The fourth district of the state of Illinois has now convened the Honorable Craig H.D. Armin presiding. Morning, council. Morning. Morning, Your Honor. First case we'll call this morning is four-21-0524 people, the state of Illinois versus Fred E. Cox. Could council for the appellate fleece states your name for the record. Sarah Curry from the state of pellet defender. Thank you. And council for the appellate. Could you please state your name for the record. It's Courtney O'Connor for State Spots Prosecutors Office. Thank you
. Is Curry you may proceed. Thank you, Your Honor. Fred Cox filed a pro-state post-commission petition alleging several claims and effective assistance of trial council, including erroneously acquiescing to the jury receiving the certified copy of conviction during deliberations. Failure to obtain the defendant's claims. Failing to object to improper closing argument by the prosecutor and failing to object to the admission of the video recorded interview of hb by sergeant rose. The P.C. Council was appointed and she filed the 6.51 C certificate stating that there was not a substantial denial of Cox's constitutional rights because all the claims raised in the P.C. had been addressed by this court on direct appeal. However, this court had not addressed the substance of these claims, rather it had left them open finding them to have been forfeited by not amending Cox's P.C. to include a claim of ineffective assistance of a public council
. P.C. Council failed to fulfill her duties in the 21C and Cox's subsequent waiver of his right to council was not knowing and voluntary where it was based on P.C. Council's erroneous assessment of his P.C. Moreover, at the time of trial, P.C. Council represented the complainant's mother in obtaining an order of protection against Cox in regard to the allegations in this case, thereby creating a conflict of interest that was not sufficiently addressed by the trial court. Rule 6.51 C requires conviction council consult with the petitioner either by mail or in person to ascertain his constitutional claims. Exam in the record of the trial court proceedings and make any amendments to the pro state petition necessary to adequately present the petitioner's claims. Amending a petition to include a claim of ineffective assistance of a public council is one of the specific amendments that P.C
. attorneys must make when necessary. Here on direct appeal Cox challenged the certified copy of conviction being provided to the jury and challenged the prosecutor's closing argument and challenged the admission of the video of the interview with HV. However, this court found each of these claims to have been forfeited. As such, Cox framed the issues in his P.C. as ineffective assistance of trial council in attempt to avoid the forfeiture that this court had found. But as a pro state petitioner, he failed to also raise the claims as ineffective assistance of a public council. P.C. Council should have amended the petition to include allegations of ineffective assistance of a public council in order to adequately present Cox's claims. Remand is required regardless of whether the claims raised in the petition have merit and not compliance with rule 651c may not be excused on the basis of harmless error. The state claims that P.C. council reviewed the substance of the underlying claims and concluded that there was not a substantial denial of Cox's constitutional rights
. However, the 651c certificate makes clear that council's determination that there was not a violation of Mr. Cox's rights was based solely on her assessment that the issues raised in the P.C. had been addressed by this court on direct appeal, which we know was not true. Um, moreover, the claims raised in the P.C. are not contradicted by the record and are not based on an invalid legal theory. So even if P.C. council had addressed the substance of these claims, she would have been wrong in determining that the substance of these claims were without merit. The certified copy of conviction was sent back during deliberations. It not only confirmed that there was a prior conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse, but it showed two prior convictions for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. And it also showed the sentence, which was not relevant to the jury's determination. It showed probation, jail and home confinement
. And it showed that Cox played guilty, which was also not necessary. It showed an admission of guilt, which was not necessary to their assessment of the facts. And then Cox, Prosecutor, the prosecutor defined propensity by Miriam Webster and then and then went on to define it on its own with a lesser standard. The interview with Sergeant Rhodes was was to follow a certain protocol as set forth by the child advocacy advisory board and during Rhodes testimony of the hearing, it was unclear whether he followed this protocol. That's all of these issues are not contradicted by the record and are not pertaining to an invalid legal theory. For these reasons, P.C. council did not comply with rule 651C and she was unreasonable in her representation. Cox did subsequently waive his right to counsel. However, this waiver was not knowing in voluntary where he was left with no choice, but to either wave council or to represent himself if he wanted to further his plans. Cox knew that the claims that he raised in his PC were not dealt with undirected appeal by this court and had no choice to further his claims to represent himself. Moreover, P.C. council should have filed a motion to withdraw, pursuing to grier rather than just file a 651C stating that Mr
. Cox's claims had no merit. That would have sparked a conversation with the trial court about what these issues actually pertain to and if or not whether they had been assessed on direct appeal as such Mr. Cox's subsequent waiver of a straight to counsel was not knowing in voluntary and should not affect this court's determination that PC council acted unreasonably. Moving on, appointed P.C. council represented ER, the mother of the complaining witness H.V. in obtaining an order of protection against Cox while the charges in this case were pending. The court said that the court didn't ask any questions about the specificity of the conflict about whether the conflict the court didn't ask whether the order of protection was still an effect. The court didn't ask whether the complainant's mother was still represented by P.C. council. The court didn't ask any questions to ascertain the nature of this conflict other than what Mr. Cox set forth and the state did not disagree that this was a representation that had taken place and the state didn't know whether or not the or didn't set forth any information that the representations did not still take place
. The court's failure to inquire into the conflict requires requires reversal on its own. But regardless, the conflict was a per se conflict where council represented a person who had a contemporary contemporaneous association with the victim, the prosecution and an entity assisting the prosecution. I know that the court didn't ask any questions about whether the complaint was still an effect that the court didn't ask any questions to ascertain the nature of this conflict. The court didn't ask any questions at the same time or occurring in the same time frame. Correct. I know that the court's failure to inquire further into the nature of the conflict, we don't know whether P.C. council is still going on that same year or the year prior or the year prior to that because it had been initiated a long time before. I know that the court's failure to inquire further into the nature of the conflict, we don't know whether P.C. council is still represented the complainant's mother, we don't know whether the order of protection was still in place. I would posit that yes, contemporaneous means close in time, but this is contemporaneous when you think about the proceedings as a whole. It's contemporaneous to the proceedings in this case, which were yes ongoing, yes it was six years earlier, but this was the still the facts of this case were contemporaneous. It's the what was happening was contemporaneous to the facts of this case, what was happening in this case, and that was still going on at the time as it was six years prior
. It would be the representation that we look at to determine whether it was contemporaneous. And we were trial judge with former trial judges here orders of protection have a limited lifespan much shorter than six years, so are we to assume that this was a contemporaneous proceeding that the order of protection proceeding was still going on and that the council was still representing the victims mother. Well, again, I would fault trial council council for not following through with asking more questions and in that case, where a trial court does not ask the necessary questions to develop what the conflict entails that requires automatic reversal. Let me interject that statement is that thinking muddled by the fact that at this point, the defendant is progressing or proceeding, because you're the burden that your placing is on the court to inquire further, it sounds to me based upon the record that the defendant was asked a broad issue to graduate conflict to the court and then asked what remedy. And then he was seeking and then indicated he was seeking no remedy. So what sort of duty and what authority do you have for this duty does the court have. Further and fire. Well, I think we can all agree that the situation, the factual situation here is quite unique, but I would tell you, look to the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Hernandez, which this court cited in pool. And it was defense council's responsibility to bring the conflict to the attention of the trial court. And she should have done that as soon as she was appointed and she did not do that. It was not. Is there anything in the record to suggest that she was aware or failed to make sufficient inquiry. Well, there's nothing in the record. And again, I would point us back to the trial court not following up on any question with any questions, but the state didn't seem surprised by it when Mr Cox brought it up and Mr Cox seemed quite aware of the fact
. So there's nothing in the record to say whether she was aware of it or not. But if she was certainly it was her responsibility to bring it to the trial court's attention and not Mr Cox responsibility. And he did bring it up. It was only one court date after he had after PC council had withdrawn. So a month later. It was the next, but it was the next trial. Four months later. Court date. And he did bring it up. And four months after he had already made it very clear to the trial court that he wanted to represent himself. I would disagree with the fact that he made it very clear that he wanted to represent himself. He made it very clear that he didn't want PC count appointed PC council to represent him because she was not going to represent him. He asked in in the interaction. And he did not request to proceed
. Pro say. He did request to proceed. Pro say he also brought up the fact was would he be able to get another attorney. My point being he wasn't necessarily gung ho on proceeding. Pro say he did not want PC council representing him because she wasn't intending to represent him. And the court went through the entire admonishment on pro say representation asked him each of the various questions. He responded in each instance that yes, he understood all that and he's still wanted to proceed on his own. I'm not disputing that. I'm only suggesting. So I'm trying to figure out what's the trial judge supposed to do. What more is a trial judge supposed to do when he's confronted with a defendant who says, I don't want this lawyer. I don't recall the transcript saying I don't want this lawyer and I want another lawyer. I would understand it to be I don't want this lawyer. And I want to proceed on my own. Now are you sure you want to do that. Let me admonish you. And the court goes through the admonishment. And he maintains throughout that conversation that no, he understands all that. And yes, he wants to represent himself. I'm trying to figure out what is the trial judge supposed to do under that circumstance. Read this guy's mind. Well, before allowing PC council to withdraw. The trial court should have asked or should have made further inquiry pursuant to Greer about what the basis of his PC was and what why she believed that it had no value. And why why she believed that his constitutional rights were not. There was no substantive substantive violation of his constitutional rights had the trial court made any inquiry into that. It might have realized that she was wrong in her assessment of Mr. Cox's pro say petition that all these issues have not been addressed. And if Mr
. Now are you sure you want to do that. Let me admonish you. And the court goes through the admonishment. And he maintains throughout that conversation that no, he understands all that. And yes, he wants to represent himself. I'm trying to figure out what is the trial judge supposed to do under that circumstance. Read this guy's mind. Well, before allowing PC council to withdraw. The trial court should have asked or should have made further inquiry pursuant to Greer about what the basis of his PC was and what why she believed that it had no value. And why why she believed that his constitutional rights were not. There was no substantive substantive violation of his constitutional rights had the trial court made any inquiry into that. It might have realized that she was wrong in her assessment of Mr. Cox's pro say petition that all these issues have not been addressed. And if Mr. Cox knew that and knew that he has this attorney that's not going to do anything for him, he was left with no choice but to represent himself. Because if he had stuck with PC council, she was when he when when four months later when he brings it up again, the court again says, well, do you want me to point you other counsel and he says no. Yes, but he did not the trial court did not, which he was required to do when a conflict of interest arises, and manage the defendant about what the conflict could mean for him. There's no conflict anymore because she's not there. But at the time that he was represented by her, there was a conflict that he nobody told him what the ramifications of that conflict were and lo and behold, she subsequently files a 651 c certificate saying that there's no value to his PC that there's been no violation of his rights that all of his claims were raised on direct appeal, which was just not true. And so yes, it was the next court date and again, he said he didn't want an attorney, but he didn't have all of the information necessary to make those determinations. Now, I think I think we're struggling with or I certainly am with the idea that it's not clear that anyone was aware of a conflict at the time that counsel. I filed that certificate. Well, and again, the reason that we don't know the answers to those questions is because the trial court didn't ask any for follow up questions to determine the nature of the conflict. No, no, no, at the time that the initial admonishment with regard to defendant proceeding for say there was no information on the table about a potential conflict. Correct. So it's a step removed from the point in which the court was to take action having been made aware of a potential conflict. And at that point, defendant is a pro say counsel. So, you know, I guess these things happen
. Cox knew that and knew that he has this attorney that's not going to do anything for him, he was left with no choice but to represent himself. Because if he had stuck with PC council, she was when he when when four months later when he brings it up again, the court again says, well, do you want me to point you other counsel and he says no. Yes, but he did not the trial court did not, which he was required to do when a conflict of interest arises, and manage the defendant about what the conflict could mean for him. There's no conflict anymore because she's not there. But at the time that he was represented by her, there was a conflict that he nobody told him what the ramifications of that conflict were and lo and behold, she subsequently files a 651 c certificate saying that there's no value to his PC that there's been no violation of his rights that all of his claims were raised on direct appeal, which was just not true. And so yes, it was the next court date and again, he said he didn't want an attorney, but he didn't have all of the information necessary to make those determinations. Now, I think I think we're struggling with or I certainly am with the idea that it's not clear that anyone was aware of a conflict at the time that counsel. I filed that certificate. Well, and again, the reason that we don't know the answers to those questions is because the trial court didn't ask any for follow up questions to determine the nature of the conflict. No, no, no, at the time that the initial admonishment with regard to defendant proceeding for say there was no information on the table about a potential conflict. Correct. So it's a step removed from the point in which the court was to take action having been made aware of a potential conflict. And at that point, defendant is a pro say counsel. So, you know, I guess these things happen. Justice Harris mentioned that you've got trial judges sitting on this panel. And things are brought to light at certain stages or different stages and it's trying to find that next. This is to why the court had a further duty at that point and defendant have didn't have a duty as zone counsel to flush out that issue. Well, and just had the trial court asked a few more follow follow up questions that we could have made more determinations. If it was determined that PC council did know of the conflict at the time she represented him and did not make that known to the court, then that would have shed a different light on the whole situation. But there were no follow up questions. There was no inquiry into the nature of the conflict. And without that information, it's hard to say whether the sub whether his agreement to continue pro say was valid. I understand, but it seems notable. The way the court conducted itself. Essentially saying something to the fact of what do you want me to do? What what's next? What's the remedy? And defendant says I just wanted you to know. So the courts trying to get some information as to what to do next with this pro say defendant. And there's no remedy saw it. Well, he's a pro say defendant what he doesn't know
. Justice Harris mentioned that you've got trial judges sitting on this panel. And things are brought to light at certain stages or different stages and it's trying to find that next. This is to why the court had a further duty at that point and defendant have didn't have a duty as zone counsel to flush out that issue. Well, and just had the trial court asked a few more follow follow up questions that we could have made more determinations. If it was determined that PC council did know of the conflict at the time she represented him and did not make that known to the court, then that would have shed a different light on the whole situation. But there were no follow up questions. There was no inquiry into the nature of the conflict. And without that information, it's hard to say whether the sub whether his agreement to continue pro say was valid. I understand, but it seems notable. The way the court conducted itself. Essentially saying something to the fact of what do you want me to do? What what's next? What's the remedy? And defendant says I just wanted you to know. So the courts trying to get some information as to what to do next with this pro say defendant. And there's no remedy saw it. Well, he's a pro say defendant what he doesn't know. He doesn't know what he doesn't know. His election he he's chosen this course. This is what I have a hard time with. He's chosen this course and the court went to the nth degree to make sure he understood what this could mean and he acknowledged he wanted to do that. Four months later, he raises this issue of a conflict. The court again says, well, do you want me to a point alternate counsel? Do you want me to a point in a different attorney? No, he doesn't want that. And then we get to what justice cabinet says, well, what do you want me to do? And he said, well, I just want you to know. He was not admonished about the nature of a conflict and what that could mean for representation of him. And so, you know, you're taking something from four months later and then somehow extrapolating it back to the last hearing where counsel was present. And somehow everybody was supposed to know at that hearing that four months from now, there's going to be a question raised about a conflict. So I need to be inquiring about this information that I'm not even going to know about for four more months. And even though I inquire about it four months later, when I bring it up again, the defendant's going to say, hey, I just want you to know about it. No, I don't want another attorney. I want to represent myself
. He doesn't know what he doesn't know. His election he he's chosen this course. This is what I have a hard time with. He's chosen this course and the court went to the nth degree to make sure he understood what this could mean and he acknowledged he wanted to do that. Four months later, he raises this issue of a conflict. The court again says, well, do you want me to a point alternate counsel? Do you want me to a point in a different attorney? No, he doesn't want that. And then we get to what justice cabinet says, well, what do you want me to do? And he said, well, I just want you to know. He was not admonished about the nature of a conflict and what that could mean for representation of him. And so, you know, you're taking something from four months later and then somehow extrapolating it back to the last hearing where counsel was present. And somehow everybody was supposed to know at that hearing that four months from now, there's going to be a question raised about a conflict. So I need to be inquiring about this information that I'm not even going to know about for four more months. And even though I inquire about it four months later, when I bring it up again, the defendant's going to say, hey, I just want you to know about it. No, I don't want another attorney. I want to represent myself. I mean, it borders on the ridiculous to tell you the truth that you're asking our trial court to somehow figure something out in the past that is going to occur in the future. And even the future event doesn't require any remedy because the defendant on his own, after having been fully admonished, says, no, I don't, I still don't want another attorney. I just want you to know about it. I can't envision any circumstance in which any trial court could be put to a burden beyond what it had in this case and reach the resolution it did. What do you want me to do, Mr. So and so I just wanted you to know, OK. OK, and just to be clear, as in regard to the initial waiver of counsel, I'm not arguing, this is why I raised it as two separate issues, the initial waiver of counsel, of course, the trial court would have no way of knowing about the conflict at that point. And that initial waiver was not knowing and voluntary because it was based on the unreasonableness of PC counsel as a separate issue, what came up at the conflict came up after. And yes, there doesn't have anything to do with the initial waiver. It's just at that point had the trial court asked further questions. There was the possibility that the conflict could have been fleshed out and maybe new counsel appointed if, if Mr. Cox had all of the information. All right, thank you, Mr. Curry
. I mean, it borders on the ridiculous to tell you the truth that you're asking our trial court to somehow figure something out in the past that is going to occur in the future. And even the future event doesn't require any remedy because the defendant on his own, after having been fully admonished, says, no, I don't, I still don't want another attorney. I just want you to know about it. I can't envision any circumstance in which any trial court could be put to a burden beyond what it had in this case and reach the resolution it did. What do you want me to do, Mr. So and so I just wanted you to know, OK. OK, and just to be clear, as in regard to the initial waiver of counsel, I'm not arguing, this is why I raised it as two separate issues, the initial waiver of counsel, of course, the trial court would have no way of knowing about the conflict at that point. And that initial waiver was not knowing and voluntary because it was based on the unreasonableness of PC counsel as a separate issue, what came up at the conflict came up after. And yes, there doesn't have anything to do with the initial waiver. It's just at that point had the trial court asked further questions. There was the possibility that the conflict could have been fleshed out and maybe new counsel appointed if, if Mr. Cox had all of the information. All right, thank you, Mr. Curry. You will have an opportunity on rebuttal. Miss O'Connor. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you
. You will have an opportunity on rebuttal. Miss O'Connor. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Take back to an order of protection
. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Take back to an order of protection. Years ago, that would not, that counsel did not represent the state than hell with their case at all. There wasn't until his post-Convection phase, that that counsel came and helped represent him and she decided, hey, there's not essential denial here. I cannot and good faith. I mean, his petition and go on with them and he disagreed with her and proceeded to proceed. You know, like I said, we do stand on the brief. I think this issue here is pretty cut and dry that is just a defendant that wanted to proceed for a say, but when the court wasn't agreeing with what he wanted, he decided to randomly bring up this alleged conflict of interest. That's really all we have here because it's just, for us, it's pretty cut and dry what happened here. And the state would stand on its brief. Thank you. All right. Thank you, Mr. Carter. It's curry. Rebuttal
. Years ago, that would not, that counsel did not represent the state than hell with their case at all. There wasn't until his post-Convection phase, that that counsel came and helped represent him and she decided, hey, there's not essential denial here. I cannot and good faith. I mean, his petition and go on with them and he disagreed with her and proceeded to proceed. You know, like I said, we do stand on the brief. I think this issue here is pretty cut and dry that is just a defendant that wanted to proceed for a say, but when the court wasn't agreeing with what he wanted, he decided to randomly bring up this alleged conflict of interest. That's really all we have here because it's just, for us, it's pretty cut and dry what happened here. And the state would stand on its brief. Thank you. All right. Thank you, Mr. Carter. It's curry. Rebuttal. Well, just to point out that I haven't heard any argument that all of the issues raised in Mr. Cox's pro-say petition were not raised and dealt with undirect appeal and counsel did violate real 6.51C by failing to amend his petition to include a claim of ineffective public counsel. And for that reason, this court should reverse the denial of his PC and remand for further post-conviction proceedings. All right. Thank you, counsel. Court will take this matter under advisement. Court stands in receipt.
The fourth district of the state of Illinois has now convened the Honorable Craig H.D. Armin presiding. Morning, council. Morning. Morning, Your Honor. First case we'll call this morning is four-21-0524 people, the state of Illinois versus Fred E. Cox. Could council for the appellate fleece states your name for the record. Sarah Curry from the state of pellet defender. Thank you. And council for the appellate. Could you please state your name for the record. It's Courtney O'Connor for State Spots Prosecutors Office. Thank you. Is Curry you may proceed. Thank you, Your Honor. Fred Cox filed a pro-state post-commission petition alleging several claims and effective assistance of trial council, including erroneously acquiescing to the jury receiving the certified copy of conviction during deliberations. Failure to obtain the defendant's claims. Failing to object to improper closing argument by the prosecutor and failing to object to the admission of the video recorded interview of hb by sergeant rose. The P.C. Council was appointed and she filed the 6.51 C certificate stating that there was not a substantial denial of Cox's constitutional rights because all the claims raised in the P.C. had been addressed by this court on direct appeal. However, this court had not addressed the substance of these claims, rather it had left them open finding them to have been forfeited by not amending Cox's P.C. to include a claim of ineffective assistance of a public council. P.C. Council failed to fulfill her duties in the 21C and Cox's subsequent waiver of his right to council was not knowing and voluntary where it was based on P.C. Council's erroneous assessment of his P.C. Moreover, at the time of trial, P.C. Council represented the complainant's mother in obtaining an order of protection against Cox in regard to the allegations in this case, thereby creating a conflict of interest that was not sufficiently addressed by the trial court. Rule 6.51 C requires conviction council consult with the petitioner either by mail or in person to ascertain his constitutional claims. Exam in the record of the trial court proceedings and make any amendments to the pro state petition necessary to adequately present the petitioner's claims. Amending a petition to include a claim of ineffective assistance of a public council is one of the specific amendments that P.C. attorneys must make when necessary. Here on direct appeal Cox challenged the certified copy of conviction being provided to the jury and challenged the prosecutor's closing argument and challenged the admission of the video of the interview with HV. However, this court found each of these claims to have been forfeited. As such, Cox framed the issues in his P.C. as ineffective assistance of trial council in attempt to avoid the forfeiture that this court had found. But as a pro state petitioner, he failed to also raise the claims as ineffective assistance of a public council. P.C. Council should have amended the petition to include allegations of ineffective assistance of a public council in order to adequately present Cox's claims. Remand is required regardless of whether the claims raised in the petition have merit and not compliance with rule 651c may not be excused on the basis of harmless error. The state claims that P.C. council reviewed the substance of the underlying claims and concluded that there was not a substantial denial of Cox's constitutional rights. However, the 651c certificate makes clear that council's determination that there was not a violation of Mr. Cox's rights was based solely on her assessment that the issues raised in the P.C. had been addressed by this court on direct appeal, which we know was not true. Um, moreover, the claims raised in the P.C. are not contradicted by the record and are not based on an invalid legal theory. So even if P.C. council had addressed the substance of these claims, she would have been wrong in determining that the substance of these claims were without merit. The certified copy of conviction was sent back during deliberations. It not only confirmed that there was a prior conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse, but it showed two prior convictions for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. And it also showed the sentence, which was not relevant to the jury's determination. It showed probation, jail and home confinement. And it showed that Cox played guilty, which was also not necessary. It showed an admission of guilt, which was not necessary to their assessment of the facts. And then Cox, Prosecutor, the prosecutor defined propensity by Miriam Webster and then and then went on to define it on its own with a lesser standard. The interview with Sergeant Rhodes was was to follow a certain protocol as set forth by the child advocacy advisory board and during Rhodes testimony of the hearing, it was unclear whether he followed this protocol. That's all of these issues are not contradicted by the record and are not pertaining to an invalid legal theory. For these reasons, P.C. council did not comply with rule 651C and she was unreasonable in her representation. Cox did subsequently waive his right to counsel. However, this waiver was not knowing in voluntary where he was left with no choice, but to either wave council or to represent himself if he wanted to further his plans. Cox knew that the claims that he raised in his PC were not dealt with undirected appeal by this court and had no choice to further his claims to represent himself. Moreover, P.C. council should have filed a motion to withdraw, pursuing to grier rather than just file a 651C stating that Mr. Cox's claims had no merit. That would have sparked a conversation with the trial court about what these issues actually pertain to and if or not whether they had been assessed on direct appeal as such Mr. Cox's subsequent waiver of a straight to counsel was not knowing in voluntary and should not affect this court's determination that PC council acted unreasonably. Moving on, appointed P.C. council represented ER, the mother of the complaining witness H.V. in obtaining an order of protection against Cox while the charges in this case were pending. The court said that the court didn't ask any questions about the specificity of the conflict about whether the conflict the court didn't ask whether the order of protection was still an effect. The court didn't ask whether the complainant's mother was still represented by P.C. council. The court didn't ask any questions to ascertain the nature of this conflict other than what Mr. Cox set forth and the state did not disagree that this was a representation that had taken place and the state didn't know whether or not the or didn't set forth any information that the representations did not still take place. The court's failure to inquire into the conflict requires requires reversal on its own. But regardless, the conflict was a per se conflict where council represented a person who had a contemporary contemporaneous association with the victim, the prosecution and an entity assisting the prosecution. I know that the court didn't ask any questions about whether the complaint was still an effect that the court didn't ask any questions to ascertain the nature of this conflict. The court didn't ask any questions at the same time or occurring in the same time frame. Correct. I know that the court's failure to inquire further into the nature of the conflict, we don't know whether P.C. council is still going on that same year or the year prior or the year prior to that because it had been initiated a long time before. I know that the court's failure to inquire further into the nature of the conflict, we don't know whether P.C. council is still represented the complainant's mother, we don't know whether the order of protection was still in place. I would posit that yes, contemporaneous means close in time, but this is contemporaneous when you think about the proceedings as a whole. It's contemporaneous to the proceedings in this case, which were yes ongoing, yes it was six years earlier, but this was the still the facts of this case were contemporaneous. It's the what was happening was contemporaneous to the facts of this case, what was happening in this case, and that was still going on at the time as it was six years prior. It would be the representation that we look at to determine whether it was contemporaneous. And we were trial judge with former trial judges here orders of protection have a limited lifespan much shorter than six years, so are we to assume that this was a contemporaneous proceeding that the order of protection proceeding was still going on and that the council was still representing the victims mother. Well, again, I would fault trial council council for not following through with asking more questions and in that case, where a trial court does not ask the necessary questions to develop what the conflict entails that requires automatic reversal. Let me interject that statement is that thinking muddled by the fact that at this point, the defendant is progressing or proceeding, because you're the burden that your placing is on the court to inquire further, it sounds to me based upon the record that the defendant was asked a broad issue to graduate conflict to the court and then asked what remedy. And then he was seeking and then indicated he was seeking no remedy. So what sort of duty and what authority do you have for this duty does the court have. Further and fire. Well, I think we can all agree that the situation, the factual situation here is quite unique, but I would tell you, look to the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Hernandez, which this court cited in pool. And it was defense council's responsibility to bring the conflict to the attention of the trial court. And she should have done that as soon as she was appointed and she did not do that. It was not. Is there anything in the record to suggest that she was aware or failed to make sufficient inquiry. Well, there's nothing in the record. And again, I would point us back to the trial court not following up on any question with any questions, but the state didn't seem surprised by it when Mr Cox brought it up and Mr Cox seemed quite aware of the fact. So there's nothing in the record to say whether she was aware of it or not. But if she was certainly it was her responsibility to bring it to the trial court's attention and not Mr Cox responsibility. And he did bring it up. It was only one court date after he had after PC council had withdrawn. So a month later. It was the next, but it was the next trial. Four months later. Court date. And he did bring it up. And four months after he had already made it very clear to the trial court that he wanted to represent himself. I would disagree with the fact that he made it very clear that he wanted to represent himself. He made it very clear that he didn't want PC count appointed PC council to represent him because she was not going to represent him. He asked in in the interaction. And he did not request to proceed. Pro say. He did request to proceed. Pro say he also brought up the fact was would he be able to get another attorney. My point being he wasn't necessarily gung ho on proceeding. Pro say he did not want PC council representing him because she wasn't intending to represent him. And the court went through the entire admonishment on pro say representation asked him each of the various questions. He responded in each instance that yes, he understood all that and he's still wanted to proceed on his own. I'm not disputing that. I'm only suggesting. So I'm trying to figure out what's the trial judge supposed to do. What more is a trial judge supposed to do when he's confronted with a defendant who says, I don't want this lawyer. I don't recall the transcript saying I don't want this lawyer and I want another lawyer. I would understand it to be I don't want this lawyer. And I want to proceed on my own. Now are you sure you want to do that. Let me admonish you. And the court goes through the admonishment. And he maintains throughout that conversation that no, he understands all that. And yes, he wants to represent himself. I'm trying to figure out what is the trial judge supposed to do under that circumstance. Read this guy's mind. Well, before allowing PC council to withdraw. The trial court should have asked or should have made further inquiry pursuant to Greer about what the basis of his PC was and what why she believed that it had no value. And why why she believed that his constitutional rights were not. There was no substantive substantive violation of his constitutional rights had the trial court made any inquiry into that. It might have realized that she was wrong in her assessment of Mr. Cox's pro say petition that all these issues have not been addressed. And if Mr. Cox knew that and knew that he has this attorney that's not going to do anything for him, he was left with no choice but to represent himself. Because if he had stuck with PC council, she was when he when when four months later when he brings it up again, the court again says, well, do you want me to point you other counsel and he says no. Yes, but he did not the trial court did not, which he was required to do when a conflict of interest arises, and manage the defendant about what the conflict could mean for him. There's no conflict anymore because she's not there. But at the time that he was represented by her, there was a conflict that he nobody told him what the ramifications of that conflict were and lo and behold, she subsequently files a 651 c certificate saying that there's no value to his PC that there's been no violation of his rights that all of his claims were raised on direct appeal, which was just not true. And so yes, it was the next court date and again, he said he didn't want an attorney, but he didn't have all of the information necessary to make those determinations. Now, I think I think we're struggling with or I certainly am with the idea that it's not clear that anyone was aware of a conflict at the time that counsel. I filed that certificate. Well, and again, the reason that we don't know the answers to those questions is because the trial court didn't ask any for follow up questions to determine the nature of the conflict. No, no, no, at the time that the initial admonishment with regard to defendant proceeding for say there was no information on the table about a potential conflict. Correct. So it's a step removed from the point in which the court was to take action having been made aware of a potential conflict. And at that point, defendant is a pro say counsel. So, you know, I guess these things happen. Justice Harris mentioned that you've got trial judges sitting on this panel. And things are brought to light at certain stages or different stages and it's trying to find that next. This is to why the court had a further duty at that point and defendant have didn't have a duty as zone counsel to flush out that issue. Well, and just had the trial court asked a few more follow follow up questions that we could have made more determinations. If it was determined that PC council did know of the conflict at the time she represented him and did not make that known to the court, then that would have shed a different light on the whole situation. But there were no follow up questions. There was no inquiry into the nature of the conflict. And without that information, it's hard to say whether the sub whether his agreement to continue pro say was valid. I understand, but it seems notable. The way the court conducted itself. Essentially saying something to the fact of what do you want me to do? What what's next? What's the remedy? And defendant says I just wanted you to know. So the courts trying to get some information as to what to do next with this pro say defendant. And there's no remedy saw it. Well, he's a pro say defendant what he doesn't know. He doesn't know what he doesn't know. His election he he's chosen this course. This is what I have a hard time with. He's chosen this course and the court went to the nth degree to make sure he understood what this could mean and he acknowledged he wanted to do that. Four months later, he raises this issue of a conflict. The court again says, well, do you want me to a point alternate counsel? Do you want me to a point in a different attorney? No, he doesn't want that. And then we get to what justice cabinet says, well, what do you want me to do? And he said, well, I just want you to know. He was not admonished about the nature of a conflict and what that could mean for representation of him. And so, you know, you're taking something from four months later and then somehow extrapolating it back to the last hearing where counsel was present. And somehow everybody was supposed to know at that hearing that four months from now, there's going to be a question raised about a conflict. So I need to be inquiring about this information that I'm not even going to know about for four more months. And even though I inquire about it four months later, when I bring it up again, the defendant's going to say, hey, I just want you to know about it. No, I don't want another attorney. I want to represent myself. I mean, it borders on the ridiculous to tell you the truth that you're asking our trial court to somehow figure something out in the past that is going to occur in the future. And even the future event doesn't require any remedy because the defendant on his own, after having been fully admonished, says, no, I don't, I still don't want another attorney. I just want you to know about it. I can't envision any circumstance in which any trial court could be put to a burden beyond what it had in this case and reach the resolution it did. What do you want me to do, Mr. So and so I just wanted you to know, OK. OK, and just to be clear, as in regard to the initial waiver of counsel, I'm not arguing, this is why I raised it as two separate issues, the initial waiver of counsel, of course, the trial court would have no way of knowing about the conflict at that point. And that initial waiver was not knowing and voluntary because it was based on the unreasonableness of PC counsel as a separate issue, what came up at the conflict came up after. And yes, there doesn't have anything to do with the initial waiver. It's just at that point had the trial court asked further questions. There was the possibility that the conflict could have been fleshed out and maybe new counsel appointed if, if Mr. Cox had all of the information. All right, thank you, Mr. Curry. You will have an opportunity on rebuttal. Miss O'Connor. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Take back to an order of protection. Years ago, that would not, that counsel did not represent the state than hell with their case at all. There wasn't until his post-Convection phase, that that counsel came and helped represent him and she decided, hey, there's not essential denial here. I cannot and good faith. I mean, his petition and go on with them and he disagreed with her and proceeded to proceed. You know, like I said, we do stand on the brief. I think this issue here is pretty cut and dry that is just a defendant that wanted to proceed for a say, but when the court wasn't agreeing with what he wanted, he decided to randomly bring up this alleged conflict of interest. That's really all we have here because it's just, for us, it's pretty cut and dry what happened here. And the state would stand on its brief. Thank you. All right. Thank you, Mr. Carter. It's curry. Rebuttal. Well, just to point out that I haven't heard any argument that all of the issues raised in Mr. Cox's pro-say petition were not raised and dealt with undirect appeal and counsel did violate real 6.51C by failing to amend his petition to include a claim of ineffective public counsel. And for that reason, this court should reverse the denial of his PC and remand for further post-conviction proceedings. All right. Thank you, counsel. Court will take this matter under advisement. Court stands in receipt