Your Honor's, my name is Eugene Wallach. I represent the Frudans. This case is basically Woolie V. Maynard gone to school. Just like in Woolie, the pellants in this case are being required to bear a motto, although in this case, the intrusion is even greater than Woolie because they have to bear it on their own persons. I hate to interrupt right at the beginning, but this case started out with all kinds, of claims, 20 counts or whatever it was. My understanding right now is that you're not saying that the school uniform policy is bad. You're just saying that the motto on the uniform is bad, is that correct? Your Honor, it is correct that given Jacobs a content neutral school uniform policy that has new exceptions for uniforms of particular groups and that would not require the bearing of a motto would be constitutional given this court's precedent. And this might seem like a silly question, but what about the golfer? Your Honor, the logic of our argument would apply to the golfer as well, although that is not something to which our, my client's object. But the logic of our argument is that people cannot be required to bear either verbal expression or symbolic expression, or at least that any such requirement must pass through scrutiny. But let me clarify that. So if you take away tomorrow's leaders from the logo, your argument would be foreclosed by Jacobs, which we're bound by, setting aside on the assumption policies. Is that correct? No, Your Honor. Jacobs approved specifically and it's stressed that it involved a policy involving blank tops and blank bottoms. So that is the kind of policy that Jacobs says is permissible. So anything beyond that the requirement of depicting any particular text or visual imagery would be not covered by Jacobs, we believe. Well, I guess then I'm worried that we have a different case than the court below had
. I mean, I appreciate you came to the case after the court below was through. And you've now put this case together and you're talking about a model. And I guess I'm really worried whether we even ought to decide this case or whether we ought to give the poor old DJ the chance to talk about this model. The poor old DJ didn't even have a chance to even think about this model or it's how it affected this particular provision. In fact, it was all about an ideological message, conformities, solidarity. And he said, this is a Jacobs problem and we're through. I guess I'm worried that I have a new case in front of me and the poor district judge hasn't had a chance to talk about it or even think about it. And even worse, the state has not had any chance to give any, if you will, opportunity to present its evidence of justifications for the model. And so maybe I'd send it back and let everybody think about it again. You're on a, we agree that the case has to be sent back in any event because unlike Jacobs, which was decided following the gathering of evidence, this case was decided in motion to dismiss and that there may not even be the evidence needed under Jacobs to uphold even a content neutral policy. But the complaints did allege that this case involved the unconstitutional compulsion of the display of a model. And the question is, I understand what the complaint said, but that's about as far as it went. If you read the argument, read what was going on. The poor district judge didn't even talk about the model. The district judge was more worried about the conformity, the solidarity, ideological message, and even thought it was on the uniform and it wasn't. Your Honor, we believe that on page 1274 in the Federal Supplement version of the case, the district court specifically talked about the speech compulsion issue and rejected the speech compulsion issue
. To be sure the district court aired in its characterization of the school model. It thought that the model was one team one community whereas the model was actually tomorrow's leaders. And one team one community is of animating purpose set to 1.5 million. But no fair. I print two pages 13 and 14 or page 9 and 10 and for this opinion, I think. It goes into compelled speech. Yes, yes, Your Honor. I believe that is correct. I'm sorry, I was referring to the Federal Supplement version, but he does indeed go into the compelled speech analysis and rejects the compelled speech argument on the model. Talking about a stucco logo, one team, one community. And I'm struggling with the same issue that Judge Smith is struggling because in all fairness, the district court, it was quite an extensive complaint with only passing references, perhaps a couple of passing references to the model to model's leaders. I mean, the case was really postured as an objection to the school uniform expressing a message of conformity and objecting to the idea of one school, one community. And so, understandably, given that the complaint was structured that way, the way that it was briefed, the district court's opinion really focused on the same primary argument that misridden advance. And in fact, I think at one point during the hearing, she even told the district court that she didn't have any particular personal objection to the idea that these students are tomorrow's leaders. It's just really primarily the message of conformity that she was really objecting to
. So that was the posture of the case below. And what do we to do with that, if anything? Your Honor, it is true that the complaint had many different kinds of claims, some of which are now being pursued in state court. But it did specifically mention the speech compulsion claim. And the district court recognized that it mentioned, and likewise the motion to dismiss, and the opposition to the motion to dismiss, discuss this, and certainly the opposition to the motion to dismiss, discuss this speech compulsion objection, incited by an act. Well, again, you're not really addressing my colleagues' question and mine as well, which is, I mean, the council below, or say, but nonetheless, council below, said she had no objection to what you're now objecting to. Your Honor, the plaintiffs have all throughout expressed their objection to being compelled to bear a motto. Well, as I understood it, she said, we have no objection about tomorrow's leaders. Your Honor, the statement was that the message tomorrow's leaders in the abstract is something that, under other circumstances, they might not find that particularly objectionable. But they did have an objection specifically mentioned to being required to bear the motto tomorrow's leaders. That was an objection that they maintained throughout. And the district court recognized that there was an objection to the speech compulsion. Your Honor, there's also the problem with the case having to do with the content-based exception for the uniforms of nationally recognized youth organizations. And that, too, is another reason why this policy is different from the one in Jacobs. The one in Jacobs did not have such an objection. In fact, there had been an exception in the policy initially that a district court said, raised very serious first amendment issues, and then it was removed by the school district in Jacobs spending the appeal. So that is another reason why the policy here differs from that in Jacobs' and that is constitutional problems
. Your Honor, as a third part of our argument says, there indeed ought to be a remand to the district court to gather further evidence. If you think that that's the appropriate way of dealing with the speech compulsion issue, that would be excellent. What would the remand accomplish? I mean, what would we tell the district judges to do? Because your argument is, I understand it, and his essence is that any kind of logo on the polo shirts would be unconstitutional. So we know that if we agree with you, what is the district judge going to do? What is the district judge going to do? Are you saying assuming that I lose on the first point then go to the second point regarding the exemption for the Girl Scouts Boyce House and similar national organizations? What would the remand do? Your Honor, as a matter of law, we believe that in fact this kind of speech compulsion is unconstitutional, at least unless the government can introduce some evidence that it serves a compelling government interest, which we doubt that it could. But if the concern is the district court did not have the opportunity to fully focus on this issue, then in that case, perhaps, are you mind with that answer? Yes, of course, thank you. So, Your Honor, if you think that a remand is appropriate, that is certainly one thing we're asking for. It just would be helpful then to instruct the district court, given that certainly the compelled speech issues and the content discrimination issues have been fully briefed, and struck the district court on the resolution of these issues, that it could then apply and then consider further questions saying having to do with compelling government interest. And in Jacobs' counsel, perhaps I'm surrendering it, but it did address the issue of the logo, so that's why I thought your argument primarily was really focused on the model tomorrow's leaders, because Jacobs did have reference to the fact that because a logo on a school uniform conveys very little communicative message, it really would not run a foul of the First Amendment, doesn't make it not content neutral, just merely by having a logo on a school uniform. Is that not so? Your Honor, we don't think that that's the way that Jacobs dealt with that logo. The policy in Jacobs was generally speaking of policy that required people to wear plain tops and plain bottoms. There was no requirement even displaying a logo. It is just that the policy there had the option that should people wish to wear a logo, that would be okay. And Jacobs said that that option does not render the policy unconstitutionally content based. And of course that option was irrelevant to the compelled speech argument because nobody was compelled to wear a logo. In this case, there is a compulsion to wear a logo. It's not just an option if you want to display the go-for, you're free to display the go-for
. It is in fact a requirement that people do so. Now, this having been said, should you wish to draw a distinction between a just an image of a go-for and an actual model which expresses a much more specific message, that is something that plaintiffs would be content with, but that is not an issue that Jacobs resolved. Because in Jacobs, there was no compulsion of wearing a logo of any sort. It was only presented as a possible thing that people could wear should they wish to. Because I just can't imagine what kind of speech a go-for would really compel the plaintiffs to say. Had an argument in your brief about tomorrow's leaders, now that could be a message. And so if we accept your argument that that's compelled speech, how does that extend to merely having a go-for on your shirt? Your Honor, plaintiffs would be fine with a requirement that there be just a go-for display rather than a slogan being displayed. This having been said, there are certain kinds of pictures that might indeed raise pretty serious objections that they may convey certain messages that many people might find that they do not wish to convey. For example, the Cresment of the Tomson case, the recent head circuit case, the court, the license plate case, the court said, well, the depiction of a logo in a license plate likewise raises constitutional problems. So it may be just as a matter of setting up a clear first amendment rule, the rule in Jacobs, which said no message at all simply blank cops and blank bottoms, may be the best rule as to what kinds of compulsions the maximum that a school district can impose. Can you dress the exemption policy briefly? Yes, Your Honor. So the exemption policy provides that there's an exemption for uniforms of nationally recognized youth organizations, specifically mentioning the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts on the school. Just as examples, though, such as. Yes, Your Honor, that is correct. But that is nonetheless a content-based exemption policy. It is limited to nationally recognized youth organizations, not to other organizations, that itself actually raises vagueness issues which feed into the content discrimination point as the court and kinds of mayor have already pointed out asking whether it's a recognized cause, and leaves it unclear what qualifies, and thus leaves it with a great discretion on the part of the principle to decide which uniforms count and which do not
. That's a content discrimination, just like in a Regenby time in, where the Supreme Court said that an exemption for journalistic or educational uses is a content-based classification that makes the entire policy content-based. So we think that's an independent. Is it the nationally recognized portion of the exemption policy that's problematic? So for example, if the school district were to rewrite it to say any organized youth organization, such as the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts on their regular leading days are exempt from the uniform policy? Would that be okay? Your Honor, we believe that would still involve a content discrimination because we distinguish organizational uniforms from other kinds of speech, for example, that expresses more individualistic messages. To be sure that wouldn't be clearly a viewpoint-based restriction, but neither was the restriction in Regenby time-aik, which did not mention any viewpoint and just gave an exemption for educational uses, that the court said was sufficiently content-based to render the entire policy subject. That invalidation. Your Honor, if you have no further questions- I was some- Do you really believe that your complaint lays out the argument you're now making? You're on- I was worried that the complaint alleges as to the uniform policy certain things that alleges, and I could go through those, but what it seems to me that- I'm really finding it tough time as to how the complaint suggests that the policy is content-based because they're not allowed to wear their soccer uniform to school instead of their school uniform. Your Honor, the complaint does specify that it is content- that the policy is not content or viewpoint neutral, but is rather viewpoint- and content-based speech restriction. And earlier, it points out that the policy treats youth organization uniform differently from others. It also complains- I'm speaking here at pages 30. I guess I'm- I read through this, and I don't know that I see it exactly the way you do, and I don't really know whether it was really argued that way in front of the district court because the district court didn't even mention the exemption when analyzing the free speech claim. Your Honor, the complaint has set forth a statement explaining the basic claims that the plaintiff is making. The complaint makes clear that there's a speech compulsion claim. The complaint makes clear there's a content discrimination claim. Now, in DuPours, there would be discovery, there would be an answer, there would be motion for summary judgment in which all of these things would be further developed. But one problem is that because there was a motion to dismiss granted here, there was no further opportunity to develop these arguments in more detail. But you only get to that if you lose on your first argument as I understand it
. In other words, the exemption argument. Your real argument as I understand it is on its face unconstitutional, as compelled speech. Yes, Your Honor. If you agree with us that this is will you be made or goes to school, the fate of this policy should be the same as that in will you be made or that at the very least the mod of requirement would have to be struck down. There would still be the question of whether applying Jacobs, this policy passes the content neutral test, and that requires the further evidence to be gathered. As Jacobs itself stressed the importance of evidence, in that case the motion for summary judgment stage in determining whether passes must be even under the fact of you. Well, okay. Thank you, Councillor. Let me tell you what bothers me about the opinion of the district court. And that is the statement about an inocuous logo. In other words, the go for and tomorrow's leaders. Are judges now going to be out there telling school districts what is inocuous and what is not? For example, in the religious area, what sectarian and what is religious? I mean, it just puts you into a can of worms. Good morning, judges. My name is Randy Drake. I'm one of the easiest things to block the whole thing. I'm not just looking for easy things, but we can't try cases on what is inocuous
. What is inocuous to one person? It might be very offensive to someone else and very desirable to someone else. I understand. Thank you. Again, my name is Randy Drake, General Counsel for the Washington School District. I'm here this morning representing the respondents. I will address that, Judge. And I'll address it in the sense that focusing on what the appellant is now focusing on at the appellate level. The woolly case gone to school, so to speak. The woolly case clearly involved an ideological message. And the appellant now is trying to make a stretch to make any logo or motto that has little if any communicative message as recognized by Jacobs, trying to stretch that into an ideological message. So I understand and I appreciate how there could be some gray area in there. But this is not that case. This is not the case to make law, which it looks like the appellant is trying to do when that gray area does not exist. And let me focus on the posture change from the lower court, from the first amended complaint to the opening brief. Most, if not all, of the arguments have been abandoned. So then, and even the complaint about what's on the shirt and what's not on the shirt
. So then we can bring this woolly case to school, so to speak. Again, we're talking about an ideological message that the state is mandating their citizens to put on their private property and not remove. That is far removed from what we have here. And Jacobs did, Jacobs did address content as Judge Gwynne noted, little if any communicative message. That's what we have here. And so much so that tomorrow's leaders wasn't even a problem in the first amendment complaint, complaint, the opposition to the motion to dismiss and the argument at the district court level. So that was addressed in at the lower court level and addressed in the district court judges opinion. Let me go to the exemption issue a little bit. That really is analogous to banal slogans. And that is what's interesting here is that banal slogans are okay. If it's just again little with any genuine communicative message, but also this policy with these exemptions, it makes this policy less restrictive than even Jacobs. It allows parents to put their children into different uniforms, different clothing on days when there might be another meeting that day. It also provides them different options. But the problem is that it's content based in the sense that built school administrators or in the business of deciding what's a nationally recognized youth organization. Does AYZO fit into the picture or not? What about some local groups that have chosen to organize and, you know, printed t-shirts to wear? It gets into all kinds of issues that administrators now are in the process of deciding when a kid shows up and saying, well, I've got a meeting later today and this is the t-shirt for it. That's really the problem
. And in Jacobs, there actually was a very similar exemption policy that the school district chose to drop because of concerns regarding the lack of neutrality. Yes, that's true, I understand that, but it's also analogous to what we started out this argument with. There is some gray area that's going to be involved in some cases, but again, this isn't that case. And let me point out to the comments opening brief. In support of that argument that you're noting, Judge Gwyn, they cited some national pagan group. I would submit that that is so far stretched that they're defeating their own argument by having to cite a pagan organization as evidence that this policy could go beyond the pale, so to speak, or into the gray, or even beyond the gray area. Let's not have here. We have a policy that is for convenience that allows parents, more options that allows parents to not have to worry about, well, I have to put my child in these clothes and then these clothes, that's not convenient for me. So an exception is carved out to allow that opportunity. If we agree with the plaintiff that the model tomorrow's leaders is more akin to pure speech and it becomes a case that's very similar to woolly, then what happens is the entire uniform policy have to be validated, or is it giving the school district an option to remove that model from the logo? Well, first of all, I think the policy itself and the logo with the tomorrow's leaders language, it satisfies the only scrutiny test as identified in Jacobs, so I don't think you have to. It's been addressed at the lower court level. I understand the court's concern that, wow, it's not a Jacob situation because in Jacobs, there was no model. But again, Jacob says little, if any communicative message, that's what we have here. It's still little, if any genuine communicative language. Yeah, with the case itself, decided just the uniform and he's saying, sure, we'll get put a red polo shirt or a blue polo shirt, tan pants, whatever, you know, send the kids to school, no problem. Like just like Jacobs, but it allowed a logo. That a little, if any, why do you insist so much on the logo? It must have an importance to you. I am sure a lot of people at the school like to wear their motto because that's what let them wear it. That's his point. I understand. But I still think it's that a lot of it. The logo must mean something to you. It is not innocuous. That's the point I'm trying to get at. The school chose to do so to further their school spirit of the golfer. So they chose to do so. Let me ask you this. I'm assuming that there are multiple schools, elementary schools within the school district. Yes. And do all their t-shirts have a logo with a communicative message, a motto like tomorrow's leaders? There's approximately 63 elementary schools within the Washington County School District. About 25 to 28 of those schools have uniform policies. Some have logos, some do not
. That a little, if any, why do you insist so much on the logo? It must have an importance to you. I am sure a lot of people at the school like to wear their motto because that's what let them wear it. That's his point. I understand. But I still think it's that a lot of it. The logo must mean something to you. It is not innocuous. That's the point I'm trying to get at. The school chose to do so to further their school spirit of the golfer. So they chose to do so. Let me ask you this. I'm assuming that there are multiple schools, elementary schools within the school district. Yes. And do all their t-shirts have a logo with a communicative message, a motto like tomorrow's leaders? There's approximately 63 elementary schools within the Washington County School District. About 25 to 28 of those schools have uniform policies. Some have logos, some do not. And the ones that have logos has a motto like tomorrow's leaders. I think all of some might. But that raises another point, Judge. One of the primary concerns of the appellant when they brought this case initially was that they were not allowed to do so. There's no global district, Washington School District uniform policy. That was the really, really I think the impetus and primary concern of the first amendment complaint. However, that's now been abandoned and not even mentioned because the district court found or, well, the district court found that there's a permissive statute in Nevada. School districts may have no form policies, but they don't have to. But that didn't prohibit individual schools from doing so. That was the impetus behind this. That's been abandoned now. And all the arguments have been changed to try to bring this new hamster case into the fold. And that's just that's not appropriate. And even if it's found appropriate, it's not applicable. And it doesn't change the intermediate scrutiny test. Well, I guess I'm struggling with your argument just a little
. And the ones that have logos has a motto like tomorrow's leaders. I think all of some might. But that raises another point, Judge. One of the primary concerns of the appellant when they brought this case initially was that they were not allowed to do so. There's no global district, Washington School District uniform policy. That was the really, really I think the impetus and primary concern of the first amendment complaint. However, that's now been abandoned and not even mentioned because the district court found or, well, the district court found that there's a permissive statute in Nevada. School districts may have no form policies, but they don't have to. But that didn't prohibit individual schools from doing so. That was the impetus behind this. That's been abandoned now. And all the arguments have been changed to try to bring this new hamster case into the fold. And that's just that's not appropriate. And even if it's found appropriate, it's not applicable. And it doesn't change the intermediate scrutiny test. Well, I guess I'm struggling with your argument just a little. Are you saying I can on this record make that determination? Are you saying out of send it back to have the district court really focus on what the state would say about? Are you saying I can make that determination on this record? Yes, Judge. Because the district court considered the content ruled on the content. So I didn't ever see anything in that district court record about leaked tomorrow's leaders. Well, that's because the plaintiff had the appellant had the problem with one team one community rather than tomorrow's leaders, which is telling me I understand, but I'm just trying to say one team one community. Yeah, I mean, tomorrow's leaders. That's quite a different. But once you the problem that you have with us is that we have Jacobs and we have no trouble following Jacobs pretty much down the line. But you're adding one more thing to this. You're not just talking about Jacobs here. You're adding a model, which is tomorrow's leaders. If you had struck tomorrow's leaders and you said, well, you don't need to wear the go for what you want to. If you want to, you can Jacobs would be right on point. But once you cross that line and you go to the further line, then I'm trying to say to myself, is there enough in this record for me to say the state is presented. What evidence they need to to meet their constitutional standard to do what they have to do. And if you have, if you've given everything you've got to do, then I can easy rule on this case. Well, I have a standard judge and I think it was sufficiently addressed at the lower court level
. Are you saying I can on this record make that determination? Are you saying out of send it back to have the district court really focus on what the state would say about? Are you saying I can make that determination on this record? Yes, Judge. Because the district court considered the content ruled on the content. So I didn't ever see anything in that district court record about leaked tomorrow's leaders. Well, that's because the plaintiff had the appellant had the problem with one team one community rather than tomorrow's leaders, which is telling me I understand, but I'm just trying to say one team one community. Yeah, I mean, tomorrow's leaders. That's quite a different. But once you the problem that you have with us is that we have Jacobs and we have no trouble following Jacobs pretty much down the line. But you're adding one more thing to this. You're not just talking about Jacobs here. You're adding a model, which is tomorrow's leaders. If you had struck tomorrow's leaders and you said, well, you don't need to wear the go for what you want to. If you want to, you can Jacobs would be right on point. But once you cross that line and you go to the further line, then I'm trying to say to myself, is there enough in this record for me to say the state is presented. What evidence they need to to meet their constitutional standard to do what they have to do. And if you have, if you've given everything you've got to do, then I can easy rule on this case. Well, I have a standard judge and I think it was sufficiently addressed at the lower court level. The district court did. The opinion does consider the content. Say the content is is analogous to the content in the Jacobs case. And even found specifically that the policy itself is less restrictive. And let me address that for a second. The judge specifically found that it's less restrictive because the older students involved in the Jacobs case were arguing that the policy was restricting them from wearing religious related clothing. And that is that is that is important in the sense that first amendment free speech rights. There's an inverse relation when you're talking about the age of children. That is an extremely important distinction here. That's an important argument and it was recognized by the district court in this case. So there would be no point. I take you to word. There would be no worry. I know where you're going. I know where I was going when I came in here, but I take you to word. And and I let me just expand on that a little further
. The district court did. The opinion does consider the content. Say the content is is analogous to the content in the Jacobs case. And even found specifically that the policy itself is less restrictive. And let me address that for a second. The judge specifically found that it's less restrictive because the older students involved in the Jacobs case were arguing that the policy was restricting them from wearing religious related clothing. And that is that is that is important in the sense that first amendment free speech rights. There's an inverse relation when you're talking about the age of children. That is an extremely important distinction here. That's an important argument and it was recognized by the district court in this case. So there would be no point. I take you to word. There would be no worry. I know where you're going. I know where I was going when I came in here, but I take you to word. And and I let me just expand on that a little further. It seemed to be inappropriate to send something back to the district court level based on the appellant now turning their arguments either on their head or just says that just says I want to give more evidence. That really is not saying I can make my argument on what's on the record and you could make your decision judge. I think the district court judge did look at the evidence. Okay. And that evidence applies to no more evidence. We can make that decision. I understand what you're arguing. I don't think I need to go into the woolly case any further. It doesn't seem that it interests the court that much and I appreciate that. It's certainly distinguishable. I don't think I have to go there. There is a parental control issue that was brought up a little bit in the in the appellant's brief. I think that's been dealt with in school uniform cases throughout this country specifically. The little field found that out of the fifth circuit found that school uniform policies do not violate appearance. First amendment or associated rights of parental control. So I think that's addressed
. It seemed to be inappropriate to send something back to the district court level based on the appellant now turning their arguments either on their head or just says that just says I want to give more evidence. That really is not saying I can make my argument on what's on the record and you could make your decision judge. I think the district court judge did look at the evidence. Okay. And that evidence applies to no more evidence. We can make that decision. I understand what you're arguing. I don't think I need to go into the woolly case any further. It doesn't seem that it interests the court that much and I appreciate that. It's certainly distinguishable. I don't think I have to go there. There is a parental control issue that was brought up a little bit in the in the appellant's brief. I think that's been dealt with in school uniform cases throughout this country specifically. The little field found that out of the fifth circuit found that school uniform policies do not violate appearance. First amendment or associated rights of parental control. So I think that's addressed. I also think that. Again, I believe it is one intention here to make law and this isn't the appropriate case to do that because there's no ideological messages here. We're talking about elementary school students. School uniform policies even beyond the elementary school level have been held constitutional throughout this country, including the circuit. And this isn't the case that is distinguished. This is just something probably way in left field. Since you've got time. What if they all went to the Presbyterian Church after school? Could they wear a probably a stupid question? Could they wear a uniform that says Jesus saves national organization? And they have a church meeting for these youngsters? You know, Catechism or whatever? Jesus saves. Judge, I understand that. And as in order to allow those organizations, we allow those organizations to have meetings on our school properties. That's addressed. But that's different than, again, that's going over that gray area. And it's not. We don't allow. Again, that's an ideological message. That wasn't allowed in Wolley
. I also think that. Again, I believe it is one intention here to make law and this isn't the appropriate case to do that because there's no ideological messages here. We're talking about elementary school students. School uniform policies even beyond the elementary school level have been held constitutional throughout this country, including the circuit. And this isn't the case that is distinguished. This is just something probably way in left field. Since you've got time. What if they all went to the Presbyterian Church after school? Could they wear a probably a stupid question? Could they wear a uniform that says Jesus saves national organization? And they have a church meeting for these youngsters? You know, Catechism or whatever? Jesus saves. Judge, I understand that. And as in order to allow those organizations, we allow those organizations to have meetings on our school properties. That's addressed. But that's different than, again, that's going over that gray area. And it's not. We don't allow. Again, that's an ideological message. That wasn't allowed in Wolley. I wouldn't be allowed here, but that's an entirely different question. But you're saying they couldn't do that? An ideological message, yes sir. And the boy scouts are not ideological. I don't believe so. Or the girls scouts. That's correct. Well, that's the problem. You talk about gray areas. And when you get into gray areas, reasonable minds do differ. And the right to free speech, tying it to ideological message, I think is potentially very problematic. Because what's benign and unoffensive to one person actually carries a communicative message that's distinct for somebody else. And so I don't think I necessarily accept that argument. Wolley did rely on Barnett, which is a school case. Yes, you're on it. It's an entirely different school case. But again, this isn't that case to not allow any type of language on a shirt or something to a school uniform policy
. I wouldn't be allowed here, but that's an entirely different question. But you're saying they couldn't do that? An ideological message, yes sir. And the boy scouts are not ideological. I don't believe so. Or the girls scouts. That's correct. Well, that's the problem. You talk about gray areas. And when you get into gray areas, reasonable minds do differ. And the right to free speech, tying it to ideological message, I think is potentially very problematic. Because what's benign and unoffensive to one person actually carries a communicative message that's distinct for somebody else. And so I don't think I necessarily accept that argument. Wolley did rely on Barnett, which is a school case. Yes, you're on it. It's an entirely different school case. But again, this isn't that case to not allow any type of language on a shirt or something to a school uniform policy. This isn't that case. The appellant here didn't even have a problem with tomorrow's leaders. I don't even know. I'm sorry. I don't see how you can say the boy scouts are not ideological. I mean, they have their anti-gay policy for so long. When I was a boy growing up in a church, touch reformed, we couldn't join the boy scouts because it's ideology. The girl scouts, I don't know enough about them, but I'm saying that all these organizations have some ideology because that's their purpose for existence. I understand that you're honoring. Again, it's an intent to be less restrictive than even Jacobs to offer choices to the parents and opportunities. All right. Okay. Thank you. Thank you. Do you have anything further? You've got another two minutes, I guess. No, you're past two minutes
. This isn't that case. The appellant here didn't even have a problem with tomorrow's leaders. I don't even know. I'm sorry. I don't see how you can say the boy scouts are not ideological. I mean, they have their anti-gay policy for so long. When I was a boy growing up in a church, touch reformed, we couldn't join the boy scouts because it's ideology. The girl scouts, I don't know enough about them, but I'm saying that all these organizations have some ideology because that's their purpose for existence. I understand that you're honoring. Again, it's an intent to be less restrictive than even Jacobs to offer choices to the parents and opportunities. All right. Okay. Thank you. Thank you. Do you have anything further? You've got another two minutes, I guess. No, you're past two minutes. I'll give you a minute. I'll give you another minute. It's my fault. I'm sorry, honor. Just point to one item in the record. You asked about the plaintiff saying they don't object to the tomorrow's leaders. They're relevant part of the transcript is in supplemental excerpts of record page two, in which Ms. Fruden does say, I don't have a problem saying my kids are tomorrow's leaders, but I do have a problem with the government compelling our kids to make that statement. So that was the position. If you have no further questions, you're on our side. No further questions. All right. Then case 1215403, Fruden versus Pilling will be submitted. And court will be adjourned for today.
Your Honor's, my name is Eugene Wallach. I represent the Frudans. This case is basically Woolie V. Maynard gone to school. Just like in Woolie, the pellants in this case are being required to bear a motto, although in this case, the intrusion is even greater than Woolie because they have to bear it on their own persons. I hate to interrupt right at the beginning, but this case started out with all kinds, of claims, 20 counts or whatever it was. My understanding right now is that you're not saying that the school uniform policy is bad. You're just saying that the motto on the uniform is bad, is that correct? Your Honor, it is correct that given Jacobs a content neutral school uniform policy that has new exceptions for uniforms of particular groups and that would not require the bearing of a motto would be constitutional given this court's precedent. And this might seem like a silly question, but what about the golfer? Your Honor, the logic of our argument would apply to the golfer as well, although that is not something to which our, my client's object. But the logic of our argument is that people cannot be required to bear either verbal expression or symbolic expression, or at least that any such requirement must pass through scrutiny. But let me clarify that. So if you take away tomorrow's leaders from the logo, your argument would be foreclosed by Jacobs, which we're bound by, setting aside on the assumption policies. Is that correct? No, Your Honor. Jacobs approved specifically and it's stressed that it involved a policy involving blank tops and blank bottoms. So that is the kind of policy that Jacobs says is permissible. So anything beyond that the requirement of depicting any particular text or visual imagery would be not covered by Jacobs, we believe. Well, I guess then I'm worried that we have a different case than the court below had. I mean, I appreciate you came to the case after the court below was through. And you've now put this case together and you're talking about a model. And I guess I'm really worried whether we even ought to decide this case or whether we ought to give the poor old DJ the chance to talk about this model. The poor old DJ didn't even have a chance to even think about this model or it's how it affected this particular provision. In fact, it was all about an ideological message, conformities, solidarity. And he said, this is a Jacobs problem and we're through. I guess I'm worried that I have a new case in front of me and the poor district judge hasn't had a chance to talk about it or even think about it. And even worse, the state has not had any chance to give any, if you will, opportunity to present its evidence of justifications for the model. And so maybe I'd send it back and let everybody think about it again. You're on a, we agree that the case has to be sent back in any event because unlike Jacobs, which was decided following the gathering of evidence, this case was decided in motion to dismiss and that there may not even be the evidence needed under Jacobs to uphold even a content neutral policy. But the complaints did allege that this case involved the unconstitutional compulsion of the display of a model. And the question is, I understand what the complaint said, but that's about as far as it went. If you read the argument, read what was going on. The poor district judge didn't even talk about the model. The district judge was more worried about the conformity, the solidarity, ideological message, and even thought it was on the uniform and it wasn't. Your Honor, we believe that on page 1274 in the Federal Supplement version of the case, the district court specifically talked about the speech compulsion issue and rejected the speech compulsion issue. To be sure the district court aired in its characterization of the school model. It thought that the model was one team one community whereas the model was actually tomorrow's leaders. And one team one community is of animating purpose set to 1.5 million. But no fair. I print two pages 13 and 14 or page 9 and 10 and for this opinion, I think. It goes into compelled speech. Yes, yes, Your Honor. I believe that is correct. I'm sorry, I was referring to the Federal Supplement version, but he does indeed go into the compelled speech analysis and rejects the compelled speech argument on the model. Talking about a stucco logo, one team, one community. And I'm struggling with the same issue that Judge Smith is struggling because in all fairness, the district court, it was quite an extensive complaint with only passing references, perhaps a couple of passing references to the model to model's leaders. I mean, the case was really postured as an objection to the school uniform expressing a message of conformity and objecting to the idea of one school, one community. And so, understandably, given that the complaint was structured that way, the way that it was briefed, the district court's opinion really focused on the same primary argument that misridden advance. And in fact, I think at one point during the hearing, she even told the district court that she didn't have any particular personal objection to the idea that these students are tomorrow's leaders. It's just really primarily the message of conformity that she was really objecting to. So that was the posture of the case below. And what do we to do with that, if anything? Your Honor, it is true that the complaint had many different kinds of claims, some of which are now being pursued in state court. But it did specifically mention the speech compulsion claim. And the district court recognized that it mentioned, and likewise the motion to dismiss, and the opposition to the motion to dismiss, discuss this, and certainly the opposition to the motion to dismiss, discuss this speech compulsion objection, incited by an act. Well, again, you're not really addressing my colleagues' question and mine as well, which is, I mean, the council below, or say, but nonetheless, council below, said she had no objection to what you're now objecting to. Your Honor, the plaintiffs have all throughout expressed their objection to being compelled to bear a motto. Well, as I understood it, she said, we have no objection about tomorrow's leaders. Your Honor, the statement was that the message tomorrow's leaders in the abstract is something that, under other circumstances, they might not find that particularly objectionable. But they did have an objection specifically mentioned to being required to bear the motto tomorrow's leaders. That was an objection that they maintained throughout. And the district court recognized that there was an objection to the speech compulsion. Your Honor, there's also the problem with the case having to do with the content-based exception for the uniforms of nationally recognized youth organizations. And that, too, is another reason why this policy is different from the one in Jacobs. The one in Jacobs did not have such an objection. In fact, there had been an exception in the policy initially that a district court said, raised very serious first amendment issues, and then it was removed by the school district in Jacobs spending the appeal. So that is another reason why the policy here differs from that in Jacobs' and that is constitutional problems. Your Honor, as a third part of our argument says, there indeed ought to be a remand to the district court to gather further evidence. If you think that that's the appropriate way of dealing with the speech compulsion issue, that would be excellent. What would the remand accomplish? I mean, what would we tell the district judges to do? Because your argument is, I understand it, and his essence is that any kind of logo on the polo shirts would be unconstitutional. So we know that if we agree with you, what is the district judge going to do? What is the district judge going to do? Are you saying assuming that I lose on the first point then go to the second point regarding the exemption for the Girl Scouts Boyce House and similar national organizations? What would the remand do? Your Honor, as a matter of law, we believe that in fact this kind of speech compulsion is unconstitutional, at least unless the government can introduce some evidence that it serves a compelling government interest, which we doubt that it could. But if the concern is the district court did not have the opportunity to fully focus on this issue, then in that case, perhaps, are you mind with that answer? Yes, of course, thank you. So, Your Honor, if you think that a remand is appropriate, that is certainly one thing we're asking for. It just would be helpful then to instruct the district court, given that certainly the compelled speech issues and the content discrimination issues have been fully briefed, and struck the district court on the resolution of these issues, that it could then apply and then consider further questions saying having to do with compelling government interest. And in Jacobs' counsel, perhaps I'm surrendering it, but it did address the issue of the logo, so that's why I thought your argument primarily was really focused on the model tomorrow's leaders, because Jacobs did have reference to the fact that because a logo on a school uniform conveys very little communicative message, it really would not run a foul of the First Amendment, doesn't make it not content neutral, just merely by having a logo on a school uniform. Is that not so? Your Honor, we don't think that that's the way that Jacobs dealt with that logo. The policy in Jacobs was generally speaking of policy that required people to wear plain tops and plain bottoms. There was no requirement even displaying a logo. It is just that the policy there had the option that should people wish to wear a logo, that would be okay. And Jacobs said that that option does not render the policy unconstitutionally content based. And of course that option was irrelevant to the compelled speech argument because nobody was compelled to wear a logo. In this case, there is a compulsion to wear a logo. It's not just an option if you want to display the go-for, you're free to display the go-for. It is in fact a requirement that people do so. Now, this having been said, should you wish to draw a distinction between a just an image of a go-for and an actual model which expresses a much more specific message, that is something that plaintiffs would be content with, but that is not an issue that Jacobs resolved. Because in Jacobs, there was no compulsion of wearing a logo of any sort. It was only presented as a possible thing that people could wear should they wish to. Because I just can't imagine what kind of speech a go-for would really compel the plaintiffs to say. Had an argument in your brief about tomorrow's leaders, now that could be a message. And so if we accept your argument that that's compelled speech, how does that extend to merely having a go-for on your shirt? Your Honor, plaintiffs would be fine with a requirement that there be just a go-for display rather than a slogan being displayed. This having been said, there are certain kinds of pictures that might indeed raise pretty serious objections that they may convey certain messages that many people might find that they do not wish to convey. For example, the Cresment of the Tomson case, the recent head circuit case, the court, the license plate case, the court said, well, the depiction of a logo in a license plate likewise raises constitutional problems. So it may be just as a matter of setting up a clear first amendment rule, the rule in Jacobs, which said no message at all simply blank cops and blank bottoms, may be the best rule as to what kinds of compulsions the maximum that a school district can impose. Can you dress the exemption policy briefly? Yes, Your Honor. So the exemption policy provides that there's an exemption for uniforms of nationally recognized youth organizations, specifically mentioning the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts on the school. Just as examples, though, such as. Yes, Your Honor, that is correct. But that is nonetheless a content-based exemption policy. It is limited to nationally recognized youth organizations, not to other organizations, that itself actually raises vagueness issues which feed into the content discrimination point as the court and kinds of mayor have already pointed out asking whether it's a recognized cause, and leaves it unclear what qualifies, and thus leaves it with a great discretion on the part of the principle to decide which uniforms count and which do not. That's a content discrimination, just like in a Regenby time in, where the Supreme Court said that an exemption for journalistic or educational uses is a content-based classification that makes the entire policy content-based. So we think that's an independent. Is it the nationally recognized portion of the exemption policy that's problematic? So for example, if the school district were to rewrite it to say any organized youth organization, such as the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts on their regular leading days are exempt from the uniform policy? Would that be okay? Your Honor, we believe that would still involve a content discrimination because we distinguish organizational uniforms from other kinds of speech, for example, that expresses more individualistic messages. To be sure that wouldn't be clearly a viewpoint-based restriction, but neither was the restriction in Regenby time-aik, which did not mention any viewpoint and just gave an exemption for educational uses, that the court said was sufficiently content-based to render the entire policy subject. That invalidation. Your Honor, if you have no further questions- I was some- Do you really believe that your complaint lays out the argument you're now making? You're on- I was worried that the complaint alleges as to the uniform policy certain things that alleges, and I could go through those, but what it seems to me that- I'm really finding it tough time as to how the complaint suggests that the policy is content-based because they're not allowed to wear their soccer uniform to school instead of their school uniform. Your Honor, the complaint does specify that it is content- that the policy is not content or viewpoint neutral, but is rather viewpoint- and content-based speech restriction. And earlier, it points out that the policy treats youth organization uniform differently from others. It also complains- I'm speaking here at pages 30. I guess I'm- I read through this, and I don't know that I see it exactly the way you do, and I don't really know whether it was really argued that way in front of the district court because the district court didn't even mention the exemption when analyzing the free speech claim. Your Honor, the complaint has set forth a statement explaining the basic claims that the plaintiff is making. The complaint makes clear that there's a speech compulsion claim. The complaint makes clear there's a content discrimination claim. Now, in DuPours, there would be discovery, there would be an answer, there would be motion for summary judgment in which all of these things would be further developed. But one problem is that because there was a motion to dismiss granted here, there was no further opportunity to develop these arguments in more detail. But you only get to that if you lose on your first argument as I understand it. In other words, the exemption argument. Your real argument as I understand it is on its face unconstitutional, as compelled speech. Yes, Your Honor. If you agree with us that this is will you be made or goes to school, the fate of this policy should be the same as that in will you be made or that at the very least the mod of requirement would have to be struck down. There would still be the question of whether applying Jacobs, this policy passes the content neutral test, and that requires the further evidence to be gathered. As Jacobs itself stressed the importance of evidence, in that case the motion for summary judgment stage in determining whether passes must be even under the fact of you. Well, okay. Thank you, Councillor. Let me tell you what bothers me about the opinion of the district court. And that is the statement about an inocuous logo. In other words, the go for and tomorrow's leaders. Are judges now going to be out there telling school districts what is inocuous and what is not? For example, in the religious area, what sectarian and what is religious? I mean, it just puts you into a can of worms. Good morning, judges. My name is Randy Drake. I'm one of the easiest things to block the whole thing. I'm not just looking for easy things, but we can't try cases on what is inocuous. What is inocuous to one person? It might be very offensive to someone else and very desirable to someone else. I understand. Thank you. Again, my name is Randy Drake, General Counsel for the Washington School District. I'm here this morning representing the respondents. I will address that, Judge. And I'll address it in the sense that focusing on what the appellant is now focusing on at the appellate level. The woolly case gone to school, so to speak. The woolly case clearly involved an ideological message. And the appellant now is trying to make a stretch to make any logo or motto that has little if any communicative message as recognized by Jacobs, trying to stretch that into an ideological message. So I understand and I appreciate how there could be some gray area in there. But this is not that case. This is not the case to make law, which it looks like the appellant is trying to do when that gray area does not exist. And let me focus on the posture change from the lower court, from the first amended complaint to the opening brief. Most, if not all, of the arguments have been abandoned. So then, and even the complaint about what's on the shirt and what's not on the shirt. So then we can bring this woolly case to school, so to speak. Again, we're talking about an ideological message that the state is mandating their citizens to put on their private property and not remove. That is far removed from what we have here. And Jacobs did, Jacobs did address content as Judge Gwynne noted, little if any communicative message. That's what we have here. And so much so that tomorrow's leaders wasn't even a problem in the first amendment complaint, complaint, the opposition to the motion to dismiss and the argument at the district court level. So that was addressed in at the lower court level and addressed in the district court judges opinion. Let me go to the exemption issue a little bit. That really is analogous to banal slogans. And that is what's interesting here is that banal slogans are okay. If it's just again little with any genuine communicative message, but also this policy with these exemptions, it makes this policy less restrictive than even Jacobs. It allows parents to put their children into different uniforms, different clothing on days when there might be another meeting that day. It also provides them different options. But the problem is that it's content based in the sense that built school administrators or in the business of deciding what's a nationally recognized youth organization. Does AYZO fit into the picture or not? What about some local groups that have chosen to organize and, you know, printed t-shirts to wear? It gets into all kinds of issues that administrators now are in the process of deciding when a kid shows up and saying, well, I've got a meeting later today and this is the t-shirt for it. That's really the problem. And in Jacobs, there actually was a very similar exemption policy that the school district chose to drop because of concerns regarding the lack of neutrality. Yes, that's true, I understand that, but it's also analogous to what we started out this argument with. There is some gray area that's going to be involved in some cases, but again, this isn't that case. And let me point out to the comments opening brief. In support of that argument that you're noting, Judge Gwyn, they cited some national pagan group. I would submit that that is so far stretched that they're defeating their own argument by having to cite a pagan organization as evidence that this policy could go beyond the pale, so to speak, or into the gray, or even beyond the gray area. Let's not have here. We have a policy that is for convenience that allows parents, more options that allows parents to not have to worry about, well, I have to put my child in these clothes and then these clothes, that's not convenient for me. So an exception is carved out to allow that opportunity. If we agree with the plaintiff that the model tomorrow's leaders is more akin to pure speech and it becomes a case that's very similar to woolly, then what happens is the entire uniform policy have to be validated, or is it giving the school district an option to remove that model from the logo? Well, first of all, I think the policy itself and the logo with the tomorrow's leaders language, it satisfies the only scrutiny test as identified in Jacobs, so I don't think you have to. It's been addressed at the lower court level. I understand the court's concern that, wow, it's not a Jacob situation because in Jacobs, there was no model. But again, Jacob says little, if any communicative message, that's what we have here. It's still little, if any genuine communicative language. Yeah, with the case itself, decided just the uniform and he's saying, sure, we'll get put a red polo shirt or a blue polo shirt, tan pants, whatever, you know, send the kids to school, no problem. Like just like Jacobs, but it allowed a logo. That a little, if any, why do you insist so much on the logo? It must have an importance to you. I am sure a lot of people at the school like to wear their motto because that's what let them wear it. That's his point. I understand. But I still think it's that a lot of it. The logo must mean something to you. It is not innocuous. That's the point I'm trying to get at. The school chose to do so to further their school spirit of the golfer. So they chose to do so. Let me ask you this. I'm assuming that there are multiple schools, elementary schools within the school district. Yes. And do all their t-shirts have a logo with a communicative message, a motto like tomorrow's leaders? There's approximately 63 elementary schools within the Washington County School District. About 25 to 28 of those schools have uniform policies. Some have logos, some do not. And the ones that have logos has a motto like tomorrow's leaders. I think all of some might. But that raises another point, Judge. One of the primary concerns of the appellant when they brought this case initially was that they were not allowed to do so. There's no global district, Washington School District uniform policy. That was the really, really I think the impetus and primary concern of the first amendment complaint. However, that's now been abandoned and not even mentioned because the district court found or, well, the district court found that there's a permissive statute in Nevada. School districts may have no form policies, but they don't have to. But that didn't prohibit individual schools from doing so. That was the impetus behind this. That's been abandoned now. And all the arguments have been changed to try to bring this new hamster case into the fold. And that's just that's not appropriate. And even if it's found appropriate, it's not applicable. And it doesn't change the intermediate scrutiny test. Well, I guess I'm struggling with your argument just a little. Are you saying I can on this record make that determination? Are you saying out of send it back to have the district court really focus on what the state would say about? Are you saying I can make that determination on this record? Yes, Judge. Because the district court considered the content ruled on the content. So I didn't ever see anything in that district court record about leaked tomorrow's leaders. Well, that's because the plaintiff had the appellant had the problem with one team one community rather than tomorrow's leaders, which is telling me I understand, but I'm just trying to say one team one community. Yeah, I mean, tomorrow's leaders. That's quite a different. But once you the problem that you have with us is that we have Jacobs and we have no trouble following Jacobs pretty much down the line. But you're adding one more thing to this. You're not just talking about Jacobs here. You're adding a model, which is tomorrow's leaders. If you had struck tomorrow's leaders and you said, well, you don't need to wear the go for what you want to. If you want to, you can Jacobs would be right on point. But once you cross that line and you go to the further line, then I'm trying to say to myself, is there enough in this record for me to say the state is presented. What evidence they need to to meet their constitutional standard to do what they have to do. And if you have, if you've given everything you've got to do, then I can easy rule on this case. Well, I have a standard judge and I think it was sufficiently addressed at the lower court level. The district court did. The opinion does consider the content. Say the content is is analogous to the content in the Jacobs case. And even found specifically that the policy itself is less restrictive. And let me address that for a second. The judge specifically found that it's less restrictive because the older students involved in the Jacobs case were arguing that the policy was restricting them from wearing religious related clothing. And that is that is that is important in the sense that first amendment free speech rights. There's an inverse relation when you're talking about the age of children. That is an extremely important distinction here. That's an important argument and it was recognized by the district court in this case. So there would be no point. I take you to word. There would be no worry. I know where you're going. I know where I was going when I came in here, but I take you to word. And and I let me just expand on that a little further. It seemed to be inappropriate to send something back to the district court level based on the appellant now turning their arguments either on their head or just says that just says I want to give more evidence. That really is not saying I can make my argument on what's on the record and you could make your decision judge. I think the district court judge did look at the evidence. Okay. And that evidence applies to no more evidence. We can make that decision. I understand what you're arguing. I don't think I need to go into the woolly case any further. It doesn't seem that it interests the court that much and I appreciate that. It's certainly distinguishable. I don't think I have to go there. There is a parental control issue that was brought up a little bit in the in the appellant's brief. I think that's been dealt with in school uniform cases throughout this country specifically. The little field found that out of the fifth circuit found that school uniform policies do not violate appearance. First amendment or associated rights of parental control. So I think that's addressed. I also think that. Again, I believe it is one intention here to make law and this isn't the appropriate case to do that because there's no ideological messages here. We're talking about elementary school students. School uniform policies even beyond the elementary school level have been held constitutional throughout this country, including the circuit. And this isn't the case that is distinguished. This is just something probably way in left field. Since you've got time. What if they all went to the Presbyterian Church after school? Could they wear a probably a stupid question? Could they wear a uniform that says Jesus saves national organization? And they have a church meeting for these youngsters? You know, Catechism or whatever? Jesus saves. Judge, I understand that. And as in order to allow those organizations, we allow those organizations to have meetings on our school properties. That's addressed. But that's different than, again, that's going over that gray area. And it's not. We don't allow. Again, that's an ideological message. That wasn't allowed in Wolley. I wouldn't be allowed here, but that's an entirely different question. But you're saying they couldn't do that? An ideological message, yes sir. And the boy scouts are not ideological. I don't believe so. Or the girls scouts. That's correct. Well, that's the problem. You talk about gray areas. And when you get into gray areas, reasonable minds do differ. And the right to free speech, tying it to ideological message, I think is potentially very problematic. Because what's benign and unoffensive to one person actually carries a communicative message that's distinct for somebody else. And so I don't think I necessarily accept that argument. Wolley did rely on Barnett, which is a school case. Yes, you're on it. It's an entirely different school case. But again, this isn't that case to not allow any type of language on a shirt or something to a school uniform policy. This isn't that case. The appellant here didn't even have a problem with tomorrow's leaders. I don't even know. I'm sorry. I don't see how you can say the boy scouts are not ideological. I mean, they have their anti-gay policy for so long. When I was a boy growing up in a church, touch reformed, we couldn't join the boy scouts because it's ideology. The girl scouts, I don't know enough about them, but I'm saying that all these organizations have some ideology because that's their purpose for existence. I understand that you're honoring. Again, it's an intent to be less restrictive than even Jacobs to offer choices to the parents and opportunities. All right. Okay. Thank you. Thank you. Do you have anything further? You've got another two minutes, I guess. No, you're past two minutes. I'll give you a minute. I'll give you another minute. It's my fault. I'm sorry, honor. Just point to one item in the record. You asked about the plaintiff saying they don't object to the tomorrow's leaders. They're relevant part of the transcript is in supplemental excerpts of record page two, in which Ms. Fruden does say, I don't have a problem saying my kids are tomorrow's leaders, but I do have a problem with the government compelling our kids to make that statement. So that was the position. If you have no further questions, you're on our side. No further questions. All right. Then case 1215403, Fruden versus Pilling will be submitted. And court will be adjourned for today