Legal Case Summary

Ramone Borromev.Atty Gen USA


Date Argued: Wed Mar 07 2012
Case Number:
Docket Number: 2598872
Judges:Not available
Duration: 30 minutes
Court Name:

Case Summary

**Case Summary for Ramone Borromeo v. Attorney General of the USA** **Docket Number:** 2598872 **Court:** United States Court of Appeals **Date:** [Insert date of decision] **Background:** Ramone Borromeo filed a case against the Attorney General of the United States, challenging a decision made by an immigration court regarding his immigration status in the United States. Borromeo, a non-citizen, was facing deportation and sought to appeal the ruling that ordered his removal based on eligibility criteria under U.S. immigration laws. **Key Issues:** 1. **Immigration Status:** The primary issue revolves around Borromeo's eligibility for relief from removal under the applicable immigration statutes. 2. **Due Process:** Borromeo argued that his rights to due process were violated during the proceedings, leading to an unjust outcome. 3. **Legal Precedents:** The case examined the interpretation of relevant legal precedents and statutes as they apply to Borromeo's situation. **Arguments:** - **For Borromeo:** His legal representation contended that the facts of the case warranted a reconsideration of the decision based on substantive legal arguments and violations of procedural fairness that occurred during the original decision-making processes. - **For the Attorney General:** The government maintained that the findings of the lower immigration court were supported by the evidence presented and that Borromeo did not meet the criteria for discretionary relief from deportation. **Ruling:** The appellate court's decision addressed the arguments presented and assessed the evidence on record. It analyzed the application of the law in the context of Borromeo's claims. [Insert a brief summary of the court's ruling here, including whether the original decision was upheld or overturned, and any directives given to the lower court if applicable.] **Conclusion:** The outcome of Ramone Borromeo's case against the Attorney General of the USA is significant not only for Borromeo himself but also for the broader implications it may have on similar immigration cases. The case underscores the complexities of immigration law and highlights the importance of due process in adjudicating matters of removal and relief. [Note: Insert facts regarding potential future steps or implications, such as possible appeals or further actions from the Attorney General or Borromeo, if applicable.] **End of Summary** (Please update the specific date and rulings based on the actual case outcome, as this is a template based on general legal principles.)

Ramone Borromev.Atty Gen USA


Oral Audio Transcript(Beta version)

Bhram v. Attorney General. Good morning, Honours. My name is Tom Griffin. I represent Ramon Barone, the petitioner on this petition for Morning Post-Graphen. I've reserved our ask to reserve five minutes for reviving. I think there's sort of a global issue that this case implicates and then a smaller sort of micro issue in how the judge Arthur of the immigration court made his ruling and got to where he got. As I was preparing this weekend, there's no reason under the categorical approach. You have to read the statute first. Find an ambiguity. What's relating to a controlled substance? Would that let us look down into the underlying circumstances? There's nothing in the related two cases in the Lulee case or anything like that that's often held up by the non-circuit that has to do. It is a drug case. So there's nothing related to it. There's not paraphernalia or transportation or facilitation systems attached to it. The typical relating two cases would be like a pipe to smoke crack, papers to roll, marijuana joint or drug houses or something like that

. It wasn't controlled. Substances, is it not? It's just not an issue. You couldn't get to the word oxycontin because under the categorical approach, you can't get to the indictment. Should we go beyond the two ways you could be implicated here. One is an aggravated felony of illicit trafficking and a controlled substance. The other violation of law relating to a controlled substance. Would those words relating to let us take us outside the usual categorical approach? Well, it's either a controlled substance or it's not. There's no relating to it. And I would concede that under the Health and Human Services Act, which is where this comes from, that oxycontin is a drug, and I would concede that under the Control Substance Act, it's a controlled substance. And where the judge made his mistake is he shouldn't even have gotten to the word oxycontin because under the categorical approach, which is in all the line of cases from Evanson, Garcia, Thomas, you look at the statute first. And what Judge Arthur didn't do is first say I'm reading this statute, 331T, and this other food in drug act, 353. And I find an ambiguity because I see certain sections of it that could be aggravated felonies and certain that are on. So now we have to decide which. But there's nothing that's an aggravated felony in the literal reading of those Health and Human Services Statutes

. What he said, and it's on, in the appendix, the first time he says that he goes, respond it was convicted of violating count one and a two-count indictment. That's completely wrong. He should have said the respond it was convicted of violating Title 21, Section 331T and 353E. So he jumped. And look at all of them. And all of them are opposed to Francis and that's it. He jumped and that's where he made his biggest mistake. And he was trying to squeeze something that's in the Health and Human Services Act that's under a different cabinet position, different investigators as Health and Human Services officers. It's not even in the criminal code in rules that these things and under the federal sensing guidelines, it's not under Section 2D, but these are punished as a completely different societal harm under 2N, 2.1, and the maximum guideline level is at level 6. And it doesn't involve any, there's no adjustments for things that involve street drugs or anything like that. It's really a regulatory offense. If it's a government prosecuting these kinds of matters in the way that we saw here or is this a unique case? In terms of immigration, I'm an immigration lawyer, so I can't. So I only know people who are convicted of this that also have, that also are not citizens

. So I've never seen it before. I think if you go with what the judge says, and also in his ruling, he says that this controlled substance act, which shouldn't even come into play here, makes it a felony to knowingly or intentionally manufacture, distribute dispenser, possess, without trying to manufacture, distribute, or expense any controlled substance, and then he goes on. Well, that's what AstraZeneca does. That's what that's what GlaxoSmith Klein does. That's what Endo, I mean, if it's a, they're just separate ways of looking at the stream of commerce of drugs that include things like oxycontin, but also lipitor, dilent, and viagra. And if you're going to implicate all these van drivers, but if they don't have the right paperwork that day as they're driving from the warehouse over to CVS, you're making it an aggravated felony where you're going to be deported and banish from the United States forever. There is an overlap between what a drug is and what a control substance is, but under this, you can't get to control substance. The government had indicted here not under 331 or 353, but rather had indicted under the control substance's act with respect to the particular drug oxycontin. Oh, you would be able to luck then, wouldn't you? Oh, yeah, I think if you're on the street selling to end users, pills of oxycontin pills, that's a clear, the DEA is going to come in and get you with their guns and arrest you. But this is not that. This is a paperwork regulatory offense where the judge did something improper, which was this, for example, hypothetically, there's a box of drugs and the judge opened the box to see what was in there. And there was a lot of drugs in there that aren't controlled substances and it just happened to be a bottle and he was improper from to open that box. And I would analogize it to even receiving stolen property offense, which if you were sentenced to more than a year, it's an aggravated felony. But that's like you have the stolen thing and what's the stolen thing is a treasure trust

. Judge Arthur opened it to see if there was also a firearm in there or if there was a drug in there and then tried to work backwards and squeeze it through the controlled substances act. And that's just not, it wasn't an element of defense, it's not an element of this statute. And it was his sort of circular reasoning, even citing the two prong approach, he even used that wrong because this is a better role. What about the argument that the Control Substances Act, along with 331 and 353 have similar regulatory goals, namely the keeping potentially dangerous chemicals out of the wrong hands? I don't read it that way, but reading the Food and Drug Act, it really talks about drugs that are for the benefit of mankind that need the supervision of a doctor, basically the easiest way to say that these things all need prescriptions. I think when you read the Control Substances Act, you see, you are targeting the international drug trade, illicit drug trade. This is very illicit. The people who get arrested or are indicted under the self and human services, it's illicit drug trade. And the Control Substances Act and even the Immigration Act talks about illicit trafficking in a controlled substance. And this is illicit trafficking in a drug which is completely different, sort of societal harm. Should we just focus on the Control Substance argument here and not the aggravated felony? The government doesn't appear to be. Yeah, I can concede that I don't quite understand what that government is, or approach is in this case. I mean, it's a threshold issue in Immigration Court. You first have to determine removable ability. Is the thing that person was convicted of something that could render him removable from the country? The second phase is applying for relief

. And is there a way out of it? Is there a way to stay in the country in spite of your removable ability? At the removable ability stage is the judge what we call pre-terminated all applications. He said, this is a Control Substance and an aggravated felony. If the judge had found that it wasn't an aggravated felony, but a Control Substance offense, he would have a way out. He would have at least an application for relief called cancellation. And if he found that it was neither, he wouldn't, the case would be terminated. He would just be restored to his lawful permanent credit status. I think it's the same argument in terms of 237A2B, the Control Substance Deportation Ground. How did the judge get to Control Substance? The statute doesn't invite an inquiry. It's not ambiguous. He, like I said, he opened the box of drugs that was on its way to CVS. And he had no grounds to do that. He had no, there was nothing ambiguous that said, let me see, to fix this. Good. Thank you very much

. Come on. Any honors? May I please the court? You did the cone on behalf of the Respondent Attorney General. If your honors will. How do you justify departing from our formal categorical approach in this case? Are you asking with respect to the... Either way. Well, with respect to aggravated felony determinations, it's clear that this court has explained that the categorical approach must be applied. However, the same is not true with respect to the controlled substance ground. Why? Yeah, why? As the board, this court and the Supreme Court have explained, the phrase relating to has a broad meaning. It's to be read expansively. And that means to stand in some relation, to have bearing or concern, to pertain, to refer or bring into association with. Thus, the question is whether a law is one relating to a controlled substance. In applying that broad definition, this court and others have considered convictions for crimes such as possession of drug paraphernalia to be a conviction of a law relating to controlled substance

. Not with any of the fact that no controlled substance was actually involved. Is there any precedent for using a violation of 331 or 353 and 353 as a basis for removal? Any case at all? Not that I'm aware of. This law doesn't even, the law that is involved here doesn't even mention control of substance. It does not, however, it's clear that it's intended to regulate the distribution of substances, many of which are controlled substance. Or it could have been penicillin, I mean, for that matter. It could have been, but the question is whether it's a law relating to a controlled substance. And in this case, you made the decision not to charge him with a controlled substance violation. You made the decision to charge him with regard to a violation of handling drugs without a proper license. There could have been several reasons why the Federal Prosecutor chose to take the route that he or she did. I'm not sure because the record doesn't indicate what they're thinking was. However, this doesn't make a difference, though, whatever. The fact that he was prosecuted under the regulatory provisions. It does not. It does not, in fact, as several state court convictions under state laws which do not include mention of the controlled substance act also have been found to be a law relating to controlled substance

. And thus, in the Ninth Circuit's decision, Lulee, they indicated that the state court, the state statute, excuse me, did not map perfectly with the definition of a controlled substance under the controlled substance act. But said that it was a law relating to a controlled substance nonetheless. And in this case, too, this law is a law relating to controlled substance. Now, that's the conclusion. You got to help us get there. Let's take the situation. And I'll admit this first one. I'll give you two examples. The first one is a bit far-affached. Okay. Pharmacist must use latex gloves to handle oxycontin. And he doesn't. Is that a crime relating to a controlled substance? The attorney general would have to determine that in the first instance. And as this court has recognized, the phrase relating to is one which this court should defer to the board's interpretation of

. Okay. Let's take an actual case. The 21 USC 353D3B says that authorized distributors of drug suppliers must store the drug samples in under conditions that will maintain their stability, integrity, and effectiveness. Otherwise, they're sure that they work. Somebody doesn't do that. And 353D3B is a criminal offense and the US attorney indites. Is that a crime relating to a controlled substance? What would have to be considered in that case is whether that statute stands in some relation to has some bearing with pertains or furs or brings to association with the controlled substance. And that would be the question to be determined by the board in such a case. You're asking us to go a long way because those examples really make it almost seem to be absurd for what is intended under the particular definition of aggravated felony here. I'll point the court to a case cited in the Respondents Brief Desire, which is a seventh circuit case, which related to a statute under Illinois law, which related to local substances. Now, local substances are not controlled substances. That's the whole point. They look white. They were intended to be controlled substances

. I mean, they were intended to have somebody who bought them, think they were controlled substances. That's correct. That's correct, but there in no way chemically, well, chemically perhaps there, but they are not controlled substances. And that's the whole point that desire was making. In that case, the seventh circuit explained that if Congress wanted this one-to-one relationship, then it could have used a phrase like involved. But there it says, I'm telling you that I would like you to give me money because I'm going to give you cocaine. And I give you instead baking power, but I take powder, but I take your money. I can understand how the side comes out, but that seems to be different from a case in which I'm prosecuted criminally for not storing drugs to be given to suppliers in the proper way. In this case, we're dealing with prohibition on the distribution of drugs under Section 353E of 21 U.S. Code. And that relates to wholesale distribution in interstate commerce of drugs. Clearly, this type of statute relates to a controlled substance. And of course, as recognized in response brief, there isn't a total overlap. Some drugs will not be controlled substances, and some controlled substances will not be drugs. However, schedules two through five of the five schedules of controlled substances are those which have medical purposes for which a prescription is required. In other words, most controlled substances do require prescription, and that's the point here. The point is that petitioner focuses on illicit versus illicit. The same drugs can be illicit or illicit depending on how they're distributed. An individual can receive a prescription for an opiate from a doctor. That same opiate can be illegal if purchased on the street, but legal if received as a prescription from a doctor. So we're talking about the same substance, and this statute under which the petitioner was convicted relates to prescriptions and distribution of prescription drugs, many of which are controlled substances. And so there need not be a one-to-one correlation. This law clearly relates to a controlled substance because of the essence of its purpose. So in my examples, those clearly relate to a controlled substance as well. And you're saying that that would be a violation of 1227A2B1, which I misspoke earlier. I said aggravated felon. I meant controls a crime, a violation of a law relating to a controlled substance

. Some drugs will not be controlled substances, and some controlled substances will not be drugs. However, schedules two through five of the five schedules of controlled substances are those which have medical purposes for which a prescription is required. In other words, most controlled substances do require prescription, and that's the point here. The point is that petitioner focuses on illicit versus illicit. The same drugs can be illicit or illicit depending on how they're distributed. An individual can receive a prescription for an opiate from a doctor. That same opiate can be illegal if purchased on the street, but legal if received as a prescription from a doctor. So we're talking about the same substance, and this statute under which the petitioner was convicted relates to prescriptions and distribution of prescription drugs, many of which are controlled substances. And so there need not be a one-to-one correlation. This law clearly relates to a controlled substance because of the essence of its purpose. So in my examples, those clearly relate to a controlled substance as well. And you're saying that that would be a violation of 1227A2B1, which I misspoke earlier. I said aggravated felon. I meant controls a crime, a violation of a law relating to a controlled substance. We'll deal with aggravated felony later. But in my example, the person doesn't do what he or she is supposed to do on a regulatory basis in terms of preserving and maintaining drugs so that they will be effective. And those people are prosecuted criminally. And the question is, is that a crime relating to a controlled substance? That, and we really know? That certainly is a more extreme example than the one in this case, which clearly relates to distribution of prescription drugs and a violation by wholesale distribution of such drugs. And the Court needn't consider those extreme examples because in this case, we have a clear violation of a law which deals at regulating distribution of prescription drugs. And this is an individual who was not a pharmacist. We know that to be the case. And so, if you wanted to tether this to 1227, why didn't the U.S. attorney indict under the Control Substances Act? I don't have an answer to that question. I'm not certain why they chose to prosecute under this statute versus another one. However, they did prosecute under the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. And that's what we have in the administrative record before us. And to take the court once that back, much was made about the immigration judges' reasoning

. We'll deal with aggravated felony later. But in my example, the person doesn't do what he or she is supposed to do on a regulatory basis in terms of preserving and maintaining drugs so that they will be effective. And those people are prosecuted criminally. And the question is, is that a crime relating to a controlled substance? That, and we really know? That certainly is a more extreme example than the one in this case, which clearly relates to distribution of prescription drugs and a violation by wholesale distribution of such drugs. And the Court needn't consider those extreme examples because in this case, we have a clear violation of a law which deals at regulating distribution of prescription drugs. And this is an individual who was not a pharmacist. We know that to be the case. And so, if you wanted to tether this to 1227, why didn't the U.S. attorney indict under the Control Substances Act? I don't have an answer to that question. I'm not certain why they chose to prosecute under this statute versus another one. However, they did prosecute under the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. And that's what we have in the administrative record before us. And to take the court once that back, much was made about the immigration judges' reasoning. But to point to jurisdiction for a moment, 242 A2C precludes this court from reviewing a petition by an alien who has been removed on certain criminal grounds, notwithstanding A2C. The court does retain jurisdiction to consider de novo whether the petitioner is an alien who's removable by reason of one of those enumerated offenses in A2C. And so this court does have jurisdiction to consider these issues. However, the court can consider them for a reason other than that provided by the immigration judge. Because it's reviewing de novo this question, which is a jurisdictional and threshold issue. It almost seems as if what happened here is that one of the seven drugs involved, Oxycontin, was a controlled substance. That seems to be the six of the seven were not. But if we're constrained to apply a categorical approach and not any modification of that, I'm going to loss to figure out how 331 and 353 are relating to controlled substance. Well, permit me to read your own read that when it comes to the aggravated felony ground, the court is obligated to apply the categorical approach. However, that test doesn't apply to law relating to controlled substance and has stated in respondents brief position of the respond is that the court only needs to reach the law relating to controlled substance because there are no, there are no collateral consequences to the aggravated felony. I thought you were not arguing that we should apply the modified categorical approach. I'm not as aggravated felony because I'm sorry I repeat the question of the argument. Did you argue in your brief as he concedes that we should apply formal categorical to aggravated felony. To the aggravated felony, however, the argument made in our brief was that the court needn't reach the aggravated felony finding because the law relating to controlled substance ground 237 is dispositive

. But to point to jurisdiction for a moment, 242 A2C precludes this court from reviewing a petition by an alien who has been removed on certain criminal grounds, notwithstanding A2C. The court does retain jurisdiction to consider de novo whether the petitioner is an alien who's removable by reason of one of those enumerated offenses in A2C. And so this court does have jurisdiction to consider these issues. However, the court can consider them for a reason other than that provided by the immigration judge. Because it's reviewing de novo this question, which is a jurisdictional and threshold issue. It almost seems as if what happened here is that one of the seven drugs involved, Oxycontin, was a controlled substance. That seems to be the six of the seven were not. But if we're constrained to apply a categorical approach and not any modification of that, I'm going to loss to figure out how 331 and 353 are relating to controlled substance. Well, permit me to read your own read that when it comes to the aggravated felony ground, the court is obligated to apply the categorical approach. However, that test doesn't apply to law relating to controlled substance and has stated in respondents brief position of the respond is that the court only needs to reach the law relating to controlled substance because there are no, there are no collateral consequences to the aggravated felony. I thought you were not arguing that we should apply the modified categorical approach. I'm not as aggravated felony because I'm sorry I repeat the question of the argument. Did you argue in your brief as he concedes that we should apply formal categorical to aggravated felony. To the aggravated felony, however, the argument made in our brief was that the court needn't reach the aggravated felony finding because the law relating to controlled substance ground 237 is dispositive. Excuse me, I'm sorry to send a to be one is dispositive in this case because there are no collateral consequences to the aggravated felony finding. Sure. The question here, the violation of law in this case was a federal guilty plea, but it could be a state law violation. Absolutely. All right. One of the advantages of the formal categorical approach is the simplicity of only looking at the elements of a state court offense. Very frequently, when you try to go deeper than that, the information simply is not available. There's a file somewhere in a cardboard box in the dusty attic of a courthouse and nobody knows where it is. I speak from years of experience. Sure. It's a district judge. Okay. And in my standpoint, it leans very heavily in favor of adopting the formal categorical approach whenever you can when you're doing this type of thing because very often you're not going to be able to find out what happened, what drugs were involved. Well, the other thing that happens is deals are made

. Excuse me, I'm sorry to send a to be one is dispositive in this case because there are no collateral consequences to the aggravated felony finding. Sure. The question here, the violation of law in this case was a federal guilty plea, but it could be a state law violation. Absolutely. All right. One of the advantages of the formal categorical approach is the simplicity of only looking at the elements of a state court offense. Very frequently, when you try to go deeper than that, the information simply is not available. There's a file somewhere in a cardboard box in the dusty attic of a courthouse and nobody knows where it is. I speak from years of experience. Sure. It's a district judge. Okay. And in my standpoint, it leans very heavily in favor of adopting the formal categorical approach whenever you can when you're doing this type of thing because very often you're not going to be able to find out what happened, what drugs were involved. Well, the other thing that happens is deals are made. Judges are outnumbered by the sheer number of crimes. So what the underlying situation is in truth, very often doesn't surface in the crime to which the person pleads guilty anyway. So you have that problem. And to my thinking, this all points towards one of the advantages of adopting the formal categorical approach with regard to the relating to language. And you're saying we can't do that or we shouldn't. I understand, you're on it. But the statute says any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of or conspires their attempt to violate any law or regulation relating to control of substance. So any law or regulation relating to control of substance. So what's the question before the court whether the law law relating to it? Sure. Sure. But we didn't reach the facts in this case. This is a law relating to controlled substance. Even if we were to. Wouldn't be a law relating to a controlled substance if you didn't have oxycatin involved

. Judges are outnumbered by the sheer number of crimes. So what the underlying situation is in truth, very often doesn't surface in the crime to which the person pleads guilty anyway. So you have that problem. And to my thinking, this all points towards one of the advantages of adopting the formal categorical approach with regard to the relating to language. And you're saying we can't do that or we shouldn't. I understand, you're on it. But the statute says any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of or conspires their attempt to violate any law or regulation relating to control of substance. So any law or regulation relating to control of substance. So what's the question before the court whether the law law relating to it? Sure. Sure. But we didn't reach the facts in this case. This is a law relating to controlled substance. Even if we were to. Wouldn't be a law relating to a controlled substance if you didn't have oxycatin involved. But it doesn't say a law involving a controlled substance. And then that's the point I'd like to make to the court. It says a law relating to controlled substance. And Congress clearly intended to make this apply to a broad swath of individuals who. Because it could relate to oxycatin. You're saying that's enough. It's not whether it could relate to it's whether the law does relate to does the law relate to. It means you have to look at the underlying facts. If you look at the statute, the statute itself relates to a controlled substance. Relates to doesn't necessarily involve. And there is a distinction to be made there and I understand that that can be difficult. Because. Well, it can be. In any case, when we consider what relating to means, if we say that it means standing in some relation to

. But it doesn't say a law involving a controlled substance. And then that's the point I'd like to make to the court. It says a law relating to controlled substance. And Congress clearly intended to make this apply to a broad swath of individuals who. Because it could relate to oxycatin. You're saying that's enough. It's not whether it could relate to it's whether the law does relate to does the law relate to. It means you have to look at the underlying facts. If you look at the statute, the statute itself relates to a controlled substance. Relates to doesn't necessarily involve. And there is a distinction to be made there and I understand that that can be difficult. Because. Well, it can be. In any case, when we consider what relating to means, if we say that it means standing in some relation to. To have a bearing or concern to pertain or bring into association with this statute brings into association. And controlled substances because many of the drugs which it prohibits the distribution of our controlled substances. And so in the same way that many courts have found that possession of drug paraphernalia, for example, which includes no controlled substance, that the pipe itself, but not the drug, is a law relating to a controlled substance. Here too, we have a law that relates to controlled substance and it requires an understanding of how broad Congress's intent was in indicating that it seeks the removal of individuals aliens who violate laws of that type to the reason saying because there's a possibility that it could involve a controlled substance that that's enough. 237 A2B2, the following provision provides the individuals who are aliens or drug addicts can also be removed. And that indicates how broad Congress intended this to be. There's an inadmissibility grant for individuals who admit committing to fear. I'm sorry. Usually if you're a drug, well, I was just going to. The fact of Judge Vanont-Torpon's point is, you know, why should we get beyond the categorical approach if we do it, we're inviting all kinds of cases to come up that are going to be very difficult. Well, they're going to be splitting hairs and this is a much easier way of getting, making having certainty with regard to legal matters pertaining to when you have a crime under 1227 A. 1227. I understand the concern if you'll permit me to respond to my time's up. In essence, because what the court is looking at is whether the law relates to controlled substance, the analysis is somewhat similar to the formal categorical approach because we're looking at the law

. To have a bearing or concern to pertain or bring into association with this statute brings into association. And controlled substances because many of the drugs which it prohibits the distribution of our controlled substances. And so in the same way that many courts have found that possession of drug paraphernalia, for example, which includes no controlled substance, that the pipe itself, but not the drug, is a law relating to a controlled substance. Here too, we have a law that relates to controlled substance and it requires an understanding of how broad Congress's intent was in indicating that it seeks the removal of individuals aliens who violate laws of that type to the reason saying because there's a possibility that it could involve a controlled substance that that's enough. 237 A2B2, the following provision provides the individuals who are aliens or drug addicts can also be removed. And that indicates how broad Congress intended this to be. There's an inadmissibility grant for individuals who admit committing to fear. I'm sorry. Usually if you're a drug, well, I was just going to. The fact of Judge Vanont-Torpon's point is, you know, why should we get beyond the categorical approach if we do it, we're inviting all kinds of cases to come up that are going to be very difficult. Well, they're going to be splitting hairs and this is a much easier way of getting, making having certainty with regard to legal matters pertaining to when you have a crime under 1227 A. 1227. I understand the concern if you'll permit me to respond to my time's up. In essence, because what the court is looking at is whether the law relates to controlled substance, the analysis is somewhat similar to the formal categorical approach because we're looking at the law. The court will be looking at whether the law relates to a controlled substance. So yes, it's a broad inquiry because we're asking whether it relates to not involves a controlled substance. But we don't need to reach, the court doesn't need to reach the actual facts of the case in order to determine that this is a law. The statute of conviction is a law. I gave you a couple of hypotheticals and Mr. Griffin posed a third hypothetical that really causes a major problem down the road if we go your way. The consequences of this are that we're opening Pandora's box for all kinds of claims that really go against what we understood previously to be the intent of 1227. Aliens who have been convicted of drug-related offenses are removable and that was Congress's intent and this is the response position that applies in the case like this under this provision 237 A2B1. And your honor is I understand my time is up. I don't want to say my welcome. Any other questions? Any additional questions? Thank you, your honor. Mr. Griffin? Just quickly, I think what this argument sort of outlines the big problem. I don't see anything that's related

. The court will be looking at whether the law relates to a controlled substance. So yes, it's a broad inquiry because we're asking whether it relates to not involves a controlled substance. But we don't need to reach, the court doesn't need to reach the actual facts of the case in order to determine that this is a law. The statute of conviction is a law. I gave you a couple of hypotheticals and Mr. Griffin posed a third hypothetical that really causes a major problem down the road if we go your way. The consequences of this are that we're opening Pandora's box for all kinds of claims that really go against what we understood previously to be the intent of 1227. Aliens who have been convicted of drug-related offenses are removable and that was Congress's intent and this is the response position that applies in the case like this under this provision 237 A2B1. And your honor is I understand my time is up. I don't want to say my welcome. Any other questions? Any additional questions? Thank you, your honor. Mr. Griffin? Just quickly, I think what this argument sort of outlines the big problem. I don't see anything that's related. If you read the Health and Human Services, it's all about controlled substances. Some of them are in the schedule of drugs that you can be addicted to that are addressed by the Drug Enforcement Administration and agents with guns and some are enforced like lipitor and di-lantin and something like that by my inspectors general. I mean, I can't play with the words to say this isn't related to controlled substances. It's right there, but that's there's two separate agencies to separate enforcement to separate sets of regulations and it's just parsing words on it just doesn't work. I think, but if you just go straight to the related two cases, it always talks about the facilitation of getting an illicit drug in the illicit market into somebody's body or across the border or in secret. And those are the related two cases and there's so many in Pennsylvania that you're really just about what about the drugs? What about the drug paraphernalia cases? Those are all about getting involved, the facilitation of getting the drug ingested. Here we're talking about van drivers that happen to forget their clipboard and maybe in the back of the van, you know, there's some oxy-contin, but maybe 99% of the van is, you know, a hypertension drug. And to hold these guys accountable for a drug drug. Every match I can't, and this sounds like facilitating for me. How would you know that it involved oxy-contin if it unless you got to the indictment and the judge wasn't allowed to? The judge had to stay even on the control substance, if it's yet to stay within the categorical approach. And is this related to drugs? I guess it is related to controlled substances. I guess so. The word is drug all over all over these two statutes though. Thank you, Mr

. Griffin. The case was very well argued. We will take the matter under advise