Morning, Your Honor, and may it please the court. My colleague, Mr. Cook, kindly has included in his brief for the government a listing of the purposes of the Arms Export Control Act and the creation of a munitions list by agencies of the United States. The AEC regulates shipments of defense articles in furthering of world peace and the munitions list was created so that knowledgeable government agencies could list items as contraband that might contribute to the arms race or aid in mass destruction or support terrorism or increase the escalation of conflict or prejudice bilateral arms control. What we know from the trial before Judge Cacharis is that Brian Bishop grew up in Alabama. Mr. Waludis did not contest our presentation of evidence, our offer approved that he was a recreational shooter, a hunter, he had licenses to carry weapons in Alabama. His father testified to his long career with the Foreign Service in many countries overseas where he lived with his family. He was his resident. Mr. Bishop, it's no longer employed with the Department of State. He had a master's in business administration. He's unlikely to ever work again in the field of financial regulation unless this court accepts his petition here in vacates his conviction. The issue here before the court is not whether Mr. Bishop should have been punished for violating the directives of his employer, the Department of State, the issue before the court is whether Mr. Bishop should have a criminal conviction for the conduct that was ledged and proven at trial. Judge Cacharis and numerous in three occasions accepted the government's argument that the information contained in the Foreign Affairs manual made it quote unlawful, unquote, for Mr
. Bishop to include ammunition in his household goods. That is a presentation that the government made to Judge Cacharis. This was a bench trial. He accepted that proposal. We suggested that there was nothing in the evidence which actually indicated that what Mr. Bishop did was unlawful for any purpose. The... the defendant had argued in that earlier case that the jury was not instructed that the government... The defendant was upset that the jury had was not instructed that the government had to show that the defendant's knew the divisive question was covered by the munitions. Lest I was designed for military use and L. President rejected that. It said whatever specificity on willfulness is required is clear that this extremely particularized definition finds no support in the case law
. And that's the same claim you're making today. Well, Your Honor, I don't think the court should decide this case and go against... Maybe you think I'm the president wrong. No, no, no. I don't believe the court should actually decide this case and say that Judge Cacharis had to decide beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Bishop knew that these weapons were on the munitions list. I indicate to the court that it could decide it that way. I don't think the court should, and I don't think the court needs to decide it that way. Not that was the subject of your almost your entire reply brief. It was, Your Honor. And alternatively, Your Honor could decide it that way. I think quite frankly, if you did decide it that way, it would create more work for me. If we look at the Brian case in the Supreme Court and we take a look at the descent of Justice Scalia joined by the Chief Judge and Judge Ginsburg, you know, he raises an issue about what law are we talking about when we have a specific intent crime? The government and I. We get around the
... You know, we have not only our own president, but how do we get around Brian? I mean, you got a 1998 case. It's a willfulness for Supreme Court, how is the willfulness required proof that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful, but did not require proof that he was aware of a particular licensing requirement? Your Honor, for purposes of your decision in this case, and actually, if you take a look at the record below and the jury instruction that we proposed, the government and I agree that the language in all of these cases and in Brian and in Sue is the proper standard. And I suggested this court that you can accept both the government's description of the intent element and our description of the intent element. The proper standard, then we are down to a question of fact. Yes, Your Honor, whether this was unlawful conduct. And so you have to take a look... But he knew it was unlawful. Your Honor, that was the... You raised a question as to whether there was sufficient evidence that he knew his conduct was unlawful. Yes, Your Honor
. The government relies entirely on the testimony, principally, on the testimony of Miss Becroft, who was a long time civilian employee within the Department of State in the Travel and Transportation Unit. And the government relied upon her testimony that the... The FAM, the Foreign Affairs Manual, is something that every Foreign Service Officer is oriented to. And she said that the FAM tells Foreign Service Officers that they can't ship ammunition in their household effects. In Mr. Cook's brief, he elaborates on that and he cites the FAM section, the 611 sections, which were never presented to Judge Cachera's trial, were never presented as evidence in the case, were never testified to by Miss Becroft. And those regulations simply are directives that tell a Foreign Service Officer, you can't pack ammunition in your household effects because it's the State Department that ships those. If you take a look at FAM 611.6-2, and by the way, the FAM is not even cited as authority in the government's brief, and there's no appendix indicating what those regulations say. But if Mr. Bishop did what the government seems to say he should do, he would look at 611.6-2, which says, quote, the employee should directly ship ammunition separately and consign it to an import handler. So, what Miss Becroft said is that.
.. The reason the rate to be attached to Miss Becroft's statement of a question for the trial of FAM. But, Your Honor, it is, but the question is whether what Mr. Bishop did was unlawful pursuant to the warnings that the government relied upon for the evidence that he had the specific intent. And what I would suggest you apply here is what the government and we agree on should be the standard of specific intent in this case. The government must prove that Mr. Bishop acted intentionally to violate a known legal duty. The known legal duty... It wasn't just her testimony. That was part of it to be sure, but in terms of discerning the intention, the government relied upon the fact that he had failed to list the ammunition on the shipping inventory. So, there was evidence of deliberate concealment there. And he also misrepresented, actively misrepresented, that his shipment contained no ammunition or explosives, but rather it was just related to his weightlifting. Your Honor, that is.
.. But, you know, this was before the trial of fact and he said, well, this is just weights and it doesn't... You know, there's no ammunition or explosives here. And that just proved out to be manifestly incorrect. And when you add that to the different people that told him about the suspicious nature of shipping these weapons and ammunition, including the movers, Paxton, why couldn't a trial of fact find that the government had carried its burden of proving that he knew his conduct was unlawful? Because there are three types of evidence here. One, he was told or informed by multiple sources, or in a fair's manual in the State Department. And the movers themselves of the probation and he didn't list them. And misrepresented what his shipment involved. Your Honor, from the very... I understand it. On August 3rd, he.
.. This is also part of the record. He admitted to the Diplomatic Security agent that he knew it was a violation of embassy firearms policy to have ammunition, but personally packed him in ammunition and tried to ship it because it was prohibitively expensive. That is exactly the issue that is before this court. Does the embassy firearms policy or the directives of the FAM constitute a notice to him of unlawful conduct? The unlawful conduct here was the violation of the Arms Export Control Act to not have a license to attempt to ship these materials overseas that are listed on a munitions list. Judge Stacker, there is nothing in the firearms policy that indicates that policy makes it unlawful. From the standpoint of the Arms Export Control Act, whether he knew his conduct was unlawful, he had to know that his conduct violated the criminal law. And there is no evidence in the case that his conduct violated the criminal law. And then in this court's case in shoe, the court really wasn't concerned about the nature of the instruction because an undercover agent told the defendant that it was unlawful to ship this without a license, that it's a munitions list, and that you'd be criminally prosecuted. The issue is, what is the source of evidence? What is that it's a violation of criminal law for him to put ammunition in his household effects? He knew that what he did was wrong. We told Judge Cacheris before the case went to bench trial and emotion to dismiss, that Mr. Bishop admits that he put out ammunition for the packers. The facts of this case as Judge Cacheris found them was that the packers knew that he had ammunition. His father testified that he had forged gigantic boxes of cabellas. Isn't this all factual? Isn't this all for the trial of fact? What I'm talking about was found by the trial of fact in favor of Mr. Bishop
. Judge Cacheris. The ultimate question was whether there was knowledge that the conduct was unlawful, and that got to be factual because you know this is a bench trial, but routinely the question of intent is submitted to a jury, or in the case of the bench trial to the judge, as simply something for the fact finder who resolved. There really isn't much difference here over the legal standard, and at that point it becomes factual, and you may say, all this is different because there was a judge involved and not a jury, but the question of intent is the quintessential factual determinant. I don't disagree with the court one bit. I do not disagree with the court one bit, and my belief is that Cacheris did what he did because the government repeatedly told him that the fam and these other incidences that you've described your honor put him on notice that his conduct violates the Arms Expo Control Act and kept using the word unlawful. The word unlawful isn't used in any of those directives, and when Mr. Cook gets up here, I would ask your honor to ask Mr. Cook if I may the following question. Why in- Just the fam that said it was unlawful. There were other sources too. There were not. The fam does not say it's unlawful. The authorization and documents that Mr. Bishop signed, the emails that he was that he was sent repeatedly said to him, the Department of State says you can't put ammunition in your household effects. What about the it's your move manual which talks both about an administrative violation and the fact that unlawfully exporting this type of material is a violation of criminal law. That talks about the shippers
. It doesn't say anything about packing ammunition in your- Well as I recall there was some evidence that all state employees, state department employees received this manual. I grant you there's no direct evidence that your client actually received it but put in a prior fact and for that. Judge Kacharis didn't mention that. It was never put in the record. It was never brought out to Judge Kacharis. He never reviewed that particular exhibit. He ruled from the bench after the evidence was presented. The citation to that, Your Honor, if I may, in the government's brief is much like what the government says to the court and that is that Mr. Bishop who was a smart guy, should have gone and looked at the fam. He should have gone and looked at section 6.11 whatever it was and he would see that in the bottom of that it has a list of the authority for the section. Well Your Honor, this is the state department. The state department is the entity that's responsible for putting items on the munitions list. It's their job. This case requires and every case requires that the secretary of state in this case- This is not an unsophisticated person. No, Your Honor, this agreed that entirely
. This is an employee of the Department of State. If the Department of State wants to- I'm going to such links to conceal it if he didn't know it was unlawful. Because he knew it was wrong for his employer. He knew that- let me pose this Your Honor. That's a Bishop. Isn't that a pretty thin- Oh, he knew he was violating- Let me tell me that without smiling, he knew it was wrong but not unlawful and I'm sorry. Absolutely. Let me pose this to Your Honor. Mr. Bishop had lived overseas with his family in residence provided for him by the Department of State. He's on duty 24-7 but he and his family live. He could ship a card tape. He could ship a crossbow. He could ship a piano. His part of his life is ammunition. All right. Now, he wants to get ammunition over to Jordan. He's used ammunition in Jordan. He's shot in Jordan. The security officers don't have to be a recreational shooter. He is shot elsewhere. He wants to get over on the State Department and have them ship his ammunition. I don't think we can write into the statute of recreational shooter exception. I mean, that would just cause all sorts of- Well, there actually is, Your Honor. There actually is. The point of fact is there actually is. In this community- When he was first- When this first started, his first response was not that the ammunition was for personal use. His first response to the agents was that he was getting it to give to some Jordanian official in the embassy as a gift. Okay, so he's- Well, it's- He wanted his story on the personal use as well. Well, Your Honor, he also said that talk to the General Services Officer at Post. He talked to the General Services Officer at Post. I talked to him and he said there'd be no problem getting it into the country
. Now, he wants to get ammunition over to Jordan. He's used ammunition in Jordan. He's shot in Jordan. The security officers don't have to be a recreational shooter. He is shot elsewhere. He wants to get over on the State Department and have them ship his ammunition. I don't think we can write into the statute of recreational shooter exception. I mean, that would just cause all sorts of- Well, there actually is, Your Honor. There actually is. The point of fact is there actually is. In this community- When he was first- When this first started, his first response was not that the ammunition was for personal use. His first response to the agents was that he was getting it to give to some Jordanian official in the embassy as a gift. Okay, so he's- Well, it's- He wanted his story on the personal use as well. Well, Your Honor, he also said that talk to the General Services Officer at Post. He talked to the General Services Officer at Post. I talked to him and he said there'd be no problem getting it into the country. And then when he was interviewed a year later and I posed to the court, you know, what's the government doing during the course of a year and trying to decide whether they should cross- Well, they were within the statute of limitations, I assume. No, it was. Of course, I understand. It was a discretionary decision by the Department of Justice. But as- As Mr. Schott indicated in his testimony, these cases are ordinarily handled by- handled by Border Patrol. But- But the point- The point here is that in every single case, there's evidence that the defendant knew it was a violation of criminal law. Judge Wilkinson, I understand You're a museman of this. But let me pose this to you- I mean, I think you- You- I think that it's not- It's not a museman. It's just the fact that- All right, you- You must think I- The- The Judge's Caterish and the Apelec court is just really gullible to- No. To- To- To buy this whole story. Oh, please- Please- Please, Your Honor, this is- No, I mean, this is- How- How gullible do you think we are? I'm sorry, Your Honor. This is a specific regulatory statute that provides for agencies of the government to periodically change what's on the munitions list. How does one know what's on the munitions list? All begins to pile up. It's not just one thing, it's one thing and another. It's- It's the manuals, it's the movers, it's the concealment, it's all the misrepresentations about the shipment being involved with weights
. And then when he was interviewed a year later and I posed to the court, you know, what's the government doing during the course of a year and trying to decide whether they should cross- Well, they were within the statute of limitations, I assume. No, it was. Of course, I understand. It was a discretionary decision by the Department of Justice. But as- As Mr. Schott indicated in his testimony, these cases are ordinarily handled by- handled by Border Patrol. But- But the point- The point here is that in every single case, there's evidence that the defendant knew it was a violation of criminal law. Judge Wilkinson, I understand You're a museman of this. But let me pose this to you- I mean, I think you- You- I think that it's not- It's not a museman. It's just the fact that- All right, you- You must think I- The- The Judge's Caterish and the Apelec court is just really gullible to- No. To- To- To buy this whole story. Oh, please- Please- Please, Your Honor, this is- No, I mean, this is- How- How gullible do you think we are? I'm sorry, Your Honor. This is a specific regulatory statute that provides for agencies of the government to periodically change what's on the munitions list. How does one know what's on the munitions list? All begins to pile up. It's not just one thing, it's one thing and another. It's- It's the manuals, it's the movers, it's the concealment, it's all the misrepresentations about the shipment being involved with weights. It just gets- Let me pose- The mis- The mis- The cumulative effect of it is not favorite. But you've got- You- I know you're committed to your case and I really appreciate that, but you've got some- You've got some rebuttal time ahead of you, okay? Thank you. You reserved it. We- We- We thank you for your- For your sense of conviction about your client, too. All right, Mr. Cook. May I please the court? I'd like to start by addressing clarifying unobre points in the record. The- It's your move- Document that was admitted into evidence and it's in the exhibit appendix at joint at 69. Specifically, as Judge Diaz was denoting reference criminal penalties for shipping ammunition. And Ms. Becraft said, in her testimony that orientation is required for all state department employees and that she always covers that you can't ship ammunition. Although- The unlawfulness standard and- Bryant and Shoe don't require a highly detailed knowledge of the regulatory scheme in order to show that the person understood that had the requisite mens rea that they were committing a violation of the law. There is actually evidence in this case that this defendant had a very sophisticated understanding of this regulatory scheme. And there's a point that I didn't put much weight on in the brief, but in rereading it, I think is- is very informative, which is this. Ms. Robin Lakata when she was testifying said that when she spoke to the defendant after discovering the ammunition and the shipment, the defendant asked her if the state department knew, quote, how much ammunition was there
. It just gets- Let me pose- The mis- The mis- The cumulative effect of it is not favorite. But you've got- You- I know you're committed to your case and I really appreciate that, but you've got some- You've got some rebuttal time ahead of you, okay? Thank you. You reserved it. We- We- We thank you for your- For your sense of conviction about your client, too. All right, Mr. Cook. May I please the court? I'd like to start by addressing clarifying unobre points in the record. The- It's your move- Document that was admitted into evidence and it's in the exhibit appendix at joint at 69. Specifically, as Judge Diaz was denoting reference criminal penalties for shipping ammunition. And Ms. Becraft said, in her testimony that orientation is required for all state department employees and that she always covers that you can't ship ammunition. Although- The unlawfulness standard and- Bryant and Shoe don't require a highly detailed knowledge of the regulatory scheme in order to show that the person understood that had the requisite mens rea that they were committing a violation of the law. There is actually evidence in this case that this defendant had a very sophisticated understanding of this regulatory scheme. And there's a point that I didn't put much weight on in the brief, but in rereading it, I think is- is very informative, which is this. Ms. Robin Lakata when she was testifying said that when she spoke to the defendant after discovering the ammunition and the shipment, the defendant asked her if the state department knew, quote, how much ammunition was there. And that's very significant because as Chuck Schwingler testified, there is this 1,000 round exception, which is located in 22 CFR 132.17. Schwingler's testimony is joint appendix 152 to 154. So there is within the Arms Expo Control Act and the ITAIR regulations a 1,000 round exemption for ammunition. And the fact that this defendant, when it was first brought to him, we've found this ammunition, his reaction is, do they know how much ammunition is there? Shoe is that this is a guy who actually has a very detailed knowledge of this regulatory scheme. And before Judge Cacharis? Yes, it was. And in fact, clarification, it was Judge Hilton. That was, yeah, that was the defense counsel's point. But the state department's information was, we won't ship ammunition, period. So there is- the fact that he is worried about the quantity shows that he understood that there was a difference even between what the state department had been telling him and this regulatory scheme that has this very specific carve-out for 1,000 rounds. But there's also an abundance of evidence through the numerous false statements and deceptive conduct that this defendant took that he understood that his conduct was in lawful. And in cases like Brian, there's nothing like the evidence that this evidence that this case had showing the defendant understood the regulatory scheme. And Brian, what you had to show the defendant knew that his conduct was in lawful was simply that- and it was the crime in Brian was selling a firearm without a federal license. So acting as the arms dealer without a license under 922a1a. And the- he evidence there was the defendant used straw purchasers to acquire firearms. He said that he would obliterate serial numbers on firearms
. And that's very significant because as Chuck Schwingler testified, there is this 1,000 round exception, which is located in 22 CFR 132.17. Schwingler's testimony is joint appendix 152 to 154. So there is within the Arms Expo Control Act and the ITAIR regulations a 1,000 round exemption for ammunition. And the fact that this defendant, when it was first brought to him, we've found this ammunition, his reaction is, do they know how much ammunition is there? Shoe is that this is a guy who actually has a very detailed knowledge of this regulatory scheme. And before Judge Cacharis? Yes, it was. And in fact, clarification, it was Judge Hilton. That was, yeah, that was the defense counsel's point. But the state department's information was, we won't ship ammunition, period. So there is- the fact that he is worried about the quantity shows that he understood that there was a difference even between what the state department had been telling him and this regulatory scheme that has this very specific carve-out for 1,000 rounds. But there's also an abundance of evidence through the numerous false statements and deceptive conduct that this defendant took that he understood that his conduct was in lawful. And in cases like Brian, there's nothing like the evidence that this evidence that this case had showing the defendant understood the regulatory scheme. And Brian, what you had to show the defendant knew that his conduct was in lawful was simply that- and it was the crime in Brian was selling a firearm without a federal license. So acting as the arms dealer without a license under 922a1a. And the- he evidence there was the defendant used straw purchasers to acquire firearms. He said that he would obliterate serial numbers on firearms. And then he resold firearms on street corners known for drug dealing. There isn't any information- there wasn't any evidence in Brian that the defendant had been instructed about rules governing firearm sales as this defendant had. And yet the Supreme Court said in that case that that conduct was sufficient to establish that the defendant understood the fact-finder could find that that was unlawful conduct. Similarly in rats laugh, which is the case involving money laundering where you've got the most stringent kind of mens rea required where there is some requirement of a knowledge of the regulatory scheme. The Supreme Court said in a- in a footnote in that case, footnote 19 that a jury may of course find the requisite knowledge on defendants part by drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence of defendant's conduct. Again, even in the context of money laundering- I'm sorry structuring- you don't have to have proof that the defendant received specific instruction about the regulatory scheme. But here this defendant who is by the way an employee of the Department of State, which is the agency that that administers the munition act and he's going to a man to further our diplomatic goals. I mean this is somebody who has more than your typical person a reason to understand the rules about exporting firearms- just in ammunition. Uh, uh, apparently wants to- us to make a distinction between something being wrong in the abstract primarily administratively subject to administrative sanction and being unlawful and you seem to be suggesting that there is no distinction. Is there? Well, I think I would agree that at some point the two could come apart. Let's suppose for example that this defendant were told by the State Department that your shipment of personal effects can't be over a thousand pounds. Ammunition is very heavy. We don't want you to include ammunition because it's real heavy and that'll put you over. In this case, the- in fact there's testimony it was 366 pounds worth of ammunition. I don't think that that- if you had evidence that the defendant was- thought that what he was doing was just violating a regulation on the amount of weight and a shipment that that would necessarily establish the unlawfulness of what he was doing. But what we have here is we have a regulation that as the Miss B
. And then he resold firearms on street corners known for drug dealing. There isn't any information- there wasn't any evidence in Brian that the defendant had been instructed about rules governing firearm sales as this defendant had. And yet the Supreme Court said in that case that that conduct was sufficient to establish that the defendant understood the fact-finder could find that that was unlawful conduct. Similarly in rats laugh, which is the case involving money laundering where you've got the most stringent kind of mens rea required where there is some requirement of a knowledge of the regulatory scheme. The Supreme Court said in a- in a footnote in that case, footnote 19 that a jury may of course find the requisite knowledge on defendants part by drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence of defendant's conduct. Again, even in the context of money laundering- I'm sorry structuring- you don't have to have proof that the defendant received specific instruction about the regulatory scheme. But here this defendant who is by the way an employee of the Department of State, which is the agency that that administers the munition act and he's going to a man to further our diplomatic goals. I mean this is somebody who has more than your typical person a reason to understand the rules about exporting firearms- just in ammunition. Uh, uh, apparently wants to- us to make a distinction between something being wrong in the abstract primarily administratively subject to administrative sanction and being unlawful and you seem to be suggesting that there is no distinction. Is there? Well, I think I would agree that at some point the two could come apart. Let's suppose for example that this defendant were told by the State Department that your shipment of personal effects can't be over a thousand pounds. Ammunition is very heavy. We don't want you to include ammunition because it's real heavy and that'll put you over. In this case, the- in fact there's testimony it was 366 pounds worth of ammunition. I don't think that that- if you had evidence that the defendant was- thought that what he was doing was just violating a regulation on the amount of weight and a shipment that that would necessarily establish the unlawfulness of what he was doing. But what we have here is we have a regulation that as the Miss B. Croft's testimony established was built off of the uh, Arms Expoor Control Act and the- the regulation of the Foreign Affairs Manual specifically links back to indeed the Arms Expoor Control Act and given that you don't have to know the details of the regulatory scheme, you don't have to have been specifically directed to 22 USC 277. The fact that here you had somebody tell him do not ship ammunition and tell him that shipping ammunition could be unlawful in the- it's your move manual for- to insist that you have to further said that- that there's the Arms Expoor Control Act and here's how it works. That would be directly contrary to what Shoe said about- you don't have to know it's on the munitions list, it would be contrary to- in the Supreme Court and Brian, they overturned 11th Circuit precedent that had required the government, quote, to prove that the defendant acted with knowledge of the licensing requirement. So, Brian didn't require that level of detail, it's just a knowledge of unlawfulness. Here where the regulatory scheme is based on the foreign- the Arms Expoor Control Act, I think that that's sufficient. But even if you thought that that was like the need to be some further showing in this case, I think that the evidence about the defendant asking Miss Lakata about how much ammunition they found shows that he understood that there was even a further difference between what the State Department had told him and the specific regulatory scheme. That- that question about- that can only be understood, I think, is being aimed at this thousand-round exemption. Because the State Department never gave him information about, well, there's a carve-out, you know, will- give you the ability to ship ammunition and some diminimates amount. What the State Department said is, don't ship ammunition, we're not going to move it for you. Does that address your audience concern on that point? One other point I wanted to mention is- is- is- Defense Council has said that the foreign affairs manual was not admitted into evidence and- Miss B. Croph started talking about the foreign affairs manual and that's at Joint Appendix pages 125 to 126 and there was a objection from Defense Council that quote the regulations speak for themselves. There was- in other words, there wasn't testimony from her about the regulations because it was the understanding that the court could simply look at the regulations. Unless the court has any other questions, we'll ask that you affirm the judgment. We don't have any further questions. Can Arnor- and listening to Mr. Cook, I may need to- to modify my suggestion because- with respect to whether the court has to look at the first circuit issue and decide that there has to be proof that he knew it was on the munitions list because there was ammunition that was not on the munitions list
. Croft's testimony established was built off of the uh, Arms Expoor Control Act and the- the regulation of the Foreign Affairs Manual specifically links back to indeed the Arms Expoor Control Act and given that you don't have to know the details of the regulatory scheme, you don't have to have been specifically directed to 22 USC 277. The fact that here you had somebody tell him do not ship ammunition and tell him that shipping ammunition could be unlawful in the- it's your move manual for- to insist that you have to further said that- that there's the Arms Expoor Control Act and here's how it works. That would be directly contrary to what Shoe said about- you don't have to know it's on the munitions list, it would be contrary to- in the Supreme Court and Brian, they overturned 11th Circuit precedent that had required the government, quote, to prove that the defendant acted with knowledge of the licensing requirement. So, Brian didn't require that level of detail, it's just a knowledge of unlawfulness. Here where the regulatory scheme is based on the foreign- the Arms Expoor Control Act, I think that that's sufficient. But even if you thought that that was like the need to be some further showing in this case, I think that the evidence about the defendant asking Miss Lakata about how much ammunition they found shows that he understood that there was even a further difference between what the State Department had told him and the specific regulatory scheme. That- that question about- that can only be understood, I think, is being aimed at this thousand-round exemption. Because the State Department never gave him information about, well, there's a carve-out, you know, will- give you the ability to ship ammunition and some diminimates amount. What the State Department said is, don't ship ammunition, we're not going to move it for you. Does that address your audience concern on that point? One other point I wanted to mention is- is- is- Defense Council has said that the foreign affairs manual was not admitted into evidence and- Miss B. Croph started talking about the foreign affairs manual and that's at Joint Appendix pages 125 to 126 and there was a objection from Defense Council that quote the regulations speak for themselves. There was- in other words, there wasn't testimony from her about the regulations because it was the understanding that the court could simply look at the regulations. Unless the court has any other questions, we'll ask that you affirm the judgment. We don't have any further questions. Can Arnor- and listening to Mr. Cook, I may need to- to modify my suggestion because- with respect to whether the court has to look at the first circuit issue and decide that there has to be proof that he knew it was on the munitions list because there was ammunition that was not on the munitions list. It's perfectly legal to ship and there was ammunition that was on the munitions list. And if they're relying only on Miss B. Crophed and the famed which says you can't put any ammunition into your household effects then yes. We do need proof that he knew that it was on the particular list. If- if- may I just sort of make a practical presentation here to the court which I think exemplifies the importance of the argument that we're making Judge Wilkinson and I would ask you- all of you to- to consider that what Mr. Bishop's concerned about what I'm concerned about is the criminalization of an employment-employee relationship. That in this case where the State Department could easily have disciplined Mr. Bishop for violating its regulations he's been subject to criminal prosecutions. All right. All right. We can test the evidence that what he did was a violation of the arms expert control act. The only evidence that the government presented to the court was this was a violation of the regulations of the Department of State and I did review the citation to the- the- the- the manual that was online and it does talk about shippers and carriers being subject to penalty. It doesn't- it says for shipping hazardous cargo. The point here is it's- it's actually the State Department that has the risk here. Now if- if Mr. Bishop is a foreign service and the entire civilian chain of command from- from- Mr
. It's perfectly legal to ship and there was ammunition that was on the munitions list. And if they're relying only on Miss B. Crophed and the famed which says you can't put any ammunition into your household effects then yes. We do need proof that he knew that it was on the particular list. If- if- may I just sort of make a practical presentation here to the court which I think exemplifies the importance of the argument that we're making Judge Wilkinson and I would ask you- all of you to- to consider that what Mr. Bishop's concerned about what I'm concerned about is the criminalization of an employment-employee relationship. That in this case where the State Department could easily have disciplined Mr. Bishop for violating its regulations he's been subject to criminal prosecutions. All right. All right. We can test the evidence that what he did was a violation of the arms expert control act. The only evidence that the government presented to the court was this was a violation of the regulations of the Department of State and I did review the citation to the- the- the- the manual that was online and it does talk about shippers and carriers being subject to penalty. It doesn't- it says for shipping hazardous cargo. The point here is it's- it's actually the State Department that has the risk here. Now if- if Mr. Bishop is a foreign service and the entire civilian chain of command from- from- Mr. Antio to Mr. Roque to his supervisor- Mr. President, the employer and employee relationship. All- all you're saying- all we're saying I think is that the facts aren't particularly appealing from your point of view because someone who has is sophisticated in his work in the State Department for a number of years is in a better position than the person on the street is to know. Well, that's making- that's- that's- the conduct is unlawful. That's like that's the simple point. Under I- I appreciate your point so here's what- here's what you have to take a look at your honor. In cases where someone has been charged with violating the arms expert control act and they work in the field they're in that business. It's part of their job to do this. The courts say that it's your obligation on a regular basis to consult the munitions list. And so when you're working in that field you can't say this is void for vagueness and I wasn't on notice of this. This doesn't- doesn't go anywhere. If you're not working in that field if you're a terrorist or you're a gun runner then there has to be some other source of evidence that you know that this is a violation of the law. In those cases or cases where you've got undercover agents who tell you it's a violation of the law. In this particular case there's no source of that information. So what you're posing Judge Wilkinson is this
. Antio to Mr. Roque to his supervisor- Mr. President, the employer and employee relationship. All- all you're saying- all we're saying I think is that the facts aren't particularly appealing from your point of view because someone who has is sophisticated in his work in the State Department for a number of years is in a better position than the person on the street is to know. Well, that's making- that's- that's- the conduct is unlawful. That's like that's the simple point. Under I- I appreciate your point so here's what- here's what you have to take a look at your honor. In cases where someone has been charged with violating the arms expert control act and they work in the field they're in that business. It's part of their job to do this. The courts say that it's your obligation on a regular basis to consult the munitions list. And so when you're working in that field you can't say this is void for vagueness and I wasn't on notice of this. This doesn't- doesn't go anywhere. If you're not working in that field if you're a terrorist or you're a gun runner then there has to be some other source of evidence that you know that this is a violation of the law. In those cases or cases where you've got undercover agents who tell you it's a violation of the law. In this particular case there's no source of that information. So what you're posing Judge Wilkinson is this. All right Mr. Bishop is part of the Foreign Service and therefore he ought to be sophisticated about this and he ought to appreciate because he's a Foreign Service officer that he should go to the FAM, go to the CFR and realize that it's a violation of the arms expert control act. Many of those. That point is only one of many. I mean the typically challenges and I think this is falling into this trap. Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence pursue a divide and conquer strategy which is that you take one piece of evidence in this case one little one piece of testimony and try to pick that apart as if it were the entire case and what we have to do is we have to consider the total case in contact. Of course and it's not just what he was informed by the mover and the State Department official and the manual and everything but it's all these representations and and the concealments and and everything that leads you to believe he knew exactly what he was doing and he knew he went to extraordinary links to cover it up. Now he covered it up from his employer. He the shippers knew that he had ammunition. Judge Hilton and I apologize for both Judge Kacharis and Judge Hilton. More cases before Judge Kacharis. They're both five people and they both they both clean my clocks on several occasions but but in this case your honor there's not a single other case out there that the government could possibly rely on for the the notion that when Miss B. Croft says there are there are DS agents who are in her orientation law enforcement officers and she says they're very interested about having weapons and ammunition overseas. I tell them you can have weapons ammunition overseas but you just have to ship them yourself. So clearly what she says in her orientation does not put anyone on notice that you have to have a license to ship the ammunition. Thank you Your Honor
. Thank you thank you very much. Will a Jiren Court and will come down and and greet Council