Gerald Lushwet at Al. 051395 and 1411. Mr. Gorenstein. Mr. Gorenstein. I'm saying you've made this for teacher judgment to use five of your men and say, I believe that will be sufficient. You can reevaluate that as you proceed. Good afternoon. My name is Charles Gorenstein. I represent the appellant, the petitioner, Pat, and I'm a protect. This is a fairly straightforward patent case. I'll hesitate to use the term playing vanilla. It involves no novel issues of law, I believe they're none. The errors of the court below are addressed fairly thoroughly in the briefs
. I'd like to focus here on an underlying question and perhaps cut through any confusion that might exist. The question for this case turns on is, is this element, which is a model of the accused device, is this a channel as required by the claims of the patent? Now let me explain what this is. This is a model of a snow pusher. Snow pusher is like a snow plow. It would be much longer than a snow pusher. And a snow pusher has a plate on each end. So when you push the snow forward, it doesn't spill to the size. We haven't had much opportunity to imagine that, just one day. Fortunately. The parties agree that all of the elements of the claims that are required by older elements are found in the accused device. With one exception that's argued, the vertical reinforcing channel. This is a horizontal reinforcing channel and a vertical reinforcing channel, of course, is perpendicular. That's the accused. This is the accused
. Where is the channel? This is the channel. The party is on the court below. The channel is mounted on the back as a panel. The vertical reinforcing element, the reinforced plate. The parties on the court below agree that the ordinary definition of channel applies in this case. And that is a channel is a structural element having a U-shaped cross section or a C-shaped cross section, depending on your orientation. You're holding it. And why does that imply that it's U-shaped from beginning to end and that the sides have the same dimensions from beginning to end of the channel? There is no such limitation for the ordinary definition of a channel. There's nothing in the patent or the prosecution history that limits it in any way other than the ordinary definition. In fact, the defendant, RCS, argued very specifically, there's nothing in the patent or the prosecution history that qualifies or limits the definition of channel. That's their argument. And we agree with that. Well, the district court, of course, pointed to a number of dictionary definitions that talk about channels being a long gutter, groove, or furrow, a metal bar of flattened U-shaped section, a lengthened groove or furrow, all of these things almost suggest that the sides are pretty much the same throughout the entire length, do they? No, they do not, your honor. Well, first of all, if you look at this element, which is the accused element, any place that you would slice this, you would have a U-shaped cross section
. Yes, but I understand. So you're emphasizing the U-shaped cross section that you're not addressing some of the other definitions, all of these definitions that are set forth in the district court's opinion on page 9 of the Attannics of... Well, don't talk about necessarily the U-shaped section, but talk about the structure of being a channel bar of being flanged to form a channel. That's correct, your honor, but the district court adopted from the various possible definitions of channel, the definition that it is a structural element of U-shaped cross section, because that is the appropriate definition in this context and under fill-ups, that was the proper thing for the court to do. The U-shaped or C-shaped sectional configuration is what sets channels apart from other structural components. Correct. And the parties don't disagree about that definition. So what about this limitation that the district court mentioned about a channel having a curved configuration to conform to the curvature of the blade? Well, the court was vertical channels depicted in the 755 patents have a curved back that parallels the curvature of the snowflisher blade. Well, that's incorrect. The court was incorrect when it said that. What basis did the district court affine for that conclusion? I don't believe it had any basis for that. I think the court was probably assuming that because the back of a cloud typically curved in some measure that the channel has disclosed in the patent must also be curved, but that's not correct
. If you look at the disclosure of the patent, the current column is on appendix 40. It talks about the channels being straight. And in fact, you're under this is a model of the channel as depicted in the patent. And you can see that the channel is straight. Are there these stipulated exhibits in the different courts? Yes, this was stipulated. Notice was given that these would be used. Now, in both cases, you'll see that the edge that meets the back of the blade is carved, if you will, to match the contour of the blade. And that's not part of what's in this patent. It's just the ordinary expedient at any person constructing this would do. You make the pieces meet and their shapes match. You see that this channel is a U-shaped throughout its cross section. Not perfectly uniform. It's very slightly because of the manner in which it's used. And similarly, this is U-shaped throughout its cross section
. Again, not perfectly uniform. Sorry, I'm still unclear about what the status of these models that you're using are here. I mean, is the other side stipulated that the yellow piece that you just held up is representative of what the patent detects? I don't believe we have a stipulation. This is a model that was used in the court below. The two of the models that you presented. Yes. So, so your argument that that depicts what's in the patent. It's not a gree that that's what's in the patent. I do not know if there's been a stipulation to that in the court below. There has not been in this proceeding. But there's been notice to RCS that this would be used in the proceeding and no objection. Okay. You're in the amount of time you wish to say. I'd like to answer your questions and make a one pointer
. On the bottle, you can only either answer questions or repot. Correct. Mr. G. N. Fortin. Could I miss an attention? Well, the point I'd like to make is simply the debate. Well, a few moments. I'll use my time. The basis for the argument that the defendant has been using is that this isn't a channel to box the gusset. They have a new name. Now, the term gusset is a known term in New York. A gusset is a structural method used for reinforcement. And if you have two elements that meet at an angle, a gusset might be used to stiffen the angle
. Now, if you look at one side of this element, just one piece in isolation, it might fairly be called a gusset. And the other side in isolation might fairly be called a gusset. And a gusset is a broader term, if you will, as RCS has argued. But we don't have a gusset here. We have several pieces, two pieces joined with a third piece to create a new structure. And just like this lecturing is made up of many flat boards, we wouldn't say this is not a lectern. It's a collection of flat boards. It's a lectern. And to say that this is not a channel when it meets the agreed upon ordinary definition, simply because we could characterize it's separate parts, is not a proper fair argument. So this renaming or an AMA might believe is insufficient to counter the fact that they've admitted that they meet the definition. The district court applied a very narrow definition of importing from the drawings, a feature that's not a critical part of this invention. There's no authority to do that. The district court narrowed the claim improperly. It's discussed in the briefs and the district court made an erroneous ruling about a stopper
. It's also discussed in the briefs. And so when those points will rest on our briefs, and at this point I will reserve my rebuttal. Thank you. Well, say before you. Just follow ahead. Thank you very much, Your Honor. My name is Gary G. and Porta. I represent the respondents. First, I was present at the argument below and I can assure you that these exhibits were not stipulated to number one. They were shown to us at the oral argument for the first time. The court apparently took a time to notice it. You mean oral argument? At the argument below. Hello
. Yes, but there was no prior stipulation today. But I'm sure the court below did take cognizance of the exhibits at the time. The headredredd it's ruling. Do you agree or disagree that the yellow piece is representative of the channel depicted in the panel? Well, what I do agree with is that it is a piece of extrinsic proof. I think what's more important is the question I'm not answering my question. Well, I think it's reasonable. It's reasonably close. I mean, I can't say geometrically that's exactly. But the problem is that it's depicted in that model of the yellow piece that corresponds to the channel in the pattern doesn't have equal size all the way down. It does not. However, I think it's that's a function simply the fact that the sides of the channel, period, who have been shaved off for purposes adhering to the back of the channel. However, I think you still need to look to the intrinsic proof relative to this to this matter to be able to discern what third parties would be able to glean from that in order to determine what it is that's being protected. Is it is is it Mr. Grunstein correct though that the essential characteristic of a channel is its U shape or a C shape section? I have no disagreement with that
. I think the problem with the appellance argument is simply that it immediately jumps to the conclusion that because a an ordinary dictionary definition is that the finds it in that way means that as a result their patent protection is co extensive with that definition. I know with great interest that the appellant did not cite the Phillips case and either of its briefs to this court. I think this the Phillips cases is controlling here. What is it in the written description that you see that that departs from that definition? Well, I think we have to look first to see that there's not too much in the intrinsic file to determine what it is that is meant by a channel. There's nothing in the claim. The specification really says that straight and it happens to be welded to the back of a of a snowblade. So there in the prosecution history doesn't define it either. It simply says that it is not certain things that distinguish it. With respect to this straight characteristic, do you agree with me then that the district court was mistaken in characterizing this channel as having a curved back that parallels the curvature of this snow-pusher blade? Well, I think that is probably correct. I think that it's a question of which action is correct. I'm correct in the district court. No, I think the district court was correct in the way it assessed that the channel is depicted in the embodiment and is, well, there is no verbal description of what a channel is in the patent. But the patent itself, though, describes this structure as being a welded straight channel. But the question is on what axis is it straight? I certainly agree that if you're looking at this axis, it's straight. We don't know which axis the patent is or the applicant was explaining. Well, it's straight. We may not know which axis, but where does it say curved? Well, I think it has to be curved because of the fact that it's being attached to a curved surface. Well, maybe the front of it is curved as that model shows that the back of it is perfectly straight. It may be on this, but we don't know exactly how it is related to the intrinsic proof of the case is my point. I'm not arguing against this. I'm arguing against the patent itself and the claim, the specification, and the only thing within the four corners of the patent, which gives any meaning whatsoever to the claim, and that is the embodied. Now, the vitrionics case says that, but there's nothing in it. You still haven't pointed to anything in the patent that discloses a curved back. Again, all I can say judges, that all we have is what the patent says in what it shows. It's hard to argue against this drawing. The patent says it's straight. We may have an argument about what that means, and the patent has an illustration in figure four, which is what the district court seemed to be referring to, but I can't find anything in figure four that shows a curved back. It may be true, but it's not the same token
. We don't know which axis the patent is or the applicant was explaining. Well, it's straight. We may not know which axis, but where does it say curved? Well, I think it has to be curved because of the fact that it's being attached to a curved surface. Well, maybe the front of it is curved as that model shows that the back of it is perfectly straight. It may be on this, but we don't know exactly how it is related to the intrinsic proof of the case is my point. I'm not arguing against this. I'm arguing against the patent itself and the claim, the specification, and the only thing within the four corners of the patent, which gives any meaning whatsoever to the claim, and that is the embodied. Now, the vitrionics case says that, but there's nothing in it. You still haven't pointed to anything in the patent that discloses a curved back. Again, all I can say judges, that all we have is what the patent says in what it shows. It's hard to argue against this drawing. The patent says it's straight. We may have an argument about what that means, and the patent has an illustration in figure four, which is what the district court seemed to be referring to, but I can't find anything in figure four that shows a curved back. It may be true, but it's not the same token. We do not have anything which is triangular right in terms of literal infringement. We have two gussets here, which happen to be joined together by a steel plate forming a bot, which is called a box gusset for lack of a better term. But this is what is alleged to be infringed against this subject. Why is this triangular shape of the side significant if the structure you're holding in your hand is a channel? Which all the claim says is a channel? Well, we believe it's significant because of the fact that there are multiple depths to this alleged view or C-shave. It makes it different. Because it's made of separate components that are welded together. Essentially, yes, there. What this is is a gusset. It's a triangular piece of material. Two of them that happen to be shaped together, formed together through the use of a steel plate. So your contention is that a channel in this art meant something that was forged from a single piece? Well, technically the definition is a hot-rolled steel product. So it's one piece that's been rolled to form a particular shape. And I think the point, too, is that this is not a unique invention. It's a crowded field of art
. We do not have anything which is triangular right in terms of literal infringement. We have two gussets here, which happen to be joined together by a steel plate forming a bot, which is called a box gusset for lack of a better term. But this is what is alleged to be infringed against this subject. Why is this triangular shape of the side significant if the structure you're holding in your hand is a channel? Which all the claim says is a channel? Well, we believe it's significant because of the fact that there are multiple depths to this alleged view or C-shave. It makes it different. Because it's made of separate components that are welded together. Essentially, yes, there. What this is is a gusset. It's a triangular piece of material. Two of them that happen to be shaped together, formed together through the use of a steel plate. So your contention is that a channel in this art meant something that was forged from a single piece? Well, technically the definition is a hot-rolled steel product. So it's one piece that's been rolled to form a particular shape. And I think the point, too, is that this is not a unique invention. It's a crowded field of art. And the applicant went through a great pain to try to distinguish itself in terms of its channel, not being certain other things. And now they try to move backward into a dictionary definition to say that not only are we what we say we are, but we're anything else that remotely approaches it. And I think that's inappropriate. It's an attempt to recapture that which it relinquished in order to obtain the patent allowance at the time. Over objection, initial objection by the panel. You're referring to the prosecution history where it was an argument made to distinguish this invention over its current. That's correct. Well, why should that be interpreted to be a surrender of anything other than angles? Well, I guess the point I'm trying to make judges is that if we're going to the questions whether we should allow the use of a dictionary definition to set the parameters of the patent, and I'm suggesting that we should not because of the fact that there has been no expression that that's the definition that they intended. The only expression within the intrinsic evidence is merely the drawing. And I think most people ordinarily skilled in the art would assume that that drawing from their understanding of what a channel generally is would be more this than this. As a matter of fact, I believe this case is essentially a poster child for the Phillips case, in that the reflexive use of a dictionary definition to set the outer boundaries of the patent would be inappropriate. And it was not the intention of the applicant here to cover all types of vertical reinforcing devices of which the boxcusset is one, but merely to distinguish itself in the form of a vertical channel. Now assuming that the court below was correct and that we do not have literal infringement, there's only one other issue to be addressed, and that is the issue of the possible infringement under the doctrine of equivalence. And I know that the London versus Carson Perry's Scott case in 91 suggests that finding of equivalence under these circumstances should be the exception and not the rule, and that this really shouldn't be a second-wide at the apple to extend inappropriate patent protection
. And the applicant went through a great pain to try to distinguish itself in terms of its channel, not being certain other things. And now they try to move backward into a dictionary definition to say that not only are we what we say we are, but we're anything else that remotely approaches it. And I think that's inappropriate. It's an attempt to recapture that which it relinquished in order to obtain the patent allowance at the time. Over objection, initial objection by the panel. You're referring to the prosecution history where it was an argument made to distinguish this invention over its current. That's correct. Well, why should that be interpreted to be a surrender of anything other than angles? Well, I guess the point I'm trying to make judges is that if we're going to the questions whether we should allow the use of a dictionary definition to set the parameters of the patent, and I'm suggesting that we should not because of the fact that there has been no expression that that's the definition that they intended. The only expression within the intrinsic evidence is merely the drawing. And I think most people ordinarily skilled in the art would assume that that drawing from their understanding of what a channel generally is would be more this than this. As a matter of fact, I believe this case is essentially a poster child for the Phillips case, in that the reflexive use of a dictionary definition to set the outer boundaries of the patent would be inappropriate. And it was not the intention of the applicant here to cover all types of vertical reinforcing devices of which the boxcusset is one, but merely to distinguish itself in the form of a vertical channel. Now assuming that the court below was correct and that we do not have literal infringement, there's only one other issue to be addressed, and that is the issue of the possible infringement under the doctrine of equivalence. And I know that the London versus Carson Perry's Scott case in 91 suggests that finding of equivalence under these circumstances should be the exception and not the rule, and that this really shouldn't be a second-wide at the apple to extend inappropriate patent protection. And I agree that as well that the Graver test applies. And I believe that we do reinforce the back of these snow pushers in a way that is different from the one depicted in the patent, and that is we have a gust-sitting type of material rather than a channel type. And the fact that the claim claim to use both terms included as well, gustsits as well as channels, at least indicates that in the applicant's mind that we're talking about two different types of structures. And I think that the way that the channels and gustsits reinforce are different, and as a result, I believe we have a distinction in terms of the way that our particular element reinforces is compared to the way that the channel reinforces. And as well, we perform an additional function in that not only do we vertically reinforce the blade, but we also support or reinforce the row of upper posts as well as a result of the triangulation of the boxed gusts. But I think overarching all of this in terms of the way to look at it, this type of a claim in the doctrine of equivalence context, is the fact that this is not a pioneered type of invention. There are a lot of prior snow pushers out there that had been patented. I come from up north and we get lots of snow and you see all kinds of configurations out on the streets. All of them have vertical reinforcing elements. There's no question about that. Again, the applicant at the time of patent application went to great pains to try to distinguish itself away from angle bars and angle irons. And indeed, in its specification, it says that ribs aren't it either. It tried to limit itself very closely to channels as being different from and better than anything else in the market. And was it based upon that that the patent office allowed this patent to go through? And now, like a compressed dried sponge, after getting allowance, we're throwing a little bit of water on it and the applicant, the appellate now is trying to expand out that initial narrowed field to say that, hey, look at any kind of vertical reinforcement area is going to be infringing under the doctrine of equivalence
. And I agree that as well that the Graver test applies. And I believe that we do reinforce the back of these snow pushers in a way that is different from the one depicted in the patent, and that is we have a gust-sitting type of material rather than a channel type. And the fact that the claim claim to use both terms included as well, gustsits as well as channels, at least indicates that in the applicant's mind that we're talking about two different types of structures. And I think that the way that the channels and gustsits reinforce are different, and as a result, I believe we have a distinction in terms of the way that our particular element reinforces is compared to the way that the channel reinforces. And as well, we perform an additional function in that not only do we vertically reinforce the blade, but we also support or reinforce the row of upper posts as well as a result of the triangulation of the boxed gusts. But I think overarching all of this in terms of the way to look at it, this type of a claim in the doctrine of equivalence context, is the fact that this is not a pioneered type of invention. There are a lot of prior snow pushers out there that had been patented. I come from up north and we get lots of snow and you see all kinds of configurations out on the streets. All of them have vertical reinforcing elements. There's no question about that. Again, the applicant at the time of patent application went to great pains to try to distinguish itself away from angle bars and angle irons. And indeed, in its specification, it says that ribs aren't it either. It tried to limit itself very closely to channels as being different from and better than anything else in the market. And was it based upon that that the patent office allowed this patent to go through? And now, like a compressed dried sponge, after getting allowance, we're throwing a little bit of water on it and the applicant, the appellate now is trying to expand out that initial narrowed field to say that, hey, look at any kind of vertical reinforcement area is going to be infringing under the doctrine of equivalence. We don't believe the box gusset does, which is the closest we come to a channel. They alleged that on top of that, even our subsequent iterations of vertical reinforcements such as a rib, which they have already said, does not comport with or does not qualify under these circumstances. And as well, structural steel tubing also infringed. I think it's pretty clear that they're overreaching. They're trying to recapture an area that they had to relinquish in order to obtain their their patent in the first instance. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Mr. Grinsey, what about their argument that this channel by definition has to be forged out of a single piece of maps? The dictionary definition that the district court side on page 9 do seem to support that. The definition adopted by the court. That is one possible definition. The channel could be rolled from one piece of metal. It could be folded from one piece of metal
. We don't believe the box gusset does, which is the closest we come to a channel. They alleged that on top of that, even our subsequent iterations of vertical reinforcements such as a rib, which they have already said, does not comport with or does not qualify under these circumstances. And as well, structural steel tubing also infringed. I think it's pretty clear that they're overreaching. They're trying to recapture an area that they had to relinquish in order to obtain their their patent in the first instance. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Mr. Grinsey, what about their argument that this channel by definition has to be forged out of a single piece of maps? The dictionary definition that the district court side on page 9 do seem to support that. The definition adopted by the court. That is one possible definition. The channel could be rolled from one piece of metal. It could be folded from one piece of metal. It could be formed by joining several pieces together. How does that definition suggest that it could be formed by joining several pieces of metal? The definitions don't address it. The point is that the court and with all respect to counsel, I believe it's a bit late for counsel for RCS to be arguing the definition that's been adopted in this case. The court adopted that the party's agreed to it. And in their brief, I'm pointing to the RCS brief pages 9, 13 and 15. They argue that the definition adopted is correct. What's the definition of the channel, the U-shaped or C-shaped cross section? The problem with that is that it doesn't address the question of whether it's made out of a single piece of metal. Correct. It doesn't address the definition. The definition is talked about a metal bar in an iron bar being clanged to form a channel. The definition seems to assume that the channel is made from a single piece of metal rather than welding pieces of metal together. What's the answer? The answer is that the definitions that are in various dictionaries may address the possible methods of manufacturing. The court correctly under Phillips looked at various definitions and concluded what was appropriate as an ordinary definition in the context of this patent. There might be many definitions that just simply don't make any sense at all
. It could be formed by joining several pieces together. How does that definition suggest that it could be formed by joining several pieces of metal? The definitions don't address it. The point is that the court and with all respect to counsel, I believe it's a bit late for counsel for RCS to be arguing the definition that's been adopted in this case. The court adopted that the party's agreed to it. And in their brief, I'm pointing to the RCS brief pages 9, 13 and 15. They argue that the definition adopted is correct. What's the definition of the channel, the U-shaped or C-shaped cross section? The problem with that is that it doesn't address the question of whether it's made out of a single piece of metal. Correct. It doesn't address the definition. The definition is talked about a metal bar in an iron bar being clanged to form a channel. The definition seems to assume that the channel is made from a single piece of metal rather than welding pieces of metal together. What's the answer? The answer is that the definitions that are in various dictionaries may address the possible methods of manufacturing. The court correctly under Phillips looked at various definitions and concluded what was appropriate as an ordinary definition in the context of this patent. There might be many definitions that just simply don't make any sense at all. Yep, but should not be responding well on a sentence. We review claim construction in Denova. Correct. We look at the available materials. One of the available materials in the dictionary, the dictionary seemed to define a channel that is made from a single piece of metal. Now, in we exercise our authority to disprove the term channel, why shouldn't we require that it be made out of a single piece of metal? Because the critical aspect of the channel is its shape, which resists buckling and other forces in a manner that's unique as compared to angles, which we agree are not included in the term channel. And it is a little or no consequence in either of these examples of the channel, whether these side elements are folded from a larger sheet, whether they are rolled, which is a form of folding, or whether this is cast or extruded as a single piece, or whether the sides are attached by welding, for example. If you were not using steel, if you were using plastic, you might join the pieces by glue, for example, that would be suitable for that material. But you're not saying it. I mean, what's the base for saying, either in the specification or the expert, after the day of the steer, or anywhere else? Or contradicting the motion that a channel made out of a single piece of metal? There's no specific discussion in the patent that says it must be made or it may be made out of one or several pieces, because all of those are reasonably understood and included in the term channel. It's an element having a U-shaped or C-shaped cross section. The method for producing the channel that would be suitable for a snow pusher, for example, was not addressed because it's not critical. It could be made by any method, as long as you have that C-shaped or U-shaped cross section, which provides the strength that's required. That's the important thing
. Yep, but should not be responding well on a sentence. We review claim construction in Denova. Correct. We look at the available materials. One of the available materials in the dictionary, the dictionary seemed to define a channel that is made from a single piece of metal. Now, in we exercise our authority to disprove the term channel, why shouldn't we require that it be made out of a single piece of metal? Because the critical aspect of the channel is its shape, which resists buckling and other forces in a manner that's unique as compared to angles, which we agree are not included in the term channel. And it is a little or no consequence in either of these examples of the channel, whether these side elements are folded from a larger sheet, whether they are rolled, which is a form of folding, or whether this is cast or extruded as a single piece, or whether the sides are attached by welding, for example. If you were not using steel, if you were using plastic, you might join the pieces by glue, for example, that would be suitable for that material. But you're not saying it. I mean, what's the base for saying, either in the specification or the expert, after the day of the steer, or anywhere else? Or contradicting the motion that a channel made out of a single piece of metal? There's no specific discussion in the patent that says it must be made or it may be made out of one or several pieces, because all of those are reasonably understood and included in the term channel. It's an element having a U-shaped or C-shaped cross section. The method for producing the channel that would be suitable for a snow pusher, for example, was not addressed because it's not critical. It could be made by any method, as long as you have that C-shaped or U-shaped cross section, which provides the strength that's required. That's the important thing. How you get that piece is not of consequence. The definitions that the court looked at, some of them included some reference to possible ways of making a channel. RCS, in brief, is arguing it must be sort of preformed. Someone else has to make it. You have to buy it that way. RCS is itself a steel fabricator. They make steel pieces of all kinds, and one of the things they make is this channel. The notion of who made it doesn't determine whether or not it's a channel. As I mentioned, for RCS to now be arguing that the definition used by the court after consideration of various dictionary definitions, for them to argue it's wrong, is inappropriate in their brief. I'll point you again to pages 9, 13, and 15. They argued that that definition must apply. To now say it's not maybe not quite right is, well, switching in horses in the middle of the stream here. The court correctly observed that nothing was relinquished in the way of meaning of channel. Simply, a distinction was made and angle is in the channel
. How you get that piece is not of consequence. The definitions that the court looked at, some of them included some reference to possible ways of making a channel. RCS, in brief, is arguing it must be sort of preformed. Someone else has to make it. You have to buy it that way. RCS is itself a steel fabricator. They make steel pieces of all kinds, and one of the things they make is this channel. The notion of who made it doesn't determine whether or not it's a channel. As I mentioned, for RCS to now be arguing that the definition used by the court after consideration of various dictionary definitions, for them to argue it's wrong, is inappropriate in their brief. I'll point you again to pages 9, 13, and 15. They argued that that definition must apply. To now say it's not maybe not quite right is, well, switching in horses in the middle of the stream here. The court correctly observed that nothing was relinquished in the way of meaning of channel. Simply, a distinction was made and angle is in the channel. Nothing more was said about that. The curve back to the extent anything is not straight. Both of these examples have a curved edge that meets the back of the blade. That's what any craftsman would do when he's making them together. The point is, this channel is straight. This one is straight in its own way. But straight isn't really the issue. The court got misled with this notion of curve which came out of nowhere. And I think I'll let the courts error, but the notion of straight or curve isn't really an issue here, I believe. Thank you. Time was up. The current theme. Okay. Thank you very much
. Thank you for your attention