Please, gentlemen, please rise. The score is now in session. May we see it? A bit purple call to the next page? 321-0586-17 Illinois. Definitely by four, high line. There's a Granville Bay, European, by W. Johnson. Mr. Johnson, may I proceed? Good morning. Douglas Johnson on behalf of the Fin and the Color Rental Baker. May I please the Court, Justice's Council? This case arises out of the Peory County Taws. It involves the charge of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. That's sexual conduct where Mr. Baker was at least five years older than the listed victim
. Mr. Baker retained counsel. In the trial court, it was Attorney Greg Whitner. Mr. Whitner, any effectively and unreasonably represented Mr. Baker. Mr. Baker did plead guilty. He did so by way of an out-forged plea. That was so he was able to maintain his innocence while pleading guilty. He did so because Attorney Whitner told him that he would have to register for ten years. The registration requirement was contained in the final order in the trial court
. Unfortunately, the plea transcripts don't reveal a plea colloquy where the registration duration was discussed. But Attorney Whitner, in the third stage of evidentiary hearing, under oath explained that he told Mr. Baker he'd have to register for ten years, not life. That there was a colloquy off the record where everyone indicated that Mr. Baker would have to register for ten years. However, that was incorrect. Attorney Whitner also explained that had the registration requirement not been ten years, Mr. Baker would have proceeded the trial. And at the conclusion of the third stage hearing, the trial Judge Gorman did deny the real week that was sought. Judge Gorman stated that Mr. Baker has no standing. That has been the case with the state's brief as well
. The cases that they rely upon are people be jox and people be beignum. We submit that people be beignum is not controlling here. That case is factually and procedurally much much different than Mr. Baker's case. And beignum, Jerome Beignum, the defendant, had a 1983 conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault. That was before Sora even existed. It was enacted in 1986. Mr. Beignum then was later found guilty in 2014 of a felony theft charge that later conviction triggered the sex offender registration. Unlike Mr. Baker's case. Sora was amended in 2011
. It provided that person who were designated a sex offender who later committed felony must register. Now most notably in being on the Sora registration requirement was not reflected in the judgment of the trial court. And that's how we get to the jurisdictional argument that the registration requirement was neither imposed by the trial court or related to the reasons for the theft conviction for which Mr. Beignum appealed. That's because the scope of a public review as this court well knows is confined to the trial court's judgments. Now here in Mr. Baker's case, the judgment did reflect that he shall register as a sex offender. The trial court used the commanding language shall in order that Mr. Baker comply with such a requirement. Us also unlike being on where Mr. Jerome being committed no less than 11 crimes being six felonies and five Mr. Meeners
. Mr. Baker has no prior subsequent offenses other than the single offense for which he is seeking relief here. An offense which he entered into an Alfred plea for. He was not subject to Sora because of a later felony conviction. This is in a different position than Mr. Bingham. Mr. Baker's registration requirement was contained in the judgment. It is a proceeding from which he can appeal. Bingham is not controlling and we believe that the states incorrect on solely relying on it. This honorable court certainly has the ability to set aside a judgment, to reduce punishment, to order a new trial. And we believe that's what should be done here
. Also, the trial court in the state rely heavily on people to be Johnson. That case is also an opposite to Mr. Baker's case. Johnson's duty to register was covered by an Avalina Finder Act. He was in order by the Circuit Court. He was not reflected in the judgment based on his often lawful restraint conviction. Johnson and his post-conviction petition alleged that the trial court failed to inform him of his obligation to register. Mr. Baker never has and is not arguing that it's an admonishment, that it's a failure to inform. The argument is affirmative myths advice is different than no advice. Now, his counsel in Johnson, he also claims was ineffective for failing to tell him about the requirement. Unlike this case, where Attorney Whitner affirmatively told Mr
. Baker, you will have to register but only for ten years. Here in Mr. Baker's case, he was ordered by the Circuit Court to his duty to register under Sora. The obligation was reflected in the judgment on the like Johnson. And what an attorney explicitly does misadvice the defendant of the term of his registration. The Sixth Amendment right guarantees him to the effective assistance of competent counsel. He did not have competent counsel in this case. We believe that Mr. Baker's case is more similarly situated and analogous to that of people be done. Very similar facts, similar time frame. In that case, Dodd was incorrectly advised by his attorney that he'd have to register for ten years, just like Mr. Baker's case, as opposed to life
. Here in Mr. Baker's case, Attorney Whitner misadvised him that he would have to register for just ten years. And I'd also point out that in Dodd's, there is a two-year time frame for filing because that was on a Section 211 edition, really from judgment. Whereas in a Post Conviction Act, there's more than just two years. Mr. Dodd, he did not learn of this error until later, specifically ten years later, just like Mr. Baker. And he then, following that, the year later, filed a petition seeking leave from the trial board. In people be dodged at states that avoidable pleas may be attacked at any time. Mr. Baker also submits that his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered. That would be a void or voidable plea
. Voidness grounds may be attacked at any time, and we submit that that does provide him with standing for this court to address his claims, to address the ineffective assistance of counsel, to address the unconstitutional as a flight challenge. And here, Mr. Baker's plea was not voluntary. This court should address and hear his claims. And when it does so, we think the court would find that, as attorney, Mr. Wittner was ineffective. Now, much of the states and the trial court, leans on standing, standing certainly important here. But Mr. Baker has both statutory standing, as his liberty is constrained by way of the trial court's order, commanding that he register as a sex offender, and re-leaf is available under the act to all persons who liberty is constrained. In addition, a convicted defendant who surged that in the proceedings which resulted in his conviction there were substantial denial of constitutional rights, the right to a competent counsel, he may institute a proceeding under this act. Now, Mr. Baker has registered, he's registered ever since 2001, every 90 days, it's almost 22 years now, and to require that he violate the registration act something he's never done
. So that his liberty can be constrained as irrational. We believe that that shouldn't have to take place. I just have one question about his death case, and I was looking at the way he knows to try and find a dead death completed his sentence irrespective of the SOAR requirement, which the court's considered collateral. But the time he brought his petition, where all the other requirements was he incarcerated or subject to MSR at that time. He was not, God's very much like Mr. Baker was placed on a term of probation. He did complete his probation term, and it's once he achieved that 10 year mark where similar to Randy's case that he learned I would have to register for life, although I was told it was 10 years in the discussion always was 10 years. So Mr. Dodd, Paul Dodd, he did complete his sentence as far as probation. Prior to any of his violence. Yes. Okay. Thank you. So Mr. Baker also has common law standing in order to have standing to bring a constitutional challenge, a party must show that he's within a class aggrieved of that constitutionality that he's suffered to be an imminent danger or a direct injury as a result. So the court of enforcement of the challenge statute here, it's the Texas Interregistration Act. It's clear that Mr. Baker actually received punishment. He continues to receive punishment. And whether or not so are a constitute punishment that goes to the merits of Mr. Baker's claim. And the merits should not affect his justice ability, just like the the Ibrianne case, which we certainly cited heavily in our brief. That notes that it were determined that it had offended lack standing to challenge the laws because they don't constitute punishment. They be hinging his standing on the merits of his argument
. Thank you. So Mr. Baker also has common law standing in order to have standing to bring a constitutional challenge, a party must show that he's within a class aggrieved of that constitutionality that he's suffered to be an imminent danger or a direct injury as a result. So the court of enforcement of the challenge statute here, it's the Texas Interregistration Act. It's clear that Mr. Baker actually received punishment. He continues to receive punishment. And whether or not so are a constitute punishment that goes to the merits of Mr. Baker's claim. And the merits should not affect his justice ability, just like the the Ibrianne case, which we certainly cited heavily in our brief. That notes that it were determined that it had offended lack standing to challenge the laws because they don't constitute punishment. They be hinging his standing on the merits of his argument. Such an analysis, they say in that case, would improperly conflate the two distinct inquiries. So constitutional challenges can be brought at any time, including for the first time on appeal. Mr. Baker already received his punishment. He pled guilty by way of an Alfred Blee to a sex offense that triggered not only so early, and then a notification loss with a host of other restrictions on his privacy on child custody. On movement, on residency, employment, and these were all contained in the judgment of the trial court. Mr. Baker's case is analogous to the Ibrianne's as he checks all the boxes on the requirements of standing and shows that he suffered imminent injury. And the outcome of these proceedings, they could redress that injury. And we're respectfully requesting that this court hear his claims, analyze them on the merits. And also analogous to the Ibrianne's, there's no contingency that has occurred before these laws applied in Mr. Baker
. Such an analysis, they say in that case, would improperly conflate the two distinct inquiries. So constitutional challenges can be brought at any time, including for the first time on appeal. Mr. Baker already received his punishment. He pled guilty by way of an Alfred Blee to a sex offense that triggered not only so early, and then a notification loss with a host of other restrictions on his privacy on child custody. On movement, on residency, employment, and these were all contained in the judgment of the trial court. Mr. Baker's case is analogous to the Ibrianne's as he checks all the boxes on the requirements of standing and shows that he suffered imminent injury. And the outcome of these proceedings, they could redress that injury. And we're respectfully requesting that this court hear his claims, analyze them on the merits. And also analogous to the Ibrianne's, there's no contingency that has occurred before these laws applied in Mr. Baker. He will be subject to them for the rest of his life, no matter what occurs, as he'll be subject to lifetime government surveillance, and restraint. His injury could be redressed from a favorable ruling from this court, like the defendant in a Vibriones, and he has standing to raise his claims here. Now, in the Vibriones case, they did ultimately find that it wasn't unconstitutional as applied to that defendant, but they certainly analyzed it and said that he had standing, and that's what we're asking for here. So Mr. Baker also states that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered into, and that's because he was a firmly misadvised that he'd have to register for 10 years, not a lifetime, as lawyers stated he would have not accepted the agreement because this 10 years was a big sticking point for him. Other than that, he would have proceeded to trial. And we submit that the witness grounds may be attacked at any time. Mr. Baker argues that his plea wasn't knowing involuntary, just like dogs, and just like dogs where his probation sentence had been completed, he had standing for the public court to hear his claims. Mr. Baker was a firmly misled, his plea should be withdrawn. In addition to the arguments of standing, timeliness was brought up in the trial court
. He will be subject to them for the rest of his life, no matter what occurs, as he'll be subject to lifetime government surveillance, and restraint. His injury could be redressed from a favorable ruling from this court, like the defendant in a Vibriones, and he has standing to raise his claims here. Now, in the Vibriones case, they did ultimately find that it wasn't unconstitutional as applied to that defendant, but they certainly analyzed it and said that he had standing, and that's what we're asking for here. So Mr. Baker also states that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered into, and that's because he was a firmly misadvised that he'd have to register for 10 years, not a lifetime, as lawyers stated he would have not accepted the agreement because this 10 years was a big sticking point for him. Other than that, he would have proceeded to trial. And we submit that the witness grounds may be attacked at any time. Mr. Baker argues that his plea wasn't knowing involuntary, just like dogs, and just like dogs where his probation sentence had been completed, he had standing for the public court to hear his claims. Mr. Baker was a firmly misled, his plea should be withdrawn. In addition to the arguments of standing, timeliness was brought up in the trial court. Timeliness is culpable negligence here, which is an exception in the act. It's a safety valve from people like Mr. Baker. And it alleges facts, just like he's done, that the delay was not attributable to his culpable negligence. Now culpable negligence is something that's greater than mere negligence, its recklessness. And I realize my time's getting short here, so our point is, is Mr. Baker discovered the air. He couldn't have discovered it until 10 years later, when he thought that he would be done registering. After he discovered the air, he contacted attorney, after attorney, a judge was consistently told he had no avenue whatsoever. But he kept going, and that's not recklessness, that's not negligence, it's the opposite. If someone who's doing everything they can to redress their injury. And we believe that when this court digs in deeper to this case, that it'll look at the ineffective assistance of counsel, that it'll look at the unconstitutionality of the statute as applied to Mr
. Timeliness is culpable negligence here, which is an exception in the act. It's a safety valve from people like Mr. Baker. And it alleges facts, just like he's done, that the delay was not attributable to his culpable negligence. Now culpable negligence is something that's greater than mere negligence, its recklessness. And I realize my time's getting short here, so our point is, is Mr. Baker discovered the air. He couldn't have discovered it until 10 years later, when he thought that he would be done registering. After he discovered the air, he contacted attorney, after attorney, a judge was consistently told he had no avenue whatsoever. But he kept going, and that's not recklessness, that's not negligence, it's the opposite. If someone who's doing everything they can to redress their injury. And we believe that when this court digs in deeper to this case, that it'll look at the ineffective assistance of counsel, that it'll look at the unconstitutionality of the statute as applied to Mr. Baker, and that he has standing because these registrations statutes have evolved. That he was not culpable negligence, his plea was not knowing involuntarily made, and we're asking this court to address his claims. Any questions? No, there's any questions at this time, and we'll have five minutes in the middle. If I am, I'll give you a right to proceed. May I please the court? I'll call. Laura Byline on behalf of the people. So the real issue in this case is statutory standing. There's two kinds of standing, common law standing and statutory standing. The issue here is statutory standing under the Post Conviction Hearing Act because the act under which defendant brought this case is the Post Conviction Hearing Act. For these, Dodds and Avila Bernourenes are not helpful because neither of those concerned postconviction petitions. The Dodds case was a two-fourch, you know, one petition case, so whatever the Post Conviction Hearing Act had to say about standing didn't matter. The Avila Bernourenes case was a direct appeal, a concerned common law standing, which is whether there's an injury that's redressable by the court
. Baker, and that he has standing because these registrations statutes have evolved. That he was not culpable negligence, his plea was not knowing involuntarily made, and we're asking this court to address his claims. Any questions? No, there's any questions at this time, and we'll have five minutes in the middle. If I am, I'll give you a right to proceed. May I please the court? I'll call. Laura Byline on behalf of the people. So the real issue in this case is statutory standing. There's two kinds of standing, common law standing and statutory standing. The issue here is statutory standing under the Post Conviction Hearing Act because the act under which defendant brought this case is the Post Conviction Hearing Act. For these, Dodds and Avila Bernourenes are not helpful because neither of those concerned postconviction petitions. The Dodds case was a two-fourch, you know, one petition case, so whatever the Post Conviction Hearing Act had to say about standing didn't matter. The Avila Bernourenes case was a direct appeal, a concerned common law standing, which is whether there's an injury that's redressable by the court. It didn't concern whether the terms of the statute that the statute sets to bring suit under it were met. So here under the Post Conviction Hearing Act, a petitioner must be imprisoned in the penitentiary for the challenged offense at the time of filing a postconviction petition. That's a statutory condition in the Post Conviction Hearing Act that must be met according to the act, the terms in section 122-1A. In prisonment in the penitentiary has been interpreted more broadly than just actual incarceration. For example, a defendant who's still on probation or mandatory supervised release or who has filed the petition well incarcerated on them release. However, the term in prisonment in the penitentiary does not include the collateral consequences of a conviction. Under Johnson only the direct consequences of a conviction conferred standing under the act. The act is talking about is the Post Conviction Hearing Act. It's the same act at issue in both places. Johnson happened to concern a violent offender registration act case, but Johnson viewed the sex offender registration as no different than it, specifically in paragraph 69 it discusses. Bingham with approval and it states that it also cites approvingly a pellet court case saying that the appellate court has been equally clear that registration obligations arising under Sora are collateral consequences that do not confer standing to challenging underlying conviction under the act. So Johnson viewed the Sora question as already settled being a collateral consequence and applied it in the violent offender situation
. It didn't concern whether the terms of the statute that the statute sets to bring suit under it were met. So here under the Post Conviction Hearing Act, a petitioner must be imprisoned in the penitentiary for the challenged offense at the time of filing a postconviction petition. That's a statutory condition in the Post Conviction Hearing Act that must be met according to the act, the terms in section 122-1A. In prisonment in the penitentiary has been interpreted more broadly than just actual incarceration. For example, a defendant who's still on probation or mandatory supervised release or who has filed the petition well incarcerated on them release. However, the term in prisonment in the penitentiary does not include the collateral consequences of a conviction. Under Johnson only the direct consequences of a conviction conferred standing under the act. The act is talking about is the Post Conviction Hearing Act. It's the same act at issue in both places. Johnson happened to concern a violent offender registration act case, but Johnson viewed the sex offender registration as no different than it, specifically in paragraph 69 it discusses. Bingham with approval and it states that it also cites approvingly a pellet court case saying that the appellate court has been equally clear that registration obligations arising under Sora are collateral consequences that do not confer standing to challenging underlying conviction under the act. So Johnson viewed the Sora question as already settled being a collateral consequence and applied it in the violent offender situation. And it was settled in Bingham. Bingham made clear that even if it is viewed as punishment, it's not punishment imposed by the trial court. The sex offender registration requirements instead its punishment imposed by Sora, the statute independently of what the trial court states. So here while the order did state that defendant had to register as a sex offender, that statement didn't turn the collateral consequence of sex offender registration into a direct one. Because it's still applied in the same way it applied because the act, the Sora act made it applied. And it's not just Bingham, it's not just Johnson, it's also TETTER, paragraph 38, KOTHAVAR, paragraph 33, stating even if it's punishment, it's not punishment imposed by the trial court and that the obligation to register in other restrictions imposed by Sora are collateral consequences of a conviction and not part of the judgment under review. As discussed in Bingham and Johnson and TETTER in KOTHAVAR, Sora's registration requirement is a collateral consequence. After Bingham and Johnson, it's clear that defendant lacks statutory standing under the Post-Condition Hearing Act because he's not imprisoned in the kind of ten-tourary. Therefore, his Post-Conviction Petition was properly dismissed by the trial judge. Are there any questions? Thank you, Your Honours. Mr. Johnson, for your vote
. And it was settled in Bingham. Bingham made clear that even if it is viewed as punishment, it's not punishment imposed by the trial court. The sex offender registration requirements instead its punishment imposed by Sora, the statute independently of what the trial court states. So here while the order did state that defendant had to register as a sex offender, that statement didn't turn the collateral consequence of sex offender registration into a direct one. Because it's still applied in the same way it applied because the act, the Sora act made it applied. And it's not just Bingham, it's not just Johnson, it's also TETTER, paragraph 38, KOTHAVAR, paragraph 33, stating even if it's punishment, it's not punishment imposed by the trial court and that the obligation to register in other restrictions imposed by Sora are collateral consequences of a conviction and not part of the judgment under review. As discussed in Bingham and Johnson and TETTER in KOTHAVAR, Sora's registration requirement is a collateral consequence. After Bingham and Johnson, it's clear that defendant lacks statutory standing under the Post-Condition Hearing Act because he's not imprisoned in the kind of ten-tourary. Therefore, his Post-Conviction Petition was properly dismissed by the trial judge. Are there any questions? Thank you, Your Honours. Mr. Johnson, for your vote. You're under the principle of the justice system that brings us here as fairness. Mr. Baker is asking that the court review his claims for fairness reasons. He did enter into an Alfred plea, he maintained his innocence, he relied upon his attorney's misadvice that he'd have to register for ten years. We still don't believe Bingham or Johnson are controlling our dispositive here because of the reasons why Bingham is so different from Mr. Baker's case. The big problem with Bingham is that justices when they analyzed it realized that Mr. Jerome Bingham was seeking to correct in a proceeding of a later subsequent felony offense, what was mandated by a statute because of a prior 1983 offense, much, much tougher than having a year here. We would rely upon our brief and our response to the state's brief. I would be happy to answer any other questions if there are any. I don't believe we have any of this time. So thank you very much
. You're under the principle of the justice system that brings us here as fairness. Mr. Baker is asking that the court review his claims for fairness reasons. He did enter into an Alfred plea, he maintained his innocence, he relied upon his attorney's misadvice that he'd have to register for ten years. We still don't believe Bingham or Johnson are controlling our dispositive here because of the reasons why Bingham is so different from Mr. Baker's case. The big problem with Bingham is that justices when they analyzed it realized that Mr. Jerome Bingham was seeking to correct in a proceeding of a later subsequent felony offense, what was mandated by a statute because of a prior 1983 offense, much, much tougher than having a year here. We would rely upon our brief and our response to the state's brief. I would be happy to answer any other questions if there are any. I don't believe we have any of this time. So thank you very much. Thank you both for your arguments here today. This matter will be taken under advisement and a written decision will be issued to you as soon as possible. And with that, it will take a very brief recessional pass.
Please, gentlemen, please rise. The score is now in session. May we see it? A bit purple call to the next page? 321-0586-17 Illinois. Definitely by four, high line. There's a Granville Bay, European, by W. Johnson. Mr. Johnson, may I proceed? Good morning. Douglas Johnson on behalf of the Fin and the Color Rental Baker. May I please the Court, Justice's Council? This case arises out of the Peory County Taws. It involves the charge of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. That's sexual conduct where Mr. Baker was at least five years older than the listed victim. Mr. Baker retained counsel. In the trial court, it was Attorney Greg Whitner. Mr. Whitner, any effectively and unreasonably represented Mr. Baker. Mr. Baker did plead guilty. He did so by way of an out-forged plea. That was so he was able to maintain his innocence while pleading guilty. He did so because Attorney Whitner told him that he would have to register for ten years. The registration requirement was contained in the final order in the trial court. Unfortunately, the plea transcripts don't reveal a plea colloquy where the registration duration was discussed. But Attorney Whitner, in the third stage of evidentiary hearing, under oath explained that he told Mr. Baker he'd have to register for ten years, not life. That there was a colloquy off the record where everyone indicated that Mr. Baker would have to register for ten years. However, that was incorrect. Attorney Whitner also explained that had the registration requirement not been ten years, Mr. Baker would have proceeded the trial. And at the conclusion of the third stage hearing, the trial Judge Gorman did deny the real week that was sought. Judge Gorman stated that Mr. Baker has no standing. That has been the case with the state's brief as well. The cases that they rely upon are people be jox and people be beignum. We submit that people be beignum is not controlling here. That case is factually and procedurally much much different than Mr. Baker's case. And beignum, Jerome Beignum, the defendant, had a 1983 conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault. That was before Sora even existed. It was enacted in 1986. Mr. Beignum then was later found guilty in 2014 of a felony theft charge that later conviction triggered the sex offender registration. Unlike Mr. Baker's case. Sora was amended in 2011. It provided that person who were designated a sex offender who later committed felony must register. Now most notably in being on the Sora registration requirement was not reflected in the judgment of the trial court. And that's how we get to the jurisdictional argument that the registration requirement was neither imposed by the trial court or related to the reasons for the theft conviction for which Mr. Beignum appealed. That's because the scope of a public review as this court well knows is confined to the trial court's judgments. Now here in Mr. Baker's case, the judgment did reflect that he shall register as a sex offender. The trial court used the commanding language shall in order that Mr. Baker comply with such a requirement. Us also unlike being on where Mr. Jerome being committed no less than 11 crimes being six felonies and five Mr. Meeners. Mr. Baker has no prior subsequent offenses other than the single offense for which he is seeking relief here. An offense which he entered into an Alfred plea for. He was not subject to Sora because of a later felony conviction. This is in a different position than Mr. Bingham. Mr. Baker's registration requirement was contained in the judgment. It is a proceeding from which he can appeal. Bingham is not controlling and we believe that the states incorrect on solely relying on it. This honorable court certainly has the ability to set aside a judgment, to reduce punishment, to order a new trial. And we believe that's what should be done here. Also, the trial court in the state rely heavily on people to be Johnson. That case is also an opposite to Mr. Baker's case. Johnson's duty to register was covered by an Avalina Finder Act. He was in order by the Circuit Court. He was not reflected in the judgment based on his often lawful restraint conviction. Johnson and his post-conviction petition alleged that the trial court failed to inform him of his obligation to register. Mr. Baker never has and is not arguing that it's an admonishment, that it's a failure to inform. The argument is affirmative myths advice is different than no advice. Now, his counsel in Johnson, he also claims was ineffective for failing to tell him about the requirement. Unlike this case, where Attorney Whitner affirmatively told Mr. Baker, you will have to register but only for ten years. Here in Mr. Baker's case, he was ordered by the Circuit Court to his duty to register under Sora. The obligation was reflected in the judgment on the like Johnson. And what an attorney explicitly does misadvice the defendant of the term of his registration. The Sixth Amendment right guarantees him to the effective assistance of competent counsel. He did not have competent counsel in this case. We believe that Mr. Baker's case is more similarly situated and analogous to that of people be done. Very similar facts, similar time frame. In that case, Dodd was incorrectly advised by his attorney that he'd have to register for ten years, just like Mr. Baker's case, as opposed to life. Here in Mr. Baker's case, Attorney Whitner misadvised him that he would have to register for just ten years. And I'd also point out that in Dodd's, there is a two-year time frame for filing because that was on a Section 211 edition, really from judgment. Whereas in a Post Conviction Act, there's more than just two years. Mr. Dodd, he did not learn of this error until later, specifically ten years later, just like Mr. Baker. And he then, following that, the year later, filed a petition seeking leave from the trial board. In people be dodged at states that avoidable pleas may be attacked at any time. Mr. Baker also submits that his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered. That would be a void or voidable plea. Voidness grounds may be attacked at any time, and we submit that that does provide him with standing for this court to address his claims, to address the ineffective assistance of counsel, to address the unconstitutional as a flight challenge. And here, Mr. Baker's plea was not voluntary. This court should address and hear his claims. And when it does so, we think the court would find that, as attorney, Mr. Wittner was ineffective. Now, much of the states and the trial court, leans on standing, standing certainly important here. But Mr. Baker has both statutory standing, as his liberty is constrained by way of the trial court's order, commanding that he register as a sex offender, and re-leaf is available under the act to all persons who liberty is constrained. In addition, a convicted defendant who surged that in the proceedings which resulted in his conviction there were substantial denial of constitutional rights, the right to a competent counsel, he may institute a proceeding under this act. Now, Mr. Baker has registered, he's registered ever since 2001, every 90 days, it's almost 22 years now, and to require that he violate the registration act something he's never done. So that his liberty can be constrained as irrational. We believe that that shouldn't have to take place. I just have one question about his death case, and I was looking at the way he knows to try and find a dead death completed his sentence irrespective of the SOAR requirement, which the court's considered collateral. But the time he brought his petition, where all the other requirements was he incarcerated or subject to MSR at that time. He was not, God's very much like Mr. Baker was placed on a term of probation. He did complete his probation term, and it's once he achieved that 10 year mark where similar to Randy's case that he learned I would have to register for life, although I was told it was 10 years in the discussion always was 10 years. So Mr. Dodd, Paul Dodd, he did complete his sentence as far as probation. Prior to any of his violence. Yes. Okay. Thank you. So Mr. Baker also has common law standing in order to have standing to bring a constitutional challenge, a party must show that he's within a class aggrieved of that constitutionality that he's suffered to be an imminent danger or a direct injury as a result. So the court of enforcement of the challenge statute here, it's the Texas Interregistration Act. It's clear that Mr. Baker actually received punishment. He continues to receive punishment. And whether or not so are a constitute punishment that goes to the merits of Mr. Baker's claim. And the merits should not affect his justice ability, just like the the Ibrianne case, which we certainly cited heavily in our brief. That notes that it were determined that it had offended lack standing to challenge the laws because they don't constitute punishment. They be hinging his standing on the merits of his argument. Such an analysis, they say in that case, would improperly conflate the two distinct inquiries. So constitutional challenges can be brought at any time, including for the first time on appeal. Mr. Baker already received his punishment. He pled guilty by way of an Alfred Blee to a sex offense that triggered not only so early, and then a notification loss with a host of other restrictions on his privacy on child custody. On movement, on residency, employment, and these were all contained in the judgment of the trial court. Mr. Baker's case is analogous to the Ibrianne's as he checks all the boxes on the requirements of standing and shows that he suffered imminent injury. And the outcome of these proceedings, they could redress that injury. And we're respectfully requesting that this court hear his claims, analyze them on the merits. And also analogous to the Ibrianne's, there's no contingency that has occurred before these laws applied in Mr. Baker. He will be subject to them for the rest of his life, no matter what occurs, as he'll be subject to lifetime government surveillance, and restraint. His injury could be redressed from a favorable ruling from this court, like the defendant in a Vibriones, and he has standing to raise his claims here. Now, in the Vibriones case, they did ultimately find that it wasn't unconstitutional as applied to that defendant, but they certainly analyzed it and said that he had standing, and that's what we're asking for here. So Mr. Baker also states that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered into, and that's because he was a firmly misadvised that he'd have to register for 10 years, not a lifetime, as lawyers stated he would have not accepted the agreement because this 10 years was a big sticking point for him. Other than that, he would have proceeded to trial. And we submit that the witness grounds may be attacked at any time. Mr. Baker argues that his plea wasn't knowing involuntary, just like dogs, and just like dogs where his probation sentence had been completed, he had standing for the public court to hear his claims. Mr. Baker was a firmly misled, his plea should be withdrawn. In addition to the arguments of standing, timeliness was brought up in the trial court. Timeliness is culpable negligence here, which is an exception in the act. It's a safety valve from people like Mr. Baker. And it alleges facts, just like he's done, that the delay was not attributable to his culpable negligence. Now culpable negligence is something that's greater than mere negligence, its recklessness. And I realize my time's getting short here, so our point is, is Mr. Baker discovered the air. He couldn't have discovered it until 10 years later, when he thought that he would be done registering. After he discovered the air, he contacted attorney, after attorney, a judge was consistently told he had no avenue whatsoever. But he kept going, and that's not recklessness, that's not negligence, it's the opposite. If someone who's doing everything they can to redress their injury. And we believe that when this court digs in deeper to this case, that it'll look at the ineffective assistance of counsel, that it'll look at the unconstitutionality of the statute as applied to Mr. Baker, and that he has standing because these registrations statutes have evolved. That he was not culpable negligence, his plea was not knowing involuntarily made, and we're asking this court to address his claims. Any questions? No, there's any questions at this time, and we'll have five minutes in the middle. If I am, I'll give you a right to proceed. May I please the court? I'll call. Laura Byline on behalf of the people. So the real issue in this case is statutory standing. There's two kinds of standing, common law standing and statutory standing. The issue here is statutory standing under the Post Conviction Hearing Act because the act under which defendant brought this case is the Post Conviction Hearing Act. For these, Dodds and Avila Bernourenes are not helpful because neither of those concerned postconviction petitions. The Dodds case was a two-fourch, you know, one petition case, so whatever the Post Conviction Hearing Act had to say about standing didn't matter. The Avila Bernourenes case was a direct appeal, a concerned common law standing, which is whether there's an injury that's redressable by the court. It didn't concern whether the terms of the statute that the statute sets to bring suit under it were met. So here under the Post Conviction Hearing Act, a petitioner must be imprisoned in the penitentiary for the challenged offense at the time of filing a postconviction petition. That's a statutory condition in the Post Conviction Hearing Act that must be met according to the act, the terms in section 122-1A. In prisonment in the penitentiary has been interpreted more broadly than just actual incarceration. For example, a defendant who's still on probation or mandatory supervised release or who has filed the petition well incarcerated on them release. However, the term in prisonment in the penitentiary does not include the collateral consequences of a conviction. Under Johnson only the direct consequences of a conviction conferred standing under the act. The act is talking about is the Post Conviction Hearing Act. It's the same act at issue in both places. Johnson happened to concern a violent offender registration act case, but Johnson viewed the sex offender registration as no different than it, specifically in paragraph 69 it discusses. Bingham with approval and it states that it also cites approvingly a pellet court case saying that the appellate court has been equally clear that registration obligations arising under Sora are collateral consequences that do not confer standing to challenging underlying conviction under the act. So Johnson viewed the Sora question as already settled being a collateral consequence and applied it in the violent offender situation. And it was settled in Bingham. Bingham made clear that even if it is viewed as punishment, it's not punishment imposed by the trial court. The sex offender registration requirements instead its punishment imposed by Sora, the statute independently of what the trial court states. So here while the order did state that defendant had to register as a sex offender, that statement didn't turn the collateral consequence of sex offender registration into a direct one. Because it's still applied in the same way it applied because the act, the Sora act made it applied. And it's not just Bingham, it's not just Johnson, it's also TETTER, paragraph 38, KOTHAVAR, paragraph 33, stating even if it's punishment, it's not punishment imposed by the trial court and that the obligation to register in other restrictions imposed by Sora are collateral consequences of a conviction and not part of the judgment under review. As discussed in Bingham and Johnson and TETTER in KOTHAVAR, Sora's registration requirement is a collateral consequence. After Bingham and Johnson, it's clear that defendant lacks statutory standing under the Post-Condition Hearing Act because he's not imprisoned in the kind of ten-tourary. Therefore, his Post-Conviction Petition was properly dismissed by the trial judge. Are there any questions? Thank you, Your Honours. Mr. Johnson, for your vote. You're under the principle of the justice system that brings us here as fairness. Mr. Baker is asking that the court review his claims for fairness reasons. He did enter into an Alfred plea, he maintained his innocence, he relied upon his attorney's misadvice that he'd have to register for ten years. We still don't believe Bingham or Johnson are controlling our dispositive here because of the reasons why Bingham is so different from Mr. Baker's case. The big problem with Bingham is that justices when they analyzed it realized that Mr. Jerome Bingham was seeking to correct in a proceeding of a later subsequent felony offense, what was mandated by a statute because of a prior 1983 offense, much, much tougher than having a year here. We would rely upon our brief and our response to the state's brief. I would be happy to answer any other questions if there are any. I don't believe we have any of this time. So thank you very much. Thank you both for your arguments here today. This matter will be taken under advisement and a written decision will be issued to you as soon as possible. And with that, it will take a very brief recessional pass