Legal Case Summary

Good morning, Your Honours. My name is Richard Weebman and I'm the appellant pro-say in this case. The first issue in this case is whether the case was wrongfully removed from Fairfax Circuit Court to U.S. District Court, especially in light of my argument that Virginia had personal jurisdiction over all of the defendants in the case. The case in Bell is my lawsuit against the Exxon Mobil Corporation. One of whose main headquarters was in Fairfax, Virginia, I served as their medical director there. That was a center for all downstream activities of Exxon Mobil Corporation, including all of the finding and supply operations, their engineering departments, all of the marketing of fuels, lubricants, etc. It's alleged that all of the wrongful acts taken by the company against me and its employees against me were took place in Fairfax, Virginia, and that the employees were acting on behalf of the corporation. Some of the employees resided in Virginia, some in other states, but all came to commit their wrongful acts in Fairfax, Virginia. Now Exxon Mobil, as I indicated from its important headquarters in Fairfax, Virginia, Exxon Mobil won all of the defendant employees at significant and continuous contact with the form state of Virginia, and all of the defendants purposefully availed themselves by the benefits and protections of the Commonwealth in Virginia. So I believe that according to the rulings of international shoe since the defendants met the criteria of contact with the state and purposeful availment, they came under the jurisdiction of Virginia. So what about diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts? How do you get around that? My analysis of this is, it's really an issue of the personal jurisdiction of Virginia versus the diversity jurisdiction. In an international shoe case, if the international shoe corporation could have claimed that it was not a resident of the state of Washington, it could escape from the jurisdiction of the state of Virginia. So I think in a situation like this, unless the personal jurisdiction of the state pays precedence over diversity jurisdiction, there's no meaning as far as I can tell to the case of international shoe versus state of Washington. And I believe that all of the defendants in the case met the criteria of purposeful availment and of contact. And if they met these two criteria, there is, and I believe this is the interpretation of the international shoe case, there's tacit consent to the state's jurisdiction. So they can consent to the jurisdiction of the state if they wanted to, and they tacit we did so by meeting through criteria. And when there's diversity of the parties, the defendant can remove it to federal court and federal court then have jurisdiction. So how is that removal not appropriate? Well, again, my interpretation of international shoe case is that if that were the case, then having personal jurisdiction over a defendant who was out of state would have no meaning. And the defendant in international shoe was a corporation that was incorporated in another state, and that's me

. That's in person on jurisdiction in terms of looking at a net sense of a state. But, back is trying to, not trying, she very clearly asked you to deal with the diversity question. And put it simply, what Virginian did you sue? You have a genuine? Yes, I am. Right? You have a genuine? Right? What Virginian did you sue? I sued several Virginians, and that was the second issue which I have to do with the alleged fraud. You don't have complete diversity is what you're saying. I'm saying that also. Yes, that's my second argument. Yeah, OK. Well, let's get to the second argument. OK. The second argument has to do with the fact that the court ruled that there was fraudulent jointer of three of the in-state, which is all of the in-state defendants. The standard which the district court used was in no possibility of liability in state court standard. But two of the non-diverse defendants I intend were clearly alleged in the lawsuit to have played significant roles in the wrongful discharge of me. And specifically, the defendant's am so was alleged to have conducted a quote-unquote sham I.E. deceitful investigation of my complaints to the corporation on the basis of which my complaints were rejected. I was subjected to the emotional distress, the heart attack, and discharge from the company. And it's notable that a handbook, which I'll get you in a minute by the time here, the handbook stated that there would be no retaliation unless quote the employee acts with willful disregard of the truth, unquote. So this defendant's am so sham investigation gave the corporation cover to violate the non-retellination guarantee. Based on your pleadings, you'd say that they were acting as the agent solely of exon in an investigation

. Uh, yes, they were acting as you. And as a Virginia, correct? In Virginia. Yeah, nothing that was a Virginia. The per- Yes, that was an in-state defendant. That's correct. Nothing much about sham about that. That's the core of your case, isn't it? The core of my case is that there was a sham investigation of the basis in which they said that I was a poor employee and my complaints were false. And then the second in-state defendant that I believe was not for when we joined was a defendant Hassan who represented the human resources department and all aspects of facilitating my discharge and supervised, in fact, the abusive meetings, which are the leds that caused me the emotional distress that led to my heart attack. And, um, importantly, in their notice of removal, the appellees were actually admitted that enough had been alleged in the complaint to subject to a non-diverse defendant's de-state liability. And they stated in that notice of removal, quote unquote, the most the plaintiff alleged about Samson Hassan is that they were background players in an attempt by Johnson and Welleson to drive plaintiff from his employment. But since this is motion to dismiss, the benefit of the doubt must be given to me. It was not at most what I had alleged, but I had at least had alleged that there were players in the scheme having wrongfully discharged. So, in a case involving wrongfully discharged, I think that the appellees have virtually admitted that they're grounds for it and that there was a possibility of state liability. And the degree to which there was state liability is, I believe, an issue of fact for the trial of fact, and there was liability. Whether they were background players or foreground players, I don't think it even matters because a background player in a case of fraud can be as important as a foreground player. Well, aren't you just conflating personal jurisdiction with subject matter jurisdiction? I'm sorry, aren't you conflating personal jurisdiction with subject matter jurisdiction? Well, I think that was the first issue. I know. You agree that you did that in your argument? I believe that the personal jurisdiction as a lay person took precedence over the subject matter jurisdiction, of diversity jurisdiction, in this case, as it would have been the international suitcase. So also the court in accepting the fact that there was fraud to a joiner that did not cite any law to the fact that persons colluding on causing an individual in Virginia to be driven from his employment could quote unquote not possibly face liability in the Virginia courts. Going on to the wrongful discharge count, the court rules that the handbook was not a contract and that I worked on an at-roll contract with F-SIM mobile

. But my intention is the handbook did, as in many other jurisdictions that I mentioned in my briefs, did constitute a contract and it rebutted the at-roll presumption. The document was written. It was written document. It was signed by the CEO of F-SIM mobile. There were mutual promises and mutual offers of valuable consideration. F-SIM promise not to discharge me for violating for reporting violations of the law and policy of the company. And I promised that I would report those violations. F-SIM mobile offered me employment as valuable consideration and I offered my services as my valuable consideration. There was no disclaimer in the handbook that the handbook did not rebut the issue of a contract at will as other F-SIM mobile documents that were submitted to the court did indicate. Also the handbook had a clause in it which I mentioned before that the employee acts with willful disregard of the truth than the assurance of non-rescaliation but not this. When was that handbook signed? That was- I don't know exactly what was signed. When it was handed to me was after I was employed by the company. And my contention is that the- What was the- when were you employed? What was the day to your employment? I began on October 1, 2007 and sometime after that in October, I've seen what was the day to your employment. I was given a handbook. And in October of 2011 and again in June of 2012 you signed two documents acknowledging that you were employee at will. I contend that I did not- the first document I did that was on my higher end. The second documents were if you read the- actually what I was signed over was receipt of document. It was an acknowledgement that- I'm looking at joint appendix 165. Are you saying that's not your signature? Oh no no, I'm saying it's my signature. I was saying it signed over the statement

. A acknowledgement of receipt. I only acknowledge receipt was a most important point here. So you acknowledge receipt. My most important point is the contract had been reached at that point because I was under disciplinary activity at that point. So I contend that the contract began with- being handed the- the handbook and it ended when the retaliation began. So in fact I signed that during a disciplinary meeting does not mean anything anyway. And as I've mentioned before, it- it never acknowledged that I was working under a at-row contract. The technology that I received a document in which F-SUN mobile carefully stated that nothing in this document would said that I- I would be re-vowze- waited in several months. Nothing in that document and that period of time would indicate that a contract for that period of time. So F-SUN was simply- simply- protecting itself. And that's where I believe it's- it's- it's non-addition of a disclaimer in that handbook was very significant because F-SUN mobile was very clear of this. Any question that a contract was- was being formed with a handbook or any other document to state that it did not contradict the at-row presumption? That was post breach their activity. Yes. My signing of it was post breach. It already had been breached the contract. And also was under direct. I will have to say this. It could never I believe stand in a trial court because it was a disciplinary meeting which I was forced to sign the document. Is that- Even if you were at will, let's go to the public policy exception. Oh, public policy exception

. Yes, yes. You're a physician, correct? Yes. I believe there was- Your license under the state of Virginia? Yes, I am, now. And tell me this. How did- how did Exxon get into the pharmacy business? Who's DEA number did they use to get drug? Well, this- as a legend. This is a very good question because- Yeah, I don't want to know too. I believe it was illegal. Right. And that's what I- why- But you're the one who had the DEA like number, correct? I have a DEA number. Right. That doesn't give me the right to practice pharmacy and it doesn't give me the right to stockpile or distribute medication. And they were- they were two things I was asked to do. I reported and I alleged in the emotion for judgment that I was discharged on a basis of. And the two- two statutes were the Virginia Code 54.1, dashed 3310 and dashed 3435, which was a specific statutes which I cited in my memorandum to support. Court said, is it in your complaint? It's not in the complaint. It was in a memorandum. And I cited in my- my- my- brief before this court, I quoted the case of story versus patient- patient first corporation. And what they said that when somebody does cite those relevant statutes in memorandum before the court, even if it was not in the original motion for judgment that under federal rules, 15A, that it leads for- at least for men should have been grand. It was more and clear to anybody and ex-son, they knew why you were bringing the suit- the public policy issue

. Correct? Well, yes. I mean, it was stated that it was- it was- it- it quote unquote that it was contravene the public policy interests of commonwealth of Virginia in protecting public safety health and welfare. Because they were stockpiling the- the medicines and that. That was clear, you know. It was very clear, I believe, in the- in the appeal. And as for the issue of fraud, the court had ruled that- that I had not- alleged that was required specificity. But I believe it was as specific as it needed to be. It was very clearly stated in my complaint that the handbook invited false representations of non-retalination that they were made by the CEO on behalf of ex-on-rollable, that the document was given to me shortly after being hired in October 2007 at my work site in their factory, Virginia. So, I did answer the who, what, where, and when of the fraud. It was all in my complaint. Well, you- was your discharge based on your reporting of the alleged violation or your- That is my- or your refusal to violate law? Or my refusal. It was- it was really both. It was- it alleged that I had been discharged for refusing to follow it. Locust is on the reporting aspect, doesn't it? Well, it was both. It was both reporting of the violation and- and refusal to go along with the- request to violate the law. Right, because he cited about not going to New Jersey, right, in office. Yes, that was- that was a trigger the whole thing. Exactly, more in just reporting, but actually- Oh, yes, it was definitely- I said I'm not going to get the license, if it means I'm going to have to break the law in New Jersey. And as to fraud, talent, I think, credence is given to the existence of the fraud, but the position taken by ex-on-rollable, that I could not possibly have relied upon the insurance as a non-intaliation since I knew I was working at will and could be discharged at any time. In other words, the- the company was saying that the insurance is a non-intaliation or false at the time they made them and they knew they were false

. I'm running out of time, so I'll just go very briefly into the issue of the physical injury. It was not, I believe, my heart attack was not an injury by accident. Very specifically, and for an injury or illness to be covered under the Virginia Workers Compensation Act, it must be caused by a condition peculiar to the type of employment that must result from conditions of employment exposing the employee to hazards to a degree beyond that of the general public. I don't believe having emotional distress in my job as a clinic position caused by my supervisor would meet that necessary standard under the Virginia Workers Compensation Act. Thank you, sir. Thank you. You're reserved some time. Mr. Murphy? May I please record Tom Murphy for the- the appellees? Okay, alright, no less than eleven appellees in your case, your ex-owned mobile corporation, the Appellans former employer and ten individuals, might be helpful to look at who those ten individuals are. Four of them are his former supervisors. They're based either in Texas or in Chevy Chase, Maryland or in the United Kingdom, non-based in Virginia. He then includes a Hodgepodge of about six individuals who are human resource professionals, auditors, slash internal investigators that- What does the investigator live? Well, there's two investigators, actually four investigators. Two of them, there's two investigations, Your Honor, that the Appellant alleges occurred. The first investigation, both investigators, lived in Texas. The second investigation that occurred after he made a second complaint, one lives in Texas, Mr. Carr, C-A-R-R, and the second one lives in Virginia. One takes one, right? It can only take one, Your Honor, that's correct. Unless, unless as we allege- That's right. That's right. Unless- Unless- Unless that individual has been fraudulent, Lee-Joy

. And that's what we believe- He brought the student state court, didn't he? He did, Your Honor. Okay, so he certainly not have tried to avail himself of some jurisdiction other than the state court. That's correct. And there's no question he had in person of jurisdiction over there, for his not disputed at this stage, for purposes of- Not admitted, but for purposes of this argument, that's correct. Go ahead. And which- What's the name of the one investigator in Virginia? Sam-Sill. Sam-Sill. There's three out of this ten individuals, three individuals who are none diverse. And- Yeah, I just want to make sure I understood which the different one you were talking about. And does he elege that this was a sham investigation on behalf of Exxon for their benefit to- of being a facade to cover up their illegal activity? That is his allegation, but- It wouldn't that investigative be working solely for Exxon? For purposes of our argument, that's correct. And would that be an attention, agency in a sense, that may- About a fact, a fact, that's an agency- Agency of fact, is it not? Under his allegation, it could satisfy respondent superior, but- Quite, quite, but it did not. And if I may address why, it did not, Your Honor. It tell me why, as a matter of law, it did not. And- As a matter of law, and as a matter of fact, as alleged in the four corners of the complaint, respectfully submit it was not. If you look at each of these three none diverse individuals, certainly as the court is- He is one deal with one. Just one. The others, you say it, you say they're not. So I wonder where about them? Let's talk about the Virginia. Yeah, the- Well, there's three, there's three that are Virginia. The three, but one is to investigate right now

. Let's hit the investigator first to your precise question. Yes, yes. SAMHSAW. SAMHSAW conducted a second investigation with an individual by name of CAR, a Texas investigator or a auditor. And if you go to the complaint, I think- And I believe it's a paragraph 20 of the complaint. That's where the appellant outlines what exactly CAR, Texas resident, and SAMHSAW did or did not do. And what's remarkable, Your Honors, in this 14-page complaint? SAMHSAW, the Virginia resident, Virginia citizen, is not accused of any specific activities that would fall under these common law torts of fraud, intentional inflection of emotional distress, and physical injury, the third cause of action, the appellant brings. Remember, the fourth cause of action, wrongful discharge, is only brought against a corporation. So if you read paragraph, when you read paragraph 20, you can see CAR's name mentioned no less than seven times in paragraph 20. And this is a detailed complaint. SAMHSAW's name is mentioned once. And the very first sentence who investigated the case was SAMHSAW, but the appellant goes with CAR. But the appellant goes on and accuses CAR of a list of horrible alleged horrible to try to fit neatly within each of these little pigeonholes of fraud, which has to be pled with particularity, intentional inflection of emotional distress, which we have to see elements of outrageousness, the toward-of-outrage, and physical injury. CAR, there's an attempt by appellant to fit CAR into the four corners of each one of those three complaints, but not SAMHSAW. I would respectfully submit your honor SAMHSAW and Montsevet, who's not even mentioned anywhere in the complaint, as you saw in our brief, as a result Montsevet should, that's one should we should pass by quickly, and hasten the human resources person. We respectfully submit that even a reading of the complaint shows that perhaps they were an afterthought, because they're listed at the bottom of the complaint. Now, maybe that's entitled to no way. You really gonna turn jurisprudence on his head now. Not only that they don't get the benefit of the inference of the non-moving part of it now, we're gonna be suit fairs and mind readers and save that to kick them out of court. I mean, that's not the law

. And not the law. It's correct. And clear a reading of, and we should have a pro-saye litigant, where we do in the court, we can't create what's not there, when we certainly have some leniency there. And clearly, it's alleged that Exxon covered up their illegal stockpiling in pharmaceuticals. That's what's alleged. And of course, you know, you'll have your day in court, wherever, whatever, all the parties have proved that, but it's alleged that you did it. And investigation was to cover it up and make it a sham investigation to whitewash it. And that Virginia is a part of that alleged investigation and could not be acting for anybody but Exxon. That's what's alleged. So, and you have a pro-saye, but on say as a matter of fact, that's what I want to hear. It's not a law that could not be taken. Though, and this is where the law does kick in. And again, this is a very detailed complaint at 14 pages. This is a pro-saye litigant who has been given every courtesy and every benefit by the district judge. We've seen references. One loud, nobody brought to amend his pleading. He said, He even seek leave to amend the pleading, Your Honor. And his briefing before the district judge, he had ample opportunity. And in fact did supplement his facts in the briefing that he submitted before the district court. Again, he was extended every courtesy in that regard and every benefit the pro-saye litigants in our judiciary should be given. And he was. But Your Honor, the facts as you allege do not fit within the three causes of actions against these three diverse defendants that he's named. Fraud, he has not alleged what Samson said, what Samson did that was a false representation. And the time and place that that occurred and how Samson's false statements, whatever those were, were relied upon Mr. By the appell. In other words, what did Exxon Mobile take from him after making those false representation? Intentional affliction of emotional distress is the other accusation he brings against Samson in these other three individuals. And again, this court knows that intentional affliction of emotional distress is highly disfavored in the law, particularly in the employment context. And Montsevet, again, nothing alleged that Montsevet did anywhere in the complaint, Samson, the gentleman we're talking about now, he simply mentioned here in paragraph 20 as being a car's wingman. The different type case though as alleged, you're right, it is disfavored normally in the context of employment. But here we're talking about as alleged. And as I think it's understood in some of this, you have the plaintiff who is a licensed physician, an MD, another Virginia law, an MD, he or she can do anything in the healing art, anything, he's out of their practice. So in the pitted obligation, patient, I'm going to be patient, physician, all those type things, well he's alleged that they conducted a sham investigation to cover up a big corporation, stockpiling, pharmaceuticals, had no right to do so, absolutely legal, to the detriment potentially of persons that he had to see as a physician, that's what he's alleged. So saying that that did have an impact because to washing that over, because it was exiled who called for the investigation, correct? After the complaint, correct? After the complaint, the company initiated the investigation. Exactly, so ideas that we're concerned about this, we're going to investigate it. And then you tell, this as a ledge, I'm not saying it's true, a ledge. Oh, so you get this person to come, who's a Virginia? Now give us an investigation so we can act upon this and act. Oh, it was all fine, nothing wrong with it. All totally legal. That absolutely goes to the very cynical unknown of the whole case that's what he's saying. It's not peripheral at all

. And he was. But Your Honor, the facts as you allege do not fit within the three causes of actions against these three diverse defendants that he's named. Fraud, he has not alleged what Samson said, what Samson did that was a false representation. And the time and place that that occurred and how Samson's false statements, whatever those were, were relied upon Mr. By the appell. In other words, what did Exxon Mobile take from him after making those false representation? Intentional affliction of emotional distress is the other accusation he brings against Samson in these other three individuals. And again, this court knows that intentional affliction of emotional distress is highly disfavored in the law, particularly in the employment context. And Montsevet, again, nothing alleged that Montsevet did anywhere in the complaint, Samson, the gentleman we're talking about now, he simply mentioned here in paragraph 20 as being a car's wingman. The different type case though as alleged, you're right, it is disfavored normally in the context of employment. But here we're talking about as alleged. And as I think it's understood in some of this, you have the plaintiff who is a licensed physician, an MD, another Virginia law, an MD, he or she can do anything in the healing art, anything, he's out of their practice. So in the pitted obligation, patient, I'm going to be patient, physician, all those type things, well he's alleged that they conducted a sham investigation to cover up a big corporation, stockpiling, pharmaceuticals, had no right to do so, absolutely legal, to the detriment potentially of persons that he had to see as a physician, that's what he's alleged. So saying that that did have an impact because to washing that over, because it was exiled who called for the investigation, correct? After the complaint, correct? After the complaint, the company initiated the investigation. Exactly, so ideas that we're concerned about this, we're going to investigate it. And then you tell, this as a ledge, I'm not saying it's true, a ledge. Oh, so you get this person to come, who's a Virginia? Now give us an investigation so we can act upon this and act. Oh, it was all fine, nothing wrong with it. All totally legal. That absolutely goes to the very cynical unknown of the whole case that's what he's saying. It's not peripheral at all. He is saying that you're honored, the problem is, here is the problem. The causes of action that he has selected to advance this dispute, this upset that he has with ExxonMobil are not satisfied by these allegations, even if they're true, even if ExxonMobil was illegally stockpiling. And see any of the defendants on the three Virginians. Correct, correct. That's the added as a matter of... You mean tell me destroying a physician in his or her profession, destroying them, saying that they're incompetent and do that as a sham, as a conspiracy, that as a matter of law, that can't be done intentionally? Because that's what he's alleging, that this is not accidental. They're covering up illegal activity. I can't understand, is this case seem like is this something, this is a frivolous case? As a legend, this is a very important case. I mean, how'd you like to have potential medication that might be, you know, stale or stockpile? I'm not saying it's true, but that's the case. This is not talking about I missed my lunch. I was too late, I didn't punch a car. And so, yes, I'm sorry. I'm sorry, I was also alleged that it was implied that he's a pedophile. That is pretty outrageous with you three. Well, first of all, some might say it's outrageous, but we don't know, he carefully chose the word imply. So he doesn't say what words were used to accuse him of being a pedophile. Whether that rises to the level of a registness, conduct not tolerating in a civilized society. Somebody said, this is a given federal court to pedophiles

. He is saying that you're honored, the problem is, here is the problem. The causes of action that he has selected to advance this dispute, this upset that he has with ExxonMobil are not satisfied by these allegations, even if they're true, even if ExxonMobil was illegally stockpiling. And see any of the defendants on the three Virginians. Correct, correct. That's the added as a matter of... You mean tell me destroying a physician in his or her profession, destroying them, saying that they're incompetent and do that as a sham, as a conspiracy, that as a matter of law, that can't be done intentionally? Because that's what he's alleging, that this is not accidental. They're covering up illegal activity. I can't understand, is this case seem like is this something, this is a frivolous case? As a legend, this is a very important case. I mean, how'd you like to have potential medication that might be, you know, stale or stockpile? I'm not saying it's true, but that's the case. This is not talking about I missed my lunch. I was too late, I didn't punch a car. And so, yes, I'm sorry. I'm sorry, I was also alleged that it was implied that he's a pedophile. That is pretty outrageous with you three. Well, first of all, some might say it's outrageous, but we don't know, he carefully chose the word imply. So he doesn't say what words were used to accuse him of being a pedophile. Whether that rises to the level of a registness, conduct not tolerating in a civilized society. Somebody said, this is a given federal court to pedophiles. I mean, some out of must think outrageous, 200, 300 months and 600 months. Pretty serious allegation in it. And we've seen, in the case is cited, and indeed one case that we brought to the court's attention outside this jurisdiction, where in Domino's delivery person and the Pennsylvania case cited in our brief, the individual, indeed, was also accused. There was no implication. He was, he was called a pedophile. And the court used appropriate language to say that's that was highly offensive. And inappropriate. He was implied to be how the implication of pedophilia occurred. He gives no allegations, Your Honor. And that's the heart of the failing of the intentional affliction of emotional distress claim. That's the heart of the failure of the fraud claim. And that we're not told the particulars, even though that's required, and pro-saleed litigants should be given every doubt. That's part of the common law of the state of Virginia. But really most states, that fraud is one of those unique torts that has to be pled in particularity, even in the federal rules in rule nine. Fraud is identified as one of the sole torts that has to be pled with particularity. And that wasn't done here. So I appreciate the courts, the courts concern what it's expressing in terms of the story that the appellant brings forward. Serious, as the court says, they're very disturbing no doubt to the appellant that's assuming they are true. They stand neither admitted or denied. At this stage, there was no answer file

. I mean, some out of must think outrageous, 200, 300 months and 600 months. Pretty serious allegation in it. And we've seen, in the case is cited, and indeed one case that we brought to the court's attention outside this jurisdiction, where in Domino's delivery person and the Pennsylvania case cited in our brief, the individual, indeed, was also accused. There was no implication. He was, he was called a pedophile. And the court used appropriate language to say that's that was highly offensive. And inappropriate. He was implied to be how the implication of pedophilia occurred. He gives no allegations, Your Honor. And that's the heart of the failing of the intentional affliction of emotional distress claim. That's the heart of the failure of the fraud claim. And that we're not told the particulars, even though that's required, and pro-saleed litigants should be given every doubt. That's part of the common law of the state of Virginia. But really most states, that fraud is one of those unique torts that has to be pled in particularity, even in the federal rules in rule nine. Fraud is identified as one of the sole torts that has to be pled with particularity. And that wasn't done here. So I appreciate the courts, the courts concern what it's expressing in terms of the story that the appellant brings forward. Serious, as the court says, they're very disturbing no doubt to the appellant that's assuming they are true. They stand neither admitted or denied. At this stage, there was no answer file. But it would be dangerous to the public. Public, this company is stock calling. We have no authority to do so. Would that be dangerous? I'm not in a position to answer that, Your Honor. I have no pharmacy background. And unlike the brother, district co-headed either, the amount of law that said it wasn't public policy. But the, while all those things being made of true, and they have to be taken as true, and every inference taken is true, as Your Honor has pointed out, this experience prosaed with again. As we mentioned, this is a person that's been in the courts 25 times with different laws. What difference does that make? It could make a slight difference in terms of Your Honor when we look at the sufficiency of the pleading. This is a lengthy complaint. The appellant has very articulities expressed himself very well in the pleading before this court and the court below. He's taken the opportunity to expand upon his allegation to a very impressive discussion of the relevant case law. But my point is, this Your Honor, that despite all of this experience, we had before, the district court had before it, with these three non-diverse individuals, and with respect to the rule 12 dismissal, this is what the court had before within the four corners of the complaint. As much as anyone might be troubled by the allegations, they can't recast the accounts, the claims that are made by an individual, such as this appellant into something, for instance, like a conspiracy, like there's no conspiracy alleged here. And the reason that's important, Your Honor, is this court very recently, in a case of it, decided earlier this year, the Flores versus Ethicon case, was decided in our brief and decided in March of this year. It's very helpful on this, because this court has said, it's not enough for a plaintiff in the court below to kind of cast a net wide and accuse everyone by guilt, guilt by associations. Mayer Fetch, that was the phrase used in the Ethicon case, guilt by association, with respect to each one of these 11 defendants, Exxon Mobil, and the 10 individuals that he names. The plaintiff has to come forward with facts, warranting a cause of action under fraud, intentional affliction, emotional distress, physical injury, and wrongful discharge, that would warrant a judgment against, relief against each one of those individuals, independently. And this court, critics, what been criticized, it highlighted the fact that the plaintiff in the Ethicon case, Flores versus Ethicon case, used phraseology in such sweeping way, which is what we have in this complaint. We have big players, as they might be called, or I think they were referred at one point to background players, people who just happen to be there that are now parties in a case, in this particular case

. But it would be dangerous to the public. Public, this company is stock calling. We have no authority to do so. Would that be dangerous? I'm not in a position to answer that, Your Honor. I have no pharmacy background. And unlike the brother, district co-headed either, the amount of law that said it wasn't public policy. But the, while all those things being made of true, and they have to be taken as true, and every inference taken is true, as Your Honor has pointed out, this experience prosaed with again. As we mentioned, this is a person that's been in the courts 25 times with different laws. What difference does that make? It could make a slight difference in terms of Your Honor when we look at the sufficiency of the pleading. This is a lengthy complaint. The appellant has very articulities expressed himself very well in the pleading before this court and the court below. He's taken the opportunity to expand upon his allegation to a very impressive discussion of the relevant case law. But my point is, this Your Honor, that despite all of this experience, we had before, the district court had before it, with these three non-diverse individuals, and with respect to the rule 12 dismissal, this is what the court had before within the four corners of the complaint. As much as anyone might be troubled by the allegations, they can't recast the accounts, the claims that are made by an individual, such as this appellant into something, for instance, like a conspiracy, like there's no conspiracy alleged here. And the reason that's important, Your Honor, is this court very recently, in a case of it, decided earlier this year, the Flores versus Ethicon case, was decided in our brief and decided in March of this year. It's very helpful on this, because this court has said, it's not enough for a plaintiff in the court below to kind of cast a net wide and accuse everyone by guilt, guilt by associations. Mayer Fetch, that was the phrase used in the Ethicon case, guilt by association, with respect to each one of these 11 defendants, Exxon Mobil, and the 10 individuals that he names. The plaintiff has to come forward with facts, warranting a cause of action under fraud, intentional affliction, emotional distress, physical injury, and wrongful discharge, that would warrant a judgment against, relief against each one of those individuals, independently. And this court, critics, what been criticized, it highlighted the fact that the plaintiff in the Ethicon case, Flores versus Ethicon case, used phraseology in such sweeping way, which is what we have in this complaint. We have big players, as they might be called, or I think they were referred at one point to background players, people who just happen to be there that are now parties in a case, in this particular case. What's the specificity which you want him to give in a case like this? What he's saying is very simple, it's common sense, it's very common sense, it's saying that Exxon was engaged in illegal pharmacies, doc filing. It's illegal, that's undisputed. And in that context, he was compromising my role as a physician, licensed in the state of Virginia, to the detriment potentially of the harming people. That's wrong, when I told him about it, in spite of their handbook, they said I would not be retaliating against, they collectively, and it's concerned, and for did so, they had a sham investigation, how much specificity it wanted, I mean, the hairs on the back of their hand, when they did, when they wrote stuff. But what else would you, I mean, tell me, you're the physician to learn it council. What should he come up with? Well, under the three counts here, fraud is very clear what he has to come up with. He has to come up with the exact... What else would he look at about the fraud in there? Forget about the reflection. I'm talking about he's got you there, Exxon, clearly in that count. And that's what he's saying. Tell me, what would he need against you? Well, again, I mean, Exxon, I make it clear. Understand, yesterday the corporation, yes, yes. Your Honor, and sometimes even good lawyers make a mistake and the causes of actions that they select. And there could have been factors here. He brought, he brought suit after, long after he was terminated. Some counts might have been barred by a statute of limitations. Whatever the rationale was, and we don't have to speculate here, he shows these counts. For this, essentially, is a garden variety, wrongful termination claim, a dispute over his employment

. What's the specificity which you want him to give in a case like this? What he's saying is very simple, it's common sense, it's very common sense, it's saying that Exxon was engaged in illegal pharmacies, doc filing. It's illegal, that's undisputed. And in that context, he was compromising my role as a physician, licensed in the state of Virginia, to the detriment potentially of the harming people. That's wrong, when I told him about it, in spite of their handbook, they said I would not be retaliating against, they collectively, and it's concerned, and for did so, they had a sham investigation, how much specificity it wanted, I mean, the hairs on the back of their hand, when they did, when they wrote stuff. But what else would you, I mean, tell me, you're the physician to learn it council. What should he come up with? Well, under the three counts here, fraud is very clear what he has to come up with. He has to come up with the exact... What else would he look at about the fraud in there? Forget about the reflection. I'm talking about he's got you there, Exxon, clearly in that count. And that's what he's saying. Tell me, what would he need against you? Well, again, I mean, Exxon, I make it clear. Understand, yesterday the corporation, yes, yes. Your Honor, and sometimes even good lawyers make a mistake and the causes of actions that they select. And there could have been factors here. He brought, he brought suit after, long after he was terminated. Some counts might have been barred by a statute of limitations. Whatever the rationale was, and we don't have to speculate here, he shows these counts. For this, essentially, is a garden variety, wrongful termination claim, a dispute over his employment. And instead, he brings fraud with its particular pleading requirements. Intentional affliction of emotional distress, a claim that the courts have shown great reluctance to allow and physical... But it's not all a whole cloth. You're right, it may be some legal problem, but it's not. He said he had a heart attack. And that's what he said. I mean, all he can do with it, we had to accept that it's true. We had a heart attack from a stress that was meant to be a few days before his surgery, you know, was scheduled, they pressed him on thing. And that might not be of legal significance, but the point is there are facts alleged and why he would suggest that that was the result. So this is not a case where he's like, oh, okay, well, you know, I stumped my toll on my way to the thing. But that's what he says. But I'm talking about the point is that, in that count, he says that Exxon discharged him because he reported and refused to go along with illegal activity that directly implicated the safety and health and safety of Virginians in Fairfax. Virginians will state action. Then they you come and move this to federal court and say, oh, let's dismiss this because this is another case. No, I'm talking about why I'm just not a case against you that you had people alleged a sham investigation, sham investigation, and you did that all for a concerted effort to watch this over because you didn't want to disclose that you were violating law in a dangerous situation. That's why that not a cause of action clearly against you, even if it's not different, believe it or say, you should be in federal court or whatever. Why did they not? You're on or my question would be good. Yes, I will

. And instead, he brings fraud with its particular pleading requirements. Intentional affliction of emotional distress, a claim that the courts have shown great reluctance to allow and physical... But it's not all a whole cloth. You're right, it may be some legal problem, but it's not. He said he had a heart attack. And that's what he said. I mean, all he can do with it, we had to accept that it's true. We had a heart attack from a stress that was meant to be a few days before his surgery, you know, was scheduled, they pressed him on thing. And that might not be of legal significance, but the point is there are facts alleged and why he would suggest that that was the result. So this is not a case where he's like, oh, okay, well, you know, I stumped my toll on my way to the thing. But that's what he says. But I'm talking about the point is that, in that count, he says that Exxon discharged him because he reported and refused to go along with illegal activity that directly implicated the safety and health and safety of Virginians in Fairfax. Virginians will state action. Then they you come and move this to federal court and say, oh, let's dismiss this because this is another case. No, I'm talking about why I'm just not a case against you that you had people alleged a sham investigation, sham investigation, and you did that all for a concerted effort to watch this over because you didn't want to disclose that you were violating law in a dangerous situation. That's why that not a cause of action clearly against you, even if it's not different, believe it or say, you should be in federal court or whatever. Why did they not? You're on or my question would be good. Yes, I will. I'll have 13 seconds remaining if I may answer that one. Well, I think that I can give you some time to do that. Thank you, Ronda. I will. Thank you. And how I would answer the question is in two ways, you're on very briefly. One is if taking those allegations is true, which we must, that is a wrongful termination claim at best that does not is not against any of the individuals that is only against ExxonMobil, in which case removal should be allowed, even under a very favorable reading of that. Secondly, he doesn't satisfy the public policy exception. We would respectfully submit because he's not within the zone of the statute's protection. The statutes that he cites, which weren't cited in the complaint, are there for the benefit of consumers, not for the benefit of physicians. And that would be my answer, Your Honor. I'm over to. To be. You may tell me physicians are not consumers. Who buys the medicine before the patient gets it? But the, no, no, after that. Yes, sir. Who? Maybe the doctor and maybe the practice. It could be. I think so. Doctors have, it spends all kinds of medication

. I'll have 13 seconds remaining if I may answer that one. Well, I think that I can give you some time to do that. Thank you, Ronda. I will. Thank you. And how I would answer the question is in two ways, you're on very briefly. One is if taking those allegations is true, which we must, that is a wrongful termination claim at best that does not is not against any of the individuals that is only against ExxonMobil, in which case removal should be allowed, even under a very favorable reading of that. Secondly, he doesn't satisfy the public policy exception. We would respectfully submit because he's not within the zone of the statute's protection. The statutes that he cites, which weren't cited in the complaint, are there for the benefit of consumers, not for the benefit of physicians. And that would be my answer, Your Honor. I'm over to. To be. You may tell me physicians are not consumers. Who buys the medicine before the patient gets it? But the, no, no, after that. Yes, sir. Who? Maybe the doctor and maybe the practice. It could be. I think so. Doctors have, it spends all kinds of medication. You think they get it free? But we would respectfully submit, Your Honor, the statutes that he cites, they're licensing statutes for pharmacists. And the licensing is for the benefit of the consumers of these medications that are being dispensed either by physicians or by pharmacists. I am over my time, Your Honor. But the state of the M.B. can't dispense medicine at that. I did not say that, Your Honor. Yeah, what I did say is that he is not within the zone of protection. And that's a requirement under the Bowman exception to the very strong, well, principal that the state of Virginia adheres to. Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. Yes, you reserve a few minutes. Thank you, Your Honor. Very briefly, first of all, as to whether I fell on the class of individuals at the statute is designed to protect as an operator of a clinic, which had a pharmacy operation, which was not legal, I think that statute specifically afforded me protection because I could close down that pharmacy, which I did, because it was illegal. So not only has an operator of a clinic and a pharmacy, but I was a licensed practitioner as well. I could have lost my license as a result of doing the activities which Exxon asked me to do. And in addition, I was consumer of medication from these pharmacies, and very specifically not as a member of the general public, but as an employee of Exxon mobile corporation, I received potentially medication from that clinic. I asked you a few other quick points. The intelligence, the attendees mentioned how many people were mentioned in this lawsuit. And I'll just say very briefly, the reason so many people are mentioned in a lawsuit against Exxon mobile is because it is a top-down corporation

. You think they get it free? But we would respectfully submit, Your Honor, the statutes that he cites, they're licensing statutes for pharmacists. And the licensing is for the benefit of the consumers of these medications that are being dispensed either by physicians or by pharmacists. I am over my time, Your Honor. But the state of the M.B. can't dispense medicine at that. I did not say that, Your Honor. Yeah, what I did say is that he is not within the zone of protection. And that's a requirement under the Bowman exception to the very strong, well, principal that the state of Virginia adheres to. Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. Yes, you reserve a few minutes. Thank you, Your Honor. Very briefly, first of all, as to whether I fell on the class of individuals at the statute is designed to protect as an operator of a clinic, which had a pharmacy operation, which was not legal, I think that statute specifically afforded me protection because I could close down that pharmacy, which I did, because it was illegal. So not only has an operator of a clinic and a pharmacy, but I was a licensed practitioner as well. I could have lost my license as a result of doing the activities which Exxon asked me to do. And in addition, I was consumer of medication from these pharmacies, and very specifically not as a member of the general public, but as an employee of Exxon mobile corporation, I received potentially medication from that clinic. I asked you a few other quick points. The intelligence, the attendees mentioned how many people were mentioned in this lawsuit. And I'll just say very briefly, the reason so many people are mentioned in a lawsuit against Exxon mobile is because it is a top-down corporation. Nothing is done without multiple approvals, laterally and vertically. So many people were involved in this. As to the issue of the intentional inscriptions of emotional distress, I believe that the citation by the court of the Womack case was not relevant in that Womack dealt with emotional distress, leading to emotional injury. I'm saying emotional distress leads to physical injury, which is not covered by Womack. Let me just say very briefly on this issue of the pedophile stuff, which was mentioned in the motion for judgment, is that it was not, I never claimed that it was a case of defamation. They seemed to be conflating defamation with intentional inflection in Virginia to file a case for defamation. You must specify the exact words that were spoken. But in this meeting, which is alleged in the motion for judgment, an individual in front of members of the law department, the Exxon mobile corporation, my colleagues and my reports made an implication that I was a pedophile. And my question to the court would be, if it's not intentional inflection in emotional distress, I don't know what is or looking at it differently, if one cannot sue for emotional distress in a situation like that, what can one sue for? The words were carefully chosen to imply and not to state that I was a pedophile. I'm just curious, how was it involved? It's very unpleasant to state, but it was at a state in the motion for judgment. But it was an award ceremony for my admin who was working with company for 10 years. And an individual, we're talking about her daughter and how willful the daughter was, et cetera. And an individual medical director said that if I would be careful with your daughter around Rift, that is me. I later asked him in private, not to ever say anything like that again. You told the mother that? He told the whole audience, the mother was there, my reports, members of the law department, the admin of the general counsel for downstream Exxon mobile was there, and attorney was there. I mean, this was not subtle. I then went and asked the individual if he would please never do that again, because that's a very serious, even implication in the society. And a few minutes later, he came to my office and it's in the motion for judgment and asked me, in fact, if I wasn't pedophile twice. And I told him, it was outrageous to get out of my office. And in terms of when the suit was filed, by the way, and that was a year or so, a lot of retaliation started taking

. That was part of the retaliation, because that was the same individual to whom I told that I would not illegally practice pharmacy. And this was part of that retaliation. But in terms of when the lawsuit was filed, it was filed actually two months afterwards discharge, it was not filed a long, while afterwards. And in terms of the sham investigation, I think there's no question what sham means, it means fraud, it means deceit, and yet the atalis in their brief referred to it as they changed the words and they call it an incompetent sham investigation. I don't know even what that would mean, but it was a sham investigation and it was conducted by the in-house or the in-state investigator. Thank you, Ron