Good morning, Donald Kilmer for the Appellants, Richard Eno's at all. Please the court. This case is a civil case that kind of stands for the proposition that it's usually better to ask for permission than forgiveness, because while this case was pending another case, Shovon came through the through the circuit in which Mr. Shovon was convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. So Shovon said that the statute is constitutional on its face and were banned by that. So the only question that seems to be remaining is whether your client still has an as-applied challenge. Can you address that? Do you agree that Shovon resolves a facial constitutionality challenge? I don't believe it resolves the entire facial constitutional challenge runner, because Shovon did apply a constitutional analysis that I can't challenge at this stage of the proceedings to the overall lifetime ban for Mr. Minutes, people convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence. It didn't apply its analysis to the parenthetical statement, which is really an issue in this case. And that is in 18 USC 921A33. We have this parenthetical statement that says if the conviction has been expunged or set aside or is an offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored, then the parenthetical starts
. If the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offense. The Shovon case did not apply any kind of analysis to that parenthetical. And the reason why that should not be failed to the ENO's claim, or even in a facial challenge, is because there's just no rational basis for applying that to misdemeanors. I don't think there's any state that strips people convicted of misdemeanors of any civil rights, at least unless they're incarcerated. We found a couple of examples of a few states that say, if you're sitting in jail for a misdemeanor, you can't vote. But even California allows people who are convicted of misdemeanors and are sitting in jail, they still have the right to vote. So it's just no rational basis for stripping people of saying that you can't have your rights restored if you haven't been stripped of your civil rights. But let's assume that we can't look behind Jovon's determination that the statute was constitutional on its face. And even if there's different arguments that that paled and considered were bound by that ruling. They also went on mode to say that it was constitutional as applied to Mr
. Chovon. And in doing so, they looked at specific reports, recidivism rates, and also factors pertinent solely to Mr. Chovon. Now would your client have any arguments that it was in constitutional as applied? That's different than what Chovon had or are we also banned by the act of germination? No, you're right. There are several factual distinctions between the Chovon, Mr. Chovon, and the clients in my case. For instance, Judge B is concurring opinion in Chovon, talks about the 1203.4 expungement procedure in California. Whereby, once somebody has served probation done their fine or paid all of their fines and remade crime free, they can petition a court to withdraw their guilty plea, have the accusatory pleading dismissed. And then they stand before the court as an innocent person
. In the ENOs case, every single appellant, every single person who is asking this court for relief has availed themselves of that adversarial procedure. Mr. Chovon rejected that, am I wrong? If I said that under Jennings, it wasn't an expungement. So I mean, isn't it, wouldn't you need to have a pardon from the governor in order to qualify for that exception? No, you're out of the language of the Lawtonburg Amendment provides for four possible ways of restoring rights, pardon, expungement, restoration of rights, and the fourth one that escapes me right now. But the, it's true that the 1203.4 expungement under California Law, by its own statutory terms, says the dismissal under this procedure does not end in of itself restore firearm rights. But the Lawtonburg Amendment doesn't say we can only look to one statute of the state, where the conviction occurred. We can look to this, the state's entire scheme. And under California Law, in order for my clients to get their remedy that they're requesting, they must avail themselves of two remedies. One is the 10 year ban that California opposes, and which the Chovon court found wasn't sufficient
. But Chovon never availed himself of the 1203.4 remedy. My clients did. And also, Apelentinos actually went through a second adversarial procedure under California Law. Again, where the people of the state of California were put on notice that there was a request to restore rights. We appeared before a judicial officer, and the relief was granted. If we, I mean, even if we take your approach, don't we have to overrule Braille to get there? And I don't know that we can't. We're only a three judge panel. Actually, Your Honor, I think you can, because Braille is a pre- He said, and I'm just reading it. They said, the language is very specific
. If misdemeanors and civil rights have been restored, and all those civil rights are not defined, then they said that is core civil rights. And then at 6'11 it says core civil rights are the right to both, the right to the right to hold public office. And then it went so far as to say, if those aren't restored, nothing could be done. That is what Braille says, Your Honor. And prior to Heller, that would be, I would be out of luck. But Braille is prior to Heller. And what Heller told us is that the right to keep in bear arms is also a core fundamental right. And Braille didn't make that finding, and Shovon didn't extend the ruling. I thought Shovon relied on Braille and rejecting that argument. That's what I thought
. Yeah, so we're bound by that. We rejected the argument that this was civil rights restored, and then it was an opposed Heller case. So I think we're just bound by that. You may be, this court may be bound by, all Shovon did was cite Braille, though. Okay, Braille is a pre-Heller case, and this court is entitled to engage in an independent analysis, or an independent analysis, once there has been a change in the law. Once Heller has said the right to keep in bear arms is also a core right. And remember, California... Then your argument says, Shovon, what, I call it Shovon, I may be wrong
. But I mean, the bottom line is, I read Braille, I read it very carefully, because I was, I said to myself, Idaho does this same kind of stuff. Why am I not going to be led in this same direction? So I read Shovon, I read what it said and what it cited. I went to Braille because of it. It seems to me that I'm stuck with Braille. If I don't send this on-bomb, then I just make the same decision. You can make that same plea to the on-bomb court that I can make. I may be stuck with that, Your Honor. I'd like to reserve the rest of my time. Thank you. May it please the court, Michael Braub, for the government
. Shovon not only controls the facial challenges, Chagy Kudi, you indicated, but also be as applied challenges. Well, what is that? Because Shovon looked at the factors specific to Mr. Shovon in determining that he couldn't make an as applied challenge. Plus, it said he didn't offer any reports that show recivism rates that would change our views. And so why doesn't Mr. Inas and the other appellans have the right to go into court and say, well, as applied to me, it's not a substantial, it doesn't further a substantial government interest. Yeah, Your Honor, with respect, they've had their chance to plead facts that would show that they're meaningfully different from Mr. Chovon. And they haven't done so. Well, but that was before, I mean, they went to court before Chovon was decided
. And so we often will remain allowed them to amend the complaint in light of new law. Your Honor, they have not ever, even in this court to date, even after Chovon was decided, they've said nothing to set them apart in any meaningful way from Mr. Chovon. Mr. Chovon also had more than 10 years, well, more than 10 years of lapse after the time of his conviction, the court. Can additional conviction or arrest for some further domestic violence issue or something like that? Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honor, Mr. Chovon did. There wasn't an actual arrest. It was just a visit to the home. And that didn't, that was one part of the court's analysis
. Then it's independently the court for the end of its analysis that he has applied challenge made clear that in any event, your respective of the visit by law enforcement officers to the home without making any arrest independently the As Apply Challenge failed, because this would create an impermissible substantial hole in the scheme. But that doesn't work, right? Because obviously we're reviewing the statute to see if it's constitutional as applied and the fact that some, it's not constitutional as applied to some people can't be a reason to say that, oh, that creates a hole. I mean, that just doesn't even make sense. Well, with respect to your Honor, this, I mean, what was true of Mr. Chovon is also true here with regard to these plaintiffs, the only in the, in that substantial amount of time is elapsed from the time of their conviction. And there's ample social science literature emphasized by the court and Chovon as well as by other courts like the Seven Circuit and Skone that make clear that these individuals convicted of crimes of violence, in particular, have unusually high rates of recidivism, and it's a permissible for Congress to say that if you do not, if you're not able to get a pardon, an expungement, or have your conviction set aside within the meaning of federal law, that there's nothing impermissible about, or have your civil rights restored, there's nothing impermissible, constitutionally precluding Congress from setting the rule as it long has done. So if a quadriplegic comes into court and says, you know, it's unconstitutional to not allow me to get to have a gun as a collector's item, I suppose, it would be constitutional as applied to him. I mean, that doesn't sound right to me because precluding a quadriplegic from having a gun wouldn't further any governmental interest. You're far removed from that. I understand that, but the question is, what you're suggesting that it's constitutional as applied in every case, and I'm not sure that's true. I mean, you could say as a factual matter, there's no evidence available that Mr. Ines or others could bring in. That is what you're saying. That's what we're saying here. You can't preclude that their law could change. The studies could change. New evidence could come up, or the individual appellants could have specific factors that would change the analysis. Right. And our point is, you're on a, they've made no effort whatsoever. So the only thing they've pointed to throughout the litigation, including today, is that they received this far less than complete form of relief under 1203
. I mean, you could say as a factual matter, there's no evidence available that Mr. Ines or others could bring in. That is what you're saying. That's what we're saying here. You can't preclude that their law could change. The studies could change. New evidence could come up, or the individual appellants could have specific factors that would change the analysis. Right. And our point is, you're on a, they've made no effort whatsoever. So the only thing they've pointed to throughout the litigation, including today, is that they received this far less than complete form of relief under 1203.4, which this court in Jennings has made clear, and echoing language from the California courts, that there are substantial, significant restrictions on that form of limited relief, most notably that the conviction can be used against the individual if they're ever charged again with regard to another offense. So that's far removed. And that's the only thing they've identified in any meaningful sense that sets all these plaintiffs apart from Mr. Chauvin. It's just not a meaningful distinction that would warrant coming to any different conclusion on the As Apply Challenge. Does the Lawtonburg Amendment allow for any way for an individual convicted of a misdemeanor crime of divestive violence to regain his or her right to possess a firearm? Well, again, it much depends on state law. So if the state like could... But in California
.4, which this court in Jennings has made clear, and echoing language from the California courts, that there are substantial, significant restrictions on that form of limited relief, most notably that the conviction can be used against the individual if they're ever charged again with regard to another offense. So that's far removed. And that's the only thing they've identified in any meaningful sense that sets all these plaintiffs apart from Mr. Chauvin. It's just not a meaningful distinction that would warrant coming to any different conclusion on the As Apply Challenge. Does the Lawtonburg Amendment allow for any way for an individual convicted of a misdemeanor crime of divestive violence to regain his or her right to possess a firearm? Well, again, it much depends on state law. So if the state like could... But in California. In California, I'm not aware. It's not entirely clear to me what Avenue was open, but California could. I mean, it's noteworthy that California has chosen not to afford this kind of expungement, say, that other states like Kentucky have done, and that's permissible for Congress to do. And it's entirely permissible for Congress to enact a statute like this that respects the interest of the states to a degree and says, look, if you as a state want to expunge, provide for true expungement or true set aside of the conviction, or you want to take away their civil rights and then provide a way for restoring them, that's one of them. It seems that doesn't seem odd that California had said for a crime of domestic violence, we will take away your right to have a gun, and we will now take away your right to vote, the Honourary or Whole Public Office, so that we can restore them, but not your right to have a gun. So that you can have qualified for guns in the future. I mean, it just seems very odd that having a harsher punishment imposed on a misdemeanor, a misdemeanor, would then enable the misdemeanor to qualify for the exception. It's not unusual, and just as the Court in Shoveon explained in rejecting the Equal Protection Challenge that was made in that case, not made here, that Congress could permissibly conclude that if you've gone through a state law process that restores rights, that you are in a meaningfully different position from someone who never had that process, post conviction, take place. But the substance of my colleagues question, which is really the thing that most concerns me in this particular case, it seems to be a similar procedure as we have in Idaho, and being a state judge, it seems that felonies, there is no question, there's a way laid out that you can get it to all of your constitutional rights back, and you know what you're supposed to do. So there it is for felonies, but they've left misdemeanors, and the real, the realality of it is maybe they thought they were doing the same thing with what they've got on the books
. In California, I'm not aware. It's not entirely clear to me what Avenue was open, but California could. I mean, it's noteworthy that California has chosen not to afford this kind of expungement, say, that other states like Kentucky have done, and that's permissible for Congress to do. And it's entirely permissible for Congress to enact a statute like this that respects the interest of the states to a degree and says, look, if you as a state want to expunge, provide for true expungement or true set aside of the conviction, or you want to take away their civil rights and then provide a way for restoring them, that's one of them. It seems that doesn't seem odd that California had said for a crime of domestic violence, we will take away your right to have a gun, and we will now take away your right to vote, the Honourary or Whole Public Office, so that we can restore them, but not your right to have a gun. So that you can have qualified for guns in the future. I mean, it just seems very odd that having a harsher punishment imposed on a misdemeanor, a misdemeanor, would then enable the misdemeanor to qualify for the exception. It's not unusual, and just as the Court in Shoveon explained in rejecting the Equal Protection Challenge that was made in that case, not made here, that Congress could permissibly conclude that if you've gone through a state law process that restores rights, that you are in a meaningfully different position from someone who never had that process, post conviction, take place. But the substance of my colleagues question, which is really the thing that most concerns me in this particular case, it seems to be a similar procedure as we have in Idaho, and being a state judge, it seems that felonies, there is no question, there's a way laid out that you can get it to all of your constitutional rights back, and you know what you're supposed to do. So there it is for felonies, but they've left misdemeanors, and the real, the realality of it is maybe they thought they were doing the same thing with what they've got on the books. And here we have a situation where you have a felony crime, you can get it, you can get it taken away, you can do what you have to do, but with this, because they give this procedure to get it done, and it just doesn't meet the statute. But somehow that, that's okay. Well, a couple of points one, the Congress was careful here in G9, which applies to only a small subset of misdemeanors, special misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, which pose special problems, as Senator Lottonberg and others mentioned, and as the Supreme Court has echoed in considering the statute subsequently. It's pose special problems. These are individuals who not only, when they convict these crimes, run the risk of unusually high risk of recidivism, but they also are oftentimes undercharged for their offense. And it's not at all impermissible for Congress to have taken the step it did, and with regard to, and states are fully free to take account of this, and if they wish to, to provide mechanisms for individuals such as these convicted of miscrimes of domestic violence to get their firearms back, they can do so. California Lyleism, I mean in other words, he's entitled to firearms under California law, but the federal law has, in effect, put a lifetime ban on someone who was convicted of a misdemeanor, and that seems odd, where the state has determined that the person is entitled to have the right to carry a firearm. And there's nothing impermissible. You're saying the state has to change its laws because of a federal law in order to restore what it already has under state law? It doesn't have to do anything if it wishes to provide mechanism for the individual to get their federal firearms back. It can do so, but it's not worth it
. And here we have a situation where you have a felony crime, you can get it, you can get it taken away, you can do what you have to do, but with this, because they give this procedure to get it done, and it just doesn't meet the statute. But somehow that, that's okay. Well, a couple of points one, the Congress was careful here in G9, which applies to only a small subset of misdemeanors, special misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, which pose special problems, as Senator Lottonberg and others mentioned, and as the Supreme Court has echoed in considering the statute subsequently. It's pose special problems. These are individuals who not only, when they convict these crimes, run the risk of unusually high risk of recidivism, but they also are oftentimes undercharged for their offense. And it's not at all impermissible for Congress to have taken the step it did, and with regard to, and states are fully free to take account of this, and if they wish to, to provide mechanisms for individuals such as these convicted of miscrimes of domestic violence to get their firearms back, they can do so. California Lyleism, I mean in other words, he's entitled to firearms under California law, but the federal law has, in effect, put a lifetime ban on someone who was convicted of a misdemeanor, and that seems odd, where the state has determined that the person is entitled to have the right to carry a firearm. And there's nothing impermissible. You're saying the state has to change its laws because of a federal law in order to restore what it already has under state law? It doesn't have to do anything if it wishes to provide mechanism for the individual to get their federal firearms back. It can do so, but it's not worth it. And that's what this Court in Chauvin made clear is entirely permissible, relying as Judd Smith pointed out on the earlier Braille decision, that's not at all unusual. This has been around for a long time. It's entirely permissible and well within Congress's conscience. We didn't know it was an individual constitutional right protected by the Constitution to have arms and individual right. We weren't told that until heller. Well, that has been... The Ninth Circuit, it wasn't. By Chauvin, the time Chauvin was decided, it certainly was, and more important as Chauvin reiterates, the term civil rights used in the statute is a term of art
. And that's what this Court in Chauvin made clear is entirely permissible, relying as Judd Smith pointed out on the earlier Braille decision, that's not at all unusual. This has been around for a long time. It's entirely permissible and well within Congress's conscience. We didn't know it was an individual constitutional right protected by the Constitution to have arms and individual right. We weren't told that until heller. Well, that has been... The Ninth Circuit, it wasn't. By Chauvin, the time Chauvin was decided, it certainly was, and more important as Chauvin reiterates, the term civil rights used in the statute is a term of art. The courts have long recognized that that term has limited the special, not just any right of any kind of colloquial sense. These are rights tied to state citizenship. And this has not only been true since decisions like Braille, but also in many other decisions across the circuits, that the Supreme Court in the Logan case noted and made clear and said nothing by way of criticism about limited to these unique rights of state citizenship, right to serve on a jury, right to hold public office. And there's nothing inappropriate about Congress having enacted a statute like that and nothing in the Second Amendment, before closes from the doing so or from applying the provision to the plaintiffs in this case. I think in you over your time. Thank you. Thank you. One of the other distinctions between Chauvin and the, the litigants before this court are that, you know, Spastiani, Marquato, Groves, Montero, and Ericsson, all received their convictions before Lottonberg became an amendment. Lottonberg tells us also that one of the ways that we say that a crime is not a just qualifying crime for purposes of federal firearm rights is if the person was not represented by counsel in the proceeding. There's no way for these, these gentlemen to have ever gotten a knowing and intelligent way of the jury right to trial if they would have known they would have lost their fundamental right to keep in their arms by waiting that right
. The courts have long recognized that that term has limited the special, not just any right of any kind of colloquial sense. These are rights tied to state citizenship. And this has not only been true since decisions like Braille, but also in many other decisions across the circuits, that the Supreme Court in the Logan case noted and made clear and said nothing by way of criticism about limited to these unique rights of state citizenship, right to serve on a jury, right to hold public office. And there's nothing inappropriate about Congress having enacted a statute like that and nothing in the Second Amendment, before closes from the doing so or from applying the provision to the plaintiffs in this case. I think in you over your time. Thank you. Thank you. One of the other distinctions between Chauvin and the, the litigants before this court are that, you know, Spastiani, Marquato, Groves, Montero, and Ericsson, all received their convictions before Lottonberg became an amendment. Lottonberg tells us also that one of the ways that we say that a crime is not a just qualifying crime for purposes of federal firearm rights is if the person was not represented by counsel in the proceeding. There's no way for these, these gentlemen to have ever gotten a knowing and intelligent way of the jury right to trial if they would have known they would have lost their fundamental right to keep in their arms by waiting that right. That's, that's, that's addressed in my brief and I'll leave it at that. I was going to say that is addressed in your brief. I guess my worry about that is I can't find any case that really stands what you're arguing because you're really arguing it isn't a voluntary waiver. You're not alleging there's any procedural defect in what happened. You don't even alleges that they didn't understand. The only thing it is is that they never anticipated it and I frankly I found all kinds of federal law case law that would suggest just to pay your anticipated isn't enough. Yeah, you're on a, and that's what's interesting is California actually provided for that in its statute, barring misdemeanants from having guns for 10 years because it said if you suffered not really talking about California law here, we're talking about federal law. We're talking about the interpretation of that federal law to help you. Yes. That's where I was looking at
. That's, that's, that's addressed in my brief and I'll leave it at that. I was going to say that is addressed in your brief. I guess my worry about that is I can't find any case that really stands what you're arguing because you're really arguing it isn't a voluntary waiver. You're not alleging there's any procedural defect in what happened. You don't even alleges that they didn't understand. The only thing it is is that they never anticipated it and I frankly I found all kinds of federal law case law that would suggest just to pay your anticipated isn't enough. Yeah, you're on a, and that's what's interesting is California actually provided for that in its statute, barring misdemeanants from having guns for 10 years because it said if you suffered not really talking about California law here, we're talking about federal law. We're talking about the interpretation of that federal law to help you. Yes. That's where I was looking at. I understand, Your Honor. I think what we have to summarize as best as possible my argument here is that Lawtonberg clearly said that we look to the state of conviction for whether or not rights should be restored under that state's procedures. Lawtonberg could have said we're going to treat misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence exactly like felonies. Period-end of statement. This would be a much different case. What they said was we're going to look to state law here. Even if we apply the Shoban analysis to the parenthetical statement I cited earlier in my brief and we strip out just that language, nothing else. We uphold Lawtonberg. We say that you have to go through all of these procedures. However, we say that we get rid of this element or this requirement that you have to have lost other civil rights because it makes no sense it's not even rational my clients win
. I understand, Your Honor. I think what we have to summarize as best as possible my argument here is that Lawtonberg clearly said that we look to the state of conviction for whether or not rights should be restored under that state's procedures. Lawtonberg could have said we're going to treat misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence exactly like felonies. Period-end of statement. This would be a much different case. What they said was we're going to look to state law here. Even if we apply the Shoban analysis to the parenthetical statement I cited earlier in my brief and we strip out just that language, nothing else. We uphold Lawtonberg. We say that you have to go through all of these procedures. However, we say that we get rid of this element or this requirement that you have to have lost other civil rights because it makes no sense it's not even rational my clients win. The court should remand the case to proceed with gathering evidence and proceed to trial if necessary. Thank you. Thank you. The case of Richard Enes, the holder, is submitted.
Good morning, Donald Kilmer for the Appellants, Richard Eno's at all. Please the court. This case is a civil case that kind of stands for the proposition that it's usually better to ask for permission than forgiveness, because while this case was pending another case, Shovon came through the through the circuit in which Mr. Shovon was convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. So Shovon said that the statute is constitutional on its face and were banned by that. So the only question that seems to be remaining is whether your client still has an as-applied challenge. Can you address that? Do you agree that Shovon resolves a facial constitutionality challenge? I don't believe it resolves the entire facial constitutional challenge runner, because Shovon did apply a constitutional analysis that I can't challenge at this stage of the proceedings to the overall lifetime ban for Mr. Minutes, people convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence. It didn't apply its analysis to the parenthetical statement, which is really an issue in this case. And that is in 18 USC 921A33. We have this parenthetical statement that says if the conviction has been expunged or set aside or is an offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored, then the parenthetical starts. If the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offense. The Shovon case did not apply any kind of analysis to that parenthetical. And the reason why that should not be failed to the ENO's claim, or even in a facial challenge, is because there's just no rational basis for applying that to misdemeanors. I don't think there's any state that strips people convicted of misdemeanors of any civil rights, at least unless they're incarcerated. We found a couple of examples of a few states that say, if you're sitting in jail for a misdemeanor, you can't vote. But even California allows people who are convicted of misdemeanors and are sitting in jail, they still have the right to vote. So it's just no rational basis for stripping people of saying that you can't have your rights restored if you haven't been stripped of your civil rights. But let's assume that we can't look behind Jovon's determination that the statute was constitutional on its face. And even if there's different arguments that that paled and considered were bound by that ruling. They also went on mode to say that it was constitutional as applied to Mr. Chovon. And in doing so, they looked at specific reports, recidivism rates, and also factors pertinent solely to Mr. Chovon. Now would your client have any arguments that it was in constitutional as applied? That's different than what Chovon had or are we also banned by the act of germination? No, you're right. There are several factual distinctions between the Chovon, Mr. Chovon, and the clients in my case. For instance, Judge B is concurring opinion in Chovon, talks about the 1203.4 expungement procedure in California. Whereby, once somebody has served probation done their fine or paid all of their fines and remade crime free, they can petition a court to withdraw their guilty plea, have the accusatory pleading dismissed. And then they stand before the court as an innocent person. In the ENOs case, every single appellant, every single person who is asking this court for relief has availed themselves of that adversarial procedure. Mr. Chovon rejected that, am I wrong? If I said that under Jennings, it wasn't an expungement. So I mean, isn't it, wouldn't you need to have a pardon from the governor in order to qualify for that exception? No, you're out of the language of the Lawtonburg Amendment provides for four possible ways of restoring rights, pardon, expungement, restoration of rights, and the fourth one that escapes me right now. But the, it's true that the 1203.4 expungement under California Law, by its own statutory terms, says the dismissal under this procedure does not end in of itself restore firearm rights. But the Lawtonburg Amendment doesn't say we can only look to one statute of the state, where the conviction occurred. We can look to this, the state's entire scheme. And under California Law, in order for my clients to get their remedy that they're requesting, they must avail themselves of two remedies. One is the 10 year ban that California opposes, and which the Chovon court found wasn't sufficient. But Chovon never availed himself of the 1203.4 remedy. My clients did. And also, Apelentinos actually went through a second adversarial procedure under California Law. Again, where the people of the state of California were put on notice that there was a request to restore rights. We appeared before a judicial officer, and the relief was granted. If we, I mean, even if we take your approach, don't we have to overrule Braille to get there? And I don't know that we can't. We're only a three judge panel. Actually, Your Honor, I think you can, because Braille is a pre- He said, and I'm just reading it. They said, the language is very specific. If misdemeanors and civil rights have been restored, and all those civil rights are not defined, then they said that is core civil rights. And then at 6'11 it says core civil rights are the right to both, the right to the right to hold public office. And then it went so far as to say, if those aren't restored, nothing could be done. That is what Braille says, Your Honor. And prior to Heller, that would be, I would be out of luck. But Braille is prior to Heller. And what Heller told us is that the right to keep in bear arms is also a core fundamental right. And Braille didn't make that finding, and Shovon didn't extend the ruling. I thought Shovon relied on Braille and rejecting that argument. That's what I thought. Yeah, so we're bound by that. We rejected the argument that this was civil rights restored, and then it was an opposed Heller case. So I think we're just bound by that. You may be, this court may be bound by, all Shovon did was cite Braille, though. Okay, Braille is a pre-Heller case, and this court is entitled to engage in an independent analysis, or an independent analysis, once there has been a change in the law. Once Heller has said the right to keep in bear arms is also a core right. And remember, California... Then your argument says, Shovon, what, I call it Shovon, I may be wrong. But I mean, the bottom line is, I read Braille, I read it very carefully, because I was, I said to myself, Idaho does this same kind of stuff. Why am I not going to be led in this same direction? So I read Shovon, I read what it said and what it cited. I went to Braille because of it. It seems to me that I'm stuck with Braille. If I don't send this on-bomb, then I just make the same decision. You can make that same plea to the on-bomb court that I can make. I may be stuck with that, Your Honor. I'd like to reserve the rest of my time. Thank you. May it please the court, Michael Braub, for the government. Shovon not only controls the facial challenges, Chagy Kudi, you indicated, but also be as applied challenges. Well, what is that? Because Shovon looked at the factors specific to Mr. Shovon in determining that he couldn't make an as applied challenge. Plus, it said he didn't offer any reports that show recivism rates that would change our views. And so why doesn't Mr. Inas and the other appellans have the right to go into court and say, well, as applied to me, it's not a substantial, it doesn't further a substantial government interest. Yeah, Your Honor, with respect, they've had their chance to plead facts that would show that they're meaningfully different from Mr. Chovon. And they haven't done so. Well, but that was before, I mean, they went to court before Chovon was decided. And so we often will remain allowed them to amend the complaint in light of new law. Your Honor, they have not ever, even in this court to date, even after Chovon was decided, they've said nothing to set them apart in any meaningful way from Mr. Chovon. Mr. Chovon also had more than 10 years, well, more than 10 years of lapse after the time of his conviction, the court. Can additional conviction or arrest for some further domestic violence issue or something like that? Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honor, Mr. Chovon did. There wasn't an actual arrest. It was just a visit to the home. And that didn't, that was one part of the court's analysis. Then it's independently the court for the end of its analysis that he has applied challenge made clear that in any event, your respective of the visit by law enforcement officers to the home without making any arrest independently the As Apply Challenge failed, because this would create an impermissible substantial hole in the scheme. But that doesn't work, right? Because obviously we're reviewing the statute to see if it's constitutional as applied and the fact that some, it's not constitutional as applied to some people can't be a reason to say that, oh, that creates a hole. I mean, that just doesn't even make sense. Well, with respect to your Honor, this, I mean, what was true of Mr. Chovon is also true here with regard to these plaintiffs, the only in the, in that substantial amount of time is elapsed from the time of their conviction. And there's ample social science literature emphasized by the court and Chovon as well as by other courts like the Seven Circuit and Skone that make clear that these individuals convicted of crimes of violence, in particular, have unusually high rates of recidivism, and it's a permissible for Congress to say that if you do not, if you're not able to get a pardon, an expungement, or have your conviction set aside within the meaning of federal law, that there's nothing impermissible about, or have your civil rights restored, there's nothing impermissible, constitutionally precluding Congress from setting the rule as it long has done. So if a quadriplegic comes into court and says, you know, it's unconstitutional to not allow me to get to have a gun as a collector's item, I suppose, it would be constitutional as applied to him. I mean, that doesn't sound right to me because precluding a quadriplegic from having a gun wouldn't further any governmental interest. You're far removed from that. I understand that, but the question is, what you're suggesting that it's constitutional as applied in every case, and I'm not sure that's true. I mean, you could say as a factual matter, there's no evidence available that Mr. Ines or others could bring in. That is what you're saying. That's what we're saying here. You can't preclude that their law could change. The studies could change. New evidence could come up, or the individual appellants could have specific factors that would change the analysis. Right. And our point is, you're on a, they've made no effort whatsoever. So the only thing they've pointed to throughout the litigation, including today, is that they received this far less than complete form of relief under 1203.4, which this court in Jennings has made clear, and echoing language from the California courts, that there are substantial, significant restrictions on that form of limited relief, most notably that the conviction can be used against the individual if they're ever charged again with regard to another offense. So that's far removed. And that's the only thing they've identified in any meaningful sense that sets all these plaintiffs apart from Mr. Chauvin. It's just not a meaningful distinction that would warrant coming to any different conclusion on the As Apply Challenge. Does the Lawtonburg Amendment allow for any way for an individual convicted of a misdemeanor crime of divestive violence to regain his or her right to possess a firearm? Well, again, it much depends on state law. So if the state like could... But in California. In California, I'm not aware. It's not entirely clear to me what Avenue was open, but California could. I mean, it's noteworthy that California has chosen not to afford this kind of expungement, say, that other states like Kentucky have done, and that's permissible for Congress to do. And it's entirely permissible for Congress to enact a statute like this that respects the interest of the states to a degree and says, look, if you as a state want to expunge, provide for true expungement or true set aside of the conviction, or you want to take away their civil rights and then provide a way for restoring them, that's one of them. It seems that doesn't seem odd that California had said for a crime of domestic violence, we will take away your right to have a gun, and we will now take away your right to vote, the Honourary or Whole Public Office, so that we can restore them, but not your right to have a gun. So that you can have qualified for guns in the future. I mean, it just seems very odd that having a harsher punishment imposed on a misdemeanor, a misdemeanor, would then enable the misdemeanor to qualify for the exception. It's not unusual, and just as the Court in Shoveon explained in rejecting the Equal Protection Challenge that was made in that case, not made here, that Congress could permissibly conclude that if you've gone through a state law process that restores rights, that you are in a meaningfully different position from someone who never had that process, post conviction, take place. But the substance of my colleagues question, which is really the thing that most concerns me in this particular case, it seems to be a similar procedure as we have in Idaho, and being a state judge, it seems that felonies, there is no question, there's a way laid out that you can get it to all of your constitutional rights back, and you know what you're supposed to do. So there it is for felonies, but they've left misdemeanors, and the real, the realality of it is maybe they thought they were doing the same thing with what they've got on the books. And here we have a situation where you have a felony crime, you can get it, you can get it taken away, you can do what you have to do, but with this, because they give this procedure to get it done, and it just doesn't meet the statute. But somehow that, that's okay. Well, a couple of points one, the Congress was careful here in G9, which applies to only a small subset of misdemeanors, special misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, which pose special problems, as Senator Lottonberg and others mentioned, and as the Supreme Court has echoed in considering the statute subsequently. It's pose special problems. These are individuals who not only, when they convict these crimes, run the risk of unusually high risk of recidivism, but they also are oftentimes undercharged for their offense. And it's not at all impermissible for Congress to have taken the step it did, and with regard to, and states are fully free to take account of this, and if they wish to, to provide mechanisms for individuals such as these convicted of miscrimes of domestic violence to get their firearms back, they can do so. California Lyleism, I mean in other words, he's entitled to firearms under California law, but the federal law has, in effect, put a lifetime ban on someone who was convicted of a misdemeanor, and that seems odd, where the state has determined that the person is entitled to have the right to carry a firearm. And there's nothing impermissible. You're saying the state has to change its laws because of a federal law in order to restore what it already has under state law? It doesn't have to do anything if it wishes to provide mechanism for the individual to get their federal firearms back. It can do so, but it's not worth it. And that's what this Court in Chauvin made clear is entirely permissible, relying as Judd Smith pointed out on the earlier Braille decision, that's not at all unusual. This has been around for a long time. It's entirely permissible and well within Congress's conscience. We didn't know it was an individual constitutional right protected by the Constitution to have arms and individual right. We weren't told that until heller. Well, that has been... The Ninth Circuit, it wasn't. By Chauvin, the time Chauvin was decided, it certainly was, and more important as Chauvin reiterates, the term civil rights used in the statute is a term of art. The courts have long recognized that that term has limited the special, not just any right of any kind of colloquial sense. These are rights tied to state citizenship. And this has not only been true since decisions like Braille, but also in many other decisions across the circuits, that the Supreme Court in the Logan case noted and made clear and said nothing by way of criticism about limited to these unique rights of state citizenship, right to serve on a jury, right to hold public office. And there's nothing inappropriate about Congress having enacted a statute like that and nothing in the Second Amendment, before closes from the doing so or from applying the provision to the plaintiffs in this case. I think in you over your time. Thank you. Thank you. One of the other distinctions between Chauvin and the, the litigants before this court are that, you know, Spastiani, Marquato, Groves, Montero, and Ericsson, all received their convictions before Lottonberg became an amendment. Lottonberg tells us also that one of the ways that we say that a crime is not a just qualifying crime for purposes of federal firearm rights is if the person was not represented by counsel in the proceeding. There's no way for these, these gentlemen to have ever gotten a knowing and intelligent way of the jury right to trial if they would have known they would have lost their fundamental right to keep in their arms by waiting that right. That's, that's, that's addressed in my brief and I'll leave it at that. I was going to say that is addressed in your brief. I guess my worry about that is I can't find any case that really stands what you're arguing because you're really arguing it isn't a voluntary waiver. You're not alleging there's any procedural defect in what happened. You don't even alleges that they didn't understand. The only thing it is is that they never anticipated it and I frankly I found all kinds of federal law case law that would suggest just to pay your anticipated isn't enough. Yeah, you're on a, and that's what's interesting is California actually provided for that in its statute, barring misdemeanants from having guns for 10 years because it said if you suffered not really talking about California law here, we're talking about federal law. We're talking about the interpretation of that federal law to help you. Yes. That's where I was looking at. I understand, Your Honor. I think what we have to summarize as best as possible my argument here is that Lawtonberg clearly said that we look to the state of conviction for whether or not rights should be restored under that state's procedures. Lawtonberg could have said we're going to treat misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence exactly like felonies. Period-end of statement. This would be a much different case. What they said was we're going to look to state law here. Even if we apply the Shoban analysis to the parenthetical statement I cited earlier in my brief and we strip out just that language, nothing else. We uphold Lawtonberg. We say that you have to go through all of these procedures. However, we say that we get rid of this element or this requirement that you have to have lost other civil rights because it makes no sense it's not even rational my clients win. The court should remand the case to proceed with gathering evidence and proceed to trial if necessary. Thank you. Thank you. The case of Richard Enes, the holder, is submitted