Legal Case Summary

You'll hear argument next in case 16, 534, Ruben versus the Islamic Republic of Iran. Mr. Perlin? Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. In 2008, Congress comprehensively overhauled the terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity to close gaps that had for years allowed foreign terror states to thumb their noses at U.S. judgments finding them liable for acts of terrorism while their victims were drawn into a long, bitter, and often futile search for scarce assets that would be subject to execution under the exceedingly narrow commercial exception to foreign sovereign immunity. A centerpiece of that legislation is Section 1610G. That provision provides that American terrorism victims can execute their judgments upon the property of a foreign state that is subject against which a judgment has been entered under 1605A, and it makes available the property of the state's agencies and instrument tallities. As provided in this section. As provided in this section. The question is what that provision means. The respondents would have the Court delete the three words between the word execution and the words as provided in this section. What it actually says is that the property is subject to execution upon that judgment as provided in this section. We know what that Congress wanted to do with them, what they call the bank check factors, and this statute was written perfectly to do just that. You say it does something more. It has to do more, Your Honor. I mean, why does it have to do it? What the statute did is it made more assets available because you didn't have to worry that it was the state itself and instrumentality of the state and agency, the property of any of those entities was available. So it's well the assets that would be available, but it didn't say anything, not a word about immunity. Well, there's two questions here. It doesn't say anything about immunity, but those are magic words. It does say that the property is subject to execution

. Magic words under A and B. In 1610 and A and B, Congress knew how directly to say property is not or is subject immune from attachment. But it used something very different here. Rather, it says that property is, quote, subject to attachment as provided in this section. Those are two very distinct formulations. They are different. Subsections A and B were part of the original Foreign Sublimunity Act from 1976. There were other amendments since then. If you look at Subsection F1, which the President has waived, there shall be subject to execution. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, which is codified as a note to Subsection 2.1610, also says, shall be subject to execution. So the language, when Congress sat down to write Subsection G, it was looking at the other Terrorism Exceptions to Execution Immunity that it had already passed. And those were F and Tria, and it modeled G after those sections. Can they execute compliance on the embassy? So on the uniform, on the uniforms that the people in the embassy wear on the papers that the ambassador keeps in his desk, if, in fact, you read, as provided in this section, the answer is no. If you read it to include, it has to be commercial. All right? Under your reading, where those words, that's something else, can't they do it? They cannot. Why not? Subsection 1609 says that Section 1610, Execution under 1610, subject to international agreements, like the Vienna Convention, which would protect diplomatic property. And Section 1611 protects military assets, certain central bank assets. Congress, when they enacted 1610 G, they did not completely aggregate foreign sovereign immunity for terrorist states. They wanted to provide a remedy for the victims, they wanted to punish and deter the terrorist states, but at the same time, Congress recognized that Iran, in North Korea, Syria, Sudan, these are sovereign states, and they're entitled to a bare minimum of sovereign immunity, and Congress retained that bare minimum by protecting quintessentially sovereign assets while making everything else subject to execution. What does, as provided in this section, mean? Am I right? You think it incorporates only procedural requirements? No, there are a number of, no, you're honor

. What does it mean? It means, as per, the way to read it is, it refers to the judgment that's entered under 1605A. As provided in this section, it says, execution, you can have execution upon the property upon that judgment as provided in this section. As provided in this section, it modifies the judgment upon that judgment, and it refers to the section, the section 1605A, which is the only section mentioned in this sentence, is referring back to the section 1605A, there was a couple lines above in the same sentence. And what it says is that a judgment, that section 1610G, which provides sweeping remedies for terrorism victims, is only applicable to those who hold judgments entered under the statutory cause of action of 1605A. If not available to other plaintiffs holding terrorism judgments. It also extends, it also extends, as provided in this section, extends the remedies, the remedies, remember, the remedies of 1605A, capital A, are very novel. To say the least, you don't have a private right of action anywhere else in the Foreign Southern Community Act. You don't have any other provision that allows punitive damages against a sovereign state, which is a sure sign that Congress was not concerned about affronting the dignity of terrorist states. They allowed punitive damages. They expected those to be enforced. They allowed a pre-judgment lien of list pendants to attach to all sovereign, all of the state's property, that is subject to execution under 1610, that including property of any party that the plaintiff identifies as being controlled by that terrorist state. So, as provided in this section is really superfluous, isn't it? Under your interpretation. It's not. It refers, well, it's, it emphasizes the centrality of the 1605 judgment to this provision. And it also, there's no other way to read it. If you read it as the respondents would, there's no provision within 1610 that can pair with 1610, they say that it must pair with another substantive provision of 1610, but nothing works. Try to go through. It says that 1610G says that the property of a foreign state is subject to execution, and the property of an agency or some mentality. Now, if this were only a veil-piercing mechanism as a respondents claim, there's no reason to mention the property of the foreign state. You don't need to pierce the veil to reach the property of the judgment debtor, terror state. You just go straight for that property

. And if you have a judgment against the agency or some insurmountality. Sotomayor, I'm sorry. I thought that the University of Chicago had raised an interesting argument that the definition of foreign state in the statute includes, by definition, an agency or insurmountality of a foreign state so that the reference to foreign state that you're relying upon does include the concept of piercing the corporate veil. And it's very definition. Well, that would, that itself would abrogate Bansack, the rationale that the University of Chicago would be. Well, not quite, because what I mean, this provision deals directly in aid of the plaintiffs in the Bansack case and in the others that had found against plaintiffs. There are at least three cases where a class of plaintiffs were found not to be in a sufficiently tied relationship to the foreign state and the plaintiffs there couldn't recover. So there was a real issue this was addressing, the fact that there were subsidiaries and agencies of foreign state who had commercial property and it wasn't being made available to plaintiffs. So the question would be to ask the respondents why they don't mention those cases in their briefs. We have maintained consistently that the property of the foreign state, those words, are completely not just superfluous but misleading. If there, if this is just a veil piercing mechanism, if it's a veil piercing mechanism, It gave them what those three cases denied though. It gives other plaintiffs with similar claims, a lot access to a lot of property that they wouldn't have had under bankset. The provisions that allow execution upon the property of an agency or instrumentality gives access to the agency or instrumentality of property. Well, given example, I mean, there's a famous example which you probably know about, the letter of Cyrus saying to everybody throughout the Middle East that the Jews are free and they can go back to Israel, Palestine, the Temple, and that letter exists and a peruse, a Persian letter, and Iran has sent it around the world. Now, in your view, they happen people of what looked at it and if it comes to United States, you can seize it. Is that your view of it? Because if it is, of course, if Congress knew about it, then they might have had a general idea giving the nature of this stuff in Chicago. I would be surprised that they would want to do that. You might be surprised, but Congress has a veil. Yes, you could seize it. It would depend on, yes, you could. Congress has addressed this very question twice

. In 22 U.S.C., 2459, Congress provided a very specific and limited immunity for culturally significant objects being brought to the United States, being brought to the United States for display or exhibition. There is a very specific immunity there that the, that somebody wants to bring in that property that those exhibits can apply to the State Department in advance and receive a letter immunizing those assets from judicial process. And last year, Congress- Did that exist in what was in 1939? It did not. In 1939. But Congress could have made that provision retroactive. And it didn't happen. What about the provision that Congress did enact in, we have been talking about G. And so this is Sub-Sex and Three, refers to nothing shall be construed to super-the authority of a court to prevent the impairment of an infest held by a person who is not liable in the action. Why isn't the University of Chicago such a person? Certainly not liable in the action. And they got this property when Iran was not listed as a terrorist state. The shop was in control, let the guy show them. The University hasn't raised that as a defense. And because Section 1610G3 refers to a party with an ownership interest, not just some other intangible interest. And even to the extent that they do, that doesn't mean that the court should not be able to transfer title to a whatever party would be ready to pay the price. And we think it would be Iran, by the way. If the court would construe this statute, as Congress, we think, as we read it, Congress would finally, I mean, Iran would finally pay attention to a judgment. And they would say, we're about to lose our artifacts. But what are the terms of that the University of Chicago has had this since 1939? Iran has never tried to take it back

. What are the terms of the lease? It's not a lease. It was a long-term loan for the study and cataloging, publishing, photograph, and cleaning of these artifacts. And University of Chicago does not assert an ownership interest. They say that in the briefs, they say they're trustees or they're entrusted, they only call themselves trustees even. They say they were entrusted with this. They use language, but they never say we have a concrete right in these assets. And if they do, the court can, the district court, when it orders the sale, it can make a accommodation for that. It can say that whoever buys it, and my clients would be perfectly happy if he is sort of interested in this property for the money, for money. It's interested in having these antiquities on display to be researched, to be seen. But it doesn't belong to them. It's not theirs. And whoever it belongs to can decide whether they're the best organization. They'll answer my question. Well, don't worry about the University of Chicago. The district court can give them some money. No, not money, not money. If they have a right, except that they have a right to retain the artifacts and continue their work with them, the district court can say that the sale should be conducted. It's subject to the rights of the University of Chicago. It doesn't mean that it's all in, it's not all in nothing. It doesn't write anybody up. The rights have been from 1939 on they have this property

. Well, since 1980, they've had the property because Iran couldn't get it back. For a big part of that time. And for a big part of the time before that, every now and then Iran was asking, when are you going to finish, when are you going to finish studying these things? And they were not very forthcoming. When this lawsuit was filed, they moved into, they expedited their study of the assets to realize that they might lose them. Now, again, the University of Chicago is really an amicus here. They don't, they have no interest in these assets. And to the extent that they do, the court can protect that. It can protect that interest in a sale. Well, assuming you're right, does that mean if you lose here, you think Iran will be able to repatriate the assets? Absolutely. There's nothing in the way. They did. They did. We lost. We lost in the district court. And there was another collection of Iran-owned assets. And on the eve of the argument in the Court of Appeals, they were shipped back to Iran after the Court had denied our motion to stay, but they were shipped back to Iran. And they- There are things in the United States. I mean, it seems to me so far that the main difference between your interpretation and the other side, as a practical matter, is that if you're right that private people will be able to take cultural assets from Persia and sell them and ship them back to Iran. And if they're right, you will have to limit your recovery to commercial objects, because that's what the other parts of the statute provide. Now, that's not perhaps going to turn out to be relevant to the decision. I grant you that

. But I- something I- I'm- I'm like to have in my mind. Okay. The distinction under the Foreign Assembly, I'm going to put it this way, he- they want to cabin us into Section 1610A7, which is the commercial use exception for property owned by the State. That provision, as a seven-circuit held, requires not just use for commercial activity, but you have to use by the foreign state. And a number of courts of appeal have held, as did the seven-circuit, and this court did not accept review of this issue, that it has to be- the use must be by the foreign state itself, even though that's not in the- those words are not in the statute. But a number of courts of appeal have looked at financial assets. Let's take the, you know, proceeds of a commercial transaction between a State and private parties. There are proceeds that are held in an account that are intended for the foreign state. And the courts have said that's not commercial use property. Why? Not because it's the proceeds of a commercial transaction, but because those proceeds have not yet been used by the foreign state for commercial activity. They're just sitting in an account passively waiting to be used, but they haven't been used yet. And the State could say, we're going to put it in our general account. And the Treasury. Congress has to address. Well, and those courts may well be wrong, I don't know. What I'm saying is, is the practical difference between our construction and the response construction is not antiquities. It's all of these cases dealing with passive bank accounts. There's another case in California where there was a judgment obtained by the Ministry of Defense of Iran against a defense contractor. And the court said the money paid by the Ministry of Defense, that's not commercial use property because it hasn't been used by Iran. There's countless cases like this. And this is the body

. These are the cases that this provision is, or one group of cases this provision is intended to cover. It's not intended to cover antiquities, and I don't think there's going to be a mad rush to grab antiquity. You're in yourself in this case. That's what it is, isn't it? That's all that they've left. That's all this proceeding below began in 2003. The terror attack in this case was in 1997. I climbed to the waiting 20 years to enforce their judgment against Iran. It's not a judgement. It's not Argentina that can't afford to pay the judgment. They just don't. And they don't care what the American court say. And Congress finally said it enough is enough. And they said there's punitive damages. And we're going to waive, rest your decada. We're going to waive collateral to Stoppill. We're going to waive statutes of limitations. You can go back and convert your old judgments into a new 1605A judgment. And use that tool under 1610G under our provision to enforce it. Congress said enough. It's enough. We want these judgments enforced

. And it's not about antiquities. That's what the respondents are writing about. But they will not tell you what the property of the foreign state applies to. Is there anything in the legislative record that shows that Congress was intending to do anything other than dispense with the bank check? Absolutely. It says that the provision will apply to any property in which the foreign state has a beneficial ownership. And that any property in which the foreign state has a beneficial ownership is subject to execution of that judgment. It says the ‑‑ the Senate sponsors said that it is intended to remove many of the barriers to execution of a judgment. And according to the respondents, it only addresses one of those barriers. It says that the ‑‑ the right to the ‑‑ to the property is subject to a simple ownership test. A simple ownership test. When you start piercing veils and layers of veils, that is not a simple ownership test. That might have been intended to be included in the ‑‑ that's not what it was being addressed. And finally, what the statute does say, the legislative history of the House report says that although it is subject to execution any property in which the state has a beneficial interest, it does not extend to diplomatic property. So once Congress is excluding specifically that narrow class of quintessentially sovereign property, diplomatic property, you know that it's ‑‑ it covers everything else. There's no reason if it didn't cover commercial use property or non‑conversal use property. There's no reason to specifically mention diplomatic property because obviously that's going to be included in non‑commercial. This applies to everything. Everything except diplomatic, military, and certain central bank assets. The idea that Congress would be concerned with affronting the dignity of a state sponsor of terrorism and would extend protection to their non‑commercial assets for that reason to avoid it in a front to their dignity is just preposterous. Do you have any other section that a dispensers with sovereign immunity that doesn't mention, doesn't say anything that refers to a meaning? Well, I mentioned section 1610F1. It says that the property shall be subject to execution

. And the tree, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, which is a note, I don't think I included it as an oversight in the statutory appendix, but it's codified as a note to section 1610. And that provision, these are the three Terrorism, Provision, Execution, Immunity Provision of the Foreign Self-immunity Act. And not one of them uses the word immunity. It says that we are aggregating immunity here or limiting immunity. Again, it's not aggregating it, wholesale. It's maintaining a skeletal remain of sovereign immunity because in recognition of the fact that these states are sovereign. In your brief, you offered several other interpretations of the phrase as provided in this section. Interpretations that are different from the one you provided this morning. Are you disavowing those now? I think that the best construction is that it refers to the judgment entered under 1605A. I think that those are alternative constructions that are viable and certainly more viable than the Seven Circuits. Again, if you sit down and try to think of cases where the property of a foreign estate will have applicability under 1610G, where there's property wouldn't be subject to execution under 1610A7, right, according to the Respondents' construction, you won't find it. You will not come up with a case or you're going to have to work very, very hard in it. There's no reason Congress would have included it. If this were only meant to peer-surveil, Congress would have said Subjection Subsection 3 or paragraph 3, the property of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state against which a judgment has been entered under 1605A is subject to execution, to attach an execution. It did not need to mention the property of the foreign state. Iran and the government both talked about how it had to mention the foreign state. Well, it's true. It had to mention the foreign state because the judgment was entered against the foreign state, but it does not need to single out the property of the foreign state. If all this were was a veil piercing mechanism, it doesn't work. It does it. You cannot pierce the veil of a company or a country to reach the property of the country on the directly. Now, let me just point out that none of the other provisions of 1610 work with G either, B, which the Subcircuit relied on, and said this section refers to subsection, really refers to Subsections A and B. Subsection B applies only where there's a judgment entered against the agency or instrumentality. If you have it again, if you have a judgment against the agency or instrumentality, you don't need a veil piercing mechanism to reach it because you go after its property directly. C is specifically mentioned as A and B only. That is an execution referenced under A and B. It doesn't mention G, and Congress could have amended it to include executions under G. D is for pre-judgment attachment where there's an express waiver of immunity. None of these provisions work. I'm going to, I'd like to reserve the rest of my time for a butl, but if you sit down and try to, they don't work. There's no way to read it according to the Subcircuit and apply it. Thank you, counsel. Mr. Strauss? Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may please the Court. Let me first pick up on a piece of the legislative history that my friend quoted to the Court. Senator Specter, who introduced the precursor of what became 1610G, did say that, as I, as Mr. Pearl, it said, that the provision was designed to eliminate many of the barriers which have prevented U.S. citizens from collecting on court order damages. He then said it does this by changing the legal standard of the bank act doctrine. So that was the way in which this makes those more, ask more property to execution by terrorism plaintiffs

. Now, let me just point out that none of the other provisions of 1610 work with G either, B, which the Subcircuit relied on, and said this section refers to subsection, really refers to Subsections A and B. Subsection B applies only where there's a judgment entered against the agency or instrumentality. If you have it again, if you have a judgment against the agency or instrumentality, you don't need a veil piercing mechanism to reach it because you go after its property directly. C is specifically mentioned as A and B only. That is an execution referenced under A and B. It doesn't mention G, and Congress could have amended it to include executions under G. D is for pre-judgment attachment where there's an express waiver of immunity. None of these provisions work. I'm going to, I'd like to reserve the rest of my time for a butl, but if you sit down and try to, they don't work. There's no way to read it according to the Subcircuit and apply it. Thank you, counsel. Mr. Strauss? Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may please the Court. Let me first pick up on a piece of the legislative history that my friend quoted to the Court. Senator Specter, who introduced the precursor of what became 1610G, did say that, as I, as Mr. Pearl, it said, that the provision was designed to eliminate many of the barriers which have prevented U.S. citizens from collecting on court order damages. He then said it does this by changing the legal standard of the bank act doctrine. So that was the way in which this makes those more, ask more property to execution by terrorism plaintiffs. In fact, the petitioner's position about the construction of 1610G is wrong for four independently sufficient reasons. One is the language the Court is focused on as provided in this section. This section is section 1610. That is the section of which G is a subsection. So the phrase, as provided in this section, means the petitioners have to satisfy the provisions of section 1610, which means that only property used for commercial activity in the United States can be seized. And petitioners, I think, have just not come up with a plausible alternative account of what, as provided in this section, means. But there's a second reason. And it has to do with the difference between subsection G and the provisions of subsection 1610 that really do abrogate sovereign immunity. The Foreign South and New York says in section 1609 that the property of foreign states in the U.S. shall be immune from attachment, except as provided in 1610. Then the subsections of 1610 say in terms, one after another, that certain property shall not be immune. Subsection A says that, as does B, as does D, as does E. Subsection G contains no such language. The relevant part of subsection G does not refer to immunity at all. And there's a reason for that. The reason is that G is about bankache, and the bankache doctrine is not an immunity doctrine. The Court was very explicit about that in the decision, the bankache decision itself. Well, you do think, agree with them, don't you, that the property of a foreign state in G1 is a strong indication at least that it is not limited to overturning the ban check decision? No, I don't agree with that. Mr. Chief Justice, I think what's going on there is Congress wanted to make it very clear that bankache was no longer going to be a barrier in these cases

. In fact, the petitioner's position about the construction of 1610G is wrong for four independently sufficient reasons. One is the language the Court is focused on as provided in this section. This section is section 1610. That is the section of which G is a subsection. So the phrase, as provided in this section, means the petitioners have to satisfy the provisions of section 1610, which means that only property used for commercial activity in the United States can be seized. And petitioners, I think, have just not come up with a plausible alternative account of what, as provided in this section, means. But there's a second reason. And it has to do with the difference between subsection G and the provisions of subsection 1610 that really do abrogate sovereign immunity. The Foreign South and New York says in section 1609 that the property of foreign states in the U.S. shall be immune from attachment, except as provided in 1610. Then the subsections of 1610 say in terms, one after another, that certain property shall not be immune. Subsection A says that, as does B, as does D, as does E. Subsection G contains no such language. The relevant part of subsection G does not refer to immunity at all. And there's a reason for that. The reason is that G is about bankache, and the bankache doctrine is not an immunity doctrine. The Court was very explicit about that in the decision, the bankache decision itself. Well, you do think, agree with them, don't you, that the property of a foreign state in G1 is a strong indication at least that it is not limited to overturning the ban check decision? No, I don't agree with that. Mr. Chief Justice, I think what's going on there is Congress wanted to make it very clear that bankache was no longer going to be a barrier in these cases. And so it said property of the state, property of agencies, property of instrumentalities, property of separaturgical entities, interests and separaturgical entities. All of these things are in the same basket, and all of them are subject to attachment and execution. I think that's why you have that language in G1. It's not a- It's not a- It wasn't about property of a foreign state. It was about the agency's instrumentalities, et cetera. It is, that is, it's right that bankache was not about the property of a state itself, but the way this section is written, property of a state, including property that is in a separate juridical entity, or is an interest held directly or indirectly in a separate juridical entity. What you see in the legislative history is a lot of concern that state judgment debtors would be arranging their assets in ways that would distance themselves from ownership. Is it the case there on that particular point? I was trying to work out that. Does bankache ever apply? Could it apply to funds or funds of the foreign state itself? Is there anything that suggested applies with the foreign state deposits of money in a bank? And then they argue, we, that isn't our money, that's the bank's money, and we're just the beneficial owner of that money. And bankache might have said, yes, that's right, it's not their money, it's an agency, it's an agent's money. I'll say two things to that, Justice Breyer. I think the bankache criteria are not very clear, the court deliberately left the criteria vague, and I think Congress was concerned about that situation. And I think that's why you see this language in G1 that really tries to be comprehensive and cover every base. But I think you don't get out of G1 as anything about immunity because it even applies to separate juridical entities. It doesn't want to cover everything in every case. It's titled property in certain actions. And I think the argument on the other side is that the certain actions are, you know, the ones in, don't include the ones governing the property of the foreign state. Well, I think the certain actions of the Chief Justice are actions to execute judgments under 1605A. This is a special provision to make it easier for terrorism plaintiffs to get assets. It doesn't apply to ordinary judgment plaintiffs. And I think that's the property it's referring to

. And so it said property of the state, property of agencies, property of instrumentalities, property of separaturgical entities, interests and separaturgical entities. All of these things are in the same basket, and all of them are subject to attachment and execution. I think that's why you have that language in G1. It's not a- It's not a- It wasn't about property of a foreign state. It was about the agency's instrumentalities, et cetera. It is, that is, it's right that bankache was not about the property of a state itself, but the way this section is written, property of a state, including property that is in a separate juridical entity, or is an interest held directly or indirectly in a separate juridical entity. What you see in the legislative history is a lot of concern that state judgment debtors would be arranging their assets in ways that would distance themselves from ownership. Is it the case there on that particular point? I was trying to work out that. Does bankache ever apply? Could it apply to funds or funds of the foreign state itself? Is there anything that suggested applies with the foreign state deposits of money in a bank? And then they argue, we, that isn't our money, that's the bank's money, and we're just the beneficial owner of that money. And bankache might have said, yes, that's right, it's not their money, it's an agency, it's an agent's money. I'll say two things to that, Justice Breyer. I think the bankache criteria are not very clear, the court deliberately left the criteria vague, and I think Congress was concerned about that situation. And I think that's why you see this language in G1 that really tries to be comprehensive and cover every base. But I think you don't get out of G1 as anything about immunity because it even applies to separate juridical entities. It doesn't want to cover everything in every case. It's titled property in certain actions. And I think the argument on the other side is that the certain actions are, you know, the ones in, don't include the ones governing the property of the foreign state. Well, I think the certain actions of the Chief Justice are actions to execute judgments under 1605A. This is a special provision to make it easier for terrorism plaintiffs to get assets. It doesn't apply to ordinary judgment plaintiffs. And I think that's the property it's referring to. This is really was intended to make it much easier for plaintiffs who have terrorism-based judgments to get their hands on assets, but only those plaintiffs. And I think those are the actions, and that's why a judgment entered under 1605A. But that doesn't mean that the rest of the section does not apply. In fact, it says the rest of the section does apply upon, as provided in this, in this section. The Court of Justice, I think you were cut off on three independent reasons. So you went through one and two, what was three and four? Two was the repetition of- The one we were just talking about. Not the repetition of- Shall not be immune. The third is this. The petitioner's position really would nullify a decision Congress made at the very same time it enacted 1610G in 2008. This is- we go through this on page 25 and 26 of our brief. This- the statute that added subsection G also created 1605, the cause of action that- the remedy the petitioners invoke. That statute then amended the FSAA to say to parties like petitioners who are seeking to execute a 1605A judgment, must show that the property they want to seize is used for commercial activity in the United States. That same statute said that. It said that by inserting 1605A into subsection A, which is a subsection that requires commercial activity. So Congress did that. It created 1605- 1605 capital A. It said if you are- if you are trying to execute a 1605 capital A judgment, here is how you do it. Section you go to section subsection A, subsection A7 says you can execute a 1605A judgment provided you can show that the property is used for commercial activity in the United States. That's what that statute does. Then the next provision or a few lines later in the statute, really it's live in the next provision, sets up an acts subsection G. So as petitioners would have it, Congress created this remedy, provided that if you want to execute a judgment based on this remedy, you go to subsection A and you show that the property you're seeing is used for commercial purpose, commercial activity in the United States

. This is really was intended to make it much easier for plaintiffs who have terrorism-based judgments to get their hands on assets, but only those plaintiffs. And I think those are the actions, and that's why a judgment entered under 1605A. But that doesn't mean that the rest of the section does not apply. In fact, it says the rest of the section does apply upon, as provided in this, in this section. The Court of Justice, I think you were cut off on three independent reasons. So you went through one and two, what was three and four? Two was the repetition of- The one we were just talking about. Not the repetition of- Shall not be immune. The third is this. The petitioner's position really would nullify a decision Congress made at the very same time it enacted 1610G in 2008. This is- we go through this on page 25 and 26 of our brief. This- the statute that added subsection G also created 1605, the cause of action that- the remedy the petitioners invoke. That statute then amended the FSAA to say to parties like petitioners who are seeking to execute a 1605A judgment, must show that the property they want to seize is used for commercial activity in the United States. That same statute said that. It said that by inserting 1605A into subsection A, which is a subsection that requires commercial activity. So Congress did that. It created 1605- 1605 capital A. It said if you are- if you are trying to execute a 1605 capital A judgment, here is how you do it. Section you go to section subsection A, subsection A7 says you can execute a 1605A judgment provided you can show that the property is used for commercial activity in the United States. That's what that statute does. Then the next provision or a few lines later in the statute, really it's live in the next provision, sets up an acts subsection G. So as petitioners would have it, Congress created this remedy, provided that if you want to execute a judgment based on this remedy, you go to subsection A and you show that the property you're seeing is used for commercial purpose, commercial activity in the United States. And then immediately Congress said, oh, never mind, you don't have to show commercial activity. That's petitioner's story. That's petitioner's account of the significance of 1610G. And I think that's just no way to read Congress's actions. That just does not- is not a plausible account of a Congress might have been doing. And there's really a fourth reason as well that it has to do with how central the commercial activity limit is to the FSIA and to FSIA community generally. The principle at stake here is the principle that commercial property may sometimes be subject to seizure, but non-commercial property is not. And that principle has the deepest roots in U.S. law and international law. It's actually anticipated by Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in the Schooner Exchange. It was the foundation of the tape letter which led to the reorganization of far and sovereign immunity doctrines. That distinction between commercial and non-commercial property is stated explicitly in the FSI itself in Section 1602. It's central to the UN Convention on the Municipities of States. It was the holding of a recent decision of the International Court of Justice, which barred the seizure of, as it happens, a cultural center. The ICJ barred the seizure of a cultural center because the cultural center is non-commercial. In that case, actually involved the victims of Nazi crimes. So this is an extremely deeply rooted principle. Now, that's not to say Congress could not abrogate it, of course, Congress could. But the Court said just last term in Helmerick the case involving the Venezuelan seizure of oil rings, that the Court is not going to assume that Congress has made a quote in the Court's words radical departure from central principles like that one, unless Congress has made its determination very clear. And here, what's really, very clear is the opposite

. And then immediately Congress said, oh, never mind, you don't have to show commercial activity. That's petitioner's story. That's petitioner's account of the significance of 1610G. And I think that's just no way to read Congress's actions. That just does not- is not a plausible account of a Congress might have been doing. And there's really a fourth reason as well that it has to do with how central the commercial activity limit is to the FSIA and to FSIA community generally. The principle at stake here is the principle that commercial property may sometimes be subject to seizure, but non-commercial property is not. And that principle has the deepest roots in U.S. law and international law. It's actually anticipated by Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in the Schooner Exchange. It was the foundation of the tape letter which led to the reorganization of far and sovereign immunity doctrines. That distinction between commercial and non-commercial property is stated explicitly in the FSI itself in Section 1602. It's central to the UN Convention on the Municipities of States. It was the holding of a recent decision of the International Court of Justice, which barred the seizure of, as it happens, a cultural center. The ICJ barred the seizure of a cultural center because the cultural center is non-commercial. In that case, actually involved the victims of Nazi crimes. So this is an extremely deeply rooted principle. Now, that's not to say Congress could not abrogate it, of course, Congress could. But the Court said just last term in Helmerick the case involving the Venezuelan seizure of oil rings, that the Court is not going to assume that Congress has made a quote in the Court's words radical departure from central principles like that one, unless Congress has made its determination very clear. And here, what's really, very clear is the opposite. That Congress did not intend to override sovereign immunity in Section 1610G. If the Court has no further questions. Thank you, Council. Thank you very much. Mr. Trip? Mr. Chief Justice, in May, please the Court. These ancient Persian artifacts are immune from execution under 1609, and nothing in 1610G lifts that immunity. And if I could just make three quick points about why that's right. The first, as most of the question is already been focused on today, is it just can't be squared with a statutory text. Statute says that the property of these different entities is subject to execution, quote, as provided in this section. But the way Petitioners read it, it would work exactly the same way if it said the exact opposite. If it said that the property was subject to execution regardless of what is provided in this section. And that just can't be right. And so second, I think another thing that really drives home that there are misread in this law is that the way they read it, it gives with one hand what it takes away with another. So as my brother was explaining, Congress added G at the same time that added A7. And what A7 says is that these very same people, victims of terrorism with judgments under 1605, capital A, it says that they can execute against the property of a foreign state, but only if it's used in commercial activity. But the way they read G, those people can defeat that limitation just by invoking a different subsection of the same statute, they can get commercial, non-commercial property, whatever. And that's just not a sensible way to draft a statute. But don't they explain A7 as being present to permit state law claims based on the same actions as the Federal action? So that would render A7. So we don't think that's right

. That Congress did not intend to override sovereign immunity in Section 1610G. If the Court has no further questions. Thank you, Council. Thank you very much. Mr. Trip? Mr. Chief Justice, in May, please the Court. These ancient Persian artifacts are immune from execution under 1609, and nothing in 1610G lifts that immunity. And if I could just make three quick points about why that's right. The first, as most of the question is already been focused on today, is it just can't be squared with a statutory text. Statute says that the property of these different entities is subject to execution, quote, as provided in this section. But the way Petitioners read it, it would work exactly the same way if it said the exact opposite. If it said that the property was subject to execution regardless of what is provided in this section. And that just can't be right. And so second, I think another thing that really drives home that there are misread in this law is that the way they read it, it gives with one hand what it takes away with another. So as my brother was explaining, Congress added G at the same time that added A7. And what A7 says is that these very same people, victims of terrorism with judgments under 1605, capital A, it says that they can execute against the property of a foreign state, but only if it's used in commercial activity. But the way they read G, those people can defeat that limitation just by invoking a different subsection of the same statute, they can get commercial, non-commercial property, whatever. And that's just not a sensible way to draft a statute. But don't they explain A7 as being present to permit state law claims based on the same actions as the Federal action? So that would render A7. So we don't think that's right. We also just don't think it really helps them. I know you're saying it, but explains to me why not. Yes. So the reason it's not right, we explain this, it pages 24 and 25 of our brief. It has to do with the language of 1605 Big A itself. This is on 12A of our gray brief, if you want to see it. And what 1605 Big A says is, quote, the court shall hear a claim under this section if, and then the prerequisites to jurisdiction are satisfied. So we think any time a court gets jurisdiction and enters a judgment, it's a judgment under 1605 Big A, regardless of what cause of action, they happen to invoke. I also think this doesn't really move the dial for them much because in practice in the minerun application of 1605 Big A, when somebody gets jurisdiction, they're also going to use the cause of action. As petitioners were describing, it's very powerful, it's directly on point, punitive damages, vicarious liability. And so it still be true that in the minerun application of G, they would be reading the law to give with one hand what it takes away with the other. And then the last thing I just like to mention here is about the United States competing interest in this case. I mean, obviously we have a very strong interest in combatant state-boundered terrorism. We also have concerns in these cases about the reciprocal treatment of our own property abroad. And I think particularly in light of those concerns which are quite weighty, if Congress was really going to take the step of allowing execution against property of a cultural and historic significance to another country and its people, that would be a big deal and it would not be the kind of thing that you expect to see buried in a conforming amendment without remark. Well, how about the cases, the other cases he was talking about, the ones with proceeds in the bank from a commercial activity, etc. His reading would take care of those rulings, wouldn't he? So I think one thing about the way we read the statute to, I think, it does help to some extent with the breadth of the using commercial activity is that the way we read G, once you, if you have a judgment against the foreign state, you can pierce the veil down through to the agency or instrumentality, and then you can go after the agency or instrumentality's property under B3. And B3 does not require that the property be used in commercial activity. It's enough that the instrumentality is engaged in commercial activity. So you think those other courts were wrong? No, those are other, I believe the other decisions that he was talking about were interpreted in A7, not B3. And so, but as we understand it, the statute works together with all of it

. We also just don't think it really helps them. I know you're saying it, but explains to me why not. Yes. So the reason it's not right, we explain this, it pages 24 and 25 of our brief. It has to do with the language of 1605 Big A itself. This is on 12A of our gray brief, if you want to see it. And what 1605 Big A says is, quote, the court shall hear a claim under this section if, and then the prerequisites to jurisdiction are satisfied. So we think any time a court gets jurisdiction and enters a judgment, it's a judgment under 1605 Big A, regardless of what cause of action, they happen to invoke. I also think this doesn't really move the dial for them much because in practice in the minerun application of 1605 Big A, when somebody gets jurisdiction, they're also going to use the cause of action. As petitioners were describing, it's very powerful, it's directly on point, punitive damages, vicarious liability. And so it still be true that in the minerun application of G, they would be reading the law to give with one hand what it takes away with the other. And then the last thing I just like to mention here is about the United States competing interest in this case. I mean, obviously we have a very strong interest in combatant state-boundered terrorism. We also have concerns in these cases about the reciprocal treatment of our own property abroad. And I think particularly in light of those concerns which are quite weighty, if Congress was really going to take the step of allowing execution against property of a cultural and historic significance to another country and its people, that would be a big deal and it would not be the kind of thing that you expect to see buried in a conforming amendment without remark. Well, how about the cases, the other cases he was talking about, the ones with proceeds in the bank from a commercial activity, etc. His reading would take care of those rulings, wouldn't he? So I think one thing about the way we read the statute to, I think, it does help to some extent with the breadth of the using commercial activity is that the way we read G, once you, if you have a judgment against the foreign state, you can pierce the veil down through to the agency or instrumentality, and then you can go after the agency or instrumentality's property under B3. And B3 does not require that the property be used in commercial activity. It's enough that the instrumentality is engaged in commercial activity. So you think those other courts were wrong? No, those are other, I believe the other decisions that he was talking about were interpreted in A7, not B3. And so, but as we understand it, the statute works together with all of it. It works 1610, you can pierce the veil and use A, B, the procedures and C would apply, D could apply, F could apply, that weren't waived. And so I think a natural way for Congress to pick up all of those procedures, which is to say, that the property is subject to execution as provided in this section. And so what Congress did was to tether the extent of execution under this veil piercing provision to all the protections that are already baked in elsewhere in 1610. And those protections ensure that you can't execute against the ancient Persian artifacts like these. So if there's no further questions, we're asking the Court to affirm. Thank you, Council. Mr. Perlin, you have five minutes remaining. The first point I want to make is that the government in the University claimed that our reading would render this, would render subsection to A7 and B3 superfluous. That's not the case. The private right of action under Section 1605, capital A, lowercase C, applies only where the plaintiffs are U.S. nationals, members of the military, or government contractors or employees. The immunity waiver, that's also in 1605 A, but subsection A, so 1605 A, capital A, lowercase A, applies where the claimant or the victim is a U.S. national, a member of the military, or a government employer contractor. It's a, it applies to a broad, the immunity waiver reaches a broader class of plaintiffs. The remedy provided under 1610 G is limited to those who hold judgments under 1605 A. And this judgment that's available under 1605 A is a, is the statutory judgment. The provisions of 1610 A7 and B3 apply where the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under 1605 A, which is explicitly referring to the immunity exception, and it's explicitly referring to the broader class of plaintiffs. So we don't think that there is, there is some overlap, but that does not render A and B superfluous

. It works 1610, you can pierce the veil and use A, B, the procedures and C would apply, D could apply, F could apply, that weren't waived. And so I think a natural way for Congress to pick up all of those procedures, which is to say, that the property is subject to execution as provided in this section. And so what Congress did was to tether the extent of execution under this veil piercing provision to all the protections that are already baked in elsewhere in 1610. And those protections ensure that you can't execute against the ancient Persian artifacts like these. So if there's no further questions, we're asking the Court to affirm. Thank you, Council. Mr. Perlin, you have five minutes remaining. The first point I want to make is that the government in the University claimed that our reading would render this, would render subsection to A7 and B3 superfluous. That's not the case. The private right of action under Section 1605, capital A, lowercase C, applies only where the plaintiffs are U.S. nationals, members of the military, or government contractors or employees. The immunity waiver, that's also in 1605 A, but subsection A, so 1605 A, capital A, lowercase A, applies where the claimant or the victim is a U.S. national, a member of the military, or a government employer contractor. It's a, it applies to a broad, the immunity waiver reaches a broader class of plaintiffs. The remedy provided under 1610 G is limited to those who hold judgments under 1605 A. And this judgment that's available under 1605 A is a, is the statutory judgment. The provisions of 1610 A7 and B3 apply where the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under 1605 A, which is explicitly referring to the immunity exception, and it's explicitly referring to the broader class of plaintiffs. So we don't think that there is, there is some overlap, but that does not render A and B superfluous. Second of all, B is Iran argues, and they argued below in the Bennett case, which is the K16 test, 334, I believe. There, there was a case where VISA had collected money for a bank, a bank, an Iranian bank, and was holding it because of the sanctions. It could not return that, it could not pay that money out. Terrorism victims came and said we want to enforce a judgment against that money that VISA collected on behalf of Bank Melley and VISA filed an interpleter action. Iran defended and they said you cannot enforce your judgment under 1610 B3 because that applies only where the judgment is entered against the agency or instrumentality and Bank Melley. There is no judgment here. That's what Iran's argument was. Iran continues to maintain that it won't apply to B3, and I think that that's, I mean, that's, you would have to say that you would have to read out of B3 the limitation that you needed judgment against the agency or instrumentality for it to apply to B3. Again, there is no way to read this through according to their construction, to read it through and apply it. Now, again, just to make clear the point about the, as provided, the pranic judgment is provided in this section. If you look at the other substantive provisions of 1610, they allow, let's start with, let's look at 1610 A. The opening paragraph says that the property of a foreign state, used for commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from attachment or from execution upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States, right? There's execution, comma upon a judgment, and then words that modify the judgment. Same thing in subsection B, it's the exact same structure. Subsection F, it's not the exact same words, but it's the same structure again, that the property is subject to execution of any judgment relating to a claim for its state is not immune. Again, the words following judgment are modifying the word judgment, which makes sense under the last antecedent rule, and it also makes sense here because we're talking about a particular judgment, section 1610 G, applies to a particular judgment. The word execution is separated from that phrase by a comma. The words upon that judgment is providing the section do not contain a comma. Those words are meant to be read together, and the as provided in this section is modifying the word judgment. The U.S. concerns about foreign relations are misplaced

. The explicit purpose, one of the explicit purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act was to remove foreign sovereign immunity decisions from the executive branch and place it with the courts. That was for two reasons. One, that plaintiffs, American plaintiffs, were being treated unequally based on whatever policy consideration was relevant at the time, and two, the government was subject to foreign pressure. So to remove this pressure from the government, Congress placed this authority in the hands of the courts rather than the government. Thank you, counsel. The case is submitted