previously been addressed by you at your point. And we will call the first case of the day, United States of America versus Quincy Resort. And we will hear from Mr. Quincy Resort, Representative Quincy Resort. Good afternoon. May it please the Court? My name is Quincy Resort. I'm doing going to have the honor of duty and privilege to represent Mr. Quincy Resort Senior, who as of this date has been incarcerated for six months of a 33-month sentence for violations of sex and sex-six-six in which the jury found no- You're Mr. Resort Junior. Junior, yes sir, my, my, senior, my father. And what's the jury found on guilty of violations of six-six-six in aiding a bedding conspiracy and principal bribery? The jury found them along with John Miller, guilty of accepting something of value from Joseph Casimir in return as it relates to the hembian elected to the St. Andrew Pair superintendent's position. In the short time I have, without waiving any of the other arguments, I'd like to address three points. First, Section 18, USC, 666 as applied is unconstitutional exchange, exchange, exercise of congressional authority. Ain't that pretty well been decided? Sir. Hasn't that issue pretty well been decided? No, sir, your Honor. Recently in sub-ree, the Supreme Court took up the issue in which that person had a facial challenge to Section 666. However, unlike that facial challenge, this is an unassiplied challenge which was left open by the court in Salinas. In Salinas, the Supreme Court of Health, the Discourse Interpretation of Six-six-six finding that there doesn't have to be a nexus between the federal funds and state funds. However, it left open the question if whether some other situation would, Section 666, would be unconstitutional. In what sense? I'm sorry, I said again. In what sense? Unconstitutional in what sense? As applied
. As applied. I'll pay all that it didn't as a statutory constant. I thought you were arguing that it was unconstitutional vague. No, no, no, no, no, sir. I'm an unconstitutional as applied. Okay. I'm an unconstitutional. And the reason I'm an unconstitutional as applied, because here Section 6666 as applied to this conduct, pays no respect for dual sovereignty and federalism as it encroaches on rights reserved specifically to the states, which in this case is education, maintenance of its own government, and crime. And as far as education, the 10th Amendment guarantees that it reserves of policy states, everything is not enumerated in the Constitution. In the area of education, lacking the constitutional power, Congress has been able to regulate education through the use of conditional grants and things in our nature where states agree to certain conditions and policy objectives in exchange for federal funds. These funds are used to distribute affirmative department of ed to states and local school districts. However, Congress and when it establishes the act placing the Department of Education into the executive branch, paid respect and show respect to this concept of federalism and states rights when it involves education as it establishes and is said, no provision of any applicable program shall be construed to authorize any Department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States, taxisized any discretion, I mean, direction, supervision, or control over the curriculum, program, institution, administration or personnel matters of any school system or schools, which is very relevant here because we're talking about a Louisiana board member, a private citizen who if who if successful would have been deemed elected to be a Louisiana constitutional officer. Well, what's the coercion inherent in this spending clause violation? I'm sorry. Well, I thought the argument is that the state would be coerced by the federal government, right? No, the argument is that under 666 is not a conditional spending, however, like at the funds with education aware it doesn't grant any funds to the state or require them to do anything, all they do is require that once the state receives a pro organization, receives $10,000 federal funds, then that's it, they submit themselves to jurisdiction of 666. Right. However, under education, because it's a reserve power reserve state, only unconditional spending with Congress is used to spending clause, its education used to be influenced and dole limits that Congress is spending an area of education into a federal interest which here Congress may have a general interest in two board members accepting something in return possibly being related to being elected to school superintendent. However, they don't have a federal interest because all powers involved are paid by Louisiana funds because the Louisiana legislature under the Louisiana Constitution is responsible for maintaining public school education. You have any cases that suggest that? Suggest. That support your theory? No, actually, there's none because every time the last case that tried was a Salinas case and the Salinas case, like I said, uphill that there's no nexus between the federal and state funds but left it open. And they said, whatever applied in this one, but they found it applied because in Salinas, the defendant was a sheriff and he was 666, they said applied because he was accepting funds in return for special treatment for a prisoner being held in that prison. And it said because the prisoner, I mean, the prison was under an agreement with the federal government on housing and the care in other prisoners that said it had applied because that was enough to make it apply to fall under jurisdiction of 666, but left open the question of, and it specifically says, whatever may be said about another case, it is tied to this one because of the agreement between the federal government to provide funds to the prison to house his parent, this prisoner and the sheriff was providing preferential treatment to the prisoner, which is a defined deductions of which the agreement was set in which he was supposed to be on the lookout for the prisoner
. There are no other cases in which they said it applied and that's the last case in which it was actually even addressed, however, sub-re, and many others have tried the facial attack saying that Congress didn't have the authority to enact the statute in general in which the Supreme Court said that they don't agree with facial attacks because they may apply in some cases but not, and just to face the discredited Congress's power and the spending clause to enact 18666, they were not going to do it. They never addressed, that was the only issue before the court in sub-re, whether it was under the power of Congress to enact 6666, nothing more, not that whether the 6666 was actually trying to face the attack, which is not what I am arguing in this matter, it's as applied because everything, all the parties involved are Louisiana with no federal funds because the federal funds provide a two states in the area of education, the Title I, individual with disabilities, they all have certain procedures or protocols that states adopt and adhere to or feel the risk of losing the federal funds. None of the conditions that, and received the federal funds, do the states waive their rights to enforce their own criminal laws because to do so would be, what would, the five federalism as the states cannot give the federal government the power to do something that they can't because that is preserved to the states. And in addition to education, states also have a priority in maintaining their own government. As I said before, the Louisiana Constitution, places the responsibility for education on the legislature. The legislature also, in the Constitution, has a responsibility to provide for school board who in turn has to provide for, has to be like a superintendent. School boards are by law, are policymaking bodies. And keeping with that authority granted to her during the Constitution, the State Land Repair and School Board themselves adopt the policy manual. In the policy manual, it specifically says board members are not allowed to act for our bind board individually. However, for Mr. Restorath to be convicted under Section 666, he has to be an agent with the definition of agent that finds as someone who's authorized to act for our bind. So in essence, the federal government is saying, as disregarding the states right to the rules and laws and establish their own government by giving Mr. Restorath more power than Louisiana and St. Linda Perry in the area of education says itself. Also, Louisiana through Lopez, we know, has the primary authority for enforcing criminal laws. Now, Sabrina, of course, said that there doesn't have to be a nexus between the federal funds and the conduct, which in, however, in this scenario, everything involved because, as I said before, in 79, when they decided the Department of Ed, they prohibited any program from encroaching and administration personnel issues. This is all state issues. And on the vast, when the interpretation of the statute would upset the balance of federalism, then Congress must expressly have an intent to enter that area in which the intent of Section 666 was to protect the integrity of federal funds, whereas here, there are no federal funds in this conduct here. And it's significant that Louisiana themselves have a criminal law to which Kate is to this exact issue, which means that federal government should not be able to encroach on that right and enforce, and enforce, and enforce, and enforce, and enforce, and enforce, and enforce, and Louisiana solely has that right. In addition to the constitutional arguments, there was some misficitive evidence arguments also. And Philips Discord said that the definition of an agent is one who is authorized to act in particular agency with respect to his funds
. The organization also has to be the beneficiary of excess of $10,000. I just more advantage essence. What is the reason that you are, I mean, that the primary basis to your contendent, that you have, the member of the Board of Trustees, or is that what it was, Board of Trustees? Senator Fair of School Board. The school board. The school board member who, uh, control, uh, member of the board that controls the school in terms of its finance and higher and fire. No, no, no, excuse me, I may correct you. And Senator Fair is that they are not in control of the higher and fire. The higher and fire and personal. Why are they in control? Why do they exist? They exist to govern and form as an extension of, uh, the Department of Education in Louisiana to maintain, to make sure that the efficient administration of power, of schools in St. Landry-Paris are ran in accordance in the form of the political subdivision as such. And why I mentioned that it this case is synonymous to Philips because the, uh, the, uh, the board doesn't hire the superintendent. Or only hired the superintendent only, who, by constitutional Louisiana is a constitutional school officer. That's the only position they actually hire. Do they have anything to, do they have any kind of, uh, post-discharge proceedings, uh, that are heard by the board by, and, and, and a teacher that's fired? Yes, the, uh, the, they can reinstate that person. The superintendent acts, may, may I can introduce you to the matter where the superintendent decides to fire an individual, and they may act in here and see if there are any discrepancies that are not, that the superintendent may have fired them, that which is not in compliance with board policy on the issues of- Right, right, to overrule the superintendent on a termination. Yes. And over- If, if it's not in accordance to the policy, if, if superintendent didn't hire a fire in accordance to that policy set by the school board. Well, well, the board members are authorized. Are they not to act on behalf of the board with respect, or act as board members with respect to the expenditure of funds? The board, these policy, specifically says quote, in the Santa Clara School Board, policy manual, the board members are offices of the state, and they, no board member has the authority, individually to act for or bond people. No, no, no. I'm saying as a board member, though, you can vote on matters involving expenditures of funds
. Is that correct or- The board members does the, the board does approve the school budget, and that, that budget is a, a, a, a majority vote, which this has, 13th board members of the board of seven. He was collecting a check. He was voting with respect to the expenditure of, of funds. He was attending, he was attending the board meetings and voting with respect to other matters. You know, this court previously said an agent for the purpose of 66, 66 must be authorized to act on behalf of the agency with respect to the agency's funds. Would you have admitted that, that he can do that? And I agree. But however, it must be authorized to act in relation to the funds, the federal funds, that they actually receive when the school board, which the Constitution removes from the board. We have rejected that argument. That's right. We have rejected that argument that, that the function had to, right, relate directly to the federal funds before a violation of 66, 66, 66 was consummated. Oh, and I agree. But the board, the board is provided for by the legislature with state funds. What is your argument? I'm trying to get to, what is it? What is your strongest argument here? The argument is the, that it is constitutional as applied, and also the, the evidence was insufficient to prove the benefits that, and the value of the transaction being exceeding $5,000 as, as by the statute, because under, under 66, 6C, it exempts, bonafide, salary, wages, and fees. Now that might be your strongest argument. And I, I heard you say too much about that, however. He was convicted because they said he was, he accepted something of value and returned for possibly having missed the, cares maybe like the superintendent. And it's the transaction of value here, which, the, would be the salary, which the superintendent receives, which is approximately 120 grand by the indictment. However, the 66, 66, 6C exempts from the reach, bonafide, salary, wages, and fees, earned in a usual course of business. But the 6C, according to this court, and the seventh circuit, that's the exception contained in 666C for bonafide, wages, and salary, it pertains to the wrongdoing or the bribe itself, but not with respect to the transactional element of the offense. So, so it appears to me that, that you may be right with respect to the, with respect to the bribery part of it, is way, you can't look at his wages, but why can't, with respect to that anything of value and the bribery part of that statute? Why can't you look at the fact that he took $5,000 of government funds? Because actually in a statute, by definition it says it has to accept something of value in return in relation to be something of $5,000 value, the transaction of, the statute by itself and its plain wording makes clear that the anything of the, the $5,000 transactional value has to be valued, what the, what the person receives something of value and influence for, the statute doesn't say $5,000 in both areas, it says he just has to receive something of value. Does that 660C apply to the first part, the anything of value involving the bribe and not the transaction at the end of that section of the statute? Hasn't this court found that? Yes, actually, in Duval, in Duval, actually the court said, actually said that it is clear that the transaction, that the, anything of value has nothing to do with the statutory implications of 666, it is that the value exceeds $5,000 because 666 was an act to protect the integrity of funds
. The bribe has no value, however, they want to protect the funds that exceed $5,000 of federal funds. So yes, if Congress would have, we're hit or have wanted the bribe amount to pay for both, they would have said so. And also in this case, and, salinas, they actually, in every case that has been interpreted with 666A1B, the value of the transaction was what, what the person was receiving and return for the something of value that the, I guess, an innocent area recipient would have received. And so therefore, by that logic in the Lymphsickum and Marrajo and Salinas, Salinas was the only one that actually held where the bribe was used to satisfy both. However, it was used because the court was first faced with the question of, I'm sorry, I never had light on it, but you've saved some time for a bottle. Yes, sir. I'll give you a permission to make. May I please the court? I'm Camille Dome, appearing for the United States, who's the appellé in this case. And I will address the, basically, the three issues that counsel raised in argument and rely on my brief, the others, unless the members of the court have questions about those. Beginning first. I would like to say, you're directed to the statute. And it does, I mean, it's difficult to understand a lot of ways, but it seems to me that probably the better reading of it is that the thing of value that was issued in the transaction was, if anything, the salary of him, and if it was not the salary of him, it was nothing. Because the vote is worth nothing, standing in its abstract self. It's worth something only if it produces the result of getting the job for $120,000. So I don't know what the thing the value was that they were robbing him for, unless it was the salary. Well, the transaction was the vote. The thing of value is the money. I will give you $5,000 in exchange for your vote. And so the question becomes. But I mean, you can't set, you can't. What you're trying to do is make a stance on the head of a pen and say that the vote is not to be considered in any kind of context of what that vote meant
. And what it was meant to obtain. And that was meant to obtain $120,000 job. Well, and I'll address that in a minute, Judge, because you know, it's our alternative argument that you can use the $120,000 to value it. So I'll put that aside for a minute. But the vote is something of value. Now, it's an intangible. It's one worth of hope. Well, if the vote doesn't carry the day for the job that he was paying money for, it's value less. Well, but I would suggest your judge it was not value less. In this particular case, what eventually happens is Mr. Reachard stays on the school board. Even after he's indicted, and he votes for the other guy, and the other guy gets the job. So the vote is worth something. No, at a negative value, it looks to me. Well, but it was worth something to Mr. Brown, the man who eventually won. And if Mr. Kassmier would have gotten the vote, then it would have been worth something to him. Well, that's a big if. And that's why I'm saying you have to look at it in context. And in fact, that's exactly what seems to be your argument is that you look at it in context
. I mean, I guess our argument is that it is an intangible thing. The vote or the transaction is the vote. The thing of value is the $5,000. I say, I will give you $5,000 if you vote for me. Or I want $5,000 in order to vote for you. So the thing of value that's being solicited, the statute prohibits either accepting or soliciting a thing of value. That's the $5,000. Involving. Involving. Anything of a value of $5,000. And if this doesn't involve that salary of $120,000, it makes the whole case senseless. But that's the transaction, Judge. The vote is the transaction. The process of the voting, the process by which Mr. Casimir might have become the superintendent is the transaction. And that's what we have to value. That's what needs to be valued. I'm not real sure about that. And I agree. It's a hard statute to interpret, which brings it to the point of if we can't understand what the statute means. I mean, well, you're frowning at me
. I mean, I'm not just asking for that at all because you don't understand what I'm saying, which maybe I don't myself. But the vote itself, I'm not sure if that's a transaction. I guess it is the transaction, but it says that this is the way I read it, just parsing it down. Any person who demands anything of value from another person, which he was demanding his vote, as you say. I would say the thing of value is the $5,000. I want $5,000 to be- I thought I was talking, but I guess I wasn't. It's a great idea. No, I mean, that's our position. That the thing of value is when Mr. Reachard says, I want $5,000 to vote for you. That's the thing of value that he's soliciting. That's the thing of value that he ultimately accepted was $5,000. That's your position, I'm sorry. And the transaction is the process by which Mr. Casimir could become the superintendent of the St. Landry-Paris school district. That's the transaction. That's what we have to value. Let me read it again if you could be quiet and hold on just a minute. Anyone who demands anything of value from any person intended to reward him with a transaction or series, just a transaction, involved him. Another thing, this is an element of the statute, involved in anything of value of $5,000 more
. And if this doesn't involve transaction, doesn't involve the $120,000 job. I don't know what they were sitting down there trying to exchange money for. It doesn't involve the job. I mean, that's what it was all about. Okay, well that's what it says. Anything of value, $5,000 more. No, that's the transaction. That's the job. That's what I'm saying. So what's your problem? A problem seems to be you and Mr. May. I guess so. Judge, it's our position that the thing of value is the payment. I want $5,000 in cash. He actually wanted $7,500, but the victim says that's too much. So it was the cash value. If it was a dollar, that's not the anything of value is not the thing that has to be worth $5,000. The transaction has to be worth $5,000. So we have to value the transaction. How do we do that? In Marmalay how this court says that you look at ordinary means of valuing things. We look at a marketplace approach
. What is a willing buyer and a willing seller willing to do here? And so in this case, Mr. Reeshar was willing to accept $5,000 and Mr. Kett. This is what I'm saying is not true and what you're saying is true. Then why is section C here not unnecessary? And what is that name? If it says this section does not apply to bonafide salary or other such and so it's reimbursed in the course of business. If it doesn't involve that, why is that even there? How would you take that? I think I'm asking her. I don't believe I ask you, but I may have. The seventh circuit actually has a good case on this. I'll provide the court with a citation in a 28J. I believe the name of the case is Robinson. It really addresses this 666C exception. We want to make sure that this section is not applied to ordinary commercial transactions. To things conducted in the ordinary course of business where I say, I'll pay your salary if you do X for me. Well, you're entitled to your salary. If you've got the job and you acquired it in a legitimate, what we call a bonafide way under the statute, if you're entitled to that money anyway, then that's not the cost going to be bribery. You're entitled to it anyway. So we want to make sure that we're not applying the statute to ordinary commercial transactions. In this circuit in Marmalayho, in Futonov. I ask you, can you give me a hypothetical, the kind of situation that would be a potential crime under this statute to which sections C would operate as an exception, would operate to exonerate the, or fail to make it a crime. I think that's the point, Judge. We want to make sure we're not making it. Can you? I'm asking you for a hypothetical. Just put it out very calmly in straight language so I can understand it. The difficulty is that it's not a crime. The difficulty is it means something that I said, and not something that you said, unless it means nothing. No, it certainly means something. I mean, we want to make sure. Okay. Just calm down. Ask, just tell me what does it mean in terms of a hypothetical? How would it apply? Create the situation for me as to how you would apply. You may be, well, I'm open on this thing, actually. On, if I can say this first, in footnote 5 of Marmalayho, this court says, Do you understand? I ask you for an illustration. Don't give me footnotes. Give me an illustration. Well, we know that it can't apply, it doesn't apply to the $10,000. So, I guess maybe you would have a situation. Just go ahead with the argument. Where there would be, Judge, I'm trying to think that, you know, maybe there'd be a situation where. You may as you can't think of it. Why you're beating around the bush and going under this door and that door trying to get out of. Did the exception have anything to do with this trial? No, Your Honor. The jury was instructed that it, that it could not consider bonafights' hourly
. Can you? I'm asking you for a hypothetical. Just put it out very calmly in straight language so I can understand it. The difficulty is that it's not a crime. The difficulty is it means something that I said, and not something that you said, unless it means nothing. No, it certainly means something. I mean, we want to make sure. Okay. Just calm down. Ask, just tell me what does it mean in terms of a hypothetical? How would it apply? Create the situation for me as to how you would apply. You may be, well, I'm open on this thing, actually. On, if I can say this first, in footnote 5 of Marmalayho, this court says, Do you understand? I ask you for an illustration. Don't give me footnotes. Give me an illustration. Well, we know that it can't apply, it doesn't apply to the $10,000. So, I guess maybe you would have a situation. Just go ahead with the argument. Where there would be, Judge, I'm trying to think that, you know, maybe there'd be a situation where. You may as you can't think of it. Why you're beating around the bush and going under this door and that door trying to get out of. Did the exception have anything to do with this trial? No, Your Honor. The jury was instructed that it, that it could not consider bonafights' hourly. And William says that that's a jury question. And the jury was instructed that it couldn't consider bonafights' hourly. Now, the argument in the motion to dismiss and the argument on appeal is that you can't use the 120 to value the transaction. And we say, well, yes, you can because this was not bonafight. And Judge, that's my problem. The whole reason for the exception is to say this is not a crime. So it's hard for me to come up with a hypothetical in which I can say, well, that wouldn't be a prosecution because it wouldn't be a crime. So let's say, for example, that Mr. Casamere got the job legitimately that the school board member went to him and said, I want you to do X, Y, and Z for me. And we will pay you your salary if you do it. Well, you saw the crime because he's entitled to the salary. It's in the ordinary court. Yes, sir. Absurd. That's my point, Judge. As illustration, that kind of thing is not going to happen. Man has added, he had, they don't pay a salary. It's under contract. So they can't bribe him from the salary that's already established. So that is in my opinion, no good. Suppose you bribe somebody to give your girlfriend a job
. And William says that that's a jury question. And the jury was instructed that it couldn't consider bonafights' hourly. Now, the argument in the motion to dismiss and the argument on appeal is that you can't use the 120 to value the transaction. And we say, well, yes, you can because this was not bonafight. And Judge, that's my problem. The whole reason for the exception is to say this is not a crime. So it's hard for me to come up with a hypothetical in which I can say, well, that wouldn't be a prosecution because it wouldn't be a crime. So let's say, for example, that Mr. Casamere got the job legitimately that the school board member went to him and said, I want you to do X, Y, and Z for me. And we will pay you your salary if you do it. Well, you saw the crime because he's entitled to the salary. It's in the ordinary court. Yes, sir. Absurd. That's my point, Judge. As illustration, that kind of thing is not going to happen. Man has added, he had, they don't pay a salary. It's under contract. So they can't bribe him from the salary that's already established. So that is in my opinion, no good. Suppose you bribe somebody to give your girlfriend a job. That would clearly violate the statute, would it not? It is the payment of wages, but it's not bonafighted payment of wages because she's the boom, boom girl. And that is the six-circuit case in Mills, which is different from all of the other circuits. That's exactly what happened in Mills. You had someone who solicited payments to give their friend jobs. And the six-circuit in Mills found that that was barred by the bonafight exception. But that's a minority opinion. But that is an example. Six-circuit. That is a six-circuit opinion. That is more or less for the duod expressed, it's not even the six-circuit. Is the consistent with, excuse me. What I have expressed here in terms of the interpretation of that exception. Well, what the six-circuit said in Mills is that these... You're not answering my question. Can you? Well, I think, yes, Judge, in the sense that what the six-circuit in Mills, that all said was, that's a job and that's a salary. And so you can't use the salary to value it. But I will tell you that there are other circuits that go the other way. The seven-circuit in Robinson, this circuit arguably, if you look at the Williams case, which did use salary now, well, it did say that that's not quite accurate. In Williams, that's a little hard to figure out what this court's concern was
. That would clearly violate the statute, would it not? It is the payment of wages, but it's not bonafighted payment of wages because she's the boom, boom girl. And that is the six-circuit case in Mills, which is different from all of the other circuits. That's exactly what happened in Mills. You had someone who solicited payments to give their friend jobs. And the six-circuit in Mills found that that was barred by the bonafight exception. But that's a minority opinion. But that is an example. Six-circuit. That is a six-circuit opinion. That is more or less for the duod expressed, it's not even the six-circuit. Is the consistent with, excuse me. What I have expressed here in terms of the interpretation of that exception. Well, what the six-circuit said in Mills is that these... You're not answering my question. Can you? Well, I think, yes, Judge, in the sense that what the six-circuit in Mills, that all said was, that's a job and that's a salary. And so you can't use the salary to value it. But I will tell you that there are other circuits that go the other way. The seven-circuit in Robinson, this circuit arguably, if you look at the Williams case, which did use salary now, well, it did say that that's not quite accurate. In Williams, that's a little hard to figure out what this court's concern was. It just simply said, it's not bonafight. The way those people got their payments wasn't bonafight. And it's hard to tell whether this court's complaining about the fact that the people didn't work for the money or that they didn't get the job legitimately. It would be our position that if Mr. Cassidy or doesn't get the job legitimately, because he paid for votes of people that otherwise wouldn't have voted for him, we think Mr. Reachart probably wouldn't have voted for him if there wasn't the payment, and in fact, never ultimately voted for him, then that's not bonafight salary. And that's the government's position here. Let me ask you something, if you don't mind. If I were to assume that the 666C exception applied to the bribery part of the statute, and not the transactional element of the offense, if I were to assume that, my question is, can the $5,000 bribe that Mr. Reachart received, or even the total of $10,000, can that be used to satisfy both the bribery part of this statute, as well as the transactional element of the statute? Yes, that's the government's position, and this is what I was trying to address in footnote 5 in Marmalayo. This court says in footnote 5 in Marmalayo that the exception is not intended to apply to the $10,000. It's intended to apply to the criminal act, the bribery part of it. And so in Marmalayo, I'm talking about the $10,000. I'm talking about the $5,000 transaction element at the end of this statute. Can that be satisfied, assuming that that 666C exception only applies to the bribery part of that part of the trial? That's our exception. My question is, can the bribe itself be used to satisfy the anything of value, the bribery part of the statute, as well as the transactional element part of the statute? Yes, because that's exactly what happened in Marmalayo. In Marmalayo, and Judge Jalyew were on the panel in Marmalayo. That's true. It's true. The defendant in that case paid a bribe to the prison official. That was the case that eventually became Salinas in the Supreme Court
. It just simply said, it's not bonafight. The way those people got their payments wasn't bonafight. And it's hard to tell whether this court's complaining about the fact that the people didn't work for the money or that they didn't get the job legitimately. It would be our position that if Mr. Cassidy or doesn't get the job legitimately, because he paid for votes of people that otherwise wouldn't have voted for him, we think Mr. Reachart probably wouldn't have voted for him if there wasn't the payment, and in fact, never ultimately voted for him, then that's not bonafight salary. And that's the government's position here. Let me ask you something, if you don't mind. If I were to assume that the 666C exception applied to the bribery part of the statute, and not the transactional element of the offense, if I were to assume that, my question is, can the $5,000 bribe that Mr. Reachart received, or even the total of $10,000, can that be used to satisfy both the bribery part of this statute, as well as the transactional element of the statute? Yes, that's the government's position, and this is what I was trying to address in footnote 5 in Marmalayo. This court says in footnote 5 in Marmalayo that the exception is not intended to apply to the $10,000. It's intended to apply to the criminal act, the bribery part of it. And so in Marmalayo, I'm talking about the $10,000. I'm talking about the $5,000 transaction element at the end of this statute. Can that be satisfied, assuming that that 666C exception only applies to the bribery part of that part of the trial? That's our exception. My question is, can the bribe itself be used to satisfy the anything of value, the bribery part of the statute, as well as the transactional element part of the statute? Yes, because that's exactly what happened in Marmalayo. In Marmalayo, and Judge Jalyew were on the panel in Marmalayo. That's true. It's true. The defendant in that case paid a bribe to the prison official. That was the case that eventually became Salinas in the Supreme Court. Paid a bribe of, I think it was $5,000 plus $1,000, $6,000, that was used to value the transaction, and it was also the bribe. That's exactly what happened in Marmalayo. And the issue there was, can this statute, can the thing of value, pertain to something intangible like a conjugal visit? But under that theory, you don't even have to debate the salary part of this, whether that uses salary because you can just use the bribe itself. If your theory is correct. That's correct. And that's the government's position, that you don't even have to get into the complicated analysis of the bona fide salary exception, because under Marmalayo, we can look at what a willing person would pay and what someone else would say. Talking about that, was even more abstract than a vote. You're talking about sex. But it's a market price of sex in an institution. And I don't, I mean, it was a real stretch to try to get that under this statute in Marmalayo. Well, there were two issues, of course, in Marmalayo. One, how do you give market value to sex? How do you, to sex? I don't know. And that's what the court said. There was one of two points on that. One, is the statute, can it apply to intangible? What's the word, terribly? Can it apply to intangibles? Yes, that's what this court said. And two, how do we value an intangible? And in Marmalayo, somebody was willing to pay $5,000 to have a conjugal visit with their girlfriend. I don't understand why Judge Jolly's theory wouldn't cut the legs out from under the entire statute, as far as bribery of public officials for their votes is concerned. I just don't understand it, because if you say that the amount that you pay is influences your vote, and your vote has no price or no value, then you can never criminalize bribe under this statute, which is quite the opposite of what it's intended to do. And we would accept for the fact, and that's what we're talking about, is that we're talking about intangibles here. And when they're not intangibles, like votes or sex, which I don't think really is the common sort of bribe that is prosecuted under here, usually cash money or more specific tangible favors. Otherwise, it doesn't apply, and it would have application only
. Paid a bribe of, I think it was $5,000 plus $1,000, $6,000, that was used to value the transaction, and it was also the bribe. That's exactly what happened in Marmalayo. And the issue there was, can this statute, can the thing of value, pertain to something intangible like a conjugal visit? But under that theory, you don't even have to debate the salary part of this, whether that uses salary because you can just use the bribe itself. If your theory is correct. That's correct. And that's the government's position, that you don't even have to get into the complicated analysis of the bona fide salary exception, because under Marmalayo, we can look at what a willing person would pay and what someone else would say. Talking about that, was even more abstract than a vote. You're talking about sex. But it's a market price of sex in an institution. And I don't, I mean, it was a real stretch to try to get that under this statute in Marmalayo. Well, there were two issues, of course, in Marmalayo. One, how do you give market value to sex? How do you, to sex? I don't know. And that's what the court said. There was one of two points on that. One, is the statute, can it apply to intangible? What's the word, terribly? Can it apply to intangibles? Yes, that's what this court said. And two, how do we value an intangible? And in Marmalayo, somebody was willing to pay $5,000 to have a conjugal visit with their girlfriend. I don't understand why Judge Jolly's theory wouldn't cut the legs out from under the entire statute, as far as bribery of public officials for their votes is concerned. I just don't understand it, because if you say that the amount that you pay is influences your vote, and your vote has no price or no value, then you can never criminalize bribe under this statute, which is quite the opposite of what it's intended to do. And we would accept for the fact, and that's what we're talking about, is that we're talking about intangibles here. And when they're not intangibles, like votes or sex, which I don't think really is the common sort of bribe that is prosecuted under here, usually cash money or more specific tangible favors. Otherwise, it doesn't apply, and it would have application only. And limited application only seems to me in these abstract abstractions, where the government is the prosecute and everything that raises its head in local corruption. Well, it is. He is what? Well, prosecuting everything that raises its head in local corruption. No, that's what I'm saying. And doing so prosecute and everything, it stretches from time to time, and this is the strategy. I don't know what Mayor Nagan was convicted of, but I do know that we recently affirmed a conviction of about three public officials in Dallas who were taking bribe to influence their votes on the Planning and Zoning Commission. And that is true. I mean, for people who serve on city councils and school boards, that is what they have that's valuable. Their ability to influence, judge Africa asked if these individuals on the school board can dictate the way money spent. Absolutely. The trial testimony from John Miller is that the superintendent would put proposals before the board. The board would vote on them, and those decisions would determine how money is spent. And $19 million of that money is federal money. And this is what 666 was at least in part intended to address. So for someone who's a member of a school board, the vote, though it's intangible, is what he has that's valuable. That's the coin of the realm. Well, we do know that Mr. Rechart and Mr. Miller each valued their vote at $5,000. Absolutely. Because that's what they were looking for
. And limited application only seems to me in these abstract abstractions, where the government is the prosecute and everything that raises its head in local corruption. Well, it is. He is what? Well, prosecuting everything that raises its head in local corruption. No, that's what I'm saying. And doing so prosecute and everything, it stretches from time to time, and this is the strategy. I don't know what Mayor Nagan was convicted of, but I do know that we recently affirmed a conviction of about three public officials in Dallas who were taking bribe to influence their votes on the Planning and Zoning Commission. And that is true. I mean, for people who serve on city councils and school boards, that is what they have that's valuable. Their ability to influence, judge Africa asked if these individuals on the school board can dictate the way money spent. Absolutely. The trial testimony from John Miller is that the superintendent would put proposals before the board. The board would vote on them, and those decisions would determine how money is spent. And $19 million of that money is federal money. And this is what 666 was at least in part intended to address. So for someone who's a member of a school board, the vote, though it's intangible, is what he has that's valuable. That's the coin of the realm. Well, we do know that Mr. Rechart and Mr. Miller each valued their vote at $5,000. Absolutely. Because that's what they were looking for. Absolutely. Actually more than that, $7,500 is what they asked for, right? They valued it just like in Marmaladejo, the prison of the... I get for what they could get for it. They just like sex. Which I mean, it has no market value, no established market value. Okay, there you go. We'll hear the next model. So what's going to be our votes on a panel word, Judge Dolly? I think I'll save that for another day. Well, the Mastercard commercial, it has no value. These guys grade my papers, so I'm staying out of this. Who came, Mr. Rechart? You're on just to rebut the points that she was trying to make. She's represented in the case of Marmaladejo, and of course the court is well aware of that being a case in which defendant paid... I mean, not the defendant, the prisoner paid the share of full contractual visits. The court was first faced with the question of whether $666 covers intangible things at all. And they said they did. Once the day terminated, the government's intangible things, they went on to find the value, how to value the things
. Absolutely. Actually more than that, $7,500 is what they asked for, right? They valued it just like in Marmaladejo, the prison of the... I get for what they could get for it. They just like sex. Which I mean, it has no market value, no established market value. Okay, there you go. We'll hear the next model. So what's going to be our votes on a panel word, Judge Dolly? I think I'll save that for another day. Well, the Mastercard commercial, it has no value. These guys grade my papers, so I'm staying out of this. Who came, Mr. Rechart? You're on just to rebut the points that she was trying to make. She's represented in the case of Marmaladejo, and of course the court is well aware of that being a case in which defendant paid... I mean, not the defendant, the prisoner paid the share of full contractual visits. The court was first faced with the question of whether $666 covers intangible things at all. And they said they did. Once the day terminated, the government's intangible things, they went on to find the value, how to value the things. And the court actually said they didn't value it from a perspective of what the share was going to say. They said because the prisoner was willing to pay that amount of money to the share that the value had exceeded $5,000. Whereas here, the federal government actually provided Mr. Karen Mill with that money. Not Mr. Karen's, but himself. So by the logic in Marmaladejo, that bill would have a value to the federal government, not necessarily Mr. Kazner, because the federal government would be in the shoes as the prisoner in Marmaladejo. Marmaladejo, because they didn't value it from what the share was willing to receive. They valued it from what the prisoner was willing to pay for. And here, the federal government was willing to pay $5,000 for it because that money is unkind. It is not an issue that the federal government provided that money to Mr. Kazner to provide to Mr. Resort. And the next point is the exception that the government was trying to speak of. In Mills, they found that the exception was applicable. As in Mills, the government tried to argue the procurement process was illegal. Thus, it could not be bona fide wages salary and things of that nature. The court in Mills said that they took the legs from that argument because they said the government never alleged that the positions were unnecessary or things of that nature. But here, I think the difference here though is that exception applies to bona fide salary paid in the ordinary course of business. And it is not the ordinary course of business for a superintendent candidate to bribe his way into his job
. And the court actually said they didn't value it from a perspective of what the share was going to say. They said because the prisoner was willing to pay that amount of money to the share that the value had exceeded $5,000. Whereas here, the federal government actually provided Mr. Karen Mill with that money. Not Mr. Karen's, but himself. So by the logic in Marmaladejo, that bill would have a value to the federal government, not necessarily Mr. Kazner, because the federal government would be in the shoes as the prisoner in Marmaladejo. Marmaladejo, because they didn't value it from what the share was willing to receive. They valued it from what the prisoner was willing to pay for. And here, the federal government was willing to pay $5,000 for it because that money is unkind. It is not an issue that the federal government provided that money to Mr. Kazner to provide to Mr. Resort. And the next point is the exception that the government was trying to speak of. In Mills, they found that the exception was applicable. As in Mills, the government tried to argue the procurement process was illegal. Thus, it could not be bona fide wages salary and things of that nature. The court in Mills said that they took the legs from that argument because they said the government never alleged that the positions were unnecessary or things of that nature. But here, I think the difference here though is that exception applies to bona fide salary paid in the ordinary course of business. And it is not the ordinary course of business for a superintendent candidate to bribe his way into his job. No, the ordinary course of business is for the school board to elect a superintendent. That is the business of the school board. But if you do it by bribing the vote. And actually, Mills actually addressed that issue. And they said the positions were necessary. The government didn't argue that they weren't necessary. So how can the money that they received not be bona fide if they actually performed the work? As here, if elected, 120,000 was the actual bona fide salary of the superintendent. So therefore, if he performed the work, then how can they not be bona fide wages? However, in the case in which the grubs, the United States versus grubs, they addressed this issue in grubs the defendant paid money because he needed two years extra employment by the sheriff's office to get his retirement. And so in exchange for the campaign contribution, he was created a position and gave salary with that nature in which in that position, he did little to no work, no functions at all, and barely showed up. The court in grubs said that that's not bona fide because he didn't do anything and was a position created. Whereas in contrast to here, the Sanland Superior School Board was looking for a superintendent. By constitution, they need a superintendent. And unless Casimir, who does no work at all, then how can every dollar that he makes not be bona fide? Exceptions does not speak to the procurement process. It just says, bona fide wages fees paid in a usual course of business, which payments to the superintendent would be. And also, if there is this confusion as to whether it applies or not, at some point in time, how does the concept of lightning apply to Mr. Reshore? And he gets the favor of it being bona fide salary, ways of fees. Look that in favor of him because of the ambiguity in which it is applied. And so with that being said, we feel that the exception not only relates to the salary of wages and fees, however, it also applies to the $10,000 because the exception says, this section, IE, section 666, does not apply to salary wages and fees. So at that point in time, it is valuing the transactional amounts which invoke the jurisdiction of this court. It doesn't say on the salary it can apply to, it just says this section, which is 18 U.S
.C. 666. Mr. Reshore, thank you very much. Appreciate your argument. I hope you had been on the board