Legal Case Summary

Lawson v. FMR LLC


Date Argued: Tue Nov 12 2013
Case Number: 146440
Docket Number: 2599645
Judges:Not available
Duration: 61 minutes
Court Name: Supreme Court

Case Summary

**Case Summary: Lawson v. FMR LLC** **Docket Number:** 2599645 **Court:** United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit **Date Decided:** [Insert Date] **Background:** The case of Lawson v. FMR LLC revolved around employee protections under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). The plaintiff, Lawson, a former employee of FMR LLC, alleged that he had been terminated in retaliation for whistleblowing activities. Lawson claimed he reported potential violations related to financial practices and accounting irregularities within the company. **Legal Issues:** The primary legal issues involved the interpretation of the whistleblower protections under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, specifically addressing: 1. Whether Lawson's communications constituted protected whistleblowing under SOX. 2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that his termination was the result of retaliation due to his whistleblowing activities. **Arguments:** - **Plaintiff's Argument:** Lawson argued that his internal reports regarding unethical financial practices were protected disclosures. He maintained that his firing shortly after these disclosures was clear evidence of retaliation. - **Defendant's Argument:** FMR LLC contended that the decision to terminate Lawson was based on legitimate non-retaliatory reasons unrelated to his reports. The company argued that Lawson's performance issues and misconduct justified the termination. **Court's Analysis:** The court scrutinized the evidentiary standards for proving retaliation under SOX, assessing the timeline of events surrounding Lawson's reports and his subsequent termination. The analysis focused on whether Lawson had demonstrated that his disclosures were a contributing factor in the decision to terminate him and examined the employer’s motives. **Holding:** The court ultimately held that Lawson's whistleblower disclosures were indeed protected under SOX, and the evidence presented established a causal connection between his engagement in protected activity and his termination. The court ruled in favor of Lawson, emphasizing the importance of protective measures for employees who disclose violations of law. **Conclusion:** This case set a significant precedent regarding the application of whistleblower protections under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, affirming that employees should not suffer retaliation for reporting misconduct. Lawson v. FMR LLC reinforced the legal framework protecting whistleblowers, underscoring the seriousness with which courts view retaliatory termination linked to reporting of corporate wrongdoing. **Significance:** The Lawson v. FMR LLC decision has important implications for both employers and employees, clarifying the extent of protections available to whistleblowers and establishing benchmarks for evaluating retaliation claims under federal law. (Note: Confirm the exact decision date and additional details as needed, as this summary is a general overview.)

Lawson v. FMR LLC


Oral Audio Transcript(Beta version)

We will hear argument next in case 12-3, Lawson and Zang versus FMR LLC. Mr. Schnapper? Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Section 1514A is written in the classic language which Congress utilizes to regulate relationships between employees and their employers. Legislation regarding how an entity is to treat an employee is understood to refer to the entities own employees. And that is particularly true here where the phrase terms and conditions of employment is used in the statute. If Section 1514A forbade only contractors to retaliate against employees in the terms and conditions of their employment, I don't think there would be any question that the courts would understand it was referring to the contractors own employees. The statute has the same meaning even though it's combined in this instance with prohibitions against retaliation by other types of employees. The first circuit's decision, interpreting 1514A to permit a contractor to retaliate against own employees, is inconsistent with this general usage. And it leads to four implausible consequences. First, it renders the statutory language regarding contractors virtually meaningless. Secondly, it renders that language with regard to contractors in the mutual fund industry literally meaningless. Third, it has the implausible consequence of permitting the very type of retaliation that we know Congress was concerned about. Retaliation by an accountant such as Arthur Anders. And finally, it renders incoherent the provisions in 1514A and the related remedial provision regarding Sienter, the burdener proof and an affirmative defense. Is it your position that employees of any officer employee contractor subcontractor or agent of a public company are covered? They're all covered? I'm not. It's our position that employees of contractors and subcontractors are covered. All employees, or would you remember this? To the ones that had a hand in executing the contract? We, if I understand the question correctly, we have not taken a position and the standard we advanced does not address the question of a personal employee of an employee, such as the Kennlase button. Well, if it doesn't raise distinct issues. It doesn't include that, then how do you avoid that with your reading of the text? Our view of this is that the meaning of the term employee depends on the context which it's used and it ought to be assessed separately for each of the actors. So when it says no publicly traded company may retaliate against an employee, it means an employee of the publicly traded company. But and the same thing with contractor and subcontractor. But if we had a statute which by itself said no employee of personal employee, no employee of an officer shall do something. The normal reading of that would be to refer to an employee of the officer's company. And we have statutes that impose personal liability on officials for things they're doing in their companies and that's the way they read. So it's all sort of peculiar. I mean, I really, I don't see how you can piece it out like that. That it includes employees of contractor subcontractors, but not of any officer. But let me ask you this, if it does include employees of an officer, is it as much of a disaster as your opponent suggests? That is to say, would a firing for something that had nothing to do with the securities laws be swept in? The statute for bids retaliation for protected activity related either to the securities law or to certain criminal fraud provisions

. And that's quite deliberate. The statute, the sub-ensoctually is not limited to corporate misdeeds and related things. Title eight and title nine also deal specific, deal much more broadly with criminal fraud. Title nine increases the penalty for wild fraud and mail fraud without regard to whether it has to, it was by a corporation or an individual. But it is limited in the fraud statute. It is limited to those subjects and is the personal employee of an officer likely to be involved with any of those subjects. No, Your Honor. They're unlikely to know of such things. But the Congress deliberately wrote the statute to deal with ordinary, wire and mail fraud, not just corporate public company related fraud. The statute is broader than that. So what's the limitation that is, if you argument against throwing the contractors in the way you want? I think as well then there's no limitation. So a company that, let's say, is a publicly traded company has a lives in a, they have a building and they hire a gardener. And the gardener is a gardening company and it has three employees and it works one day a week cutting their lawn and it works four days a week cutting somebody else's lawn. And is the mail fraud and then they fire one of the three employees or two and he gets annoyed and says it was because of fraud. Now the fraud has nothing to do with the company that they're cutting the lawn for. It has to do with some other customers. So what, how do, I don't think the statute intends to get that. I mean, it was it want to make every mom and pop shop in the country with they have one employee suddenly subject to the whistleblower protection for any fraud, even those frauds that have nothing to do with any publicly traded company. This is not really this case. But I'm trying to foresee, is it, are you arguing for no limitation or this? Well, I think there are two relevant limitations here. One of them, statutory and one of the practice. The statutory one is that although it wouldn't deal with, I think the situation hypothesized that the counter party, so to speak, over the public company, has to be, is described as a contractor. And we think that is not anyone who has ever had a contract with a public company. Contractor in ordinary parlance refers to an ongoing relationship. The paradigm is someone providing services on an ongoing basis, which of course fits lawyers and accountants perfectly. And so if someone from a private firm goes down to Walmart buys a box of rubber bands, that one ordinary parlance wouldn't be referred to as a contractor. So we think there's a practical matter that rules out most mom and pops stores, they don't have that kind of relationship with you. Of course it is. It also rules out the accounting firm that's only used once, right? Well, it would have to be very fast

. I mean, I think an audit takes some time, but if you had someone come in for it. Well, you just hire them for this one audit. Or are they a contractor? I think an audit takes long enough that they would be. It's not like the moments that it takes to buy something at the gift shop downstairs. I think it typically takes weeks if not months. And I think in ordinary parlance you would call someone a contractor in those circumstances. So you could have limited it as also ruling out frauds by companies that are not publicly traded themselves, of course, but where the fraud has nothing to do with the contract. That is the whole activity just has nothing to do with the contract. It's just chance that they have never contract something. That's the way the Congress wrote the statute. And we think for two kinds of reasons. First of all, that the statute is also about, as you put it, guard variety fraud. It's increased the penalty for wire fraud, for mail fraud. For the first time there's a provision for attempts and conspiracy. It is an anti-fraud statute in addition to dealing with the N-RON issues. So we think that's deliberate. Secondly, Your Honor, although I'm not sure. Does that mean yes or no to his question? I have to remember the exact question. Can you rule out frauds where the fraud had issued as absolutely nothing to do with the contract? The statute isn't written that way. That's the position that the SEC took in its amicus brief to the first circuit. It said Section 806 applies where employees of the contractor are reporting possible violations of law by the public company for which the company was not. The contractor is performing work. So it did put a limitation on of the kind that Justice Breyer is suggested. In other words, yes, employees of the contractor, but only when the employees are engaged, you know, only when the violations of law that the employee is reporting relates to the work that the contractor is doing for the publicly held company. Do you think that that's a possible reading of the statute or not? It's certainly possible. We think it's not the correct reading. And there's a, I think I'm, it's the possible reading, but we think it's not the correct reasons. So you're rejecting the district or its limitations as well? Yes, we are. Why is it a possible reading? All right, well, I guess it makes a lot of sense

. I'm not sure. I don't want to go down that road. That's not our view. I don't want to go down that road. I suppose? Justice Breyer, the road is when you see a statute that says any policeman, they don't mean a policeman on Mars, nor are they likely to mean a policeman in Europe. The any policeman is likely, although it says any policeman, to mean policeman in the United States. And similarly, where they talk about this, the contractors, they don't mean frauds related to, you have to use a, some kind of scope for the word, for the kinds of frauds that are included in the statute, and you have to read that in to language that says nothing about it. And that's, I don't say that that's necessarily easy to do, and that's why I started with my first question. I, I say, we, we think that's, we, we think that's not the correct reading of the statute for a couple of reasons. Another one is that we think that unlikely, I mean, over and above the fact that Congress was concerned with fraud generally, the, was that I think Congress would have been reluctant to try to define what was sufficiently related to the corporation. Well, to go back to Justice Breyer's hypothetical, which gets at this point where you have the gardening, the gardening company privately held that's working for a public company, and there's some kind of an employee of the subcont, of the contractor is fired and claims that the company is engaging in some kind of fraud that has nothing to do with the public company. So you have that situation. Now you have the identical, another privately held gardening company, exactly the same thing is going on, except they don't have a contract with a public company. Why would Congress have wanted to cover the former and not the latter? Just to leave, I think that's just the way they wrote the statute. They were concerned with all fraud, but they didn't extend the whistleblowers to all the why. Well, I think, concerned with all fraud, why not cover them both? Well, this is sort of a hybrid piece of legislation dealing with corporate problems and fraud, and they kind of meld of the two here. But I think there is also important in this situation to bear in mind the following point. I think Congress would have, it didn't itself draw a line because the experience of the Enron scandal was that all sorts of terribly complicated arrangements had been drawn up between Enron and these hundreds of off the books entities, Jedi, Raptors, LJM and the like. I think Congress correctly concluded that if it tried to write out a description of what else it was covering, someone would think of a way to get around it. And I think it certainly wouldn't have contemplated that federal courts were to try to untangle these relationships to the point where they could figure out whether, for example, if Andrew Fasto was skimming off money from Chukka, whether that would be sufficiently related to Enron. It's just enormously complicated, and I think Congress didn't mean to open the door to that. And that brought home by the fact that this statute is written more broadly than Air 21. Stature model on Air 21, which is a statute dubbed a couple of years earlier about whistle blowing in the airline industry, particularly with regard to safety work. In that statute, contractor is specifically defined to mean an airline contractor dealing with safety. They did not put that kind of limitation here. And I think it, in part because it would simply have been very difficult to do. And I don't think they meant to give the courts the commission to try to sort that sort of thing out. The core problem with the interpretation of the court appeals is that it really renders almost meaningless the decision of Congress to prohibit retaliation by contractors as subcontractors. Contractors and subcontractors would rarely be in a position to engage in retaliation, but particularly to engage in the very specific kind of retaliation specified in the statute

. Retaliation in the terms and conditions of employment. Is one of the limitations in the statute where it says in sub one to provide information relating to fraud against the shareholders. Do you think shareholders mean just the shareholders of the public company? Or does it mean shareholders of the contract? Suppose you have an accountant, which is a shareholders in it. And there's a fraud with the accounting firm, and it hurts the shareholders of the accounting firm, but not the company that's registered. It's a limited. Chairholders, and I would describe just to the public, a registered company. I would think so, but you would think so. I think so. But these clauses in an alternative, it may, a report would be protected if it involves a violation of 1341 or 134348, which aren't limited to shareholders. So fraud against shareholders just modifies the last clause or an evaluation is better or less the last clause. With all the court's permission, I'd like to reserve the balance at my time. Thank you, counsel. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The statute protects an employee of a contractor from retaliation. That's what the text says. That's what Congress intended to cover these accountants, lawyers, and outside auditors who are so central to the fall of N-Ron. I'd like to array to some of the questions that the court had about the limits of the statute and how it would be applied. Now, of course, what we're talking about here is really the core of the statute, a contractor retaliating against its own employees. And we think that when the first circuit said that that is unambiguously not covered by the statute that it's wrong. But moving beyond that, assuming that that is covered and asking some of these questions or answering some of these questions about the limit. First of all, as Justice Scalia suggested, the statute applies to individuals who are in a position who have information about fraud or securities law violations are in a position to report it. So it is very unlikely that that would be the gardener. It's incredibly likely that it would be an accountant or auditor, like a person who worked for Arthur Anderson. It's not unlikely that an employee of a subcontractor will have information about something that can be a ledge to be male fraud by the contractor. That's not at all unlikely. If you see some civil recon complaints, you see the kind of things that are alleged as male fraud. Right. I disagree with that

. No, but I think it raises your question, raises another limitation on the statute, which is when the statute talks about contractors and subcontractors, its contractor of a public company so that it's talking about the contractor working in its capacity for the public company, not the contractor doing some other type of work. So if the contractors work is for the public company and there is fraud being committed by the contractor, yes, that is something that Congress was concerned about. It was concerned about the fact that Arthur Anderson was committing fraud. But you think this is limited to fraud by the contractor relating to the public company, not fraud that has nothing to do with the public company? I think that it can be fraud by the contractor while the contractor is fulfilling its role as a contractor for the public company, not the contractor. While, during the same period of time or in the police. In that capacity, in that capacity. And where do you see that in the statute? Of such company, the words contractor and subcontractor of such company. Now it's a- It's the contractor of such company, not the fraud of such company. Right, but we think that when you're reading the statute holistically that that's the most natural reading. Now I point out here that these are not questions at the courts of appeals or the public. The argument that I just said to the reason that I brought this up is because I think that the strongest argument in those courts of appeals that held against you is that they fear that otherwise this statute would create any fraud by any gardener, any cook, anybody that had one employee in the entire United States and engaged in any alleged fraud would be covered. But it seems to me there are many ways to skin that cat. And one way that I suggested, now Mr. Stavras said, no, that's that kind of thing related to the contract isn't going to work very well because it's too complicated to try to figure out. So maybe we don't have to figure it out in this case. I mean, that's possible. I just wanted a universe of possibilities. Yes, I think this is a completely understandable concern that was raised by the first circuit. I have several responses to it. First of all, I don't think you need to decide it in this case. This is a fairly mainstream application. Second of all, this is the kind of thing that the expert agency should consider in the first instance. There have not been cases except for the spinner case that really have considered these questions about contractors and subcontractors. In the history of this statute, there are only about 20 published cases that have ever reached the court. You say this is a mainstream application. We still have to give a rule. Do we write in the opinion? This is a mainstream application case and therefore it is so confined. That doesn't make any sense. No, Justice Kennedy, my suggestion was because the court doesn't have to decide some of these more far-fetched applications of the statute in this case that it should leave it to the expert agency in the first instance

. Well, that was your second point. Your first point was just talk about the mainstream in this case and leave other cases. But I don't see how you can do that and interpret the statute. That's what I'm asking. Your statutory interpretation rule to keep this to mainstream is what? I'm sorry, I should be more clear. What we think that this court should say is that the natural reading of this provision covers, protects employees of contractors. The first circuit said that employees of contractors are not protected at all from retaliation. I understand that. And I think that's a plausible reading. I don't see how it's confined to so-called mainstream, which is what we're talking about. What I was trying to suggest, Justice Kennedy, is that this is a contractor retaliating against its own employees and it's within the work that the contractor is doing for the mutual fund. This is investment advising. This is the heart of what contractors of mutual funds do. I understand that, but I think you're- I don't agree with you that we don't have to get into these other situations. Because to my mind, the principal argument made by the respondent is if you read the statute literally the way you like, it covers a wide range of things that one would have no reason to believe Congress wanted to cover. And unless you come up with some limiting principle that eliminates that argument, I'm not inclined to go along with your broad interpretation of the statute. So I at least do have to grapple with whether there are limitations. With what is the central mainstream of the statute and what is outside the statute? Right. And what we're saying is that there are- there are several limitations. The first is that it has to be in a person who is in a position to detect and report the types of fraud and securities violations that are included in the statute. Second, we think that the contractor of such company refers to the contractor in that role working for the public company. Third, the expert agency that is considered this question has looked at whether there would be a floodgates open. And it has concluded in this is on page 166 of the petition appendix that there are built-in limits that there would not be those floodgates. And fourth, I can tell you is an empirical matter that no floodgates have been opened. The Department of Labor has consistently interpreted the statute this way since the beginning of SOX. And you'll find on OSHA's website that it's only 150 or maybe 200 complaints per year that are filed with the agency. Mr. Karskick, if I can take you back to second, this contractor of such company, you're saying we can read that to impose a limitation that it's not anything that the contractor does in any capacity for anybody whether relating to the contract or not. We could instead read it as, you know, if the contractor means the entity doing a particular contract for a particular public company

. Is that correct? Do I get that? Yes. In other words, inherent in the word contractor or in the phrase contractor of such company is a sort of status of a company and that one should not read this statute as applying outside that particular status. I think that that's right. And the only thing that I would add to that is that it could be fraud that's being reported that the contractor is engaging in fraud in that contract or that the public company is engaging in fraud. But Congress would have wanted both those covered. It was Arthur Anderson and Anne and Ron that were involved in the fraud. This is not the petitioner's position, however. The petitioner takes a broader interpretation as I understood him. That is my understanding as well. But I think on the main question that's raised by this case, which is whether contractors can ever be covered. And the first circuit said that they can't. We're in complete agreement. I also want to point this Court to the Board's opinion in this case, which we think is entitled to Chevron on different deference. It's an exceptionally thorough opinion, which, of course, went up. But it came up. I mean, we are reviewing a decision of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. And this spinner case from the ARB host dates, we have a district court, a Court of Appeals, Chevron didn't raise its head until after the First Circuit was through with the case. So how does Chevron come into this particular case? It's because the agency has been given this authority. And the Court has faced cases before where it has afforded Chevron deference, even though that was not an issue considered by the Court of Appeals, I'd point the Court to INS versus a Gare, a Gare. It's the Congress has entrusted this expert agency with making decisions through formal adjudication. Even though it delegated rulemaking authority to a different agency, right? No. There is no rulemaking authority for this provision under 1514A delegated. And then why is the DSEC? Sorry. And this, SEC has no rulemaking authority that would cover this provision? Not for this provision, for other parts of SOX, yes, but the anti-retaliation provision in SOX, like about 20 other anti-retaliation provisions, is entirely handled by the Department of Labor, and it's entirely handled through formal adjudication. As I understand, the ARB decisions, they said that they were bound by OSHA's interpretation, right? They said that, but then they also cited the whole term. And OSHA made it quite clear in its interpretation that it, in its rule, that it had no authority to issue statutory interpretations. It said that it was not providing an interpretation, but I want to make sure the Court realizes that there are many other things that the Spinner decision relied on. I'd point the Court to footnote 8, page 143 of the Board's decision where it says, in addition to this regulation, we're relying on several of our prior decisions, many of which do not even cite the regulation, and our decades of experience in looking at similar statutes like AR-21. So to think that- So we should ignore the part where it said it's bound by OSHA's interpretation? I don't think that the agency should be worse off because everyone who has considered this question within the agency has come to the same conclusion over a period of a decade

. Thank you, Council. Mr. Perry? Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court? Justice Alito asked, why didn't Congress say all employer or no employers? There are approximately 40 whistleblower statutes on the books as of today, Your Honors. And more than 30 of them, in fact, 36 of them are phrased exactly that way. They say no employer may retaliate, or any employer is prohibited from retaliating. This statute is not phrased that way. This statute, which Congress could have written that way, and Dodd-Frank 922, is written that way, this statute is written quite differently. This statute says no public company may retaliate, and then it has a subordinate clause. And the subordinate clause is what's the issue here that references officers, employees, contractors, subcontractors, and agents. Justice Alito also asked, my friend, Mr. Schnapper, do you contend that the same construction should be given to officers and to contractors, and he acknowledged that they have to say no? Because the ARB has also said no. In other words, an employee, the phrase that we are construing at the bottom of all of these turtles, is different, they say, for officers and employees and agents, presumably, then for contractors and subcontractors. But that doesn't fit with the statute. It doesn't fit with the tools of statutory construction, and it doesn't fit with what Congress was trying to do here. This was the failure of Enron. This was a bankruptcy situation. Congress was acutely aware that corporate bankruptcies, failures, left victims high and dry. One of the other provisions in this title, Section 803, specifically deals with the discharge ability of shareholder fraud debts in bankruptcy. And what the subordinate clause that added these corporate representatives does is make sure that if the employer, the public company, goes out of business the way Enron had just done, somebody is on the hook for the money damages that Congress authorized for these employees, like Sharon Watkins. It's a very simple regime to make sure that the victim, the whistleblower, is not left high and dry if the company that is by hypothesis riddled with fraud goes out of business. What happens if another Enron situation comes along and the corporations accounting firm retaliates against an employee of the accounting firm because that employee wants to report illegal activity by the corporation. Just as a leader, the accounting firms are not covered by 806 and let me explain that. Accountants, accounting firms and auditors are referenced by name 153 times in the Sarbanes Oxley Act, including in Section 802 in this title. It says no accountant shall shred documents. 806 doesn't refer to accountants anywhere. It refers to contractors. And nowhere in the account can be in contract. No, you're honor because the contractor is being referred to here

. There's nothing in the statute, nothing in the legislature history that suggests that an accountant is a contractor. And more importantly, the reason for this is- But the bottom line of your argument, Mr. Perry, is that the whistleblower who is working for the accountant, you say there are separate provisions to deal with the accounting firm and the law firm. But the whistleblower who wants to disclose what the fairies thing is going on would have no protection against retaliation by the accounting firm or if it's a law firm, the law firm. Justice Ginsburg, that is the matter that the Congress left to the expert agencies. The accounting firms are regulated by Section 105 and the PCAO- The answer to my question is right. They wouldn't have. You're honor- The whistleblower claim against the accounting firm or the law firm. To this day, the agencies have not written rules requiring that they could. And I would refer the Court respectfully to Section 501 dealing with securities analysts where Congress required the SEC to write a rule protecting whistleblowers at the investment banks that are securities analysts. So when Congress wanted to protect those people, what Congress did for the accountants and lawyers was not to protect whistleblowers. It imposed a mandate. Section 108, if you- You told me that Congress didn't provide for the whistleblower, but it allowed the agency to do so. Correct, Your Honor. Which agency? The SEC for the lawyers, that's Section 307 and the PCAO-B for the accountants, that's Section 105 and Section 10A of the Exchange Act, which is incorporated by reference, Your Honor. What about the ARB? The ARB is nowhere involved with lawyers or accountants as this Court made a decision to make clear in the PCAO-B case. The Congress decided to put the entire accounting profession under the thumb of that new board. That is a purpose-built regulatory agency that regulates birth to death of the accounting industry. And if they want to protect whistleblowers or not protect whistleblowers, that is the board's business. Congress didn't do anything there. What Congress did in 806 was regulate the public companies and their employees. And we can see this. This track is very clearly through the legislative history. The Federal Reserve. When you're going to go through this, I'd appreciate you're telling me in your opinion, what the statute says, taking the extraneous words out, is that no contractor of a publicly traded company made discharge, demote, et cetera, any employee because of his lawful act in reporting abroad. That's what it says. So, what did they have in mind? If they didn't have in mind forbidding any contractor of a publicly traded company from a contractor and maybe their limitations there, but a contractor from demoting an employee because of his lawful act reporting abroad? I may answer that in two steps, Justice Breyer. First, with respect to Court inverted the statute, it actually says, no public company comma or any contract, any, I just eliminated the extraneous words. It's not

. Instead of the word, sought, chai, put it in what sought to refer. It's not extraneous here because it is just subordinating the contractors to the public employees. And what Congress, more importantly, second, what Congress is doing in response to my friend's question with this, a meaningless act. If I could point the court to the Calcunte case. The Calcunte case is an ARB decision from 2009, as cited a page 16 of the government's brief. Here is a bankrupt company and the estate brings in a work out firm, a privately held contractor to wind down the affairs of the company. And this private contractor decides that there's a squeaky wheel employee within the legal department and fires her. And she sews under Section 806, both the estate of the bankrupt company, that is the public company employer and the first primary clause of the statute, and the work out firm. I feel all they're interested in here, you say, is this work out contractor, but not, for example, where you have a fund, which has virtually no employees, and does all its work really through investment advisers, such as here. And you think Congress didn't want to include the investment adviser firing its whistleblower, even if it's directly related to the fraud, the hot fund, and everything else. But it did just want to include the people who are there because the contractor is a work out firm and not the investment adviser. Now, all that's a conceivable reading, I agree. But what is it that leads you to that conclusion other than, you know, three points here, Your Honor. First, when Congress wishes to reach investment advisers, in Sox and elsewhere, it amends the investment company active in 1940 and the Investment Advisers active in 1940. And for this I can point you to Dodd-Frank 922, the parallel whistleblower's provision that my friends haven't talked about, but it is very important here because it does cover all employers. And when Congress covered all employers in Dodd-Frank, it amended the 1940 acts to make clear that investment advisers were included. And the SEC has issued its form, TCR, that applies to investment advisers. Congress didn't do any of that in Sox and elsewhere. Second, we know the very next Congress after Sox and elsewhere took up the Mutual Fund Reform Act, which would have amended Section 806 to include investment advisers, to do exactly what the petitioners in this case say this statute did. Why would Congress have taken up the very next Congress? All the same members were still there. Senator Sox and the other Sarbans were still there, taking up a bill to do that. It's sort of post legislative history, which we usually don't pay attention to. The problem that I have is if the statute does not cover contractors, subcontractors, firing of their own people, what coverage does it have? A subcontractor usually cannot fire somebody from the principal company that's traded on the exchange. Justice Scalia, it's not just firing. It's also harrassing. It's also threatening. These are contracts to do management. I don't know how it can harrass your threat, neither, if it's an employee of another company. Sure, that it has no power to fire. Your Honor, you can, you can, you have contractors that are in the operation. Management consultants and others that are working side by side with the public company employees who can make their lives difficult, who can make their lives intolerable, who can lead to a constructive discharge if it's bad enough. And this Court has said in the Title VII context that that kind of discrimination does not require a supervisory relationship, and these contractors, just like agents and officers and employees, may have that ability to affect the terms and conditions of the public company's employees. You're eliminating the principal contractors who might have that kind of power. You say they're not covered. The accountants and lawyers. Yeah, absolutely. But, you know, if they are, I mean, they are not covered for their own employees. If they were to discriminate against a public company employee, the public company's employees are always protected. That is the subject of this statute, the employees of the public company. Let's look at the title. We know Congress didn't leave a big mystery about who they were protecting here. Whistleblower protection for employees of publicly traded companies. That's what the Congress told us here. Including by accountants and lawyers. Against the public company's employees, actually, absolutely. How so if accountants and lawyers are not contractors? If I said that, I'd misspoke or I didn't say they weren't contractors. They weren't regulated as contractors here because they were specifically regulated as accountants elsewhere. If they fit with the defendant. What is it that they're not regulated as contractors here, unless it means that contractor here does not include that. Let me try to be much clearer. The government makes the point that this statute is written to cover Arthur Anderson. I can't agree with that. Arthur Anderson appears all over the statute and there's two titles of this statute to deal with accountants. Arthur Anderson might be included here if it discriminates against a client, an audit client's employee. That's just a normal contracting or agency relationship. That's what Congress was dealing with. What's not covered is Arthur Anderson retaliating against its own employees. That is what Congress gave to the board to decide

. Your Honor, you can, you can, you have contractors that are in the operation. Management consultants and others that are working side by side with the public company employees who can make their lives difficult, who can make their lives intolerable, who can lead to a constructive discharge if it's bad enough. And this Court has said in the Title VII context that that kind of discrimination does not require a supervisory relationship, and these contractors, just like agents and officers and employees, may have that ability to affect the terms and conditions of the public company's employees. You're eliminating the principal contractors who might have that kind of power. You say they're not covered. The accountants and lawyers. Yeah, absolutely. But, you know, if they are, I mean, they are not covered for their own employees. If they were to discriminate against a public company employee, the public company's employees are always protected. That is the subject of this statute, the employees of the public company. Let's look at the title. We know Congress didn't leave a big mystery about who they were protecting here. Whistleblower protection for employees of publicly traded companies. That's what the Congress told us here. Including by accountants and lawyers. Against the public company's employees, actually, absolutely. How so if accountants and lawyers are not contractors? If I said that, I'd misspoke or I didn't say they weren't contractors. They weren't regulated as contractors here because they were specifically regulated as accountants elsewhere. If they fit with the defendant. What is it that they're not regulated as contractors here, unless it means that contractor here does not include that. Let me try to be much clearer. The government makes the point that this statute is written to cover Arthur Anderson. I can't agree with that. Arthur Anderson appears all over the statute and there's two titles of this statute to deal with accountants. Arthur Anderson might be included here if it discriminates against a client, an audit client's employee. That's just a normal contracting or agency relationship. That's what Congress was dealing with. What's not covered is Arthur Anderson retaliating against its own employees. That is what Congress gave to the board to decide. Or for the lawyers to the SEC to decide. And again, I have to point the Court to Section 501, which ordered the SEC to make a rule protecting securities analysts. Apparently, that's not the view of the SEC because I think they are represented by the government. And the SEC apparently takes the view that this provision does cover contractors, covers lawyers who couldn't be contractors and accounts. Your Honor, they are defending the ARB's decision. I agree with them. The ARB's decision, however, is all comes back to this procedural regulation that OSHA promulgated that they agree is not entitled to deference. So it's not a reasoned articulation of the government's position. It is rather a post-hoc rationalization of what the OSHA said a long time ago. Because it's a lot like the dissent in the first circuit. Your Honor, dissent in the first circuit, like the ARB, I agree. This associates the statute, the language, and employee from its context, from its grammar, from its syntax, from the title of the statute, from the legislative history. I mean, the Senate report, Your Honor, goes through six times to explain what is the problem being addressed. And the Congress says there is no current protection for employees of publicly traded companies. That's a page 18. So what does this legislation do? Section 806. It provides protection for employees of publicly traded companies. That's a page 19. You're right on that. I mean, it is correct that that's what they talk about. And so then that sends us on a search for limitation. You have one limitation. Your limitation says the person who is dismissed has to be an employee of a publicly traded company. Now, the government and even your Mr. Schnatterers come up with accepting some limitations, there are possibly others. One would be on the nature of the contractor, which you want to do, but it would be somewhat broader than yours. Another possibly is on the nature of the fraud, is it related to the contract. Another might be the one the district court proposed, and there could be others. So I think if you want to say anything about this, it seems to me that taking is given, I will for argument sake anyway, say all the legislative history is about publicly traded companies, and I do look at it

. Or for the lawyers to the SEC to decide. And again, I have to point the Court to Section 501, which ordered the SEC to make a rule protecting securities analysts. Apparently, that's not the view of the SEC because I think they are represented by the government. And the SEC apparently takes the view that this provision does cover contractors, covers lawyers who couldn't be contractors and accounts. Your Honor, they are defending the ARB's decision. I agree with them. The ARB's decision, however, is all comes back to this procedural regulation that OSHA promulgated that they agree is not entitled to deference. So it's not a reasoned articulation of the government's position. It is rather a post-hoc rationalization of what the OSHA said a long time ago. Because it's a lot like the dissent in the first circuit. Your Honor, dissent in the first circuit, like the ARB, I agree. This associates the statute, the language, and employee from its context, from its grammar, from its syntax, from the title of the statute, from the legislative history. I mean, the Senate report, Your Honor, goes through six times to explain what is the problem being addressed. And the Congress says there is no current protection for employees of publicly traded companies. That's a page 18. So what does this legislation do? Section 806. It provides protection for employees of publicly traded companies. That's a page 19. You're right on that. I mean, it is correct that that's what they talk about. And so then that sends us on a search for limitation. You have one limitation. Your limitation says the person who is dismissed has to be an employee of a publicly traded company. Now, the government and even your Mr. Schnatterers come up with accepting some limitations, there are possibly others. One would be on the nature of the contractor, which you want to do, but it would be somewhat broader than yours. Another possibly is on the nature of the fraud, is it related to the contract. Another might be the one the district court proposed, and there could be others. So I think if you want to say anything about this, it seems to me that taking is given, I will for argument sake anyway, say all the legislative history is about publicly traded companies, and I do look at it. But nonetheless, they did use this language in their other possible limitations that would serve the same purpose. Then you say to that, saying yours is the best. What? Your Honor, first, the very need for this discussion about limitations, which is found nowhere in the statute and nowhere in the legislative history, is eliminated if the court were to construe the statute as Chief Judge Lynch and the majority did below for that itself. That is a big limitation. That is exactly right. Well, it is the limitation that Congress put in the statute, Your Honor. If we go beyond that, it seems to me universally accepted by my friends on this side that some limitation is needed. It can't be every company with a contract for the public company, except that is what the ARB said a contractor is. And it can't be every kind of misconduct, except that's what the ARB has said this statute covers. And I put it to the Lockheed case, which has nothing to do with fraud against shareholders. This is a run of the mill adulterous affair by a gossip, an office gossip in a supervisor, that the person brings a lawsuit under Section 806 saying that is fraud because she submit her expense accounts. So what we have is, this is fraud under 1343 as wire fraud, Your Honor. Correct. Was that what the fraud was in this statute case? Correct. So Justice Breyer, your gardener, your three-person gardener. There's a couple of problems with it. First, if the same gardener company works for Ken Ley and for Enron, this goes back to Justice Leito's question. My friend's argument is, they are covered when they work for Enron, but not covered when they work for Ken Ley. That's a bizarre reading of the statute, okay? Second, they are covered under all of the so-called limitations that have been offered if the junior gardener thinks her gossip that the senior gardener is having an affair and submitting false expense reports regarding the hotel receipts. That's the facts of the Lockheed case and reports that to the middle gardener and nothing happens and then the junior gardener gets fired because of the economy downturns or something. Well, those, that's an easy hypothetical. What about the butler who does in fact hear all this information about a conspiracy and wire fraud? There are still the state law protections, of course, for public policy and other protections. There is the Dodd-Frank Act. We haven't talked about it enough. Dodd-Frank 922 came in eight years later and said, Congress said, we think we need to do more. We think we need to cover all employers, but we're going to provide more limitations. We're going to require a written submission to the SEC under penalty of perjury and we're going to limit it to securities fraud. So if the butler learns that the boss is doing something untoward, the butler then can go to the SEC and make it complaint, if it's pans out he can even get a bounty under that program. And if he gets fired, he's completely protected, has reinstatement and back pay

. But nonetheless, they did use this language in their other possible limitations that would serve the same purpose. Then you say to that, saying yours is the best. What? Your Honor, first, the very need for this discussion about limitations, which is found nowhere in the statute and nowhere in the legislative history, is eliminated if the court were to construe the statute as Chief Judge Lynch and the majority did below for that itself. That is a big limitation. That is exactly right. Well, it is the limitation that Congress put in the statute, Your Honor. If we go beyond that, it seems to me universally accepted by my friends on this side that some limitation is needed. It can't be every company with a contract for the public company, except that is what the ARB said a contractor is. And it can't be every kind of misconduct, except that's what the ARB has said this statute covers. And I put it to the Lockheed case, which has nothing to do with fraud against shareholders. This is a run of the mill adulterous affair by a gossip, an office gossip in a supervisor, that the person brings a lawsuit under Section 806 saying that is fraud because she submit her expense accounts. So what we have is, this is fraud under 1343 as wire fraud, Your Honor. Correct. Was that what the fraud was in this statute case? Correct. So Justice Breyer, your gardener, your three-person gardener. There's a couple of problems with it. First, if the same gardener company works for Ken Ley and for Enron, this goes back to Justice Leito's question. My friend's argument is, they are covered when they work for Enron, but not covered when they work for Ken Ley. That's a bizarre reading of the statute, okay? Second, they are covered under all of the so-called limitations that have been offered if the junior gardener thinks her gossip that the senior gardener is having an affair and submitting false expense reports regarding the hotel receipts. That's the facts of the Lockheed case and reports that to the middle gardener and nothing happens and then the junior gardener gets fired because of the economy downturns or something. Well, those, that's an easy hypothetical. What about the butler who does in fact hear all this information about a conspiracy and wire fraud? There are still the state law protections, of course, for public policy and other protections. There is the Dodd-Frank Act. We haven't talked about it enough. Dodd-Frank 922 came in eight years later and said, Congress said, we think we need to do more. We think we need to cover all employers, but we're going to provide more limitations. We're going to require a written submission to the SEC under penalty of perjury and we're going to limit it to securities fraud. So if the butler learns that the boss is doing something untoward, the butler then can go to the SEC and make it complaint, if it's pans out he can even get a bounty under that program. And if he gets fired, he's completely protected, has reinstatement and back pay. Congress dealt with that. There is a gap of eight years. We definitely acknowledge that. But Congress moves incrementally in this area. The Sarbin's Oxley Act was the first major widespread corporate governance reform at the federal level. And Congress didn't report to do everything at once. It went a long way. It subjected every public company to these new things. But for my friends to suggest that they covered not just the 5,000 public companies, but all 6 million private companies without ever mentioning the fact, without ever discussing it, without debating it, without acknowledging that that would be the consequence, is a dramatic, a dramatic expansion of this statute that was already pretty dramatic to begin with, that barely passed as the Court. So doesn't that drama reduce itself if we accept the government's limitation that it has to do only with the fraud related to the government's public company? Is that was the center of this bill? What motivated this bill? Your Honor, I agree that would be a limitation. I don't agree that it's found in the language of the statute. I mean, as a defense lawyer, I would like that down the road. But, and the ARB in the Lockheed case didn't seem to suggest that there is any such limitation. The ARB simply said fraud. Mr. Schnapper, petitioners here certainly took that position today. So it's every fraud of any sort, by any company that has a different- We're not being asked to give difference to the petitioner. We're being asked to give difference to the government. That's why I pointed to the ARB's decision in Lockheed, Your Honor, and the language there is exceedingly sweeping it. It rejected all limitations that were offered in that case. The government's so-called limitation is no limitation at all. It is simply anything that is fraudulent is covered, according to the law. They didn't say that today. And if, in fact, the fraud is related to the contract or by certain kinds of contract or as who do investment work, who do all kinds of important work for the company, why shouldn't it be covered? I mean, in the language, of course, does say what I read, as you agree. There is a contractor. Justice Breyer, if I could return to the point of this discussion of limitations, which is fascinating, but we are having it for the first time in the Supreme Court of the United States. Congress never had this discussion. Congress never discussed limitations, because Congress never contemplated covering private companies. What the kind of- The statute says is any conduct, any conduct, which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of Section 1341, 43, 44, or 48

. Congress dealt with that. There is a gap of eight years. We definitely acknowledge that. But Congress moves incrementally in this area. The Sarbin's Oxley Act was the first major widespread corporate governance reform at the federal level. And Congress didn't report to do everything at once. It went a long way. It subjected every public company to these new things. But for my friends to suggest that they covered not just the 5,000 public companies, but all 6 million private companies without ever mentioning the fact, without ever discussing it, without debating it, without acknowledging that that would be the consequence, is a dramatic, a dramatic expansion of this statute that was already pretty dramatic to begin with, that barely passed as the Court. So doesn't that drama reduce itself if we accept the government's limitation that it has to do only with the fraud related to the government's public company? Is that was the center of this bill? What motivated this bill? Your Honor, I agree that would be a limitation. I don't agree that it's found in the language of the statute. I mean, as a defense lawyer, I would like that down the road. But, and the ARB in the Lockheed case didn't seem to suggest that there is any such limitation. The ARB simply said fraud. Mr. Schnapper, petitioners here certainly took that position today. So it's every fraud of any sort, by any company that has a different- We're not being asked to give difference to the petitioner. We're being asked to give difference to the government. That's why I pointed to the ARB's decision in Lockheed, Your Honor, and the language there is exceedingly sweeping it. It rejected all limitations that were offered in that case. The government's so-called limitation is no limitation at all. It is simply anything that is fraudulent is covered, according to the law. They didn't say that today. And if, in fact, the fraud is related to the contract or by certain kinds of contract or as who do investment work, who do all kinds of important work for the company, why shouldn't it be covered? I mean, in the language, of course, does say what I read, as you agree. There is a contractor. Justice Breyer, if I could return to the point of this discussion of limitations, which is fascinating, but we are having it for the first time in the Supreme Court of the United States. Congress never had this discussion. Congress never discussed limitations, because Congress never contemplated covering private companies. What the kind of- The statute says is any conduct, any conduct, which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of Section 1341, 43, 44, or 48. Do you see in there any limitation on- It says that the conduct has to be fraudulent conduct relating to the activities of the publicly held company. It is not in the terms of the statute you're on, or as I said, that's the holding of the Lockheed case in the ARB that there isn't. Very sensible limitation. Unfortunately, he is not there. Your Honor, that's the danger of moving beyond the text of the statute. If we- If they won't admit, my friends won't admit that every contractor and every fraud is covered. But that is the import of their argument. We submit that that's not right, or at least that that decision, if it is right, should be made by the Congress, or by an agency with rulemaking authority on the public record to take public responsibility for it. No such definition. So that it may be that you have a good point that it's the SEC we should defer to and not the Labor Department. But then as it was pointed out, fun, and you're going to have that rulemaking and given their position here, it looks as if they will hold something you don't like. But what-so what are we supposed to do about that in your opinion? Your Honor, they have not had that rulemaking since this statute was enacted in 2002, and we don't know whether they will have that rulemaking. The Court's opportunity, and I would submit obligation respectfully, is to read the statute as it was passed by Congress. I assume you would say that that rulemaking would be ultravirus if it took the position that the government's taking here, right? Your Honor, Mr. Harsky said that the SEC has no power to make rules under Section 806. I'm not going to quarrel with her on that. No, but even if they did, and they came out with the rule that reads just the way the government presented it today, you would say that that is an unreasonable reading of the statute, wouldn't you? We would, but we would also have a rulemaking record and a cost-benefit analysis of the impact on private companies and the impact on unemployment and all of the things that agencies have to take into account when they make these determinations, none of which exists on this record. We simply have the ARB deciding 5,000, 6 million, good enough. Let's-let's move forward. And that is not, we submit, what Congress intended here. And that is not what Congress did not intend for the ARB to be able to make that decision. I mean, both of my friends here agree that our reading, the first circuit's reading, is a plausible construction of the statute. There's no argument that it's unambiguous on their side, okay? So their argument must be that Congress intended not to be able to answer this question, not to know whether it's 5,000 public companies or 6 million private companies, and so they punted that to an unelected board of lawyers within the Labor Department. That is not what I- Well, why is it-just because we may have to get to this. I-I thought Section 3A of Sarbanes Oxley, that's what we found here. Quote, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall promulgate such rules and regulations as maybe necessary appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors and in further isn't of this act. So why doesn't that delegate right to the SEC, the power to- to interpret the general provisions of the Section 802? To be quite blunt, Justice Breyer, before the government's concession 20 minutes ago, I would have thought the same thing. Well, so I mean, I don't know that we should interpret that provision. We know one's briefed, given on that basis

. Do you see in there any limitation on- It says that the conduct has to be fraudulent conduct relating to the activities of the publicly held company. It is not in the terms of the statute you're on, or as I said, that's the holding of the Lockheed case in the ARB that there isn't. Very sensible limitation. Unfortunately, he is not there. Your Honor, that's the danger of moving beyond the text of the statute. If we- If they won't admit, my friends won't admit that every contractor and every fraud is covered. But that is the import of their argument. We submit that that's not right, or at least that that decision, if it is right, should be made by the Congress, or by an agency with rulemaking authority on the public record to take public responsibility for it. No such definition. So that it may be that you have a good point that it's the SEC we should defer to and not the Labor Department. But then as it was pointed out, fun, and you're going to have that rulemaking and given their position here, it looks as if they will hold something you don't like. But what-so what are we supposed to do about that in your opinion? Your Honor, they have not had that rulemaking since this statute was enacted in 2002, and we don't know whether they will have that rulemaking. The Court's opportunity, and I would submit obligation respectfully, is to read the statute as it was passed by Congress. I assume you would say that that rulemaking would be ultravirus if it took the position that the government's taking here, right? Your Honor, Mr. Harsky said that the SEC has no power to make rules under Section 806. I'm not going to quarrel with her on that. No, but even if they did, and they came out with the rule that reads just the way the government presented it today, you would say that that is an unreasonable reading of the statute, wouldn't you? We would, but we would also have a rulemaking record and a cost-benefit analysis of the impact on private companies and the impact on unemployment and all of the things that agencies have to take into account when they make these determinations, none of which exists on this record. We simply have the ARB deciding 5,000, 6 million, good enough. Let's-let's move forward. And that is not, we submit, what Congress intended here. And that is not what Congress did not intend for the ARB to be able to make that decision. I mean, both of my friends here agree that our reading, the first circuit's reading, is a plausible construction of the statute. There's no argument that it's unambiguous on their side, okay? So their argument must be that Congress intended not to be able to answer this question, not to know whether it's 5,000 public companies or 6 million private companies, and so they punted that to an unelected board of lawyers within the Labor Department. That is not what I- Well, why is it-just because we may have to get to this. I-I thought Section 3A of Sarbanes Oxley, that's what we found here. Quote, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall promulgate such rules and regulations as maybe necessary appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors and in further isn't of this act. So why doesn't that delegate right to the SEC, the power to- to interpret the general provisions of the Section 802? To be quite blunt, Justice Breyer, before the government's concession 20 minutes ago, I would have thought the same thing. Well, so I mean, I don't know that we should interpret that provision. We know one's briefed, given on that basis. We can certainly say this though, what we know is the SEC has not exercised its power under 3A or under 307 or under 501, also dealing with contractors of sorts, to provide for whistleblower protections. If it chooses to do so for in the future, then we would have a different lawsuit. What we have now, however, is the unadorned statute passed by Congress, which deals with public companies. We have the first circuit in an exhaustive opinion, construing it, again, using all of the ordinary tools of statutory construction, with this court has directed the lower courts to determine plausibly, as everyone agrees, plausibly that it only covers public companies. We have a reading then that gives meaning to every single word in the statute that is comprehensible, that fits the purpose of the statute. Remember, the overall purpose of the statute is disclosure by public companies. It's not protection of investors, as some as times have said. It is disclosures by public companies. Private companies make no disclosures. They are not governed by the securities laws. So that excluding private company employees makes perfect sense in that respect. Mutual funds, Mr. Schnapper, page 13 of his reply briefs, says, well, the advisors make all the disclosures for the mutual funds. We had that argument, in your honor, two years ago, just as Thomas wrote the opinion for the court in the Janus case, which rejected that very argument, and said the mutual fund and the advisor are separate companies. The mutual fund makes the disclosures. Congress has set up the mutual fund industry that way. The ICI's brief, in this case, explains very cogently, I believe, all of the separate protections, including the independent board of directors and the chief compliance officer mandated by the SEC's 40 act regulations that protect the investors in mutual funds. So we have a coherent on the first circuit side, a coherent reading of the statute that my friends admit is plausible, that gives meaning to every word in the statute, that fits exactly the title that Congress used. And the title is legislative language passed by Congress, signed by the President. If it's every word in the legislative history, it makes perfect sense, and it doesn't have any untoward results. But it gives the reference to the subcontractors, or the contractors and the subcontractors, such a narrow meaning, except for this concept of the Axe-Wielding Specialist, those provisions mean nothing under that. That's what gives me pause about your interest. Justice Alito, they give employees two things. They give another defendant, which means another insurance policy. So for example, if you see the company, you get the ENO policy. If you see the President at the same time, you get the DNO policy. So you get two separate insurance policies, which is more money, more availability. You get the personal liability, officers hate to be sued, so to contractors. And if the public company goes out of business, you get that protection of monetary relief

. We can certainly say this though, what we know is the SEC has not exercised its power under 3A or under 307 or under 501, also dealing with contractors of sorts, to provide for whistleblower protections. If it chooses to do so for in the future, then we would have a different lawsuit. What we have now, however, is the unadorned statute passed by Congress, which deals with public companies. We have the first circuit in an exhaustive opinion, construing it, again, using all of the ordinary tools of statutory construction, with this court has directed the lower courts to determine plausibly, as everyone agrees, plausibly that it only covers public companies. We have a reading then that gives meaning to every single word in the statute that is comprehensible, that fits the purpose of the statute. Remember, the overall purpose of the statute is disclosure by public companies. It's not protection of investors, as some as times have said. It is disclosures by public companies. Private companies make no disclosures. They are not governed by the securities laws. So that excluding private company employees makes perfect sense in that respect. Mutual funds, Mr. Schnapper, page 13 of his reply briefs, says, well, the advisors make all the disclosures for the mutual funds. We had that argument, in your honor, two years ago, just as Thomas wrote the opinion for the court in the Janus case, which rejected that very argument, and said the mutual fund and the advisor are separate companies. The mutual fund makes the disclosures. Congress has set up the mutual fund industry that way. The ICI's brief, in this case, explains very cogently, I believe, all of the separate protections, including the independent board of directors and the chief compliance officer mandated by the SEC's 40 act regulations that protect the investors in mutual funds. So we have a coherent on the first circuit side, a coherent reading of the statute that my friends admit is plausible, that gives meaning to every word in the statute, that fits exactly the title that Congress used. And the title is legislative language passed by Congress, signed by the President. If it's every word in the legislative history, it makes perfect sense, and it doesn't have any untoward results. But it gives the reference to the subcontractors, or the contractors and the subcontractors, such a narrow meaning, except for this concept of the Axe-Wielding Specialist, those provisions mean nothing under that. That's what gives me pause about your interest. Justice Alito, they give employees two things. They give another defendant, which means another insurance policy. So for example, if you see the company, you get the ENO policy. If you see the President at the same time, you get the DNO policy. So you get two separate insurance policies, which is more money, more availability. You get the personal liability, officers hate to be sued, so to contractors. And if the public company goes out of business, you get that protection of monetary relief. My question wasn't clear. If you say that the employee is only the employee of the publicly held company and not the employee of the privately held subcontractor, then that's the only situation that's covered with respect to the contractor is this so-called Axe-Wielding Specialist. You have the actuality specialist. The real world is Calcunte. I gave you that case where that actually happened. Yeah, it can happen, but it's really very small, isn't it? Well, you're uttered. That was one of six cases. The ARB decided under this statute in 2009. So that year, that was one six of the cases. That's not, I mean, it happens, okay? And it is not, it is a conceivable scenario in many more things. Because again, it's not limited to discharge. It's also threats and harassment. And we certainly can see situations where contractors, particularly those kinds of contractors like management consultants, photocopy vendors, and so forth, are in the facility with the public company employees can make their life miserable. And remember, I'm going to agree with my friend Mr. Snapron something. The Congress recognized that in-ron was structured in a way to try to get the liability out of headquarters. They had all these subsidiaries. They had Chukko and Pandaros and all this. And Congress recognized that corporations might try to avoid their liability. So by picking up officers, employees, contractors, subcontractors, and agents, they were trying to make sure that if the company tried to lay off the responsibility on somebody else, they'd still get captured because when their employees were doing. They could have done that just under agency. Many employment laws, of course, speak only of officers, employees, and agents. But many contracts, disclaim agency. Where did it come from? That is, you're worded the words, contractors. Some human being wrote them for the first time. You probably know who did and where and under what circumstances. What, what, you know? Who was it, counsel? Some of us are interested in mad at least I am. Justice Breyer? Somewhere. It appears that formulation appears for the first time in the history of the United States code in this law

. My question wasn't clear. If you say that the employee is only the employee of the publicly held company and not the employee of the privately held subcontractor, then that's the only situation that's covered with respect to the contractor is this so-called Axe-Wielding Specialist. You have the actuality specialist. The real world is Calcunte. I gave you that case where that actually happened. Yeah, it can happen, but it's really very small, isn't it? Well, you're uttered. That was one of six cases. The ARB decided under this statute in 2009. So that year, that was one six of the cases. That's not, I mean, it happens, okay? And it is not, it is a conceivable scenario in many more things. Because again, it's not limited to discharge. It's also threats and harassment. And we certainly can see situations where contractors, particularly those kinds of contractors like management consultants, photocopy vendors, and so forth, are in the facility with the public company employees can make their life miserable. And remember, I'm going to agree with my friend Mr. Snapron something. The Congress recognized that in-ron was structured in a way to try to get the liability out of headquarters. They had all these subsidiaries. They had Chukko and Pandaros and all this. And Congress recognized that corporations might try to avoid their liability. So by picking up officers, employees, contractors, subcontractors, and agents, they were trying to make sure that if the company tried to lay off the responsibility on somebody else, they'd still get captured because when their employees were doing. They could have done that just under agency. Many employment laws, of course, speak only of officers, employees, and agents. But many contracts, disclaim agency. Where did it come from? That is, you're worded the words, contractors. Some human being wrote them for the first time. You probably know who did and where and under what circumstances. What, what, you know? Who was it, counsel? Some of us are interested in mad at least I am. Justice Breyer? Somewhere. It appears that formulation appears for the first time in the history of the United States code in this law. I know. So who is a human being who wrote them and what did he have in mind or is she? We know, we don't know the individual. We know, however, that there is a Senate report that accompanied that language when it was introduced. Now let's go back to the hearings. I mean, there might have been hearings. The only hearing testimony was, for example, the National Whistleblower Center, one of the Miki here, said corporate insiders, publicly traded companies. There is nothing, there is the word contractor specifically appears nowhere in the legislative history. In the entire legislative history of the Sarvea Zofi Act, every hearing, every floor statement, every report, it nowhere appears. It came, the word contractor came from the Air 21 Act, but of course the Air 21 Act doesn't have officers, employees, or agents. That is language from Title VII. But the language did talk about Arthur Anderson and Inron. It did, Your Honor, and as I said, 150 times accountants appear. If I could just finish with this point. The Senate report lists four examples of the so-called corporate code of silence. The Anderson partner, the Vincent and Elkins lawyer, the UBS securities analyst, and Sharon Watkins at Enron. Congress dealt with them in four different provisions, Section 105 for the accountants, Section 307 for the lawyers, Section 501 for the securities. Section 806 for the public company employee. Then, we haven't talked about this yet either, it added for good measure, Section 1107, which says, whoever shall retaliate against anybody who provides information to a law enforcement officer, which includes the SEC, is subject to a criminal offense under Title 18. So we have this interlocking, connected, nested series of provisions that deals with each of the concerns identified by Congress in an industry-specific fashion. And at no point did Congress suggest, intimate, hint, that, oh, by regulating these things, the lawyers, the accountants, the securities analysts, and the public companies, that they also were going to sweep in six million private employers. And if a member of Congress, I would submit, had stood up on the floor and suggested that, it would have been met with debate, derision, and defeat. The first circuit judgment, Your Honor, should be affirmed. Thank you. Thank you, Councilor. Mr. Schnapper, you have five minutes left. Thank you, Your Honor. Let me begin by just referring the court to some materials that might be relevant to some of the questions you asked. With regard to the SEC's view prior to this case coming to this court, those views were expressed in a separate brief, the SEC filed in the first circuit, which is consistent with the government's approach here

. I know. So who is a human being who wrote them and what did he have in mind or is she? We know, we don't know the individual. We know, however, that there is a Senate report that accompanied that language when it was introduced. Now let's go back to the hearings. I mean, there might have been hearings. The only hearing testimony was, for example, the National Whistleblower Center, one of the Miki here, said corporate insiders, publicly traded companies. There is nothing, there is the word contractor specifically appears nowhere in the legislative history. In the entire legislative history of the Sarvea Zofi Act, every hearing, every floor statement, every report, it nowhere appears. It came, the word contractor came from the Air 21 Act, but of course the Air 21 Act doesn't have officers, employees, or agents. That is language from Title VII. But the language did talk about Arthur Anderson and Inron. It did, Your Honor, and as I said, 150 times accountants appear. If I could just finish with this point. The Senate report lists four examples of the so-called corporate code of silence. The Anderson partner, the Vincent and Elkins lawyer, the UBS securities analyst, and Sharon Watkins at Enron. Congress dealt with them in four different provisions, Section 105 for the accountants, Section 307 for the lawyers, Section 501 for the securities. Section 806 for the public company employee. Then, we haven't talked about this yet either, it added for good measure, Section 1107, which says, whoever shall retaliate against anybody who provides information to a law enforcement officer, which includes the SEC, is subject to a criminal offense under Title 18. So we have this interlocking, connected, nested series of provisions that deals with each of the concerns identified by Congress in an industry-specific fashion. And at no point did Congress suggest, intimate, hint, that, oh, by regulating these things, the lawyers, the accountants, the securities analysts, and the public companies, that they also were going to sweep in six million private employers. And if a member of Congress, I would submit, had stood up on the floor and suggested that, it would have been met with debate, derision, and defeat. The first circuit judgment, Your Honor, should be affirmed. Thank you. Thank you, Councilor. Mr. Schnapper, you have five minutes left. Thank you, Your Honor. Let me begin by just referring the court to some materials that might be relevant to some of the questions you asked. With regard to the SEC's view prior to this case coming to this court, those views were expressed in a separate brief, the SEC filed in the first circuit, which is consistent with the government's approach here. But we know they don't have rulemaking authority in this area. I agree with that, but question came up about what their views were. With regard to the suggestion earlier that the ARB has taken the position that every contract, every firm that has a contract with the public companies, a contractor, actually in the Flesar case, which is mentioned in both the Respondents Brief and our Yellow Brief, the ARB took the opposite position, and took the position, I think, consistent with the view we've advanced, which is not every contract renders you a contractor. With regard to Arthur Anderson, the discussion in the Senate report about why there's a need to do with retaliation is repeatedly about Arthur Anderson. Many of the people who actually understood what was going on at Anne-Run were Arthur Anderson employees, not most of the run of the mill employees at Anne-Run. And they were the ones who remained silent in the face of this very, very serious problem. With regard to the origins of this phrase contractor, my brother, Mr. Perry was right, it comes from AR-21. The preliminary AR-21 regulations, regarding what it means, were issued prior to the adoption of SOX, and they said it included employers, employees of employers, which has remained the view of the agency throughout. With regard to AR-21, the history of hair is, I think, important. This statute referred to air carriers and contractors and subcontractors. And the court below assumed that that meant that employees of subcontractors and contractors were covered. The first circuit theory was that Congress meant to narrow the meaning of contractor employees because it added retaliation barred by officers and employees. And it seems to me that I was set that that is precisely the wrong conclusion. When Congress added to the entities that could not retaliate, when it rewrote AR-21 to add some other people that couldn't retaliate, it didn't mean to tacitly then eliminate the employees of contractors who were governed under AR-21. Finally, with regard to the question the court has raised about whether it should explore the possibility of a limitation based on whether a contractor was acting as a contractor. We think it would probably not be prudent to take that on at this time for a couple of reasons. First of all, a fair amount of the work that was done by Arthur Anderson was not that was relevant, it wasn't done for Enron. It was done for the off the books and the enterprises. They did $5.7 million of accounting work for Jedi, where one of the places where the deaths were being hidden. So you would get into that problem. Secondly, this provision is adopted against the background of a series of executive orders, most important which is executive order, 11, 246, about racial discrimination by federal contractors. That executive order has always been understood to cover all the employees of the contractor, not just the employees who are working on the government project. I think that's an important part of the background here. Congress has not tried to, the executive branch hasn't limited that. And in the Civil Rights Restoration Act of about 1986, Congress rewrote Title VI and Title IX to have institution-wide application rather than to do little parts of it. This issue about what a contractor might be doing, acts of contract, hasn't been vetted in lower courts, and we think it would be not prudent to try to take that on here. Thank you very much

. Thank you, Council. The case is submitted