Good morning, Your Honours. May please the Court. My name is Anna Darbynian of Asherson Clined Darbynian. Together with my partner, Naval Asherson, who's seated at the table. We represent Petitioner Maurizio Crepa in these consolidated proceedings. They're actually, I don't know. I'm not sure they're formally consolidated, but I'll go through separate arguments in this too. OK. Well, the first issue at hand is, in summary, the cases that are before you have to do with this Crepa attempting to just status to that of a US, to that of a permanent resident by virtue of marriage to a US citizen. Let me ask you some questions, if I may, about specifically the older case, which is the one we're on now. And as I understand it, there are two separate orders that are on review in this case. And one of them is the notice of decision on the denial by USCIS. It's an order denying adjustment of status
. And on that, I would like to know from you why that is an appealable or reviewable matter in two respects. First, the order itself says it is not appealable and that it is without prejudice to reopening. So I don't see that it's final. And the other issue is that the adjustment of status decision they're in is discretionary. So if you would address why that is a reviewable order, I would appreciate it. Absolutely, Your Honor. Well, if I may just go backwards with the second request, why is the adjustment of status discretionary, the entire proceedings in these cases, in these cases, Judge Graber, is that the government seems to shield itself under the skies of discretion without really respecting what Congress's intent has been, which is that individuals like Mr. Creepa, who enter on a visa waiver program, are part of what would be concerned for the favored class as being that of a spouse of a U.S. citizen as immediate relative. And in addition, that's not your auntie of adjustment of status. Well, it certainly presents, if the issue is that you've overstayed on a visa waiver program and that you've worked illegally, which Congress explicitly exempts these individuals for purposes of adjustment of status, if the U
.S. immigration can just under the skies of discretion, completely ignore what Congress's command is, then everything could be under the skies of exercise of discretion and there was no transparency, which you also address the finality problem with that order. The finality problem with regard to the adjustment of status with the U.S. CIS order, which says that it's without prejudice to renew all and that it's not appealable. It seems non-final. Well, I think that in that case, Your Honor, I'd like to bring the case of the Morales Isquiro, though, which the Court has requested that we, you know, brief on the issue and we've actually presented valid arguments in that the adjustment of status is inextricably linked to the removal order. In fact, there's a memo that the U.S. CIS has issued that explicitly instructs U.S. CIS officials to regard ICE's decision of a removal order under Section 217 as a negative factor and to, under the exercise of discretion, to deny those cases without having any merit
. Let me see if I understand where we are. And this is the holder case that we're on now, correct? And my understanding is that your client, when he entered, pursuant to VISA waiver, he signed a form which told him that he was waving the right to contest removal of the overstate, correct? That's correct, Your Honor. However, in the... I'll just finish. Okay, excuse me. But that's correct, right? In essence. And under the regulations and law, there are some exceptions to that, including if you file a timely request for adjustment of status under certain conditions. But this one was not timely. Was filed after the 90 days expired, correct? That's correct, Your Honor. However, the moment case, if that's what you're referring to, Your Honor, has not been upheld or it does not have any authority with the U
.S. immigration. In fact, they've explicitly stated that they will not be following the moment case. You have to. We're bound by it. Well, I understand that, but if we could look at the moment case, there was a rule that the 90 days... People exercise prosecutorial discretion all the time. They choose not to prosecute case, say that they do prosecute case V. And when case V comes before us as our presiding judge is indicated, we have to follow the law. I understand that, Your Honor
. However, I think prior to more many, there was the Femin case, which is a President case. And in that case, I don't think that that was the main argument that it has to be within the 90 days. And in addition, I also want to point out to the honorable Court that this has been actually repudiated by the Attorney General and the Bradley V. Holder and the Supreme Court. So the fact that, you know, to impose the 90-day regulation, which is not being reviewed by the U.S. immigration or is not taken into consideration, I think also violates my Klein's equal protection argument. Because then he's single now. May I go back and ask you a question? Because I'm still processing what you just said. Is it your position that is, did Bradley V. Holder post-date our Momeni decision? Is it later than 2008? I believe it did, Your Honor. And because it's your position that it essentially overruled Momeni on the 90-day question
. I believe that if the Attorney General repudiates, now I'm asking if the U.S. Supreme Court decision, which you mentioned, is inconsistent with our decision in Momeni because that is potentially one reason why we might not follow the earlier case. If it is no longer valid under a U.S. Supreme Court decision, that's why I'm asking the question. Yes, Your Honor, I would take that position. And what are our, in addition, I think your second argument, Judge Hawkins, is the question. Excuse me, the question I apologize. Your second question. You get to argue, I just give that as question. I will happily argue, Your Honor
. And you're doing just fine. Thank you. And the second issue, I think your second question, if you can just remind me what that was, was it having you? Well, the first is he signed the way. Thank you. Thank you. No contestation of a notable removal. And then under the applicable law, he file an untimely request for adjustment status based on an I-130. Okay. So if I could just basically look at the jurisdiction with regard to the removal order itself. So if the removal order was, if Congress explicitly has allowed judicial review in cases of all removal orders that are final, except except except I had the removal. So it was congressional intent to explicitly not include the visa waiver entrance as under that removal order context. So therefore for the government to come back and say that there's the no contest clause
. Number one, they are under regulation under Section 217 required to follow the regulation as to the validity of the removal order. Number one, they've included a, at the time of execution of the removal order, they did not have a signed or any document that reflects that he entered on a visa waiver. This was attached in our opening brief, which explicitly stated that the only document that they had was a blank I-94 form, which is an arrival departure card. So at the time the director actually issued the order, which is in question, which I'd like to have a moment to explain, they did not have an actual signed document. You're talking about which order now. I'm talking about final order. Absolutely, Your Honor. It's the order on the Section 217 administratively removing my client under the visa waiver program, which Director Robbins, Tim Robbins, had signed. The second issue is that this document, which miraculously appeared in the certified admin record later filed with the court, is in Spanish. The government is under, basically, disrespecting the regulation, which says any document in the United States as far as I'm aware, it needs to be in the English language. So if the government is going to present evidence that the document that my client signed, which is a Spanish document, not an English document, that my client knowingly, involuntarily basically waived all his rights and that therefore he cannot contest it, and I don't think is applicable. And under the Morales square no matter, under the zipper clause, I think that issue is explicitly addressed as well
. I'd like to ask you a hypothetical question. What would your position be if the director had in his or her possession, the visa waiver at the time that the decision was made? Does that allow me to be outcome? In that hypothetical, Judge Sardwick, I would take the position that the only document that exists in fact is a Spanish document. So unless Mr. Robbins will come and testify that he understands the Spanish language, or that my client understands the Spanish language, I would find that very hard to understand how a decision would be rendered on that basis. I can say that if there were a document that was in a language that would clearly knew your client understood what that changed the outcome. It may, however, I'd like to preserve the argument of the Consumer Rights Theory under the Supreme Court decision that, which I will cite to, if you like, which states that consumers cannot just knowingly, involuntarily, waive all rights, you know. I want to get in, they have to. I understand that that's the position. You honor, however, if comes. This is the iron curtain. I understand that. If you sign, you get in
. If you don't sign, you don't get in. That's true. However, if Congress explicitly understood it, could have been in Swahili. Well, there's an exception to immediate relatives, which is really the core of this issue. He is married to a U.S. citizen. It's a heightened class. I have a career, I have a career, I have a career, I have a career, I have a career. That did. But I think that, I would say about three years, three and a half years later, you honor. Yes. However, I think that if Congress explicitly excludes the provision that expedited removal orders are the only class of removal orders that is not reviewable, then I think it was congressional command that these orders are not, per se, you know, the applicant does not waive his his or right to contest it. Thank you, Councillor. You've exceeded your time, but we'll give you a minute for a bottle. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Your Honor. May I please the court and, Shane, behalf of the United States Government. We have just two points for one to make. Just one quick question. I'm sorry, I don't have right at hand. And that is, the I-130 denial was merit-spaced or based on timing. The I-130, I believe, was granted, Your Honor
. However, I think that if Congress explicitly excludes the provision that expedited removal orders are the only class of removal orders that is not reviewable, then I think it was congressional command that these orders are not, per se, you know, the applicant does not waive his his or right to contest it. Thank you, Councillor. You've exceeded your time, but we'll give you a minute for a bottle. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Your Honor. May I please the court and, Shane, behalf of the United States Government. We have just two points for one to make. Just one quick question. I'm sorry, I don't have right at hand. And that is, the I-130 denial was merit-spaced or based on timing. The I-130, I believe, was granted, Your Honor. Well, it was granted. In other words, the USCIS determined that this was a valid marriage, not entered into for fraud. That's what I understand, Your Honor. If he loses these cases before us today, that's hypothetically, if he loses them, can he return to Italy and wait a period of time and then reapply for I-130? Yes, Your Honor. And what's the waiting period? I believe it's a 10-year bar. Go ahead. So, Your Honor, the two prime points we wish to make this morning is one, the removal order itself is valid. And second, that the Court's last jurisdiction to review the adjustment claim. So first, the removal order is valid simply because the waiver is valid. As you are talking as you pointed out, the I-94 is in Spanish. But the very first line of the I-94 says it's a 994N. It should be known that it was on his flight back from Mexico that he was handed his form in Spanish
. Well, it was granted. In other words, the USCIS determined that this was a valid marriage, not entered into for fraud. That's what I understand, Your Honor. If he loses these cases before us today, that's hypothetically, if he loses them, can he return to Italy and wait a period of time and then reapply for I-130? Yes, Your Honor. And what's the waiting period? I believe it's a 10-year bar. Go ahead. So, Your Honor, the two prime points we wish to make this morning is one, the removal order itself is valid. And second, that the Court's last jurisdiction to review the adjustment claim. So first, the removal order is valid simply because the waiver is valid. As you are talking as you pointed out, the I-94 is in Spanish. But the very first line of the I-94 says it's a 994N. It should be known that it was on his flight back from Mexico that he was handed his form in Spanish. And in the form, it contains all of his information. So it's not only his name, but it's got his nationality, his passport, the airline, his address. I mean, everything is filled out. And then he signs it. And then, no one in his opening brief, because he ever said he doesn't understand Spanish. So the Petitioner's Council argues that there's a rule that any form, that anyone signs, there's contrast to being English. I don't know if it's such a rule. In fact, I think these I-94s are translated into other languages specifically to help make sure that the person signing understands what they're signing. Well, it's interesting because he does actually answer every question too. Yes, Your Honor. And what's, you know, I think to the extent there is some factual dispute, I think we have to use record before. Since what Congress intended with these VWP cases, they're meant to be expedited and kind of funnel through the circuit courts
. And in the form, it contains all of his information. So it's not only his name, but it's got his nationality, his passport, the airline, his address. I mean, everything is filled out. And then he signs it. And then, no one in his opening brief, because he ever said he doesn't understand Spanish. So the Petitioner's Council argues that there's a rule that any form, that anyone signs, there's contrast to being English. I don't know if it's such a rule. In fact, I think these I-94s are translated into other languages specifically to help make sure that the person signing understands what they're signing. Well, it's interesting because he does actually answer every question too. Yes, Your Honor. And what's, you know, I think to the extent there is some factual dispute, I think we have to use record before. Since what Congress intended with these VWP cases, they're meant to be expedited and kind of funnel through the circuit courts. And so there's a reason why Congress never intended that it before discovering these cases. And so what we have is what we have. And in this case, it seems pretty clear that he understood the form. And he doesn't, he doesn't argue, he doesn't understand the form. He simply argues that there's some responsibility of the United States government to provide everything in English, which is simply not true. And just briefly touch on this, the validity of the VWP has already been upheld in Bingham by this Court. And very simply Bingham held that the VWP program is constitutional because the condition is rationally related to the benefit and the condition being that you have to accept expedited removal, but what you get is expedited entry. So the benefit, the petitioner got in this case was that he was able to enter the country. You never had to apply for a visa. But the condition of his stay under this program is that he also had to leave in a timely fashion, which not only did it not do, but he waited until he was in detention and the in detention judge said that's the chance to your question. He was made three years ago while he was in detention. So
. And so there's a reason why Congress never intended that it before discovering these cases. And so what we have is what we have. And in this case, it seems pretty clear that he understood the form. And he doesn't, he doesn't argue, he doesn't understand the form. He simply argues that there's some responsibility of the United States government to provide everything in English, which is simply not true. And just briefly touch on this, the validity of the VWP has already been upheld in Bingham by this Court. And very simply Bingham held that the VWP program is constitutional because the condition is rationally related to the benefit and the condition being that you have to accept expedited removal, but what you get is expedited entry. So the benefit, the petitioner got in this case was that he was able to enter the country. You never had to apply for a visa. But the condition of his stay under this program is that he also had to leave in a timely fashion, which not only did it not do, but he waited until he was in detention and the in detention judge said that's the chance to your question. He was made three years ago while he was in detention. So. Can I ask you specifically your position with respect to the argument that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Radley overruled, which is fairly inconsistent with our decision in Momanie? Yes, Your Honor. I don't believe there is a Supreme Court decision in Bradley. What the petitioner said to the cert up, it's the Solicitor General's position in a rather than a third circuit decision. And the Attorney General took the position in that case, but the Solicitor General in opposing the motion for cert, the Dribb for cert was that these adjustments applications do get you to get by cis. So it doesn't matter if there is no Supreme Court decision. So Momanie is good law. Absolutely. For us, it may not be right, but it's valid for M we have to follow. Absolutely, Your Honor. To have briefly touched on the issue of whether this case should be, well, the brief question that you know whether this case should be in this Court or in District Court on the adjustment claim, Your Honor
. Can I ask you specifically your position with respect to the argument that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Radley overruled, which is fairly inconsistent with our decision in Momanie? Yes, Your Honor. I don't believe there is a Supreme Court decision in Bradley. What the petitioner said to the cert up, it's the Solicitor General's position in a rather than a third circuit decision. And the Attorney General took the position in that case, but the Solicitor General in opposing the motion for cert, the Dribb for cert was that these adjustments applications do get you to get by cis. So it doesn't matter if there is no Supreme Court decision. So Momanie is good law. Absolutely. For us, it may not be right, but it's valid for M we have to follow. Absolutely, Your Honor. To have briefly touched on the issue of whether this case should be, well, the brief question that you know whether this case should be in this Court or in District Court on the adjustment claim, Your Honor. I just wanted to, because you asked that earlier, on the Morales Disguierdo, this Court called out a very now exception, but when the Zipper calls on your 1252B9 applies to Zip Adjustment Applications, up with final orders of removal, I have to say, I didn't really understand even the relevance of that decision in view of the fact that the notice of decision is not a final order. So, so, so would, would it even apply to something that's not a final order? You Honor, no, that's the first argument we're making, our brief, cis decision is not a final order of removal. But secondarily, the Zipper calls when it applies to Zip Adjustment Applications and with the VWP claim, primarily because even in Morales Disguierdo, the Court recognized that for the most part, just an application is don't Zip. And the reason why is because somebody can be here lawfully, and he can be here for a long time, and he can apply for adjustment, and the Adjustment Applications can be denied. And he can still be legal status, so you think of somebody here, and a student visa, or someone here on an extended tourist visa, they can, they can try to adjust to whatever means, and it can get denied. And there's no final order of removal. And so in most cases, it doesn't make sense to Zip Adjustment because then you'll never get reviewed. But there it was the reinstatement of a final order, and the holding was that when you reinstate a final order, it's still final. Right. And reinstate the reason why it ties to Adjustment is because the statute itself says if you apply for adjustment and a reinstatement order is issued against you, in the statute, adjustments automatically denied. We don't have that with VWP, it's much more of a separate track. Sometimes like in some cases, they could parallel each other, but it's not nearly the way it's kind of one-for-one in the end statement cases
. I just wanted to, because you asked that earlier, on the Morales Disguierdo, this Court called out a very now exception, but when the Zipper calls on your 1252B9 applies to Zip Adjustment Applications, up with final orders of removal, I have to say, I didn't really understand even the relevance of that decision in view of the fact that the notice of decision is not a final order. So, so, so would, would it even apply to something that's not a final order? You Honor, no, that's the first argument we're making, our brief, cis decision is not a final order of removal. But secondarily, the Zipper calls when it applies to Zip Adjustment Applications and with the VWP claim, primarily because even in Morales Disguierdo, the Court recognized that for the most part, just an application is don't Zip. And the reason why is because somebody can be here lawfully, and he can be here for a long time, and he can apply for adjustment, and the Adjustment Applications can be denied. And he can still be legal status, so you think of somebody here, and a student visa, or someone here on an extended tourist visa, they can, they can try to adjust to whatever means, and it can get denied. And there's no final order of removal. And so in most cases, it doesn't make sense to Zip Adjustment because then you'll never get reviewed. But there it was the reinstatement of a final order, and the holding was that when you reinstate a final order, it's still final. Right. And reinstate the reason why it ties to Adjustment is because the statute itself says if you apply for adjustment and a reinstatement order is issued against you, in the statute, adjustments automatically denied. We don't have that with VWP, it's much more of a separate track. Sometimes like in some cases, they could parallel each other, but it's not nearly the way it's kind of one-for-one in the end statement cases. So the ties definitely not as strong. And so I think the language used by the Corps and Marossi's Guierdo was, they must be inextricably linked and in VWP and adjustments, they're simply not inextricably linked. And just briefly to touch on the question of the denial itself. Your Honour's discretion is, is the decision to give or not give a benefit based on an adjudicator's determination of a composite sketch of an individual? So we look at all the facts of an individual and determine that this person may have a positive benefit that we want to confer on this person. And in this case, this is clearly a discretionary decision. So the commissioner spends a lot of time arguing that, well, none of these individual factors that USCIS relied upon are per se bars to adjusting. And that may be true, but that's not what sits held. Since all these different factors working with the authorization, overstaying the VWP to arrest for driving on an influence and said, this man doesn't respect our laws. And so given our discretion, we're going to deny this positive benefit to become a citizen of our country. And that's a discretionary determination in this court-led jurisdiction review. There's nothing legal or constitutional about that finding. And so if your odds have no further questions, we would ask that the court cannot have a petition for review
. So the ties definitely not as strong. And so I think the language used by the Corps and Marossi's Guierdo was, they must be inextricably linked and in VWP and adjustments, they're simply not inextricably linked. And just briefly to touch on the question of the denial itself. Your Honour's discretion is, is the decision to give or not give a benefit based on an adjudicator's determination of a composite sketch of an individual? So we look at all the facts of an individual and determine that this person may have a positive benefit that we want to confer on this person. And in this case, this is clearly a discretionary decision. So the commissioner spends a lot of time arguing that, well, none of these individual factors that USCIS relied upon are per se bars to adjusting. And that may be true, but that's not what sits held. Since all these different factors working with the authorization, overstaying the VWP to arrest for driving on an influence and said, this man doesn't respect our laws. And so given our discretion, we're going to deny this positive benefit to become a citizen of our country. And that's a discretionary determination in this court-led jurisdiction review. There's nothing legal or constitutional about that finding. And so if your odds have no further questions, we would ask that the court cannot have a petition for review. Thank you. I don't know what we do. Mr. Bannon, do you have one minute for a bottle? Okay. Thank you, Honour. I'll be very fast. First to clarify, the I-130 is, in fact, granted. So the marriage petition is granted. The prejudice to my client is a 10-year bar that he would be away from his US citizen wife. The most important issue that I'd like to also present, because I forgot to mention that I had confirmed whether or not you have received and reviewed my 28J letter that I found. We received it. You did
. Thank you. I don't know what we do. Mr. Bannon, do you have one minute for a bottle? Okay. Thank you, Honour. I'll be very fast. First to clarify, the I-130 is, in fact, granted. So the marriage petition is granted. The prejudice to my client is a 10-year bar that he would be away from his US citizen wife. The most important issue that I'd like to also present, because I forgot to mention that I had confirmed whether or not you have received and reviewed my 28J letter that I found. We received it. You did. Okay. So the issue here is that my client was basically denied the ability to get married, which would have preemptively removed this removal order entirely. And the fact that the USI denied my client the ability to marry, even though they were aware of the underlying fact that he had a US citizen fiance, I think is really one of the other violations, the regulatory violations that we've presented in our briefs. And I'd like to point that out in the, in my, with the presentation of my 28J letter, which explicitly states that he was basically not free from detention. We understand your position. I think I'm, I'd like to argue some more, but I'm out of time. So thank you very much. Thank you. The case just argued is submitted and we appreciate your arguments.
Good morning, Your Honours. May please the Court. My name is Anna Darbynian of Asherson Clined Darbynian. Together with my partner, Naval Asherson, who's seated at the table. We represent Petitioner Maurizio Crepa in these consolidated proceedings. They're actually, I don't know. I'm not sure they're formally consolidated, but I'll go through separate arguments in this too. OK. Well, the first issue at hand is, in summary, the cases that are before you have to do with this Crepa attempting to just status to that of a US, to that of a permanent resident by virtue of marriage to a US citizen. Let me ask you some questions, if I may, about specifically the older case, which is the one we're on now. And as I understand it, there are two separate orders that are on review in this case. And one of them is the notice of decision on the denial by USCIS. It's an order denying adjustment of status. And on that, I would like to know from you why that is an appealable or reviewable matter in two respects. First, the order itself says it is not appealable and that it is without prejudice to reopening. So I don't see that it's final. And the other issue is that the adjustment of status decision they're in is discretionary. So if you would address why that is a reviewable order, I would appreciate it. Absolutely, Your Honor. Well, if I may just go backwards with the second request, why is the adjustment of status discretionary, the entire proceedings in these cases, in these cases, Judge Graber, is that the government seems to shield itself under the skies of discretion without really respecting what Congress's intent has been, which is that individuals like Mr. Creepa, who enter on a visa waiver program, are part of what would be concerned for the favored class as being that of a spouse of a U.S. citizen as immediate relative. And in addition, that's not your auntie of adjustment of status. Well, it certainly presents, if the issue is that you've overstayed on a visa waiver program and that you've worked illegally, which Congress explicitly exempts these individuals for purposes of adjustment of status, if the U.S. immigration can just under the skies of discretion, completely ignore what Congress's command is, then everything could be under the skies of exercise of discretion and there was no transparency, which you also address the finality problem with that order. The finality problem with regard to the adjustment of status with the U.S. CIS order, which says that it's without prejudice to renew all and that it's not appealable. It seems non-final. Well, I think that in that case, Your Honor, I'd like to bring the case of the Morales Isquiro, though, which the Court has requested that we, you know, brief on the issue and we've actually presented valid arguments in that the adjustment of status is inextricably linked to the removal order. In fact, there's a memo that the U.S. CIS has issued that explicitly instructs U.S. CIS officials to regard ICE's decision of a removal order under Section 217 as a negative factor and to, under the exercise of discretion, to deny those cases without having any merit. Let me see if I understand where we are. And this is the holder case that we're on now, correct? And my understanding is that your client, when he entered, pursuant to VISA waiver, he signed a form which told him that he was waving the right to contest removal of the overstate, correct? That's correct, Your Honor. However, in the... I'll just finish. Okay, excuse me. But that's correct, right? In essence. And under the regulations and law, there are some exceptions to that, including if you file a timely request for adjustment of status under certain conditions. But this one was not timely. Was filed after the 90 days expired, correct? That's correct, Your Honor. However, the moment case, if that's what you're referring to, Your Honor, has not been upheld or it does not have any authority with the U.S. immigration. In fact, they've explicitly stated that they will not be following the moment case. You have to. We're bound by it. Well, I understand that, but if we could look at the moment case, there was a rule that the 90 days... People exercise prosecutorial discretion all the time. They choose not to prosecute case, say that they do prosecute case V. And when case V comes before us as our presiding judge is indicated, we have to follow the law. I understand that, Your Honor. However, I think prior to more many, there was the Femin case, which is a President case. And in that case, I don't think that that was the main argument that it has to be within the 90 days. And in addition, I also want to point out to the honorable Court that this has been actually repudiated by the Attorney General and the Bradley V. Holder and the Supreme Court. So the fact that, you know, to impose the 90-day regulation, which is not being reviewed by the U.S. immigration or is not taken into consideration, I think also violates my Klein's equal protection argument. Because then he's single now. May I go back and ask you a question? Because I'm still processing what you just said. Is it your position that is, did Bradley V. Holder post-date our Momeni decision? Is it later than 2008? I believe it did, Your Honor. And because it's your position that it essentially overruled Momeni on the 90-day question. I believe that if the Attorney General repudiates, now I'm asking if the U.S. Supreme Court decision, which you mentioned, is inconsistent with our decision in Momeni because that is potentially one reason why we might not follow the earlier case. If it is no longer valid under a U.S. Supreme Court decision, that's why I'm asking the question. Yes, Your Honor, I would take that position. And what are our, in addition, I think your second argument, Judge Hawkins, is the question. Excuse me, the question I apologize. Your second question. You get to argue, I just give that as question. I will happily argue, Your Honor. And you're doing just fine. Thank you. And the second issue, I think your second question, if you can just remind me what that was, was it having you? Well, the first is he signed the way. Thank you. Thank you. No contestation of a notable removal. And then under the applicable law, he file an untimely request for adjustment status based on an I-130. Okay. So if I could just basically look at the jurisdiction with regard to the removal order itself. So if the removal order was, if Congress explicitly has allowed judicial review in cases of all removal orders that are final, except except except I had the removal. So it was congressional intent to explicitly not include the visa waiver entrance as under that removal order context. So therefore for the government to come back and say that there's the no contest clause. Number one, they are under regulation under Section 217 required to follow the regulation as to the validity of the removal order. Number one, they've included a, at the time of execution of the removal order, they did not have a signed or any document that reflects that he entered on a visa waiver. This was attached in our opening brief, which explicitly stated that the only document that they had was a blank I-94 form, which is an arrival departure card. So at the time the director actually issued the order, which is in question, which I'd like to have a moment to explain, they did not have an actual signed document. You're talking about which order now. I'm talking about final order. Absolutely, Your Honor. It's the order on the Section 217 administratively removing my client under the visa waiver program, which Director Robbins, Tim Robbins, had signed. The second issue is that this document, which miraculously appeared in the certified admin record later filed with the court, is in Spanish. The government is under, basically, disrespecting the regulation, which says any document in the United States as far as I'm aware, it needs to be in the English language. So if the government is going to present evidence that the document that my client signed, which is a Spanish document, not an English document, that my client knowingly, involuntarily basically waived all his rights and that therefore he cannot contest it, and I don't think is applicable. And under the Morales square no matter, under the zipper clause, I think that issue is explicitly addressed as well. I'd like to ask you a hypothetical question. What would your position be if the director had in his or her possession, the visa waiver at the time that the decision was made? Does that allow me to be outcome? In that hypothetical, Judge Sardwick, I would take the position that the only document that exists in fact is a Spanish document. So unless Mr. Robbins will come and testify that he understands the Spanish language, or that my client understands the Spanish language, I would find that very hard to understand how a decision would be rendered on that basis. I can say that if there were a document that was in a language that would clearly knew your client understood what that changed the outcome. It may, however, I'd like to preserve the argument of the Consumer Rights Theory under the Supreme Court decision that, which I will cite to, if you like, which states that consumers cannot just knowingly, involuntarily, waive all rights, you know. I want to get in, they have to. I understand that that's the position. You honor, however, if comes. This is the iron curtain. I understand that. If you sign, you get in. If you don't sign, you don't get in. That's true. However, if Congress explicitly understood it, could have been in Swahili. Well, there's an exception to immediate relatives, which is really the core of this issue. He is married to a U.S. citizen. It's a heightened class. I have a career, I have a career, I have a career, I have a career, I have a career. That did. But I think that, I would say about three years, three and a half years later, you honor. Yes. However, I think that if Congress explicitly excludes the provision that expedited removal orders are the only class of removal orders that is not reviewable, then I think it was congressional command that these orders are not, per se, you know, the applicant does not waive his his or right to contest it. Thank you, Councillor. You've exceeded your time, but we'll give you a minute for a bottle. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Your Honor. May I please the court and, Shane, behalf of the United States Government. We have just two points for one to make. Just one quick question. I'm sorry, I don't have right at hand. And that is, the I-130 denial was merit-spaced or based on timing. The I-130, I believe, was granted, Your Honor. Well, it was granted. In other words, the USCIS determined that this was a valid marriage, not entered into for fraud. That's what I understand, Your Honor. If he loses these cases before us today, that's hypothetically, if he loses them, can he return to Italy and wait a period of time and then reapply for I-130? Yes, Your Honor. And what's the waiting period? I believe it's a 10-year bar. Go ahead. So, Your Honor, the two prime points we wish to make this morning is one, the removal order itself is valid. And second, that the Court's last jurisdiction to review the adjustment claim. So first, the removal order is valid simply because the waiver is valid. As you are talking as you pointed out, the I-94 is in Spanish. But the very first line of the I-94 says it's a 994N. It should be known that it was on his flight back from Mexico that he was handed his form in Spanish. And in the form, it contains all of his information. So it's not only his name, but it's got his nationality, his passport, the airline, his address. I mean, everything is filled out. And then he signs it. And then, no one in his opening brief, because he ever said he doesn't understand Spanish. So the Petitioner's Council argues that there's a rule that any form, that anyone signs, there's contrast to being English. I don't know if it's such a rule. In fact, I think these I-94s are translated into other languages specifically to help make sure that the person signing understands what they're signing. Well, it's interesting because he does actually answer every question too. Yes, Your Honor. And what's, you know, I think to the extent there is some factual dispute, I think we have to use record before. Since what Congress intended with these VWP cases, they're meant to be expedited and kind of funnel through the circuit courts. And so there's a reason why Congress never intended that it before discovering these cases. And so what we have is what we have. And in this case, it seems pretty clear that he understood the form. And he doesn't, he doesn't argue, he doesn't understand the form. He simply argues that there's some responsibility of the United States government to provide everything in English, which is simply not true. And just briefly touch on this, the validity of the VWP has already been upheld in Bingham by this Court. And very simply Bingham held that the VWP program is constitutional because the condition is rationally related to the benefit and the condition being that you have to accept expedited removal, but what you get is expedited entry. So the benefit, the petitioner got in this case was that he was able to enter the country. You never had to apply for a visa. But the condition of his stay under this program is that he also had to leave in a timely fashion, which not only did it not do, but he waited until he was in detention and the in detention judge said that's the chance to your question. He was made three years ago while he was in detention. So. Can I ask you specifically your position with respect to the argument that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Radley overruled, which is fairly inconsistent with our decision in Momanie? Yes, Your Honor. I don't believe there is a Supreme Court decision in Bradley. What the petitioner said to the cert up, it's the Solicitor General's position in a rather than a third circuit decision. And the Attorney General took the position in that case, but the Solicitor General in opposing the motion for cert, the Dribb for cert was that these adjustments applications do get you to get by cis. So it doesn't matter if there is no Supreme Court decision. So Momanie is good law. Absolutely. For us, it may not be right, but it's valid for M we have to follow. Absolutely, Your Honor. To have briefly touched on the issue of whether this case should be, well, the brief question that you know whether this case should be in this Court or in District Court on the adjustment claim, Your Honor. I just wanted to, because you asked that earlier, on the Morales Disguierdo, this Court called out a very now exception, but when the Zipper calls on your 1252B9 applies to Zip Adjustment Applications, up with final orders of removal, I have to say, I didn't really understand even the relevance of that decision in view of the fact that the notice of decision is not a final order. So, so, so would, would it even apply to something that's not a final order? You Honor, no, that's the first argument we're making, our brief, cis decision is not a final order of removal. But secondarily, the Zipper calls when it applies to Zip Adjustment Applications and with the VWP claim, primarily because even in Morales Disguierdo, the Court recognized that for the most part, just an application is don't Zip. And the reason why is because somebody can be here lawfully, and he can be here for a long time, and he can apply for adjustment, and the Adjustment Applications can be denied. And he can still be legal status, so you think of somebody here, and a student visa, or someone here on an extended tourist visa, they can, they can try to adjust to whatever means, and it can get denied. And there's no final order of removal. And so in most cases, it doesn't make sense to Zip Adjustment because then you'll never get reviewed. But there it was the reinstatement of a final order, and the holding was that when you reinstate a final order, it's still final. Right. And reinstate the reason why it ties to Adjustment is because the statute itself says if you apply for adjustment and a reinstatement order is issued against you, in the statute, adjustments automatically denied. We don't have that with VWP, it's much more of a separate track. Sometimes like in some cases, they could parallel each other, but it's not nearly the way it's kind of one-for-one in the end statement cases. So the ties definitely not as strong. And so I think the language used by the Corps and Marossi's Guierdo was, they must be inextricably linked and in VWP and adjustments, they're simply not inextricably linked. And just briefly to touch on the question of the denial itself. Your Honour's discretion is, is the decision to give or not give a benefit based on an adjudicator's determination of a composite sketch of an individual? So we look at all the facts of an individual and determine that this person may have a positive benefit that we want to confer on this person. And in this case, this is clearly a discretionary decision. So the commissioner spends a lot of time arguing that, well, none of these individual factors that USCIS relied upon are per se bars to adjusting. And that may be true, but that's not what sits held. Since all these different factors working with the authorization, overstaying the VWP to arrest for driving on an influence and said, this man doesn't respect our laws. And so given our discretion, we're going to deny this positive benefit to become a citizen of our country. And that's a discretionary determination in this court-led jurisdiction review. There's nothing legal or constitutional about that finding. And so if your odds have no further questions, we would ask that the court cannot have a petition for review. Thank you. I don't know what we do. Mr. Bannon, do you have one minute for a bottle? Okay. Thank you, Honour. I'll be very fast. First to clarify, the I-130 is, in fact, granted. So the marriage petition is granted. The prejudice to my client is a 10-year bar that he would be away from his US citizen wife. The most important issue that I'd like to also present, because I forgot to mention that I had confirmed whether or not you have received and reviewed my 28J letter that I found. We received it. You did. Okay. So the issue here is that my client was basically denied the ability to get married, which would have preemptively removed this removal order entirely. And the fact that the USI denied my client the ability to marry, even though they were aware of the underlying fact that he had a US citizen fiance, I think is really one of the other violations, the regulatory violations that we've presented in our briefs. And I'd like to point that out in the, in my, with the presentation of my 28J letter, which explicitly states that he was basically not free from detention. We understand your position. I think I'm, I'd like to argue some more, but I'm out of time. So thank you very much. Thank you. The case just argued is submitted and we appreciate your arguments