Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. Again, with this case for the second time, this appeal is at the intersection of two very important policies established by RISA. First of these policies is protecting participants' rights to receive the benefits that have been promised to them and that they have earned. The second of these policies, though, is that employers and sponsors have a right to change those promises with regard to benefits that they have not yet earned that relate to future service. Congress drew this line between these two policies in what we call the Any Cutback Rule, which is embodied in 29 USC 1054G. Accrued benefits, those that have been earned, cannot be taken away. But, if not yet accrued, not yet earned based on service to date, those promises in the future accruals that are expected can be altered or even eliminated. The statute itself makes this clear. The terms of the statute say that it's only with respect, and I'm quoting with respect, to benefits are attributable to service before the amendment. The regulation says that it, quote, only protects benefits that accrue before the applicable amendment date. Thus, a plan is permitted to be amended to eliminate or reduce an early retirement benefit, retirement type subsidy, with respect to benefits that accrue after the applicable amendment date without violating the Any Cutback. I thought we had in our earlier case indicated that these were accrued benefits. Your Honor, you categorize them as accrued benefits, just like you would categorize the pension itself as an accrued benefit. It was a little more, and I was on your side first time, that it was a little more than what you're saying, isn't it, Council? The last page of the opinion says the plan plainly incorporated both supplements into its definition of accrued benefit. I mean, the opinion pretty squarely says that this is part of the accrued benefit. And I don't contest that at all, Your Honor. It is part of the accrued benefit
. I mean, that's what this court has found, and that's what this court has held. What this court has not addressed is who then is entitled to the benefit. Who has actually earned it and accrued it? Accrued by one year of service? No, Your Honor. It actually requires 15 years of service in age 50. But what I'm saying is nobody's talking about doing away with that requirement, as I understand it. All you do is you accruate through one year of service, but you still need to attain age 50 and just spend the additional 15 years of service in order to receive the early retirement benefit. As I understand it, nobody is thinking that you're simply entitled. You're eligible in the sense that you may get it, but you're not simply entitled to it after a year. Yes, that's the problem, Your Honor. You have to look at what a person would be entitled to if they stopped working today. And you're saying that the company can essentially take away all the benefits that they could have earned if they ceased their employment one day short of the 15 years. Your Honor, that's the way the statute works. Well, but it isn't just how the statute works because the question is, did the plan confirm more benefits than the statute insurface, isn't that it? Well, Your Honor, but you have to still look at what the plan says. And the plan says that these participants are only entitled to the benefit if they retire from active service after 15 and 50, 15 years of service and 50 years of age. So they had to continue to serve, they had to continue to work in order to actually earn this benefit and be entitled to it. If that's still true. And we uncovered this problem when we went back to the trial court and we started
. Let's just take the person who is at the time of a free as a menma. That individual had accrued one year of service, but had not accrued 15 years of service or the 50 years of age. As I understand it, in order to be eligible for the 700 monthly supplement, that individual who accrued one year of service prior to December 31, 2005, but not 15 or 50 years of age would still have to serve those 15 years and become and be over 50. And your honor, that's the precise point of why we say this benefit was not accrued as to that individual at that time. They don't have to. Does that run into the law of the case? Doesn't that run into our previous opinion, which where we have said it's accrued from the one year of service? And you can grow into the receipt of it satisfying those remaining years of eligibility. I think that's the way the district judge read our opinion and that hard press to see why that was wrong. Well, you weren't addressing this issue at all in your prior opinion. You were not saying that there was one year worth of accrual and that the one year provision of this requirement wasn't accrual. You were saying that the benefit itself, the supplemental benefit that's described in section or going to self-indicate that the one year is the year of accrual because you have section 4.12A2. You're out of there is four different requirements for this benefit. Well, that's part of the problem is that I don't understand why these plans can't ever be straightforward. They are. There are four different requirements to decide. There's not many would be eligible for this benefit. There's not many would be eligible for this benefit
. Of course, just devoted to this plan. Yes, you're right. Probably, but you might too. Before we understood it. I don't know how well you, one of us, would do on that final exam. Well, well, your honor. Really, I guess what I'm saying is, if this individual, Mr. Taylor, who represents this subclass, and by the way, everybody who was 50 and 15 by the date of the freeze amendment, is getting the benefit. Mr. Savani's already gotten his benefit. Those who retired after that date are getting the benefit. We're not saying that you couldn't retire after that date and get the benefit. But this distinction that you're urging on us, Mr. Henson, accrued as to A. Yes. Okay. And as accrued as to Taylor, we make no distinction in Savani one accrued as to
. We simply say that this early retirement benefit is an accrued benefit. Yes. So then now, it seems to me you're asking us to walk back a little bit on that opinion and say, well, it's not always an accrued benefit. It can only be an accrued benefit if it is accrued as to years of service at the time of the freeze. I'm actually not saying that, Judge. I guess what I'm saying is that you did in the first time say that these four requirements no longer are there. You did not say that everybody who'd worked a year is gonna get this benefit so long as they stay for 15 and 50 years. You did not say that. You said that Mr. Savani, who there was no issue about 15 and 50 and no issue about the one year or any of the other requirements, he met all those requirements. There was no dispute. He met those requirements. But what this court said was for people who met those requirements, it's an accrued benefit. Right, but again, the language right before the last paragraph of the opinion, it says the supplements inclusion in the plain terms of the plans that crude benefit calculation necessarily meant that any change to the amount or existence of a supplement constituted a change to an accrued benefit. That's pretty sweeping. It's talking, it seems to me. It's talking about the accrued benefit as being a class of benefits rather than accrued as to A, accrued as to B
. Tell me why that language isn't a lot more sweeping than your legal position today. Well, because of the facts of that case, Your Honor. The facts of the case was for a reasonable. No, I'm talking about the language of this opinion. So you're just saying that this language was way over broad from what the court was presented. That has to be your position. It would have been dictated if the court had intended to essentially wipe away the other four elements or the four elements of the requirements for this benefit and say, we no longer care whether people really meet the requirements for this benefit. It's an accrued benefit. And if I can point you to some language in the plan. Well, they still have to serve, though. I mean, it's just Judge Wilkinson pointed out. And nobody's saying that you can walk in the door at the company and just divert you getting in. The paycheck get the benefit. No one's saying that. If I can point you to the language that you did rely on last time, it says, and it's very specific, I can find it, it's over here. Says plus any applicable supplement as described in Section 4.12
. That was the language that you focused on. Plus any applicable supplements plural as described in Section 4.12. Applicable in that sentence has to mean something. It's an applicable supplement if the person has in fact earned it. If the person has in fact met the requirements, that's what makes it an applicable supplement. This issue was not there for Mr. Savani. And the issue that we're presenting today is with regard to a subclass of individuals who had not met those requirements and therefore in the definition of accrued benefit. That you were allowed to. Requirements by the time of the freeze. Correct. So that's the complete. It was not accrued for them at that time. At the time of the freeze, but will later accrued or have accrued. Well, but again, back to the law and the statute, which says that accrued benefits are what people have earned through their service to date. And the way to determine what is accrued for any individual is to look at what they have earned and what they would receive if they quit work today
. These individuals, if they quit work before they reached the 50 and 15, would not have received this benefit. And therefore it couldn't have been accrued with regard to them because they wouldn't receive it. You can't have an accrued benefit one day and then not meet through a department. They do satisfy the 15, 15. Well, you're honored then they have. After the freeze. Yes, they have. I mean, that's why we're here, isn't it? And that is my point. They have to continue working, which means as by definition, it's not accrued as to them at the point of the freeze. If they have to continue to work afterwards. It's not accrued. It's not accrued to them. If they, if they satis, if they have the one year of service before the freeze and they work 15, and work 15 years and attain age 50, I mean. Not if they have to do that. Not if they have to do that, Your Honor, after the freeze. Because it's not accrued after one year. Yes, but we already need all the requirements
. This 700 was an accrued benefit. I was honest, I mean, we've said that you accrued after the year of service. Well, but Your Honor, there was no discussion in your prior opinion that it accrued after one year of service required. Again, that was not an issue with regard to Mr. Sabani and it was not in the court's mind. You might be looking back at it now and saying that looks like an accrual provision to me. It's not, it's a vesting provision. It's for people who came over and maybe you had 15 and 50 already and then they had to have one more year at WSMS to get this benefit. That's what that one year was for. It wasn't an entry level. I have one year and then I'm entitled to the benefit. That's just not the way it worked, Your Honor. And so I guess what I'm saying is, you do have to look at whether or not the benefit is accrued on an individual by individual basis. Saying it's an accrued benefit. Putting it in that category of an accrued benefit does not mean that by definition everybody is then entitled to it. They still have to earn it and if they have to earn it with service after the freezing. But under your theory, you could have a group of employees and you could say something like this and then you had an idea and eligibility of 15 years of service and obtaining 50 years of age
. And then you have a group of employees who have worked 14 years and attain 49 years of age. And so you say, well, this is more than we want a shoulder because we've got 35 employees coming down the pike who have are between 45 and 50 years of age and they've worked and they will have worked 15 years shortly. But right now they've only worked maybe 13 or 14. So the company puts in a phrasal thenment and wipes all those people out and they've spent 14 years with the company, with the understanding as represented in the plan that they were gonna get this $700 benefit. Maybe they've, you know, maybe they shifted as apparently was the situation here. Maybe they came to the company because this was one of the attractive things the company had to offer. But it seems to me if we take your point of view that we just invite companies to slam down phrasal amendments when employees or larger groups of employees have spent substantial time with the company and are about to become eligible for them and you say, oh, they haven't accrued it. And what does that do to the whole purpose of the anti accrual, the anti cutback rule because the anti cutback rule says, I mean, when you go back down to what it really means, it says you don't have to offer this plan and maybe you should have had a lower benefit or maybe you should have had a defined contribution plan rather than a defined benefit plan. But the whole anti cutback thing is saying, you don't have to offer this program. But once you do, you can't just tear a hole in the reliance interest of the employees and you can't just stiff arm somebody that spent a large part of their working life working on this, wanting this early retirement benefit, planning their family's finances in reliance on it and in counting upon it. And then just say, right before they're about to get it, too bad, it's off the table. And the risk, the anti cutback provision can't mean that. You're on it, it does mean exactly that because it's protecting the other interests that's there that says employers can change promises with regard to benefits to be earned in the future. And if you have not earned the benefit, this benefit came with all at all times. It came with the requirement of 50 years and 15 years of service. That requirement was there from the beginning. But you didn't point out nobody's thinking of tossing that requirement overboard
. But having a lot of the circuits say that you can grow into a retirement, a grow into a benefit after the day of a freeze of amendment, isn't it still possible to satisfy those conditions and grow into the amendment after? You're on our out of time, I have to answer that question now or I'm happy to answer it later, whichever you'd prefer. I'll answer it now because I suspect there'll be plenty to talk about later. You're on early retirement benefits are protected in the sense that you can grow into an early retirement benefit. But it's only the early retirement benefit again that you have earned with your service to date. If you have to contribute additional service in order to get that early retirement benefit, that's not growing into it. And fell into the third circuit disagreed with you, didn't it? No, you're on it. It did not. I mean, it was a kind of benefit, but it wasn't. But why wasn't it analogous in that case? Because in that case, it was a job separation benefit, you're on it, that they changed the rules on after they put it in. In other words, there was nothing anybody had to do in order to earn that job separation benefit. It was already there. There was no years of service requirement. There was no 15 and 50 or anything else. It was just there. And so these people had earned that benefit because there was no requirement of age and service to get that benefit. So when they changed the rules about getting that separation benefit, that was taking away something they'd already earned. Okay, that's what Della's was about. Well, there was a group of them if they hadn't already been separated. I mean, see, it seems to me the argument can be skewed either way. But that's not the issue. And that's why we have to look at the language of this plan and the first opinion of this court. And I agree with that, Your Honor, but you also have to look at the service issue. If additional services required in order to earn this benefit, the employer is free under a risson under the any cutback rule to freeze future occult. If this benefit was not accrued and fully earned by them as of the date of that amendment, that's where Congress drew that line. I'm not drawing that line. And that's where Congress drew that line to protect employers who wanted to change benefit promises that had not yet been earned. Thank you, sir. Mr. Jackson, let's hear from you on this. May I please the court, I'm Stan Jackson. I'm privileged to appear for Bob Taylor in the subclass of people who were represented that they would receive these benefits. They were represented in the pension plan with all the rights will be preserved, be transferred. I know you all sold these forward the last time or some of it. And once we iterate that the earlier time and benefit factors and in subclass were promised, he and they were transferred
. Well, there was a group of them if they hadn't already been separated. I mean, see, it seems to me the argument can be skewed either way. But that's not the issue. And that's why we have to look at the language of this plan and the first opinion of this court. And I agree with that, Your Honor, but you also have to look at the service issue. If additional services required in order to earn this benefit, the employer is free under a risson under the any cutback rule to freeze future occult. If this benefit was not accrued and fully earned by them as of the date of that amendment, that's where Congress drew that line. I'm not drawing that line. And that's where Congress drew that line to protect employers who wanted to change benefit promises that had not yet been earned. Thank you, sir. Mr. Jackson, let's hear from you on this. May I please the court, I'm Stan Jackson. I'm privileged to appear for Bob Taylor in the subclass of people who were represented that they would receive these benefits. They were represented in the pension plan with all the rights will be preserved, be transferred. I know you all sold these forward the last time or some of it. And once we iterate that the earlier time and benefit factors and in subclass were promised, he and they were transferred. And they were only available, only available to transfer ease. And then it was clearly stated, you would have become and you spend one year at Washington Safety Management Solutions that Bob Taylor would be effective after 1998 to have that accrued benefit as his courted attorney. Last time we were here arguing about, and I guess we were arguing again about Christmas as to what is applicable, trying to hear we have a huge plan. I mean, as you all see from the record, we're talking about people to come and spend as Dick Wippinson said 14 years of their life and don't know that this could be during the wait in the night. We'll hear, I think, in real trouble, that they are right to freeze the plan. But if they froze the plan in here under something that I've said, they're right, why would we have it as at least one year of service here? That's what makes it accrued. Is it if they spin one year of service, they had any price? We don't contest if they froze it maybe in 2002, the amount would have been set at $600. But no, they froze it after January 1, 2005. And then the accrued amount, $700. The freebies and the accruals are set for it. In the document in the plan, in the plan for it. And I think of these 13 or the 13th providence notice he is the one who did this for earlier said that the only time of self-defense is the food benefit. On after the case was submitted and remanded on April 25, 2012, the district court, this was when the defendants raised this remaining issue in a joint scheduling order. They say they need to have this resolved by fraud moves. At that time, if they were going to say we are going to have some more ambiguity in this case or a bot Taylor has to exhaust remedies before our administrative committee. They should have, but didn't amend their answer. And that's part of the record
. And they were only available, only available to transfer ease. And then it was clearly stated, you would have become and you spend one year at Washington Safety Management Solutions that Bob Taylor would be effective after 1998 to have that accrued benefit as his courted attorney. Last time we were here arguing about, and I guess we were arguing again about Christmas as to what is applicable, trying to hear we have a huge plan. I mean, as you all see from the record, we're talking about people to come and spend as Dick Wippinson said 14 years of their life and don't know that this could be during the wait in the night. We'll hear, I think, in real trouble, that they are right to freeze the plan. But if they froze the plan in here under something that I've said, they're right, why would we have it as at least one year of service here? That's what makes it accrued. Is it if they spin one year of service, they had any price? We don't contest if they froze it maybe in 2002, the amount would have been set at $600. But no, they froze it after January 1, 2005. And then the accrued amount, $700. The freebies and the accruals are set for it. In the document in the plan, in the plan for it. And I think of these 13 or the 13th providence notice he is the one who did this for earlier said that the only time of self-defense is the food benefit. On after the case was submitted and remanded on April 25, 2012, the district court, this was when the defendants raised this remaining issue in a joint scheduling order. They say they need to have this resolved by fraud moves. At that time, if they were going to say we are going to have some more ambiguity in this case or a bot Taylor has to exhaust remedies before our administrative committee. They should have, but didn't amend their answer. And that's part of the record. The record is, it says that their answer never raises the ambiguity at all that they claim until after the decision of the district court. There is no real ambiguity. The district judge felt that this case turned on our prior decision. Yes, sir. And that we had characterized this benefit as a crude and that we had characterized it as a retirement benefit, an early retirement benefit, both. In the district court, then said you can grow into those because where it has been a crude. But you understand that you still need to satisfy the decision. Yes, sir. Requirement. But this whole case seems to me driven by the law of the case and by what was said in our earlier decision. And the district judge took a look at that earlier decision. And put it together as I've just recapitulated she did it at much greater length. And then she said, what was wrong with that? I see absolutely nothing wrong with that. That's a fair interpretation of what we have said. That is, you know, the district court opinion meticulously tracks the earlier decision of the panel. That's absolutely correct, Your Honor. And I think she, very after, as she describes it in the order, that she entered on the motion to reconsider or remand, she described it as a lengthy hearing
. The record is, it says that their answer never raises the ambiguity at all that they claim until after the decision of the district court. There is no real ambiguity. The district judge felt that this case turned on our prior decision. Yes, sir. And that we had characterized this benefit as a crude and that we had characterized it as a retirement benefit, an early retirement benefit, both. In the district court, then said you can grow into those because where it has been a crude. But you understand that you still need to satisfy the decision. Yes, sir. Requirement. But this whole case seems to me driven by the law of the case and by what was said in our earlier decision. And the district judge took a look at that earlier decision. And put it together as I've just recapitulated she did it at much greater length. And then she said, what was wrong with that? I see absolutely nothing wrong with that. That's a fair interpretation of what we have said. That is, you know, the district court opinion meticulously tracks the earlier decision of the panel. That's absolutely correct, Your Honor. And I think she, very after, as she describes it in the order, that she entered on the motion to reconsider or remand, she described it as a lengthy hearing. If I recall correctly, it was about an hour and a half, maybe two hours, in which the she listened to all of URS's positions. As you've heard them somewhat articulated in the last presentation, by Mr. Henson, and she came to the conclusion that your decision controlled the case and the law of the case. The question was asked you. Yes, sir. It was asked your opponent whether this was, whether the third circuit decision was against them. And of course, the district court relied, is some extent on that third circuit decision. What did you say about that third circuit case? Well, it's not just the third circuit. There are other cases cited in the brief. All the circuits that have considered this issue of early retirement benefits. And also the Senate report, when in 1984, the anti-cut back rule was amended to include early retirement benefits, early retirement subsidies. They all uniformly say, you can't jerk away these benefits. These benefits are something you can... The basic point of all those decisions, which were in the spirit of the anti-cut back rule, is that once a benefit has been characterized as an accrued benefit, and early retirement benefits fall into the category of accrued benefits. That you can grow into that by meeting larger eligibility requirements, even after the day of the Freeza Amendment
. If I recall correctly, it was about an hour and a half, maybe two hours, in which the she listened to all of URS's positions. As you've heard them somewhat articulated in the last presentation, by Mr. Henson, and she came to the conclusion that your decision controlled the case and the law of the case. The question was asked you. Yes, sir. It was asked your opponent whether this was, whether the third circuit decision was against them. And of course, the district court relied, is some extent on that third circuit decision. What did you say about that third circuit case? Well, it's not just the third circuit. There are other cases cited in the brief. All the circuits that have considered this issue of early retirement benefits. And also the Senate report, when in 1984, the anti-cut back rule was amended to include early retirement benefits, early retirement subsidies. They all uniformly say, you can't jerk away these benefits. These benefits are something you can... The basic point of all those decisions, which were in the spirit of the anti-cut back rule, is that once a benefit has been characterized as an accrued benefit, and early retirement benefits fall into the category of accrued benefits. That you can grow into that by meeting larger eligibility requirements, even after the day of the Freeza Amendment. I mean, there's not that point of those decisions. That is my reading of them, yes, Your Honor. Because any other reading would mean you could wait until the last minute and slam down like a guillotine of Freeza Amendment, and knock out something that an employee had worked a large portion of his working life in anticipation of and in reliance upon, and to think that that would be consistent with Eryssa's anti-cut back rule, or the decisions of the other circuit, is a bit perplexing. I agree, Your Honor, totally. And I'm not sure why we're here, other than to say that if all of the people I'll represent in that subclass, aren't informed that they're entitled to this, some may choose that they are decided they can't afford to take early retirement, and once they get over age 65, they will be forever barred, or if they leave their employment before taking early retirement, they will never get this benefit. So I don't understand, I think, the clear holding of this court, and the clear- If you have anything further, I'm going to ask my colleagues if they have questions. No. All right, we have no further questions. Mr. Hansen. Your Honor, you've mentioned a few times that you believe that the decision you rendered last time is controlling here and has outcome determinative here. I will say, Your Honor, that it does not control the outcome here because the issue there was with regard to the plan language, not the actual law of what an accrued benefit is, not the regulations of what an accrued benefit is, but the plan language said this isn't accrued benefit if applicable, if applicable to somebody. And that's what this court ruled the last time. If this court was to say that accrued benefits include any expectation of a benefit that you haven't yet earned, but that you have to continue to work for in the future, if that's what this panel said before, I can tell you there is no precedent for that. There is zero precedent out there for saying that just because we've defined it as an accrued benefit that people no longer had to work and earn it over time, that's unprecedented. What I believe this court meant to say is that it's categorized. What we meant to say? Yes
. I mean, there's not that point of those decisions. That is my reading of them, yes, Your Honor. Because any other reading would mean you could wait until the last minute and slam down like a guillotine of Freeza Amendment, and knock out something that an employee had worked a large portion of his working life in anticipation of and in reliance upon, and to think that that would be consistent with Eryssa's anti-cut back rule, or the decisions of the other circuit, is a bit perplexing. I agree, Your Honor, totally. And I'm not sure why we're here, other than to say that if all of the people I'll represent in that subclass, aren't informed that they're entitled to this, some may choose that they are decided they can't afford to take early retirement, and once they get over age 65, they will be forever barred, or if they leave their employment before taking early retirement, they will never get this benefit. So I don't understand, I think, the clear holding of this court, and the clear- If you have anything further, I'm going to ask my colleagues if they have questions. No. All right, we have no further questions. Mr. Hansen. Your Honor, you've mentioned a few times that you believe that the decision you rendered last time is controlling here and has outcome determinative here. I will say, Your Honor, that it does not control the outcome here because the issue there was with regard to the plan language, not the actual law of what an accrued benefit is, not the regulations of what an accrued benefit is, but the plan language said this isn't accrued benefit if applicable, if applicable to somebody. And that's what this court ruled the last time. If this court was to say that accrued benefits include any expectation of a benefit that you haven't yet earned, but that you have to continue to work for in the future, if that's what this panel said before, I can tell you there is no precedent for that. There is zero precedent out there for saying that just because we've defined it as an accrued benefit that people no longer had to work and earn it over time, that's unprecedented. What I believe this court meant to say is that it's categorized. What we meant to say? Yes. What the court did say. That's a hard task. It is, Your Honor. It is. All right, go ahead. How else do we meant to say? What I meant to say. How about if I start there? What I meant to say, Your Honor. What I meant to say is that what this court decided is that it was applicable, but not that it was applicable to everybody. And, and your honor, if I could sign a couple of other decisions that I think stand for this proposition that you find to be so offensive, the Sonoto case and the Ashenball case, both stand for the proposition that in order to determine what an accrued benefit is, you look at what the participant would be entitled to if they quit work today. But the Sonoto plan had language which specifically reserved the right to base a cruel on future service, and this plan does not. Actually, it does, Your Honor. By, by, by selling. Well, you're arguing your language. I think your problem, Mr. Henson, is, is the, the opinion of this court. It's, it's just Judge Wilkinson said, it's the law of the case. How do you get around the classification? Is this of this early retirement supplement being a component part of accrued benefits under the plan? I guess your honor, it's because I don't think you intended to say that you no longer had to work 15 and 50 years
. What the court did say. That's a hard task. It is, Your Honor. It is. All right, go ahead. How else do we meant to say? What I meant to say. How about if I start there? What I meant to say, Your Honor. What I meant to say is that what this court decided is that it was applicable, but not that it was applicable to everybody. And, and your honor, if I could sign a couple of other decisions that I think stand for this proposition that you find to be so offensive, the Sonoto case and the Ashenball case, both stand for the proposition that in order to determine what an accrued benefit is, you look at what the participant would be entitled to if they quit work today. But the Sonoto plan had language which specifically reserved the right to base a cruel on future service, and this plan does not. Actually, it does, Your Honor. By, by, by selling. Well, you're arguing your language. I think your problem, Mr. Henson, is, is the, the opinion of this court. It's, it's just Judge Wilkinson said, it's the law of the case. How do you get around the classification? Is this of this early retirement supplement being a component part of accrued benefits under the plan? I guess your honor, it's because I don't think you intended to say that you no longer had to work 15 and 50 years. Let's take the participant who worked 10 years and then they quit. But five years later, would you, would you say that they're entitled to this benefit? I mean, would you say that everybody who ever worked there for one year is entitled to this benefit, as soon as they hit age 50, I don't think you would. And you can't be having an accrued benefit one day. And serve 15 years. If, well, if they did, I'm saying that they didn't serve 15 years. I'm saying if they quit after 10, before they get to 15 and 50, if they voluntarily quit, I don't think you're saying they're entitled to the benefit. No, they're what? But you're saying that your decision said that they had an accrued benefit. Oh, it says that it, that this is an accrued benefit, but they have not met the eligibility requirement. Exactly. And if they, and, and if it doesn't take away from the fact that it's an accrued benefit. Exactly. Under the opinion. And, and what the law says is that an accrued benefit is what they have earned through their service today. The law does not say that they can have an accrued benefit for service that's going to happen in the future. Your, your client is the one that set the parameters of this whole problem. You know, I wasn't the one, we weren't the one. I understand
. Let's take the participant who worked 10 years and then they quit. But five years later, would you, would you say that they're entitled to this benefit? I mean, would you say that everybody who ever worked there for one year is entitled to this benefit, as soon as they hit age 50, I don't think you would. And you can't be having an accrued benefit one day. And serve 15 years. If, well, if they did, I'm saying that they didn't serve 15 years. I'm saying if they quit after 10, before they get to 15 and 50, if they voluntarily quit, I don't think you're saying they're entitled to the benefit. No, they're what? But you're saying that your decision said that they had an accrued benefit. Oh, it says that it, that this is an accrued benefit, but they have not met the eligibility requirement. Exactly. And if they, and, and if it doesn't take away from the fact that it's an accrued benefit. Exactly. Under the opinion. And, and what the law says is that an accrued benefit is what they have earned through their service today. The law does not say that they can have an accrued benefit for service that's going to happen in the future. Your, your client is the one that set the parameters of this whole problem. You know, I wasn't the one, we weren't the one. I understand. And, but, employees weren't the ones that promised the $700 monthly early retirement benefit. We weren't the ones that set the, the eligibility requirements at 15 years and 50 years of age. So the amount of the benefit that was set and the 15, 50 eligibility requirements that were set were all of your doing. Yes, you're right. And they were paraded in front and shown to the employees who relied upon it. But you're the one that set the parameters. You had, it was entirely within your prerogative to set the amount and to set the eligibility requirements. But once you set them, you can't expect us to, to rescue you from the adverse consequences of a business decision. Because you reap the benefit of the business decision by luring employees to come with your company. And by luring them and encouraging them to stay with your company. And you reap the benefit of that, of the parameters of the plan which you, which you set for. And then after reaping those benefits, you can't come to a court and say, well, now it's your time to relieve us or the adverse consequences. That doesn't, that doesn't make sense to me. That's not two and two equals four. You're out of the promise always was you get the benefit if you retire from active service after 15 years and age 50. That was the promise from day one. That was the promise that was given to these people and that they relied upon
. And, but, employees weren't the ones that promised the $700 monthly early retirement benefit. We weren't the ones that set the, the eligibility requirements at 15 years and 50 years of age. So the amount of the benefit that was set and the 15, 50 eligibility requirements that were set were all of your doing. Yes, you're right. And they were paraded in front and shown to the employees who relied upon it. But you're the one that set the parameters. You had, it was entirely within your prerogative to set the amount and to set the eligibility requirements. But once you set them, you can't expect us to, to rescue you from the adverse consequences of a business decision. Because you reap the benefit of the business decision by luring employees to come with your company. And by luring them and encouraging them to stay with your company. And you reap the benefit of that, of the parameters of the plan which you, which you set for. And then after reaping those benefits, you can't come to a court and say, well, now it's your time to relieve us or the adverse consequences. That doesn't, that doesn't make sense to me. That's not two and two equals four. You're out of the promise always was you get the benefit if you retire from active service after 15 years and age 50. That was the promise from day one. That was the promise that was given to these people and that they relied upon. And if they relied upon that promise, they knew they had to keep working till age 50 and at least 15 years of service in order to approve this benefit. That's all they had to do, but now you're free. Exactly. But you've reasoned, freez them out. But that's what the law says we can do. Not if it's an approved benefit. If it's, if they've not earned it, judge. Let's try to do it one of the times. The, the, the holy of the cases is an approved benefit. Of course, you disagree with that. But that's the holy. I disagree that it applied to individuals who had not yet met the requirements because you had an individual in front of you who had met those requirements. And the issue that we're dealing with here today was not in front of you. The issue that we're dealing with here today is for people who had not met those requirements. Was an accrued benefit for them. Wasn't an applicable accrued benefit for them. And I don't think on that language any applicable supplement, you can say that it applied to somebody who had not yet earned it
. And I don't think this court did say that. I don't think the court could say that because that issue was not in front of this court. All right. Thank you, Your Honor