All persons have any manner or form of business before the Honorable of the United States Court of the Field, from the Fourth Circuit, are obliged to draw an eye and give their attention for the court as now say. God save the United States, this Honorable Court. I'd be seated, please. All right, the first case we're going to hear is the United States versus Carter, Mr. Coleman. Good morning, Your Honours. It's good to see you again. I'm Lex's second time up here on this, isn't it? Yes, sir. Again, I'm Lex Coleman and I'm continuing to represent Todd Carter on this matter. When the case was last before the Court following an argument, the judge was vacated and the case was... There's a little feedback on the microphone
. Is there some possibility to turn down just a touch? Yeah, that's correct. The case was remanded for the government to have an opportunity to put on evidence showing the disarming habitual marijuana users substantially served the governmental interests of producing gun violence. The court didn't just remand it for that purpose. Your opinion, the opinion of this panel actually gave the government a very thorough and lengthy roadmap observing that the evidence they were given the opportunity to produce should be abundantly available. The court pointed to the studies the seven circuit relied on in the Yancey case in 2010 and suggested a number of factual scenarios there would be evidence to support that might show a correlation or a justification for disarming habitual marijuana users. The government didn't seem to really take advantage of all that direction. There was no evidence presented of inflated prices of marijuana, no evidence of financial desperation of habitual marijuana users. Mr. Coleman, you phrased the question as whether or not habitual marijuana users should be disarmed, but I thought we phrased it in a bit more general terms as whether drug users writ large should be disarmed. Well, I think the facts of the case narrow that further with Mr. Carter because the only assertion and evidence in this case is there was an habitual user of marijuana. Well, that happens to be the drug in question, but I don't know that we phrased the issue that narrowly or did we require that narrow a fit to have it pertained to a single drug? Well, I think then the reason in our brief we cited the number of state laws showing the different treatment of guns and marijuana, as well as now since then we've had two states legalized the recreational use of marijuana, was not to disagree with policy considerations as Judge Covonhaver interpreted it but to point out that it's not as simple as that broad of fit
. We can define this so broadly that it's easy to make a reasonable fit with just about anything and that's really unfortunate if that's what happens because despite the construction of the core non-core or limited core that has developed in the circuit, we're still dealing with a fundamental right. Do you think that the legalization of marijuana in certain states would override the provisions of 922G3? It's not an overriding Judge Hamilton as much as illustrating the really imperfectness of that fit. There's no other drug that's been said that way. It's later to alcohol. You can't get out on the highway and drive when you're intoxicated. But we're not taking cars away from marijuana users. We're disarmed. I'm just using it as an analogy. Yes, sir. And the same thing. I don't think the legalization of marijuana would in any way impact 922G3. No, it's going to the analysis of the fit
. We're applying intermediate scrutiny. Except the question is, you have to get a little more specific. The question is public safety was the legitimate government purpose. And the question is, in the interest of public safety, did Congress have a justification to disarm people who were drug users or addicts? And the question is, is there some kind of data that supports the notion of disarming drug users and addicts of guns while they're drug addicts and abuse? And it looked to me like the government put on a fair amount of data that showed a correlation between drug use, including marijuana, and increased violence, which would justify Congress's legislating. That's the problem or the difficulty with correlations. All of the studies are consistent in saying that there's no evidence of direct causation. You said you have to have causation. This is a legislative enactment done by Congress. And we're going to require Congress to show a causative line for every enactment they adopt. They have basically said we find the public safety is advanced by taking guns out of the hands of people who are drug users and drug addicts. And you can start off with the common sense that that sounds to me like it would improve the public safety. We do know there's a correlation, for instance, between drug users spending money or needing money and causing crime
. The whole debate, the public policy debate about disarming, I mean, making drugs legal is to try to avoid that correlation. And we also have these studies that show this correlation that if you fall into one of these classes, there is a higher incidence of violence and gun use. The Harrison studies pretty, pretty important, even though Waikaze U-Sighted study supports that. Almost twice as much. Well, at the Joint Appendix on page 60, the Harrison study notes that drug addicts commit few violent offenses. The Ocer study at the University of Kentucky, which only talked to 800 probationers out of two probation offices in 30 counties, limited the drug use component of its assessment to alcohol, crack, powder cocaine, and stimulants. All of these studies, the first six that were submitted by the government and then the other three that were requested by Judge Copenhagen. The McCoy study out of Florida International University focused just on Miami and the use of cocaine and opiates. The Florida State study, the COO study, which was the sixth one submitted by the government. Joint Appendix pages 92 through 125 dealt only with users of heroin and opiates, crack, and alcohol. There's a distinction in the study separating out the use of marijuana and there are no evidence of propensity of violence for that classification of drug. Well, why don't you go through and do the same analysis with respect to the study's discussion on marijuana? There's as much in the studies that were produced to the corporal of correlating marijuana with violations
. The Ocer study doesn't. The Bureau of Journal of Justice Statistics, a 2004 report, establishes no showing that habitual marijuana use is related to gun violence. The Harrison study, again, made the express statement that drug addicts commit few violent offenses generally. The 1997 Special Report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics really tied the majority of violent crimes to abuse of alcohol. It joined Appendix page 71. The long and paper I've never understood, it deals with road crashes in France and no one's disputing that marijuana could intoxicate people just like any other people. For about the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, this is a J249 that found that of adults who have been arrested for serious offenses in the past year, almost half that used marijuana in the past year. I understand that there's evidence pointing to a contrary conclusion, but there's evidence pointing that supports the district court's conclusion, and given that we only need to find a reasonable fit, isn't that enough? Well, that's a concern of when we're using a reasonable fit. I'm not saying it has to be perfect. I'm not going to argue you have ruled it doesn't have to be a perfect fit, but it's still got to substantially serve the purpose, even if we call it preserving public safety. Lacking any evidence that habitual marijuana users are meaningfully contributing to violent crime. Not drug traffickers, just marijuana, habitual marijuana users
. To answer your question, this is looking at people already in a prison context that been arrested and as I read the report and the study, yes, it's been used in the past year, but there was also a substantial amount of use of alcohol, methamphetamine, and cocaine. No one's saying that those types of drugs don't increase danger. So, as I said, the year's point out, the legislation uses the word drug, which is a broader classification than just marijuana, it includes marijuana. But the difficulty with your argument is the Harrison report, for instance, actually addressed marijuana and showed an increase, a substantial increase in users of marijuana from people who did not. And there were other studies in here that talked about the increase, even the way study did. And the year argument is that it was not this to go significant, but it was 1.9 times greater when people were using marijuana. And I think there's a lot of common sense in that, don't you? I mean, we're allowed to look at common sense, the legislators are doing that. Well, the common sense, I've experienced since I got this case, as in many contexts, been in conversations with court security officers who used to be in law enforcement. And they asked me about the case, and I tell them a few thoughts, I don't elaborate on with legal details. I guarantee you, I've gotten more than once the comment, the boy, I've never had a guy who was stolen that I stopped, get out and try and hit mayor pull a gun on me. I've practically had that somewhere here, but that isn't where the risk goes
. It's the observation that we see in case after case where they link guns and drugs, where distributors of marijuana and other drugs protect territories. They protect themselves from being robbed during an illegal transaction. They protect themselves from being selling bad stuff. Well, and guns in that context, there's a lawlessness in the drug trafficking trade, which includes marijuana. And that lawlessness is in a common sense term, policed by the use of guns. And we see in case after case in these drug cases where people are convicted, that guns are involved. And when, and I accept, is policed in the drug trafficking context, we have a separate statute that has regularly listed constitutional scrutiny in non-24C. Of the same section. I understand, but here the question if you're an addict or a drug user, you're in that trade, you have to get illicitly. You have to go somewhere to get it. Has it happened to you? The bottom is not governed by any law. It's governed by the law of the street, which is enforced with guns
. Well, that's just the common sense of it. Well, the common sense you're pointing to makes the assumption that the gun is going to the purchase. The gun is leading the home. In this case, while we've distinguished- I didn't make any assumptions. I'm just observing that when we have the drug trade and the drug participation in the drug trade, we're a person who's participating in an area where he would logically arm himself if he were going to buy drugs, sell drugs, this type of thing. And we see that a lot. Well, you're not seeing selling drugs in Mr. Carter's part number one. Number two. Let's stick with the legislation first and see whether Congress had a justification for doing what it did. Well, it's interesting you looked at what justification Congress had back in 1960-80. We had the assassination of a president, excuse me, predating it
. And then with Senator Kennedy and then with Malcolm Axe, we had so much social unrest in this country. Congress passed and amended the gun control act twice. Marijuana was listed expressly in that until- It's still it. Well, now it's under- It's still illegal under Title 21 to distribute traffic in and possess marijuana. It is, but I think the contextual distinction of where the gun was kept. No matter how much you want to remove, Mr. Carter is an individual or class from a core. Still warrants protection by being in a home. We don't have officers going in on a drug raid. We have no evidence of drugs being sold out of that home. And yes, I- Well, you can go to get- That's not clear either. What's he doing with scales in his house? What's he doing with the cash that was stashed? It's not all together clear what his role was
. Well, actually, I can clarify that. He had just moved and is presented with the sinencing that cash was there relative to that purpose of making deposits. A new utilities, a new thing setting of living at that house. As far as the scales submitted to the court in the second sinencing, examples of how users being ripped off wanted to ensure they were getting the amount of marijuana they were intending to buy. The presence of digital scales doesn't allow for fair inference either way. Yes, they're distributors you use them. They're also consumers who use them. So they're not blowing their money. Just like you were on my pay attention I received when we purchased something somewhere. So I think it's certainly not clear that he- Yes, it's not clear the inferences would more go with the limited amount of money. And the limited amount of volume that is not fair to assert that he had any connection to that, or that as you had put it in your opinion, he was drifting toward that. I'm getting the fact that this- That you might be over-inclusive and- We don't require perfect fit. But we're disarming people. I'm sorry, even outside the court, doesn't that mean something? Didn't heller say it means something? I mean we can talk about the- The temple duration we can talk about. All the different aspects of the court is previously addressed. When we disarm a citizen who's a law-abiding citizen, and we disarm a citizen who's a law-breaker, and heller recognized that distinction. And our cases have recognized that distinction in relaxing. We don't eliminate the Second Amendment analysis in the sense that it's maybe applicable. But we relax the standard which allows Congress to act more freely in an area where we have law-breakers. My red light's on. Can you answer that if you want- I wish to answer it. Just while looking at intermediate scrutiny, we're still looking at- Yes, that's what we're looking at. Whether there is a substantial service of the government- And it doesn't have to be a perfect fit, but it needs to advance it. And in the context of habitual marijuana use
. But we're disarming people. I'm sorry, even outside the court, doesn't that mean something? Didn't heller say it means something? I mean we can talk about the- The temple duration we can talk about. All the different aspects of the court is previously addressed. When we disarm a citizen who's a law-abiding citizen, and we disarm a citizen who's a law-breaker, and heller recognized that distinction. And our cases have recognized that distinction in relaxing. We don't eliminate the Second Amendment analysis in the sense that it's maybe applicable. But we relax the standard which allows Congress to act more freely in an area where we have law-breakers. My red light's on. Can you answer that if you want- I wish to answer it. Just while looking at intermediate scrutiny, we're still looking at- Yes, that's what we're looking at. Whether there is a substantial service of the government- And it doesn't have to be a perfect fit, but it needs to advance it. And in the context of habitual marijuana use. I'm sorry, Your Honor, I still have to posit. These studies go off on stimulants and other things that- Or have a much greater reputation or known to be much more dangerous and to present episodes of violence where the government's evidence doesn't sustain that with respect to marijuana use. Okay. You have some rebuttal. Yes, right. Morning, Your Honor's May, please, the Court. On behalf of the United States, I'm Phil Wright. And we ask this Court to affirm that conviction and judgment find that the statute is constitutional. We do believe that the appellant stated the issue correctly and is brief on page one of his brief. And that is whether the statute substantially serves an important governmental interest, which is to take guns out of the hands of dangerous people. And we do not agree with the argument that it's much more narrow than that. You should focus, as Mr
. I'm sorry, Your Honor, I still have to posit. These studies go off on stimulants and other things that- Or have a much greater reputation or known to be much more dangerous and to present episodes of violence where the government's evidence doesn't sustain that with respect to marijuana use. Okay. You have some rebuttal. Yes, right. Morning, Your Honor's May, please, the Court. On behalf of the United States, I'm Phil Wright. And we ask this Court to affirm that conviction and judgment find that the statute is constitutional. We do believe that the appellant stated the issue correctly and is brief on page one of his brief. And that is whether the statute substantially serves an important governmental interest, which is to take guns out of the hands of dangerous people. And we do not agree with the argument that it's much more narrow than that. You should focus, as Mr. Coleman just argued, on marijuana users in particular and Mr. Carter in particular. It only requires a reasonable fit between the statute and the governmental interest. And the studies clearly show a significant correlation between drug use, which is what the statute prohibits and applies to drug users and not just marijuana users. And the incidence of violent crime. And we agree with Judge Neumar that the way study actually cuts against the appellant in this case. There is some language that he could point to, but the study also says that the frequent use of marijuana and alcohol were both significantly associated with violence. It's on page 228 of the appendix. It sites to another study by a person named White. Consociations were stronger for marijuana and violence and for alcohol and violence. Frequent marijuana use appears to predict violent behavior. And frequent marijuana use and violence co-occur
. Coleman just argued, on marijuana users in particular and Mr. Carter in particular. It only requires a reasonable fit between the statute and the governmental interest. And the studies clearly show a significant correlation between drug use, which is what the statute prohibits and applies to drug users and not just marijuana users. And the incidence of violent crime. And we agree with Judge Neumar that the way study actually cuts against the appellant in this case. There is some language that he could point to, but the study also says that the frequent use of marijuana and alcohol were both significantly associated with violence. It's on page 228 of the appendix. It sites to another study by a person named White. Consociations were stronger for marijuana and violence and for alcohol and violence. Frequent marijuana use appears to predict violent behavior. And frequent marijuana use and violence co-occur. That study by itself, your honor, would be sufficient for Congress to enact the statute and for you to find that the statute is constitutional. In the earlier opinion, the court, I think, dealt with this issue of being over-inclusive and said that some categorical disqualifications are permissible and Congress is not required to engage in a case-by-case exclusion for people who are not trustworthy with weapons. And that Congress could view illicit drug users as a class and not go into particular drug use. So given that issue and given these studies, we think it's very clear that there is a significant correlation between drug use and violence. And that Congress are fully justified in enacting that statute. Has any court found G3 unconstitutional under the Second Amendment? No, your honor. Not that I'm aware of. Do you know approximately how many have addressed it? There are at least four that we've cited and this would be the fifth hopefully, but I don't have the correct exact number. Ultimately, the Second Amendment does not require Congress as the ANSI court stated to simultaneously allow people to choose between drug use illicit drug use and possessions of firearms. This is a temporal statute. He can, on his own, choose to forego drug use and then he can possess a firearm. He did not do that
. That study by itself, your honor, would be sufficient for Congress to enact the statute and for you to find that the statute is constitutional. In the earlier opinion, the court, I think, dealt with this issue of being over-inclusive and said that some categorical disqualifications are permissible and Congress is not required to engage in a case-by-case exclusion for people who are not trustworthy with weapons. And that Congress could view illicit drug users as a class and not go into particular drug use. So given that issue and given these studies, we think it's very clear that there is a significant correlation between drug use and violence. And that Congress are fully justified in enacting that statute. Has any court found G3 unconstitutional under the Second Amendment? No, your honor. Not that I'm aware of. Do you know approximately how many have addressed it? There are at least four that we've cited and this would be the fifth hopefully, but I don't have the correct exact number. Ultimately, the Second Amendment does not require Congress as the ANSI court stated to simultaneously allow people to choose between drug use illicit drug use and possessions of firearms. This is a temporal statute. He can, on his own, choose to forego drug use and then he can possess a firearm. He did not do that. He wanted to do it both, have both activities available to him, but he's not allowed to. We ask this court to affirm. Thank you. Mr. Coleman, everything further? Mr. Coleman, as Judge D. H. pointed out, the 922 G3 refers to the term drug. Do you find any assistance in that legislative history that helps you in your case? As far as the FOPA, your honor, and switching from identified drugs to that, the prior opinion of this court talked about a comprehensive scheme. However, that scheme at this point still takes position that marijuana has absolutely no medical benefit. And we've submitted evidence to that effect that it does. We don't take cars away from people who are intoxicated
. He wanted to do it both, have both activities available to him, but he's not allowed to. We ask this court to affirm. Thank you. Mr. Coleman, everything further? Mr. Coleman, as Judge D. H. pointed out, the 922 G3 refers to the term drug. Do you find any assistance in that legislative history that helps you in your case? As far as the FOPA, your honor, and switching from identified drugs to that, the prior opinion of this court talked about a comprehensive scheme. However, that scheme at this point still takes position that marijuana has absolutely no medical benefit. And we've submitted evidence to that effect that it does. We don't take cars away from people who are intoxicated. And I guarantee you statistically, the more people killed in car wrecks, then by being shot by a gun out of their home. Congress could have taken the gun out of the hands of drunk people who were intoxicated during the period of their intoxication. During the period of their intoxication, if it was analyzed consistent with the free movement, causes them to constitution. And they had the evidence they probably could. Well, an answer to your question. In most states, after sometimes after one, if there's a wreck involved, sometimes after two, there is no wreck involved. The driver's license is revoked. And it's not taken his car away from him, but it's depriving him of the previous, or him or her, of the previous to drive on the state highways. Right. And I don't disagree with that. Remember John Wayne? The car vis, you know, where the guy comes, he's been in the bar, and he's totally drunk, and he's fighting and everything else. And they take him across, screen the compound, take his guns off, lay him on the table, and put him in the lock up
. And I guarantee you statistically, the more people killed in car wrecks, then by being shot by a gun out of their home. Congress could have taken the gun out of the hands of drunk people who were intoxicated during the period of their intoxication. During the period of their intoxication, if it was analyzed consistent with the free movement, causes them to constitution. And they had the evidence they probably could. Well, an answer to your question. In most states, after sometimes after one, if there's a wreck involved, sometimes after two, there is no wreck involved. The driver's license is revoked. And it's not taken his car away from him, but it's depriving him of the previous, or him or her, of the previous to drive on the state highways. Right. And I don't disagree with that. Remember John Wayne? The car vis, you know, where the guy comes, he's been in the bar, and he's totally drunk, and he's fighting and everything else. And they take him across, screen the compound, take his guns off, lay him on the table, and put him in the lock up. And when he wakes up a few hours later, five hours to six hours later, they let him out of the lock up, hand him his guns, and off he goes. It sounds to me that's a fairly common sense notion that when somebody's intoxicated, it would be justified to take his arms from him. Well, that's what the possibilities of his acting irrationally with a gun would be a lot higher as a matter of common sense. Well, that's assuming there's a perceivable impermancy that creates that danger, which is different person to person. I'm not encouraging, I mean, I think it's right to do individual by individual, but the courts of rule don't do that. It's supporting categorical discernment. And that marijuana increases the correlation with violence over intoxication, alcoholic intoxication. Those studies also show that being poor, being a young black male, being desperate because of addictions to stimulus and opiates, all produces the same result, but we're not trying to disarm young black males. And we're not trying to disarm poor people. The sort of people who are neutralized for those categoristic, didn't they? Those variables? I don't think they did, but getting to the end of it, because a matter of time, well, no, I'm sorry, I'm not. I'm concerned, your honor. You said in your last opinion, and pointed to all the bases, it could be considered in winning the constitutionality of something, and you and your Copenaver both included common sense
. And when he wakes up a few hours later, five hours to six hours later, they let him out of the lock up, hand him his guns, and off he goes. It sounds to me that's a fairly common sense notion that when somebody's intoxicated, it would be justified to take his arms from him. Well, that's what the possibilities of his acting irrationally with a gun would be a lot higher as a matter of common sense. Well, that's assuming there's a perceivable impermancy that creates that danger, which is different person to person. I'm not encouraging, I mean, I think it's right to do individual by individual, but the courts of rule don't do that. It's supporting categorical discernment. And that marijuana increases the correlation with violence over intoxication, alcoholic intoxication. Those studies also show that being poor, being a young black male, being desperate because of addictions to stimulus and opiates, all produces the same result, but we're not trying to disarm young black males. And we're not trying to disarm poor people. The sort of people who are neutralized for those categoristic, didn't they? Those variables? I don't think they did, but getting to the end of it, because a matter of time, well, no, I'm sorry, I'm not. I'm concerned, your honor. You said in your last opinion, and pointed to all the bases, it could be considered in winning the constitutionality of something, and you and your Copenaver both included common sense. A lot of the discussion today has revolved around common sense, as opposed to empirical evidence that the cases referred to develop. It's concerning in the sense we're still dealing with the fundamental right, if that's going to largely lead the analysis given the absence of the, we're talking a general correlation that people in these studies have still not worked out. And they focus entirely on other glasses of drugs. In previous cases, not just our previous decision in this case, but in most of our cases, we talk about looking for just Congress's justification in the congressional history, in studies, in common sense, and in precedence from other courts. Those are the four sources that we'd look for, and I was just asking, we were, I was bringing up some common sense notions as one of the factors that we can look at. We can also look at the cases I asked Mr. Wright about the courts of appeals that have considered the same issue, and do you agree with him that they have all upheld the constitutionality of G3? Yes, but only two circuits, other than actually only two circuits after the seventh circuit, and the ninth circuit. You've got, say, and Doug and Patterson was the circuit of the court. No, sir. No, sir. So that's one of the factors. Judge Hamilton asked you about the legislative history, I guess it's not very informative in this
. A lot of the discussion today has revolved around common sense, as opposed to empirical evidence that the cases referred to develop. It's concerning in the sense we're still dealing with the fundamental right, if that's going to largely lead the analysis given the absence of the, we're talking a general correlation that people in these studies have still not worked out. And they focus entirely on other glasses of drugs. In previous cases, not just our previous decision in this case, but in most of our cases, we talk about looking for just Congress's justification in the congressional history, in studies, in common sense, and in precedence from other courts. Those are the four sources that we'd look for, and I was just asking, we were, I was bringing up some common sense notions as one of the factors that we can look at. We can also look at the cases I asked Mr. Wright about the courts of appeals that have considered the same issue, and do you agree with him that they have all upheld the constitutionality of G3? Yes, but only two circuits, other than actually only two circuits after the seventh circuit, and the ninth circuit. You've got, say, and Doug and Patterson was the circuit of the court. No, sir. No, sir. So that's one of the factors. Judge Hamilton asked you about the legislative history, I guess it's not very informative in this. It's not informative on those two acts at all. And so we have, we still have studies, common sense, and precedence, and that's only reason I was asking you. Yes, those questions. The precedence does not, I was surprised, really surprised, and I hope you would be at the seventh circuit looking at these studies, and just concluding that gosh, this really supports things. I didn't pick at the studies, as Judge Coppany was suggesting in his opinion, I think the defects in them should be concerning. If we're going to make it so broad that it's all drugs, then I lose. I looked pretty difficult because that's the way the statute's written. The way the statute is written, yes, but it's being applied to a whole cross section of a type of drug that doesn't present the danger that marijuana is in drug, don't you? It's called a Schedule 1 control substance. Yeah, okay. So, again, this empirical data does not show a contribution to drug violence or suggest it by disarming the virtual drug users. It's going to reduce drug violence. It certainly does for cocaine users, for methamphetamine users, for opiate users
. It just doesn't from marijuana. Okay, thank you. Thank you. We'll come down and greet Council and then proceed on to our next case. Thank you