That's nice. Nice. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Is that correct? That's for our head. Yes. That's a ready for as you clients. It's sexy. Setchy. Okay. Mr
. Arhen, go ahead. Thank you. Can you take me a turn for a moment? I believe I will have two minutes. The bottle of K-10. All right. So, this is a version case that came out of the version called Certainly your Pennsylvania. In the city of Russia? Yes. My client was a sexy who is the petitioner in this case was claiming you as a citizenship. In fact, the relative petitioner is the one who was not to be 18 years old, so he was 14 to the two A play, which has the boom boom. The boom boom. And it plays by 14 to the one A play. And also the former INA section played through to one A play. My client believes that the immigration jagging in this case his conclusion was in error and that his finals were flawed in this case. So we found this, but it is in from the scope to review the decision of the immigration jagging
. The one because the decision was raised on an independent costary clause in the case in the city where I called the boss. And the DC's superior court had jurisdiction to consider custody. No, the order. The DC's recorded not had the condition because at the time that the divorce the court was entered. The cost of the court that was in the divorce, the court was assumed that the children might my client. And here's a story left in the custody of the Amaterian. But your client was he in fact a resident of DC, and the custody decree was made. He was not. So then how did the DC court have jurisdiction to make the determination? Well, the mother and the father were residents. So this case was actually the divorce case, I don't know, came to the DC security court. But the custody clause that was insettably presumed that the case were actually living in Ghana with the Amaterian. No, the divorce was in Ghana. At the time the divorce itself was initiated, the case were a little with the Amaterian, the Amaterian, the Amaterian. The divorce was granted in 1996, but it was initiated in 1996
. But why was he living in 1996? In 1996 the, the, the, the, the, the, the city has, I thought it immigrated to the United States, what the sister turned into. So there was no Virginia. We were living in Virginia. So the, the divorce decree says, Mr. Satchee is, in Ghana going to be in the custody of his grandmother, who lives in Ghana. That's correct. And yet Satchee was in Virginia or in Virginia living with whom? With the mother. Okay. And so your point is that this DC court could not possibly grant custody to a party who was living in a different continent. Exactly. Then the North American case. That is, that is my, my, my position. I think that why wasn't that custody or challenged? If that custody were locked to a station that was improper from the beginning, why didn't anyone live in the DC court and change that? Yeah. You know what happened? This is, this is what happened to us that by the time the actual divorce proceedings actually became right for the District of Columbia Court and Superior Court to decide on the divorce, the council at that point had another case in the European suburb, and could not attend a set of letter to the court
. It was no going to be present, and that the parties will be present. The immigration judge had some problems with their custody or the opinion. I'm not sure because if you did have, I think that it was invalid. This is the government, the DHS and the respondent indicated that they were considered that the custody clause was invalid, not the divorce decree itself, but the custody clause itself was invalid. No, it's invalid, right? But you're arguing with it. My other interest act is the trust in the mother of the other ten. All right. And for that matter, my submission to the immigration court was that the problem is the problem is who has custody of such an issue? The mother. The mother has custody, had custody at the time of her naturalization. Exactly. The fact that she had custody, that he would become a US citizen and cannot be removed. That's correct. We can't make that determination. We need a court to determine the mother was the custodial parent of the relative time
. Well, the reason why this court has the authority to review it was the immigration court that actually came to the conclusion that we can review the petition, but I'm suggesting we're not the ones to make the decision with the mother hand custody. That's a fact. That's a fact. That's a fact. That's correct. What fact father do you argue should we want to make that determination? I believe we can, firstly, these are clause findings or custody clause. In the divorce decree was invited and both the governments. I understand that. I'm asking what, what's your remedy? What's really going to go next? Who, what's the court, what judge? Are you going to persuade to make a fine as a matter of fact that Sachi's mother was the custodial parent at the time of her to get him the status to seek? I will believe that it should have been the original court, the original judge that actually decided over the Court of the Maritime Court. What did the immigration court decide with respect to custody? Didn't he decide against you? That's correct. The custody was with his aunt, not with his mother. That's exactly what the immigration court actually indicated. But doesn't the record support that? The record does not seem to be assuming not agree with it, but he booked records, he looked at a number of documents and came to the conclusion that he made with his aid. That's one original court concluded, but that is not what the record actually supported
. The reason why I'm saying that J.S. is that? Who are the merits hearing? When you looked at school records, I said, I mean look at school records. The school records did not actually indicate that the, was the city actually the left few. The aunt, the school records indicated that the administration was using the aunt's, because there's evidence in the record he was running with the aunt. There was not ever less in the record that he was living with the aunt. But when, when there is a disputed factual issue with respect to custody and naturalization, is it appropriate for the immigration judge to make that decision? Is it, well, now the immigration judge has made the decision, but what do we do now? What we do now is that the school should actually find or review the totalities of the record. The judge tried to just say, I, I, I, I happened to agree, we don't find facts, we, we can't do that. You know what we are? Can we remain, case or send the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and direct them to home hearing as to the custody, pursuant to eight United States Code Section 1252B5B? What we, the clock can do, got to, those clock can do that. The, the, the, my guess your preference is that we, we decide differently from the immigration judge, but you still have an issue of fact. That is true because the government takes us a strongly different position than you do. That is very true. Well, let me ask you this. Can you, I think the immigration judge said that, that, uh, Saadji lived with his aunt, and lived that his mother happened to be in the same apartment complex
. Yes, this is, this is, this is the can you, can you have your residences and still have one custody? Uh, the, the, the, the, during the match here, what actually transpired was that Mr. Sitch is testifying that the aunt lived in the same apartment complex, and he, he and his sister spent some time with the aunt. The maximum he's taking with the aunt was, was two weeks, and this was corroborated by his sister, who in the merits hearing. Yet, I'll, but you know that the immigration judge did not call so that Mr. Sitch is testifying, and the sister's corroboration of the fact that they never actually lived with the aunt. As a matter of fact, the evidence showed that the aunt, she would treat the, the assertion that she had custody. She had nothing, then that was submitted in the immigration judge. So your point is that even though he, he lived with his aunt, the mother had a contestant custody. That's correct. Where did he know? Atmosa Sitch has moved remote to that. So if there's a hearing, how's that going to occur? I believe this court, Boris and you here are going to remind this case. The government will obligate it to bring Mr. Sitch back to be able to attend this hearing. Okay
. Very, anything else? Nothing further. Thank you. Mr. Cohen? 20 years oners. It was a court invited to be appointed in the papers and through Spong, the 20th General of the United States. As this court recognized, this sole issue raised in this case, the murder of Cis and Chip Claim. Mr. Sitch claims that he could have had Cis and Chip from his mother under former section 321, 8th, 3 of the I and 8th, and his mother naturalist in 1999. Congress entrusted the course of appeal to dress nationality claims to no vote for the court determines that there's no genuine issue of material fact about the addition of nationality claim. The person claiming that Cis and Chip, there's a burden of establishing his eligibility and all doubts are resolved in favor of the United States and against the claim. As this court recognized, the issue in this case comes down. At the outset, too, the custody determination was rendered by the Superior Court in 1996 after the addition of his mother has followed the divorce. The record indicates that the addition of his mother was residing in the district, unlike the claim presented by the addition of your argument this morning. Are you defending the court as a custody order issued by the DC Court? I'm sorry
. Are you defending that whatever as a custody order as a valid custody order? That's correct. Notwithstanding that custody was given to a grandmother who was then living in Africa. The question raised in the bill is whether as a purely legal matter, the district court, so the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction issued custody order. But even in the DC law itself, the parties who are going to be obtaining custody have to be in court, have to be or live within the jurisdiction of the court. The record suggests that perhaps the parents have decided as a matter of custody. You know, sense that something is wrong with somebody in Ghana is being given custody of a child who is in the district of Columbia by district of the District Court. We don't even have a Virginia. Perhaps even in Virginia. I mean, the crime was certainly not an African to the time he was in this country. That's correct. He may have been in Virginia, he may have been in DC, but the mother's address is also in to be in Virginia. The mother's address was actually in this district of Columbia, and the only way that she was going to get enforced in the district was because she was resigned there for a least six months. And in fact, the divorce decree indicates that that was one of the bases for jurisdiction over the divorce. So, supposing we were to say that that DC decree is invalid and agreeing with the immigration judge, I don't love her a different reason
. What's your next argument? The next argument is that as a matter of the DC law, regardless of whether the custody order was valid, because both parents remained on equal footing as a matter of DC law, the mother didn't have solely the custody such that the such derives citizenship from her once she nationalized in 1999. And now this should be. But if you have divided custody, then both parents have custody. It's not like neither parent has custody, right? So, the argument is, is that if there's no valid custody order. Well, there is a valid custody. Well, if you're saying there's joint custody, then they both have custody. That's correct. Right. Yeah, and this court has been treated as at other courts when there is joint custody between parents. There is a derives citizenship under 3-1-1-8-3. There is a lot of joint custody, and that's the statute for sole custody. So, joint doesn't work. Well, the statute doesn't say sole custody, but it says legal custody. So, what are your cases on that? Well, so this court and the unclosured decision where the regas has cited two fifth-circuit decision in which the Montague-Berrera, both of those cases are cited in response to brief indicating that sole legal custody is the only situation in which during the citizenship may be derived. Because the point is that the non-custodial care can have to be removed from the life of your child, such that citizenship can be derived. It's in the normal course of things, and the statute provides it only if the group parents are nationalized, could get the child to write citizenship to the parents. And so, the provision for separation is included because it recognizes that it's on what parents separate. And then sole custody is invested in one parent, then citizenship may be derived in that situation. It doesn't mean to be a hearing move. If the D.C. custody was invalid, it doesn't mean to be a hearing to sort that out. How can we just take notice of what you're suggesting? There are two primary arguments that are presented in response to brief. One relates to the custody order. And if the court is in words with that, then there's a secondary argument relating to a D.C. law. And if the court is in words with both of those arguments, then as an argument by a client, you just would have to go to the district court for a factual determination which is not
. Because the point is that the non-custodial care can have to be removed from the life of your child, such that citizenship can be derived. It's in the normal course of things, and the statute provides it only if the group parents are nationalized, could get the child to write citizenship to the parents. And so, the provision for separation is included because it recognizes that it's on what parents separate. And then sole custody is invested in one parent, then citizenship may be derived in that situation. It doesn't mean to be a hearing move. If the D.C. custody was invalid, it doesn't mean to be a hearing to sort that out. How can we just take notice of what you're suggesting? There are two primary arguments that are presented in response to brief. One relates to the custody order. And if the court is in words with that, then there's a secondary argument relating to a D.C. law. And if the court is in words with both of those arguments, then as an argument by a client, you just would have to go to the district court for a factual determination which is not. Which court would that be? The district of Pennsylvania? Well, the petitioner was in New York, Pennsylvania before he was removed. So, it's supposed to be the government requesting an opportunity to brief the venue for the court wanted to. It's a dependable way to brought him back to it, I suppose. Because the district of Virginia's address was actually in Virginia. And so, it's a question of whether you would return to Virginia or to Pennsylvania. And if your R's wanted additional position from the government on the issue, I would respectfully request an opportunity to brief it. Could you do that? Within, say, a week? Sure. Absolutely. It's just addressing the issue of any of the venues. Now, let me try to understand with respect to the other. If the order is invalid because the custody was invalid because there's no jurisdiction over the grandmother. You were saying that it necessarily follows that there's no..
. Which court would that be? The district of Pennsylvania? Well, the petitioner was in New York, Pennsylvania before he was removed. So, it's supposed to be the government requesting an opportunity to brief the venue for the court wanted to. It's a dependable way to brought him back to it, I suppose. Because the district of Virginia's address was actually in Virginia. And so, it's a question of whether you would return to Virginia or to Pennsylvania. And if your R's wanted additional position from the government on the issue, I would respectfully request an opportunity to brief it. Could you do that? Within, say, a week? Sure. Absolutely. It's just addressing the issue of any of the venues. Now, let me try to understand with respect to the other. If the order is invalid because the custody was invalid because there's no jurisdiction over the grandmother. You were saying that it necessarily follows that there's no... The record is devoted in any other custody order, other than the law, but we hypothesize it is invalid. So that means that the DC law, it necessarily follows the court of custody. And it can't meet the custody threshold. The reason, believe, controls. And this does come down to the question of how the court interprets decision and bego, and is the board decision a matter of that. And the bill, as I indicated in the 28th jl later that I found last week, the split decision by this court in which the opinion of the court indicated that first the court would look as a matter of M indicated to whether there's a judicial determination or a judicial or statutory grant custody. And then to whether there was actual undisputed custody to choose that process and indicate in the court decision a matter of M. Can we, as it was clear, that we don't determine what the law of the state is? So the judge, Judge Becker, is positioned. So Judge Becker actually said that first before getting the matter of M test, the court should look at state law. And only then, if state law doesn't determine should they apply the matter of M test. Judge Becker concluded that those two tests are reconcilable, but the two concurring to this, Judge Rose and Niger indicated that they believe that there's no reason to look at state law. Now, of course, that's the majority on that issue. But that's correct. That's correct
. The record is devoted in any other custody order, other than the law, but we hypothesize it is invalid. So that means that the DC law, it necessarily follows the court of custody. And it can't meet the custody threshold. The reason, believe, controls. And this does come down to the question of how the court interprets decision and bego, and is the board decision a matter of that. And the bill, as I indicated in the 28th jl later that I found last week, the split decision by this court in which the opinion of the court indicated that first the court would look as a matter of M indicated to whether there's a judicial determination or a judicial or statutory grant custody. And then to whether there was actual undisputed custody to choose that process and indicate in the court decision a matter of M. Can we, as it was clear, that we don't determine what the law of the state is? So the judge, Judge Becker, is positioned. So Judge Becker actually said that first before getting the matter of M test, the court should look at state law. And only then, if state law doesn't determine should they apply the matter of M test. Judge Becker concluded that those two tests are reconcilable, but the two concurring to this, Judge Rose and Niger indicated that they believe that there's no reason to look at state law. Now, of course, that's the majority on that issue. But that's correct. That's correct. But Judge Niger and Judge Rose and agreed that the matter of M test does apply. Now, the matter of M test is that it is first step of two steps indicates that the court looks at whether there's a judicial determination or a judicial or statutory grant. Now, what's a statutory grant if not requiring the court to look at state law because there isn't a federal law of custody? And so there is some inconsistency within the concurring opinion and turn on consistency because they seem to accept the matter of M test, which is the first step does a lot of the court to look at whether there's a judicial or statutory grant. But yet they say the court should not look to state law. Do you accept the immigration judges finding that this decree from DC is invalid? The immigration judges finding was based upon a mistake of fact. He thought the child was still in gun. He thought the child was still in gun. And so he indicated that this case was exactly like the vote in which a case the child was in Vienna. But it looked the problem that custody is given to someone who did not appear in court and in fact was living in a different country. If the parents consent the custody in the Gramm other. So can the parents consent this giving custody of a child to somebody in Arizona who hasn't no idea that they're getting custody of a child? There wasn't have to be from the grandmother that was, I suppose, dated 2009 or time. I can't recall the exact date. So several years later the grandmother indicated that she did not consent but there's no evidence that's contemporaneous indicating that she didn't consent. The record is the void of information regarding whether or not she consented
. But Judge Niger and Judge Rose and agreed that the matter of M test does apply. Now, the matter of M test is that it is first step of two steps indicates that the court looks at whether there's a judicial determination or a judicial or statutory grant. Now, what's a statutory grant if not requiring the court to look at state law because there isn't a federal law of custody? And so there is some inconsistency within the concurring opinion and turn on consistency because they seem to accept the matter of M test, which is the first step does a lot of the court to look at whether there's a judicial or statutory grant. But yet they say the court should not look to state law. Do you accept the immigration judges finding that this decree from DC is invalid? The immigration judges finding was based upon a mistake of fact. He thought the child was still in gun. He thought the child was still in gun. And so he indicated that this case was exactly like the vote in which a case the child was in Vienna. But it looked the problem that custody is given to someone who did not appear in court and in fact was living in a different country. If the parents consent the custody in the Gramm other. So can the parents consent this giving custody of a child to somebody in Arizona who hasn't no idea that they're getting custody of a child? There wasn't have to be from the grandmother that was, I suppose, dated 2009 or time. I can't recall the exact date. So several years later the grandmother indicated that she did not consent but there's no evidence that's contemporaneous indicating that she didn't consent. The record is the void of information regarding whether or not she consented. And the question is how far this court is going to look behind the face of that order and whether the government can rely upon these states. Is it the order invalid in their DC law? Does it DC law say that a parent or a person getting custody of a child should they have resident or at least appear in court? Even if this court concluded as much the secondary argument assuming the court were to accept it under the bill and that the matter had been tested indicates that... So we're about the first argument. I mean, we're about to approach what this question. I'm not sure you answered it. Well, the response position is that the custody order is in fact the valid. And so... Why? He is..
. And the question is how far this court is going to look behind the face of that order and whether the government can rely upon these states. Is it the order invalid in their DC law? Does it DC law say that a parent or a person getting custody of a child should they have resident or at least appear in court? Even if this court concluded as much the secondary argument assuming the court were to accept it under the bill and that the matter had been tested indicates that... So we're about the first argument. I mean, we're about to approach what this question. I'm not sure you answered it. Well, the response position is that the custody order is in fact the valid. And so... Why? He is... as I understand the question, I think it's an important one. Because under DC law, is it not required that the person to move to the custody of a room either be within the jurisdiction of the court or appear in court? Well, I begot the court indicated that the slow question was whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction to issue a custody order. And the court indicated that it wouldn't look into service of process, personal jurisdiction, the matter of the custody of the court does not go to the subject matter jurisdiction. That's the question. What can you say anything in DC law that says the DC court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case where it purports to a word custody to someone in the clean of England or someone in another country? I can't but I'd be happy to supplement that. The bottom up by the court or by the venue of the court. I'd like to see that. The clean of England. Sure, this case is what we are in the quib and in the particular... It's a practical matter. I mean, sometimes the law follows makes sense. How could you support the idea that a court can give custody of someone who has no idea that they're getting custody of a child? The record doesn't indicate that she had no idea she was
. as I understand the question, I think it's an important one. Because under DC law, is it not required that the person to move to the custody of a room either be within the jurisdiction of the court or appear in court? Well, I begot the court indicated that the slow question was whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction to issue a custody order. And the court indicated that it wouldn't look into service of process, personal jurisdiction, the matter of the custody of the court does not go to the subject matter jurisdiction. That's the question. What can you say anything in DC law that says the DC court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case where it purports to a word custody to someone in the clean of England or someone in another country? I can't but I'd be happy to supplement that. The bottom up by the court or by the venue of the court. I'd like to see that. The clean of England. Sure, this case is what we are in the quib and in the particular... It's a practical matter. I mean, sometimes the law follows makes sense. How could you support the idea that a court can give custody of someone who has no idea that they're getting custody of a child? The record doesn't indicate that she had no idea she was... But it doesn't indicate that she does. I mean, and that's the challenge. In the immigration judge found that the District Court had no jurisdiction. Maybe we're beating a dead horse. Let's say the order is invalid from the purposes of argument now. Where does that get you? I'd get you back into District Court. So assuming the court also rejects that the argument regarding DC law and the parents remaining on equal footing nonetheless such that it says it shouldn't be derived from the mother because the additional wasn't. Could you have a person residing and having two different residents but still be under the custody of one of those two. What do you know the two people who live in those residences? DC law does distinguish between physical custody and legal custody. So there could be a situation where custody order could be entered where a court parent's head, physical custody, joint physical custody, and only one parent had legal custody. I suppose I mean, I suppose the mother could not have legal custody while the child was living with him. What's wrong with that? In theory, the court could have granted the mother legal custody and the child would be residing with the aunt
... But it doesn't indicate that she does. I mean, and that's the challenge. In the immigration judge found that the District Court had no jurisdiction. Maybe we're beating a dead horse. Let's say the order is invalid from the purposes of argument now. Where does that get you? I'd get you back into District Court. So assuming the court also rejects that the argument regarding DC law and the parents remaining on equal footing nonetheless such that it says it shouldn't be derived from the mother because the additional wasn't. Could you have a person residing and having two different residents but still be under the custody of one of those two. What do you know the two people who live in those residences? DC law does distinguish between physical custody and legal custody. So there could be a situation where custody order could be entered where a court parent's head, physical custody, joint physical custody, and only one parent had legal custody. I suppose I mean, I suppose the mother could not have legal custody while the child was living with him. What's wrong with that? In theory, the court could have granted the mother legal custody and the child would be residing with the aunt. But here we have a custody order whether or not it's valid. They granted custody. Let's assume that custody order aside for the moment and say why could not the mother have legal custody while her son is living with the aunt? If this court reaches the question of who had actual uncontested custody then the agreement to the district court is proper because it raises the question of fact as responding concedes there is a genuine issue with respect to that the actual uncontested custody. So unless the court can decide this as a matter of law which are the primary arguments raised by the district then in fact a remand would be appropriate to the district court. And here I just, if this court agrees that would be responded that this petitioner is an alien non-faxism, the proper course is for the court to dismiss the petition for review, which is going to section 232, 18C of the INA which provides a court, my jurisdiction review, petitioned for review by certain criminal aliens such as petitioner. The, it does not challenge the nor did it challenge the, before the agency that his convictions are either memorable under the sections charged by the Department of the Home of Security. Those sections are listed into for to ATC and therefore if the court agrees so with the question of nationality or if the argument raised by the, responding regarding petitioner's nationality then dismissal was proper and I was not respectfully quite requested the court to dismiss the petition for review. Thank you very much for your time. Thank you very much. I have already been considered by the government in this brief, that was dated on March 8, 2021. I believe that it's on page 25 to 27 other governments brief in this case. So it is due to consider that it is invited. Now if the cost of the cost is invited then just like what the court is saying is very sought to bother. What Bucket says is that it uses, if it uses the matter of M test then what we have here is a situation where there is a physical, a custody and a legal custody
. But here we have a custody order whether or not it's valid. They granted custody. Let's assume that custody order aside for the moment and say why could not the mother have legal custody while her son is living with the aunt? If this court reaches the question of who had actual uncontested custody then the agreement to the district court is proper because it raises the question of fact as responding concedes there is a genuine issue with respect to that the actual uncontested custody. So unless the court can decide this as a matter of law which are the primary arguments raised by the district then in fact a remand would be appropriate to the district court. And here I just, if this court agrees that would be responded that this petitioner is an alien non-faxism, the proper course is for the court to dismiss the petition for review, which is going to section 232, 18C of the INA which provides a court, my jurisdiction review, petitioned for review by certain criminal aliens such as petitioner. The, it does not challenge the nor did it challenge the, before the agency that his convictions are either memorable under the sections charged by the Department of the Home of Security. Those sections are listed into for to ATC and therefore if the court agrees so with the question of nationality or if the argument raised by the, responding regarding petitioner's nationality then dismissal was proper and I was not respectfully quite requested the court to dismiss the petition for review. Thank you very much for your time. Thank you very much. I have already been considered by the government in this brief, that was dated on March 8, 2021. I believe that it's on page 25 to 27 other governments brief in this case. So it is due to consider that it is invited. Now if the cost of the cost is invited then just like what the court is saying is very sought to bother. What Bucket says is that it uses, if it uses the matter of M test then what we have here is a situation where there is a physical, a custody and a legal custody. The statute of 1432 he paid own talks about legal custody. So the suggestion by the government that even the petitioner's list was living with the aunt does not actually confer legal custody to the aunt. It could happen a new physical custody and that is not legal custody. I would like to note that the statute specifically talks about the grant of legal custody. What about Mr. Coles' father, that he, that's assumed that we agree with him with the custody orders in Valor. He argues that it follows from that. In the absence of any other valid custody order in the record, but under district of Coles' law there is a joint custody. So how can you, is he right about that first of all? And then secondly, how can you prove that the mother had some legal custody with the appropriate time? My submission to this court is that the mother at all times had legal custody. 1432, 8300 that's not even talking about so legal, so the case was a court status. But then the point is that the, what is determinative in this case is the legal as opposed to the physical custody in this case. And as I already told this court that you would have mercy on the court, that you spend the time with the aunt, the mother of two, and that did not post to the legal custody. And not so much of the court that the court should view this case and remind her to the court to the court to the legal issue for the termination of custody in this case. I'm starting
. Thank you very much. I'm going to give this a call and we'll take the case and we'll revise it