I am pleased the court lectures are two minutes from the battle. Yes, well, a balance. I can save time, but we are not going to watch the time for it. Thank you, sir. To begin, I will address the issues for which the court ordered a supplemental briefing, that is whether Dwayne is all of our essence, realistic probability standard, has been satisfied with respect to Mr. Parnell's Massachusetts armed robbery conviction. Assuming that Dwayne is all of our essence applies to the incident case, it is not here because the state's statutes greater breadth is evident from its text. In Massachusetts armed robbery, it can be boiled down to its essential elements, which is largely from a person plus force, as defined by Massachusetts case law. And I will discuss that in a moment, plus being armed again, as defined by Massachusetts case law
. As a court noted in its order for supplemental briefing, that under Massachusetts case law, the degree of force is immaterial as long as it is sufficient to obtain a victim's property against us well. In that case, that was a quote by joiner. The joiner relied, in fact, quoted the seminal case, which is Commonwealth First's Jones. And Jones, the degree, the court held a degree of force necessary that makes a victim aware that her person is being snatched into sufficient force to satisfy the force element, which obviously runs afoul of Johnson 1, which held at the required force's violent force, that is capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person. Moreover, the armed element does not satisfy the force clause, because Massachusetts does not require actual use of the weapon. In Commonwealth First's Goldman, the court made clear that it's the possession of the weapon, not the use of the weapon. That is the essential element of arm robbery. In this case, it's very similar to the United States versus World Case that we cited and submitted on our second 28J letter
. In that case, the Washington riot statutes armed element, the court held could be satisfied by simply having a knife in one's pocket. In World, the court found that, given the case law interpreting the state statute, that its greater breadth was evident from its text, and thus the opponent need not point to an actual case applying the statute of conviction in non-generic manner. Even if this group is concerned, the armed robbery statute is Section 1. The armed robbery is Section 17 correct. So, even if this court disagrees that the state statute over inclusiveness is evident from its text, the Goldman case satisfies Duanian's over as this point to a case requirement. In Goldman, the court recognized that the robbery was complete upon the personatching, and the victim was not aware of the defendant's firearm. It held that that was still an armed robbery. Lastly, Duanian's over as does not apply because the force clause issue, because this is a force clause issue, not an enumerated clause issue
. As a first circuit, or the fourth circuit, rather noted in the United States versus Torres Miguel, by its own terms, Duanian's over as applies only to determinations of whether a state statute creates a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime, not to every possible state predicate. Here, the armed robbery is obviously not one of the listed crimes that's an enumerated clause. Expanding Duanian's over as also presents the Duanian's over as probability test also presents problems because post-Johnson 2, in Johnson 2, as the court was all aware, it overruled the James case, the ordinary case approach that was in James. The Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional vague, and James made its press reference to Duanian's over as the United States versus Spencer this court stated that the tests were effectively indistinguishable. The method of determining whether the offense is a crime of violence has been characterized by this court is straightforward. You're supposed to examine the elements of the conviction, and if they contain the use of force, threatening use of force, or..
. I think it's very hard to listen to you, you should read it, and it's really difficult to know. I apologize, I should. So, what I was... What I was saying is your apologies that in this court, in that, when the standard has been considered fairly straightforward in determining whether something is a satisfied of force, it's a crime of violence, otherwise it's not. That's your question of force, I mean, this statute in terms of the question of force. That is correct, John
. So, in this case, it is fairly well defined by Jones that the force, and has been repeated for 40 years, that the force that we're talking about is the amount of force that is being taken to be taken. So, I believe that the law that I've created in a personate situation, awareness, and I believe that even governments breathe a supplemental breathing. So, the short version, as I understand it, is that under Massachusetts law for armed robbery, the kind of force that's involved could be personaching, in other cases, to that effect, as long as it's enough force that takes the first away, and that that is not enough under federal law to be, of course. That's correct. And the armed part of it doesn't help because the gun could be in your pocket. That's correct. And I would add, though, that it's to be clear that it's not the amount of force just to remove a purse, like it has to be, but actually just creates awareness. And Jones, the victim in that case, as well, it was just enough for me to be aware that it was gone, not that there was some kind of tugging or pulling
. I mean, that's the minimal force that was required in Jones, which obviously does not comport with Johnson-Won. Next, I would like to briefly discuss Frank's in US versus Tangue, the court held that the whole, sometimes, it can you see the sum of its parts, and that the appropriate test focus on the totaling of circumstances. And this court made a very similar statement. Yes, this is the Frank's issue, your honor, at your point. And the point being is, is your honor, is that the district court found that these individual broke down the actual statements of Mr. Hanson, and he ruled on them as to whether or not they were material or not. Now, we would contend your honor, that individually, when a person is lying, that that satisfies materiality, but that abides at a minimum. If you put all of the statements together, accumulatively, they certainly demonstrate that the omissions were material
. In fact, I detected Ma on the interviewing officer agreed that Mr. Hanson, and I'm quoting, was a lying racist, drug addict with mental illness who doesn't pay his bills, who would throw his mother under the bus to save himself. That's what the interviewing agent in the evidentiary hearing agreed with me in his synopsis of Mr. Hanson. And then, as for Miss Sawyer, I see that my time is running out, but as for Miss Sawyer, I think the most important thing was the only thing. I'm not sure, isn't the most significant thing about what they said, is that they both said essentially the same thing about your client, even though they do with each other. Your honor, respectfully, that this is not like a femme diagram, where you have two incredible people, and they happen to have, they happen to overlap in one area. So you have one incredible person stating something, and one incredible person saying another thing, and they happen to say the same thing
. But we would respectfully submit that 0 plus 0 still equals 0, and that one incredible person cannot corroborate another incredible person. And if there are no questions, I'd like to research their assailant. May I please the court? My name is Josh Burwitt, I represent the United States. Let me start with the Frank's issue, because I think your honor asked this. I've never dropped the other issue. Okay. As I, well, I gather it's not just positive, but it's just positive. I've already dropped the Frank's issue
. Very dependent in the sense that what goes should be both your surprise and surprise and what goes to the sense. That's correct, Your Honor. And I can do the Frank's issue briefly, I think. I think your honor at the nail in the head, where you have two independent informants, they didn't know each other. They were contacted by police at different times for different reasons. But they both gave the police probable cause of methamphetamine use at the defendant's residence. And the issue here is whether there was, well, I guess it's whether there was probable cause of this sense of whether if everything that he said should have been put in was put in, there's two would be probable cause. I guess that's your ultimate
. That is the ultimate conclusion here, or even if we accept over the district court's findings that these informants had all of the problems that the defendant's raised. Each one of them still pointed to criminal activity at the defendant's residence for independent reasons. And that provides probable cause even if the court was to have every omission, alleged omission in this case. Now, turning to the armbarabar issue, I think that the defendant has just misread Jones. And the analysis here and the Massachusetts Supreme Court case, and John Sin is the United States Supreme Court case that lays out what violent force means under the federal statute. In Jones, Massachusetts case, what the court said was armed, well actually it was the case of robbery. But the force element in robbery and armbarabar, under Massachusetts law is the same. And what the Massachusetts Supreme Court said in Jones is that force means force and violence or assault and putting in fear. Both of those formulations match the definition and the formulation of violent force that the Supreme Court said forth in Johnson for purposes of the armed criminal act. This because both formulations from Jones case involve bodily injury or the threat of bodily injury or pain. I've been really interested out, we know that the language is fairly up to the question is what is the key to Massachusetts? And Jones does say that the statute of motion is so long as the victim is aware of the application of force which leads him to property to crime. This is something where he gets just well. So war is involved in the stealthy taking, where he has no present realization. Essentially, I have to put you so I understand it means enough force to pull the person out of your arm. In fact they were putting in context, they were rejecting the stronger. I'm sorry I didn't, they were rejecting the more forceful, excuse me, the more forceful they were
. Both of those formulations match the definition and the formulation of violent force that the Supreme Court said forth in Johnson for purposes of the armed criminal act. This because both formulations from Jones case involve bodily injury or the threat of bodily injury or pain. I've been really interested out, we know that the language is fairly up to the question is what is the key to Massachusetts? And Jones does say that the statute of motion is so long as the victim is aware of the application of force which leads him to property to crime. This is something where he gets just well. So war is involved in the stealthy taking, where he has no present realization. Essentially, I have to put you so I understand it means enough force to pull the person out of your arm. In fact they were putting in context, they were rejecting the stronger. I'm sorry I didn't, they were rejecting the more forceful, excuse me, the more forceful they were. They adopted the Kentucky rule. Let's crash smashing without more and while the threat was so no one would know. You're right, they don't. How are they misrevening? You're right because the force involved in a personage to the Massachusetts Supreme Court was still violent force. Because it made the victim aware and it impliedly indicated a willingness to use violence and that's language from the Jones case. So what the Massachusetts Court was saying is yes this is sort of a borderline case where there was no injury. We know there's an injury but the question means was that personage had nothing violent force. And the force said it was because the robber used enough force to make the victim aware and by doing so showed a willingness to use violence
. They adopted the Kentucky rule. Let's crash smashing without more and while the threat was so no one would know. You're right, they don't. How are they misrevening? You're right because the force involved in a personage to the Massachusetts Supreme Court was still violent force. Because it made the victim aware and it impliedly indicated a willingness to use violence and that's language from the Jones case. So what the Massachusetts Court was saying is yes this is sort of a borderline case where there was no injury. We know there's an injury but the question means was that personage had nothing violent force. And the force said it was because the robber used enough force to make the victim aware and by doing so showed a willingness to use violence. What are you relying on? I'm looking at the Jones case and trying to find where it steps up the force of the wobbleable violence is defined by Johnson. You're right before the discussion of the facts in that case, the court started with the legal discussion of the differences between larceny and robbery and that's where the language regarding force and violence is contained. I'm looking at what they say about this snatching. Snatching necessarily involves the exercise of a man some actual force. Even if this actual force sufficient to produce awareness, although the action may be so swift, as soon as the victim moved on the chair in a day's condition, the requisite degree of force is present to make the crime robbery that does not track with violent force and defined by the Supreme Court. You're I think it does track violent force if you look. You're wearing some language and pulling the balance of out what I see as a force in discussion of the technical is the sense that says whether actual constructive force is employed, the degree of force is immaterial so long as it is sufficient to obtain the victim's property against us as well. You're a man of the moment to grab my case file
. What are you relying on? I'm looking at the Jones case and trying to find where it steps up the force of the wobbleable violence is defined by Johnson. You're right before the discussion of the facts in that case, the court started with the legal discussion of the differences between larceny and robbery and that's where the language regarding force and violence is contained. I'm looking at what they say about this snatching. Snatching necessarily involves the exercise of a man some actual force. Even if this actual force sufficient to produce awareness, although the action may be so swift, as soon as the victim moved on the chair in a day's condition, the requisite degree of force is present to make the crime robbery that does not track with violent force and defined by the Supreme Court. You're I think it does track violent force if you look. You're wearing some language and pulling the balance of out what I see as a force in discussion of the technical is the sense that says whether actual constructive force is employed, the degree of force is immaterial so long as it is sufficient to obtain the victim's property against us as well. You're a man of the moment to grab my case file. I don't think the whole idea of that is that case. Or a base of other case. You ought to try and act that as well. So you're I'm looking right above star page 89 in my West law case print out. And Jeff in Jones crack down. Star page 89. So the New England reporter would be at page 844 and this is where the court is talking about the Kentucky rule which they adopt. So we prefer the Kentucky rule on person matching the majority jurisdiction rule and looking to whether or not the victim resists
. I don't think the whole idea of that is that case. Or a base of other case. You ought to try and act that as well. So you're I'm looking right above star page 89 in my West law case print out. And Jeff in Jones crack down. Star page 89. So the New England reporter would be at page 844 and this is where the court is talking about the Kentucky rule which they adopt. So we prefer the Kentucky rule on person matching the majority jurisdiction rule and looking to whether or not the victim resists. We think wrongly emphasizes the victims opportunity to defend himself over the willingness of the person that are to use violence if necessary. So that's the language that I think indicates that the Massachusetts court is saying even if there's a snatch and there's no injury or no pain. Doing that is sufficient violence force because it indicates the willingness to use violence if necessary. And let's step back and think about a situation of a person. The the assailant is grabbing the purse and indicating at the same time I'm going to take this purse whether you resist or not. And in that case nothing to suggest that if the person turned like the man they would proceed again. Well, the necessary way they go on that you're seizing upon the sentence is your fragment of the sentence. I think we have to look at what they say about describing person
. We think wrongly emphasizes the victims opportunity to defend himself over the willingness of the person that are to use violence if necessary. So that's the language that I think indicates that the Massachusetts court is saying even if there's a snatch and there's no injury or no pain. Doing that is sufficient violence force because it indicates the willingness to use violence if necessary. And let's step back and think about a situation of a person. The the assailant is grabbing the purse and indicating at the same time I'm going to take this purse whether you resist or not. And in that case nothing to suggest that if the person turned like the man they would proceed again. Well, the necessary way they go on that you're seizing upon the sentence is your fragment of the sentence. I think we have to look at what they say about describing person. And you're on what they say about personation later on in the opinion is that I'm sorry. And what you're having pointed out this language before what the court says in discussing personation later in the opinion is that it involves the requisite degree of force. And I think we need to go back to how Massachusetts defines force at the beginning of the opinion which is to say that force means force and violence or assault and being put in fear. And it's like words, those are words of its supreme court is given content to the Turkish violence. And so that's where we have to look at it. Correct. And the words are what the categorical approach depends on how the elements match from state predicates you to the federal generic definition. And I'd refer to page 843 of the Jones opinion where the elements do match
. And you're on what they say about personation later on in the opinion is that I'm sorry. And what you're having pointed out this language before what the court says in discussing personation later in the opinion is that it involves the requisite degree of force. And I think we need to go back to how Massachusetts defines force at the beginning of the opinion which is to say that force means force and violence or assault and being put in fear. And it's like words, those are words of its supreme court is given content to the Turkish violence. And so that's where we have to look at it. Correct. And the words are what the categorical approach depends on how the elements match from state predicates you to the federal generic definition. And I'd refer to page 843 of the Jones opinion where the elements do match. You have force and violence and assault and putting in fear. And so we started to question what kind of violence force we talk about. And to the Massachusetts court, you're on it. It's sufficient force to cause fear and injury even in the personation case which isn't the typical situation that might involve injury. But the Massachusetts court was saying that is enough given that the acts in the case of willingness to use violence and that it creates an awareness by the victim. And I see that my time has expired. So there's no other questions I'd ask. Thank you
. You have force and violence and assault and putting in fear. And so we started to question what kind of violence force we talk about. And to the Massachusetts court, you're on it. It's sufficient force to cause fear and injury even in the personation case which isn't the typical situation that might involve injury. But the Massachusetts court was saying that is enough given that the acts in the case of willingness to use violence and that it creates an awareness by the victim. And I see that my time has expired. So there's no other questions I'd ask. Thank you. With all the respected coverings council, the Jones case is fairly specific. In that case it held and I'm reading from it. It says the victim. Yes, but with respect to what the victim actually said is I really couldn't tell what he did. All I knew he was standing there. Next thing I knew I felt something off my arm. I realized that my bad was gone. So it's the court
. With all the respected coverings council, the Jones case is fairly specific. In that case it held and I'm reading from it. It says the victim. Yes, but with respect to what the victim actually said is I really couldn't tell what he did. All I knew he was standing there. Next thing I knew I felt something off my arm. I realized that my bad was gone. So it's the court. If we're supposed to look at the least the greatest enemy state of the state's statute range of conduct, this is how Massachusetts defines its violence. The court went on to say in any of the spring that this fight she was petrified and I was scared to death whether her fear hated the defendant and affecting the taking of early aromas afterwards. As the defendant argues with a question in the jury, do you have to take the comments on the comments? That's a great thank you.
I am pleased the court lectures are two minutes from the battle. Yes, well, a balance. I can save time, but we are not going to watch the time for it. Thank you, sir. To begin, I will address the issues for which the court ordered a supplemental briefing, that is whether Dwayne is all of our essence, realistic probability standard, has been satisfied with respect to Mr. Parnell's Massachusetts armed robbery conviction. Assuming that Dwayne is all of our essence applies to the incident case, it is not here because the state's statutes greater breadth is evident from its text. In Massachusetts armed robbery, it can be boiled down to its essential elements, which is largely from a person plus force, as defined by Massachusetts case law. And I will discuss that in a moment, plus being armed again, as defined by Massachusetts case law. As a court noted in its order for supplemental briefing, that under Massachusetts case law, the degree of force is immaterial as long as it is sufficient to obtain a victim's property against us well. In that case, that was a quote by joiner. The joiner relied, in fact, quoted the seminal case, which is Commonwealth First's Jones. And Jones, the degree, the court held a degree of force necessary that makes a victim aware that her person is being snatched into sufficient force to satisfy the force element, which obviously runs afoul of Johnson 1, which held at the required force's violent force, that is capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person. Moreover, the armed element does not satisfy the force clause, because Massachusetts does not require actual use of the weapon. In Commonwealth First's Goldman, the court made clear that it's the possession of the weapon, not the use of the weapon. That is the essential element of arm robbery. In this case, it's very similar to the United States versus World Case that we cited and submitted on our second 28J letter. In that case, the Washington riot statutes armed element, the court held could be satisfied by simply having a knife in one's pocket. In World, the court found that, given the case law interpreting the state statute, that its greater breadth was evident from its text, and thus the opponent need not point to an actual case applying the statute of conviction in non-generic manner. Even if this group is concerned, the armed robbery statute is Section 1. The armed robbery is Section 17 correct. So, even if this court disagrees that the state statute over inclusiveness is evident from its text, the Goldman case satisfies Duanian's over as this point to a case requirement. In Goldman, the court recognized that the robbery was complete upon the personatching, and the victim was not aware of the defendant's firearm. It held that that was still an armed robbery. Lastly, Duanian's over as does not apply because the force clause issue, because this is a force clause issue, not an enumerated clause issue. As a first circuit, or the fourth circuit, rather noted in the United States versus Torres Miguel, by its own terms, Duanian's over as applies only to determinations of whether a state statute creates a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime, not to every possible state predicate. Here, the armed robbery is obviously not one of the listed crimes that's an enumerated clause. Expanding Duanian's over as also presents the Duanian's over as probability test also presents problems because post-Johnson 2, in Johnson 2, as the court was all aware, it overruled the James case, the ordinary case approach that was in James. The Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional vague, and James made its press reference to Duanian's over as the United States versus Spencer this court stated that the tests were effectively indistinguishable. The method of determining whether the offense is a crime of violence has been characterized by this court is straightforward. You're supposed to examine the elements of the conviction, and if they contain the use of force, threatening use of force, or... I think it's very hard to listen to you, you should read it, and it's really difficult to know. I apologize, I should. So, what I was... What I was saying is your apologies that in this court, in that, when the standard has been considered fairly straightforward in determining whether something is a satisfied of force, it's a crime of violence, otherwise it's not. That's your question of force, I mean, this statute in terms of the question of force. That is correct, John. So, in this case, it is fairly well defined by Jones that the force, and has been repeated for 40 years, that the force that we're talking about is the amount of force that is being taken to be taken. So, I believe that the law that I've created in a personate situation, awareness, and I believe that even governments breathe a supplemental breathing. So, the short version, as I understand it, is that under Massachusetts law for armed robbery, the kind of force that's involved could be personaching, in other cases, to that effect, as long as it's enough force that takes the first away, and that that is not enough under federal law to be, of course. That's correct. And the armed part of it doesn't help because the gun could be in your pocket. That's correct. And I would add, though, that it's to be clear that it's not the amount of force just to remove a purse, like it has to be, but actually just creates awareness. And Jones, the victim in that case, as well, it was just enough for me to be aware that it was gone, not that there was some kind of tugging or pulling. I mean, that's the minimal force that was required in Jones, which obviously does not comport with Johnson-Won. Next, I would like to briefly discuss Frank's in US versus Tangue, the court held that the whole, sometimes, it can you see the sum of its parts, and that the appropriate test focus on the totaling of circumstances. And this court made a very similar statement. Yes, this is the Frank's issue, your honor, at your point. And the point being is, is your honor, is that the district court found that these individual broke down the actual statements of Mr. Hanson, and he ruled on them as to whether or not they were material or not. Now, we would contend your honor, that individually, when a person is lying, that that satisfies materiality, but that abides at a minimum. If you put all of the statements together, accumulatively, they certainly demonstrate that the omissions were material. In fact, I detected Ma on the interviewing officer agreed that Mr. Hanson, and I'm quoting, was a lying racist, drug addict with mental illness who doesn't pay his bills, who would throw his mother under the bus to save himself. That's what the interviewing agent in the evidentiary hearing agreed with me in his synopsis of Mr. Hanson. And then, as for Miss Sawyer, I see that my time is running out, but as for Miss Sawyer, I think the most important thing was the only thing. I'm not sure, isn't the most significant thing about what they said, is that they both said essentially the same thing about your client, even though they do with each other. Your honor, respectfully, that this is not like a femme diagram, where you have two incredible people, and they happen to have, they happen to overlap in one area. So you have one incredible person stating something, and one incredible person saying another thing, and they happen to say the same thing. But we would respectfully submit that 0 plus 0 still equals 0, and that one incredible person cannot corroborate another incredible person. And if there are no questions, I'd like to research their assailant. May I please the court? My name is Josh Burwitt, I represent the United States. Let me start with the Frank's issue, because I think your honor asked this. I've never dropped the other issue. Okay. As I, well, I gather it's not just positive, but it's just positive. I've already dropped the Frank's issue. Very dependent in the sense that what goes should be both your surprise and surprise and what goes to the sense. That's correct, Your Honor. And I can do the Frank's issue briefly, I think. I think your honor at the nail in the head, where you have two independent informants, they didn't know each other. They were contacted by police at different times for different reasons. But they both gave the police probable cause of methamphetamine use at the defendant's residence. And the issue here is whether there was, well, I guess it's whether there was probable cause of this sense of whether if everything that he said should have been put in was put in, there's two would be probable cause. I guess that's your ultimate. That is the ultimate conclusion here, or even if we accept over the district court's findings that these informants had all of the problems that the defendant's raised. Each one of them still pointed to criminal activity at the defendant's residence for independent reasons. And that provides probable cause even if the court was to have every omission, alleged omission in this case. Now, turning to the armbarabar issue, I think that the defendant has just misread Jones. And the analysis here and the Massachusetts Supreme Court case, and John Sin is the United States Supreme Court case that lays out what violent force means under the federal statute. In Jones, Massachusetts case, what the court said was armed, well actually it was the case of robbery. But the force element in robbery and armbarabar, under Massachusetts law is the same. And what the Massachusetts Supreme Court said in Jones is that force means force and violence or assault and putting in fear. Both of those formulations match the definition and the formulation of violent force that the Supreme Court said forth in Johnson for purposes of the armed criminal act. This because both formulations from Jones case involve bodily injury or the threat of bodily injury or pain. I've been really interested out, we know that the language is fairly up to the question is what is the key to Massachusetts? And Jones does say that the statute of motion is so long as the victim is aware of the application of force which leads him to property to crime. This is something where he gets just well. So war is involved in the stealthy taking, where he has no present realization. Essentially, I have to put you so I understand it means enough force to pull the person out of your arm. In fact they were putting in context, they were rejecting the stronger. I'm sorry I didn't, they were rejecting the more forceful, excuse me, the more forceful they were. They adopted the Kentucky rule. Let's crash smashing without more and while the threat was so no one would know. You're right, they don't. How are they misrevening? You're right because the force involved in a personage to the Massachusetts Supreme Court was still violent force. Because it made the victim aware and it impliedly indicated a willingness to use violence and that's language from the Jones case. So what the Massachusetts Court was saying is yes this is sort of a borderline case where there was no injury. We know there's an injury but the question means was that personage had nothing violent force. And the force said it was because the robber used enough force to make the victim aware and by doing so showed a willingness to use violence. What are you relying on? I'm looking at the Jones case and trying to find where it steps up the force of the wobbleable violence is defined by Johnson. You're right before the discussion of the facts in that case, the court started with the legal discussion of the differences between larceny and robbery and that's where the language regarding force and violence is contained. I'm looking at what they say about this snatching. Snatching necessarily involves the exercise of a man some actual force. Even if this actual force sufficient to produce awareness, although the action may be so swift, as soon as the victim moved on the chair in a day's condition, the requisite degree of force is present to make the crime robbery that does not track with violent force and defined by the Supreme Court. You're I think it does track violent force if you look. You're wearing some language and pulling the balance of out what I see as a force in discussion of the technical is the sense that says whether actual constructive force is employed, the degree of force is immaterial so long as it is sufficient to obtain the victim's property against us as well. You're a man of the moment to grab my case file. I don't think the whole idea of that is that case. Or a base of other case. You ought to try and act that as well. So you're I'm looking right above star page 89 in my West law case print out. And Jeff in Jones crack down. Star page 89. So the New England reporter would be at page 844 and this is where the court is talking about the Kentucky rule which they adopt. So we prefer the Kentucky rule on person matching the majority jurisdiction rule and looking to whether or not the victim resists. We think wrongly emphasizes the victims opportunity to defend himself over the willingness of the person that are to use violence if necessary. So that's the language that I think indicates that the Massachusetts court is saying even if there's a snatch and there's no injury or no pain. Doing that is sufficient violence force because it indicates the willingness to use violence if necessary. And let's step back and think about a situation of a person. The the assailant is grabbing the purse and indicating at the same time I'm going to take this purse whether you resist or not. And in that case nothing to suggest that if the person turned like the man they would proceed again. Well, the necessary way they go on that you're seizing upon the sentence is your fragment of the sentence. I think we have to look at what they say about describing person. And you're on what they say about personation later on in the opinion is that I'm sorry. And what you're having pointed out this language before what the court says in discussing personation later in the opinion is that it involves the requisite degree of force. And I think we need to go back to how Massachusetts defines force at the beginning of the opinion which is to say that force means force and violence or assault and being put in fear. And it's like words, those are words of its supreme court is given content to the Turkish violence. And so that's where we have to look at it. Correct. And the words are what the categorical approach depends on how the elements match from state predicates you to the federal generic definition. And I'd refer to page 843 of the Jones opinion where the elements do match. You have force and violence and assault and putting in fear. And so we started to question what kind of violence force we talk about. And to the Massachusetts court, you're on it. It's sufficient force to cause fear and injury even in the personation case which isn't the typical situation that might involve injury. But the Massachusetts court was saying that is enough given that the acts in the case of willingness to use violence and that it creates an awareness by the victim. And I see that my time has expired. So there's no other questions I'd ask. Thank you. With all the respected coverings council, the Jones case is fairly specific. In that case it held and I'm reading from it. It says the victim. Yes, but with respect to what the victim actually said is I really couldn't tell what he did. All I knew he was standing there. Next thing I knew I felt something off my arm. I realized that my bad was gone. So it's the court. If we're supposed to look at the least the greatest enemy state of the state's statute range of conduct, this is how Massachusetts defines its violence. The court went on to say in any of the spring that this fight she was petrified and I was scared to death whether her fear hated the defendant and affecting the taking of early aromas afterwards. As the defendant argues with a question in the jury, do you have to take the comments on the comments? That's a great thank you