursuing are for the reason why I am here. And that was affirmed by the court circuit. And he made the exact same claims under the exact same S-curve movement that he was entitled to recover under claim interest and the District Court for the District of Maryland and for the Circuit rejected that argument. And I think there is no reason to reach a different result here and create a circuit split in that regard. And Mr. DiPierre has briefed that he makes an argument that somehow this case is different because this case is involved cash levies, where the divorce of one opinion involved non-cash assets. But I think there is no factual basis for that distinction because if you look at the S-curve agreement, all three of the divorce of taxpayers, the two brothers and the corporation, all had a variety of assets, including cash bank accounts as well as brokerage accounts, real estate, partnership interest. So I think there is not a factual distinction on that basis. And even if we were just dealing with cash here, it fact remains that the cash remember applied paid tax instead of partying to this S-curve agreement in the place of the money that was led to the crime or all the assets that were led to the crime in S-curve before they actually got to the point of applying money to pay tax. I don't like to just briefly touch on the suggestion that the cash-the-cash-bond provisions are relevant here. In the order of one, the district court for the district of Maryland concluded that this was not a cash-bond arrangement and the government's never continued this is a cash-bond arrangement. The cash-bond is specialized in the stance for a taxpayer who wants to litigate the tax court, can avoid unpayment expenses accruing by taking certain steps to post a cash-bond. And that wasn't what happened here, so this is not a cash-bond situation. And to the extent that the tax-bearer is briefed to just, then it has to be their payment cash-bond. It's not. Are there any further questions from the court? Senator, could you put a question to that? Thank you very much. Nice to see you. Mr. General, we have about two minutes. Thank you. I know of your arguments, Mr. D. Carroll, is that you somehow got less than the interest rate you wish to receive on the money that was in the S-curve account. That's right, you are. But if you look at page 163, you agree to the interest procedure for the S-curve account. You agree that those will be invested with the Federal-insured Bank or savings alone in the certificates of deposit. That's part of your agreement, so it's a agree to that interest rate, is that correct? Well, I mean, that's what it says in the S-curve agreement. However, that S-curve agreement came about as a result of a district court challenge of the Jeopardy Assessment. And so both parties agree to that. You can't say the standard party, even before you agreed to it, and so it's a little hard for you to contest at this point that that's not something you two were aware of
. Are there any further questions from the court? Senator, could you put a question to that? Thank you very much. Nice to see you. Mr. General, we have about two minutes. Thank you. I know of your arguments, Mr. D. Carroll, is that you somehow got less than the interest rate you wish to receive on the money that was in the S-curve account. That's right, you are. But if you look at page 163, you agree to the interest procedure for the S-curve account. You agree that those will be invested with the Federal-insured Bank or savings alone in the certificates of deposit. That's part of your agreement, so it's a agree to that interest rate, is that correct? Well, I mean, that's what it says in the S-curve agreement. However, that S-curve agreement came about as a result of a district court challenge of the Jeopardy Assessment. And so both parties agree to that. You can't say the standard party, even before you agreed to it, and so it's a little hard for you to contest at this point that that's not something you two were aware of. But we're not saying that now. The chair of Regents buy it. I would definitely graduate this by it because the agreement was followed preceded by a levy among these assets. And under white pools, you can take it under white pools and in the other case, the jurisdiction between levy and liquid assets and non-liquid assets. So, do you care where are the records that showed you raising this point, as well? Give me the levy pools? No, the argument... Well, where? The other payment of the old payment of the interest. The other payment of the interest? Your Honor, I'm going to say that I'm going to acknowledge, I just re-write the claim for refunds, the claim for refunds, as a claim for other payment of interest. So, this reminded me that we're going to be stuck with the... what is that in the claim? And I may have to argue a lot about that, I don't think it's relevant for purposes of these proceedings. So, when you're saying that, and I want to make sure you understand this, you're saying that for purposes of these proceedings, the appeal before us, you are not asserting entitlement to additional interest on the funds in the escrow camp. While I am asserting that, I'm acknowledging the fact that the claim says, this is a claim for refunds, interest payment of the rose is under pay
. But we're not saying that now. The chair of Regents buy it. I would definitely graduate this by it because the agreement was followed preceded by a levy among these assets. And under white pools, you can take it under white pools and in the other case, the jurisdiction between levy and liquid assets and non-liquid assets. So, do you care where are the records that showed you raising this point, as well? Give me the levy pools? No, the argument... Well, where? The other payment of the old payment of the interest. The other payment of the interest? Your Honor, I'm going to say that I'm going to acknowledge, I just re-write the claim for refunds, the claim for refunds, as a claim for other payment of interest. So, this reminded me that we're going to be stuck with the... what is that in the claim? And I may have to argue a lot about that, I don't think it's relevant for purposes of these proceedings. So, when you're saying that, and I want to make sure you understand this, you're saying that for purposes of these proceedings, the appeal before us, you are not asserting entitlement to additional interest on the funds in the escrow camp. While I am asserting that, I'm acknowledging the fact that the claim says, this is a claim for refunds, interest payment of the rose is under pay. That's what it says in the interest. So, this claim that we... our TQ, our TQ, are the things that we're not raised below. No, it wasn't. Right, up below. All right. All right. I mean, I got 18 seconds. You know, I give a text to your past. Oh, sorry. I'm sorry. Thank you very much. Thank you
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