Legal Case Summary

All right, this is Mitchell. So we're ready for you. Good morning. Mr. Chief Judge, your honors. May it please the court. My name is Greg Mitchell. I'm a counsel for the appellant John Giddner. The crux of this case is very simple. Mr. Giddner was statutorily entitled to a hearing under 28 USC Section 30205, C5, but was not granted one. The purpose of this statute is to protect the debtor. The effect of the government's arguments would instead exploit the debtor and leave the debtor with no legal remedy for a wrongful garnishment. The case at bar arises from a crime committed by Mr. Giddner's wife, Ms. Engelman prior to their marriage. Part of her sentence was a restitution find that the government sought to assess against Mr. Giddner's property after their marriage. Property he believes to be separate property under Texas law. Mr. Giddner sought a hearing to prove the characterization of the property as separate property, but his request was summarily denied, and a final order of garnishment was issued. The judgment of the trial court, therefore in this matter, should be reversed. The final order of garnishment quashed, and the case remanded for the mandatory hearing under Section 30205, for the following three reasons. Number one, Mr. Giddner was indeed objecting to the garnish. He's answer, and so therefore correctly requested a hearing under Section 30205

. Second, Mr. Giddner correctly stated the grounds for his objection and writing. The hearing is where he would have properly carried the burden of proof. And finally, third, simply put, shall mean shall, and therefore the statute service requirement is not a prerequisite for the mandatory hearing requirement. What's the level of specificity required for the objection to fully envelop the answer? Well, Your Honor, I would submit that the bar is relatively low. The statute simply says the party objecting shall state the grounds for the objection. The Mr. Giddner listed in the objection that was filed, that he objected to the garnishment based on the fact that he believed the property was separate property under Texas law. That's all he listed. I don't believe that there's any sort of summary judgment type proof requirement that specifically laid out in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It simply says that. And so I think that adding to that, if Congress intended for it to be more stringent than that, I think they would have put in more specificity as they do with a summary judgment type level of proof. It seems to me from looking at the record and the briefs that the the the the rid of garnishment said to the banks, just tell us all the property you have. And then when the judge issued, I guess the order of garnishing the property, she reduced the property of the bank to half. But I believe that Mr. Giddner wanted a chance to argue that 100% of the property was not subject to seizure of our garnishment because it was his separate property under his separate management. Is that correct? Have I read that correctly? Well, I think that's close. I think his his primary argument was that the property was actually separate property. But apparently under some situation, even if it's separate, there can be garnishment apart. I believe based on Texas law, but as I got into those things, I thought, well, I guess that's what he would have wanted to explain as a hearing and get into what Texas law is. Right. Exactly. And my brief didn't go into a whole lot of detail about that because of that very reason. I feel like that if the court were to agree, I think the appropriate forum for those arguments is on remained at the trowel. Didn't there be some

. I'm a face is showing that separate property and not subject to garnish. I mean, you just validate say I want a hearing and the judge says, why should I drag everybody down here if there's not any kind of a colorable argument that is in fact separate property? Well, I guess I would I would start by pointing back to the statute that the statute doesn't doesn't add those those requirements. All right. Let's let's say harmless error on this in this on our end. Is there anything in the record that shows us that there's a colorable argument that the funds in these accounts were separate property? Other than just the argument that it is, I don't know that there is, but I would simply respectfully suggest that the statute doesn't require that. The statute simply says state the grounds therefore it doesn't say prove it. And I think under normal motion practice, that's what happens. It's a movement files a file's emotion stating general grounds. The respond and files a response stating general grounds why they object. And then it's the hearing where both sides put on there. Typically many and at least money in a bank account. Under Texas laws, presumed to be community. And if you you're claiming it separate, you need to say well, no, it's not because I just sold a piece of real estate that was separate property and these are funds that I can trace them. I mean, just as a practical matter, you know, we shouldn't say I don't think that just because you say you say an employee it's separate property period that the court has no discretion. At all, do anything other than have a face to face hearing and court. I do believe that Mr. Giddner in this case did specify the argument and certainly in a general fashion that it was separate property as retirement funds. I think retirement funds was specific. That's one thing, but in a checking account, sightings accounts harder to argue that, isn't it? And I agree and I think the focus of our argument was the retirement funds as opposed to the checking account which there's an argument, but I think it was certainly not as strong an argument as the retirement funds. There's something about this that's, you know, not as clear as you want to make it. I mean, due respect to a colleague to the left, it's just your judges are not sleep at the wheel. I mean, Judge Ball is very able and, you know, handles her docket and knows what's here and is not unwilling to have a hearing and so on and so forth. So, you know, when I look at it, not that any judge is not, is infallible that error can't be made but, you know, having been a trial judge myself. I mean, there are times when this is just not zero and in when somebody's just saying just because, you know, I'm entitled to it. If, as Judge I want you to say something more than here's the statute, I'm entitled to it

. Give it to me. No showing whatsoever that that's not an exercise and futility. So, it is you say, well, the statute doesn't say, you know, any more specific, but if you're standing up there at the judge, you want to crank up a hearing. Surely it's not the case. We're going to say, take it out of this context. I think of a lot of context where, you know, a hearing quote unquote, my ordinarily be the case, but the judge is going to want to know, okay, what are we going to do at the hearing? What are you putting on? You have it in an expert. What's the showing you want to make? You know, something beyond just, okay, here's rule 65, you know, that says you got a hearing. But I guess more to the real point is that even if we say assuming without deciding that it was error for the district court not the grant to hearing, that no showing is made, that there was any harm done because no callable claim is made here. Nothing is pointed to us in the record to indicate other than just the emptiness of making the judge have the hearing of what in the world would be produced. So, it's not enough to just say there's a statute read it, if I want to say it. So, even if we agree with you, I'm not saying I do, but even if we agree with you, the better practice would be to have the hearing or yes, facial it, it's there. Don't you have some requirement of articulating a principal basis for the hearing what's shown. Now, I understand in the matter of trial strategy, you know, people don't want to show their cards and, you know, pull all the stops. And that's not the guts of my point of I got unfold, you know, who's going to testify on that thing. But something beyond just, I get a hearing judge, give it to me. You don't give it to me. I'm going to the 5th Circuit and get you a record. You follow the tenor of my question? I understand that you're on a point and certainly there's got to be some level of judicial discretion. I mean, to a judge, a lawyer's court is like any other federal district court, they have a large dock in it. And certainly their time is valuable. I guess I would start simply with the language of the statute from my perspective, doesn't give a lot of discretion. And certainly there are statutes. I think it's 30-13 that gives a district court kind of general discretion. But it seems to me that the explicit language of the statute would kind of trump that that general discretion is for the point. He said, assuming without deciding that we say yes, or hearing was required, we are now on appeal

. And we've got to have some harm shown for us to reverse and send back. Well, I think the harm, and I think there is sufficient evidence in the record from a standpoint of the communications that went on between the debtor and the US Attorney's Office. The harm is that we've got at least $80,000 that is Mr. Giddner's retirement funds that he was planning on living on for the rest of his life. So, I mean, certainly not suggesting that the district court was asleep at the will, but I think it's at least possible that in a rush to manage a docket, and I think if you look at the very first order that Judge Boyle issued, it was very summary in its finding that Mr. Giddner didn't prove his case. And so, I think that certainly is too far because I think the statute doesn't say that he has to prove his case. What that level of proof is, it's certainly arguable that I would have a better, stronger case standing here today if he had given a little more substance. But I think that I would go back to the purpose of the statute being to protect the debtor, I think the trial court in this court would want to be on the side of interpreting the statute, shall mean shall. And, you know, to the extent that there's any conflicting authority out there, I think if it was, you know, went up to a higher level, I would certainly want to be on the side of interpreting the shall mean shall. What is in the record that indicates these funds work separate property retirement funds? There may be additional, but the ones that the evidence that comes to mind, I believe it's pages 166 through 168 of the record, it may go on to 171. There's communications that occurred between the debtor and the US attorney's office that were filed. Now, the US attorney has an opinion regarding the propriety of these communications being in the record, but nevertheless they are in the record, and they weren't confidential in any way. Miss Engelman took a lot of information regarding the retirement funds and filed it with the court, and it's in the court's record, but specifically there's these communications that are in those pages where the US attorney actually seems to indicate that there's nothing absolutely definitive, but seems to indicate that they agree that the funds are retirement funds. In one communication, it talks about some $3,000 that was arguable, and they wanted a response, and previous counsel for appellant provided that response, and the subsequent communication indicated that the US attorney even agreed with that, but it was only subsequent to that that changed their mind, filed a motion to get a final rid of garnishment and the garnishment was issued. So, I think there is evidence in the record that nothing else is coming to mind immediately, but I think those communications certainly indicate that the retirement funds are community property in Texas unless they're separate funds, right? My reading of Texas law is that retirement funds that were... They're accessible on the horse. They are... They're extended their community property. To the extent that they were earned prior to the marriage, which all of these retirement funds were.

.. Were those those who were separate funds? Are there evidence that some of this was earned prior to the marriage? Only the communications that suggests that the US attorney agreed that there was a lot of the actual statements that indicate that they were... That the funds were there, and I think the statements go back several years, and what you see in the statements is that nothing has changed. And I think in one of the US attorney's briefs, it made the argument that will any property that's added to retirement funds after the fact are community property and can be divisible on divorce. But if you follow, and certainly there has to be a little bit of reading into the documents because it doesn't ever specifically say that nothing was added. But by looking at the balances and seeing that the balances don't change or that the only change in the balances are fluctuations based on the market in what the funds were invested in, you see that nothing has been added since the marriage... Is there anything in the record? I think earlier in the case there had been a motion to quash the subpoena to the bank. Were those documents in the record? I believe the documents were. I have the record on my computer and I can try and respond on rebuttal. But I'm pretty certain that there were documents related to the motion to quash, but I think the communications that went back and forth suggested that Mr. Giddner, although he attempted to, never actually filed it with the court. I think what he did is he mailed it to the US attorney's office, didn't send it to the clerk. So I believe that certainly the court could have interpreted that as a filing and treated that as a filing. It did not and that's it is not the primary focus of our arguments but nevertheless there was at least an attempt made to respond to the initial word of garnishment. But again, we would argue that the 32.05 is broad enough to encompass any argument with respect to the garnishment. I would refer the court to the Crowther case that's in my brief. It was out of another district court in the Northern District of Texas in which Judge Godby specifically found that an answer filed after the court was filed. After the answer was still valid and that case the debtor was attempting to make an argument that they couldn't afford to pay the garnishment. And the court looked at Section 302.02D which is the section that allows you to object after the initial word of garnishment and realize that that section is very limited in the objections that you can make

. And it went on to find specifically that although 32.02D is limited, 32.05 is not so limited and that it can pretty much allow for any objection including an objection that's limited to the garnishment. And of course our argument is that the objection was not, it was in fact to the garnishment because he had no reason to believe that he had to object until he saw the garnishment. He's answered which suggested that his retirement funds were subject to the writ. So I see that I'm out of time. Thank you. You've reserved your rebuttal time. Thank you, Judge. Man, please the court. Good morning, Your Honours. I'm Megan Fehie, on behalf of the United States of America. This call. The number of cases below. Yes, Your Honor. I have been involved with this case prior to the garnishment through the bankruptcy and the entire time Your Honor. Good. Keep it per se. This case is essentially about the ability of a trial court to control its own docket and whether or not it abused its discretion and properly denied Mr. Gibner's hearing request and properly adjudicated the issues pending before it when Mr. Gibner failed to request a section 32.02D hearing. Fail to file motion to cross rates of garnishment. Fail to file any other motions, evidence or briefing at any time to put the issues properly before the court and fail to comply with the statutory requirements contained within section 32.02

.02.5C5 itself. There are effectively three interrelated issues on appeal in this case. One is whether or not the trial court abused its discretion and denied Mr. Gibner's section 32.05C5 hearing request. Whether or not Mr. Gibner waived his right to put the separate property issue before the court and whether or not Mr. Gibner's due process rights were violated in this case. At the heart of its case is effectively the section 32.05C5 hearing and to fully understand this statute it's important to understand its statutory framework. It's one of two hearings that may be held in post-judgment garnishment actions in which the United States is enforcing debt owed to it. The other statute being section 32.02D, it's a statute that's permitted. It's a hearing that a party who's objecting to the government sees your assets can claim in any of the subchapter C post-judgment enforcement actions. It's limited to certain issues that may be heard of the hearing including. Yes, Your Honor. Question, are you arguing that the objection that Mr. Gibner made could have been raised under 32.02D? Yes, Your Honor. Your last section. It's section 32.02D and really his appellate brief hits the argument that he should have been making at the trial court. It's in paragraph 61 to 63 on page 36 of his brief. His argument was that the United States sees to separate property thereby not complying with the statutory requirements for the issuance of a writ of garnishment which is one of the requirements in section 32

.05A. So when I read 32.02D, I see the probable validity of a claim for exemption and there's a specific list of exemptions and this doesn't fit. That's not been raised as an issue in this case. And then three is certain issues regarding default judgments. That's not applicable. The second is failure to imply with statutory requirements for the issuance of a writ. So what statutory requirements? That would be under 28 USC section 32.05A that the United States is able to seize property in which the debtor has a substantial non-exempt interest. How does the debtor know? So am I like Mr. Gibner? No, what's being seized until they see the answer? There may not be any objection. Maybe that came back and said no, we have no property in which Mrs. Gibner had a substantial interest. Then Mr. Gibner would have been perfectly satisfied with that. He would have had no reason to object. So how does he know what's going to be in the answer as being represented to be the debtor having a substantial interest until he sees the answer? Well, your honor, when he served with a garnishment paperwork, which is required to be served on any interested party as well as the judgment debtor, he understands which institutions and which garnishes are at issue and at that point in time he can understand what the potential arguments are. But in addition, in this particular case, when he actually received the garnishes answers prior to receiving the garnishment paperwork, in fact from the Judge denied a C5 hearing request, he still had 16 days to request a section 32 to D hearing. And there's always the opportunity for the court to entertain a motion to reconsider because he was substantially prejudiced because he wasn't aware of the information. But he made the substantive arguments. He just didn't use the right numbers, right? He didn't use the correct procedural mechanisms to put it in front of the court. He objected. He put the grounds in. And you're saying if he just said 3202 D instead of 3205 C, it would have been okay. He could have held a hearing, but it also goes back to what the court was referring earlier clearly explaining the objection and providing a reasonable for the court

. Well, did he say, I think you're going after my separate property. Why isn't that enough? Because he never put any evidence before the court. I don't see any requirement in that rule that you have to put evidence in your objection. No, that's correct, Your Honor. But what he didn't do is under the seat, all he requested was the C5 hearing. When he appeared in this case, he effectively said three things. One, I want a section 3205 C5 hearing. Two, I don't owe any money to the government. It's my wife's debt. And three, I object because it's my separate property. The court correctly determined had the ability to deny the C5 hearing request. Why? Because he failed to comply with the statutory requirements. My question is if he had said 3202 D instead of 3205, would that have been sufficient? Would he put in that objection been sufficient? Yes, Your Honor. But that's not what he did. And all the court had before it was a section 3205 C5 hearing request. With improper grounds stated that go beyond the scope of a C5 hearing? On any cases that say that this kind of objection to the separate or community nature of property should be under 3202 D hearing. No, Your Honor. Not that I'm aware of. Do you, is there evidence in this record that these retirement funds are part of them are his separate property? No, Your Honor. There's been no evidence at any point in this case presented, even in the motion for new trial or anywhere else that would trace this money or give any callable claim that this is separate property. The only thing that Mr. Ginner has cited were those email communications where after the Mr. Ginner C5 hearing request was denied. The government and Mr. Ginner's council at that time attempted to communicate and the government was receiving quite a lot of additional records that it received that it did not have in addition to the subpoena

. And the requested documents in the United States tried to obtain before starting this garnishment action. And what the government did at that time was to create a money flow chart and try to go back and trace the assets that were seized back to the Maryland account that Mr. Ginner says was what was actually seized. And those email communications, I think Mr. Ginner has misinterpreted what they meant. They're taken out of context. They're cherry picked communications. They're referencing documents that are not a part of the record on appeal. They were attached in about 120 pages from a letter. Mr. Ginner sent to council for the government and it was inserted behind metal records and police reports and some other financial records. In this statement about I'm okay with the $3,000 or the email says something to that effect. Really meant that the government at that time was tracing the seized accounts back to a certain period of time and a $3,000 unexplained cash deposit came in. At that point in time, council for the government asked Mr. Ginner's attorney to explain that and said okay so we've seized that that came from a separate property source. But at no time did that email ever reference the fact that the accounts had an issue and how far the tracing had been had actually gone all the way back to Mr. Ginner's premarital assets. There are copies of some statements in those records that had dates on them prior to his marriage. Yes and those were Maryland's accounts and what was seized in this case were Raymond James and J.P. Morgan. And what the government at that time was trying to do was trace them back through the cash out and the reinvestments and the property that he earned after marriage versus property he had before marriage and the United States was never able to clearly trace it back there. Did you think that what would have happened to the hearing? Yes your honor. Which is what the government was trying to do rather than running up unnecessary legal expenses on Mr. Ginner or wasting the court's time. If Mr. Ginner had evidence that could trace it back to show the separate property the United States would have been willing to quash the writ of garnish. Well I guess though that's the difference between settlement negotiations and something actually being presented in court. Yes your honor. If his objection had said 32.02.D. instead of 32.05.C. what would the district court have been required to do? I think if there is an issue that's properly presented to the district court and the court needs the hearing to take the evidence to decide the issue they're required to hold the hearing. Would simply saying I think this is my separate property would that trigger right to hear you? No your honor because he didn't request the C5 hearing and he didn't provide the checkbox for me. This isn't just an inadvertent mistake about the type of hearing request because Mr. Ginner throughout this case has remained steadfast that he did not want a section 32.02.D. hearing. And why? Why? I'm not sure your honor but even in the briefing for the motion for neutral that the court ordered Mr. Ginner, Chastide the government for even raising the 32.02.D. issue. I'm not sure what his reasons for that were. But this all the district court had before was a C5 hearing request that didn't comply with the statutory requirements. An objection that goes beyond the scope of the 302

. If Mr. Ginner had evidence that could trace it back to show the separate property the United States would have been willing to quash the writ of garnish. Well I guess though that's the difference between settlement negotiations and something actually being presented in court. Yes your honor. If his objection had said 32.02.D. instead of 32.05.C. what would the district court have been required to do? I think if there is an issue that's properly presented to the district court and the court needs the hearing to take the evidence to decide the issue they're required to hold the hearing. Would simply saying I think this is my separate property would that trigger right to hear you? No your honor because he didn't request the C5 hearing and he didn't provide the checkbox for me. This isn't just an inadvertent mistake about the type of hearing request because Mr. Ginner throughout this case has remained steadfast that he did not want a section 32.02.D. hearing. And why? Why? I'm not sure your honor but even in the briefing for the motion for neutral that the court ordered Mr. Ginner, Chastide the government for even raising the 32.02.D. issue. I'm not sure what his reasons for that were. But this all the district court had before was a C5 hearing request that didn't comply with the statutory requirements. An objection that goes beyond the scope of the 302.05.C5 hearing. Why do you think it didn't comply with the 302.05.C statutory requirements? Why didn't the hearing request comply with 302.05.C? For the reason stated in the district court's order. One really the C5 hearing request is to address a creature of the garnishment statute which is the C4 garnishes answer. The C5 hearing is not contained within any of the other post-judgment enforcement actions. So the court found that it didn't actually object to an answer. It's not objecting to the information provided by the garnishing. It's really objecting to the root of garnishment itself. It's stated to fail to state of valid grounds for the hearing. And it didn't serve the garnishing. Add issue in this case is a lot of what is the scope of a C5 hearing request. And there's no appellate court authority on point. And there are a number of district court cases that cover the wide spectrum of what a C5 hearing is. And in this case the district court got it right to give full meaning to the statutory context to C5 hearing. Only pertains to the garnishes answer because the hearing of the statute itself says the hearing is objections to answer. And then it also requires the defendant to file written objections to the answer. And also requires them to serve the garnishing, which is not a requirement of the 32 to D hearing. The Crowther opinion out of the Northern District Texas is only opposite end of the spectrum. The court got it wrong in that case. Not only for the reason stated in this district court's opinion given the statutory context within C5. But also because it's illogical to believe it a third party claimant's judgment debtors rights to hearing

.05.C5 hearing. Why do you think it didn't comply with the 302.05.C statutory requirements? Why didn't the hearing request comply with 302.05.C? For the reason stated in the district court's order. One really the C5 hearing request is to address a creature of the garnishment statute which is the C4 garnishes answer. The C5 hearing is not contained within any of the other post-judgment enforcement actions. So the court found that it didn't actually object to an answer. It's not objecting to the information provided by the garnishing. It's really objecting to the root of garnishment itself. It's stated to fail to state of valid grounds for the hearing. And it didn't serve the garnishing. Add issue in this case is a lot of what is the scope of a C5 hearing request. And there's no appellate court authority on point. And there are a number of district court cases that cover the wide spectrum of what a C5 hearing is. And in this case the district court got it right to give full meaning to the statutory context to C5 hearing. Only pertains to the garnishes answer because the hearing of the statute itself says the hearing is objections to answer. And then it also requires the defendant to file written objections to the answer. And also requires them to serve the garnishing, which is not a requirement of the 32 to D hearing. The Crowther opinion out of the Northern District Texas is only opposite end of the spectrum. The court got it wrong in that case. Not only for the reason stated in this district court's opinion given the statutory context within C5. But also because it's illogical to believe it a third party claimant's judgment debtors rights to hearing. And the procedural mechanisms available to the misdependent on the mechanism to post judgment enforcement mechanism that the government chooses. In this case instead of doing a garnishment action and going out and seizing Mr. Gynner's retirement account, serving the garnishing, freezing it, letting them file an answer and letting all the parties adjudicate the issues and then doing the final disposition order. The government could have sent the marshals out and immediately executed under under 32 through Section 3203 of the FDC pay and immediately taken possession of the property. In which case there would be no C5 hearing, the only avenue for relief would have been the 32 to D hearing. In addition to that in the Crowther case, the court actually missed states the statutory language on page 731 of the opinion. It says that the report of all written objection to the writ and the statute actually says a written objection to the answer. And I believe that's probably what released a lot of the confusion about the scope of the C5 hearing. In addition to that in the Crowther case, doesn't support Mr. Gynner's argument as well because the court found that when they failed to comply with the C5 requirements, that it was a fatal flaw and the C5 hearing couldn't have been held. I can ask you a question on the 32 to D back to your argument that this kind of objection is an objection to the statutory requirements for the issuance of a writ. Is there any support for your argument? Is it in the comments? Is it legislative history? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? But it does say if you believe you're probably been improperly seized, you need to request a hearing. In fact, it provides a checkbox form. Mr. Gynner's attorney was provided with a checkbox form that would have allowed that. And under Section 322, it also states that that's requesting a hearing will allow them to file the motion to quash rates of garnishment. And that's effectively what Mr. Gynner should have done here is request the hearing improperly placed the issue before the district court. When he failed to do all of that, the district court had the discretion to deny the hearing request and all that was left before the court when there were no other motions to quash affidavits briefing at any point was just this unsubstantiated. I object because it's my separate property. And the district court, when that was all had before under Texas law, it's clear that the property was presentively community property and then enter the final disposition order giving note to the fact that his retirement account is presentively also his sole management community property subject to one half garnishment. And we asked that the district court decision to deny the hearing request be affirmed and also the final word of garnishment also be affirmed. What's actually what does the record actually consist of? I'm sorry, Your Honor. What does the record actually consist of? The record in this most of the litigation in this case happened after the final order of garnishment. So what we have up to the final order of garnishment that's being appealed was the applications, the redacted application it was redacted to so that missing, single men's security numbers would have been disclosed

. And the procedural mechanisms available to the misdependent on the mechanism to post judgment enforcement mechanism that the government chooses. In this case instead of doing a garnishment action and going out and seizing Mr. Gynner's retirement account, serving the garnishing, freezing it, letting them file an answer and letting all the parties adjudicate the issues and then doing the final disposition order. The government could have sent the marshals out and immediately executed under under 32 through Section 3203 of the FDC pay and immediately taken possession of the property. In which case there would be no C5 hearing, the only avenue for relief would have been the 32 to D hearing. In addition to that in the Crowther case, the court actually missed states the statutory language on page 731 of the opinion. It says that the report of all written objection to the writ and the statute actually says a written objection to the answer. And I believe that's probably what released a lot of the confusion about the scope of the C5 hearing. In addition to that in the Crowther case, doesn't support Mr. Gynner's argument as well because the court found that when they failed to comply with the C5 requirements, that it was a fatal flaw and the C5 hearing couldn't have been held. I can ask you a question on the 32 to D back to your argument that this kind of objection is an objection to the statutory requirements for the issuance of a writ. Is there any support for your argument? Is it in the comments? Is it legislative history? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? But it does say if you believe you're probably been improperly seized, you need to request a hearing. In fact, it provides a checkbox form. Mr. Gynner's attorney was provided with a checkbox form that would have allowed that. And under Section 322, it also states that that's requesting a hearing will allow them to file the motion to quash rates of garnishment. And that's effectively what Mr. Gynner should have done here is request the hearing improperly placed the issue before the district court. When he failed to do all of that, the district court had the discretion to deny the hearing request and all that was left before the court when there were no other motions to quash affidavits briefing at any point was just this unsubstantiated. I object because it's my separate property. And the district court, when that was all had before under Texas law, it's clear that the property was presentively community property and then enter the final disposition order giving note to the fact that his retirement account is presentively also his sole management community property subject to one half garnishment. And we asked that the district court decision to deny the hearing request be affirmed and also the final word of garnishment also be affirmed. What's actually what does the record actually consist of? I'm sorry, Your Honor. What does the record actually consist of? The record in this most of the litigation in this case happened after the final order of garnishment. So what we have up to the final order of garnishment that's being appealed was the applications, the redacted application it was redacted to so that missing, single men's security numbers would have been disclosed. The rights of garnishment, the orders for issuance, the precepts of service, and the answers of the garnishes disclosing Mr. Gidner's property interests and how the accounts were held. And then we have the Ms. Gidner appeared in this case. She's not followed the appeal. And Mr. Gidner's objection and notice for parents and it was just the objection that said, object, it's my separate property. I don't know the debt and I want to see five hearing. The emails were attached to a brief or somehow they had it they get in the record. At some point during the process when the government was speaking to Mr. Gidner's attorney at the time, Ms. Gidner process sent a letter to the government, outlining financial hardships, and then attached a number of documents behind it. Back towards the end maybe around pages 110, these couple of emails and the money flow chart the government had created were inserted in there. But it was also CC to quite a number of people including the court and when the court got it it went on to the doctor. Well sort of between, I don't know if I can necessarily say what I'm thinking because I'm trying to figure out whether there's an element of bad lawyer, floating somewhere or aren't lawyering. So to speak sometimes happens when people are in an area that they don't do all the time. A peril that strikes fear. It used to it me. I'm glad I don't do it now. But you're in an area you don't do all the time and you know, whether the in-artfulness of the request, you know, led to, say let's just say technically not hitting the right target. But on the other hand, it shouldn't sound like the me alone hearing. I mean, this is nothing but a few pieces of paper. You know, a practical matter in terms of hearing. Like I said, I probably shouldn't think out loud. But at an event, it's somewhere between here, between, you know, I got you a situation which we obviously, you know, sort of one of the things that I wanted to say

. The rights of garnishment, the orders for issuance, the precepts of service, and the answers of the garnishes disclosing Mr. Gidner's property interests and how the accounts were held. And then we have the Ms. Gidner appeared in this case. She's not followed the appeal. And Mr. Gidner's objection and notice for parents and it was just the objection that said, object, it's my separate property. I don't know the debt and I want to see five hearing. The emails were attached to a brief or somehow they had it they get in the record. At some point during the process when the government was speaking to Mr. Gidner's attorney at the time, Ms. Gidner process sent a letter to the government, outlining financial hardships, and then attached a number of documents behind it. Back towards the end maybe around pages 110, these couple of emails and the money flow chart the government had created were inserted in there. But it was also CC to quite a number of people including the court and when the court got it it went on to the doctor. Well sort of between, I don't know if I can necessarily say what I'm thinking because I'm trying to figure out whether there's an element of bad lawyer, floating somewhere or aren't lawyering. So to speak sometimes happens when people are in an area that they don't do all the time. A peril that strikes fear. It used to it me. I'm glad I don't do it now. But you're in an area you don't do all the time and you know, whether the in-artfulness of the request, you know, led to, say let's just say technically not hitting the right target. But on the other hand, it shouldn't sound like the me alone hearing. I mean, this is nothing but a few pieces of paper. You know, a practical matter in terms of hearing. Like I said, I probably shouldn't think out loud. But at an event, it's somewhere between here, between, you know, I got you a situation which we obviously, you know, sort of one of the things that I wanted to say. But I mean, the rules are what they are. The statutes says what it says, et cetera. And part of the questions, you know, we've been asking is trying to get a beat on, you know, like what's that issue? I mean, this is fairly routine. This is by no means the most complex issue we've had this week in terms of, you know, pleading, the following is the record, what's here, et cetera. I mean, it's just really not. So we get an appeal, you know, in this matter, over whether to say the statutes says what it says, try to court your wrong boom versus even if that was in the air, you know, what in the world is either in this record, which doesn't sound like much. Or what's to come by just saying, okay, you're wrong. You should have had a hearing, but we acknowledge there's really nothing for you to hear, but go have this empty proceeding just because the statutes said some of it just doesn't seem quite. You follow me? Yes, I understand what you're saying in the government. It seems kind of missing. It's very sensitive to the fact that many of these attorneys are not practicing in the series of law and are not familiar with it. That's why all these- This house probing to see if the government was, you know, sometimes it was pro pro say, literally, and she got to help people a little bit. That's why I asked you a few howl from the beginning. I always loved when we have the lawyer who- It's me. All right. We're very sensitive to that. And we are very sensitive to not trying to play a game of gacha with the attorneys, which is one of the reasons why we tried to subpoena the information beforehand, so we're not putting people through an unnecessary burden and expense. That's also- How hard is it to get the records to see whether this money existed before the marriage? Well, you're on it. We did subpoena those records prior to the garnishment, and that's when Mr. Ginder filed a motion to quash, which didn't hit the court's docket. And then I sent the letters saying that it looks like you sent it to me instead of filing it with the court. Then Mr. Ginder went down to the court and actually got the agent that was in charge of this case on the phone, and they found out that it- The motion to quash for some reason just didn't get docket properly, in which time we filed a sent- The letter to the- Companies who were trying to subpoena saying- I guess what I'm saying, we filed a release, we're here, y'all have played to come to New Orleans. Has anybody- before all this happened gone back and said, show me your bank record? That's what the three months of litigation- I mean, the discussions between the denial of the hearing request to the final order was the government trying to do that. No one's offered a bank record, y'all haven't

. But I mean, the rules are what they are. The statutes says what it says, et cetera. And part of the questions, you know, we've been asking is trying to get a beat on, you know, like what's that issue? I mean, this is fairly routine. This is by no means the most complex issue we've had this week in terms of, you know, pleading, the following is the record, what's here, et cetera. I mean, it's just really not. So we get an appeal, you know, in this matter, over whether to say the statutes says what it says, try to court your wrong boom versus even if that was in the air, you know, what in the world is either in this record, which doesn't sound like much. Or what's to come by just saying, okay, you're wrong. You should have had a hearing, but we acknowledge there's really nothing for you to hear, but go have this empty proceeding just because the statutes said some of it just doesn't seem quite. You follow me? Yes, I understand what you're saying in the government. It seems kind of missing. It's very sensitive to the fact that many of these attorneys are not practicing in the series of law and are not familiar with it. That's why all these- This house probing to see if the government was, you know, sometimes it was pro pro say, literally, and she got to help people a little bit. That's why I asked you a few howl from the beginning. I always loved when we have the lawyer who- It's me. All right. We're very sensitive to that. And we are very sensitive to not trying to play a game of gacha with the attorneys, which is one of the reasons why we tried to subpoena the information beforehand, so we're not putting people through an unnecessary burden and expense. That's also- How hard is it to get the records to see whether this money existed before the marriage? Well, you're on it. We did subpoena those records prior to the garnishment, and that's when Mr. Ginder filed a motion to quash, which didn't hit the court's docket. And then I sent the letters saying that it looks like you sent it to me instead of filing it with the court. Then Mr. Ginder went down to the court and actually got the agent that was in charge of this case on the phone, and they found out that it- The motion to quash for some reason just didn't get docket properly, in which time we filed a sent- The letter to the- Companies who were trying to subpoena saying- I guess what I'm saying, we filed a release, we're here, y'all have played to come to New Orleans. Has anybody- before all this happened gone back and said, show me your bank record? That's what the three months of litigation- I mean, the discussions between the denial of the hearing request to the final order was the government trying to do that. No one's offered a bank record, y'all haven't. No, we've subpoenaed what we could from the records that we had beforehand. They showed that they were post-marital assets at that time. We couldn't trace them back. Even after the hearing, after the denial of the Christ, I was getting boxes of financial records dumped in my office, not with the tracing, which is what those emails are really about as the money flow chart with me trying to assist council, was showing where the problems- I haven't got the money now. Why, at this moment? The government has the money from J.P. Morgan, but the garnish she- Raymond James is still holding Mr. Good-Ears Retirement Accounts pending the outcome of this appeal. So the government has tried repeatedly and given every opportunity. There's even been additional briefing in the motion for neutral with support. Is it your testimony and all your experience with this case that you- It's your belief that none of this money was in a retirement account before the marriage. I couldn't trace it back, Your Honor. But you didn't have the documentation, is that right? I have basically what I'm going back to years now from when I was looking at all these financial records. I had the documents that he had asked us before marriage, and I have the documents where I'm trying to push them back in the- You did see some with assets before the marriage. Yes, you're awesome. And I put it from one to the other, but he had about 180,000 before marriage and about 180 after marriage. And if I recall, he had taken over $100,000 of money out of the accounts he'd been working post-marriage putting money into the account. I couldn't trace them or link them back. We're very sensitive to not trampling on people's rights just because they don't understand the law and the procedural mechanisms, but we just couldn't link it up in this case, which is why we follow the motion for final order of garnishment and then all the litigation in the case ensued. Okay. All right. As always, we appreciate candor from all lawyers, but especially from the government. So we can just be clear of what we have. I think the case just kind of strikes all of us, even though we I'm conferred by it, just kind of one of these seems like two people across the table should have could have resolved something without having to be some eating. And so we're not going to get it from the fifth circuit, you know, in terms of what the stat says, what it means, if it's a prank, it was discernible

. No, we've subpoenaed what we could from the records that we had beforehand. They showed that they were post-marital assets at that time. We couldn't trace them back. Even after the hearing, after the denial of the Christ, I was getting boxes of financial records dumped in my office, not with the tracing, which is what those emails are really about as the money flow chart with me trying to assist council, was showing where the problems- I haven't got the money now. Why, at this moment? The government has the money from J.P. Morgan, but the garnish she- Raymond James is still holding Mr. Good-Ears Retirement Accounts pending the outcome of this appeal. So the government has tried repeatedly and given every opportunity. There's even been additional briefing in the motion for neutral with support. Is it your testimony and all your experience with this case that you- It's your belief that none of this money was in a retirement account before the marriage. I couldn't trace it back, Your Honor. But you didn't have the documentation, is that right? I have basically what I'm going back to years now from when I was looking at all these financial records. I had the documents that he had asked us before marriage, and I have the documents where I'm trying to push them back in the- You did see some with assets before the marriage. Yes, you're awesome. And I put it from one to the other, but he had about 180,000 before marriage and about 180 after marriage. And if I recall, he had taken over $100,000 of money out of the accounts he'd been working post-marriage putting money into the account. I couldn't trace them or link them back. We're very sensitive to not trampling on people's rights just because they don't understand the law and the procedural mechanisms, but we just couldn't link it up in this case, which is why we follow the motion for final order of garnishment and then all the litigation in the case ensued. Okay. All right. As always, we appreciate candor from all lawyers, but especially from the government. So we can just be clear of what we have. I think the case just kind of strikes all of us, even though we I'm conferred by it, just kind of one of these seems like two people across the table should have could have resolved something without having to be some eating. And so we're not going to get it from the fifth circuit, you know, in terms of what the stat says, what it means, if it's a prank, it was discernible. He's got the proof where he doesn't, you know, and the government gives up, but it sounds like all that sort of not at play. But, you know, we appreciate responses from both counsel candidly to help us kind of get a grasp at, you know, what's there? Because my sensitivity in part is even if we said, I'm not sure we will, there's error not to hear. I still like to have some sense of what the hearing would be. And I mean, I'm not comfortable ordering something that's somewhat futile, so to speak. And any of the counsel is going to come back up on Rebellion. He should have already perceived kind of what is burdened is. So we thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. All right, Mr. Mitchell, we've asked a lot of questions, and we're not planning necessarily wanting to plow the ground. You know, that we went through initially, but the government says, you know, there were a lot of, you know, opportunities here and so forth to try to unearth this. And so you're just, you're still standing on the statute says what it says? I do, Your Honor. If I may real quick in reference to Judge Morgan's question earlier, that motion to cross subpoena, you can find that at page 95 of the record. It was included as part of what Miss Engelman supplied, so it is in there. You're one of the courts, spend a lot of time discussing with the appellate, the appellate regarding evidence of separate property. And I would submit that that whole discussion kind of misses the point. I mean, the, the, the, the, the, maybe, you all try to work this out to the, uh, just be resolution people here at the court. I mean, if you gone then with the government, light your documents on the table and said, look, this is my evidence. Let's be done with this. We would welcome that opportunity. And my point wasn't saying that the missing the point. I mean, I think the hearing is where all of this stuff would have been fleshed out. I mean, the, to the extent that the court finds the, the, what's tough? You know, it's not a matter of trying to make you pull out the Joker or, you know, your Trump card, but, you know, it's just a little ephemeral to say, have a hearing and what's to prove. I mean, what's wrong with saying? This is what I want to put on in hearing. And if we're going to reverse the trial, or we say, okay, stat says what it says, you know, uh, hearing to, you know, consider ABC D&E

. He's got the proof where he doesn't, you know, and the government gives up, but it sounds like all that sort of not at play. But, you know, we appreciate responses from both counsel candidly to help us kind of get a grasp at, you know, what's there? Because my sensitivity in part is even if we said, I'm not sure we will, there's error not to hear. I still like to have some sense of what the hearing would be. And I mean, I'm not comfortable ordering something that's somewhat futile, so to speak. And any of the counsel is going to come back up on Rebellion. He should have already perceived kind of what is burdened is. So we thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. All right, Mr. Mitchell, we've asked a lot of questions, and we're not planning necessarily wanting to plow the ground. You know, that we went through initially, but the government says, you know, there were a lot of, you know, opportunities here and so forth to try to unearth this. And so you're just, you're still standing on the statute says what it says? I do, Your Honor. If I may real quick in reference to Judge Morgan's question earlier, that motion to cross subpoena, you can find that at page 95 of the record. It was included as part of what Miss Engelman supplied, so it is in there. You're one of the courts, spend a lot of time discussing with the appellate, the appellate regarding evidence of separate property. And I would submit that that whole discussion kind of misses the point. I mean, the, the, the, the, the, maybe, you all try to work this out to the, uh, just be resolution people here at the court. I mean, if you gone then with the government, light your documents on the table and said, look, this is my evidence. Let's be done with this. We would welcome that opportunity. And my point wasn't saying that the missing the point. I mean, I think the hearing is where all of this stuff would have been fleshed out. I mean, the, to the extent that the court finds the, the, what's tough? You know, it's not a matter of trying to make you pull out the Joker or, you know, your Trump card, but, you know, it's just a little ephemeral to say, have a hearing and what's to prove. I mean, what's wrong with saying? This is what I want to put on in hearing. And if we're going to reverse the trial, or we say, okay, stat says what it says, you know, uh, hearing to, you know, consider ABC D&E. I mean, this is your last sort of best shot to be frank about it. And, uh, you keep saying, well, you know, we'll show this. We could show this. What is it you would show? I think we, what, what was it attempting to be shown and, and, uh, uh, a Pelli Council admitted this, that there was a showing of, of retirement fund records, um, that, that had been transferred from Maryland. She could trace up to a point she couldn't connect the dot to the other point you heard her. All right. So do you have the evidence to connect the dots all the way? I believe that the dots are connected. And I think she had the evidence to connect the dots because the, the, the rowovers were not that complicated. They went from Maryland to Raymond James and they were retirement funds. There were no contributions to those retirement funds that, that it was the same money. She said there was 190,000. He took out 100,000 and he put more in. I would dispute that. And again, this is an argument that would have happened at the hearing. But I don't think, I don't think if, if the reason that the record may be devoid of some of that evidence is because we didn't get a chance to have a hearing. I think those records would show that there. We heard. And I apologize. But what you got to hear is this. Tell me one, two, three, four. We say, Judge Balls got to have a hearing. You tell me now one, two, three, four. What are you putting on at the hearing? And what is the source of it? The documents from, that traced the money from the time that he was, previous, previous. Where are the documents? The documents are, I believe my client has them back now. I have them, but they're, I have a whole suitcase full of documents that my client presented to me that have all of the historical records from the retirement funds

. I mean, this is your last sort of best shot to be frank about it. And, uh, you keep saying, well, you know, we'll show this. We could show this. What is it you would show? I think we, what, what was it attempting to be shown and, and, uh, uh, a Pelli Council admitted this, that there was a showing of, of retirement fund records, um, that, that had been transferred from Maryland. She could trace up to a point she couldn't connect the dot to the other point you heard her. All right. So do you have the evidence to connect the dots all the way? I believe that the dots are connected. And I think she had the evidence to connect the dots because the, the, the rowovers were not that complicated. They went from Maryland to Raymond James and they were retirement funds. There were no contributions to those retirement funds that, that it was the same money. She said there was 190,000. He took out 100,000 and he put more in. I would dispute that. And again, this is an argument that would have happened at the hearing. But I don't think, I don't think if, if the reason that the record may be devoid of some of that evidence is because we didn't get a chance to have a hearing. I think those records would show that there. We heard. And I apologize. But what you got to hear is this. Tell me one, two, three, four. We say, Judge Balls got to have a hearing. You tell me now one, two, three, four. What are you putting on at the hearing? And what is the source of it? The documents from, that traced the money from the time that he was, previous, previous. Where are the documents? The documents are, I believe my client has them back now. I have them, but they're, I have a whole suitcase full of documents that my client presented to me that have all of the historical records from the retirement funds. All right, so why have you just given those to Ms. Faye to look at them? I mean, you think she's just going to say, you don't have a hearing? I don't want to see them? I believe they were. They were presented in Ms. Faye. And this discussion that was ongoing, at least the way I read it, indicates that they were very near a resolution and that the government actually agreed. But again, for whatever reason there was a, there was a change of heart. You were not the lawyer below, is that right? That's correct. Okay. All right, think we're at the bottom line. All right, I mean, we've exhausted it, but not because, well, we've exhausted because there are questions, you know, something about this. It's floating, but, you know, we have a duty and we're going to do it. I mean, we'll decide the case. It seems to me that, you know, a good settlement is better than an opinion from the Fifth Circuit in a context like this. But we've asked enough questions to flesh it out. And if that doesn't seem to be bold well for the parties, then so that it'd be done, you know, we'll decide the case and pour it out. It may or may not be the most favorable outcome, but, you know, we'll decide the case and we'll move on. But we appreciate the candor of both sides, the briefing in the case, and we'll get it done. Thank you, sir. All right, before we take up the third case, the panel is starting.

All right, this is Mitchell. So we're ready for you. Good morning. Mr. Chief Judge, your honors. May it please the court. My name is Greg Mitchell. I'm a counsel for the appellant John Giddner. The crux of this case is very simple. Mr. Giddner was statutorily entitled to a hearing under 28 USC Section 30205, C5, but was not granted one. The purpose of this statute is to protect the debtor. The effect of the government's arguments would instead exploit the debtor and leave the debtor with no legal remedy for a wrongful garnishment. The case at bar arises from a crime committed by Mr. Giddner's wife, Ms. Engelman prior to their marriage. Part of her sentence was a restitution find that the government sought to assess against Mr. Giddner's property after their marriage. Property he believes to be separate property under Texas law. Mr. Giddner sought a hearing to prove the characterization of the property as separate property, but his request was summarily denied, and a final order of garnishment was issued. The judgment of the trial court, therefore in this matter, should be reversed. The final order of garnishment quashed, and the case remanded for the mandatory hearing under Section 30205, for the following three reasons. Number one, Mr. Giddner was indeed objecting to the garnish. He's answer, and so therefore correctly requested a hearing under Section 30205. Second, Mr. Giddner correctly stated the grounds for his objection and writing. The hearing is where he would have properly carried the burden of proof. And finally, third, simply put, shall mean shall, and therefore the statute service requirement is not a prerequisite for the mandatory hearing requirement. What's the level of specificity required for the objection to fully envelop the answer? Well, Your Honor, I would submit that the bar is relatively low. The statute simply says the party objecting shall state the grounds for the objection. The Mr. Giddner listed in the objection that was filed, that he objected to the garnishment based on the fact that he believed the property was separate property under Texas law. That's all he listed. I don't believe that there's any sort of summary judgment type proof requirement that specifically laid out in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It simply says that. And so I think that adding to that, if Congress intended for it to be more stringent than that, I think they would have put in more specificity as they do with a summary judgment type level of proof. It seems to me from looking at the record and the briefs that the the the the rid of garnishment said to the banks, just tell us all the property you have. And then when the judge issued, I guess the order of garnishing the property, she reduced the property of the bank to half. But I believe that Mr. Giddner wanted a chance to argue that 100% of the property was not subject to seizure of our garnishment because it was his separate property under his separate management. Is that correct? Have I read that correctly? Well, I think that's close. I think his his primary argument was that the property was actually separate property. But apparently under some situation, even if it's separate, there can be garnishment apart. I believe based on Texas law, but as I got into those things, I thought, well, I guess that's what he would have wanted to explain as a hearing and get into what Texas law is. Right. Exactly. And my brief didn't go into a whole lot of detail about that because of that very reason. I feel like that if the court were to agree, I think the appropriate forum for those arguments is on remained at the trowel. Didn't there be some. I'm a face is showing that separate property and not subject to garnish. I mean, you just validate say I want a hearing and the judge says, why should I drag everybody down here if there's not any kind of a colorable argument that is in fact separate property? Well, I guess I would I would start by pointing back to the statute that the statute doesn't doesn't add those those requirements. All right. Let's let's say harmless error on this in this on our end. Is there anything in the record that shows us that there's a colorable argument that the funds in these accounts were separate property? Other than just the argument that it is, I don't know that there is, but I would simply respectfully suggest that the statute doesn't require that. The statute simply says state the grounds therefore it doesn't say prove it. And I think under normal motion practice, that's what happens. It's a movement files a file's emotion stating general grounds. The respond and files a response stating general grounds why they object. And then it's the hearing where both sides put on there. Typically many and at least money in a bank account. Under Texas laws, presumed to be community. And if you you're claiming it separate, you need to say well, no, it's not because I just sold a piece of real estate that was separate property and these are funds that I can trace them. I mean, just as a practical matter, you know, we shouldn't say I don't think that just because you say you say an employee it's separate property period that the court has no discretion. At all, do anything other than have a face to face hearing and court. I do believe that Mr. Giddner in this case did specify the argument and certainly in a general fashion that it was separate property as retirement funds. I think retirement funds was specific. That's one thing, but in a checking account, sightings accounts harder to argue that, isn't it? And I agree and I think the focus of our argument was the retirement funds as opposed to the checking account which there's an argument, but I think it was certainly not as strong an argument as the retirement funds. There's something about this that's, you know, not as clear as you want to make it. I mean, due respect to a colleague to the left, it's just your judges are not sleep at the wheel. I mean, Judge Ball is very able and, you know, handles her docket and knows what's here and is not unwilling to have a hearing and so on and so forth. So, you know, when I look at it, not that any judge is not, is infallible that error can't be made but, you know, having been a trial judge myself. I mean, there are times when this is just not zero and in when somebody's just saying just because, you know, I'm entitled to it. If, as Judge I want you to say something more than here's the statute, I'm entitled to it. Give it to me. No showing whatsoever that that's not an exercise and futility. So, it is you say, well, the statute doesn't say, you know, any more specific, but if you're standing up there at the judge, you want to crank up a hearing. Surely it's not the case. We're going to say, take it out of this context. I think of a lot of context where, you know, a hearing quote unquote, my ordinarily be the case, but the judge is going to want to know, okay, what are we going to do at the hearing? What are you putting on? You have it in an expert. What's the showing you want to make? You know, something beyond just, okay, here's rule 65, you know, that says you got a hearing. But I guess more to the real point is that even if we say assuming without deciding that it was error for the district court not the grant to hearing, that no showing is made, that there was any harm done because no callable claim is made here. Nothing is pointed to us in the record to indicate other than just the emptiness of making the judge have the hearing of what in the world would be produced. So, it's not enough to just say there's a statute read it, if I want to say it. So, even if we agree with you, I'm not saying I do, but even if we agree with you, the better practice would be to have the hearing or yes, facial it, it's there. Don't you have some requirement of articulating a principal basis for the hearing what's shown. Now, I understand in the matter of trial strategy, you know, people don't want to show their cards and, you know, pull all the stops. And that's not the guts of my point of I got unfold, you know, who's going to testify on that thing. But something beyond just, I get a hearing judge, give it to me. You don't give it to me. I'm going to the 5th Circuit and get you a record. You follow the tenor of my question? I understand that you're on a point and certainly there's got to be some level of judicial discretion. I mean, to a judge, a lawyer's court is like any other federal district court, they have a large dock in it. And certainly their time is valuable. I guess I would start simply with the language of the statute from my perspective, doesn't give a lot of discretion. And certainly there are statutes. I think it's 30-13 that gives a district court kind of general discretion. But it seems to me that the explicit language of the statute would kind of trump that that general discretion is for the point. He said, assuming without deciding that we say yes, or hearing was required, we are now on appeal. And we've got to have some harm shown for us to reverse and send back. Well, I think the harm, and I think there is sufficient evidence in the record from a standpoint of the communications that went on between the debtor and the US Attorney's Office. The harm is that we've got at least $80,000 that is Mr. Giddner's retirement funds that he was planning on living on for the rest of his life. So, I mean, certainly not suggesting that the district court was asleep at the will, but I think it's at least possible that in a rush to manage a docket, and I think if you look at the very first order that Judge Boyle issued, it was very summary in its finding that Mr. Giddner didn't prove his case. And so, I think that certainly is too far because I think the statute doesn't say that he has to prove his case. What that level of proof is, it's certainly arguable that I would have a better, stronger case standing here today if he had given a little more substance. But I think that I would go back to the purpose of the statute being to protect the debtor, I think the trial court in this court would want to be on the side of interpreting the statute, shall mean shall. And, you know, to the extent that there's any conflicting authority out there, I think if it was, you know, went up to a higher level, I would certainly want to be on the side of interpreting the shall mean shall. What is in the record that indicates these funds work separate property retirement funds? There may be additional, but the ones that the evidence that comes to mind, I believe it's pages 166 through 168 of the record, it may go on to 171. There's communications that occurred between the debtor and the US attorney's office that were filed. Now, the US attorney has an opinion regarding the propriety of these communications being in the record, but nevertheless they are in the record, and they weren't confidential in any way. Miss Engelman took a lot of information regarding the retirement funds and filed it with the court, and it's in the court's record, but specifically there's these communications that are in those pages where the US attorney actually seems to indicate that there's nothing absolutely definitive, but seems to indicate that they agree that the funds are retirement funds. In one communication, it talks about some $3,000 that was arguable, and they wanted a response, and previous counsel for appellant provided that response, and the subsequent communication indicated that the US attorney even agreed with that, but it was only subsequent to that that changed their mind, filed a motion to get a final rid of garnishment and the garnishment was issued. So, I think there is evidence in the record that nothing else is coming to mind immediately, but I think those communications certainly indicate that the retirement funds are community property in Texas unless they're separate funds, right? My reading of Texas law is that retirement funds that were... They're accessible on the horse. They are... They're extended their community property. To the extent that they were earned prior to the marriage, which all of these retirement funds were... Were those those who were separate funds? Are there evidence that some of this was earned prior to the marriage? Only the communications that suggests that the US attorney agreed that there was a lot of the actual statements that indicate that they were... That the funds were there, and I think the statements go back several years, and what you see in the statements is that nothing has changed. And I think in one of the US attorney's briefs, it made the argument that will any property that's added to retirement funds after the fact are community property and can be divisible on divorce. But if you follow, and certainly there has to be a little bit of reading into the documents because it doesn't ever specifically say that nothing was added. But by looking at the balances and seeing that the balances don't change or that the only change in the balances are fluctuations based on the market in what the funds were invested in, you see that nothing has been added since the marriage... Is there anything in the record? I think earlier in the case there had been a motion to quash the subpoena to the bank. Were those documents in the record? I believe the documents were. I have the record on my computer and I can try and respond on rebuttal. But I'm pretty certain that there were documents related to the motion to quash, but I think the communications that went back and forth suggested that Mr. Giddner, although he attempted to, never actually filed it with the court. I think what he did is he mailed it to the US attorney's office, didn't send it to the clerk. So I believe that certainly the court could have interpreted that as a filing and treated that as a filing. It did not and that's it is not the primary focus of our arguments but nevertheless there was at least an attempt made to respond to the initial word of garnishment. But again, we would argue that the 32.05 is broad enough to encompass any argument with respect to the garnishment. I would refer the court to the Crowther case that's in my brief. It was out of another district court in the Northern District of Texas in which Judge Godby specifically found that an answer filed after the court was filed. After the answer was still valid and that case the debtor was attempting to make an argument that they couldn't afford to pay the garnishment. And the court looked at Section 302.02D which is the section that allows you to object after the initial word of garnishment and realize that that section is very limited in the objections that you can make. And it went on to find specifically that although 32.02D is limited, 32.05 is not so limited and that it can pretty much allow for any objection including an objection that's limited to the garnishment. And of course our argument is that the objection was not, it was in fact to the garnishment because he had no reason to believe that he had to object until he saw the garnishment. He's answered which suggested that his retirement funds were subject to the writ. So I see that I'm out of time. Thank you. You've reserved your rebuttal time. Thank you, Judge. Man, please the court. Good morning, Your Honours. I'm Megan Fehie, on behalf of the United States of America. This call. The number of cases below. Yes, Your Honor. I have been involved with this case prior to the garnishment through the bankruptcy and the entire time Your Honor. Good. Keep it per se. This case is essentially about the ability of a trial court to control its own docket and whether or not it abused its discretion and properly denied Mr. Gibner's hearing request and properly adjudicated the issues pending before it when Mr. Gibner failed to request a section 32.02D hearing. Fail to file motion to cross rates of garnishment. Fail to file any other motions, evidence or briefing at any time to put the issues properly before the court and fail to comply with the statutory requirements contained within section 32.02.02.5C5 itself. There are effectively three interrelated issues on appeal in this case. One is whether or not the trial court abused its discretion and denied Mr. Gibner's section 32.05C5 hearing request. Whether or not Mr. Gibner waived his right to put the separate property issue before the court and whether or not Mr. Gibner's due process rights were violated in this case. At the heart of its case is effectively the section 32.05C5 hearing and to fully understand this statute it's important to understand its statutory framework. It's one of two hearings that may be held in post-judgment garnishment actions in which the United States is enforcing debt owed to it. The other statute being section 32.02D, it's a statute that's permitted. It's a hearing that a party who's objecting to the government sees your assets can claim in any of the subchapter C post-judgment enforcement actions. It's limited to certain issues that may be heard of the hearing including. Yes, Your Honor. Question, are you arguing that the objection that Mr. Gibner made could have been raised under 32.02D? Yes, Your Honor. Your last section. It's section 32.02D and really his appellate brief hits the argument that he should have been making at the trial court. It's in paragraph 61 to 63 on page 36 of his brief. His argument was that the United States sees to separate property thereby not complying with the statutory requirements for the issuance of a writ of garnishment which is one of the requirements in section 32.05A. So when I read 32.02D, I see the probable validity of a claim for exemption and there's a specific list of exemptions and this doesn't fit. That's not been raised as an issue in this case. And then three is certain issues regarding default judgments. That's not applicable. The second is failure to imply with statutory requirements for the issuance of a writ. So what statutory requirements? That would be under 28 USC section 32.05A that the United States is able to seize property in which the debtor has a substantial non-exempt interest. How does the debtor know? So am I like Mr. Gibner? No, what's being seized until they see the answer? There may not be any objection. Maybe that came back and said no, we have no property in which Mrs. Gibner had a substantial interest. Then Mr. Gibner would have been perfectly satisfied with that. He would have had no reason to object. So how does he know what's going to be in the answer as being represented to be the debtor having a substantial interest until he sees the answer? Well, your honor, when he served with a garnishment paperwork, which is required to be served on any interested party as well as the judgment debtor, he understands which institutions and which garnishes are at issue and at that point in time he can understand what the potential arguments are. But in addition, in this particular case, when he actually received the garnishes answers prior to receiving the garnishment paperwork, in fact from the Judge denied a C5 hearing request, he still had 16 days to request a section 32 to D hearing. And there's always the opportunity for the court to entertain a motion to reconsider because he was substantially prejudiced because he wasn't aware of the information. But he made the substantive arguments. He just didn't use the right numbers, right? He didn't use the correct procedural mechanisms to put it in front of the court. He objected. He put the grounds in. And you're saying if he just said 3202 D instead of 3205 C, it would have been okay. He could have held a hearing, but it also goes back to what the court was referring earlier clearly explaining the objection and providing a reasonable for the court. Well, did he say, I think you're going after my separate property. Why isn't that enough? Because he never put any evidence before the court. I don't see any requirement in that rule that you have to put evidence in your objection. No, that's correct, Your Honor. But what he didn't do is under the seat, all he requested was the C5 hearing. When he appeared in this case, he effectively said three things. One, I want a section 3205 C5 hearing. Two, I don't owe any money to the government. It's my wife's debt. And three, I object because it's my separate property. The court correctly determined had the ability to deny the C5 hearing request. Why? Because he failed to comply with the statutory requirements. My question is if he had said 3202 D instead of 3205, would that have been sufficient? Would he put in that objection been sufficient? Yes, Your Honor. But that's not what he did. And all the court had before it was a section 3205 C5 hearing request. With improper grounds stated that go beyond the scope of a C5 hearing? On any cases that say that this kind of objection to the separate or community nature of property should be under 3202 D hearing. No, Your Honor. Not that I'm aware of. Do you, is there evidence in this record that these retirement funds are part of them are his separate property? No, Your Honor. There's been no evidence at any point in this case presented, even in the motion for new trial or anywhere else that would trace this money or give any callable claim that this is separate property. The only thing that Mr. Ginner has cited were those email communications where after the Mr. Ginner C5 hearing request was denied. The government and Mr. Ginner's council at that time attempted to communicate and the government was receiving quite a lot of additional records that it received that it did not have in addition to the subpoena. And the requested documents in the United States tried to obtain before starting this garnishment action. And what the government did at that time was to create a money flow chart and try to go back and trace the assets that were seized back to the Maryland account that Mr. Ginner says was what was actually seized. And those email communications, I think Mr. Ginner has misinterpreted what they meant. They're taken out of context. They're cherry picked communications. They're referencing documents that are not a part of the record on appeal. They were attached in about 120 pages from a letter. Mr. Ginner sent to council for the government and it was inserted behind metal records and police reports and some other financial records. In this statement about I'm okay with the $3,000 or the email says something to that effect. Really meant that the government at that time was tracing the seized accounts back to a certain period of time and a $3,000 unexplained cash deposit came in. At that point in time, council for the government asked Mr. Ginner's attorney to explain that and said okay so we've seized that that came from a separate property source. But at no time did that email ever reference the fact that the accounts had an issue and how far the tracing had been had actually gone all the way back to Mr. Ginner's premarital assets. There are copies of some statements in those records that had dates on them prior to his marriage. Yes and those were Maryland's accounts and what was seized in this case were Raymond James and J.P. Morgan. And what the government at that time was trying to do was trace them back through the cash out and the reinvestments and the property that he earned after marriage versus property he had before marriage and the United States was never able to clearly trace it back there. Did you think that what would have happened to the hearing? Yes your honor. Which is what the government was trying to do rather than running up unnecessary legal expenses on Mr. Ginner or wasting the court's time. If Mr. Ginner had evidence that could trace it back to show the separate property the United States would have been willing to quash the writ of garnish. Well I guess though that's the difference between settlement negotiations and something actually being presented in court. Yes your honor. If his objection had said 32.02.D. instead of 32.05.C. what would the district court have been required to do? I think if there is an issue that's properly presented to the district court and the court needs the hearing to take the evidence to decide the issue they're required to hold the hearing. Would simply saying I think this is my separate property would that trigger right to hear you? No your honor because he didn't request the C5 hearing and he didn't provide the checkbox for me. This isn't just an inadvertent mistake about the type of hearing request because Mr. Ginner throughout this case has remained steadfast that he did not want a section 32.02.D. hearing. And why? Why? I'm not sure your honor but even in the briefing for the motion for neutral that the court ordered Mr. Ginner, Chastide the government for even raising the 32.02.D. issue. I'm not sure what his reasons for that were. But this all the district court had before was a C5 hearing request that didn't comply with the statutory requirements. An objection that goes beyond the scope of the 302.05.C5 hearing. Why do you think it didn't comply with the 302.05.C statutory requirements? Why didn't the hearing request comply with 302.05.C? For the reason stated in the district court's order. One really the C5 hearing request is to address a creature of the garnishment statute which is the C4 garnishes answer. The C5 hearing is not contained within any of the other post-judgment enforcement actions. So the court found that it didn't actually object to an answer. It's not objecting to the information provided by the garnishing. It's really objecting to the root of garnishment itself. It's stated to fail to state of valid grounds for the hearing. And it didn't serve the garnishing. Add issue in this case is a lot of what is the scope of a C5 hearing request. And there's no appellate court authority on point. And there are a number of district court cases that cover the wide spectrum of what a C5 hearing is. And in this case the district court got it right to give full meaning to the statutory context to C5 hearing. Only pertains to the garnishes answer because the hearing of the statute itself says the hearing is objections to answer. And then it also requires the defendant to file written objections to the answer. And also requires them to serve the garnishing, which is not a requirement of the 32 to D hearing. The Crowther opinion out of the Northern District Texas is only opposite end of the spectrum. The court got it wrong in that case. Not only for the reason stated in this district court's opinion given the statutory context within C5. But also because it's illogical to believe it a third party claimant's judgment debtors rights to hearing. And the procedural mechanisms available to the misdependent on the mechanism to post judgment enforcement mechanism that the government chooses. In this case instead of doing a garnishment action and going out and seizing Mr. Gynner's retirement account, serving the garnishing, freezing it, letting them file an answer and letting all the parties adjudicate the issues and then doing the final disposition order. The government could have sent the marshals out and immediately executed under under 32 through Section 3203 of the FDC pay and immediately taken possession of the property. In which case there would be no C5 hearing, the only avenue for relief would have been the 32 to D hearing. In addition to that in the Crowther case, the court actually missed states the statutory language on page 731 of the opinion. It says that the report of all written objection to the writ and the statute actually says a written objection to the answer. And I believe that's probably what released a lot of the confusion about the scope of the C5 hearing. In addition to that in the Crowther case, doesn't support Mr. Gynner's argument as well because the court found that when they failed to comply with the C5 requirements, that it was a fatal flaw and the C5 hearing couldn't have been held. I can ask you a question on the 32 to D back to your argument that this kind of objection is an objection to the statutory requirements for the issuance of a writ. Is there any support for your argument? Is it in the comments? Is it legislative history? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? Is it in the comments? But it does say if you believe you're probably been improperly seized, you need to request a hearing. In fact, it provides a checkbox form. Mr. Gynner's attorney was provided with a checkbox form that would have allowed that. And under Section 322, it also states that that's requesting a hearing will allow them to file the motion to quash rates of garnishment. And that's effectively what Mr. Gynner should have done here is request the hearing improperly placed the issue before the district court. When he failed to do all of that, the district court had the discretion to deny the hearing request and all that was left before the court when there were no other motions to quash affidavits briefing at any point was just this unsubstantiated. I object because it's my separate property. And the district court, when that was all had before under Texas law, it's clear that the property was presentively community property and then enter the final disposition order giving note to the fact that his retirement account is presentively also his sole management community property subject to one half garnishment. And we asked that the district court decision to deny the hearing request be affirmed and also the final word of garnishment also be affirmed. What's actually what does the record actually consist of? I'm sorry, Your Honor. What does the record actually consist of? The record in this most of the litigation in this case happened after the final order of garnishment. So what we have up to the final order of garnishment that's being appealed was the applications, the redacted application it was redacted to so that missing, single men's security numbers would have been disclosed. The rights of garnishment, the orders for issuance, the precepts of service, and the answers of the garnishes disclosing Mr. Gidner's property interests and how the accounts were held. And then we have the Ms. Gidner appeared in this case. She's not followed the appeal. And Mr. Gidner's objection and notice for parents and it was just the objection that said, object, it's my separate property. I don't know the debt and I want to see five hearing. The emails were attached to a brief or somehow they had it they get in the record. At some point during the process when the government was speaking to Mr. Gidner's attorney at the time, Ms. Gidner process sent a letter to the government, outlining financial hardships, and then attached a number of documents behind it. Back towards the end maybe around pages 110, these couple of emails and the money flow chart the government had created were inserted in there. But it was also CC to quite a number of people including the court and when the court got it it went on to the doctor. Well sort of between, I don't know if I can necessarily say what I'm thinking because I'm trying to figure out whether there's an element of bad lawyer, floating somewhere or aren't lawyering. So to speak sometimes happens when people are in an area that they don't do all the time. A peril that strikes fear. It used to it me. I'm glad I don't do it now. But you're in an area you don't do all the time and you know, whether the in-artfulness of the request, you know, led to, say let's just say technically not hitting the right target. But on the other hand, it shouldn't sound like the me alone hearing. I mean, this is nothing but a few pieces of paper. You know, a practical matter in terms of hearing. Like I said, I probably shouldn't think out loud. But at an event, it's somewhere between here, between, you know, I got you a situation which we obviously, you know, sort of one of the things that I wanted to say. But I mean, the rules are what they are. The statutes says what it says, et cetera. And part of the questions, you know, we've been asking is trying to get a beat on, you know, like what's that issue? I mean, this is fairly routine. This is by no means the most complex issue we've had this week in terms of, you know, pleading, the following is the record, what's here, et cetera. I mean, it's just really not. So we get an appeal, you know, in this matter, over whether to say the statutes says what it says, try to court your wrong boom versus even if that was in the air, you know, what in the world is either in this record, which doesn't sound like much. Or what's to come by just saying, okay, you're wrong. You should have had a hearing, but we acknowledge there's really nothing for you to hear, but go have this empty proceeding just because the statutes said some of it just doesn't seem quite. You follow me? Yes, I understand what you're saying in the government. It seems kind of missing. It's very sensitive to the fact that many of these attorneys are not practicing in the series of law and are not familiar with it. That's why all these- This house probing to see if the government was, you know, sometimes it was pro pro say, literally, and she got to help people a little bit. That's why I asked you a few howl from the beginning. I always loved when we have the lawyer who- It's me. All right. We're very sensitive to that. And we are very sensitive to not trying to play a game of gacha with the attorneys, which is one of the reasons why we tried to subpoena the information beforehand, so we're not putting people through an unnecessary burden and expense. That's also- How hard is it to get the records to see whether this money existed before the marriage? Well, you're on it. We did subpoena those records prior to the garnishment, and that's when Mr. Ginder filed a motion to quash, which didn't hit the court's docket. And then I sent the letters saying that it looks like you sent it to me instead of filing it with the court. Then Mr. Ginder went down to the court and actually got the agent that was in charge of this case on the phone, and they found out that it- The motion to quash for some reason just didn't get docket properly, in which time we filed a sent- The letter to the- Companies who were trying to subpoena saying- I guess what I'm saying, we filed a release, we're here, y'all have played to come to New Orleans. Has anybody- before all this happened gone back and said, show me your bank record? That's what the three months of litigation- I mean, the discussions between the denial of the hearing request to the final order was the government trying to do that. No one's offered a bank record, y'all haven't. No, we've subpoenaed what we could from the records that we had beforehand. They showed that they were post-marital assets at that time. We couldn't trace them back. Even after the hearing, after the denial of the Christ, I was getting boxes of financial records dumped in my office, not with the tracing, which is what those emails are really about as the money flow chart with me trying to assist council, was showing where the problems- I haven't got the money now. Why, at this moment? The government has the money from J.P. Morgan, but the garnish she- Raymond James is still holding Mr. Good-Ears Retirement Accounts pending the outcome of this appeal. So the government has tried repeatedly and given every opportunity. There's even been additional briefing in the motion for neutral with support. Is it your testimony and all your experience with this case that you- It's your belief that none of this money was in a retirement account before the marriage. I couldn't trace it back, Your Honor. But you didn't have the documentation, is that right? I have basically what I'm going back to years now from when I was looking at all these financial records. I had the documents that he had asked us before marriage, and I have the documents where I'm trying to push them back in the- You did see some with assets before the marriage. Yes, you're awesome. And I put it from one to the other, but he had about 180,000 before marriage and about 180 after marriage. And if I recall, he had taken over $100,000 of money out of the accounts he'd been working post-marriage putting money into the account. I couldn't trace them or link them back. We're very sensitive to not trampling on people's rights just because they don't understand the law and the procedural mechanisms, but we just couldn't link it up in this case, which is why we follow the motion for final order of garnishment and then all the litigation in the case ensued. Okay. All right. As always, we appreciate candor from all lawyers, but especially from the government. So we can just be clear of what we have. I think the case just kind of strikes all of us, even though we I'm conferred by it, just kind of one of these seems like two people across the table should have could have resolved something without having to be some eating. And so we're not going to get it from the fifth circuit, you know, in terms of what the stat says, what it means, if it's a prank, it was discernible. He's got the proof where he doesn't, you know, and the government gives up, but it sounds like all that sort of not at play. But, you know, we appreciate responses from both counsel candidly to help us kind of get a grasp at, you know, what's there? Because my sensitivity in part is even if we said, I'm not sure we will, there's error not to hear. I still like to have some sense of what the hearing would be. And I mean, I'm not comfortable ordering something that's somewhat futile, so to speak. And any of the counsel is going to come back up on Rebellion. He should have already perceived kind of what is burdened is. So we thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. All right, Mr. Mitchell, we've asked a lot of questions, and we're not planning necessarily wanting to plow the ground. You know, that we went through initially, but the government says, you know, there were a lot of, you know, opportunities here and so forth to try to unearth this. And so you're just, you're still standing on the statute says what it says? I do, Your Honor. If I may real quick in reference to Judge Morgan's question earlier, that motion to cross subpoena, you can find that at page 95 of the record. It was included as part of what Miss Engelman supplied, so it is in there. You're one of the courts, spend a lot of time discussing with the appellate, the appellate regarding evidence of separate property. And I would submit that that whole discussion kind of misses the point. I mean, the, the, the, the, the, maybe, you all try to work this out to the, uh, just be resolution people here at the court. I mean, if you gone then with the government, light your documents on the table and said, look, this is my evidence. Let's be done with this. We would welcome that opportunity. And my point wasn't saying that the missing the point. I mean, I think the hearing is where all of this stuff would have been fleshed out. I mean, the, to the extent that the court finds the, the, what's tough? You know, it's not a matter of trying to make you pull out the Joker or, you know, your Trump card, but, you know, it's just a little ephemeral to say, have a hearing and what's to prove. I mean, what's wrong with saying? This is what I want to put on in hearing. And if we're going to reverse the trial, or we say, okay, stat says what it says, you know, uh, hearing to, you know, consider ABC D&E. I mean, this is your last sort of best shot to be frank about it. And, uh, you keep saying, well, you know, we'll show this. We could show this. What is it you would show? I think we, what, what was it attempting to be shown and, and, uh, uh, a Pelli Council admitted this, that there was a showing of, of retirement fund records, um, that, that had been transferred from Maryland. She could trace up to a point she couldn't connect the dot to the other point you heard her. All right. So do you have the evidence to connect the dots all the way? I believe that the dots are connected. And I think she had the evidence to connect the dots because the, the, the rowovers were not that complicated. They went from Maryland to Raymond James and they were retirement funds. There were no contributions to those retirement funds that, that it was the same money. She said there was 190,000. He took out 100,000 and he put more in. I would dispute that. And again, this is an argument that would have happened at the hearing. But I don't think, I don't think if, if the reason that the record may be devoid of some of that evidence is because we didn't get a chance to have a hearing. I think those records would show that there. We heard. And I apologize. But what you got to hear is this. Tell me one, two, three, four. We say, Judge Balls got to have a hearing. You tell me now one, two, three, four. What are you putting on at the hearing? And what is the source of it? The documents from, that traced the money from the time that he was, previous, previous. Where are the documents? The documents are, I believe my client has them back now. I have them, but they're, I have a whole suitcase full of documents that my client presented to me that have all of the historical records from the retirement funds. All right, so why have you just given those to Ms. Faye to look at them? I mean, you think she's just going to say, you don't have a hearing? I don't want to see them? I believe they were. They were presented in Ms. Faye. And this discussion that was ongoing, at least the way I read it, indicates that they were very near a resolution and that the government actually agreed. But again, for whatever reason there was a, there was a change of heart. You were not the lawyer below, is that right? That's correct. Okay. All right, think we're at the bottom line. All right, I mean, we've exhausted it, but not because, well, we've exhausted because there are questions, you know, something about this. It's floating, but, you know, we have a duty and we're going to do it. I mean, we'll decide the case. It seems to me that, you know, a good settlement is better than an opinion from the Fifth Circuit in a context like this. But we've asked enough questions to flesh it out. And if that doesn't seem to be bold well for the parties, then so that it'd be done, you know, we'll decide the case and pour it out. It may or may not be the most favorable outcome, but, you know, we'll decide the case and we'll move on. But we appreciate the candor of both sides, the briefing in the case, and we'll get it done. Thank you, sir. All right, before we take up the third case, the panel is starting