I'd like to thank the the great contract in engineering corporation V. Condo, America. And well, here only from the appellate, the appellant has submitted a brief. Thank you. May please, Court, my name is Jack Pell, security name representing the Appalise State contract. The first question before this Court is whether this Court should even exercise jurisdiction over the state law, conflict between a litigant and its former attorney after a voluntary settlement agreement and dismissal of the underlying suit that arose under the pack of jurisdiction. In this case, there has never been any adjudication by the district court of any section 1338 claim on the merits. And for that reason, we believe that this Court's decisions in the Nielsen case and the Grand Hall's case militate in favor of declining jurisdiction in this case and transferring to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. There was a dismissal with prejudice in this case, which has some facial similarity with the Zeeman decision, which is the only case upon which Mr. Ross relives. However, the dismissal with prejudice in this case did not operate as an adjudication on the merits and solely pursuant to the settlement agreement between my clients on the state of Florida in order to provide the state of Florida with the appropriate and necessary finality of the settlement agreement did not report and did not in fact operate to adjudicate any of the claims that were made
. In fact, if we were to try to articulate what the holding would be if we were going to assume that this dismissal with prejudice was in fact an adjudication on the merits who would be hard pressed to say what that adjudication was because of course it was the plaintiffs' claims that were dismissed with prejudice yet presumed for the terms of the settlement agreement. The plaintiff was paid money and the patent rights were recognized. So it's very difficult to say what that determination would have been if there was one. Well, what about the Rosenberg case? And his suggestion that that case spells out the recovery for the remaining attorney when there's been a discharge without cause, and that he was entitled to the entire contingent fee less quantum merit recovery for his, if you want to call him, joint venture. Greg, we have to get back to what the claim of lean was that was in front of the magistrate. But Mr. Roth sought under in his claim of lean and all of the litigation in front of the magistrate was not an award book as owed to the joint venture. In fact, what he sought was an award book as owed to him. Well, I mean, I think what he's saying is that I was owed the entire amount because the other attorney was discharged and the other attorney was entitled to require an under quantum merit with that portion of the contingent fee represented by that theory, but that I got the rest of it. And the Rosenberg case does seem to lend some support to that
. So what's the answer to that? Would you run a free run situation where there were successive attorneys? And before I get to that point, I will address that on the merits. First, I would point out that this whole argument that Mr. Roth was entitled to the entire joint venture fee and that he should then turn around into account to Mr. Ferrer, his co-counsel, was an argument that was made for the first time in objections to the magistrates' important recommendations. This was not an issue that was tried or pled and therefore was waiting. But addressing Rosenberg as fat cat, now, the Rosenberg case deals with the circumstance where we have successive attorneys. One attorney handling the case is and then discharged. Then second attorney, discharge of that clause. Second attorney comes in and takes over the case and has also a contingency fee agreement, same as the first attorney. Under those circumstances, the court held that the second attorney should not be penalized by the client's decision to discharge the first attorney, and the obligation to pay the first attorney in quantum merit fee does not diminish
. The second attorney's entitlement to the full contingency fee, completely different factual pattern that we have here, where the two attorneys were working simultaneously as co-counsel and they did as the magistrate found it as a joint venture. Again, the comeback to the fact that the magistrate was asked to determine not what the joint venture was entitled to so that they could then do account to do an account between themselves. I'm confused. I thought the Rosenberg case involved a situation in which two attorneys had been employed under a contingency fee contract and one had been discharged with that clause. Am I misreading the case? I don't believe that's correct, Your Honor. The Rosenberg case, in my recollection of it, is that this was a successive representation case. One attorney represented the client was discharged. Second attorney was there after retained and her contingency fee agreement. Now, the certainly Mr. Ross's argument of the case wouldn't lead you to note that factual distinction, but that is the factual pattern in the Rosenberg case
. So, if I could jump back to the jurisdictional point for one moment because this court did ask us to address the Supreme Court's decision in the Coo-Counen. And Coo-Counen, the Supreme Court decided that a district court does not have automatic jurisdiction. Why are you so interested in having this case dismissed for one jurisdiction when you're the prevailing party? Well, Your Honor, only because this court asked us to address that question and particularly did ask us to address the Coo-Counen case. Frankly, what I would like to see, if I had my brothers, would be a simple one word of fart, and I would be very happy with that. But I do only want to address the jurisdictional issue, because this court request would be to do so. And that is why, specifically, we were asked to address the Coo-Counen case. In that case, with the Supreme Court held that a district court does not have the inherent power to adjudicate an enforcement of a settlement agreement if the district court did not retain a jurisdiction would do so. Otherwise, have independent jurisdiction to do so. But this case thing, the complaint is dismissed with prejudice. That's the right
. Correct, Your Honor. But for the fact that the court had in its registry the $10 million or so that was posted as a bond in connection with the prior appeal to this court, that would have ended it. If that $10 million applied on the registry of this court, then the district court could never have adjudicated this cardgely under Coo-Counen. It would have completely lacked jurisdiction to deal with that purely-the-state law claim. The only reason why the court had jurisdiction and ancillary jurisdiction to address this purely-state law claim is because it had this $10 million in its registry, then it needed to disperse, and different parties were making claims to that money. So our position is that the jurisdiction of the court was exercising then after the underlying patent dispute had been completely and totally resolved. And now we're dealing with different issues, different parties, different theories, different release. The only jurisdiction that this court had had to be ancillary jurisdiction in 1367, and therefore applying the logic of this court's cases in Nilson and Grineholtz, unfortunately this court lacks jurisdiction. And, again, as I'd say, which preferred to have in firmness in the transaction. And the case ought to go to the 11th Circuit that's supposed to be the state court's, is your submission
. And the case should be in the 11th Circuit, it's still a federal case, but you say it's not a thus, and you're not suggesting that it ought to be adjudicated by the state court's afflorn. No, you're not. If the bond money had been disperse prior to or at the time. Then you would say otherwise. This should have been in the Brown County Circuit Court rather than the federal court of all. Mr. Kern, so the result of that would be the juror of property would be vacated also, right? No, you're on it. If we, if he, because we did have jurisdiction in the district court, because the money was in the registry of the court, it would, the relief that requesting would not be issued, the relief that we received from the district court would not take that away. Really? How? I don't know. Because, you know, all we would have, they would be a transfer from this court to the 11th Circuit
. We're dealing with a hypothetical situation if that bond money had not been there. I don't understand how, if the district court had no jurisdiction. You're suggesting that it had jurisdiction, but it was diversity jurisdiction? No, obviously it is an insular jurisdiction. And the university is. So the district court had jurisdiction, but the appeal should be out of the 11th Circuit. That's exactly right, right? Although, again, as I'd say, I would much prefer to have an affirmative transfer, but I'm trying to answer the court's questions honestly as possible. But coming back to the Rosenberg case, the Rosenberg case doesn't stand for the proposition that Pharrell was only entitled to quantum marrow to recover. Why doesn't it stand for that proposition? Whether it's a successive representation or a concurrent representation doesn't seem to make any difference. It says that when you're discharged without cause, and you had a contingent fee agreement, all you get is quantum marrow to recover. That's all he was entitled, right? There's a distinct question to whether or not we may overpaid Mr
. Pharrell and we settled within. No, no, but what's the answer to the question? If he gave you a law, was he entitled to anything more than Pharrell or recover? If he was just charged with that cause and the answer to that is no, he was not entitled to more than that. Okay, so that's based on that proposition, then why isn't Ross entitled to the rest? Because Ross is only entitled to what he was entitled to by based on the claim of the lien that he made. And then he only claimed for his own fees. He did not claim for Mr. Ross's fees. He did not claim for a joint venture space. What did he didn't have any claim for Mr. Ross's fees? Mr. Ross wasn't entitled at anything except quantum marrow recovery
. The question is, when you have a contingent fee arrangement like this, and one person is discharged and the other person continues with the representation. It performs the rest of the services. Why isn't the entitled to the contingent fee less the quantum marrow recovery? He received his full contingency fee. I've never been entitled to was one half of one third. And this is because of the agreement between Mr. Farrow and Mr. Ross, the 50-50 split. That's correct around it, but also the rearrangement between the two lawyers and the client to stay contracted was that each of these attorneys was entitled to one half of one third. And so he asked for and received his fee under this agreement. He got one half of one third
. He didn't have a seam on the air. Let's say there's a contingent fee agreement for a third. One lawyer performs services for a week. And then he's discharged without a part of the other guy goes on for years and performs the rest of the services. He's saying that he can only get half of it. He can't get the entire contingent fee. Well, it depends on what he asked for your honor. But I'm glad you asked a question. Is it unfair? Because these cases all sound inequity in Florida and an attorney's card, generally, always sounds inequity. In this case, it is not unfair. It is not unfair because at the end of the day, once all of the hours of Mr. Ross and Mr. Farrow were told that next to each other from the beginning of the litigation through the end, including that period of time after Mr. Farrow was discharged. Their hours in the case were roughly equal. Yes, but address my hypothetical. We have a situation where there's a contingent fee contract. One lawyer works for a week. He's discharged. He's entitled to Quantamera recovery
. It is not unfair because at the end of the day, once all of the hours of Mr. Ross and Mr. Farrow were told that next to each other from the beginning of the litigation through the end, including that period of time after Mr. Farrow was discharged. Their hours in the case were roughly equal. Yes, but address my hypothetical. We have a situation where there's a contingent fee contract. One lawyer works for a week. He's discharged. He's entitled to Quantamera recovery. You agree. He's entitled to Quantamera recovery for whatever hours he put in for that week and nothing more. The other lawyer goes on and he handles the case for years. There's a successful outcome. What's the basis for saying that he doesn't get the contingent fee less than Quantamera recovery? How is that fee? Well, actually, Your Honor, you would get the entire contingent fee. Not unless the Quantamera recovery and that would be fair under those circumstances. What do you mean you get the entire? He would be entitled to the full Quantamera fee without receiving the full contingency fee without deductions of the Quantamera fee for whatever services were performed under that one week. And that would be fair under the circumstances. He would get what? I'm sorry. He would be entitled
. You agree. He's entitled to Quantamera recovery for whatever hours he put in for that week and nothing more. The other lawyer goes on and he handles the case for years. There's a successful outcome. What's the basis for saying that he doesn't get the contingent fee less than Quantamera recovery? How is that fee? Well, actually, Your Honor, you would get the entire contingent fee. Not unless the Quantamera recovery and that would be fair under those circumstances. What do you mean you get the entire? He would be entitled to the full Quantamera fee without receiving the full contingency fee without deductions of the Quantamera fee for whatever services were performed under that one week. And that would be fair under the circumstances. He would get what? I'm sorry. He would be entitled. If he had a separate contract with the Quantamera. No, not separate contract. They have to have a joint contract just like this case. One of them is discharged in the first week. The other one goes on for years and performs the rest of the contract. Under the theory of this case, that person would only get half the contingent fee. That's just not right. Is it? Under those circumstances, Your Honor, I would tend to agree with you, but that's not, again, we're not dealing with that fact that we're here and we're trying to do equity. And that's what the, what the magistrate was attempting to do here was to do equity as Florida law requires to be done in a charging lane case. So, read the decision is doing that
. If he had a separate contract with the Quantamera. No, not separate contract. They have to have a joint contract just like this case. One of them is discharged in the first week. The other one goes on for years and performs the rest of the contract. Under the theory of this case, that person would only get half the contingent fee. That's just not right. Is it? Under those circumstances, Your Honor, I would tend to agree with you, but that's not, again, we're not dealing with that fact that we're here and we're trying to do equity. And that's what the, what the magistrate was attempting to do here was to do equity as Florida law requires to be done in a charging lane case. So, read the decision is doing that. I read the decision is saying that because there was a 50-50 split, he only gets 50 percent regardless. And he relies on debt cases to say that he doesn't get any more than 50-50, even though one, even one of the lawyers gone from the case. In this case, you're on the magistrate expressly noted at several points in its court recommendations that it was applying equity jurisdiction. I understand, but isn't my description of what he held correct? Because there was a 50-50 split, one person is gone. It's just like the debt cases and therefore the remaining person only gets half of it. That each lawyer is still entitled to 50 percent of the contingent fee. Is that what he held? Well, that was the result. Yes, you're on our, our our our policy, I'm not sure I understand any question. Under the fact that we have here because the, Well, what I'm suggesting is that the magistrate's decisions based on an error of law that he is failing to take the Canada Rosenberg case and to recognize that Farrah was only entitled to quantum merit recovery and not as the magistrate held a 50 percent recover. Mr
. I read the decision is saying that because there was a 50-50 split, he only gets 50 percent regardless. And he relies on debt cases to say that he doesn't get any more than 50-50, even though one, even one of the lawyers gone from the case. In this case, you're on the magistrate expressly noted at several points in its court recommendations that it was applying equity jurisdiction. I understand, but isn't my description of what he held correct? Because there was a 50-50 split, one person is gone. It's just like the debt cases and therefore the remaining person only gets half of it. That each lawyer is still entitled to 50 percent of the contingent fee. Is that what he held? Well, that was the result. Yes, you're on our, our our our policy, I'm not sure I understand any question. Under the fact that we have here because the, Well, what I'm suggesting is that the magistrate's decisions based on an error of law that he is failing to take the Canada Rosenberg case and to recognize that Farrah was only entitled to quantum merit recovery and not as the magistrate held a 50 percent recover. Mr. Farrah, again, as I've considered before, made very well and been overpaid in this case under that formulation in Rosenberg, but state contracting did equity in this case. I'm not saying that it's a little bit of a red herring here with respect to the strictly legal component of the analysis of where the fee ought to be assumed for a moment that the result of a 50 percent share would be inequitable. But nonetheless, had there, if I understand your argument, it is predicated on the agreement between Ross and Farrah, the express or at least found to be express understanding that each would have 50 percent share, that at that moment that that agreement was, was executed, that Ross lost his right any more than a one half share of the one third regardless of what happened downstream to Farrah. Strictly as a matter of, all right, and your support for that, you have a Florida case that stands for that proposition. Well, in that case, you're not simply a matter of what is the contract or say that we were not applying any common law then or even any... This is a contract. Now let's assume for a moment that this is not part of the contract between you and the joint venture, but only a contract between Farrah and Ross. So as far as your concern, you owe one third to the joint venture, but the question really comes to this
. Farrah, again, as I've considered before, made very well and been overpaid in this case under that formulation in Rosenberg, but state contracting did equity in this case. I'm not saying that it's a little bit of a red herring here with respect to the strictly legal component of the analysis of where the fee ought to be assumed for a moment that the result of a 50 percent share would be inequitable. But nonetheless, had there, if I understand your argument, it is predicated on the agreement between Ross and Farrah, the express or at least found to be express understanding that each would have 50 percent share, that at that moment that that agreement was, was executed, that Ross lost his right any more than a one half share of the one third regardless of what happened downstream to Farrah. Strictly as a matter of, all right, and your support for that, you have a Florida case that stands for that proposition. Well, in that case, you're not simply a matter of what is the contract or say that we were not applying any common law then or even any... This is a contract. Now let's assume for a moment that this is not part of the contract between you and the joint venture, but only a contract between Farrah and Ross. So as far as your concern, you owe one third to the joint venture, but the question really comes to this. Are you entitled to take advantage of the fact and thereby reduce your exposure to the fee, the fact that Ross and Farrah have engaged in this side arrangement? And if so, what authority is there for that? I would first of all answer that point by saying that 4-1.5G provides an division between attorneys who are not affiliated with the firm, must be in writing and agreed to by the client or in proportion to the amount of work performed. And that is read into every contingency fee contract entering into the state of Florida. So I would say that the agreement between state contracting and Ross and Farrah or being to find the relationship was that the fee would be divided between them since they didn't enter into any written agreement that was signed by us, what's agreed to be divided proportionate to the amount of time that they spent and the magistrate found that the amount of time they spent was roughly equal, therefore 50-50. Where did he find that? That's rule 4-1.5G. No, but the finding is that in this case the amount of time spent was roughly equal. I don't remember that finding. The magistrate made that finding and all you have to do is.
. Are you entitled to take advantage of the fact and thereby reduce your exposure to the fee, the fact that Ross and Farrah have engaged in this side arrangement? And if so, what authority is there for that? I would first of all answer that point by saying that 4-1.5G provides an division between attorneys who are not affiliated with the firm, must be in writing and agreed to by the client or in proportion to the amount of work performed. And that is read into every contingency fee contract entering into the state of Florida. So I would say that the agreement between state contracting and Ross and Farrah or being to find the relationship was that the fee would be divided between them since they didn't enter into any written agreement that was signed by us, what's agreed to be divided proportionate to the amount of time that they spent and the magistrate found that the amount of time they spent was roughly equal, therefore 50-50. Where did he find that? That's rule 4-1.5G. No, but the finding is that in this case the amount of time spent was roughly equal. I don't remember that finding. The magistrate made that finding and all you have to do is... Where? Show me in the record where he made that finding. It comes from the page. I don't know if they don't have a page in front of me or I don't know if it's in the last part of the report and recommendations where the magistrate was. So first of all, it's what Mr. Farrah received, which was the $1.32 million, $666 less his hours, which was simply $100 per hour. And then what Mr. Ross obtained, which again was according to the same formula, was the same $100 per hour. And since the deductions from each parties third was roughly equal, that's how you know the hours were roughly equal
.. Where? Show me in the record where he made that finding. It comes from the page. I don't know if they don't have a page in front of me or I don't know if it's in the last part of the report and recommendations where the magistrate was. So first of all, it's what Mr. Farrah received, which was the $1.32 million, $666 less his hours, which was simply $100 per hour. And then what Mr. Ross obtained, which again was according to the same formula, was the same $100 per hour. And since the deductions from each parties third was roughly equal, that's how you know the hours were roughly equal. That's what was billed by Mr. Ross and Mr. Farrah to state contracting and was paid by state contracting. Roughly equal amounts approximately to $200,000 each. But... Oh, that's the only evidence that the contribution was equal, is it the number of hours charged with equal? That's correct. And that's what 4-1.5 provides
. That's what was billed by Mr. Ross and Mr. Farrah to state contracting and was paid by state contracting. Roughly equal amounts approximately to $200,000 each. But... Oh, that's the only evidence that the contribution was equal, is it the number of hours charged with equal? That's correct. And that's what 4-1.5 provides. Not any theory such as Mr. Ross put out that you have to go by the number of pleading signs that it was properly rejected by the magistrate, nor any other kind of subjective analysis as the amount of time effort it was put in. And that goes by hours. I do want to dispel any possible notion this court might have that state contracting has paid one dime less than the full 1-3rd contingency in this case. If you total up the amounts that were paid to Mr. Ross and Mr. Farrah, they paid that exact amount. But under your theory, you overpaid Farrah and you would get away with paying less than the 1-3rd contingency. What you've told me is that what you should have paid Farrah was just quantum error. And that and that and that and that and that Ross should be limited to half the contingent fee
. And under those circumstances, if Farrah had been properly paid under quantum error, you would have ended up paying less than the 1-3rd contingent fee. Correct? We're assuming Mr. Farrah under that circumstance was only entitled to quantum error. We were suddenly the speed of claim. We may have been entitled to that. Yeah, but under the Rosenberg case, under this theory, you've agreed that the Rosenberg case limited Farrah to quantum error recovery, you would have to pay less than the total amount of the contingency. You'd only have to pay 1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1 2-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1 yo