whenever the lawyers are ready. I may please the court. I'm John Dussenberry on behalf of the appellant. You know, as the district court correctly found that Mr. Sothear did not consent to the search of his vehicle. And the court also correctly found that the information on which the search of the vehicle was based was given at a point in time when Mr. Sothear could not have felt that he was free to leave, he would terminate the encounter with the officer. The court's error that led to its denial of the motion of suppress was first, in treating the question of whether or the question of when a lawful, police citizen encounter becomes an unconstitutional seizure, as essentially a question of duration. That is, it's only took five minutes. Therefore, it was a de minimis extension irrespective of the content of what occurred during those five to eight minutes. When in fact the appropriate analytical parameter is a qualitative assessment, which had been undertaken in this case would have led to the conclusions that the statements were in fact the promise of an unconstitutional seizure, therefore could not have provided probable cost to search, and would have resulted in the motion of suppress being granted. The second error that the district court made was in conflating the statements by Mr. Sothear, there may be a gun and there may be a gun in the car, and there is a gun in the car and it may be under the seat. I'm sorry, the initial statement was there may be a gun in the car, and it may be under the seat. I think by the time you get there, you have a volunteer. I mean, to be correct to make your argument before that, you think that it's unreasonable for the police to think that that is, it gives them reasonable, articulable suspicion to go into the car. Yeah, I think there may be a gun in the car. Yes, I think that statement comes short of... He had to say there is a gun in the car. He couldn't say there may be a gun. I mean, I look at all those stop and frisk cases. It seems to me there's a lot less that gives police a reasonable, articulable suspicion than somebody saying there may be a gun. My contention, Your Honor, is that saying that there may be a gun and it may be under the seat is..
. What you have, I think, is essentially a negative compounding. That is to say, if the standard for probable cause is that the evidence suggests that it's more likely than not that a crime is committed, I either have done... But police had to have probable cause? I think that's what the district court found, Your Honor. They had to have probable cause to get into the car. You think the district court found that? That's my reading of the... Well, if that had been the standard... Maybe I misunderstood you. Why wouldn't that be the standard? Because the search of the vehicle can only be substantiated on the basis of either probable cause or consent. The district court concluded that Mr. Smith's affair did not consent. Therefore, the only other permissible ground on which the search could be upheld would be probable cause. That probable cause, if it exists at all, has to derive from the statement that he made. The statements that he made are so qualified in their nature, so ambiguous in their nature that they do... The crime is committed and that evidence of the crime can be found in this location. In other words, had the officer gone to a magistrate to try to get a search warrant for the vehicle and represented that the only thing that was said, the only evidence of the existence of a firearm is the defendant's statement. There may be a gun in the car and it may be under the seat. My contention would be that that would be an insufficient factual showing. That's not probable cause? That's my contention, you're on the yes
. But of course, the first question is... You don't have any concerns about this stop or anything that the police did up until that point. No, I do have concerns. What, maybe you should back up to... Well, you kind of scared it over your first issue rather quickly. And I didn't mean to. No, I was... What I envisioned, what I thought I was doing was providing something of a forecast. These are the two issues. But the first issue, and I think the... The dispositive issue is whether the statement... whether the fact that the... whether the district court was correcting concluding that the point in time in which the statement by Mr. Sephere about the gun in the car represented a diminimum of extension of what had begun as a lawful encounter
. My contention is that it... To the extent that the court... That the court's conclusion that the extension was diminimumous was based solely on the basis of the length of time that it took. That analysis is flawed. And I would further contend that the... The relevant point in time to determine whether or not the extension was reasonable or not or constitutional or not was actually before it occurred. Because the facts that informed this issue, I would continue on, is the fact that the... Corporal C. Crest bias... bias on testimony said that his supervisor had given him a directive that it had become a searching or increasing the intensity and the frequency of searches for firearms that become an investigative priority for his unit. I think it's significant that after he... Did the computer assisted check and determined Mr..
.. The status of Mr. Sephere's license and the other information about him, he called the K9 unit. The district court found it... He called the K9 unit before returning his... Mr. Sephere's documents to him. That I would submit suggest that an intention for him to extend the encounter beyond the point in time that one would deem a necessary to complete the traffic stop. Once he returned the documents to him, he immediately, that is the amount of time... From the record, the length of time, from the time the officer returned the documents to Mr. Sephere until the time that he... The officer began talking about... We've been having problems with robberies and so forth. Was..
. It was the very next thing he did. Not only that, he asked him if he could risk him and did risk him. Exactly. I think the district court aired in concluding that there was a period that upon returning Mr. Sephere's documents to him that he should have felt a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. I don't know that a finding regarding that is necessary to resolve the case. Isn't that a legal conclusion? It is a legal conclusion. And in fact, do you agree that the question is not whether your client felt free to leave, the question under the Fourth Amendment is whether a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances would have felt free to leave? I agree that that's the task. Yes. And that's a legal conclusion. It is. And we review that denouvo, correct? Correct. Do you agree that the traffic stop actually had come to an end when he returned? Well, I don't know if you want to make that answer. Well, didn't the traffic stop conclude when he handed back the documents? Well, I'm sorry. You're on the... I'll see the course point. In other words, you seem to have accepted, and I don't mean this critically, the district court's analysis, that this was a continuation of the stop. But one could argue, and I thought you were arguing, that this was a new stop. Because he gave him back his ID, and the district court said at that point, he was free to leave. Mr. Saphir was free to break off the encounter. Yes. That's what the district court.
.. That's what the... And we review that denouvo. That is correct. And I think the district court was incorrect in reaching that conclusion. I was merely saying, I was not accepting the district court's rationale. You're right. I was simply saying that even adopting that rationale, the resulting... The facts that led to the eliciting of the statement regarding the gun... That information was elicited at a point in time that the encounter had become an unconstitutional seizure under the fourth. But it was all one continuum in your view. In my view, yes. I think it's... I think it's... especially.
.. I thought you were saying to us a little earlier that there were two separate searches. One concluded, and then another one began. No, but we're not saying it. I was saying that that was what the district court said. That's what I understand judge Eagles to have determined. That the traffic stop came to an end when the documents were returned. And Mr. Saphir... Well, a reasonable person might not have felt free to leave, but we're operating in the world of precedent. And this is daytime in a residential neighborhood, as I understand, your client had already called somebody to come get him. Yes. All of those are factors that look like that we had a conclusion. And he was free to leave, according to precedent. I understand. Those factors... those factors do cut against my position. And so what cuts for your position? That he was not free to leave when he was given back the document? Well, the fact that apparently immediately upon returning the documents, the officer launched into the speech about violent crimes being a problem in this area. We police officers having been given this directive to heighten our enforcement efforts regarding good. There's a fair amount of law that you can have these extraneous discussions. I'm sorry, Yarn. There's a fair amount of law that you can have these extraneous discussions that they don't go on too long
. I mean, that's what you... Oh, absolutely. But while that is permissible, of course, it is a case-specific inquiry. Do you have any case where that turns it into an extension of the search? Just an extraneous discussion? A short extraneous discussion? Well, you... No, to dance, of course, and I cannot cite a case. Right. But the problem with treating the issue of whether the extension is de minima or not, as a... as a... Appearly a function of how much time it took is that I would continue on... The officer could very easily say, this... I'm not continuing this happen, but the officer could very easily hand the credentials back to Mr. Sefer and say, look, I'm going to search your car, and I'm going to do it..
. I've already called the K9 unit, and we can do it either with your consent or without your consent. But if you don't consent, we're going to wait here for another 25, 30 minutes for the officer... I don't think the guy would be free to leave. He would not be free to leave. But my point is that could be conveyed in a matter of less than 60 seconds. But it would nevertheless constitute an impermissible extension, not because of how much time it took, but because of what was said. All right. You have a little time left for a rebuttal. Let's hear what the government has to say, okay? Good morning. May I please the court? My name is Michael DeFranco, and I represent the United States of America in this case. Mr. DeFranco, I'll tell you right off the thing that troubles me most about this case is that the officer lied to the defendant. Are you saying that he lied when he indicated that the flask gave him probable cause to search the car? Yes. Well, respectfully, the officer said that he believed that the flask gave him proper. It doesn't make any difference. We're all in the area of objective reality. Not your subjective thoughts about something, isn't that right? Yes. That's the line, the government, the Supreme Court sings to us. So admittedly, when I reviewed this case, that was something that bothered you too. It bothered me that that came into play at all. Because I viewed this as a case that was your typical consensual encounter after a traffic stop, and along the lines of Sullivan, Latin War, and Russia, that it was a legitimate traffic stop, followed by a consensual encounter. And the consensual encounter began when the officer gave Mr. Saffir back his identification, told him that and explained the process. You don't have to appear in court
. You're not going to be fined. So certainly, from that vantage point, I didn't have a problem when I analyzed the case whatsoever. The fact that he made that statement that the flask gave him probable cause to search the car, was problematic or trouble something, it certainly gave me pause. But when you also look at the fact of Mr. Saffir exercising his free will, and I think it's very significant that he consented to a search of his person, but he felt free enough to repeatedly decline the officer's request to search the car, which shows someone here that's exercising his free will. But are the police officers entitled to lie to get entry? Lie on a not a factual matter, but a legal matter? I would say that they're not entitled to lie, but that's what this was. It was objectively untrue. Well, I understand that that's the court's opinion. I mean, you've conceded that. No, I have not conceded that he lied. It's objectively an error. It's an error of law. He was in error that the flask gave him probable cause to search the car. I specifically asked him that question. Did you believe this to be the case? He did. He was wrong. He was wrong that the flask gave him probable cause to search the car. The district court determined that the flask gave him reasonable suspicion to search the flask, which he didn't do. And certainly that's troubling. Why did he not dispel his concern for what was in the flask? That's certainly a concern. But does that... What on earth would be the basis for reasonable suspicion, first of all, reasonable suspicion to justify a search other than a pack down for a weapon? But what criminal offense would he have been investigating? Well, when he did the... If you'd search the flask. There's an infraction in North Carolina that's... Called what? Carrying up driving with a flask? No, driving with alcohol that's not in its original container. And certainly that there's a leap there that the flask actually contains alcohol. Now, common sense and reason would say if someone's carrying a flask, they're not going to be carrying coke or something that's legal in a flask. And that's commonly used for alcohol. So certainly there's a leap there. And certainly that that part of the case is... He could have been empty. I'm sorry? He could have been empty. He could have been empty. And he never took the time to... He didn't do anything. And if he had picked it up and could tell from picking it up that it was empty, then he couldn't open it, could he? If he could tell that it was empty now, he couldn't open it. But he didn't go there because he didn't want to dispel what he believed. He told you he believed was probable cause. He wanted to search the car, that's obvious. Yeah, no question about it. Why didn't he.
. If you'd search the flask. There's an infraction in North Carolina that's... Called what? Carrying up driving with a flask? No, driving with alcohol that's not in its original container. And certainly that there's a leap there that the flask actually contains alcohol. Now, common sense and reason would say if someone's carrying a flask, they're not going to be carrying coke or something that's legal in a flask. And that's commonly used for alcohol. So certainly there's a leap there. And certainly that that part of the case is... He could have been empty. I'm sorry? He could have been empty. He could have been empty. And he never took the time to... He didn't do anything. And if he had picked it up and could tell from picking it up that it was empty, then he couldn't open it, could he? If he could tell that it was empty now, he couldn't open it. But he didn't go there because he didn't want to dispel what he believed. He told you he believed was probable cause. He wanted to search the car, that's obvious. Yeah, no question about it. Why didn't he... First of all, why didn't he arrest the defendant? We're driving on a revoke license. I asked him the very same question. And what was his answer? Why didn't he arrest the defendant? Because he was under the directive from the police department to ask about weapons and so on and so forth. Now, if the defendant... Then they didn't know before you ever asked that. Yeah. When he discovered that the license was revoked, he just observed the defendant commit the offense of driving on a revoke license. And then he gave him a warning. Or was going to give him a warning. I want to put that police officer on my case. Right. If he could have arrested him and then he could have impounded the vehicle, and they could have... Exactly. And you wouldn't be here. He couldn't have searched the vehicle, right? This was post-gant. No. Right? Didn't this take place post-gant in 2009? So he couldn't have searched the vehicle under Belton at the time this occurred, which was post-gant. But you're right. He could have impounded the vehicle, right? He couldn't have. And he didn't do any of that because he wanted to keep the defendant there and engage with him. And as he said in his testimony, talk him into consenting
.. First of all, why didn't he arrest the defendant? We're driving on a revoke license. I asked him the very same question. And what was his answer? Why didn't he arrest the defendant? Because he was under the directive from the police department to ask about weapons and so on and so forth. Now, if the defendant... Then they didn't know before you ever asked that. Yeah. When he discovered that the license was revoked, he just observed the defendant commit the offense of driving on a revoke license. And then he gave him a warning. Or was going to give him a warning. I want to put that police officer on my case. Right. If he could have arrested him and then he could have impounded the vehicle, and they could have... Exactly. And you wouldn't be here. He couldn't have searched the vehicle, right? This was post-gant. No. Right? Didn't this take place post-gant in 2009? So he couldn't have searched the vehicle under Belton at the time this occurred, which was post-gant. But you're right. He could have impounded the vehicle, right? He couldn't have. And he didn't do any of that because he wanted to keep the defendant there and engage with him. And as he said in his testimony, talk him into consenting. Right? He did, but he was unsuccessful in talking him into consenting. Despite some fairly coercive attempts. I would not characterize it as coercive. You don't think it's coercive for a police officer with backup to save a motorist after handing him back his ID and documents. May I pat you down? You don't think that's coercive? No. You interpreted it as an exercise of the defendant's free will. You say, well, he said yes to the pat down, but no to the car search. And you regard that as evidence of the presence of free will. That's a decision by the defendant who is exercising his free will saying that I'm not a- You think it's free will. You don't think the defendant was thinking, okay, I'm going to let this guy pat me down and then maybe he'll just get this car and drive away. You don't think that was coercive? You think very many people would say no, you can't pat me down. I think people would say that no, you can't pat me down, sure. I do. Okay. Can we just for one moment segue back to the misrepresentation? Yes. I take it and you're not familiar with Kentucky versus King. No, you're wrong. It's a 2011 Supreme Court case in which the court suggested that if a police officer misrepresent lied about a legal matter, and that was the basis for a search that the search would be invalid. And it was there a exigent circumstances search. Here, it's not exigent circumstances, but I don't know any reason why it wouldn't fit right into this case. Nobody cited it, and maybe it's not worth while talking about it, but maybe you each could file five pages with us within a week telling us what you think of Kentucky versus King. Well, it's 131 Supreme Court 1849. And I'm not going to prolong you on unless you have some independent things you would like to talk about. No. The court says threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment would give you a right to cancel the what happened. And that's what I think we have here, a threat to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment
. Right? He did, but he was unsuccessful in talking him into consenting. Despite some fairly coercive attempts. I would not characterize it as coercive. You don't think it's coercive for a police officer with backup to save a motorist after handing him back his ID and documents. May I pat you down? You don't think that's coercive? No. You interpreted it as an exercise of the defendant's free will. You say, well, he said yes to the pat down, but no to the car search. And you regard that as evidence of the presence of free will. That's a decision by the defendant who is exercising his free will saying that I'm not a- You think it's free will. You don't think the defendant was thinking, okay, I'm going to let this guy pat me down and then maybe he'll just get this car and drive away. You don't think that was coercive? You think very many people would say no, you can't pat me down. I think people would say that no, you can't pat me down, sure. I do. Okay. Can we just for one moment segue back to the misrepresentation? Yes. I take it and you're not familiar with Kentucky versus King. No, you're wrong. It's a 2011 Supreme Court case in which the court suggested that if a police officer misrepresent lied about a legal matter, and that was the basis for a search that the search would be invalid. And it was there a exigent circumstances search. Here, it's not exigent circumstances, but I don't know any reason why it wouldn't fit right into this case. Nobody cited it, and maybe it's not worth while talking about it, but maybe you each could file five pages with us within a week telling us what you think of Kentucky versus King. Well, it's 131 Supreme Court 1849. And I'm not going to prolong you on unless you have some independent things you would like to talk about. No. The court says threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment would give you a right to cancel the what happened. And that's what I think we have here, a threat to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment. And I don't I don't view what officer secrets said to Mr. Saffir as a lie. It was an incorrect statement. Certainly on the case. Well, but it is a threat to engage in conduct. If he in fact didn't have, if that didn't give him a basis to search the car, the looking at the flask, then that was a threat to search the car without a basis. So it's in violation of the Fourth Amendment, right? Well, it's certainly different if it's a lie versus a mistake or an error. Well, I don't think you'll find that distinction in Kentucky versus King. Or in any other case. Other distinctions. Mistakes of law. Mistakes of law. That's the same effect. That's that this is. It's a mistake of law. It's not the police misrepresenting because we know police can come in. They can question you and say your buddies giving you up. They can make all kinds of. Subterfuge to get you to confess or to get you to do incriminating. But what the Supreme Court was drawing the line was, as Judge Davis says, it's a mistake in law. The government tells you something is the law and it is not. And that induces you to give out the constitutional right. And then the. In a 90 in a 2011 case, the Supreme Court by Justice Alito said that would be a problem. Well, so it's not like a fringe old case. Well, the interesting point that that raises is that
. And I don't I don't view what officer secrets said to Mr. Saffir as a lie. It was an incorrect statement. Certainly on the case. Well, but it is a threat to engage in conduct. If he in fact didn't have, if that didn't give him a basis to search the car, the looking at the flask, then that was a threat to search the car without a basis. So it's in violation of the Fourth Amendment, right? Well, it's certainly different if it's a lie versus a mistake or an error. Well, I don't think you'll find that distinction in Kentucky versus King. Or in any other case. Other distinctions. Mistakes of law. Mistakes of law. That's the same effect. That's that this is. It's a mistake of law. It's not the police misrepresenting because we know police can come in. They can question you and say your buddies giving you up. They can make all kinds of. Subterfuge to get you to confess or to get you to do incriminating. But what the Supreme Court was drawing the line was, as Judge Davis says, it's a mistake in law. The government tells you something is the law and it is not. And that induces you to give out the constitutional right. And then the. In a 90 in a 2011 case, the Supreme Court by Justice Alito said that would be a problem. Well, so it's not like a fringe old case. Well, the interesting point that that raises is that. What right did Mrs. Safair give up because he didn't cause that statement by the officer did not cause him to consent to a search. He never did consent to the search. Oh, yes. Well, I guess that depends on how you read the facts. What what Mr. Safair did was when the officer said this flask is me provoked cause to search the car. Mr. Safair lowered his head inside. And then the officer said, is there anything in the car that you want to tell me about? And that's when. Your view is you can have a preliminary. Misrepresentation of law that what 30 seconds later leads to another question, which, and we which there's consent. Is that which your representation? No, because I it's not well, that has to be no, because it was never a consent search. It was a problem cause search based upon Mr. Safair stating that there was a gun in the car. All right, I amend that. 30 seconds later leads to somebody giving up probable cause. You can have this initial misrepresentation of law by the government. And 30 seconds later in light of that misrepresentation, the defendant gives the officer probable cause. Seems to me that that, you know, that it certainly can't be the law. It's certainly different than giving up a constitutional right. If he said the, the last gives me probable cause of search the, search the car and then Mr. Safair turned around and said, okay, then I'll let you search the car. That's certainly giving up. Don't you think that that's, that's a fair reading of what happened without the office without him saying that? I mean that was defeated. Mr
. What right did Mrs. Safair give up because he didn't cause that statement by the officer did not cause him to consent to a search. He never did consent to the search. Oh, yes. Well, I guess that depends on how you read the facts. What what Mr. Safair did was when the officer said this flask is me provoked cause to search the car. Mr. Safair lowered his head inside. And then the officer said, is there anything in the car that you want to tell me about? And that's when. Your view is you can have a preliminary. Misrepresentation of law that what 30 seconds later leads to another question, which, and we which there's consent. Is that which your representation? No, because I it's not well, that has to be no, because it was never a consent search. It was a problem cause search based upon Mr. Safair stating that there was a gun in the car. All right, I amend that. 30 seconds later leads to somebody giving up probable cause. You can have this initial misrepresentation of law by the government. And 30 seconds later in light of that misrepresentation, the defendant gives the officer probable cause. Seems to me that that, you know, that it certainly can't be the law. It's certainly different than giving up a constitutional right. If he said the, the last gives me probable cause of search the, search the car and then Mr. Safair turned around and said, okay, then I'll let you search the car. That's certainly giving up. Don't you think that that's, that's a fair reading of what happened without the office without him saying that? I mean that was defeated. Mr. Safair had been saying no, you can't search the car. It's not my car. He's twice refusing search of it. And the cop says, oh yes, I can. I have a right to search because of the class. Then he's deflated. So, and then the officer says, well, he sees the officer sees the side, sees him stoop and says, well, is there something in there that we should know about? I agree, but I think that that is different than if the officer said, that now can I search the car? And Mr. Safair said, yes, you can. I mean, Mr. Safair was still within his life. So you think that the, that situation would be a violation of rights and we should reverse, but that this situation is not, is that what you're saying? You say they're different. Different facts, true. And frankly, I'm not aware of the case that you're not excited. Right. And if that is the case, a misrepresentation, a legal misrepresentation by the officer leads to an individual giving up his constitutional rights. Then certainly that, that would fit into the box. What I'm arguing is that our facts don't fit into that box because Mr. Safair never gave up a constitutional right. What he did do was he answered a question that he didn't have to. And he made an admission establishing probability. But he only did it because he had been misinformed about the law. By the least fair statement that that's what led to it. That's what. Well, Kentucky versus King is at right on point. So I'm looking to you all for help. Yes, Your Honor
. Safair had been saying no, you can't search the car. It's not my car. He's twice refusing search of it. And the cop says, oh yes, I can. I have a right to search because of the class. Then he's deflated. So, and then the officer says, well, he sees the officer sees the side, sees him stoop and says, well, is there something in there that we should know about? I agree, but I think that that is different than if the officer said, that now can I search the car? And Mr. Safair said, yes, you can. I mean, Mr. Safair was still within his life. So you think that the, that situation would be a violation of rights and we should reverse, but that this situation is not, is that what you're saying? You say they're different. Different facts, true. And frankly, I'm not aware of the case that you're not excited. Right. And if that is the case, a misrepresentation, a legal misrepresentation by the officer leads to an individual giving up his constitutional rights. Then certainly that, that would fit into the box. What I'm arguing is that our facts don't fit into that box because Mr. Safair never gave up a constitutional right. What he did do was he answered a question that he didn't have to. And he made an admission establishing probability. But he only did it because he had been misinformed about the law. By the least fair statement that that's what led to it. That's what. Well, Kentucky versus King is at right on point. So I'm looking to you all for help. Yes, Your Honor. And then the other issue would be as the government sees it is the finding the gun in the glove box. Mr. Safair statement about the gun and the car was ambiguous. It was a little unclear. Well, he indicated there might be a gun. It might be under the seat. So the government's contention is that that allowed the officer probably cause to search the vehicle wherever a gun might be found. And certainly if it was a long gun, he wouldn't be able. Wouldn't be allowed to look into the glove compartment. But because it was his belief was it was a handgun that he was allowed to look into the glove box. What's the law of North Carolina regarding guns and cars? One can have a carried concealed weapon permit. It's a gun in a car by definition of concealed weapons. Is that how it works? No, I believe that the gun has to be concealed within the car as well. I think there are cases that talk about if an individual is pulled over and puts the gun on the dashboard or something that indicates to the officer that there's a gun there. That that's not a violation. But if you can have a, you can carry a gun in a vehicle. But when you get out of the vehicle, you cannot have it concealed upon your person unless you have a permit. Now, Mr. Sophia being a convicted felon, certainly obviously could not possess a gun. And when the officer did the records check. He knew he was a felon. So any gun in the car in the knowing possession of Mr. Sophia would have been probable cause to believe he was in possession of. Yes, Your Honor. Of the weapon. Yes
. And then the other issue would be as the government sees it is the finding the gun in the glove box. Mr. Safair statement about the gun and the car was ambiguous. It was a little unclear. Well, he indicated there might be a gun. It might be under the seat. So the government's contention is that that allowed the officer probably cause to search the vehicle wherever a gun might be found. And certainly if it was a long gun, he wouldn't be able. Wouldn't be allowed to look into the glove compartment. But because it was his belief was it was a handgun that he was allowed to look into the glove box. What's the law of North Carolina regarding guns and cars? One can have a carried concealed weapon permit. It's a gun in a car by definition of concealed weapons. Is that how it works? No, I believe that the gun has to be concealed within the car as well. I think there are cases that talk about if an individual is pulled over and puts the gun on the dashboard or something that indicates to the officer that there's a gun there. That that's not a violation. But if you can have a, you can carry a gun in a vehicle. But when you get out of the vehicle, you cannot have it concealed upon your person unless you have a permit. Now, Mr. Sophia being a convicted felon, certainly obviously could not possess a gun. And when the officer did the records check. He knew he was a felon. So any gun in the car in the knowing possession of Mr. Sophia would have been probable cause to believe he was in possession of. Yes, Your Honor. Of the weapon. Yes. Now, I don't know if the court has any other questions. I guess not. Thank you very much. Thank you. Yarnas, I too am unaware of a. But you're going to find it. Can you write a five pages about it? Absolutely. But I think it is clear factually that there is a but for causal connection between the misrepresentation of the officer and Mr. Sophia's subsequent incriminating statement that led to what judge. I would say that. This case represents I believe a law enforcement response training response to this court's holdings in cases like Russia, D.G. Ivani, D.G. And others. To the extent that it's offices are apparently instructed being instructed to hasten the point in the encounter at which the. Encounter becomes consensual. Return because of so many cases have highlighted the return of the driver's license and identification document as a point in time at which the. Traffic stopped the non consensual in the lawful non consensual encounter ends. And that's the case. From that point forward. It really becomes a credibility contest, a credibility contest between a law enforcement officer and oftentimes a convicted. That's so the district court. I'm sorry. If that is the case, the district court is going to be determining it. It's always
. Now, I don't know if the court has any other questions. I guess not. Thank you very much. Thank you. Yarnas, I too am unaware of a. But you're going to find it. Can you write a five pages about it? Absolutely. But I think it is clear factually that there is a but for causal connection between the misrepresentation of the officer and Mr. Sophia's subsequent incriminating statement that led to what judge. I would say that. This case represents I believe a law enforcement response training response to this court's holdings in cases like Russia, D.G. Ivani, D.G. And others. To the extent that it's offices are apparently instructed being instructed to hasten the point in the encounter at which the. Encounter becomes consensual. Return because of so many cases have highlighted the return of the driver's license and identification document as a point in time at which the. Traffic stopped the non consensual in the lawful non consensual encounter ends. And that's the case. From that point forward. It really becomes a credibility contest, a credibility contest between a law enforcement officer and oftentimes a convicted. That's so the district court. I'm sorry. If that is the case, the district court is going to be determining it. It's always. Absolutely. And I only mention that because I think that highlights the danger in treating the again, the. Whether a. Trans from an extension of an encounter. Is de minimis or not as solely a one dimensional inquiry. You remember when. And judge Davis was questioning. The other side and he brought up as I remember the facts, there's enough. To arrest this man. Yes, man. So that's what makes this a little complicated. And not not sure it jives with your theory because if there was enough evidence to arrest him, that would get them the gun ultimately. Right. It would. It would. And I would not presume to be able to enlighten the court as to that. If. If my years in doing this work has taught me anything, it's that. You don't argue the other side's case. Certainly not. And that we sometimes. We sometimes deceive ourselves when we look for logic where it sometimes doesn't exist. And. If the court has any other questions, I'll be happy to try to entertain. All right. Thank you
. All right