Legal Case Summary

We'll hear argument next this morning in case 16309, Moslyn Yacht, versus United States. Mr. Landau. Landau. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. May it please the Court. Section 1425A of the Federal Criminal Code authorizes the government to strip a naturalized American of citizenship if it was procured contrary to law. Our position in this case is simple. The words procured contrary to law require a causal link between the procurement of citizenship and the underlying violation of law. At the government's urging, the district court read such a causal link out of the statute, instructing the jury that it could convict if petitioner obtained United States citizenship and violated at least one law governing naturalization. The instructions didn't require the government to prove that the underlying violation of law had any effect whatsoever on the naturalization decision. To the constant, even assuming I bought your argument, that's a very broad statement, any effect. How about a natural tendency to effect? Because you can never predict what will actually happen in the end. You can only talk about what might happen. And we would be happy. What we ask for was a materiality standard, which I think is very much along the lines that Your Honor just suggested. What's amazing here, and I think what makes this case so extreme, we're really at one end of the spectrum, the district court specifically instructed the jury, and here I quote, even if you find that a false statement did not influence the decision to approve the defendant's naturalization, the government need only prove that one of the defendant statements was false. Well, but what Justice Sotomayor said in essence means sometimes we, a causality is known only after the fact. You can have a statement that everyone thinks is immaterial, that's objectively immaterial. But it might have a causal connection at the end of the day. Well, the government, if it wants to strip an American of citizenship, which is about the most grave thing it can do, probably short of taking away someone's. Sotomayor, I fully understand that. But it is the idea of what's material and what's immaterial, and what's a causal link and what is not, in a sense can be understood and analyzed only after the fact. Well, I think your honor. The government has the burden if it wants to show that the petitioner or the defendant procured citizenship contrary to law. The government has to show at the very least that, based on a false statement, that the false statement was material, our basic submission

. But plainly, this wouldn't be homeless area. You're all going to know about material or not. But why isn't this obviously material? She lied about her husband's, what he was doing in Bosnia, right? She said he was trying to avoid military conscription when, in fact, he was in the service. And in the unit that was committing atrocities. Under what circumstances would that be in material? You're honor, we would like a chance to argue the materiality question to a jury, which is the general decider of what is material under this Court's decision in Godend. We did not have the chance, given prevailing Six Circuit Law, which said there was no materiality to contest this issue at trial. And we very much understand that. What they were given refugee status based on a well-founded fear of persecution where and for what reason? Well, this is the crux of the dispute, Your Honor. The government's position was that it was based on the fear of persecution by the Serbs based on her husband's evasion of military service. Where? In Bosnia? In Bosnia, yes. Yes. And so this is now there out of Bosnia that their American embassy in Belgrade seeking refugee status. And this was in a sense the heart of the dispute at trial. And in fact, I think relates also to Justice Ginsburg's question, the jury sent a note about what was the refugee status based on. We're a little bit confused because we see here a document that says that it was apparently based on ethnic persecution by the Muslims in Bosnia. So I think this is really the heart of the factual dispute on what was the refugee status based on. Was it based on? So we don't know which it was based on? No, that's the hottest, that was the, that's the key issue that we would like to have an opportunity for our day of war. Well, if this isn't the issue that we, that we took, uh, cert to decide, but it does, uh, raise the question whether there's really anything at stake here. I assume that every Serb in Bosnia hurts a Gavina is not entitled to asylum in the United States. That's correct. So merely being a Serb there where I think there about 30 percent of the population would not be a Serb. That is a correction. No, and in this case, if you read that the, um, naturalization, to me, the refugee application, which is at PETF 62A to 64A, you can see that they were, um, that the concern was their house was, uh, that they got death threats. Their house, I think, stones are thrown at the window. I mean, this was not just any particular area. This was a majority Muslim area within Bosnia

. I was, Bosnia was a patchwork of ethnicities at this point, and they were in a majority Muslim area, and they had to flee Bosnia. And I think this is really the crux of their argument that this is not, that the, that the whole issue about our husband's military service was really not the basis for it. And this is what we would like to chance to, uh, argue this before properly instructed jury. We may win or we may lose on that. I mean, that's the issue that we would like the opportunity for our day in court on that issue. Materiality, which is how, um, good moral character works into this, because even if it's immaterial, it is alive. And there was more than one lie in this application. The good moral character provision, your honor, which is 1101 F6, 8 U.S.C. 1101 F6 is our friend in this case, because you are absolutely right. We have conceded that she told a lie. But 1101 F6 does not make every lie preclusive of good moral character. It only makes a particular kind of lie preclusive. There's a list of things that preclude good moral character, and among them is a lie for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit. That was one of the things that the government had to prove a trial, and they charged her with that. And if, in fact, she were convicted of that, that would preclude, that would disqualify her from naturalization, because you cannot establish good moral character categorically. If you have told that lie for that purpose, but I think that underscores your honor, that Congress did not intend to make every lie on the form, per se, disqualifying. To be sure, they may be relevant to good moral character, but where Congress wanted to make a particular kind of lie preclusive of good moral character in 1101 F6. It did so specifically. And so the applicant has the burden under section 1427 A3 of proving good moral character. And so, again, I think that section is our friend here, because it shows the anomaly of the government's position that basically any lie automatically makes you liable under section 1015, it's section 1015 under their view of section 1425 as a pure look-through statute to 1015, sucks up any violation of 1015A, which again has no materiality there for them, has no materiality in 1425A. That's the anomaly I'm stuck with, and maybe you can help me with Mr. Landau's, that 1425 doesn't contain an express materiality provision. And 1451 does, in one provision, one clause, but not another. And then some of the predicate acts for 1425 do, and others don't

. So it seems like linguistically we have to do some summer assaults to get where you want to go. Because no one would say that if you violate 1425, you have to prove, say, a material genocide. I couldn't agree with you more. Okay, so we have to, it would be material, not only we would have to add the word material to 1425, it isn't there. We'd have to limit it's impact to some predicate offenses and not others. Right, statement-based ones, I think your position is. That's a lot of linguistic summer assaults to add to a statute, isn't it? I don't think so at all, Your Honor. I think you have to look, again, I think the contrast with civil denaturalization provision, 8 U.S.C. 1451A, is a very powerful point in our favor. How is that because it says illegally procure? And then it talks about material misrepresentations in two separate clauses. Correct. And if your Honor wanted to take the most natural kind of textual reading, you would say, okay, here in 1425, we only have the general one procured contrary to law. So the most natural pure textual approach would be to say, well, then that shouldn't cover statement offenses at all because statement offenses were broken out, and that would render the statement offenses in 1451A reference to preference. The Federal Encos interpreted the language procure and doing it illegally as anything in the course of the proceeding, right? So that's the answer to that, isn't it? No, but I think the point is, Your Honor, nobody is fighting that Section 1425A is broader than statements, but I think what you can't do is- Oh, then that concession right there answers my problem, doesn't it? I might have mispoken if I said. 1425A includes bribery. It includes things to which the word material wouldn't naturally apply, which I think answers your question right there in the sense that it would have been nonsensical for Congress to put in a general illegally procured statute, the word material. It just wouldn't fit there because it's a general one where they used the word material in 1451, that's because historically, 1451 has had illegally procured the kind of the catch-all and a separate statement one. But what you can't do is say 1425 applies is a general catch-all, but when it's applied to statements, they're not material. I mean, I don't know if that doesn't make sense. Hasn't the briefing in this case really clarified what the issue is? And in a way, it seemed to me that what was being debated in the district court was the wrong issue about whether to charge the jury on materiality, because materiality is not in this statute, but as you have refined the argument, the issue is the meaning of the term procure, which may or may not mean exactly the same thing as materiality. I think you are absolutely correct, Your Honor. That's one of the things. I mean, it's the same issue we've been arguing all along. I think you put the point exactly right

. I think we have a textual basis for what had been a line of circuit court decisions going our way, starting in Puerto, that went our way based on policy concerns, which are very powerful, but really didn't grapple with the text of the statute. But in your brief, I think have possibly tried to read more into procure than you can, because at a number of spots, you see, you argued that it means but for causation. Now, this morning, you have said that's not your argument. It's not, you don't have to prove that, but for the false statement in the immigration proceeding, the person would not have been naturalized. Well, Your Honor, our position in this case was always relying on the line of circuit precedent going our way was that it was materiality. I think if you didn't, I mean, if we hadn't, but for the way this case evolved, where it was really based on materiality, I think there is a good argument that the most natural reading of procure contrary to law goes back to the general causation principles in our law, which is this court underscored just last week and good here, is but for causation. Well, I don't know whether you can get that out of procured. Let me give you this example. Let's say there is a municipal ordinance that says that it is illegal to buy or sell a scout ticket within 200 feet of the entrance of the stadium or a concert hall, and I buy, knowingly, buy a scout ticket within 199 feet of the entrance of this facility. Now, in order for me to have procured that ticket contrary to law, would it be necessary to prove that I couldn't have purchased this from another scalper around the other side who was outside of the 200 feet, or I couldn't have gotten the ticket if I had waited in line at the box office? Your Honor, I think your question points out some of the very difficult questions of causation that are really implicated by the word procure, and on which the court frankly fractured in Congress, and I think those are difficult questions that really haven't been briefed before you. I think our position here is really at the very least, it has to be material. You can't establish a causal link in this context where the statement doesn't even have the tendency. If I could refer the Court to the definition of materiality that was actually used by the majority in Congress, this is at 485 U.S. at 772, a statement with a natural tendency to produce the conclusion that the applicant was qualified for citizenship. So, please finish. I'm sorry, Your Honor. I mean, my point really was there is some starch in the standard of materiality, and it really goes to qualifications for citizenship. My friends on the other side seem to have a pretty watered down version of materiality that will anything that might launch an investigation as per say. Can I ask you, Mr. Landau, about a different interpretation of the statute? Neither you nor the government supports it, but it's raised briefly in the government's in footnote four of the government's brief, which is this idea that what we really should be doing here is we should be interpreting 1425 in exactly the same way that we interpret the civil statute, 1451, which talks about illegally procuring something, and that both are limited to failures to satisfy the prerequisites to naturalization. And that's really what we should be thinking about when we interpret that. I think that that, you know, I think that makes a lot of sense that this is really, that's what it's about. You're stripping somebody of their citizenship, so you kind of think the natural question is, were they qualified for the citizenship in the first place? I found footnote four. And that would, in this case, presumably be because of bad character, is that right? Well, I mean, no, the government, I think, thinks a lot more than that. I mean, they did not, they tried to prove, but again, we have a general verdict, so we don't know whether they proved that her lie was for the subjective purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit

. That's one way they could try to prove that if they did prove that, we would agree she would not be qualified. There's no question that there's a causal link there if you can say the person wouldn't have been qualified. So I have no- I mean, the reason that the government relies on, if it's a prerequisite to getting citizenship, one of the, their argument is that a prerequisite is not telling a falsehood, an intentional falsehood in your application. So how do you win? And how do you get causation and- But that is, that is what I was trying to get at before. With 11-0-1-F-6, which goes to the things that categorically preclude a finding of good moral character, does not say any falsehood in the application process is enough to disqualify you. It says any falsehood for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit. If they prove that, then I think this goes back to Justice Kagan's question. They would prove that we were disqualified. And I think that line of case is very consistent with footnote board. I find it to be in concrete. Suppose you're right and there is a materiality requirement. You said you should have an opportunity to present that to a jury. On the facts that we have here, how could you argue this is immaterial? This is immaterial. These lies were immaterial. Well, we would go back to- we'd get a witness to talk about how her two sisters got here, for instance, that they were victims of ethnic persecution by the Muslims in Bosnia and that she would have gotten the refugee status regardless of the point about the husband's military service. That was not the clock. That there was- I mean, this was in a sense the issue- I think the jury note on Pet-Ab90 really nicely points out that the jury in this very case asked the judge a question, what was her refugee status based on? Was it based on fear of persecution by the Muslims on ethnic persecution? Or was it based on fear of persecution by the ethnic Serbs based on his avoiding military service? We can see that that is a fair question to debate, but we would like an opportunity to debate that in front of a jury that is properly instructed and that- I'm sorry, I don't know how you can do that answers only a part of the materiality issue. If she lied to get her husband a benefit, that's an immigration benefit that she was leseeking. Well, she- She had to lie about his military service otherwise he would have been disqualified. Well, but they did include it. They allege, and this is exactly right, Your Honor. That was one of the predicate offenses they allege here, that one was Section 1015A, which we've discussed in our brief. The other one is that she didn't have good moral character because she lied to obtain an immigration benefit. But we have a general verdict here. We have no finding here that the jury actually agreed with the government that in fact she lied to obtain an immigration benefit. Is there any way they could have found otherwise? Well, I understand- I understand- We don't know why she said that

. One would have to speculate to say, I mean, people lie for many different reasons. They lie because they are embarrassed about certain things. I mean, I think it would be speculative to say basically, as a matter of law, we can say there's only one reason she could have lied. I don't think we are basically in the practice of directing verdicts in criminal cases. Do you think this well-instructed jury would be entitled to hear evidence about Srebrenica and about her husband's military service? I think that raises some interesting questions about- I don't know how well you're going to do in front of this well- And structure. Again, I am not here to say that- To project that people are going to be throwing roses in our path on remand. I do not deny that this could be a very tough road to ho-un remand. What I'm here to do is basically to say, as far as this case has gone along, the six circuits so far has thrown roses in the government's path and the lower courts to allow them specifically to get a criminal conviction, to strip her citizenship without even proving that the statement is material. There is nothing- You can come up with a chart that goes from 1015A, which they say has no materiality to 1425A, which they say adds nothing as a pure look through statute, and leads to the direct consequence of denaturalization. So under their view, any lie leads- Can lead to automatic denaturalization. Congress could have come up with that regime, but it didn't, because I think Congress recognizes that not all lies are created equal. They come in different shapes and sizes, and that's why when Congress wanted to make one kind of lie particularly significant, it did so in 1101F6 by saying it has to be a lie for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit. If they prove that lie, they are gold, then they actually- Then they win. The problem is, in this case, my client could have been convicted without that finding. We just don't know that. And so, again, I think part of the problem is here, the government's fundamental conception of 1425A is wrong. They really do look at it basically as nothing more than a sentence enhancer for the underlying convictions, but it is its own distinct provision of the criminal code with its own distinct statute of limitations and its own very distinct penalties. For instance, in 1015A, the maximum imprisonment term is five years. Under section 1425A, you can go to prison for up to 25 years, plus automatic denaturalization, which flows as a result of 1451E. So, the essence of that distinct 1425A crime is the unlawful procurement. You're taking the unlawful predicate act and you're using it to procure citizenship. And so, our basic position is if the government wants to strip you of citizenship on the ground that you were not qualified for citizenship that was procured contrary to law, it's very important for them to show that you would have been qualified if the truth had been known. And going back to your point, Justice Kagan, just to round out on footnote 4, I found that footnote incomprehensible because the government basically starts out with talking about a standard that we actually like, which is the disqualification standard for causation essentially. But then they go on to say, well, that would have been met here. I think the most they can say is that could have been met here. And they can't possibly prove that as a matter of law, this was the contested issue at trial

. So, we're okay with the legal standard there, but the inference they draw in the next sentence, I think they use the wrong verb tense. That particular footnote, I think, if you focus on that, that can answer the case in a sense. But failing to meet the qualifications for naturalization sounds to me like but for causation. So, is that your argument or is it something less than but for it? Well, you know, you can say it should be but for but I'll win if it's anything. What is your, do you have a firm position or if we were starting this on tabula rasa and we had not argued materiality below, I would say that it's but for. I think that is the best interpretation of the past. Because I mean that's awfully hard because then you have to go back and determine, even if somebody says something that has a real potential to affect the naturalization decision, you still would have to go back and show that in this case it accurately did make the difference. And your honor, this was the crux of the debate in the plurality opinion and conges between Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens. And I mean that's a very interesting debate but actually in the majority part of conges, in part two A, the majority there, the court, speaking through Justice Scalia, define materiality, I think in a way that is pretty darn close to but for. It's not quite there but it's said a natural tendency to produce the conclusion that the applicant was qualified for citizenship. So again, I think the real crux here is not just might this have led to an investigation, it really has to go to the qualifications for citizenship. Because that's what this whole thing is about. We're trying to figure out, did we naturalize somebody who shouldn't have been naturalized? Well, if that's the case, how do we distinguish between 1425A and B? A says that it has to be a procured contrary to law, B says procured when you're not entitled to it. It seems to me that B does the work you're describing. That the Ilegal Act has something to do with the underlying entitlement as opposed to a lie or something illegal in the process of. Can you help me out with that? I'm stuck there. I think again, you know, A is really about the procurement of citizenship. That's an interesting point, the government has never really drawn any distinction between 1425A and B. They have to do something different, right? Well, no. But again, I think A is clearly about, they both use the words procure or obtain. And again, I'm not sure, I think on rebuttal I'll address the difference between A and B. I'll see you on it. If there are no further questions. Thank you, Council. Mr. Parker

. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Naturalization is the highest privilege the United States can bestow upon an individual. It fundamentally changes the relationship between the government and the individual. And Congress has required that individuals who seek that high privilege must script the law. So, you have to be very meticulously comply with every rule governing the naturalization. Well, it's difficult to have a question. I looked at it on the naturalization form. There's a question. It's number 22. Have you ever, and they've got ever, in bold form, committed, assisted in committing, or attempted to commit a crime or offense for which you were not arrested? Some time ago, outside the statute of limitations, I drove 60 miles an hour in a 55-hour zone. I'm sorry to get it. I was not arrested. Now, you say that if I answer that question no, 20 years after I was naturalized as a citizen, you can knock on my door and say, guess what? You're not an American citizen after all. Well, I would say two things. First, that is how the government would interpret that. That it would require you to disclose those sorts of a fight. Oh, come on. You're saying that on this form, you expect everyone to list every time in which they drove over the speed limit, except when they were arrested. Well, what I think that, what I think that particular question demonstrates is, and I will readily acknowledge. Number one, that is a very broad question. And number two, I think that there is a great deal of ambiguity, and what exactly is meant by crime and offense? Well, but just, it's worse. If you look at blacks, in blacks law dictionary, I looked up what's an offense. And this is what it says. It says it's a violation of the law, a crime, often a minor one. So you really are looking for the listing of every time somebody drove over the speed limit

. But here is what I think is important, though. What you would have to show to denaturalize someone, at least under Section 1425, would be that, number one, they were aware that that is what the question was asking for. I knew I knew. They knew. I drove over 55. Right. You were aware that that happened. You were aware that a truthful answer to that question would require you to disclose that. And yet, notwithstanding the fact that you had taken an oath to truthfully answer that question, you chose to deliberately lie. And if all of those things could be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that's an awful lot of ifs, and I think, no, it's not a lot of ifs. I knew that I drove over 60. Okay, I understand the question. I saw that it even says, ever. I researched it in Blacks Law Dictionary, and it said in offense, no matter how minor, the conditions that you set forth were fully satisfied, and I would say fully satisfied, in everybody's case who drives at any time. And your position is still, you answer that question, no. We can take away your citizenship. If we can prove that you deliberately lied in answering that question, then yes. I think, let me give you another example. One of the requirements is that you list any nickname that you've ever had. All right. When I was a child, not me, but some imagined applicant, I was very slight of built, I wasn't. The applicant was. And his buddies were calling him the F word in terms of gender identity. He's not, never was, or is and disclosed it in another part of the application. But that word embarrassed him, continues to embarrass him, and it has no importance to the decision-making process. Is that failure to disclose the use of a childhood nickname that is embarrassing that has no relationship to anything whatsoever? Could you prosecute that person? No

. Well, I think that you may be overreading that particular question. I think what the, what that question is requesting are names that you yourself have gone by, and the reason that that is requested is because the FBI conducts a background check on all these individuals, and it needs to know if there are other names that you may be known by that would come. There are. But I mean, I don't mean to push back against that. But that, I only think that what you're suggesting is that this is something that other people called you in childhood, and I don't think that that would be asked about that. But the point is that I think of all these questions, the same thing. You read, you read the briefs. The questions are unbelievably broad. All right, we can think of a thousand examples, not a thousand, but maybe only 500, of the kind that the Chief Justice gave, and it's, to me, rather surprising that the government of the United States thinks that Congress is interpreting this statute and wanted it interpreted in a way that would throw into doubt the citizenship of fast percentages of all naturalized citizens. I mean, isn't that, you explain to me why that isn't so? I don't think that it would throw into doubt. You want 15 more examples, such as the one that the Chief Justice gave? Well, I'm really shocked by the one he gave, by the way. But, but, but, but. So what is the end? You want to fight that? You want to say, no, I don't have listed on the page in front of me. 15 such examples, and the briefs didn't list 23, and we couldn't think of 100 of this. I think that we can look, I would readily agree with you, that there are a number of questions on this form that taken in isolation would appear to be if you gave an untruthful answer to one of those questions. It was just the questions. I walked into the immigration hearing with a pocket knife in a government building, because boy scout knife, I carry on my key chain. By the way, no one ever saw it. No one ever saw it. It was there the whole time, and then I walked out. Okay. Subject to deportation. No, I knew there was. I knew I wasn't supposed to do it, but I thought, oh, so what? And there it's been on my key chain for 30 years. No, I actually think that that would not look. I think there are a couple of questions there. I could just very briefly address the last one. I don't think that the crime that you just made. Yes, my last examples. Look to the general example, and you've read through the ones in the brief. I don't want to repeat it. It's the same underlying question. There are a number of answers that could be given in the naturalization process that could be false and might seem to be in isolation in material, completely in material, for example. I mean, you could lie about your weight, let's say. You're embarrassed that you weigh 170 pounds, and so you claim that you weigh 150. The point though is, Congress has specifically attended to all false statements under oath in these types of proceedings. It has specifically provided that it is a crime to lie under oath in the naturalization process, even about an immaterial matter, and it is provided that certain of those immaterial lives are categorical bars to naturalization. Mr. President, please, I'm sorry, I'm finishing. I was just going to say that there are a number of reasons why Congress did not want to require that the government prove that a particular lie is immaterial in this context. I think it's important to understand what those are. The first is, when an individual lies, even remember, this has to be a lie under oath after you've sworn that you will tell the truth, and you are deliberately lying about something. It calls into question the veracity of your other answers, and that is very important in the naturalization process. Oh, please, I'm sorry. Go ahead. You'll be glad to know I don't have another of these questions for you. Although I am a little bit horrified to know that every time I lie about my weight, it has to be. Only under oath. Yeah. Can I just ask you, can I ask you to take you through a few parts of your brief, because I guess I felt a little bit confused on reading it what your standard is. So, on page 14, you say that the question is whether petitioner violated the law in the course of procuring naturalization, in the course of procuring naturalization. Then on page 9 and page 17, you say that the question is whether a person procures naturalization in a manner that violates other laws

. I could just very briefly address the last one. I don't think that the crime that you just made. Yes, my last examples. Look to the general example, and you've read through the ones in the brief. I don't want to repeat it. It's the same underlying question. There are a number of answers that could be given in the naturalization process that could be false and might seem to be in isolation in material, completely in material, for example. I mean, you could lie about your weight, let's say. You're embarrassed that you weigh 170 pounds, and so you claim that you weigh 150. The point though is, Congress has specifically attended to all false statements under oath in these types of proceedings. It has specifically provided that it is a crime to lie under oath in the naturalization process, even about an immaterial matter, and it is provided that certain of those immaterial lives are categorical bars to naturalization. Mr. President, please, I'm sorry, I'm finishing. I was just going to say that there are a number of reasons why Congress did not want to require that the government prove that a particular lie is immaterial in this context. I think it's important to understand what those are. The first is, when an individual lies, even remember, this has to be a lie under oath after you've sworn that you will tell the truth, and you are deliberately lying about something. It calls into question the veracity of your other answers, and that is very important in the naturalization process. Oh, please, I'm sorry. Go ahead. You'll be glad to know I don't have another of these questions for you. Although I am a little bit horrified to know that every time I lie about my weight, it has to be. Only under oath. Yeah. Can I just ask you, can I ask you to take you through a few parts of your brief, because I guess I felt a little bit confused on reading it what your standard is. So, on page 14, you say that the question is whether petitioner violated the law in the course of procuring naturalization, in the course of procuring naturalization. Then on page 9 and page 17, you say that the question is whether a person procures naturalization in a manner that violates other laws. What are we talking about? Is it in the course of or in a manner that violates other laws? Well, my apologies if that wasn't clear. I think we're just saying two ways of saying exactly the same thing, and that is exactly how the jury was instructed in this case. Yeah. I mean, it seems sort of different to me, and the course of is what creates the hypotheticals that Justice Breyer was talking about at the pan-night for the gun or something like that. But what you're saying, but I can just choose. You can tell me your standard is in a manner that violates other laws. Well, I think that's right, and I think what that means is the same as what the jury was instructed in this case. Okay, so then, I mean, it makes me want to say, okay, what does it mean to procure naturalization in a manner that violates other laws? And then you talk about that, and you talk about that on this, this is the only time I found in the brief where you actually suggest what it means to procure naturalization in a way that in a manner that violates other laws. And you say on page 18, but that means is by violating those various laws, by violating those various laws. And that made me think that's a causal requirement. No. I mean, you procure naturalization, this is again on page 18, a person who know only procure naturalization in an unlawful manner, and then you clarify that that means by violating the laws Congress has enacted. So when you say that you procure naturalization by violating laws Congress has enacted, all you're saying is that the naturalization results from the violation of those laws. Well, I, and I guess if that's not what you meant to say, and I don't mean to trick you here. If that's not what you meant to say in this brief, although it suggests it did, I think it is what you say. But if it's not what you meant to say, well, how could it be anything else? Well, I, I think it is not, and my apologies if that sentence is unclear. I think it's actually described in more detail on the preceding page, in page 17. Our interpretation of that provision is that it means that you have to procure naturalization in violation of the laws that govern the naturalization process. These are laws that address naturalization. And- Well, number one, where is that in the statute? Well, I think that it is a necessary construction of the phrase procure contrary to law naturalization. But it doesn't say the statute. It just says contrary to law. It doesn't say what laws, it doesn't say laws governing the naturalization process. So that's one issue, but that's a different issue from the one I'm talking about. Whatever laws it is, whether it's all laws or whether it's laws relating to the naturalization process, when you describe what you mean, when you say in a manner that violates the laws, when you say you say it's by virtue of your naturalization by violating the laws, you very naturally, I think it's a totally natural construction of the language. You very naturally say you got the naturalization by violating those laws, meaning that the naturalization is the result of that violation

. What are we talking about? Is it in the course of or in a manner that violates other laws? Well, my apologies if that wasn't clear. I think we're just saying two ways of saying exactly the same thing, and that is exactly how the jury was instructed in this case. Yeah. I mean, it seems sort of different to me, and the course of is what creates the hypotheticals that Justice Breyer was talking about at the pan-night for the gun or something like that. But what you're saying, but I can just choose. You can tell me your standard is in a manner that violates other laws. Well, I think that's right, and I think what that means is the same as what the jury was instructed in this case. Okay, so then, I mean, it makes me want to say, okay, what does it mean to procure naturalization in a manner that violates other laws? And then you talk about that, and you talk about that on this, this is the only time I found in the brief where you actually suggest what it means to procure naturalization in a way that in a manner that violates other laws. And you say on page 18, but that means is by violating those various laws, by violating those various laws. And that made me think that's a causal requirement. No. I mean, you procure naturalization, this is again on page 18, a person who know only procure naturalization in an unlawful manner, and then you clarify that that means by violating the laws Congress has enacted. So when you say that you procure naturalization by violating laws Congress has enacted, all you're saying is that the naturalization results from the violation of those laws. Well, I, and I guess if that's not what you meant to say, and I don't mean to trick you here. If that's not what you meant to say in this brief, although it suggests it did, I think it is what you say. But if it's not what you meant to say, well, how could it be anything else? Well, I, I think it is not, and my apologies if that sentence is unclear. I think it's actually described in more detail on the preceding page, in page 17. Our interpretation of that provision is that it means that you have to procure naturalization in violation of the laws that govern the naturalization process. These are laws that address naturalization. And- Well, number one, where is that in the statute? Well, I think that it is a necessary construction of the phrase procure contrary to law naturalization. But it doesn't say the statute. It just says contrary to law. It doesn't say what laws, it doesn't say laws governing the naturalization process. So that's one issue, but that's a different issue from the one I'm talking about. Whatever laws it is, whether it's all laws or whether it's laws relating to the naturalization process, when you describe what you mean, when you say in a manner that violates the laws, when you say you say it's by virtue of your naturalization by violating the laws, you very naturally, I think it's a totally natural construction of the language. You very naturally say you got the naturalization by violating those laws, meaning that the naturalization is the result of that violation. Because what else could you mean when you say, when you have a naturalization and you have these violation of laws? Well, again, that the violation led to the naturalization? Well, again, I mean, just with respect to the sentence that you're quoting, I think what we were saying is by violating the laws, we were trying to describe what it means to act in an unlawful manner. I don't think we were trying to say that that I know, I'm sort of suggested that in trying to describe that, you ended up using the petitioner's formulation, and that seems quite natural to me, because I don't know whether the formulation you could use to describe what it means to say in a manner that violates those laws. I don't think that it is natural, and let me explain why. The statute says, procure contrary to law naturalization. We know what procure naturalization means. That means to obtain naturalization. And then the phrase is contrary to law. Well, the question then is contrary to what laws? I think that law has to be interpreted consistent with the two words that bookend that provision, procure in naturalization. Now, I don't think it's maybe a simple minding question, but how can an immaterial statement procure naturalization? I think that the, that's such a shorter statement of my question, it's perfect. I think the answer is, we at least don't read the statute to require that the statement be procuring the naturalization. We don't read the statute to say that the violation has to procure it. And I think that this goes to a difference in how we may be using the term materiality here. The petitioner is saying that it means that the person has to have lied about a material matter, meaning that a truthful answer would be more likely to get them naturalization than an untruthful one. Or, as petitioner has also said several times, that it would be the but-for-cause of getting that naturalization. But what Congress was concerned here with is not what people lied about. Rather, it was the fact that they lied. And the lie itself, the same question in a different form. Just giving a sentence that has this pattern, Jane Doe procured something. Jane Doe procured X contrary to law. Where the thing that she procured had no potential, I'm sorry, where the thing that she did had no potential to help her get X. Well, she procured X contrary to law, but the thing that she did had no potential to help her get that thing. If what we are saying, as petitioner has argued, is that it has to be something that where you either could not get it or be much less likely to get it if you did Y instead of X. I think one example might be, you know, you go to a gallery. You can procure the painting that's in the gallery in one of two ways. You can procure it unlawfully by stealing it, or you can procure it lawfully by buying it. But if you steal it, it's entirely natural to say that you have procured the painting contrary to law, even though, because you mean that you had the money, you could just as easily have purchased it

. Because what else could you mean when you say, when you have a naturalization and you have these violation of laws? Well, again, that the violation led to the naturalization? Well, again, I mean, just with respect to the sentence that you're quoting, I think what we were saying is by violating the laws, we were trying to describe what it means to act in an unlawful manner. I don't think we were trying to say that that I know, I'm sort of suggested that in trying to describe that, you ended up using the petitioner's formulation, and that seems quite natural to me, because I don't know whether the formulation you could use to describe what it means to say in a manner that violates those laws. I don't think that it is natural, and let me explain why. The statute says, procure contrary to law naturalization. We know what procure naturalization means. That means to obtain naturalization. And then the phrase is contrary to law. Well, the question then is contrary to what laws? I think that law has to be interpreted consistent with the two words that bookend that provision, procure in naturalization. Now, I don't think it's maybe a simple minding question, but how can an immaterial statement procure naturalization? I think that the, that's such a shorter statement of my question, it's perfect. I think the answer is, we at least don't read the statute to require that the statement be procuring the naturalization. We don't read the statute to say that the violation has to procure it. And I think that this goes to a difference in how we may be using the term materiality here. The petitioner is saying that it means that the person has to have lied about a material matter, meaning that a truthful answer would be more likely to get them naturalization than an untruthful one. Or, as petitioner has also said several times, that it would be the but-for-cause of getting that naturalization. But what Congress was concerned here with is not what people lied about. Rather, it was the fact that they lied. And the lie itself, the same question in a different form. Just giving a sentence that has this pattern, Jane Doe procured something. Jane Doe procured X contrary to law. Where the thing that she procured had no potential, I'm sorry, where the thing that she did had no potential to help her get X. Well, she procured X contrary to law, but the thing that she did had no potential to help her get that thing. If what we are saying, as petitioner has argued, is that it has to be something that where you either could not get it or be much less likely to get it if you did Y instead of X. I think one example might be, you know, you go to a gallery. You can procure the painting that's in the gallery in one of two ways. You can procure it unlawfully by stealing it, or you can procure it lawfully by buying it. But if you steal it, it's entirely natural to say that you have procured the painting contrary to law, even though, because you mean that you had the money, you could just as easily have purchased it. And that I think is the difference. The thing that was done there stealing the painting certainly had the potential to help the thief get the painting. That's true. It was the means by which they walked away with the painting, but I don't think that it is that there was any causal relationship there of the sort that we have been talking about. What about what sort would you accept? That is, you heard too right there. Forget the word materiality from your point of view, you don't. Okay? And I take it about four conditions, you don't. And I take it that proximate cause, you don't. But what about how to tendency to affect a reasonable immigration officer in his judgment? What about that? What about the one you just used? It was a means towards getting. That's tougher than you're usually accepting. Well, which ones were here? I have about five. It influenced the decision. It had the possibility or tendency to influence the decision. Do you say all those are wrong? I think they are, but the reason is that Congress has... Well, which one do you accept? I don't think I would accept any of them. I think that the problem here is that Congress has said... I know, I know you say Congress said that, but the question, of course, for us is whether Congress said that. And we have some words. So I want to know if those words in your mind are capable of any interpretation that suggests any kind of tendency of the unlawful act to move an immigration judge if not this one, some other one towards a plus decision. I don't think so because Congress has said, for example, that even..

. And that I think is the difference. The thing that was done there stealing the painting certainly had the potential to help the thief get the painting. That's true. It was the means by which they walked away with the painting, but I don't think that it is that there was any causal relationship there of the sort that we have been talking about. What about what sort would you accept? That is, you heard too right there. Forget the word materiality from your point of view, you don't. Okay? And I take it about four conditions, you don't. And I take it that proximate cause, you don't. But what about how to tendency to affect a reasonable immigration officer in his judgment? What about that? What about the one you just used? It was a means towards getting. That's tougher than you're usually accepting. Well, which ones were here? I have about five. It influenced the decision. It had the possibility or tendency to influence the decision. Do you say all those are wrong? I think they are, but the reason is that Congress has... Well, which one do you accept? I don't think I would accept any of them. I think that the problem here is that Congress has said... I know, I know you say Congress said that, but the question, of course, for us is whether Congress said that. And we have some words. So I want to know if those words in your mind are capable of any interpretation that suggests any kind of tendency of the unlawful act to move an immigration judge if not this one, some other one towards a plus decision. I don't think so because Congress has said, for example, that even... And this was the Court's decision in Conjes, that even an immaterial false statement about the most immaterial of matters can be a categorical bar to the ability of the person to be naturalized. And the point there is that it would be very odd, I think, to read the statute to say that if a person procures naturalization despite having done that, that somehow that was not done contrary to law because materiality or some other formulation would be required in addition in order to establish that. Let me try this another way. If you take this phrase, which is a kind of of a naturalization, is that all it really means is procure naturalization illegally? Do you agree with that? I can say, contrary to law and naturalization is procure naturalization. Yes, it's a violation of laws governing naturalization. Right. So the idea that procure naturalization illegally somehow includes illegal acts that have no effect on naturalization or on procure naturalization. It's just not how we use language. How could it be that that is true? But it's not, well, my disagreement there is that it is not that it has no effect. The effect, though, is the fact that the person lied. It is not what the person lied to House. But it has no effect on the decision to naturalize. Whether a truthful answer would have had an effect on the decision to naturalize versus an untruthful one, I think that Congress has said quite clearly that that is not the relevant consideration for purposes of these applying these steps. Yes, and I guess what I'm saying is that how do you use that phrase in a statute and not mean that there has to be a relationship between the illegal acts and the procurement of naturalization? Well, I think there does have to be a relationship. We don't dispute that. We just don't think that it's a causal match. That's what you tell us what that relationship is. That relationship, in our view, is that the laws have to be the laws governing naturalization. And what that means is there are laws governing who may be naturalized and there are laws governing how they must do so. If that's one of them, Mr. Parker, what do you do with 15, 1425 B? What's the difference between A and B on the government's account? A, you procure a contrary to law, naturalization B says you procure naturalization when you're not entitled to. Well, I think that the reference to being entitled in subsection B reinforces our point that contrary to law doesn't necessarily mean that you weren't entitled to the naturalization. It means that you violated the rules that Congress has set forth governing who can be naturalized and how they must do so. So B would be you were not entitled to begin with and A is you may have been entitled but you lied in the process of. I think that's a fair reading. I mean, I would note that B also sweeps more broadly than A because it includes things like obtaining a certificate of naturalization rather than the actual procurement of naturalization

. And this was the Court's decision in Conjes, that even an immaterial false statement about the most immaterial of matters can be a categorical bar to the ability of the person to be naturalized. And the point there is that it would be very odd, I think, to read the statute to say that if a person procures naturalization despite having done that, that somehow that was not done contrary to law because materiality or some other formulation would be required in addition in order to establish that. Let me try this another way. If you take this phrase, which is a kind of of a naturalization, is that all it really means is procure naturalization illegally? Do you agree with that? I can say, contrary to law and naturalization is procure naturalization. Yes, it's a violation of laws governing naturalization. Right. So the idea that procure naturalization illegally somehow includes illegal acts that have no effect on naturalization or on procure naturalization. It's just not how we use language. How could it be that that is true? But it's not, well, my disagreement there is that it is not that it has no effect. The effect, though, is the fact that the person lied. It is not what the person lied to House. But it has no effect on the decision to naturalize. Whether a truthful answer would have had an effect on the decision to naturalize versus an untruthful one, I think that Congress has said quite clearly that that is not the relevant consideration for purposes of these applying these steps. Yes, and I guess what I'm saying is that how do you use that phrase in a statute and not mean that there has to be a relationship between the illegal acts and the procurement of naturalization? Well, I think there does have to be a relationship. We don't dispute that. We just don't think that it's a causal match. That's what you tell us what that relationship is. That relationship, in our view, is that the laws have to be the laws governing naturalization. And what that means is there are laws governing who may be naturalized and there are laws governing how they must do so. If that's one of them, Mr. Parker, what do you do with 15, 1425 B? What's the difference between A and B on the government's account? A, you procure a contrary to law, naturalization B says you procure naturalization when you're not entitled to. Well, I think that the reference to being entitled in subsection B reinforces our point that contrary to law doesn't necessarily mean that you weren't entitled to the naturalization. It means that you violated the rules that Congress has set forth governing who can be naturalized and how they must do so. So B would be you were not entitled to begin with and A is you may have been entitled but you lied in the process of. I think that's a fair reading. I mean, I would note that B also sweeps more broadly than A because it includes things like obtaining a certificate of naturalization rather than the actual procurement of naturalization. Mr. Parker, the government, the Congress doesn't have the power to denaturalize someone. At least so far we haven't let them do that as punishment for a criminal act. So how go back to Justice Kagan's question about footnote 4 in your brief and your adversaries position that if it's a prerequisite to naturalization, that's what this means. That that's the only time Congress can deprive you of citizenship is when something actually would have barged you from getting it. Well, the only point that we were trying to make in that was to. I know the point you were trying to make was to answer the point he's made. Yes, well, and the point I've made, which is if Congress doesn't have the power, expos facto to denaturalize you, we're giving them this power. Should we be reading it narrowly or broadly? Well, I don't think that there's a, I think that it shouldn't necessarily be read broadly, but I think that any fair reading of the statute would include this. And let me just explain what we think about eligibility because frankly, I think that it may be a way to get to the same point. I mean, I don't see we've been concentrating on this statute. Is there any other statute in the entire U.S. criminal code, any false statement statute that is violated by an immaterial false statement? Yes. Section 1014 is criminalized as false statements made to a bank and in Wells this court held that it can be a completely immaterial false statement. I think Justice Sotomayor has a question. Yes. So let me just explain for a moment how eligibility would work in this context. Let's say that somebody makes a false statement in their naturalization process. And that false statement is discovered. One of two things will happen. Either the false statement is of the sort that is mentioned in Section 1101F6, and therefore is a categorical bar to naturalization. You are immediately deemed out of the law. Is that the false statement for the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits? Yes, and it can be a material one. Yes. So that would be one

. Mr. Parker, the government, the Congress doesn't have the power to denaturalize someone. At least so far we haven't let them do that as punishment for a criminal act. So how go back to Justice Kagan's question about footnote 4 in your brief and your adversaries position that if it's a prerequisite to naturalization, that's what this means. That that's the only time Congress can deprive you of citizenship is when something actually would have barged you from getting it. Well, the only point that we were trying to make in that was to. I know the point you were trying to make was to answer the point he's made. Yes, well, and the point I've made, which is if Congress doesn't have the power, expos facto to denaturalize you, we're giving them this power. Should we be reading it narrowly or broadly? Well, I don't think that there's a, I think that it shouldn't necessarily be read broadly, but I think that any fair reading of the statute would include this. And let me just explain what we think about eligibility because frankly, I think that it may be a way to get to the same point. I mean, I don't see we've been concentrating on this statute. Is there any other statute in the entire U.S. criminal code, any false statement statute that is violated by an immaterial false statement? Yes. Section 1014 is criminalized as false statements made to a bank and in Wells this court held that it can be a completely immaterial false statement. I think Justice Sotomayor has a question. Yes. So let me just explain for a moment how eligibility would work in this context. Let's say that somebody makes a false statement in their naturalization process. And that false statement is discovered. One of two things will happen. Either the false statement is of the sort that is mentioned in Section 1101F6, and therefore is a categorical bar to naturalization. You are immediately deemed out of the law. Is that the false statement for the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits? Yes, and it can be a material one. Yes. So that would be one. If it is not that, let's say it's a violation of Section 1015, but it didn't involve oral testimony. And in Conjes, this court held that 1101F6 requires oral testimony. Then what happens is it would have to be analyzed under the residual provision of 1101F, which says the fact that we have enumerated certain grounds above does not mean that those are exclusive and there are other grounds on which the person's good moral character may be denied. What happens at that point is either the person could be denied because they are actually ineligible based on that statement, or they could be denied naturalization because at every stage, the alien bears the burden of persuasion, and it could be concluded that they did not satisfy their burden. So that would be an exception of establishing eligibility. What they have to do in order to obtain naturalization not withstanding having made a false statement is do what the regulations refer to as demonstrating, extenuating circumstances. And this is a whole, I'm sorry? Devin, stating what? Extenuating circumstances. So this would be a whole record evaluation by the agency of all of the circumstances involved, and the alien bears the burden of doing that. In which of those processes has there ever been the kind of immaterial statement that the chief justice gave lying about a traffic ticket where there's been no injury to anybody and no claim of reckless striving other than the speeding? Where has the agency ever denied naturalization because of an immaterial statement? I'm not aware of a particular case in which that has occurred. These are not published decisions, so I couldn't say, but I would note, however, that if the alien, if that lie is not discovered and the alien manages to procure naturalization not withstanding it, the government's position would be that at that point that person has procured naturalization in a circumstance in which they are not eligible, because as a factual matter they had lied, and because they lied, they were then, it was incumbent upon them to show extenuating circumstances. They did not do that, and so they would be ineligible. I would also like to note though. On that interpretation and on your interpretation of 1425, and the words that say in 1451, shall be deprived of his citizenship, given the seriousness of that, your interpretation would raise a pretty serious constitutional question, wouldn't it? I don't think so. No, it's not a serious constitutional question of whether an American citizen can be have his citizenship taken away because 40 years before he did not deliberately put on paper. What his nickname was or what is speeding record was 30 years before that, which was, in fact, totally immaterial. That's not a constitutional question. Well, I don't think so, because Congress has number one specified that immaterial fall statements are grounds for denying naturalization, but I also would note that there are a few responses. One is the criminal provision, at least, has a 10-year statute of limitations, so it wouldn't be 40. But I think that it's important to remember that denaturalization is not like a lifetime bar on citizenship. All denaturalization does is it returns you to the status of a lawful permanent resident. You then have to wait five years, and if after the end of those five years you can demonstrate that you're entitled to citizenship, you can be renaturalized. It also doesn't have a problem of a constitutional statute, but it is certainly a problem of prosecutorial abuse. If you take the position that refusing to not answering about the speeding ticket or the nickname is enough to subject that person to denaturalization, the government will have the opportunity to denaturalize anyone they want, because everybody is going to have a situation where they didn't put in something like that, or at least most people. And then the government can decide, we're going to denaturalize you for other reasons than what might appear on your naturalization form or were not. And that to me is troublesome to give that extraordinary power, which essentially is unlimited power, at least in most cases, to the government. Well, that strikes me as a serious problem

. If it is not that, let's say it's a violation of Section 1015, but it didn't involve oral testimony. And in Conjes, this court held that 1101F6 requires oral testimony. Then what happens is it would have to be analyzed under the residual provision of 1101F, which says the fact that we have enumerated certain grounds above does not mean that those are exclusive and there are other grounds on which the person's good moral character may be denied. What happens at that point is either the person could be denied because they are actually ineligible based on that statement, or they could be denied naturalization because at every stage, the alien bears the burden of persuasion, and it could be concluded that they did not satisfy their burden. So that would be an exception of establishing eligibility. What they have to do in order to obtain naturalization not withstanding having made a false statement is do what the regulations refer to as demonstrating, extenuating circumstances. And this is a whole, I'm sorry? Devin, stating what? Extenuating circumstances. So this would be a whole record evaluation by the agency of all of the circumstances involved, and the alien bears the burden of doing that. In which of those processes has there ever been the kind of immaterial statement that the chief justice gave lying about a traffic ticket where there's been no injury to anybody and no claim of reckless striving other than the speeding? Where has the agency ever denied naturalization because of an immaterial statement? I'm not aware of a particular case in which that has occurred. These are not published decisions, so I couldn't say, but I would note, however, that if the alien, if that lie is not discovered and the alien manages to procure naturalization not withstanding it, the government's position would be that at that point that person has procured naturalization in a circumstance in which they are not eligible, because as a factual matter they had lied, and because they lied, they were then, it was incumbent upon them to show extenuating circumstances. They did not do that, and so they would be ineligible. I would also like to note though. On that interpretation and on your interpretation of 1425, and the words that say in 1451, shall be deprived of his citizenship, given the seriousness of that, your interpretation would raise a pretty serious constitutional question, wouldn't it? I don't think so. No, it's not a serious constitutional question of whether an American citizen can be have his citizenship taken away because 40 years before he did not deliberately put on paper. What his nickname was or what is speeding record was 30 years before that, which was, in fact, totally immaterial. That's not a constitutional question. Well, I don't think so, because Congress has number one specified that immaterial fall statements are grounds for denying naturalization, but I also would note that there are a few responses. One is the criminal provision, at least, has a 10-year statute of limitations, so it wouldn't be 40. But I think that it's important to remember that denaturalization is not like a lifetime bar on citizenship. All denaturalization does is it returns you to the status of a lawful permanent resident. You then have to wait five years, and if after the end of those five years you can demonstrate that you're entitled to citizenship, you can be renaturalized. It also doesn't have a problem of a constitutional statute, but it is certainly a problem of prosecutorial abuse. If you take the position that refusing to not answering about the speeding ticket or the nickname is enough to subject that person to denaturalization, the government will have the opportunity to denaturalize anyone they want, because everybody is going to have a situation where they didn't put in something like that, or at least most people. And then the government can decide, we're going to denaturalize you for other reasons than what might appear on your naturalization form or were not. And that to me is troublesome to give that extraordinary power, which essentially is unlimited power, at least in most cases, to the government. Well, that strikes me as a serious problem. I certainly understand your concern, Mr. Chief Justice. All I can say is, I don't think that the statute says anything that would necessarily prevent denaturalization from occurring. But there are a number of other. The way that your argument is demeaning the priceless value of citizenship. You say, oh, does he just be restored to his or she should, her former status? That's not what our cases say. That's not what citizenship means. I'm arguing for the government of the United States, talking about what citizenship is and ought to mean. Right. And I, well, we would readily agree that it is a priceless treasure. We are not disputing that at all. One of the consequences of the priceless nature of citizenship is that Congress has surrounded it with a number of protections to ensure that the individual's seeking it square every corner and are absolutely and completely honest. I do want to point out though that there are a number of other protections built into the system that would prevent the sort of problems that the Chief Justice has raised. And one of those is that we would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this was a deliberate lie. I think that convincing a unanimous jury of that is very difficult. I also would note that there are 780,000 naturalization petitions filed every year. It would be an extraordinary undertaking to do what you're suggesting. I don't want to finish my answer. And one other thing about the character of this statute. So we have here for denaturalization, a parallel, civil way to get a person denaturalized and a criminal. In other cases, whether parallel, criminal penalties, civil penalties, is there any other one where the criminal disqualification is easier to establish than the civil one? May I answer? We would say no because we believe that the language illegally procured in the civil provision is effectively synonymous with procurement contrary to law. It would only be that in the criminal provision you have to satisfy the statute of limitations and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the mens rea requirement. Thank you. Thank you, Council. Five minutes, Mr. Landau

. I certainly understand your concern, Mr. Chief Justice. All I can say is, I don't think that the statute says anything that would necessarily prevent denaturalization from occurring. But there are a number of other. The way that your argument is demeaning the priceless value of citizenship. You say, oh, does he just be restored to his or she should, her former status? That's not what our cases say. That's not what citizenship means. I'm arguing for the government of the United States, talking about what citizenship is and ought to mean. Right. And I, well, we would readily agree that it is a priceless treasure. We are not disputing that at all. One of the consequences of the priceless nature of citizenship is that Congress has surrounded it with a number of protections to ensure that the individual's seeking it square every corner and are absolutely and completely honest. I do want to point out though that there are a number of other protections built into the system that would prevent the sort of problems that the Chief Justice has raised. And one of those is that we would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this was a deliberate lie. I think that convincing a unanimous jury of that is very difficult. I also would note that there are 780,000 naturalization petitions filed every year. It would be an extraordinary undertaking to do what you're suggesting. I don't want to finish my answer. And one other thing about the character of this statute. So we have here for denaturalization, a parallel, civil way to get a person denaturalized and a criminal. In other cases, whether parallel, criminal penalties, civil penalties, is there any other one where the criminal disqualification is easier to establish than the civil one? May I answer? We would say no because we believe that the language illegally procured in the civil provision is effectively synonymous with procurement contrary to law. It would only be that in the criminal provision you have to satisfy the statute of limitations and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the mens rea requirement. Thank you. Thank you, Council. Five minutes, Mr. Landau. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I'd like to make three quick points if I might. First, to go back to Justice Gorsuch's question that he asked both sides about the relationship between 1425A and B. I think they are largely overlapping. It is true that the B covers some more things that A doesn't cover, B uses the language entitled. That may inform exactly the nature of the causal link that one would infer in A, but I think it doesn't in any way affect our central argument here, which is there has to be some causal link that it's absolutely, you cannot procure something contrary to law based on immaterial false statement, which by definition is the kind of thing that doesn't even have the tendency to do that. Again, to go back to Conjus, the natural tendency to produce the conclusion that the applicant was qualified for citizenship. Second, the government said a number of times, oh, yeah, it's not a big deal. You know, the government under Conjus, it said you don't need material false statement and it said in Wells also that in response to another statute where that was true. In both Wells and Conjus, and we make this point in the 1015 section of our brief, the court made the point of addressing the concerns that taking out materiality would open up the defendant to an incredible array of sanctions based on something that, you know, presumably Congress doesn't mean to criminalize minor offenses, but it said there's a purpose requirement in both of those, and that's what gave the court comfort in saying you didn't need materiality in addition to that purpose requirement. So it is not true when the government is saying, oh, immaterial false statements are a basis for denaturalization under 1101 F6. That is only as Conjus stress because there is already a, for the purpose of requirement in that very provision, and the same exact thing is true in Wells, which is based on Conjus. The government has identified no case in the history of American law where this court has upheld a statute without a materiality requirement if there wasn't some functional equivalent to materiality such as a purpose requirement. And I think some of the hypotheticals that were posed here show just how drastic this would be and how extreme the government's position is here. The third and final point I'd like to make is that I think as some of Justice Kagan's questions pointed out, the most natural way to read procured contrary to law is to have it mean procured by means of a violation of law. Contrary to law is an adverbial phrase that modifies the way in which you procure it. It is fully reared wells as having a causal requirement, as being a causal requirement. I think it's, it basically says for the purpose of refining. The speaker knows the falsity of what he says and intends to influence the institute. Correct. I think that that's, basically that's why I think it's functionally the equivalent of materiality. So I think the court felt some comforting wells. The court didn't just say, oh, we are fine with, you know, we're dispensing with diminimus noncure at legs. That is the background norm against which all of our laws are enacted because we have to assume that this, the government, you have to look at how the harshest prosecutor in the land will apply this. And I think the questioning today makes it chillingly clear that the government's position in this case would subject all naturalized Americans to potential denaturalization at the hands of an aggressive prosecutor that is not what Congress intended, that is not what is in the language of the statute, nothing in the statute compels the court that this would be breaking entirely new ground

. And we urge this court not to go there. Thank you very much. Thank you, counsel. The case is submitted