And the first date this morning is Microsoft versus DataTurn. Mr. Belt. Thank you, Your Honor. Good morning. I'm Eric Belt. I'm from Carter and English in our Boston office and I represent DataTurn. The District Court took the claim of clean construction. The claim wording, as we know, is the starting point for a clean construction. Can we come up with a 402 way? Excuse me. Can we come up with a 402 patent? That's what I'm going to talk about primarily, Your Honor. What the District Court did in the 402 patent, 502 as well, is to jump ahead and to start the process with examples in the specification or the prosecution history or in some cases extrinsic evidence, while bypassing the claims. And the result of that, Your Honor, is that the District Court rewrote a claim one of each patent by inserting new steps into each of the methods, both claim ones, both patents or method claims. So let me repeat that. The District Court in effect took out a pen and inserted entirely new steps into the claims. These steps are not present in the claim wording, and are not otherwise required by the specification or the prosecution history. The District Court also aired in accepting subject manager jurisdiction in the first place, and I will speak to that as I have sufficient time. Well, let me ask you about what I think is your first point. You're not disputing the logical tables, require normalized data, right? You're disputing whether or not that normalization process is required in particular claims. Right, so the question is, right about that. I don't think they've even required normalized data. The logical table is simply a representation or a definition that exists virtually. That's what logical means is to the user. It appears as if the user is working with the real tables in the physical tables. The really what the logical tables are is, if I could back up. As you've seen from our briefs, there's a mismatch. The relational database is structured in one way through tables. The object-oriented application has a different structure to it, so they don't necessarily readily speak to one another. What a logical table does your honors? Do I understand your argument to be among other things that are at least too disclosed embodiments that in figure one and figure five that don't require any normalization? That's right, your honor. So figure one reads the relational schema, which is the structure of the database, directly into the process and creates relational schema objects
. That's what a call relational schema objects, they are objects that are representing the logical, I'm sorry, that is normalized before it gets there. It could be normalized before it gets there. In fact, what the panel says is typically the relational databases organized into already normal tables. If you look at the background of the invention, your honor, in column one. Right there, it says starting in line 2526, it talks about relational databases. They are typically organized into normalization, minimize duplication, and so you have in a typically in a database already normal tables. They can be directly read in through the capture process to create the normalized relational schema object. That's what a normalized relational schema object is. Now, is your argument to figure one requires no logical table? No, that's not our argument. The claims require logical tables. That I understand. Where is that in figure one? They're not in figure one, or in figure five for that matter, your honor. Figure five is the embodiment that Microsoft relied upon. Then is this embodiment in figure one claimed since it has no logical table? Of course, it's claimed, your honor, it's the normalized relational schema object, according to the claim represents the logical table. So first, one way to do it would be to read in the normalized relational schema objects, create those, you form those, and you define logical tables by selecting columns that you need. You may not need all of the columns in a particular table. The dimension of RSO may be helpful for you. Doesn't it mention RSO as opposed to NRSO? It does, and that means... Is that part of what I understood your argument to be? I'm just trying to make sure I get it. It's quite complicated. So the, and it is complicated, your honor. The, I think it uses the term RSO because in the database, you could have either tables that are already normalized, or you could have denormalized tables. And for example, claim eight is a claim that discusses starting from denormalized tables, and some of the later claims as well. The reference of an age of about figure one and figure five. In figure five, a Mrs. and argument, I think Microsoft makes, is described in column four of the patent. It talks about the normalization process, allowing the users to define different tables
. So it brings to me, and normalization process does appear in figure five. So how does that help you? I'm not understanding how figure five helps you. You see, it's a, it's a, it wasn't R argument, it was Microsoft argument. Figure five is simply an alternative embodied. So that does include the normalization process. Figure five is an only logical process. So that supports Microsoft argument. Your only argument is that that's not required in all instances, right? That's right, yeah, claim one is brought enough to support either claim. I don't think you want to figure five. And you didn't correct me, which you should have. I said figure one and figure five both do not disclose normalization. And you said yes. No, I'm sorry. You said correct me. Because figure one doesn't disclose normalization, but figure five clearly does. Yeah, maybe I'm not. Don't let me misspeak. Even when it helps me. Because trust me, they'll figure it out. I'm sorry, maybe I miss heard you, you're on or so figure five. And that was our argument is so there are two embodiments that are disclosed, at least two embodiments that are disclosed. Figure five shows the alternative normalization process. And you're right, that is disgusting, for example, call four and call them 10. And so what the district court did was there are claims that specifically call out a normalization step. That is not in claim one. Climb one would necessarily exclude a normalization step, but it's certainly not real life. And in addition to inserting into the claim in essence this normalization step, what the district court did was re-did not just any normalization step, but the normalization step that has to do with normalizing a database. That is the normalization that is discussed in the background of the infection. The district court specifically refers to that
. And that's a normal, the background normalization is concerned with how do you structure a database so that the data is organized efficiently to minimize duplication? Even if we would agree with you on the claim's structure, where does that leave us in terms of this case? Just send it back for renianly, still have to determine an infringement based on a revised claim construction? Well, we actually have in the summary judgment briefing below, we submitted testimony, much of which was not opposed. So you could actually read the book. What are planning to go into what? Oh, the infringement and the way that infringement would work if the claim construction was reversed. But certainly you could read men if the claim construction were reversed for further proceedings. And there would still be a dispute argument between what are the other infringement. I think that would certainly be Microsoft for your senior senior honor. On the 502 patents, if I understand your reply brief, you believe that we should deem the arguments all waved in this particular appeal because of the attempt to incorporate my reference. That's right. You believe that incorporating my reference is a violation of rule 28i under these circumstances? That's right. That's a pretty draconian response that you're asking us to take. You want to defend it a little bit? Well, first of all, the role is the role. And I think what should have happened was Microsoft should have at least moved for permission to do so and should have pointed out what are the similarities and what are the differences. Now, there are certainly differences between FAPs, arguments, and Microsofts, arguments, you're on. But Microsoft's position is to affirm the district court. I mean, even if we were to exclude the arguments made in the other brief, if we speak to the 402, with respect to this case in 502, we've still got the district court to pin you. Right. That's right. And we have our arguments as to why the district court erred with respect to the federal defense. So yes, I do agree that you still need to conclude that our arguments are correct. Well, and of course, since they may be arguments for the 502 and SAP, they are fairly presented there. So if we just decide the SAP case a minute before we decide that Microsoft case, right? I mean, I understand that yes, you're absolutely right, Your Honor, and this is something that we discussed. There is the practical implication of even if the role is violated. That is clear. There are differences, however. And one of the differences, in addition to, for example, different projects, SAP has its business-onjured products, Microsoft has its own products that, and we conceded infringement differently. So some of the claim terms, one being the create, in 502 patent, the creation of the interface object, that step, we conceded as to SAP on one portion of the reading of that claim, and conceded as to Microsoft as to a different portion of that claim. So there are some differences, and we do point that out in our grease, Your Honor. So to the extent that Microsoft seeks to rely on SAP's arguments, they don't quite mesh up all the way. Mr
. Bill, let's back to normalization, assuming that normalization is not required by the claim. What happens when we start with denormalized physical tables? So, for example, if you look at claim A, you have a process where you start with a denormalized table, and that gives you a process for doing. And what has to happen? You read there. There has to be normalization, right? I'm not actually sure that that is necessarily so. Certainly there is an example. How could it not be? Maybe that's what you could tell me. So you are defining the logical table, which is simply the step of first selecting one or more columns from the table, and then you are assigning a primary to, I guess you would need to have normalization. I think you have normalization. I understand it correctly. So really, the only time normalization is not necessary is when the tables are already normalized. When persons skill in the art kind of automatically understand that. I mean, not even automatically. It's almost beyond presumption, isn't it? I think that's right, Your Honor. So normalization, as the district court says, is necessary every time it is necessary. That was somehow circular, but I think you understand what I'm saying. It's necessary in the claim every time it's actually necessary in practice, isn't it? I think that would be right here. So is the district court correct in its claim construction? No, because the only time normalization isn't there. It really isn't necessary anyway. So why we, why we, why we, in other words, claims all the time, because they required every time it's going to be put into use. But there aren't, there are other things. And the person skill in the art can understand the distinction, and so the district court kind of made this simple, right? No, I think it actually makes it more confusing, Your Honor, because if the district court is saying, a normalization step is required. Even in those instances where you don't need normalization, for example, when you're starting with, when you've got normalized tables, that's the only thing. So why, it wouldn't be a person of skill absolutely understand that. It's already normalized. I don't need to re-normalize. Well, how is the jury doing, Your Honor? I mean, would it be, I think I just explained it. If the district court says a normalization process is required, then a jury is going to conclude that it's going to be required no matter what the table is. And that's just not right, Your Honor. And not only did the district court read in the normalization, a normalization step, but the wrong normalization step
. The normalization step from the prior art, I shall say, a structure in the database to minimize duplication by dividing the tables. That's not what the- And we're just talking about claim one, because the other claims are all covered. That's right. Other claims specifically require a normalization step. I claim one does not. It's brought enough to cover both imbodies. Thank you. I think we've made up your time. We'll give Mr. Ryan some extra two minutes. And then you can have your re-bub time. Thank you very much. These are Mr. Ryan's two more minutes. There we go. Time will be used now. Thank you. You're welcome. Your Honor, may I please the court? I'm prepared to address normalizations as essentially the subject of that argument, but I'm happy to answer any questions about anything. I would like you to start with the incorporation by reference and what we ought to do about the incorporation by reference in this case that is not consistent as I read both 28 I. I mean, John Dunner out there in the audience, writes lovely briefs that you don't just get to incorporate them by reference whenever you file your own briefs. That's correct, Your Honor. So first of all, I hope you appreciate the purpose for what we did with that consideration. Really? Because I think the purpose for what you do was to extend your word count. Mr. Ryan, how many words over 14,000 did your brief go when you incorporated by reference? 3,025 words. So those were 3,025 words that you were not entitled to in your brief if you would type them in. So I think your purpose was to get more words to mount a bigger defense. Okay
. I don't believe that so. I could split the argument and made most of the argument on some terms in one and most in the other and gotten more pages because we didn't use the last 15 pages in one of the briefs. So clearly what? Well, but that phrase didn't raise two patents this point in. No, but if you needed more pages in Microsoft, you needed to respond to this. We could have gotten more pages if we split the argument to the two briefs. We wanted to do, we was added consideration to put the argument in one place because it's the same argument about the same water. Let me argue on the law on your assumption that it's a violation because I don't believe that's right. First of all, if you think about it, we could have gotten more if we just split it, but what if it didn't consider it? Second of all, rule 28 is permissive. It doesn't preclude and it notes where cases are consolidated. You can incorporate by reference. This opinion is the result of consolidated proceeding. Not just that the cases were preceded below. It's one opinion. It would make no sense to argue about one claim construction order, which is an issue of law in two different briefs and split it out. Well, when was it consolidated initially, right? Or for purposes of pre-trial, but then not, I mean, what was the consolidation? For using our time on this, this is a result of the fact that there was no motion for consolidated appeal. I didn't know what they were going to argue about, which issues came in, and that's just a lot more issues that aren't being fulfilled here. So I had to wait to see what their briefs were. They split the argument in their two briefs. I was confronted with, do I move to consolidate? Maybe only get one brief, create a little bit of a rush. Or do I do what I did, which is not just the last 13 pages of one brief and put it in one coherent place. But on the law, rule 28 was elected to permit it in consolidated cases. This is clearly consolidated proceeding below the opinion below with itself. Also, I was keeping in mind the practice note tool 28, which advises when multiple parties are represented by the same council that it's inappropriate to split the argument. You recognize, of course, as a federal rule of a pellet procedure, and they're talking about consolidated cases, and in the same sentence, talking about the appellants and the appellees. Clearly, they're talking about consolidated on appeal. Not sort of consolidated sometime in the past, but no longer consolidated cases. I think the opinion below that you're on, that's on review is still the topic. And I also think that there's a practical issue, that it's an issue of law that's being decided. But I think most importantly, it's about motives of a council
. I think if you think about it, you'd understand how I could have gotten more pages if I'd split the argument across two briefs. On the marital. It's about normalization. Yes, it's not in the claim. It is in normalized relational schema object in one of the claim terms. And the word is used four or five or six times, but normalization, the process of normalization is not. So I think the important thing to understand is in the patent itself, in this specification, there's no reference to an RSL normalized relational schema object, that concept first came in to the patent in a amendment to overcome prior art, and normalized got packed on and added. And I don't, I think it's something that normalized object, that means it's been normalized. I mean, it's the past participle, that's what it means. I don't see how one would assume that the object's not been normalized when that's exactly in the claim term. In terms of the logical tables, there's a specific definition. So I think what is a logical table? We've got the logical tables on a variety of different technologies in this different meaning in different places. There's a definition, I believe it's a definition of definitional quality, or a column for where it lines 28 through 34. Since once a denormalized table, such as table APs catch from the date of database, the normalization process allows the user to define different tables. You can subset the columns of the table AP. And that's new table. That's bigger five. Those references are all five. That's the regular picture column. Clearly, no one's disputing, including your friend on the other side, but that's the normalization process. But there's the different process. That's right. But this is where logical table is first introduced. It says, this new table is hence the subset of a real physical table in the database, and it's henceforth referred to as a logical table. I believe that's definitional. I believe that's first introduced at this point. And I believe that this reinforces the claim language of the normalized relational. Obviously, it's got normalized. I mean, that's just its claim grammar
. So I think normalization is clearly part of the claim requirement. And that's why all the other claims, you know, claiming different ways. And it's just not surprising that the special sought here is the logical tables. I think there, I kind of resonated with me with Judge Proce's point and first. It's sort of hard to deny normalization is part of it. I think that's right, based on the argument they just pended. The question is, this bit about what is normalization in Cal? And I think normalization clearly in Cal is dividing into two tables within a logical table construct. And the reason that I do is, for several holds, one is, that's what determines conventionally. Council relied even on the reference at column one at line 29 from 32, where it puts quotes and defines normalization is dividing the data into different tables. But it's also reinforced. What would you reference just then? column one at line 30 to 32. But I think to me, the realization is... At that location does define logic table as a subset of real physical table in the database? I think that's a descriptor of it. I consider it to that condition to be in column four. I think that's more helpful as such. But clearly that's an element. I mean, when you divide it, I mean, the point being that when you divide it into two, it's a subset. If you divide one thing, it's multiple, each one is a subset. So it's totally consistent. But to me, the trick to getting this to understanding our argument on normalization, what it is, when you accept that it's got to be part of it, for the reason I said it's not for the outset. So you're looking at column four, and it's in this definitional phase, it says at line 30 to 32, it says, allows the user to define different tables using subsets of columns at the reference that judge more and eight. Of the table AP. You see that? Of the table AP? What line are you up? That's at 32. 32. Calls for 32. And if you look at figure seven, which is very, very important, this is your normalization process. Okay? If you're demonstrating within the logical table construct, how you would normalize
. And you'll see the references to table PL, table AL, and table AP. Please, if you have that. The table AP is the denormalized, and then table PL, table AL, are the dividing out, just like standard normalization. I don't know how, it's a complicated stuff, but at least if you study up on this art, there's a basic construct of normalization that's taking a superset and dividing it into subsets. And that's exactly what's shown here. So the idea that in some different kind of normalization is completely inconsistent with figure seven, which is only discussing an embodiment which is in denormalized form. Yes, if you would, the tables are in denormalized form. That's correct. I'm starting, this argument is starting from the assumption that normalization is required by the predispotological table. I think you're opponent degrees when it's denormalized, you've got a normalize. What about the other side of the... If it's normal, then there's no normalization, and it doesn't need to be normalized. I'm putting normalize... That's the part that will confuse. I think that when you have normalized relational schema objects, they've been normalized. That's what's all about that. Add that to the claim, and that if it's just a relational schema object without having to normalize, there's no logical case... Just think about it, Your Honor. Here's the problem. These are method claims. And if the method claim requires normalization, the fact that normalization is required creates the problem. I mean, I guess I'm just finding it difficult to reconcile your answer to judge raiders' questions because if there are circumstances in which this method is not required for formal normalization because it's already been done, there's no need.
.. That's not using the method of the claims for argument. But the concept... Let me back to persuading you that normalization has to happen. It's me, the second debate is more interesting. On that issue, what is critical is understanding this long discussion of figure one that's been mentioned, and they go into it, there's no reference to logical table. Why would you... If logical tables are the most important thing, I think we can all agree with that. Some of the invention abstracts everywhere, right? Consider the most important thing. How could you have an embodiment describe them, figure one, that's talking about the invention itself, that doesn't even introduce the concept of logical table until four columns later? It doesn't make any sense, that table set. What they ended up focusing on was the logical table, which is introduced for the first time and defined in column four, relating to figure five. I'd like to ask Mr. Rhynas a few questions on the DGager restriction, but I don't want to make him bounce back and forth. No, let's go there, I want to go there too. Okay, so Mr. Rhynas, can you explain to me the basis as you understand it for why there is DGager restriction? Yes, under ours there's two problems. I mean we can go ahead and hire up to Meta-Mew and the part is that there's something touching a legal interest to the parties. And in ours the way that was implemented. Well, not something touching, there has to be an immediate and real adverse legal interest. In Meta-Mew and they use the word touching, but... It happens to be immediate and real, adverse legal interest. The dispute certainly has to be immediate and real, so I don't want to... I have no problems with that. Our issue implemented that with the two problem tasks as I read it. One is that there's a claim that could have been brought, which is also considered with actually microchip, which is pre-minute. And the second thing is that there be an identity claim. On the could have been brought, clearly the claim could have been brought, it had been brought. Why? Why could it have been brought? What is the claim that you think could have been brought? Indirect infringement. Exactly what, because that's just a label. Two-seminone B or C, which is... Both. You think a claim against Microsoft on this record legitimately could have been brought? Do you think that if there is absolutely no evidence anywhere in any record for anybody of intent for inducement, for example, that it would be fair to say a claim for intent could be brought? I mean, that's self-answered questions. No, that wouldn't be, but since the claim is brought... No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, those are post-complaint acts. Our case falls crystal clear that post-complaint acts cannot be considered for determining whether jurisdiction exists. So you're talking about the counter-clam, which was compulsory. No, what I'm explaining to you is if there's a question, whether something could have happened at time A, and it does happen at time B, that is probative of the fact that it could have happened. No, no, no, we've said post-complaint... We've addressed this exact fact pattern, and quite clearly said that post-complaint behavior cannot be considered for purposes of determining whether jurisdiction exists. They have to file it. They can both retound a claim. They didn't file it. They lost it. They never choice
.. I have no problems with that. Our issue implemented that with the two problem tasks as I read it. One is that there's a claim that could have been brought, which is also considered with actually microchip, which is pre-minute. And the second thing is that there be an identity claim. On the could have been brought, clearly the claim could have been brought, it had been brought. Why? Why could it have been brought? What is the claim that you think could have been brought? Indirect infringement. Exactly what, because that's just a label. Two-seminone B or C, which is... Both. You think a claim against Microsoft on this record legitimately could have been brought? Do you think that if there is absolutely no evidence anywhere in any record for anybody of intent for inducement, for example, that it would be fair to say a claim for intent could be brought? I mean, that's self-answered questions. No, that wouldn't be, but since the claim is brought... No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, those are post-complaint acts. Our case falls crystal clear that post-complaint acts cannot be considered for determining whether jurisdiction exists. So you're talking about the counter-clam, which was compulsory. No, what I'm explaining to you is if there's a question, whether something could have happened at time A, and it does happen at time B, that is probative of the fact that it could have happened. No, no, no, we've said post-complaint... We've addressed this exact fact pattern, and quite clearly said that post-complaint behavior cannot be considered for purposes of determining whether jurisdiction exists. They have to file it. They can both retound a claim. They didn't file it. They lost it. They never choice. Well, you wouldn't believe something you didn't own. That logic is not compelling to me personally, because if you didn't have a counter-clam, you wouldn't bring it. But I like to know what was the basis upon which you said both B and C. And so what ERIS did is said, contributory infringement was the basis. And it actually walked through all the elements and showed how the infringer had a potential infringer, had a legitimate concern about adversely-the-interest on every single element for contributory infringement. I see no similar thing here. It seems to me you're alleging nothing more than they sued our customers when our product using claim charts referring to add-o.net, therefore we could potentially be sued for infringement or contributory. And that doesn't seem to me what I understand as required. Everything ERIS has, this case has, except the file sheet has also had that participation in the licensing. Everything ERIS has really, because in ERIS, there was, as I understand it, let's see, let's look at ERIS. All through the claim charts is referenceadio.net. The name of the claim charts is customer of ADO.net. They're not even customized to the different customers. It's so clear that what's being accused is the product under contributory theory, I think, and then an adducement theory. Really, where is the evidence in the claim charts or otherwise that it was said add-o.net was especially made or adapted for use to infringed the passion. Because I don't see that evidence anywhere, but that existed in ERIS quite clearly just like in his majority opinion explained it. So where is that evidence in the claim charts? I think just throughout the claim charts, by saying that there's a normal life. But add-o.net and a Serrinet has lots of uses, beyond simply using to create an interface that will allow for object-oriented to communicate with relational databases. I don't know.net can be used to retrieve data broadly in many sets of circumstances. Can't it? If there's an NRSL functionality, that functionality would only have one use. That's the argument. So.
. Well, you wouldn't believe something you didn't own. That logic is not compelling to me personally, because if you didn't have a counter-clam, you wouldn't bring it. But I like to know what was the basis upon which you said both B and C. And so what ERIS did is said, contributory infringement was the basis. And it actually walked through all the elements and showed how the infringer had a potential infringer, had a legitimate concern about adversely-the-interest on every single element for contributory infringement. I see no similar thing here. It seems to me you're alleging nothing more than they sued our customers when our product using claim charts referring to add-o.net, therefore we could potentially be sued for infringement or contributory. And that doesn't seem to me what I understand as required. Everything ERIS has, this case has, except the file sheet has also had that participation in the licensing. Everything ERIS has really, because in ERIS, there was, as I understand it, let's see, let's look at ERIS. All through the claim charts is referenceadio.net. The name of the claim charts is customer of ADO.net. They're not even customized to the different customers. It's so clear that what's being accused is the product under contributory theory, I think, and then an adducement theory. Really, where is the evidence in the claim charts or otherwise that it was said add-o.net was especially made or adapted for use to infringed the passion. Because I don't see that evidence anywhere, but that existed in ERIS quite clearly just like in his majority opinion explained it. So where is that evidence in the claim charts? I think just throughout the claim charts, by saying that there's a normal life. But add-o.net and a Serrinet has lots of uses, beyond simply using to create an interface that will allow for object-oriented to communicate with relational databases. I don't know.net can be used to retrieve data broadly in many sets of circumstances. Can't it? If there's an NRSL functionality, that functionality would only have one use. That's the argument. So... If you're saying that software, because it has many uses, can never... That in the case where someone's used 60 customers in wonder's addiction, you can never come in if they're trying to avoid keeping the manufacturer in. Because it's software and therefore can always be used in different ways, especially in the mass of operating system or whatever else. Then yes, then maybe there's never jurisdiction. I don't think that's why it's policy-wise. I think here's my problem. My problem is that I don't see you having any evidence in the record that Microsoft has a legally adverse interest because the inducement standard requires a very high level of intent. And I see no such evidence in 10. And then for contributory, there's all kinds of elements that aren't established. And in the air, as opinion, Judge Dyke shows how the record in that case gave the alleged infringer a reason to believe that he was in jeopardy on every one of those elements. And no similar thing happened here. I didn't see anything in ours that there was any show knowledge of the patent, those kind of things. Well, actually it is present. And the same type of intent. And in all of those... You know, there is an unducent case. There is only a contributory. But what I think does the standard, if you read, the way I read, global attack is that that applies to both. What you think is the same intent standard that we articulated in DSU for inducement applies to contributory. Well, DSU is overruled by global attack. I mean, that was... But you think the same inducement standard of intent and just
.. If you're saying that software, because it has many uses, can never... That in the case where someone's used 60 customers in wonder's addiction, you can never come in if they're trying to avoid keeping the manufacturer in. Because it's software and therefore can always be used in different ways, especially in the mass of operating system or whatever else. Then yes, then maybe there's never jurisdiction. I don't think that's why it's policy-wise. I think here's my problem. My problem is that I don't see you having any evidence in the record that Microsoft has a legally adverse interest because the inducement standard requires a very high level of intent. And I see no such evidence in 10. And then for contributory, there's all kinds of elements that aren't established. And in the air, as opinion, Judge Dyke shows how the record in that case gave the alleged infringer a reason to believe that he was in jeopardy on every one of those elements. And no similar thing happened here. I didn't see anything in ours that there was any show knowledge of the patent, those kind of things. Well, actually it is present. And the same type of intent. And in all of those... You know, there is an unducent case. There is only a contributory. But what I think does the standard, if you read, the way I read, global attack is that that applies to both. What you think is the same intent standard that we articulated in DSU for inducement applies to contributory. Well, DSU is overruled by global attack. I mean, that was... But you think the same inducement standard of intent and just... I think this is an argument. Is there a real decision that applies to the contributory? There is a good argument. But in ours, what they said is you don't obviously don't have to admit that you're inducing infringement or that you're contributing infringement in order to get your day in court. The whole point is you can test that. But I don't see any basis upon which you ought to be shaking in your business. I mean, that's the problem. The problem is Microsoft has to believe a legally adverse interest exists. I don't see any basis for Microsoft to have any fear that it was going to be sued by data terms. I don't think that the standard can or should be shaking in your boots. The question is, their software is being challenged and accused in cases against all their customers that are generically being stated. Customers? Okay, but... Listen, listen. You say Microsoft saw a screw. A screw, just a screw. The claim is to a bicycle. A wheel connected by that screw to the frame. Okay? So I have your attention. Yes. All right. I don't appear to you. I'd like to. Wheel, screw, frame. All right? And suppose that I am the patentee, and I see Microsoft and say, when you sell people this screw, you know that they are putting it together with a wheel and a frame and making a bike that infringes my claim. Okay. Do I now have a direct and indirect infringement claim against Microsoft for selling this screw? I think it knows more facts
... I think this is an argument. Is there a real decision that applies to the contributory? There is a good argument. But in ours, what they said is you don't obviously don't have to admit that you're inducing infringement or that you're contributing infringement in order to get your day in court. The whole point is you can test that. But I don't see any basis upon which you ought to be shaking in your business. I mean, that's the problem. The problem is Microsoft has to believe a legally adverse interest exists. I don't see any basis for Microsoft to have any fear that it was going to be sued by data terms. I don't think that the standard can or should be shaking in your boots. The question is, their software is being challenged and accused in cases against all their customers that are generically being stated. Customers? Okay, but... Listen, listen. You say Microsoft saw a screw. A screw, just a screw. The claim is to a bicycle. A wheel connected by that screw to the frame. Okay? So I have your attention. Yes. All right. I don't appear to you. I'd like to. Wheel, screw, frame. All right? And suppose that I am the patentee, and I see Microsoft and say, when you sell people this screw, you know that they are putting it together with a wheel and a frame and making a bike that infringes my claim. Okay. Do I now have a direct and indirect infringement claim against Microsoft for selling this screw? I think it knows more facts. No, you don't. Those are the only facts you have here. The only facts you have here is data term claim construction chart that indicates that add-o.net is being used by customers in a manner that amounts to direct and infringement. That's it. That's all that's present here. Do the indemnity requests and the pattern of litigiousness at anything to them? Well, that's... I was going to say the second problem I was going to hope to get to is indemnity. I mean, I was saying the first thing that if you read a claim against every single element is satisfied by a product and you sue many customers that that is sufficient to mean that someone could bring in a direct and infringement claim. On indemnity... But that's direct... But that would be suggesting that all you have to have is direct infringement to bring a contributory claim. That can't possibly be the standard. I think that if a supplier supplies a product and it goes to many customers and they all get the same claim chart, that the implication is by selling the product to all those people that they're inducing infringement and that product is substantially designed for the infringement. I believe those infringements are fair. I think that should be enough to get you in the courtroom. I think that's the test. I think I think especially giving a litigious activity and the indemnity demand. Were they ever litigious against an indirect infringer because I only saw them going after people who used the product in a way that amounted to direct infringement? I didn't see them being litigious against the... Right, it's very calm, right? It's very calm and we're going to.
. No, you don't. Those are the only facts you have here. The only facts you have here is data term claim construction chart that indicates that add-o.net is being used by customers in a manner that amounts to direct and infringement. That's it. That's all that's present here. Do the indemnity requests and the pattern of litigiousness at anything to them? Well, that's... I was going to say the second problem I was going to hope to get to is indemnity. I mean, I was saying the first thing that if you read a claim against every single element is satisfied by a product and you sue many customers that that is sufficient to mean that someone could bring in a direct and infringement claim. On indemnity... But that's direct... But that would be suggesting that all you have to have is direct infringement to bring a contributory claim. That can't possibly be the standard. I think that if a supplier supplies a product and it goes to many customers and they all get the same claim chart, that the implication is by selling the product to all those people that they're inducing infringement and that product is substantially designed for the infringement. I believe those infringements are fair. I think that should be enough to get you in the courtroom. I think that's the test. I think I think especially giving a litigious activity and the indemnity demand. Were they ever litigious against an indirect infringer because I only saw them going after people who used the product in a way that amounted to direct infringement? I didn't see them being litigious against the... Right, it's very calm, right? It's very calm and we're going to... Millions of the fact patterns where they just want to, the customers on a mass basis and never let the manufacturer come into the case. Hold on, could you just have agreed to indemnify any one of these people in Texas? This isn't a case about you getting in court. This is the case about you choosing the court you want to begin. You could have agreed to indemnify any one of those Texas customers and stepped into their shoes in Texas. And then try to join the case that we're saying down there. You could have totally descended. You could have taken over the case. So that goes for the question of whether indemnity that this feud should be enough to be an adversely go interest. And I believe that it clearly should be. It seems to me that you don't have to... It's requiring someone to accept that kind of obligation. Broadly, when there's so many disputed issues, the whole point is to eliminate risk. The question to me is, is it right? It comes to me a rightness issue. Is there enough information such that a court can just... Is able to just... Just to show what it's used to me. But you realize if you agreed to indemnify or if you were required to indemnify, you could have only gone in Texas because there's already a suit there. You wouldn't have had any basis to file in New York. You have to accept the full indemnity risk in order to do that. So how can the sector of indemnity allow you to get into New York, but not force you to litigate in Texas where the case is already ongoing? Because I don't think it's not the same case. So if it's not the same.
.. Millions of the fact patterns where they just want to, the customers on a mass basis and never let the manufacturer come into the case. Hold on, could you just have agreed to indemnify any one of these people in Texas? This isn't a case about you getting in court. This is the case about you choosing the court you want to begin. You could have agreed to indemnify any one of those Texas customers and stepped into their shoes in Texas. And then try to join the case that we're saying down there. You could have totally descended. You could have taken over the case. So that goes for the question of whether indemnity that this feud should be enough to be an adversely go interest. And I believe that it clearly should be. It seems to me that you don't have to... It's requiring someone to accept that kind of obligation. Broadly, when there's so many disputed issues, the whole point is to eliminate risk. The question to me is, is it right? It comes to me a rightness issue. Is there enough information such that a court can just... Is able to just... Just to show what it's used to me. But you realize if you agreed to indemnify or if you were required to indemnify, you could have only gone in Texas because there's already a suit there. You wouldn't have had any basis to file in New York. You have to accept the full indemnity risk in order to do that. So how can the sector of indemnity allow you to get into New York, but not force you to litigate in Texas where the case is already ongoing? Because I don't think it's not the same case. So if it's not the same... It's a broader case. It's not the same... It's the real parties and interests actually litigate. So what you're saying is, if we originally indemnified, we could then only step into the shoes of the direct infringer and argue their case, correct? So how does that give you a basis to claim indirect infringement and go up north? I think the issue is right and just dischivable when you still can test indemnity. I don't think you have to accept indemnity before you can defend your product. If you can prove that your product is not infringing, that should be enough without litigating indemnity everywhere. The whole point is to be able to free yourself from those kind of legal risks. That's what I think Madam Union says. That's what other Supreme Court cases say. I don't think you have to accept all that indemnity. All right. Thank you, Mr. Wright. Thank you. We'll hear from you in the next case as well. The bill. The bill. Thank you. It's a matter of policy. Now, we prefer a single suit against the supplier rather than letting you sue dozens and dozens of customers and avoid the person that you're ultimately after. Each case, because I understand it, was... Every time one of these claim charts lists the Microsoft product. Who are you really after here? The focus was on the end users, the defendants and the taxes case. Yeah, but we understand that if you can sue 100 mom and pop shops and threaten them with very expensive litigation, you're going to get a lot of settlements and find yourself in a lucrative patent-melking business
.. It's a broader case. It's not the same... It's the real parties and interests actually litigate. So what you're saying is, if we originally indemnified, we could then only step into the shoes of the direct infringer and argue their case, correct? So how does that give you a basis to claim indirect infringement and go up north? I think the issue is right and just dischivable when you still can test indemnity. I don't think you have to accept indemnity before you can defend your product. If you can prove that your product is not infringing, that should be enough without litigating indemnity everywhere. The whole point is to be able to free yourself from those kind of legal risks. That's what I think Madam Union says. That's what other Supreme Court cases say. I don't think you have to accept all that indemnity. All right. Thank you, Mr. Wright. Thank you. We'll hear from you in the next case as well. The bill. The bill. Thank you. It's a matter of policy. Now, we prefer a single suit against the supplier rather than letting you sue dozens and dozens of customers and avoid the person that you're ultimately after. Each case, because I understand it, was... Every time one of these claim charts lists the Microsoft product. Who are you really after here? The focus was on the end users, the defendants and the taxes case. Yeah, but we understand that if you can sue 100 mom and pop shops and threaten them with very expensive litigation, you're going to get a lot of settlements and find yourself in a lucrative patent-melking business. Why don't you bring it right to the head and sue Microsoft right up front because they'll probably contest you? Is that what's going on here? That is not what is going on here. How do we know that? Why didn't you bring Microsoft in if you don't want that inference to be drawn? When you look at the client-toucher owner, the focus was on the products and the methods that were being used by the end users. To use Judge Morris analogy, adjo.net, for example, was a tool like a screw. But the defendants in the taxes cases were not mom and pop shops. Many of them were large companies who had their own IT departments that were building their own systems. And the focus, in fact, data turns representative to Microsoft. We're not interested in suing you. This is a matter of efficiency. Why don't we have one suit against the supplier rather than hundreds of suits against the users? Because there's that saying in forget the Russian novel, every happy family is happy in the same way. Every sad family is sad in a different way. Every one of those defendants is infringing in a different way. By using their own products and their own methods and systems. So you're saying there's absolutely no basis for an indirect infringement tried here against Microsoft? No, we later discovered that there was, but at the time, you have to focus, as Judge Morris said, at the time that Microsoft filed is confining what were the state of the firm? You will fully blind at that point. Could you take a step to find out whether there was going to be the liability that just refers to? We weren't well fully blind. I don't think there's any accusation of that. So I'm not sure about that. What Mr. Kullis said, he would kill him. He was the 36th witness. He said, I looked at those claim charts that the defendants in Texas were sending us. I didn't see the Microsoft code being implicated there. That was deciding about the source code. That was the state, and what he said was, what is being implicated there are the products that are being felt behind the defendants. Now, if Microsoft felt that it needed to step in, the proper step should have been to intervene. And that is, I think, the teaching case that we cited in our brief, this is, towards case from 2006. Now, it would have been the efficient way to do it rather than, I'll say, a foreign shopping to get into a different jurisdiction. But wait, are you talking about, if there's an, if you're talking about the indemnification piece of this, right, not the indirect infringement piece of this? You, when you're saying Microsoft should have stepped in, they should have stepped in. It could have been into the Texas cases because there was an indemnification piece of this, right? And it could have been either way or honor
. Why don't you bring it right to the head and sue Microsoft right up front because they'll probably contest you? Is that what's going on here? That is not what is going on here. How do we know that? Why didn't you bring Microsoft in if you don't want that inference to be drawn? When you look at the client-toucher owner, the focus was on the products and the methods that were being used by the end users. To use Judge Morris analogy, adjo.net, for example, was a tool like a screw. But the defendants in the taxes cases were not mom and pop shops. Many of them were large companies who had their own IT departments that were building their own systems. And the focus, in fact, data turns representative to Microsoft. We're not interested in suing you. This is a matter of efficiency. Why don't we have one suit against the supplier rather than hundreds of suits against the users? Because there's that saying in forget the Russian novel, every happy family is happy in the same way. Every sad family is sad in a different way. Every one of those defendants is infringing in a different way. By using their own products and their own methods and systems. So you're saying there's absolutely no basis for an indirect infringement tried here against Microsoft? No, we later discovered that there was, but at the time, you have to focus, as Judge Morris said, at the time that Microsoft filed is confining what were the state of the firm? You will fully blind at that point. Could you take a step to find out whether there was going to be the liability that just refers to? We weren't well fully blind. I don't think there's any accusation of that. So I'm not sure about that. What Mr. Kullis said, he would kill him. He was the 36th witness. He said, I looked at those claim charts that the defendants in Texas were sending us. I didn't see the Microsoft code being implicated there. That was deciding about the source code. That was the state, and what he said was, what is being implicated there are the products that are being felt behind the defendants. Now, if Microsoft felt that it needed to step in, the proper step should have been to intervene. And that is, I think, the teaching case that we cited in our brief, this is, towards case from 2006. Now, it would have been the efficient way to do it rather than, I'll say, a foreign shopping to get into a different jurisdiction. But wait, are you talking about, if there's an, if you're talking about the indemnification piece of this, right, not the indirect infringement piece of this? You, when you're saying Microsoft should have stepped in, they should have stepped in. It could have been into the Texas cases because there was an indemnification piece of this, right? And it could have been either way or honor. Even if, I mean, they've been, they've denied that there wasn't a indemnification piece. Even if they felt that they were somehow, I forget who used the term shaking in their booths. But even if they felt that they were next up, that would have been, there are any cases that are going on. They could have intervened in the Texas cases. They didn't. And of course, they could have intervened absent an indemnification component. I mean, what would be the basis for that? Actually, you're right. I don't know that they could get in if they're not interested. Party and economic interest is the degen, the city. Right, actually, you're right, you're right. They could not have intervened absent the, the, um... So they would have an accepted liability in order to intervene? Well, I'm in amputation. Exactly, yes. Or at least make some accommodation with their, with their, and users and customers. If I may, just comment very briefly back to the normalization. One sentence. Logical table is not introduced in column four. It is introduced in column one. And the invention is about using logical tables from the, and it can start from the normalization process. I mean, I'm sorry, it can start from already analyzed tables. The normalization process, as Cologne one says, allows you to define different logical tables. Not logical tables, periods, but different, in other words, logical tables coming from the normal, uh, an already normal table in the physical database. Or new ones as a result of normalization. Thank you, yours. Thank you, Mr. Vell. Our next key is
..