Good morning, everyone. The first I could case this morning, December 15, 5034, rum enough equities against the United States. Mr. Herndt. Thank you, Judge Newman, and may it please the Court. This appeal asks this Court whether the Court of Federal Clients is correct to hold that a 1932 easement that was granted for the purpose of creating and operating an elevated railroad viaduct was in fact, which was used for 50 years for only that purpose. Let me ask you exactly what's troubling here. There's no question that that was why the easement must have been an issue, that the contract that was entered into is extraordinarily broad and unlimited. Does it more matter of contract interpretation than easement philosophy? Well, I think two points in answer to that, Judge Newman. The first is what New York's highest court has said is a timeless first principle is that the intent of the grand tours is what defines the scope of the easement. In this case, as even Judge Firestone found, the parties never foresaw the use of this property for anything other than a railroad. They didn't foresee it particularly for taco trucks and dancing in public recreation. That was not something contemplative
. In New York Court of Appeals, I was expressed as a few in the opinion, including Judge Cardoso, what happened better than that. They had a precedent in a similar case going with a broader interpretation based on the language, which is similar to Allah. Right? Well, I don't think it's similar. I think the case you're referring to is missionary society, opinion by Judge O'Brien, joined by Justice Cardoso. Justice Pound didn't participate in that, but certainly some luminous jurors involved in that. But that case, if you read the case, is a short opinion. That involved an easement to access Long Island Sound. That in the question there was whether an easement granted for horses and vehicles could also be used by pedestrians and could they build a sidewalk. And in that case, the court specifically notes that the intent of the grand tours, they're talking about this was an easement, this are uses that were within the scope of the intent of the grand tours. And the source of the determination of the intent of the grand tours, as I understand your applause and the law generally is, starts with language, right? And if there's something about the context that strongly suggests that the language should not be read as broadly as it would appear on the face of it, that's something worth considering. But you start with the language, and frequently, I would suppose, stop with the language. So that brings us back to Judge Newman's question, isn't this very broad language indicative of an intention to grant in accordance with the ordinary understanding of that language? And certainly on that point, we prevail and help explain why
. This language, it says, such other purposes as a railroad may desire. That's the language Judge Firestone fixed upon to say, this is such argument that you've got to say. So before we get to that, and I would, I don't want to cut you off from making that out of it, because I know it's a central issue in your group. But before you get there, I'd like to make sure I understand what your position is with respect to whether this kind of conveyance could, even if quite clearly intended to grant the right for any purpose whatsoever, would be unenforceable in New York law. And suppose that instead of saying such purposes as that the language had been unambiguously explicit and said for any purpose whatsoever whether railroad purpose or otherwise, that the successors and the signs whoever they may be might wish. Is it your position that that clause would be unenforceable in New York law? Well, yes, Judge Bryce, because it's not an easement, right? I mean, if you say it could be easement. Is he got another way of saying that it might not be an easement, but whatever kind of instrument it is, whatever's at the top, you look at the text of the instrument and if it makes that conveyance, and that conveyance is the intent of the parties, wouldn't that conveyance be respected, whether you call it an easement or a fee or a fee with a reverter or whatever? Wouldn't that be respected at New York law or put another way? Do you have any case that says it wouldn't? Well, I think there are several cases and we cite them in the brief. I think the young case is one, this particularly leading, that New York's high score that said, we must look at the language of this document to determine the intent of the parties and intent governs. And we've agreed on that. But I'm looking for something, some support, which I didn't really find in your brief for the proposition that no matter how clear, even assuming away that such problem, no matter how clear, the language might be, it's unenforceable. Well, again, that begs the conclusion that this deed in the language and the deed would have actually said you can use this land for anything. And it does
. Well, it's starting point for trying to decide whether we're the inquiry into what the language actually means is worth engaging in. I mean, if you can't have anything, any kind of conveyance like this no matter how clear the language is, we're done. Well, I would say no court, I would agree exactly with that premise, that no court in New York, in particularly New York's high score, has never found ever that an easement granted the right to use property for any purpose, essentially converting what is an easement into a fee estate. No court has ever found that to be the case. But no court has ever held that it isn't enforceable as I got it. Well, I mean, the courts have said repeatedly in New York that we're going to look at the language and the intent of the parties. That's our quote, timeless first principle. Right, but you're going back to the language in intent and not pointing you to a case that says you can't have this kind of a great agreement, even if the language is clear. Well, I would look at the Lewis versus Young decision, which was in 1998. I would look at also on Tomp versus Lake Shore Railroad, which was an 1877 decision, both by the New York Court of Appeals. Both of those say when we're confronted with situations such as this, we have this document, which in this case, it's not just six words. We're dealing with a 10 page, 3,000 word single space, typewritten document that the parties took great pains to specifically identify all their rights and responsibilities
. And to conclude that that text somehow said, oh, forget everything in this document, we're giving you the right to use this property for anything you want to use. Even things that as Judge Feierstown found, they never contemplated, is contrary to, as again, the Court of Appeals in New York has said, timeless first principle that we're going to look at. The parties in intent will look at the language and the text of the document. What's that against us to that? That argument is if you look at the language and the text of the document, it's extraordinarily strong. We see so many of these documents because of the Rails of Trails Act. And I don't recall any that was written this broadly. They generally say railroad purposes. Well, this does. And the related purposes in the document, related purposes, then comes the act of Congress of the conversion to recreation use. In part, in order to preserve the space in case we ever go back to railroads. But I've never seen one written this broadly and one wonders back in history, obviously, none of us was there. What was in the minds of the negotiators to write something? We assume competent lawyers on both sides to write an unlimited grant
. And it's still called an easement, which is an argument that gives one pause to think about as Judge Bryson has. As mentioned, but this language is unique. Well, Judge Newman, I would take issue with that. I don't find the language unique. And I would refer to our opening brief, particularly on pages 6 through 8, where we quote the relevant provisions of this. Repeatedly throughout this document, they define this as being four railroad purposes. And for the successor railroad, which in the Supreme Court's East Alabama decision has said, a successor railroad is a successor railroad with the franchise. So that would not include New York City using this property for something having no relation whatsoever to the operation of a railroad. Why would they have written 10 pages of single space, typewritten specification, all of which dealt very specifically, and precisely with operating railroad, if their intent was to say, well, let you use it for anything. It makes no sense to say that you can pull these three or four words out of the context and conclude the entire document then somehow granted rights that even as Judge Byerson said, no one contemplated at the time. And I see my time as expired and I would deserve the balance for rebuttal. Yes, let's hear it for you
. But I had a side of me. Can we rebuttal? Okay. Miss Meeker. Good morning. I am Emily Meeker, and with my colleague, Chris Tartiff, I represent the United States. May it please the Court. We all agree that this case involves the interpretation of East Memphis language under New York law. The Court of Federal claims correctly concluded that this broad easement allows use for rail-baking and interim trials and is not limited only to rail. What's your answer to the position that yes, we've got this broad statement. We also have 10 pages on specificity railroad use. We do have that, Your Honor, but the language that we are looking at and are focused on is the language that talks about how the New York Central Railroad can use the easement area. And that's the granting language
. What the Court is. Let's talk about the other language. And the other language talks about taxes, how the parties will divide the taxes, talks about certain other ways, how they'll build, how they'll be venting. And there is certainly other language. But when we look to how the easement area should be used, this is clear and unambiguous language that it can be used for any such purposes that the railroad company its successors and assigns. Is that just this language that just got tucked into one sentence? Well, Your Honor, I don't think that's right. And there are a couple of reasons to believe that. First, these are two highly sophisticated corporations. We have the New York Central Railroad and we have the New York Realty and Terminal Company. The Realty and Terminal Company was actually a division of the central railroad. These are sophisticated corporations. They certainly anticipated that this property would be used for railroad purposes
. We see that in the language. But they also anticipated that the New York Central Railroad might want to use the language for other purposes. And we know that because it's also in the easement language. And what New York law says is that once the easement language is clear and unambiguous, the inquiry is finished. So you disagree with your closing counsel on the question of whether New York law would regard the language that's unambiguously clear that says you can use it for any purpose that New York law would not enforce. Such an agreement. I disagree with my colleague, Mr. Herne. I would urge the Court to look to the missionary society case. And we have. And that doesn't quite get you there. It seems to me
. Well, in that case, the Court. That was a related, argued with the latest and related use, right? Well, in that case, the Court looked at the language. It allowed for horses' vehicles and all other lawful purposes. And what the Court said is this is unusually broad. It's general in terms. And the only limitation on the use of this property is that it would be used for lawful purposes. But they went on, if I recall, the opinion to say that it's really related to access. Well, the water, I think it's water-quartly driven, but some sets use, right? They did do that, Your Honor, assuming that it was only limited to a right of way, these uses would also be included. But I am not aware of any New York case that says, you know, this is too broad. And Mr. Herndt says that this is a fee, but it's not, in fact, a fee. It's an easement because the realty company reserves certain rights to itself
. The rights being the right for the case of abandonment to have a reverter of the interest. I take it and the rights against dispoiling the property and so forth. They also reserve the right to build columns. They had the right to build above this easement area. This is a rectangular prism. And so they had the right to build columns above. They didn't interfere with the uses of the easement holder, but they had that right. So they did reserve certain rights to themselves. And a fee, as the Court is aware, the Granger gives all of these rights. Let me ask you a question that doesn't pertain to the precise issue we've been discussing, but it was in the record, and I'm just curious. The issue of the Covenant's not to sue has, was not decided by Judge Firestone. And isn't an issue here. What happened to that issue? Because he would have thought that would have been a threshold issue, which, if resolved against the appeal, would be the end of the game. So, Your Honor, there were six, I think it's why you were on the merits, but it's a standard issue. There were six plaintiffs that did sign a covenant not to sue. That decision was issued by Judge Firestone. It was appealed in this Court, summarily affirmed. This particular appellant was not involved in that. And the reason it wasn't is that on the day the C2 was issued, the appellant created a new corporation and transferred the property a couple months later to a new entity. And then New York got this new entity to sign the Covenant not to sue. But the taking, alleged taking occurs on the date of the C2. So, although the entity that was, you know, wholly owned by this other entity and by the same family signed a Covenant not to sue, this particular entity did not. I'd like to turn back to the plain language. My colleague argues that such other railroad purposes should be interpreted, excuse me, for such other purposes should be interpreted as for such other railroad purposes
. What happened to that issue? Because he would have thought that would have been a threshold issue, which, if resolved against the appeal, would be the end of the game. So, Your Honor, there were six, I think it's why you were on the merits, but it's a standard issue. There were six plaintiffs that did sign a covenant not to sue. That decision was issued by Judge Firestone. It was appealed in this Court, summarily affirmed. This particular appellant was not involved in that. And the reason it wasn't is that on the day the C2 was issued, the appellant created a new corporation and transferred the property a couple months later to a new entity. And then New York got this new entity to sign the Covenant not to sue. But the taking, alleged taking occurs on the date of the C2. So, although the entity that was, you know, wholly owned by this other entity and by the same family signed a Covenant not to sue, this particular entity did not. I'd like to turn back to the plain language. My colleague argues that such other railroad purposes should be interpreted, excuse me, for such other purposes should be interpreted as for such other railroad purposes. Such that the granting clause would say for railroad purposes and for such other railroad purposes as the railroad company, its successors and assigns desire. Of course, that reading would be, make the second clause completely redundant and would strip it of any meaning. Maybe they were just sloppy or hasty or what else could they be? Your Honor, I think the answer is they weren't sloppy, they weren't hasty, they carefully came to an agreement, they negotiated it, and they used this language that the grantee negotiated for this right and paid for it. And what the New York courts also say, which I think is not necessary here, but if the language is ambiguous or if it's not clear, New York courts construe easements most strongly against the grantor. And that's also in the Missionary Society case from the New York Court of Appeals. And in this case, that would require a broad reading of the easement, not narrow as a pellance suggests. We talked a little bit about the relationship between the parties, and I wanted to also talk about the East Alabama case that my colleague, Mr. Herndt mentioned. That is a case where the Supreme Court was applying Alabama law, and Mr. Herndt is not cited a case where New York courts use Alabama law to interpret their decision, or a New York court case that says anything similar. What New York courts do, as we know, as they look to the language of the easement, and if we turn to page 826 and 27 of this particular easement, it defines who the successors and assigns are. And it says, whenever the term railroad company shall be used herein, the same shall be construed to mean the railroad company, its successors and assigns being the successor entitled to the railroad company, to the rights and easements herein granted to the railroad company and the respective land
. Such that the granting clause would say for railroad purposes and for such other railroad purposes as the railroad company, its successors and assigns desire. Of course, that reading would be, make the second clause completely redundant and would strip it of any meaning. Maybe they were just sloppy or hasty or what else could they be? Your Honor, I think the answer is they weren't sloppy, they weren't hasty, they carefully came to an agreement, they negotiated it, and they used this language that the grantee negotiated for this right and paid for it. And what the New York courts also say, which I think is not necessary here, but if the language is ambiguous or if it's not clear, New York courts construe easements most strongly against the grantor. And that's also in the Missionary Society case from the New York Court of Appeals. And in this case, that would require a broad reading of the easement, not narrow as a pellance suggests. We talked a little bit about the relationship between the parties, and I wanted to also talk about the East Alabama case that my colleague, Mr. Herndt mentioned. That is a case where the Supreme Court was applying Alabama law, and Mr. Herndt is not cited a case where New York courts use Alabama law to interpret their decision, or a New York court case that says anything similar. What New York courts do, as we know, as they look to the language of the easement, and if we turn to page 826 and 27 of this particular easement, it defines who the successors and assigns are. And it says, whenever the term railroad company shall be used herein, the same shall be construed to mean the railroad company, its successors and assigns being the successor entitled to the railroad company, to the rights and easements herein granted to the railroad company and the respective land. So the successor and assigns are the entity that takes title to the land. This clause does not refer to the operation of a railroad or someone having to franchise. And again, it seems to help them how confident are you that New York law would be clear and explicit and unambiguous in interpreting this property right? Very confident. I think the New York Court of Appeals addressed a case that's very similar in Missionary Society 85 years ago, and the court has the other courts in New York, the Pelot Division, have applied that law to other cases. I don't think any of those cases I have to say I haven't studied them carefully had as explicit a grant as here. That's broad a grant. That's true, except I guess the one exception might be the Phillips V. Jacobson case. And in that case, we don't know much about the grant except that the court said it was an easement and it wasn't limited by its terms for purposes. And the court cited the Missionary Society case for that it could be used for any purpose. So I believe that New York law is clear on this point. And I also think that the purposes were not as broadly unrelated as here
. So the successor and assigns are the entity that takes title to the land. This clause does not refer to the operation of a railroad or someone having to franchise. And again, it seems to help them how confident are you that New York law would be clear and explicit and unambiguous in interpreting this property right? Very confident. I think the New York Court of Appeals addressed a case that's very similar in Missionary Society 85 years ago, and the court has the other courts in New York, the Pelot Division, have applied that law to other cases. I don't think any of those cases I have to say I haven't studied them carefully had as explicit a grant as here. That's broad a grant. That's true, except I guess the one exception might be the Phillips V. Jacobson case. And in that case, we don't know much about the grant except that the court said it was an easement and it wasn't limited by its terms for purposes. And the court cited the Missionary Society case for that it could be used for any purpose. So I believe that New York law is clear on this point. And I also think that the purposes were not as broadly unrelated as here. You're on her. I mean, what my colleague says is that it wasn't contemplated. Well, we know what the parties contemplated. They contemplated that the railroad might want to use it for other purposes. That's the language. No New York case says that the parties have to sit down and sort of imagine every specific use. No, the parties can contract. They can say, you know, we don't know how this might be used. We don't know what's going to happen in the future, but we can contract around that unknown. And that's what they did here. The other part of this easement that I'd like to direct the court to is the Hibinam clause. Frequently in our cases, we see a judge Newman, you mentioned before that often in our cases, they refer to railroad purposes
. You're on her. I mean, what my colleague says is that it wasn't contemplated. Well, we know what the parties contemplated. They contemplated that the railroad might want to use it for other purposes. That's the language. No New York case says that the parties have to sit down and sort of imagine every specific use. No, the parties can contract. They can say, you know, we don't know how this might be used. We don't know what's going to happen in the future, but we can contract around that unknown. And that's what they did here. The other part of this easement that I'd like to direct the court to is the Hibinam clause. Frequently in our cases, we see a judge Newman, you mentioned before that often in our cases, they refer to railroad purposes. Frequently, we see Hibinam clauses that state that the easement will terminate when railroad purposes end. This one, which is on J.A.J. to Pindex 827, does not. It says, quote, to have and to hold the perpetual rights and easements here and granted by the realty company and the parcels of land above described into the railroad company, its successors and assigns forever. It does not limit this or say that the easement will end when it is no longer used for railroad purposes. And this differentiates this easement from other easements we see. I'd also like to quickly address the abandonment issue. Under New York law, to prove abandonment, Appellant must show by clear and convincing evidence that there was an intention to abandon, add some overt act or failure to act, which carries the implication that the owner neither claims nor retains any interest in the easement. Appellant does not meet that heavy burden here. Appellant's arguments regarding abandonment rely on their argument that easement was limited to railroad purposes
. Frequently, we see Hibinam clauses that state that the easement will terminate when railroad purposes end. This one, which is on J.A.J. to Pindex 827, does not. It says, quote, to have and to hold the perpetual rights and easements here and granted by the realty company and the parcels of land above described into the railroad company, its successors and assigns forever. It does not limit this or say that the easement will end when it is no longer used for railroad purposes. And this differentiates this easement from other easements we see. I'd also like to quickly address the abandonment issue. Under New York law, to prove abandonment, Appellant must show by clear and convincing evidence that there was an intention to abandon, add some overt act or failure to act, which carries the implication that the owner neither claims nor retains any interest in the easement. Appellant does not meet that heavy burden here. Appellant's arguments regarding abandonment rely on their argument that easement was limited to railroad purposes. It was not that shown by the granting clause, which we've discussed, and the Hibinam clause, which is found on page 827. And we also discussed that as well. Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that the railroad has been actively involved with the High Line and is never acted in a way that suggested it neither claimed nor retained any interest in the easement. It contested the adverse abandonment proceeding and was actively involved regarding the negotiations in the High Line in the late 1990s and early 2000s. So as the court of federal claims found, these actions are of an entity that was actively claiming its property, not one that neither claimed nor retained any interest in the property. And Appellant lacks evidence to show otherwise. Unless the court has any further questions, I will sit down. We ask that you affirm the decision of the trial court, and in the event that you, the court demands we would ask that you demands so that the trial court can consider our alternative liability argument. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor
. It was not that shown by the granting clause, which we've discussed, and the Hibinam clause, which is found on page 827. And we also discussed that as well. Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that the railroad has been actively involved with the High Line and is never acted in a way that suggested it neither claimed nor retained any interest in the easement. It contested the adverse abandonment proceeding and was actively involved regarding the negotiations in the High Line in the late 1990s and early 2000s. So as the court of federal claims found, these actions are of an entity that was actively claiming its property, not one that neither claimed nor retained any interest in the property. And Appellant lacks evidence to show otherwise. Unless the court has any further questions, I will sit down. We ask that you affirm the decision of the trial court, and in the event that you, the court demands we would ask that you demands so that the trial court can consider our alternative liability argument. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. Judge Bryson, you're absolutely correct when you say that missionary society doesn't get the government where it wants to go, doesn't support the CFC's conclusion in this case. Missionary society said an easement granted for vehicular use for horses, for carriages, could also be used for pedestrians. You're exactly right to say, which is why the court analyzed missionary society saying, that's okay. You can also build a sidewalk for the pedestrians and lay a water pipe. That's a far cry from the situation we're confronted with here, which is a situation where, unquestionably, what even Judge Fairfund found was what was intended to be an elevated railroad via that easement. Somehow now is used by a non-rare road for taco trucks, dancing, stargazing, public recreation, things have nothing to do with the railroad. It is impossible to read that document, the 10-page typewritten document, and come away with the conclusion that these people intended to grant New York City a non-rare road the right to use that property in the manner it's now being used. That is the simple question of New York law. No case that we've ever found in New York has embraced a situation like this, granting such an interpretation of an easement to allow uses that were not contemplated by the parties. Again, I mentioned it earlier, the timeless first principle, the New York Court of Appeals, continues to use to guide its interpretation of easements, is the parties' intention. Now, when we look at the language, as you noted, Judge Newman, and I quote the language right now, the operative language upon which Judge Firestone premise her conclusion were the words, for railroad purposes and for such other purposes as the railroad company its successors and assigns made for time to time desire to make use. Other meaning other than railroad? I mean, other, I would say for such other purposes, the word such qualifies other purposes
. Judge Bryson, you're absolutely correct when you say that missionary society doesn't get the government where it wants to go, doesn't support the CFC's conclusion in this case. Missionary society said an easement granted for vehicular use for horses, for carriages, could also be used for pedestrians. You're exactly right to say, which is why the court analyzed missionary society saying, that's okay. You can also build a sidewalk for the pedestrians and lay a water pipe. That's a far cry from the situation we're confronted with here, which is a situation where, unquestionably, what even Judge Fairfund found was what was intended to be an elevated railroad via that easement. Somehow now is used by a non-rare road for taco trucks, dancing, stargazing, public recreation, things have nothing to do with the railroad. It is impossible to read that document, the 10-page typewritten document, and come away with the conclusion that these people intended to grant New York City a non-rare road the right to use that property in the manner it's now being used. That is the simple question of New York law. No case that we've ever found in New York has embraced a situation like this, granting such an interpretation of an easement to allow uses that were not contemplated by the parties. Again, I mentioned it earlier, the timeless first principle, the New York Court of Appeals, continues to use to guide its interpretation of easements, is the parties' intention. Now, when we look at the language, as you noted, Judge Newman, and I quote the language right now, the operative language upon which Judge Firestone premise her conclusion were the words, for railroad purposes and for such other purposes as the railroad company its successors and assigns made for time to time desire to make use. Other meaning other than railroad? I mean, other, I would say for such other purposes, the word such qualifies other purposes. It refers back to what appears before that. We cite Justice Roberts' decision in King V. Burwell, where he noted the word such is not any. The word such is qualified by the proceeding. It depends on phrase. How the word such is used, though. I mean, if one says an expression such as, I am going to invite my fellow judges and such other persons as I may choose to dinner, the such there does not mean, and they have to be among my fellow judges. It means exactly the opposite. It means such other different purposes. And that's parallel to this language, it seems to me. I find your such argument doesn't have much traction. Well, and I would say that when you look at that, and here's maybe I can add some traction to the argument, because what I'm looking at is within that whole paragraph, and particularly within the whole document, you find, again, painstaking discussion of the specifics of the railroad's use, so you find reference to cables, to tracks, to, there's other railroad purposes that are necessary to the operation of a railroad
. It refers back to what appears before that. We cite Justice Roberts' decision in King V. Burwell, where he noted the word such is not any. The word such is qualified by the proceeding. It depends on phrase. How the word such is used, though. I mean, if one says an expression such as, I am going to invite my fellow judges and such other persons as I may choose to dinner, the such there does not mean, and they have to be among my fellow judges. It means exactly the opposite. It means such other different purposes. And that's parallel to this language, it seems to me. I find your such argument doesn't have much traction. Well, and I would say that when you look at that, and here's maybe I can add some traction to the argument, because what I'm looking at is within that whole paragraph, and particularly within the whole document, you find, again, painstaking discussion of the specifics of the railroad's use, so you find reference to cables, to tracks, to, there's other railroad purposes that are necessary to the operation of a railroad. That's clearly what I believe they had contemplated when they said such other purposes. So, for example, employee lockers or hand cars or some signals or electric signals or telegraph lines that are related to the operation of the railroad. Those would be other railroad purposes. When you see this document, it's impossible, I think, to conclude that when they wrote that, that they contemplated, and even Judge Feierstund didn't find, oh, we can mean a non-rair railroad using it for public recreation. Well, you keep saying that Judge Feierstund so found this. I assume you're referring to the statement, or she says that it doesn't matter that they didn't specifically contemplate the use for a trail or a park, as long as the language is clear enough that it's clear that they contemplated that they could be any other purposes, basically, but I don't see that that's terribly helpful. Well, the statement I was actually referring to as a joint appendix 12, and I'll quote, if the time the easement was, this is Judge Feierstund speaking, at the time the easement was granted, re-it, or a reality company in New York Central Railroad, could not foresee use of the corridor for a public trail or park, meaning that it was not within their contemplation at the time of this document, this easement was established. Not for those kinds of specific purposes, but that's quite different from saying they couldn't contemplate that it could possibly be used for any other non-rair, any non-rair purpose, right? And I think, Judge Reisen, that's where it blends into this concept of the distinction between an easement and the Fee Estate. If you say the party signed a document called an easement, which everybody admits it is, but that they contemplated this easement granting the right to do anything they wanted with the property, you've suddenly trans-modified an easement into a Fee Estate, because what would be the limits to this? The only limit that Judge Feierstund suggested was the physical dimensions of the property. Well, that's not really a limit on a use. An easement is a specific, but by definition, a specific use of the property for a specific purpose, and it can't encompass all purposes. Thank you
. Thank you. Thank you, sir. In case it's taken into consideration