We call the third case Alice versus Ethicon. I'm not a really doj and I represent the pellant Ethicon ink in this matter. With the court permission I'd like to reserve four minutes to rebuttal. Upon reflection and preparing for this argument, it became clear to me that our points 1 and 2 in our opening brief are really intertwined. And really should be intertwined and really should be considered together. So I'd like to address those two points and focus on that because I think that's the core of our argument. And I can boil down those two points to four sentences. One, the parties were engaged through their representatives. And when I say through their representatives, they're chosen lawyer by plaintiffs and our husband. And Ethicon's attorney. But they were engaged in an agreed upon process. An interactive process that was agreed upon in which both parties were waiting for the plaintiff to get clarified medical restrictions from her doctor. So that's point 1. The second point is that plaintiff didn't provide the information that both her lawyer and Ethicon's lawyer thought would be forthcoming. You're basically arguing that the jury got it wrong. I'm sorry? You're basically arguing that the jury got it wrong. Well, I'm on the due issue
. The issue was squarely presented by the jury whether Ethicon engaged in the interactive process or not. It was really a binary decision. Yeah, I know. Okay. Well, I'm saying that the jury got it wrong, but I'm saying that the jury got it wrong and it ought to be reversed for two reasons. One, that the jury got it wrong because the evidence as to the agreed upon process, the interactive process that was agreed upon by Ethicon and Ellison's lawyers was uncontradicted. That evidence was uncontradicted. What was the agreed upon procedure? I thought they'd just repassing information back and forth. No, no, the agreed upon procedure was that plaintiff, Nicola H. I can never pronounce her last name from Corella Byrne, and Lisa Warren from Ethicon agreed that the co-la H was going to go back to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was going to get address, whether there was any flexibility and have revised restrictions, medical restrictions from the doctor, and then we're going to come back and then we're going to talk about it. That's the interactive process. That's precisely what the interactive process is all about. And that was agreed upon. Ethicon's sitting there, Lisa Warren is sitting there expecting that plaintiff is going to come back with an answer on that question in terms of the medical restrictions. When your friends across the aisle say, well, no, actually, we made an offer
. It was rejected at a hand, and then we were basically terminated. And that's all you need to know. No, that's not true. And you need to look at the chronology you're on. If you look, you can talk about that. We have to keep our reference point. It's with the jury thought. I know, I've read you brief, but it's with the jury. I mean, you've got a fairly high helplac line here. There has to be nothing that would support the jury's finding. I understand it. I understand it. I accept that. And I accept that challenge. But when you look at the facts, the jury's got to base its decision on the evidence. It just can't grab it out of thin air
. When you accept the unrefuted, un-contradicted evidence that Lisa Warren and Ellis' lawyers were talking about getting revised restrictions. And then you couple last with the fact that I wasn't able to cross the examine the plaintiff or present evidence that I should have been able to present through her lawyer because of the attorney client privilege, whereas the plaintiff and her husband are getting on a witness stand in tell on the jury, I didn't know what was going on. I think it didn't judge Wolfson. Did she save that situation by an instruction to the jury about communications to counsel or actually communications to the actual client? You have to impute the knowledge across that. I think she tried to do it. I think she tried to do it, but it didn't work. And she even acknowledged it didn't work because in her opinion on the post-trial motions, she in fact said that plaintiff, the jury could have found that plaintiff was thought that Ethicon was unwilling to discuss further accommodations. And had I been able to get the evidence thing that I wanted that was blocked by the attorney client privilege when plaintiff put that in issue through her own chosen representative, had I been able to get that in evidence, I could have proven that that was a lie. Yes, you also say that I didn't know what my lawyers had been talking about in terms of the accommodations. Yes, yes. And I think what happened? Why did the jury believe that lock stock and barrel? I'm sorry? Why did the jury believe that lock stock and barrel? I think they talked to her lawyers for her lawyers in Teller. That's exactly why I say that my point one and two need to be discussed together because what happened here is because I was hamstrown because of the attorney client privilege, plaintiff was permitted to say, I didn't know what my lawyers were talking about. I didn't know there was a part time job offer. I didn't know that Lisa Warren and my lawyers were talking about getting additional medical information and that they were going to sit down and talk about it. That's the key point. And that's the core issue in this case
. And that's why this judgment ought to be added for Ethicon or at least a new trial. Because that's when you put those two issues together, the unrebutted evidence that the parties through their representatives were engaging in the read upon interactive process. And then you have the plaintiff over my objection being permitted to say that they didn't know what was going on between their children representative and Ethicon. And I can't get into that and show that that's a lie. The way I should have been able to stay waved and privileged. And I've been able to do that. Then I think we would have had a different verdict. Was other evidence presented in the case to establish what conversations were had between counsel and the Davis House? Well, of course, Lisa Warren testified and her testimony was uncontradicted. And her notes were introduced in evidence to support her deposition. So you had some evidence that was able to put but what the plaintiff was saying in her case. That's right. I did. But but permitting the plaintiff and her husband to drive home the fact that they didn't know what their lawyer was talking about. And as I said, you need to look at Judge Wilson's own statement. She concluded in denying my motion, post trial motion, that in fact the jury could have concluded that plaintiff's thought at the con was unwilling to discuss further accommodations, which is further from the truth. And I had I've been able to drive that home across examination and convinced the jury that they were lying about that
. We would have had a different result. You're looking for a new trial. I'm looking for for judgment for Epicon, but in the alternative, I'm looking for a new trial. Talk about a little bit here about whether or not then you make the argument on your post trial motions, saw the judgment of matter of law and a couple of points. But talk a little bit about whether or not you think the plaintiff was qualified. Well, I think there's two points there, Your Honor. One is plaintiff's obligation to prove that she had that she was qualified. And it's her obligation to prove that she was disabled. On the qualification issue, the only evidence in the record as to her qualifications was that she needed her doctor said she needed to work from home three days a week on a permanent basis. And I know there's this issue about was a permanent Dr. Maun versus Dr. Watson, but the fact of the matter is it was Dr. Maun who was the return to work doctor. He was the one who was making the call on what her restrictions were returning to work. It's very difficult to assess this because this is very difficult to assess this because that precise question was put to the jury. What's she qualified? The jury said yes, but you're re-arguing the evidence presented to the jury
. Yes, I'm re-arguing the evidence. You're arguing essentially that evidence was just not sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Exactly. Exactly. Because it's un-conferredicted. The evidence is a matter of law working. The facts are undisputed that the company would have had to have reassigned the core functions of the job. But it didn't traverse say, well, perhaps we could have assigned some of those and couldn't the jury have concluded from that statement that perhaps some of those reassigned duties were not essential functions. But no, no. What they could have concluded was that since travelers were willing to do it on a temporary basis that she should have done it on a permanent basis. And that would have been an era as a matter of law. There is no requirement. That's requiring more than the company is required to do. The law is clear that if the company is willing to do more than the law requires, that doesn't mean that the company has to do that. And that was an issue where perhaps the jury did get confused on that issue. I agree with you
. We'll get you back on our bottom. Thank you. Mr. Foreman. Coach Fuentes and may it please the court. First, I want to thank the court for giving the clinic an opportunity to work in this case while not representing Miss Ella personally representing her interest. Unfortunately, all the students that worked on this have now graduated and are studying for the bar have not been barred so I didn't have an opportunity to try to have one of them. But I thank you for the opportunity to do that. This court has a long record. In fact, Judge Chagarras in the Ashowen case, you wrote an opinion, Judge Fisher, you joined that opinion, where you said pretty much what you just said, where the record is critically the efficient of the minimum, one of the evidence in support of the verdict. And I like your words better, where there's nothing in the record to support the jury verdict. That's when you revisit the jury verdict here on every point that they have raised. We believe not there's there's substantial evidence on most points. And on the point that my colleague says is the critical point, the interactive process and the attorney client privilege issue. Judge Wilson on an early motion for some judgment thought that evidence was so compelling that she entered judgment as a matter of law in support of Miss Alice. And then, ethical and says, but wait your honor
. There's a question of fact that is a question of fact and Judge Wilson reconsider sent that issue to the jury. And the jury then concluded a judge for one day as you said very specifically that they failed to engage in the interactive process and then ethical and comes back and says, but no, no, it's really a question of law. Judge Wilson got it right, the jury got it right. Could you talk a little bit about the fact that there wasn't offer made to her and offer a part-time work that she rejected. There was subsequently an offer of her job back. You can have your job back. She said no. Twice. Once I think there were two different levels that she worked at. Both levels were offered to her and she said no. Well, just so there's no confusion and I want to make sure I'm answering your question. There are two separate issues. There's the part-time job offer which the jury heard and rejected as a reasonable accommodation or the reasonable engagement in the entire process. But in terms of the interactive process, I mean, there is a process there where the ethical and says, look, how about this? Why don't you study this and get back to me and on separate occasion, she didn't get back to the employer. Again, Your Honor, I don't want to fight on the record. I just want to make sure that you can fight on the record
. That's okay. All right. I'll fight on the record. Moving to relief, there's evidence that after there was an order of reinstatement, there were two audit. Post-offers. Post-offers. There were two offers of two jobs. This is on the remedy issues. But back to the interactive process, which this circuit has again recognized how important it is, Judge Fulontes, in the Disabled and Action case, you talked about the ADA being a comprehensive mandate. But let me walk the court through this, the issue that I think is the heart of the issue. Their point is the jury must have accepted Miss Ellis' testimony that she didn't know about her park on job offer. Rather than invade the attorney-client privilege, the judge Wilson gave an imputation instruction, and it couldn't be clear. In addition to considering any communications between the parties regarding the accommodations in 2001, you should consider any communications between the attorneys regarding accommodations, attorneys or agents of their clients, etc. This circuit, in several cases of rule, that if you give a correct jury instruction, we will presume that the jury follows that instruction. They have not adopted that jury instruction. Indeed, if you move to Mr
. D's closing argument, Mr. D's closing argument says, and I'm reading from the record of Joint Appendix 157-16-24, now as the judge told you, this is as if it was being offered directly to the plaintiff because lawyers are agents of the clients. It goes on to say, it doesn't matter if Miss Ellis says, hey, I didn't know about it. My lawyer didn't tell me, that doesn't matter as the judge instructs you. Taking it a step further, Miss Ellis' counsel in her closing argument at page 1606 of the Joint Appendix Line 9-18 really summed up what this part-time job offer was and says, and Lisa Warren doesn't mean, she doesn't answer the question, she doesn't try to come up with an accommodation to put Theresa back to work. What she does, and this is an important time, think, she acts like this is some great thing, is she offers her a part-time job. And I submit to you that a part-time job is not a reasonable accommodation unless they have exhausted the possibility of putting her back to work in a full-time job. That closing argument exactly tracks the jury instruction, but yet, Ethicon continues to ask. Has she submitted a proposal, I mean in terms of the interactive process, did she say to the employer, this is what I can do, this is what we can work. Through her doctors, she came back and said, because of the substantial limitations of my condition, I need to work home three days a week and I need a job coach, loosely summarized. And the response was, we can't do that, you are being processed for long-term disability, which is the functional equivalent of termination. And at that point, she was terminated from the job on another level, and we covered this. Lisa, she was terminated, there was no actual letter saying you're here by terminated, right? There was no actual letter saying she was terminated, but the record is very clear on that point. And in fact, I mean going to, is the operative time or date when she goes on to full-time disability or long-term disability rather? That's when her job ended, and in fact, if I could refer to, joining appendix 486, and this is one of the correspondence prior to the termination from Ethicon's medical manager, where she says, at the bottom, please help as soon as possible so the plaintiff does not have to go to straight-long term and disability and, quote, lose her job. So I think that's a pretty firm statement that her job was terminated. She's in a different state. But the one point I don't want to lose is that Ethicon's argument is despite their very crystal closing, despite the jury's instruction, saying, but the jury must have been confused. But the jury wasn't confused. If you go to the joint appendix 219, the jury came back with a very specific question. And their question was, would the accommodation have to been proposed prior to October 22nd? That's the date she went on long-term disability. In order to be considered as an accommodation, or can we consider any accommodation proposed on or after October 22nd? Very clear question. Not indicating much confusion. The judge says, October 22nd is not a cutoff date. It is for you the jury decide whether any accommodations proposed, including after October 22nd. The only thing that happened after October 22nd is the part-time job offer, or part of the interactive process, based upon that very clear understanding. The jury says they failed to engage in the interactive process. Let me ask you a question. What evidence is there in the record as to why the plaintiff did not give the medical information that was asked for? Or was there no evidence on that? There's not significant evidence of what was happening. I think the testimony was Ms. Ellis thought she was terminated. And there is a point we were- Did she testify to that? That's what I'm asking you. In all honesty, I don't want to mislead the court
. But the one point I don't want to lose is that Ethicon's argument is despite their very crystal closing, despite the jury's instruction, saying, but the jury must have been confused. But the jury wasn't confused. If you go to the joint appendix 219, the jury came back with a very specific question. And their question was, would the accommodation have to been proposed prior to October 22nd? That's the date she went on long-term disability. In order to be considered as an accommodation, or can we consider any accommodation proposed on or after October 22nd? Very clear question. Not indicating much confusion. The judge says, October 22nd is not a cutoff date. It is for you the jury decide whether any accommodations proposed, including after October 22nd. The only thing that happened after October 22nd is the part-time job offer, or part of the interactive process, based upon that very clear understanding. The jury says they failed to engage in the interactive process. Let me ask you a question. What evidence is there in the record as to why the plaintiff did not give the medical information that was asked for? Or was there no evidence on that? There's not significant evidence of what was happening. I think the testimony was Ms. Ellis thought she was terminated. And there is a point we were- Did she testify to that? That's what I'm asking you. In all honesty, I don't want to mislead the court. I would have to go double check. What I do now is that one of the things that Ms. Ellis talked about was once the doctor came forward with the restrictions, she was now being forced into a requirement. I don't want to lose its end of brief, but I don't want to belabor it because my clock is ticking very quickly. I do want to get the relief. Is we actually don't believe that the interaction between Ms. Warren and Ms. Ellis' counsel is an interactive process. Because the chronology was basically telling the employee whatever your doctor's proposed we can't do. That's not- we're not going to do. Ms. Ellis then has an attorney that writes to counsel for ethical and says, that's unito-commodator. And then there's a discussion. Our position is that's not the interactive process. That's settlement discussion. And we don't want to turn the ADA into a vehicle where we don't accommodate, but once somebody oilers up, then we'll seriously consider a reasonable accommodation
. I would have to go double check. What I do now is that one of the things that Ms. Ellis talked about was once the doctor came forward with the restrictions, she was now being forced into a requirement. I don't want to lose its end of brief, but I don't want to belabor it because my clock is ticking very quickly. I do want to get the relief. Is we actually don't believe that the interaction between Ms. Warren and Ms. Ellis' counsel is an interactive process. Because the chronology was basically telling the employee whatever your doctor's proposed we can't do. That's not- we're not going to do. Ms. Ellis then has an attorney that writes to counsel for ethical and says, that's unito-commodator. And then there's a discussion. Our position is that's not the interactive process. That's settlement discussion. And we don't want to turn the ADA into a vehicle where we don't accommodate, but once somebody oilers up, then we'll seriously consider a reasonable accommodation. The jury properly rejected that. I want to turn in a limited time that I- Mr. Foreman, let me address your question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question
. The jury properly rejected that. I want to turn in a limited time that I- Mr. Foreman, let me address your question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. The second case that was taken back in college was a know your honor and indeed there's evidence from mis-traverse saying two things. Two things that are very important and they all relate the interactive process. The first one is that well, I could have probably done this on a limited time basis assigned to some job duties. That is a reasonable accommodation. Now whether that would become permanent, we don't know because there was never the interactive process. There was never a discussion with Miss Ellis. You're getting hung up on this interactive process. It's important, but if she's not qualified, the absence or the failure to comply with the interactive process doesn't matter. But the reason I get hung up on the interactive process is part of the interactive process is to identify specifically the central functions of the job and then with reasonable accommodation, can you do that? Because of ethical and failure to engage in the interactive process, we have them basically saying that being there seven days a week or five days a week is the essential function of the job. But the jury heard that, heard her qualifications and came back to the finding. But on that point, there was never a discussion as to whether that was truly a essential function of the job. And our brief discusses that in pretty great detail in terms of what the evidence supporting. And I would be really remiss in not representing this Ellis's interest
. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. I want to ask you a question. The second case that was taken back in college was a know your honor and indeed there's evidence from mis-traverse saying two things. Two things that are very important and they all relate the interactive process. The first one is that well, I could have probably done this on a limited time basis assigned to some job duties. That is a reasonable accommodation. Now whether that would become permanent, we don't know because there was never the interactive process. There was never a discussion with Miss Ellis. You're getting hung up on this interactive process. It's important, but if she's not qualified, the absence or the failure to comply with the interactive process doesn't matter. But the reason I get hung up on the interactive process is part of the interactive process is to identify specifically the central functions of the job and then with reasonable accommodation, can you do that? Because of ethical and failure to engage in the interactive process, we have them basically saying that being there seven days a week or five days a week is the essential function of the job. But the jury heard that, heard her qualifications and came back to the finding. But on that point, there was never a discussion as to whether that was truly a essential function of the job. And our brief discusses that in pretty great detail in terms of what the evidence supporting. And I would be really remiss in not representing this Ellis's interest. If I didn't at least get to the relief, which I think is the important part. And again, citing Eschomon. That this two of you on the Eschomon case have a term in there that if you have given the the ADA has given district judges great discretion to craft, quote, a just result. What's wrong with reinstatement? Part what's wrong with reinstatement? That's what she decided. Absolutely nothing. We agree. You think I mean, this is an extraordinary amount of this harmony and ill will that jumps out from the pages of the breeze. You think that's a good idea? I think it was at the time that Judge Wilson heard this case, heard all the testimony and was left with the conclusion, should I adopt the front pay, the advisory front pay which was almost a million dollars. Or should I order reinstatement? In her determination, was reinstatement was the best determination of how to make Miss Ellis hope. Now getting to what I feel as the hardest part of this case. Here we are 10 years after Miss Ellis was terminated. Four years, basically four years after the reinstatement order. With a condition that is fluid, a medical condition that is fluid, and an ethical disposition, a business situation that is changing. How does this court achieve justice? In our proposal, one, we submitted if I could have just a few minutes to wrap up so I could get to this. You're honest. Did you add two minutes? The one proposal we floated was to put an end of this litigation, recognized there seems to be a total disconnect between the parties here, was to adopt the advisory verdict, order front pay, and put an end of this case
. If I didn't at least get to the relief, which I think is the important part. And again, citing Eschomon. That this two of you on the Eschomon case have a term in there that if you have given the the ADA has given district judges great discretion to craft, quote, a just result. What's wrong with reinstatement? Part what's wrong with reinstatement? That's what she decided. Absolutely nothing. We agree. You think I mean, this is an extraordinary amount of this harmony and ill will that jumps out from the pages of the breeze. You think that's a good idea? I think it was at the time that Judge Wilson heard this case, heard all the testimony and was left with the conclusion, should I adopt the front pay, the advisory front pay which was almost a million dollars. Or should I order reinstatement? In her determination, was reinstatement was the best determination of how to make Miss Ellis hope. Now getting to what I feel as the hardest part of this case. Here we are 10 years after Miss Ellis was terminated. Four years, basically four years after the reinstatement order. With a condition that is fluid, a medical condition that is fluid, and an ethical disposition, a business situation that is changing. How does this court achieve justice? In our proposal, one, we submitted if I could have just a few minutes to wrap up so I could get to this. You're honest. Did you add two minutes? The one proposal we floated was to put an end of this litigation, recognized there seems to be a total disconnect between the parties here, was to adopt the advisory verdict, order front pay, and put an end of this case. At the con objected, the intimately in their briefs, we withdrew that and said the preferred remedy now is to respect the jury. Make a finding of liability, approve that, approve all judge Wolfson's remedies, the $50,000, everything that she ordered, and order immediate reinstatement with one caveat. A limited hearing on how much she is entitled to receive from the time that their motion to stay the reinstatement order until the actual reinstatement. So you're running from about 2,000 in 10 to the present. Have a factual hearing on that, not the emergency contempt hearing that Judge Sheraton, but have a limited determination on that. They will of course argue that they already complied with the order and she's entitled the limited amount of damages, but at least there'll be a factual record from a district court to be able to make that determination and some amount of justice would be accomplished. In closing, Judge Fisher, you wrote a recent, Jaw Law Review article that appeared in the Villanova Law Review and you say the law that bears no relation to the world we live in lacks any semblance of rationality and good law requires validation through comparison with actual judgments. That's what the jury did here. They heard real life. They applaud she and then Judge Wolfson applied the law meticulously to try to give some justice to that. And we are asking this court to respect the jury's function here, respect the jury's factual planning and grapple with the hard issue of how do you give Miss Ellis some amount of justice 10 years after the fact. And unless you have any other questions, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Florida. Mr. D
. At the con objected, the intimately in their briefs, we withdrew that and said the preferred remedy now is to respect the jury. Make a finding of liability, approve that, approve all judge Wolfson's remedies, the $50,000, everything that she ordered, and order immediate reinstatement with one caveat. A limited hearing on how much she is entitled to receive from the time that their motion to stay the reinstatement order until the actual reinstatement. So you're running from about 2,000 in 10 to the present. Have a factual hearing on that, not the emergency contempt hearing that Judge Sheraton, but have a limited determination on that. They will of course argue that they already complied with the order and she's entitled the limited amount of damages, but at least there'll be a factual record from a district court to be able to make that determination and some amount of justice would be accomplished. In closing, Judge Fisher, you wrote a recent, Jaw Law Review article that appeared in the Villanova Law Review and you say the law that bears no relation to the world we live in lacks any semblance of rationality and good law requires validation through comparison with actual judgments. That's what the jury did here. They heard real life. They applaud she and then Judge Wolfson applied the law meticulously to try to give some justice to that. And we are asking this court to respect the jury's function here, respect the jury's factual planning and grapple with the hard issue of how do you give Miss Ellis some amount of justice 10 years after the fact. And unless you have any other questions, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Florida. Mr. D. Thank you, Madam. A couple of things. First of all, I'm not quarrelling with the standard that this circuit is established in terms of setting aside a jury book. I recognize that standard. I recognize I haven't upheld that. But when I'm talking about the jury barrack or how have we put it, the jury got it wrong. I'm talking about they not being as contlla of evidence to support the jury barrack on a number of these issues. One, counsel says nothing happened after October 22 other than the part-time job offer. That's not true. The agreed upon process, the way at the con through Lisa Warren left it when the COA age. And the way the COA age thought it was going to be handled was that Plena would go and address the restrictions with her doctor and see if there's some flexibility. And the whole concept was that then they would come back with whatever information and then they would discuss it from there. Until that happened, it was premature to be discussing any other alternatives. The part-time offer was not the end-of-the-one deal. It was a legitimate good faith offer and Plena projected it and that's fine. At the con still continue the conversation with Nicola H
. Thank you, Madam. A couple of things. First of all, I'm not quarrelling with the standard that this circuit is established in terms of setting aside a jury book. I recognize that standard. I recognize I haven't upheld that. But when I'm talking about the jury barrack or how have we put it, the jury got it wrong. I'm talking about they not being as contlla of evidence to support the jury barrack on a number of these issues. One, counsel says nothing happened after October 22 other than the part-time job offer. That's not true. The agreed upon process, the way at the con through Lisa Warren left it when the COA age. And the way the COA age thought it was going to be handled was that Plena would go and address the restrictions with her doctor and see if there's some flexibility. And the whole concept was that then they would come back with whatever information and then they would discuss it from there. Until that happened, it was premature to be discussing any other alternatives. The part-time offer was not the end-of-the-one deal. It was a legitimate good faith offer and Plena projected it and that's fine. At the con still continue the conversation with Nicola H. Plena's chosen representative, not ours, her chosen representative, with the idea of trying to explore an alternative. And that's what me direct the process is all about. That's what they were doing. And just imagine what was going on here. The way this plays out, and you have to look at the timing, I suggest. You have Plena in her doctors dragging their feet towards the end of a leave period and they do not give the medical information, the final medical information to Kemper until October 12th. On October 15th and October 12th with the Friday. And the following Monday, Melissa Stretch gets back to them, tries to reach them to discuss it with them. They're not reachable, sends them an email telling them that they were trying to reach it. Without, I know it's a good thing to cut you off too much, but hypothetically speaking, if we were to affirm the verdict, we have to reach remedies. Could you spend a little time responding to Mr. Foreman's argument respecting the remedy? Well, first of all, in terms of the back pay and front pay, the Judge Wilson properly decided that Plena's back pay was cut off because she abandoned the workforce and that she wasn't entitled to front pay. That was not appealed. Plena did not appeal that, so that can't be disturbed. In terms of the reinstatement issue, we offered reinstatement twice and they rejected it. She rejected it
. Plena's chosen representative, not ours, her chosen representative, with the idea of trying to explore an alternative. And that's what me direct the process is all about. That's what they were doing. And just imagine what was going on here. The way this plays out, and you have to look at the timing, I suggest. You have Plena in her doctors dragging their feet towards the end of a leave period and they do not give the medical information, the final medical information to Kemper until October 12th. On October 15th and October 12th with the Friday. And the following Monday, Melissa Stretch gets back to them, tries to reach them to discuss it with them. They're not reachable, sends them an email telling them that they were trying to reach it. Without, I know it's a good thing to cut you off too much, but hypothetically speaking, if we were to affirm the verdict, we have to reach remedies. Could you spend a little time responding to Mr. Foreman's argument respecting the remedy? Well, first of all, in terms of the back pay and front pay, the Judge Wilson properly decided that Plena's back pay was cut off because she abandoned the workforce and that she wasn't entitled to front pay. That was not appealed. Plena did not appeal that, so that can't be disturbed. In terms of the reinstatement issue, we offered reinstatement twice and they rejected it. She rejected it. I don't know what was supposed to do. But getting back to this issue of the interactive process, what happened here and had I been able to, you know, after they opened up the door saying that they didn't know what their lawyers were talking to ethical and about. If I had been able to show and produce evidence to cross examine properly, to introduce old and notes, etc. Because they waived the privilege. I would have been able to show that it was Plena who interrupted the interaction. But where about the jury instruction? That doesn't solve the problem, Your Honor. That really doesn't solve the problem. Because if it had, if the jury had listened to that instruction and understood it correctly, then why was Judge Wilson saying, well, maybe the jury believed that Plena thought that ethical con was not willing to discuss further accommodations. When, in fact, the undisputed evidence, if you accept the discussions between lawyers, the undisputed evidence was that, in fact, ethical con was willing to discuss further accommodations. And ethical con was waiting for the plaintiff to get back. And had I been able to get into all that, despite the Attorney Klein privilege, which was waived, I would have been able to show that, in fact, what they were doing, she and her husband was stringing us along so that she could get a better job at a dentist. Okay, my finish up is today. Thank you, Your Honor. That's it. Okay, good. Mr
. D, thank you very much. Mr. Forman, as well. Thank you. We'll take the case and the regards you