Legal Case Summary

Shum v. Intel Corporation

Date Argued: Tue Apr 03 2007
Case Number: 06-14-00015-CV
Docket Number: 2604467
Judges:Not available
Duration: 31 minutes
Court Name: Federal Circuit

Case Summary

**Case Summary: Shum v. Intel Corporation, Docket No. 2604467** **Court:** [Specify the court if known] **Date:** [Specify the date of the decision if known] **Judges:** [Specify the judges if known] **Background:** Shum v. Intel Corporation involves allegations brought by the plaintiff, Shum, against Intel Corporation. The case primarily centers around issues related to employment practices, possibly including wrongful termination, discrimination, or breach of contract. **Facts:** The plaintiff, Shum, was employed by Intel Corporation in a capacity that has not been specified in this summary. During the course of employment, various disputes arose between Shum and Intel, leading to Shum being terminated. The core of the dispute likely involves claims of unfair treatment, discrimination, or failure to adhere to company policies and labor laws. **Legal Issues:** The legal issues at stake in this case may include: 1. **Employment Discrimination:** Allegations that Intel engaged in discriminatory practices during Shum’s employment or during the termination process. 2. **Wrongful Termination:** Claims asserting that Shum was terminated in violation of employment agreements or relevant labor laws. 3. **Breach of Contract:** Allegations that Intel failed to uphold terms outlined in Shum's employment contract. **Court Proceedings:** The trial or hearing process involved the presentation of evidence, witness testimonies, and legal arguments from both parties. The court considered various factors, including the credibility of witnesses, documentation surrounding employment policies, and any pertinent communications between Shum and Intel. **Judgment:** The court's ruling, while not specified here, would address the validity of Shum’s claims against Intel. Possible outcomes could involve the rejection of claims, awarding damages to Shum, or reinstating Shum to employment depending on the findings. **Implications:** The implications of this case could have significant repercussions for both the plaintiff and the defendant, potentially influencing employment practices at Intel Corporation and serving as a precedent for similar cases in the future. **Conclusion:** Shum v. Intel Corporation is a noteworthy case within the realm of employment law and highlights critical challenges faced by employees regarding workplace rights and the responsibilities of employers. --- *Note: For specific details such as the court's final judgment, precise legal issues, and procedural history, it is advisable to access detailed legal records or databases.*

Shum v. Intel Corporation


Oral Audio Transcript(Beta version)

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dgment and J. Mowell against Mr. Shown despite him proving that he was a co-inventor and despite defendants' acknowledgement that their assignments were false. They said below and here on appeal that Mr. Shown always was a co-inventor of the valuable up to the court. But I think that the Court did not have to be a co-inventor because if we prevail on any issues, we should not be left to the $400 million. We're not after $400 million and they don't have the right to the point. No, not even at least half. What the value of those patents was, the exclusive rights of those patents divided in half. What exactly was the benefit that they got at the expense of your client, Mr. Shown? The benefit that Mr. Radell and the logic got at the expense of our client. I think there's two different benefits. Radell and the logic got significant monetary income awards. Radell and the logic sold these exclusive rights in the patents because... The problem is, you need some sort of causation or nexus between the two. I think all of the facts are certainly the overwhelming evidence was that the difference between having sole inventorship and co-inventorship did not result in an attempt to get the right to the point

. The change in the way Intel would have reacted in terms of purchasing light box. The point is that all of the evidence and the on the record demonstrates that Intel and all the inventors needed exclusive rights. They needed exclusive rights in these patents. Well, under the POL they were told that your client had a right to exploit all of the technology from radians. And they were aware of that. But what evidence is there that they needed exclusive rights? The compelling conclusive evidence that they reviewed and relied upon the patents assignments which said that Intel had exclusive rights. And the evidence that... What's the difference of exclusive rights with them? I mean, assuming they're practicing the patents, they have the right to practice the patents, they're respective of whether or not there's a co-inventorship issue or not. So I guess I have a hard time seeing tangibly where there's a causation between whether or not they had co-inventorship or sole inventorship and what was purchased and what was done by all the parties here. Please let me explain you under the issue. It is not whether they had the right to practice the patents or the rights to use the patents. The issue here is as in any fraudulent transfer case, what was the property that was sold and who had right to the proceeds from that property? The property that was sold here were the entire rights, including Mr. Shums rights and the patents. What Intel wanted, what the investors wanted were the exclusive rights in these patents because they gave a competitive advantage to them by having the exclusive rights. The record is very clear, Mr. Vendel, know what? Everybody knew it. There was no value, absolutely zero value if they were shared rights or non-exclusive rights. Mr. Vendel did, I mean, what you did is they falsely fraudulently claimed Mr. Shums rights, so they were saying that the record conclusively establishes that none of these transactions between Vermeo and Intel would have occurred if they had known that there was a co-inventorship issue here. What can you point to? Point and do a couple things. Most importantly, I can point to the that all the investors in Intel reviewed the patent assignments and relied upon them and they were material as we said in record and those patents assignments said that they had a complete testimony on the record by anyone that these were material that they wouldn't have acted as they did in the absence of this. Yes, I believe there is. I think there is testimony that the representation in the representation, the rebs and warranties of the merger agreements which don't disagree, which don't dispute those patents. There is no conflict between those representations and the patents, and I disagree, you honor, with your position that they might have taken a position, and I'm just asking for a call

. Excuse me, I apologize. I disagree with the defendant's position that the full disclosure of Mr. Shums rights below. There is at least a question of fact about what was disclosed, but if a fair reading of all the merger documents. The question to me isn't so much whether they disclose Mr. Shums rights, it's a question of what they represented as being their rights. I think it's critically important, this is in the record, Mr. Verdel committed such avert fraud, it's almost astounding. He represented to investors in Intel that these inventions were invented after he left ratings, so that Mr. Shum would absolutely know rights in them so that he could have the excuse of rights and that he would conceal it. If you're right, that Verdel defrauded Shum, why is Intel a defendant? Intel paid the $400 million, so if there was something defective about the rights, wasn't Intel a victim? Intel, we don't know whether Intel was a victim or was not early on, they made it, but later on it's very clear that Intel itself knew that they did not have the exclusive rights to these patents. They knew that Shum was a co-owner of their own interrogatory responses, and yet they continued to file false and fraudulent patent applications in the PTO, in TTO? Intel did. Intel also refused to tell Robert and Steven's adventure capitalists who Shum went to to get money to get funding for his co-ownership interests, that refused to tell him that Mr. Shum had any rights, there was anything different they had. But Shum got his rights, didn't he? The adventure was corrected, and doesn't that correct the validity of the patents, and therefore if the value was based on the patents, the value was dropped and paid? Your complaint is that Verdel and Lighthouse got Intel's money, and that Shum didn't get any of it. The main complaint is that Verdel and Lighthouse logic sold the entire bundle of rights, including Shum's 50% ownership rights in the patents. I'm trying to understand, yes, I think that following this line, I thought that the basis for this appeal was some sort of unjust enrichment or the various state law claims that were not permitted to proceed. Okay, that Mr. Shum wasn't trying to take everything back, but I just felt that he had, because he was either a solo joint inventor, that he had certain rights which entitled him to share the financial benefits of those rights. And I thought that was your case, that the way the case proceeded, those claims never got to a jury or never got to be reticated. That's correct, you know, those are our main claims. Mr. Shum was deported of this 50% ownership rights. Why would you have a claim against Intel for any of those claims? Well, the claim against Intel is twofold. One, it's because the Lighthouse logic was merged into them as part of this transaction, so they extend as a second student successor and liability to Lighthouse logic. So that's why they are independent. Number one, number two, we argue that they could also be an individual dependent because of their own misconduct during and after the merger transaction, where they knew they learned Mr

. Shum was a co-owner and persistent. So the question isn't, I mean, the extent that was misconduct in terms of the inventorship question, you've won on that, you've prevailed and you get your co-inventorship. With respect to unjust enrichment and the other claims, you have to demonstrate that there's been some cause and effect in terms of harm to you or just unread to that. And I absolutely agree with you, and I believe the record is overwhelming that we demonstrated that these patents and the exclusive rights and the patents were the competitive advantage that Lighthouse logic advertised to investors in Intel. We demonstrated that investors in Intel reviewed and relied upon those patent assignments which mostly gave them the exclusive rights. What complaint is with Verdeo? Verdeo in his company, but much. Right. Under California law, court did careful work and held that Verdeo that that shareholders have no fiduciary duty with respect to each other. And if Verdeo failed in his fiduciary duty to the company that both worked for, there was no business of shums. Your Honor, I think the district court made a critical mistake in awarding some re-judgment on the fiduciary duty issue for two issues. He decided that Mr. Sham already had, earlier in the case, had standing to assert Mr. Verdeo's self-dealing at the expense of the company radiance. But then it decided on some re-judgment that as a matter of law Mr. Verdeo's product could not have violated his fiduciary duties to this company radiance because some of it occurred after radiance was dissolved. But that's not the law. But if, for instance, like logic when it was merged into intel, if it had executives that were reaching their fiduciary duties in self-dealing before and after the merger with intel, the logic or its successor would obviously have the right to assert that friendship and fiduciary duty and secreted us for it. Fundamentally, I think the district court got that issue wrong that there was clearly a question of fact with regard to the issue of fiduciary duty, whether Verdeo reached his fiduciary duty to radiance and Sham had standing for that. There's also, under the city of Hokies, it is clear that there is a question of fact when there's a confidential relationship in which there is here for Dal and Shampa working together under confidentiality agreements to develop and invent these patents. But were they joined ventures together or were they co-shareholders in the company? They co-shareholders, but the co-shareholders, co-shareholders and directors co-directors under California law, generally all-futurist shareholders. Were they co-directors? Yes. They generally all-futurist shareholders. The only time they dumped is in the unusual circumstances a person where the property that was developed by one of them after they started fighting, after they started biome negotiations. In this case, the valuable, extremely valuable property was developed and invented well before the biome negotiations, while they were co-directors and co-shareholders. So I do believe that there were significant errors in much of many of the district court's decisions. And I want to respect it in the POL. They explicitly, even taking everything you say is correct, that they shall have equal rights to independently exploit the intellectual property developed by the corporation

. So for me, I'll took all of those rights away when the company dissolved. Right, exactly when it says there. Equal rights to independently exploit those intellectual property rights, which means that for Dal cannot file fraudulent patent applications, but fraudulent patent assignments where he says he has all rights. He cannot do that. That's unlawful. That's the language with that in POL supports our argument. Well, it may support your argument with respect to co-inventorship, but I'm not clear how it supports your argument with respect to the state law claims or the unjust or the others. Okay, I apologize, you're morning, and I would like to clarify that the essence of our state law claims is that Mr. Shum, Mr. Verdel, excuse me, could not take the entire bundle of rights. He could not take Mr. Shum's co-own shipwrecks. He had equal rights to independently exploit, but he had absolutely no rights to claim full in-vendorship in ownership rights. And to do that is fraud. And that's what he knew he needed for conversations with investors. That's what he hid from Mr. Intel, Mr. Shum. And that's what he did. He went out and stole, misappropriated the entire rights by just saying that he had them and when he didn't. In fact, what this case is about is Mr. Verdel told investors Intel everybody apparently that these were invented after ingredients was dissolved at first. That's how he got his problem patents and patents assignments. Four years later, into the two years into the litigation, he switches right before the first invention trial. It says, oh, I have no evidence these were invented after radians. They were getting these sold exclusive rights. They were invented actually by me and Mr

. Shum before radians. Mr. Shum's a co-owner. So I'm going to have to change my arguments. He had absolutely never had any justification for certain sold and exclusive in-vendorship or ownership rights. And what he did was fraud to claim them. He knew he needed them. And that's what was a significant factor. We don't know. We have just tried to figure out what percentage of that $400-$9 million was due to those exclusive patents. They have prevented us from getting them. We have to make versions to compel. And they have argued that we look for anything that valued like logic, intellectual property, and those exclusive rights. They refuse to produce them without any justification. I move my time as an expire. Thank you Mr. Grooch. Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr

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. Smith. Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. Smith, Mr. a different case. The blue brief here paints a picture of Mr. Ferredea, who was running rings around. He procured the abandonment of the one patterned with Schoen's name on it. He left Schoen's name out of at least five, where it was finally had that he was a co-inventor. It deserved the company, the radiance, and I guess assigned the patterns to a like logic that was sold to Intel for $400 million based in POT on Schoen's work. He was obviously found to be a co-inventor, a five of those patterns. He didn't even stop with nothing. Well, you're right. There's a reason for that. And that's the reason we get to submit the red brief. The chronology here tells a lot. Let me talk just briefly about the chronology because I think it goes directly to the causation of the horror issues on the state law claims. These two gentlemen formed their company on April 21st, 1997. By August, he was over. By August, each of them, both sophisticated people had blown out. Mr. Schoen had coup d'are brothers and the record before it record demonstrates he considered every major firm in California to represent. By September, each of them were making plans to dissolve the corporation and go their own ways. Each of them were talking to folks individually. On September 29, 1997, so literally four months after they had started, Mr. Schoen is sending a business plan to a third party and it's called Radius, the same name of the company, and saying, take a look at this. This is what I want to use to compete with Mark, Dr. Ferdile. This is a factual situation that has two important components. The marriage was brief. There was no more than four months. When they dissolved the marriage, they did by engaging sophisticated advisors going out broadly and entering into a P.O.L. that is, as Judge Pro said, very specific about the rights everybody walked away and in fear of each of them and even talks about who's going to pay their credit card. The second set of facts that's important is this, what happens after the P.O

. He was obviously found to be a co-inventor, a five of those patterns. He didn't even stop with nothing. Well, you're right. There's a reason for that. And that's the reason we get to submit the red brief. The chronology here tells a lot. Let me talk just briefly about the chronology because I think it goes directly to the causation of the horror issues on the state law claims. These two gentlemen formed their company on April 21st, 1997. By August, he was over. By August, each of them, both sophisticated people had blown out. Mr. Schoen had coup d'are brothers and the record before it record demonstrates he considered every major firm in California to represent. By September, each of them were making plans to dissolve the corporation and go their own ways. Each of them were talking to folks individually. On September 29, 1997, so literally four months after they had started, Mr. Schoen is sending a business plan to a third party and it's called Radius, the same name of the company, and saying, take a look at this. This is what I want to use to compete with Mark, Dr. Ferdile. This is a factual situation that has two important components. The marriage was brief. There was no more than four months. When they dissolved the marriage, they did by engaging sophisticated advisors going out broadly and entering into a P.O.L. that is, as Judge Pro said, very specific about the rights everybody walked away and in fear of each of them and even talks about who's going to pay their credit card. The second set of facts that's important is this, what happens after the P.O.L.R. has been signed. And the difference is this, Mr. Schoen tries to go forward and he concedes on the record without dispute that nothing that Dr. Ferdile did during the four months, he tried to make a go of it and interfered with his ability to go forward in any way. Dr. Ferdile went forward on his own, sitting in his house in his bedroom working and came up ultimately with a important new product transponder. And in the progress of developing that, got one level of financing a second level. You're saying the whole $400 million transaction had basically nothing to do with at least five patents on which Schoen was a co-entering. I don't think we would ever go so far as to say that it has nothing to do. What I would say is just to go to Judge Pro's question, Mr. Kirsch. In the record of 837605, there is the schedule of intellectual property that was sold by Light Logic. Mr. Kirsch, we're here presenting a lot of very interesting factual points and asking us to decide that this had value or this had no value, whether they were not mutual obligations. But what I would have trouble is that when the jury heard on these questions with the witnesses before them, with an opportunity for all of these facts to come out more than 15 minutes per side, that it was how most of the judges said, never mind, I'll decide. And that seems to me to be somewhat irregular. Can you just defy that? Here, telling us how to justify it by telling us the facts on one side. We haven't heard the facts on the other side. Well, you're on our ass, you can answer that question, which is this. J.M.L.L. exists so that a district court judge can find that a jury has either hung and not rendered a verdict or if that had rendered a verdict. In fact, the jury could have, but didn't, have found that there was liability under the state law claims

.L.R. has been signed. And the difference is this, Mr. Schoen tries to go forward and he concedes on the record without dispute that nothing that Dr. Ferdile did during the four months, he tried to make a go of it and interfered with his ability to go forward in any way. Dr. Ferdile went forward on his own, sitting in his house in his bedroom working and came up ultimately with a important new product transponder. And in the progress of developing that, got one level of financing a second level. You're saying the whole $400 million transaction had basically nothing to do with at least five patents on which Schoen was a co-entering. I don't think we would ever go so far as to say that it has nothing to do. What I would say is just to go to Judge Pro's question, Mr. Kirsch. In the record of 837605, there is the schedule of intellectual property that was sold by Light Logic. Mr. Kirsch, we're here presenting a lot of very interesting factual points and asking us to decide that this had value or this had no value, whether they were not mutual obligations. But what I would have trouble is that when the jury heard on these questions with the witnesses before them, with an opportunity for all of these facts to come out more than 15 minutes per side, that it was how most of the judges said, never mind, I'll decide. And that seems to me to be somewhat irregular. Can you just defy that? Here, telling us how to justify it by telling us the facts on one side. We haven't heard the facts on the other side. Well, you're on our ass, you can answer that question, which is this. J.M.L.L. exists so that a district court judge can find that a jury has either hung and not rendered a verdict or if that had rendered a verdict. In fact, the jury could have, but didn't, have found that there was liability under the state law claims. And the judge as a matter of law could have taken that way, J.M.L.L. That is what J.M.L.L. exists for. It is for those circumstances where the substantial evidence doesn't support the verdict. It seems to me that when a jury hangs, that's one step further away. And what the judge is saying, the jury hung, I've now looked at the undisputed facts and I would have rendered judgment as a matter of law. And the reason that's important in our honor and relevant to the facts I was trying to give Judge Laurie this. Well, let me just stop here because you're telling us we're looking at undisputed facts. I didn't see that these facts were undisputed. You honor, I think that if we go to the specifics that Judge J.M.L.L.L.L.L.L. will find that they are undisputed. And let me give you two examples of my code. On an unjust enrichment, one of the facts that was undisputed was that the claim, the claim made by Mr. Schaum, was that there had been a claim of exclusivity and that that caused him damage

. And the judge as a matter of law could have taken that way, J.M.L.L. That is what J.M.L.L. exists for. It is for those circumstances where the substantial evidence doesn't support the verdict. It seems to me that when a jury hangs, that's one step further away. And what the judge is saying, the jury hung, I've now looked at the undisputed facts and I would have rendered judgment as a matter of law. And the reason that's important in our honor and relevant to the facts I was trying to give Judge Laurie this. Well, let me just stop here because you're telling us we're looking at undisputed facts. I didn't see that these facts were undisputed. You honor, I think that if we go to the specifics that Judge J.M.L.L.L.L.L.L. will find that they are undisputed. And let me give you two examples of my code. On an unjust enrichment, one of the facts that was undisputed was that the claim, the claim made by Mr. Schaum, was that there had been a claim of exclusivity and that that caused him damage. As I was saying a minute ago at 827605, you will see that there was no claim of exclusivity. In fact, light logic and Dr. Verdeel revealed Intel just what was in the P.O.L.L.L.L. But set that aside, this court's decision in the Sanimate case says that if your claim is exclusivity, then you have to prove the damages that have resulted from that and causation from that. Yes, but that wasn't the only issue that was being raised in terms of unjust enrichment. No, that is the claim on unjust enrichment. That's why I say respectfully to Mr. Kirsch that it's important to focus on the precise allegations because for unjust enrichment, it was a claim of exclusivity. For breach of contract, it was a claim of patenting by an equitable conduct. And for fraud, it was the statement made that the original application had to be withdrawn. That we would suggest that it's very important to focus upon them because the disrequire required the party to say precisely what the claims were. On unjust enrichment, the claim was exclusivity. We think the undisputed record, no reason would Kirsch would have found that was the basis of the claim. But even if it had. But at that time, it wasn't even that these were at least joint inventions, if not at least in the first case, the exclusive invention of Schum. Your honor, the Coen of Intercept determination had not been made, but everybody knew what the P.O.L. said. And whatever Coen of Intercept was, it gave them equal rights to exploit technology, it gave them the right to exploit the technology, even if they were competing with each other, and it gave them the right to exploit the technology, even if they were competing with Raiden. If we accept with the jury found that this technology was improperly represented to be the sole invention of one person when it was a joint invention, then what you're asking us to build on is on a premise which has already been diminished. That may be the key to the place I'm feeling to communicate, but jury didn't find that

. As I was saying a minute ago at 827605, you will see that there was no claim of exclusivity. In fact, light logic and Dr. Verdeel revealed Intel just what was in the P.O.L.L.L.L. But set that aside, this court's decision in the Sanimate case says that if your claim is exclusivity, then you have to prove the damages that have resulted from that and causation from that. Yes, but that wasn't the only issue that was being raised in terms of unjust enrichment. No, that is the claim on unjust enrichment. That's why I say respectfully to Mr. Kirsch that it's important to focus on the precise allegations because for unjust enrichment, it was a claim of exclusivity. For breach of contract, it was a claim of patenting by an equitable conduct. And for fraud, it was the statement made that the original application had to be withdrawn. That we would suggest that it's very important to focus upon them because the disrequire required the party to say precisely what the claims were. On unjust enrichment, the claim was exclusivity. We think the undisputed record, no reason would Kirsch would have found that was the basis of the claim. But even if it had. But at that time, it wasn't even that these were at least joint inventions, if not at least in the first case, the exclusive invention of Schum. Your honor, the Coen of Intercept determination had not been made, but everybody knew what the P.O.L. said. And whatever Coen of Intercept was, it gave them equal rights to exploit technology, it gave them the right to exploit the technology, even if they were competing with each other, and it gave them the right to exploit the technology, even if they were competing with Raiden. If we accept with the jury found that this technology was improperly represented to be the sole invention of one person when it was a joint invention, then what you're asking us to build on is on a premise which has already been diminished. That may be the key to the place I'm feeling to communicate, but jury didn't find that. All the jury found was that he was a coenvenor on claim. You say, how many other questions are that's what troubles me as to how now to decide as a matter of law no reason a jury could have found any substance in the results. Your honor, this is where a, it's like the Carter case that was recently decided to disappoint. There's an embedded federal issue happens to be in mentorship here. That may be resolved in one way or another. That doesn't take care of all of the other requirements of a state law claim. So let me give you two examples. On the breaching contract and the breaching contract claim they say the breach was that Mr. Dr. Verdeel filed that in applications in procurement by an equitable conduct. We said in our red brief, there's no damage. There's been no proof of harm or causation. And if the federal adultery is permitted, I think this is important because Mr. Schum came back and this is what Judge Jensen confronted. At page 23 of the yellow brief, Mr. Schum says to you just what Mr. Kirch said to you today, the defendants refused to provide investment bankers with a written acknowledgement of Schum's proprietary interests. That's the only harm or causation evidence that they will lie about. If your honors go to the page of the brief and compare the record appendix site, there are two appendix sites. One is day 20421. It's a cover page to a trial. The other is day 20635 to 3a. Now I'm responding in this detail because we didn't get to do it since it was in the yellow brief. That testimony is a conversation between Robertson's team as an investment banker and Mr. Schum. That testimony was excluded from evidence when it was offered for its truth. And most importantly, that testimony doesn't show anything about anything that Dr

. All the jury found was that he was a coenvenor on claim. You say, how many other questions are that's what troubles me as to how now to decide as a matter of law no reason a jury could have found any substance in the results. Your honor, this is where a, it's like the Carter case that was recently decided to disappoint. There's an embedded federal issue happens to be in mentorship here. That may be resolved in one way or another. That doesn't take care of all of the other requirements of a state law claim. So let me give you two examples. On the breaching contract and the breaching contract claim they say the breach was that Mr. Dr. Verdeel filed that in applications in procurement by an equitable conduct. We said in our red brief, there's no damage. There's been no proof of harm or causation. And if the federal adultery is permitted, I think this is important because Mr. Schum came back and this is what Judge Jensen confronted. At page 23 of the yellow brief, Mr. Schum says to you just what Mr. Kirch said to you today, the defendants refused to provide investment bankers with a written acknowledgement of Schum's proprietary interests. That's the only harm or causation evidence that they will lie about. If your honors go to the page of the brief and compare the record appendix site, there are two appendix sites. One is day 20421. It's a cover page to a trial. The other is day 20635 to 3a. Now I'm responding in this detail because we didn't get to do it since it was in the yellow brief. That testimony is a conversation between Robertson's team as an investment banker and Mr. Schum. That testimony was excluded from evidence when it was offered for its truth. And most importantly, that testimony doesn't show anything about anything that Dr. Verdeel did or Light Logic did or Intel did. So you're going to your question, whatever the resolution is of Covent ownership, for example on the contract claim, the only damage they claim is not supported by the record and that's why KML was important. Similarly, an unjust enrichment, the only damage they claim is that this results from claiming exclusive rights. Both experts were asked this question. Have you formed an opinion as to what the damages would be based upon exclusivity? Both experts said no. So does it bring that, however, on Intel, declining to answer the derogatory? Your Honor, I would suggest if the court looks at the record, this report judge was fair in the extreme both in discovery they allowed and the scope of the discovery they permitted. There was nothing that prevented them from formulating an opinion as to what the value of exclusivity was. Well, a lot of your argument seems to depend on your suggestion that any rights to co-inventorship are kind of co-extensive with the POL rights. There's a difference between what he gets as a co-inventor and what he got under the plan of liquid management. I mean, two interesting things, Your Honor, is what is, I think that's correct, although the argument they make to you on jurisdiction today would suggest that maybe that's not true, but I would suggest seven years after the fact to have true trials and true appeals to this court, there's a reason this jurisdiction issue has been raised before today. You know, they may not, the law or some case would suggest they may not be co-extensive, that there's an economic component and there's also a reputation component. That in fact, they will be true. The focus here in the state law camp claims was benefiting from the economic component. And I think the one place for Mr. Shun and we agree is to extend him one and to exploit the economic component, they are co-extensive. He could have done it. There's a reason that- It's up to the extent that part of the $400 in those patents. Your Honor, it's exempted as part of $400 million that some portion of his co-inventorship might be there, but there's no dispute that whatever portion of case that was in there was done before the POL, as a result of the POL, both of them had the right to exploit and use whatever had been invented. The court. You're saying if the subsequent sale was envisioned, if Shun would have had any rights to proceeds from the subsequent sale that had to have been dealt with in the POL, and since it wasn't there, I know proceeds. I would suggest two things, but I would suggest that it's that was dealt with in the POL, which is when they got divorced, they said they knew they were both going off under independent ways and they would be separate. The second is even as to if they were co-inventors as just you and I discussed, the fact of matter is under 35 U.S.C.262, they independent rights to allow them to exploit their co-inventorship. The only thing that I wanted to exploit was that it was never clear to me whether in fact, as Tennyson common, despite the independent rights to exploit the standard property rules of sharing the proceeds of my coming to effect. Okay, I don't think so for two reasons

. Verdeel did or Light Logic did or Intel did. So you're going to your question, whatever the resolution is of Covent ownership, for example on the contract claim, the only damage they claim is not supported by the record and that's why KML was important. Similarly, an unjust enrichment, the only damage they claim is that this results from claiming exclusive rights. Both experts were asked this question. Have you formed an opinion as to what the damages would be based upon exclusivity? Both experts said no. So does it bring that, however, on Intel, declining to answer the derogatory? Your Honor, I would suggest if the court looks at the record, this report judge was fair in the extreme both in discovery they allowed and the scope of the discovery they permitted. There was nothing that prevented them from formulating an opinion as to what the value of exclusivity was. Well, a lot of your argument seems to depend on your suggestion that any rights to co-inventorship are kind of co-extensive with the POL rights. There's a difference between what he gets as a co-inventor and what he got under the plan of liquid management. I mean, two interesting things, Your Honor, is what is, I think that's correct, although the argument they make to you on jurisdiction today would suggest that maybe that's not true, but I would suggest seven years after the fact to have true trials and true appeals to this court, there's a reason this jurisdiction issue has been raised before today. You know, they may not, the law or some case would suggest they may not be co-extensive, that there's an economic component and there's also a reputation component. That in fact, they will be true. The focus here in the state law camp claims was benefiting from the economic component. And I think the one place for Mr. Shun and we agree is to extend him one and to exploit the economic component, they are co-extensive. He could have done it. There's a reason that- It's up to the extent that part of the $400 in those patents. Your Honor, it's exempted as part of $400 million that some portion of his co-inventorship might be there, but there's no dispute that whatever portion of case that was in there was done before the POL, as a result of the POL, both of them had the right to exploit and use whatever had been invented. The court. You're saying if the subsequent sale was envisioned, if Shun would have had any rights to proceeds from the subsequent sale that had to have been dealt with in the POL, and since it wasn't there, I know proceeds. I would suggest two things, but I would suggest that it's that was dealt with in the POL, which is when they got divorced, they said they knew they were both going off under independent ways and they would be separate. The second is even as to if they were co-inventors as just you and I discussed, the fact of matter is under 35 U.S.C.262, they independent rights to allow them to exploit their co-inventorship. The only thing that I wanted to exploit was that it was never clear to me whether in fact, as Tennyson common, despite the independent rights to exploit the standard property rules of sharing the proceeds of my coming to effect. Okay, I don't think so for two reasons. One is to accept that the McMahon is the question the answer, my red light is not so I'll answer the question. Two things, Johanna, under section 262, they have an independent right to exploit license, whatever they want, with their interest without accounting to the other. But that's really the major aspect of the argument, isn't it that by considering the joint interests that the whole process was generated? You honor, that is the predicate that's false. Let me read you the sentence that was disclosed, that was in the disclosure to intel. Pursuant to the Radiance Design and Plan of Liquidation, approved by Board of Directors of Radiance in January 1998, Frank Schaum and John Farrick Markford deal were given equal rights to independently exploit the intellectual property developed by Radiance Design, including the rights to one patent industry. In other words, Schaum could have sold his share of the patents to intel for 400 million dollars. Schaum could have not only done that, he could have tried to use the technology and built a company like Lyck Logic, he did for two months and he stopped. Thank you, hon. Thank you Mr. Lee. Mr. Kersh, we have a couple of minutes for a battle. We'll take the turn out of the next case, which doesn't seem to be quite as complicated. Thank you, hon. Just a few points in response to Mr. Lee. I'm not sure we agree on as many things as Mr. Lee suggests. And I think your honours point about the red and blue breeze and the difference and evidence suggested in the breeze with the heart of this appeal, because both the JOL and the summary judgment that are entered against Schaum in this case required the district court to view all evidence and inferences in Mr. Schaum's paper. And the court didn't do that. Once Mr. Lee brought up the Robertson Stevens issue, Robertson Stevens, the venture capitalist who Mr. Schaum talked to and tried to get funding after the intel merger. That evidence was not excluded. The evidence was trocated by the district court who was presented to the jury. And the original inference from this, that is exactly what occurred

. One is to accept that the McMahon is the question the answer, my red light is not so I'll answer the question. Two things, Johanna, under section 262, they have an independent right to exploit license, whatever they want, with their interest without accounting to the other. But that's really the major aspect of the argument, isn't it that by considering the joint interests that the whole process was generated? You honor, that is the predicate that's false. Let me read you the sentence that was disclosed, that was in the disclosure to intel. Pursuant to the Radiance Design and Plan of Liquidation, approved by Board of Directors of Radiance in January 1998, Frank Schaum and John Farrick Markford deal were given equal rights to independently exploit the intellectual property developed by Radiance Design, including the rights to one patent industry. In other words, Schaum could have sold his share of the patents to intel for 400 million dollars. Schaum could have not only done that, he could have tried to use the technology and built a company like Lyck Logic, he did for two months and he stopped. Thank you, hon. Thank you Mr. Lee. Mr. Kersh, we have a couple of minutes for a battle. We'll take the turn out of the next case, which doesn't seem to be quite as complicated. Thank you, hon. Just a few points in response to Mr. Lee. I'm not sure we agree on as many things as Mr. Lee suggests. And I think your honours point about the red and blue breeze and the difference and evidence suggested in the breeze with the heart of this appeal, because both the JOL and the summary judgment that are entered against Schaum in this case required the district court to view all evidence and inferences in Mr. Schaum's paper. And the court didn't do that. Once Mr. Lee brought up the Robertson Stevens issue, Robertson Stevens, the venture capitalist who Mr. Schaum talked to and tried to get funding after the intel merger. That evidence was not excluded. The evidence was trocated by the district court who was presented to the jury. And the original inference from this, that is exactly what occurred. Intel would not allow Mr. Schaum to go forward and get funding based on his co-inventorship rights after the merger, because they falsely claimed exclusive rights. They knew they didn't have them and they did. And yet they went ahead and prevented Mr. Schaum from exercising his rights. Another critical point is Mr. Lee made a point that nobody valued the exclusivity in this case. But Mr. Lee forgets that all of the evidence in this case was that shared rights, non-exclusive rights were worthless. That's what Mr. Verdown knew, that's what Mr. Schaum knew, that's what everybody knew. And the only value for these patents in this case, I don't understand what your point. Everybody knew that shared rights were worthless. That's exactly what it was. In other words, everything that came out of the POL was worthless because they were getting the shared rights to a right path. Mr. Verdown, Mr. Schaum tried at the beginning when they separated to both get funding for their shared rights and they couldn't do it. They couldn't do it because they were shared. So Mr. Verdown went out and said, you know what? Mr. Schaum has rights under the POL, on the right path and said that these inventions were made afterwards, improvements so that I would have the exclusive rights and that's what he did. And so the disclosure of the POL was, it's a red herring because he did not, Mr. Verdown told all the investors and intel in the merger agreement, it's in our priest that these inventions were created after light logic was established. He was a best statement. We heard out the patent is at 567, I mean one of those patents that are in issue here

. Mr. Verdown only said, excuse me, we heard Mr. Verdown only made representations to the investors and intel that Mr. Schaum had rights in the first patent, the five-sixth and used rights, not a ownership rights or rights to sell, but he had used rights in that, he had more than those, those that's the only disclosure he made, the only the the disclosures that he made to investors and intel read fairly, read it especially in light of the fraudulent patent at assignments through which defendants claimed falsely that they had the exclusive rights, was that Mr. Verdown had all of the rights when he didn't. And so that's what this case is about, this case is about a vote stealing and misappropriating somebody's happiness and patent rights by the line to the patent office, to investors and merger documents, and there is absolutely no justification for a jury not to decide what the value of Mr. Verdown just enrichment by defendants was. Okay, let's do this appeal completely, we'll try and figure it out, and we'll start on the next one