Oral Argument Legal Case Summary

Oral Audio Transcript(Beta version)

. The Court has gone, I'm sorry, Your Honor. You would not have any problem about, assuming we agree with you that there's no personal jurisdiction, there's the wrong venue for the district court in Nevada to transfer the case to the Federal District Court in Georgia. Well, I think Justice Ginsburg in the ordinary course, in a case starting in district court under Section 1631 or the venue statute, that would be an appropriate course here. The district court asked respondents specifically, if I agree with Officer Walden on personal jurisdiction or venue, do you want me to transfer or do you want me to dismiss? Because the statute gives the district court discretion and says in the interest of justice transfer is permissible and lieu of dismissal, the respondent said, and fatically, we don't want you to transfer. We want you to dismiss. I guess they decided they would rather have an appeal to the Ninth Circuit and take their chances with an appeal than pursue the case in Georgia. So I think under the- Sotomayor New York to be a good strategy, at least to the extent they got to the Ninth Circuit. Isn't a call to against Jones in considerable tension with your proposition that you don't look to the plaintiff's contacts with the forum? I don't think so, Your Honor. I think there's definitely some language and call that could be read in a variety of ways. I think the key language and call that is the court states its conclusion. It says in some, California was the focal point both of the article and of the harm suffered by the plaintiff. And then the court later says that the defendant expressly aimed the conduct that California doesn't say at the plaintiff who happened to be in California. It says at California. And I think that's not an accident that the court used those formulations. In all of the personal jurisdiction cases before Calder and Sins, and for that matter decided the same day, and Keaton decided the same day as Calder, the court has emphasized that random, you know, attenuated and fortuitous contacts with the forum state aren't sufficient. And then in particular, contacts between the defendant and the forum that are created by the unilateral activity of the plaintiff are not sufficient. What do you say to the court meant when it said that the article was aimed at California? I think what the court meant just as Alito is that the article was distributed in California. The California was by far the largest market for the national inquire. The article recounted events or alleged events that happened in California. And the article was drawn from California's sources. So it's not for two of us that the effect of the article was felt in California. That was, that was, nothing about that was fortuitous because the defendants knew that the article would be distributed widely in California, that was the largest market. And they just distributed it. It was distributed everywhere. It was the national inquire, or so it was probably in every supermarket in the country. And why does California as an abstract entity care about an article that makes allegedly defamatory statements about things that people are supposedly did in California? I don't quite understand that. Well, let me try to answer the first part of your question. First Justice Alito, it's true that the national inquire was national and was distributed throughout the country. But the court went to, to Paynes in the opinion to emphasize that California was the largest market. And so when the court said the brunt of the harm that, that, that this is right after the court's reference to express aiming, where the court said, the largest market for everything, isn't it? Well, I think particularly for the national inquire, or when you're talking about articles, about celebrities, about actresses in particular, that allegedly injure their professional reputation and prevent them from getting viewed for a long time. Are you suggesting if this, everything was the same except, Ms. Jones was in New York, there'd be a different result in that case? No, I'm not suggesting that

. I think that- Well, I thought several times you said California was the biggest market. Right, I think the way that, that that called her reads, I think that there are a number of factors. One of them is plaintiffs' residents in California, and that's where she was when she suffered the emotional distress from, from reading the article about herself and where her job prospects were allegedly adversely affected. But it's also true that the court points out that not only is, when the court says the defendant's expressly aim their conduct at California, the next passage after that, where the court explains what that express aiming at California means, says California was not only where, where Ms. Jones suffered the brunt of the harm, but where the defendant knew that the inquire had its lower discirculation. So I don't think you can disentangle the fact that that's where she was, which, of course, was a relevant factor in that case because it was true, from the fact that the defendant in a broader sense, in a sense not based on her even letter of activity, but in a sense based on their own contacts aimed at California through their- Kagan- Well, what does it mean in the context of an intentional tort, which is what we're talking about here, to aim at a particular state? If it doesn't mean to aim at a person who you know to be within that state, I mean nobody conducts an intentional tort intending to injure California per se. You're intending to injure a person who resides in California. So what would it actually mean to aim conduct at a state irrespective of a person? Well, just as Kagan, I think the answer is that it could take a few forms, and it depends on the type of case. And it would be very difficult to try to come up with the single, you know, sort of comprehensive unitary answer to that question that would govern all types of cases. I think the way that the plurality put it in J. McIntyre for intentional tort cases is that maybe you're intending to obstruct the laws of the forum state that would be more meaningfully aimed at the forum state, quest state, and not just somebody who happens to be in it or have a connection to it. Another way that conduct could be aimed at a state would be if it's a species of purpose full of ailment or purposeful direction, where you're projecting your conduct into that state, whether that's physical and literal, or whether it's through some indirect or technological means. Well, suppose I'm sorry, please. For some benefit, for some reason, where you're projecting your conduct into that state, not just because that's where the plaintiff happens to be, which is incidental and irrelevant to you, that the plaintiff is there as opposed to anywhere else. But because you're seeking that state out, that could be, it could be in a case like J. McIntyre, the Court, of course, divided over whether in a very broad sense sending your product into the terms of commerce, intending that it, in some sense, you know, go to the U.S. as a whole without any particular focus on a given state was sufficient. But at least there, at least there, you have the intent to serve the U.S. market as a whole. And so you at least are unnoticed that your own conduct is putting you at risk of being held into court in any one of the states. Yes, I mean, I guess I just, the McIntyre example is a very different kind of example because in those cases, you really are talking about a company seeking to serve a general market in a state. But intentional tort cases don't usually have that quality. You're going after a particular person in an intentional tort case, and it's odd to think of going after an intentional, a particular person, whether it's a defamation suit or it's a fraud suit or what have you as targeting the state itself. Well, I think if it's a defamation suit, Justice Kagan, if you project your defamation into the forum state, then it's fair to say that you've, in a sense, entered the forum state whether that's electronic or physical as in Calder. But in this case, it was known or should have been known that these were gamblers. They were in Nevada. That's where their gambling takes place. They were residents of Nevada. So in that sense, they were like the plaintiff in Calder. The injury was there and the defendant arguably knew or should have known that that's where its major impact would be

. I recognize your point that when you take money away, then you're inconvenience in any state where you happen to be. But there was an argument here, it seems to me there is an argument that this was gambling. And these people were from Nevada. And so this curtail is their right or their option to conduct their activities in Nevada. Well, Justice Kennedy, the complaint alleges that the plaintiffs had contacts with Nevada were residents of Nevada. Of course, they showed Officer Walden California licenses. That's what the complaint alleges, not Nevada licenses. And so at the time of their actual- But didn't they say they were a resident in both places, in both California and Nevada? They do say that. But there's no reason to think, and even they don't want to ledge this, that Officer Walden knew that at the time that he actually interacted with them. And so there's no allegation that- But let me ask this, and it's probably clear in the reason. Is the gravimund of the complaint, the seizure at the airport, or the later false affidavit? Because to the extent it's the later false affidavit that cuts against you marginally? Well, I would emphasize marginally, Justice Kennedy, because I think the gravimund of the complaint is both. I don't think there was a way to separate them. The fact that the plaintiffs are- The reason for their lawsuit, their claim damages based on the allegedly false affidavit is that it took them longer than it otherwise would have to get their money back. It's the same money that was seized in Atlanta. So it's a continuation of the effect of the seizure. You can't separate them cleanly. And the affidavit- Would your answer be different? Suppose that the officer had said, you can keep your money. Go on to Nevada with it. And then once- The affioreans had reached Nevada, the officer said the officer filed a false affidavit, which, let's say, froze the Fiori's bank accounts. Would your answer be different? The affidavit was filed in Georgia, but the money was not seized in Georgia. Instead the money has gone onto Nevada. Is there a personal jurisdiction in the data? Justice Kagan, I think if what Officer Walden allegedly had done- And of course, that's not this case. It's free as a bank account in Nevada. Well, you did it by filing an affidavit in Georgia, and then it froze a bank account. No, I understand the question. But if what he had done is free as a bank account in Nevada, then maybe it would be fair to say that he had entered into Nevada by freezing the bank account in Nevada. But here, the cash was in Atlanta. The plaintiffs brought the cash to Atlanta. Officer Weldon didn't seek them out knowing that they had any connection to Nevada. They even go to Nevada. He didn't direct anyone in Nevada to do anything. He didn't see or freeze a bank account in Nevada or direct anyone to do anything like that

. He never had any contact with Nevada at all, except for the very intangible contact, if you can call it that, of allegedly writing this affidavit to keep the plaintiffs from getting the money back sooner than they would have. But the plaintiffs would have gotten the money back wherever they happened to be, or really more precisely wherever their lawyer happened to be. The fact that they chose a lawyer in Nevada, and that's where they asked the government to send them their money back ultimately, is the very definition of fortuitous contact being walled in Nevada. You started by saying that our personal jurisdiction and venue provisions, and jurisprudence, center on a defendant's action, not on the plaintiffs' action, or injury. Colder suggests otherwise. But how do you respond not only to justice, I'll do this after, but let me just pose a question. You can ask her it on your rebuttal. Thank you. I'm worried about the internet thefts from somebody's accountant Vermont by someone in Illinois's, the hypothetical on page 19, who steals something from a store in California. Thank you, Justice Sotomayor. All right, if I may, I'll reserve the balance of my time, and as you suggest, I'll address that on her bottle. Thank you. Thank you, counsel. Mr. Chief Justice, and may I please the court? If I could start with this court's decision in Calder, because the facts of this case and stark contrast to Calder, in Calder, the article was all about the state of California. It was about the California activities of a California resident whose career was centered in California based on California sources, and in a magazine that it's where its primary publication was in California. Here, even if you were to focus just on the affidavit, the affidavit, it is in every real sense, focused on the state of Georgia. According to Respondent's own allegation, it recounts what happened in the Atlanta airport in Georgia. It was based on information that was received by Officer Walden in Georgia. It's about funds that were seized in Georgia, that remained in Georgia. It was repaired in Georgia, forwarded to an AUSA in Georgia, for four-footer proceedings in Georgia. And so the two cases could not be more different, just as the focal point of the torsious activity in Calder was on the state of California. Here, the focus of the torsious activity was on the state of Georgia. Did the affidavit ever get to Nevada? It didn't get to Nevada based on Respondent's own allegations. It was sent to an AUSA in Georgia for four-footer proceedings in Georgia. And notably, had Respondent's wanted to regain their property during the six months period of seizure, they would have had to go to Georgia to do so. Do we know how much of the information, supplemental information that was prepared in Nevada and then was forwarded to Georgia? How much of that information was in the affidavit? Based on the current record, I don't know that we do if you look at the complaint allegation. They suggest that the ex-cultiv- what they call the ex-cultivatory information was left out of the affidavit, the affidavit itself, if it even exists, is not in the record in this case. And then, you know, by focusing, you asked the question, Your Honor, about what the gravimint of this case is. I think in a very real way, the gravimint of the case is the initial seizure. The Ninth Circuit focused exclusively on the affidavit and Respondent's do so here as well. But I think it's the quintessential example of the tell wagging the dog

. The affidavit is that best a thin and artificial read, even if you were to focus exclusively on the affidavit as I. It was dated as a separate claim. And I think Judge Brisson read it that way. And I don't think petitioner has taken issue with that. That there's one claim is for the seizure, another claim is for the false affidavit. So the seizure stops the funds immediately. And then the false affidavit keeps them there. So I didn't think there was a genuine difference between the parties on whether the affidavit, knowingly composing a false affidavit is an independent claim. There is an for purposes of this case and this court, and I don't mean to suggest otherwise, but while there may be a distinct claim, there is no distinct injury. The injury that Respondent's alleged based on the affidavit is simply that the initial seizure continued beyond the time that it otherwise would have. And for that reason, the harm, the same economic harm that they were already feeling in Nevada continued beyond a certain point. But imagine a case where everybody agreed that the initial seizure was lawful, so that that wasn't part of the complaint at all. And the only complaint was that a false affidavit had been filed so that after making a preliminary investigation, the officer hadn't transferred the money but had instead kept it. And again, obviously that's not this case, but I don't think that case would be any different because assuming that the affidavit looks the same as the alleged to look in this case, it would still be focused at money in Georgia and everything about it would still be related to Georgia. Again, the only connection to Nevada would be the fact that Respondent felt some harm in that state. It's not a harm that's unique in any respect to Nevada. It's a harm that they would have felt no matter where they traveled that they had gone to their other residents in California, that they had left on another. And that would be true even if the Respondents had never been in Georgia. No, I think it's significant here that the Respondents did go to Georgia. I mean, here we are talking about a traveling plane to the mobile plaintiff who voluntarily left their home state and traveled to other states, traveled to New Jersey, traveled to San Juan, and traveled to Walden's home state, the place where he lives and works, and brought their cash with them there. And so I think it is significant that they did travel to the state of Georgia. And I think it shows how broad the Ninet Circuit ruling really is. As far as law enforcement officers though, federal, state, or local, this is a really problematic decision because they interact with travelers from all 50 states and beyond on a daily basis. The idea that based on those interactions that they can be hauled into a faraway and distant forum, based on nothing more than their interaction with the traveler and finding out where that person is from, which of course, unlike this case, the facts here are somewhat unique in that the driver's licenses that were showed were not from the state of Nevada. In most cases when travelers show a driver's license, it's from their state of residents. Do you think it's relevant in a case like this, whether the Federal Officer who is sued is represented by the Justice Department? I don't think it's relevant at all. I would point your honor to the Court's decision in Stafford v. Briggs. In that case, it's a venue case. It's about 1391 E. In that case, the dissent made an argument that that provision should extend to personal capacity cases against government officials and one of the arguments made is there's really not much of a burden on them because they have DOJ representation because they have indemnification. And the majority there rejected that argument, I think it's equally implausible here

. And I think it's significant that not only did the Ninth Circuit rely on the fact of DOJ representation, which mind you, is not a guarantee it's a discretionary determination. But not only did they rely on it, they relied on it to say that there would be personal jurisdiction here. Because this is a Federal official or really a State official, deputized as a Federal official. I mean, Sherry, just to try to figure out how far your argument goes, suppose there's an IRS agent sitting in Washington, D.C. And she maliciously does something, files an affidavit, does whatever she does to impose a tax penalty on somebody in Nevada. And everything that she does happens in Washington, D.C. Does the person in Nevada, who is the victim of this malicious attempt to impose a tax penalty have to go to Washington, D.C. to sue her? I think there's more difficult questions there where the individual hasn't left the state at all and where it's targeted at the state. I think that comes to your honor's question of how well you do. Well, she's a very mobile person. She lives in Nevada, but she goes other places. And this could harm her wherever she goes. Isn't that what you said? So why should she be able to bring suit in Nevada under your view? That is what I said. I think maybe it goes to your honor's other question earlier about what it means to express Lee Amier conduct at the forum state as opposed to just the forum resident when we're talking about an intentional tort. And the cases that have looked at this, they have looked for something more besides simply aiming your conduct at a forum resident. Some indication that the defendant is trying to reach into the forum state. And some of the examples that have come up is when they've actually sent something into the forum state, whether it's a defamatory article or a letter, the bullet example that's in the statement and mentioned in the briefs. In those cases, the defendant is actually sending something physically into the state, or for example, directing activity in the forum state, directing something to happen in the forum state. Whatever the answer is to that hypothetical, the facts here are really quite different. Walden didn't do anything to reach into the state in Nevada. And as my colleague pointed out, the only connection to Nevada and the idea that the money was going to be returned there and eventually was returned there is entirely fortuitous. It's based entirely on the unilateral acts of the plaintiff, the fact that they happen to hire a Las Vegas attorney. And Sherry, would you want us to decide this case on the jurisdictional question or the venue question? The Court, I think, can do either. My preference would be that that's why I asked the question. My preference would be that this is the same as petitioners that the Court decided on personal jurisdiction grounds and the reasons are the ones expressed in the Federal Law Enforcement Office or brief. What type of action would the United States have brought if they decided to bring an action? It would have been in persona or in Ram against the assets. It would have been an in-ram action against the assets. It would have been a forfeiture complaint that would have been filed in Georgia. And in those proceedings, the respondents would have had an opportunity to contest the forfeiture

. If during either the dependency of those proceedings or even before those proceedings that they had wanted to seek to regain control of their property, they would have had to file a motion or a petition in the state of Georgia. They wouldn't have been able to file one in their home state. And again, those are the statutes that we cite at page 31 of our brief. The consequence of the Ninth Circuit's decision here really is to allow personal jurisdiction as well as venue to travel with a mobile plane to be in a way that it cannot travel with mobile travel. We've talked mostly about personal jurisdiction here, but if I could just take a quick moment on venue and point the court to this, to the Leeroy decision in 1979, nobody can test that there would be no venue in the district of Nevada under the Leeroy decision. The language change in 1990 does nothing to change that. It does nothing to change the result in Leeroy respondents avoid the statutory tax, and I think it resolves this case. Thank you. Thank you, counsel. Mr. Goldstein? Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court, you are being asked by the other side of the slide, to write an opinion about personal jurisdiction that is going to try and slice the slumy, very, very, very thin, that is going to create a huge amount of confusion about these facts versus the facts in Calder, and that is going to be very, very difficult to reconcile with the internet cases and the cases that the lower courts are constantly confronting about where a person in state A intentionally injures a person in state B, and that person frequently doesn't shoot a gun into the other state. They sit at their computer and they steal money out of the bank account, they take the person's ID, they use their credit cards and the like. I think, in truth, the way the case is most likely to be resolved. He didn't really injure a person in state B here. I mean, these people were in Georgia when the injury occurred. Justice Scalia, we disagree, and so let me focus on your point in Justice Kennedy's question about which claim it is. The claim here, the complaint states to complaints, Judge Berzon recognized. One is about the seizure, it's exactly what you're describing. The other is about the false affidavit, and those really are different as a matter of law. I have a couple of citations to give you to explain how this legal process works. What happens is the DEA ceases the money at the Atlanta Hartfield Airport. He takes the cash and he turns it into a locker. Then what happens is that we have to state a claim to the money, and when we state a claim to the money, they either have to do one of two things. They have to give it back to a ceasematter of law, or they have to start a forfeiture process as a matter of law. And if you start the forfeiture process, you have to provide to the assistant U.S. attorney a factual basis for the forfeiture. And the way to look at this, I think, is the way that Justice Kagan's hypothetical asked, and that is, imagine that there were two officers here, not one. Officer A. will call him Walden. He's at the Atlanta Hartfield Airport, and he ceases our money

. And just assume that that's perfectly lawful. We then state a claim to the money, and then we provide factual information about why it is that the money is not subject to seizure. They have to return it to us at that point, or they have to start the forfeiture process. And when that second officer creates a false affidavit to start the forfeiture process, we are not in Georgia. We have no ongoing contacts with Georgia, and we are losing access to the money only in Nevada, that's the only place we're in. I suppose that the plaintiffs in this case were not professional gamblers. Let's say they were majorly umpires, or they are members of a rock group that's going on a tour of 25 cities. Where would there be personal jurisdiction there? In every place where the umpire was going to appear at a game, every place where the group was going to perform? No, sir. The lower courts have tackled this question, because people go visit their mother-in-law, they do travel around, it's a mobile society, and they have taken from your opinion in Calder and Jones the focus on where it is that the plaintiff lives and works. And there's a good reason for that. Personal jurisdiction is trying to tackle the question of where does the defendant reasonably believe that he will be hailed in court? It's a fairness principle, and that is we need to have a predictable rule that allows the would-be defendants to know, okay, if I do this. Well, here the plaintiffs apparently lived in two places, right? California and Nevada. That is not. Suppose my hypothetical rock performer has five houses, one in California, one in Montana and so forth. Yeah. That personal jurisdiction everywhere? No, sir. And let me just start with a premise of this case, all right? My friend said that this officer was shown in California, California driver's license, that's not correct. He wasn't shown in California driver's license, the officer in San Juan Puerto Rico was shown one. They only had their principal residents, the complaint alleges, I think, in paragraph two, is in Nevada. We do have situations, and that's where they lived in work. Well, they were sufficiently residents of California to get California driver's licenses, were they not? That is true. At one point, and they had moved. I'm going to step outside the record just so I can accurately answer your question. But it will give you a sense of how these cases actually operate. Most often, you have the situation where they're college students. You know, you have a college student who lives at home with their parents, but they go off to college, and they may be injured where it is that they live and go to school, and in that case. And what the lower courts do is sensibly they say, if you know where the person's principal residence is, and this case is simplified by the fact that the district court understood and assumed that the defendant knew that they lived in Nevada, it's never been contested in the case. And Judge Burzon said, quite correctly, what you have to do is you have to make it a prime facie case, because there's no evidence in this case that the principal residence was Nevada and that the defendant knew that. So you're really arguing for a very broad principal. Whenever there is an intentional tort, you can be hailed into court at the place of residents of the person against whom the tort is committed. No, sorry. I'm sorry

. That's what I thought you were saying. And I've misled you and let me state our test, which I haven't done yet, and that may help you. Our rule is this follows. When the defendant intentionally targets the plaintiff for injury in State A where the injury arises, and that's going to be the big difference, does the injury arise? There are just a Scalia, your impression in your earlier question was that this injury didn't arise in Nevada, but our test requires that it arise in Nevada, and the defendant knows that it's going to arise in Nevada. I'll contrast our fall seizure claim, right? We were in the airport. We lose the $97,000. If we then go back to Nevada and then file suit, our injury can't travel with us. And that's the big concern of the fact that I don't see how it arises in Nevada. What they're saying is that some people in Georgia didn't give back some money that they took in Georgia. To take your example, my question is this. You say there are many, many, many cases to get this all mixed up if we don't follow your rule. All I want you to do is cite me a few. But the few that I want you to cite me will meet certain criteria. Okay. For example, a college student goes into the bookstore and it's also a pharmacy by the way, and he breaks his finger in the door, which he thinks is faulty, says, I'm going home, send me some bandages. Yeah. The store never does. Send me some books. I just bought them. The store never does. They know his home address. All right. What about those? They cite me some lower cases where they say there's jurisdiction in cases like that. I have not seen it. Oh, I lost my billfold. I lost it here in the store. When you find it, when you send it back, they never send it back, but they found it. All right. So just give me some lower court cases that find jurisdiction in that kind of situation. In that kind of situation where the injury actually, and you've named several situations. No, no, the injury, my goodness, he lost his billfold. There was money in it

. Yeah. And by the way, when he gets home, his parents are away, and he's not going to have any money to spend on food or even like CDs or anything. So just as prior, it is our position that in that situation, there is not personal jurisdiction. And let me try. There's no jurisdiction. In those cases where he lost his billfold in the bookstore in the college town, 1,000 miles away from home, and he's going home, and everybody knows he's never going to have any money, and they keep the money. Okay. What's the difference if there's no cases on those? What is the difference between that case and yours? Okay. The difference is that the defendant in that instance, the injury arises at the bookstore. And the fact that it has a continuing effect is a practical matter. The lower courts uniformly treat the injury arising as in the bookstore. But there are situations that you can imagine the following. And that is, he loses the billfold in the store. That injury arose there. Now, someone takes the credit card from the billfold. After he's gone home, knows that he's at home, and starts spending his money with it. That injury arises where he lives. Okay. Now, give me the case that says that. Okay. The cases that are closest to that are two of them are at page 25A of the petition appendix. They are the bankroft case, and these are not going to be billfold cases. Okay. Billfold cases, people tend not to, if you lose $100, people don't file lawsuit. These are bigger cases. And it's the petition appendix. You're allowed, you've pulled open the red brief. So I'm asking you for the serve petition. The bankroft case at 25A is where a Georgia resident writes to a Virginia registrar. And the registrar misappropriates the website of a California company. And that is, they never set foot in California. They don't, you know, do anything in California at all. And there, there's jurisdiction in California because they know that the person is going to be hurt in California. The next one is Metropolitan Life. That is, same page. And Alabama resident writes to an insurance company. And they say, ah, I'm entitled to the insurance proceeds. But the actual proceeds belong to someone in California, and they never get the money. So it's like this case, the money never gets sent into California. And these remote injury cases, and the- Just a case, is this a case like, I'll look at those cases. But as your case, a case like where the credit card is used, somebody finds it in the bookstore and starts spending the money. And did the agents here who were outside Nevada, and they were keeping the money, were they going and spending it? They weren't going and spending it. Is there a credit card that they were using? No, sir. I'm giving- I was trying to take a billfold example, and I'm trying to figure out just which cases I should read carefully, and I will read those cases. And there's a case that's discussed in several of the briefs called Dudenekov, and that involves an EBA- like auction, and someone in one state blocks an auction in another state. So one of the impressions- What was the money here in Georgia the whole time? The money is still there in that blocker? No, here's the thing about it. This is no longer about the cash. The actual answer to your question is he turns the money in into locker. Okay, then it's deposited into an account. It's not about the physical money in any way, shape, or form at that point. When we got the money, nobody sent us a duffle bag full of cash. There was a check, of course. Well, if it were about them- So suppose they seized a gold watch. And then they refused to return the gold watch. But the gold watch really is still sitting there in Georgia. Yes. Okay. Would you say that then there's this personal jurisdiction in Nevada? Okay, in same facts, and then there's a false affidavit. It's not just they seized it, it's they're giving false affidavit- Yeah, they seize it, and then there's a false affidavit keeping it. Yes, that- The complaint is only about the false affidavit, but it's in reference to property that is indisputably in Georgia. I do think if you can prove an injury, which I think is very hard from the gold watch, let's say a computer just to make it a little bit more possible that they would be heard in Nevada, then yes, I do think if you can make out an injury, which isn't- The tort doesn't arise until the injury occurs. That's why the lower courts treat these cases as the tort occurring where the victim is. Mr. Goldstein, can I take you back to the origins of all of this? Yes

. And there, there's jurisdiction in California because they know that the person is going to be hurt in California. The next one is Metropolitan Life. That is, same page. And Alabama resident writes to an insurance company. And they say, ah, I'm entitled to the insurance proceeds. But the actual proceeds belong to someone in California, and they never get the money. So it's like this case, the money never gets sent into California. And these remote injury cases, and the- Just a case, is this a case like, I'll look at those cases. But as your case, a case like where the credit card is used, somebody finds it in the bookstore and starts spending the money. And did the agents here who were outside Nevada, and they were keeping the money, were they going and spending it? They weren't going and spending it. Is there a credit card that they were using? No, sir. I'm giving- I was trying to take a billfold example, and I'm trying to figure out just which cases I should read carefully, and I will read those cases. And there's a case that's discussed in several of the briefs called Dudenekov, and that involves an EBA- like auction, and someone in one state blocks an auction in another state. So one of the impressions- What was the money here in Georgia the whole time? The money is still there in that blocker? No, here's the thing about it. This is no longer about the cash. The actual answer to your question is he turns the money in into locker. Okay, then it's deposited into an account. It's not about the physical money in any way, shape, or form at that point. When we got the money, nobody sent us a duffle bag full of cash. There was a check, of course. Well, if it were about them- So suppose they seized a gold watch. And then they refused to return the gold watch. But the gold watch really is still sitting there in Georgia. Yes. Okay. Would you say that then there's this personal jurisdiction in Nevada? Okay, in same facts, and then there's a false affidavit. It's not just they seized it, it's they're giving false affidavit- Yeah, they seize it, and then there's a false affidavit keeping it. Yes, that- The complaint is only about the false affidavit, but it's in reference to property that is indisputably in Georgia. I do think if you can prove an injury, which I think is very hard from the gold watch, let's say a computer just to make it a little bit more possible that they would be heard in Nevada, then yes, I do think if you can make out an injury, which isn't- The tort doesn't arise until the injury occurs. That's why the lower courts treat these cases as the tort occurring where the victim is. Mr. Goldstein, can I take you back to the origins of all of this? Yes. The main move for personal jurisdiction traditionally is that the plaintiff must go to where the defendant is, no matter how inconvenient that is for the plaintiff. Jurisdiction is defendant-centered. You're trying to hold a defendant. You have to go where he is. Then the long-long age comes about, and we have a specific jurisdiction, which by the ways what you're urging is certain or not, they have all purpose jurisdiction over the Walden. And this court, as the McIntyre decision indicates, has been pretty careful about specific jurisdiction. There wasn't enough that the machine blew up while cut somebody's fingers in New Jersey. They had to purposely avail themselves of whatever the standard words are. And here you're asking for really pushing this specific jurisdiction to the limit. The defendant has acted only in Georgia. He hasn't set foot outside this state. Okay. So I don't think we are trying to push the bounds, but let me make one point about McIntyre and then try and create the misimpression that I think that's been left, that there are a few contacts between Nevada and this case and hopefully prove to you that there are far more contacts between this toward and this forum than will be true in the overwhelming majority of cases that the lower courts confront. And the point I would make just as Ginsburg and it's made by the plurality in McIntyre is that there have always been special rules for intentional toward cases. That's the distinction and that's why Calder comes out the way it does. Sighting restatement section 32nd of the second, the second restatement of the conflict of laws. And that is the reason, it's not just made up, the reason there's a special rule for intentional towards is that the defendant knows he's hurting someone somewhere else and therefore expects to be hailed in the court. The view of the McIntyre plurality, of course, was that the overseas manufacturer there wasn't itself doing anything directed at the forum, but if I could just get to the very important point about my- Before you move on from that point, your argument is dependent on the fact that the officer here knew that the plaintiffs were residents of Nevada, is that right? That they lived in work there. Why should that make any difference? The conduct is the same, the injury is the same. What if he didn't know? Then there would be no personal jurisdiction. That is actually generally what the lower courts hold and their reason is that the defendant is doing something knowing that he may be hailed into that court. It is a defendant-favoring rule that attempts to give predictability. Now, if that's wrong, it doesn't hurt my case because as the case comes to you, it's not- You should say that about whatever rule we adopt. Once we adopt the rule, when the defendant will know that if he violates that rule, he's going to be hailed into court. Justice Scalia, there is a sort of a self-fulfilling point. It's almost like the Fourth Amendment reasonable expectations are privacy. There is a circularity here, but it's not entirely circular because we're talking about a specific state here. It's not that he knows that the plaintiffs might be in, live in Georgia or might live anywhere in the United States. It's a very specific state, and that's why it's not circular. Now, if I could just help you understand our view that there are a lot more contacts between this toward in Nevada, then in the great, great, at least 90 percent of the cases the lower courts are confronting. So here are the points that I would make about those contacts, and there are six, and I will try and be brief. The case involves money in own by Nevada residents, $30,000 of which originated in Nevada, and all of which was on its way to Nevada

. The main move for personal jurisdiction traditionally is that the plaintiff must go to where the defendant is, no matter how inconvenient that is for the plaintiff. Jurisdiction is defendant-centered. You're trying to hold a defendant. You have to go where he is. Then the long-long age comes about, and we have a specific jurisdiction, which by the ways what you're urging is certain or not, they have all purpose jurisdiction over the Walden. And this court, as the McIntyre decision indicates, has been pretty careful about specific jurisdiction. There wasn't enough that the machine blew up while cut somebody's fingers in New Jersey. They had to purposely avail themselves of whatever the standard words are. And here you're asking for really pushing this specific jurisdiction to the limit. The defendant has acted only in Georgia. He hasn't set foot outside this state. Okay. So I don't think we are trying to push the bounds, but let me make one point about McIntyre and then try and create the misimpression that I think that's been left, that there are a few contacts between Nevada and this case and hopefully prove to you that there are far more contacts between this toward and this forum than will be true in the overwhelming majority of cases that the lower courts confront. And the point I would make just as Ginsburg and it's made by the plurality in McIntyre is that there have always been special rules for intentional toward cases. That's the distinction and that's why Calder comes out the way it does. Sighting restatement section 32nd of the second, the second restatement of the conflict of laws. And that is the reason, it's not just made up, the reason there's a special rule for intentional towards is that the defendant knows he's hurting someone somewhere else and therefore expects to be hailed in the court. The view of the McIntyre plurality, of course, was that the overseas manufacturer there wasn't itself doing anything directed at the forum, but if I could just get to the very important point about my- Before you move on from that point, your argument is dependent on the fact that the officer here knew that the plaintiffs were residents of Nevada, is that right? That they lived in work there. Why should that make any difference? The conduct is the same, the injury is the same. What if he didn't know? Then there would be no personal jurisdiction. That is actually generally what the lower courts hold and their reason is that the defendant is doing something knowing that he may be hailed into that court. It is a defendant-favoring rule that attempts to give predictability. Now, if that's wrong, it doesn't hurt my case because as the case comes to you, it's not- You should say that about whatever rule we adopt. Once we adopt the rule, when the defendant will know that if he violates that rule, he's going to be hailed into court. Justice Scalia, there is a sort of a self-fulfilling point. It's almost like the Fourth Amendment reasonable expectations are privacy. There is a circularity here, but it's not entirely circular because we're talking about a specific state here. It's not that he knows that the plaintiffs might be in, live in Georgia or might live anywhere in the United States. It's a very specific state, and that's why it's not circular. Now, if I could just help you understand our view that there are a lot more contacts between this toward in Nevada, then in the great, great, at least 90 percent of the cases the lower courts are confronting. So here are the points that I would make about those contacts, and there are six, and I will try and be brief. The case involves money in own by Nevada residents, $30,000 of which originated in Nevada, and all of which was on its way to Nevada. Second, the defendant intentionally hurt the plaintiffs, knowing that they would lose access to the money in Nevada where they lived and were. Third, we will use documents in Nevada to prove that his action was intentional, because it omitted the information that the defendant requested. This is not a unilaterally sending money at the Atlanta airport. He said, send us the proof that the funds are legitimate, that he requested and received from the plaintiffs in Nevada, and that he learned in searching a Nevada law enforcement database, which is paragraph 79 of the complaint. The two last points I would make is that the plaintiffs will show that they will deprived of the money in Nevada until the Nevada lawyer they had to hire used records in Nevada to persuade the government to send the money to Nevada. And the plaintiffs in their case, of course, will show, because it is the fact that they are gamblers working in Las Vegas, that the economic injury occurred to them there. Now, if you think that's not enough, if you conclude that's not enough, you are closing the door absolutely to all of the Internet cases, because those are cases where someone sits at the computer and targets someone in another state. This one you're talking about the Internet, you're in a different world, but this is a, the facts here are old fashioned. Everything that happened here could have happened in 1920. Could have happened in the 19th century. Yes. So I don't see what the Internet has to do with us. Justice Alita, you always tell us that you've got to write a legal rule. And there is no special personal jurisdiction rule and the lower courts are like- Yes, well, there it seems to be, because it's hard to think of an Internet case who are a defendant wouldn't be having communications with people in the foreign state, wouldn't be inviting business, wouldn't be doing all kinds of things. So there are many kinds of Internet cases, but I don't automatically see in deciding this that we're deciding any of them. Justice Breyer, the kinds of Internet cases, and it's wrong for me to just say Internet. The kinds of cases that I'm talking about are the fraud cases, the intentional tort case. Like what? You're sitting in Georgia, you don't, but someone is sitting in Georgia and they steal the identity of someone who's in the... I wouldn't do that. I'm exactly right. That's why I took it immediately back recognizing the error. He wouldn't know how. But there are bad people in the world, obviously, and those people do with increasing and distressing frequency with these new tools of communication, they are very, very capable of causing significant harm to someone else without actually do a setting foot in the state. Now I have to offer you a solution. Let me just speak here. I recognize that this can go either way, because if I say Internet cases, well, then I'm opening the door to potentially a very wide range of cases going into Nevada, and we have here the special case of a law enforcement officer, and I believe that I do have the solution, and that is this is actually a case about transfer. It is not a case about jurisdiction and venue. This is the unusual case where the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and did not file a 14-04 motion to transfer. In this case, you should treat it like Atlantic Marine, because what you need to do is recognize, I think, that there's the big category of jurisdiction, where there's jurisdiction, there's a subset, there's venue. That's where you can file a lawsuit

. Second, the defendant intentionally hurt the plaintiffs, knowing that they would lose access to the money in Nevada where they lived and were. Third, we will use documents in Nevada to prove that his action was intentional, because it omitted the information that the defendant requested. This is not a unilaterally sending money at the Atlanta airport. He said, send us the proof that the funds are legitimate, that he requested and received from the plaintiffs in Nevada, and that he learned in searching a Nevada law enforcement database, which is paragraph 79 of the complaint. The two last points I would make is that the plaintiffs will show that they will deprived of the money in Nevada until the Nevada lawyer they had to hire used records in Nevada to persuade the government to send the money to Nevada. And the plaintiffs in their case, of course, will show, because it is the fact that they are gamblers working in Las Vegas, that the economic injury occurred to them there. Now, if you think that's not enough, if you conclude that's not enough, you are closing the door absolutely to all of the Internet cases, because those are cases where someone sits at the computer and targets someone in another state. This one you're talking about the Internet, you're in a different world, but this is a, the facts here are old fashioned. Everything that happened here could have happened in 1920. Could have happened in the 19th century. Yes. So I don't see what the Internet has to do with us. Justice Alita, you always tell us that you've got to write a legal rule. And there is no special personal jurisdiction rule and the lower courts are like- Yes, well, there it seems to be, because it's hard to think of an Internet case who are a defendant wouldn't be having communications with people in the foreign state, wouldn't be inviting business, wouldn't be doing all kinds of things. So there are many kinds of Internet cases, but I don't automatically see in deciding this that we're deciding any of them. Justice Breyer, the kinds of Internet cases, and it's wrong for me to just say Internet. The kinds of cases that I'm talking about are the fraud cases, the intentional tort case. Like what? You're sitting in Georgia, you don't, but someone is sitting in Georgia and they steal the identity of someone who's in the... I wouldn't do that. I'm exactly right. That's why I took it immediately back recognizing the error. He wouldn't know how. But there are bad people in the world, obviously, and those people do with increasing and distressing frequency with these new tools of communication, they are very, very capable of causing significant harm to someone else without actually do a setting foot in the state. Now I have to offer you a solution. Let me just speak here. I recognize that this can go either way, because if I say Internet cases, well, then I'm opening the door to potentially a very wide range of cases going into Nevada, and we have here the special case of a law enforcement officer, and I believe that I do have the solution, and that is this is actually a case about transfer. It is not a case about jurisdiction and venue. This is the unusual case where the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and did not file a 14-04 motion to transfer. In this case, you should treat it like Atlantic Marine, because what you need to do is recognize, I think, that there's the big category of jurisdiction, where there's jurisdiction, there's a subset, there's venue. That's where you can file a lawsuit. That is not where the case is going to be litigated. And in these cases, what defendants uniformly do, and the lower courts pay incredible attention to the fact that law enforcement officers are going to be witnesses or are the defendant. In these cases, the defendant comes in and says, okay, I recognize technically there's jurisdiction and venue, but let me tell you how disruptive it will be if I actually have to litigate the case. Well, I don't understand what you're saying. You're saying that we should reverse the night's circuits dismiss the dismissal and send it back for the district court to consider whether the case should be transferred? No, sir. I would not, this is my judgment. I do not want to reverse. Well, I'm saying no, that's why I'm accused by what you're saying. I'm trying to describe an opinion that you would write. And the opinion that I think you would write is this and says, look, personal jurisdiction in the wake of Calder, particularly where there are contacts here, exists. Veneu exists because several of these are event sonomissions, including the injury that occurs in Nevada. But what we expect the lower courts to do in a case like this is to pay particular attention at the beginning of the case as we do with qualified immunity to have an efficient process in which the defendant can say it would be. But you're asking the court to decide a big ticket item, personal jurisdiction, and what the theory that you're proposing would apply not to just two office of the world, but it would be about as far out as any specific jurisdiction case I know. So the court shouldn't say, well, jurisdiction, okay, Veneu, okay, but consider transferring it to Georgia. Justice, it seems to me well. Justice, but I am not trying to just skip over. I've talked for this entire time about why I think we're right on jurisdiction and venue, and I'm pleased to return to the issue. What I'm suggesting to you is that I recognize that we can't have, there are two ways of dealing with the prospect of a broad personal jurisdiction rule. One is to narrow it substantially. The second is to recognize that it doesn't determine where the case is going to ultimately be litigated. I will tell you, Justice Ginsburg, from personally reviewing all of the post-pollier cases in the Federal courts and the State courts, that the contacts here are much, much greater between Nevada and this tort than exists in the great majority of cases that the lower courts are confronting. And so if you fully- KWALDA have something to do with the notion that every defamation is a doubt. Every publication is a tort where it occurs. There is something special about the libel cases. There was that theory that wherever the paper that contains the libelist is, ironically, wherever it's sent, each one of those places, the tort occurs there. Two things about that. That is the rule for torts, not specifically. It does, it's true of libel, but it's true as well of fraud. The fraud occurs where the person is defrauded. This is straight from the restatement. It's the ordinary common law rule. So the tort does happen where the victim is injured in libel and in a case like this

. That is not where the case is going to be litigated. And in these cases, what defendants uniformly do, and the lower courts pay incredible attention to the fact that law enforcement officers are going to be witnesses or are the defendant. In these cases, the defendant comes in and says, okay, I recognize technically there's jurisdiction and venue, but let me tell you how disruptive it will be if I actually have to litigate the case. Well, I don't understand what you're saying. You're saying that we should reverse the night's circuits dismiss the dismissal and send it back for the district court to consider whether the case should be transferred? No, sir. I would not, this is my judgment. I do not want to reverse. Well, I'm saying no, that's why I'm accused by what you're saying. I'm trying to describe an opinion that you would write. And the opinion that I think you would write is this and says, look, personal jurisdiction in the wake of Calder, particularly where there are contacts here, exists. Veneu exists because several of these are event sonomissions, including the injury that occurs in Nevada. But what we expect the lower courts to do in a case like this is to pay particular attention at the beginning of the case as we do with qualified immunity to have an efficient process in which the defendant can say it would be. But you're asking the court to decide a big ticket item, personal jurisdiction, and what the theory that you're proposing would apply not to just two office of the world, but it would be about as far out as any specific jurisdiction case I know. So the court shouldn't say, well, jurisdiction, okay, Veneu, okay, but consider transferring it to Georgia. Justice, it seems to me well. Justice, but I am not trying to just skip over. I've talked for this entire time about why I think we're right on jurisdiction and venue, and I'm pleased to return to the issue. What I'm suggesting to you is that I recognize that we can't have, there are two ways of dealing with the prospect of a broad personal jurisdiction rule. One is to narrow it substantially. The second is to recognize that it doesn't determine where the case is going to ultimately be litigated. I will tell you, Justice Ginsburg, from personally reviewing all of the post-pollier cases in the Federal courts and the State courts, that the contacts here are much, much greater between Nevada and this tort than exists in the great majority of cases that the lower courts are confronting. And so if you fully- KWALDA have something to do with the notion that every defamation is a doubt. Every publication is a tort where it occurs. There is something special about the libel cases. There was that theory that wherever the paper that contains the libelist is, ironically, wherever it's sent, each one of those places, the tort occurs there. Two things about that. That is the rule for torts, not specifically. It does, it's true of libel, but it's true as well of fraud. The fraud occurs where the person is defrauded. This is straight from the restatement. It's the ordinary common law rule. So the tort does happen where the victim is injured in libel and in a case like this. What you're libeled wherever it's published, you don't have to be there where it's published. That you are libeled wherever it's published. And Justice, that's correct. And Justice Scalia, this is exactly why you were asking the question, why is it that Justice then Justice Ranker's opinion in KWALDA has the discussion that the other side is focusing on about how the article was centered on California and how it came from California sources. Now, none of the holding of the case describes it, but you wondered and he has emphasized, my friend has, why is it in the opinion and it's for the reason you've just given. And that is defamation and libel cases. When you're talking about the publication to the internet or publication nationwide like the National Inquirer, the lower courts have rightly focused on the fact, can we say that this isn't just directed to the United States? You could say that KWALDA, far from being an expansive decision, was a narrowing decision. It said, you know, there's jurisdiction not necessarily everywhere where the libel was published, which is where the injury occurs, but there's jurisdiction only in California where these other connections exist. We're saying the same thing, I'm just not explaining my view of it well enough. And that is the part for you to establish that the injury occurred in Nevada. I don't think so, and let me try my best. All right, the reason these defamation cases about internet and national publications say the New York Times is sued for defamation. The court was very concerned and the lower courts are concerned that the publisher can't be sued in all 50 states. And so what the lower courts have done in the wake of KWALDA is say, I know you published it to the whole country in National Inquirer, but is it fair to say you expected to be hailed into court in California because there were special features about this defamation? Now defamation and nationwide publication is very different from the other courts, the lower courts confront, which is what was suggested in the first 30 minutes of questioning, I think, by Justice Kagan, are directed at a person, the shoot the gun example, the defraud, the victim. But are jurisdiction cases have not been based on where you expected to be sued? You could expect to be sued anywhere if the State says you're going to be sued here. Are cases have focused on whether the State has jurisdiction, whether the State has enough connection with it to assert its power, not the expectation of the defendant, but the power of the State? Justice, what's going on here? Justice, I agree with you, but I will say in my defense that when the Court has said when we're trying to figure out if there are minimum contacts and whether it's consistent with fair play and substantial justice, the language the Court has used is, is it fair because the defendant could reasonably expect to be hailed into the Court? That's true of purposeful, available cases like Macintyre is true of intentional court cases, and that is we measure fairness and whether you're getting processed that is due to you procedurally. By whether this is something that you could expect to happen to you, that you've turned out the Court. Justice, just whether you could expect this to happen. No, sir. No, sir. I've given you a specific test about where you have to intentionally injure the person, knowing that they will be injured there and the injury has to arise there. And as I've said, the way in intentional court cases that has to work is that the lower courts recognize that a tort has a wrong and an injury, and the injury is what makes the tort complete and the tort occurs where the victim is. Just take the shoot, the gun example, right? The reason is that the person is injured there. It doesn't have to be that you shoot the gun, that the bullet travels across the state line because the same thing can happen when money is taken out of your bank account. What is the, what are the elements of the, of the second tort? Yes. It is essentially a fraud claim. And what is the element? That he knowingly submitted information that caused the government not to send us the money. No, the injury element. Right. Yeah, that is, there's no need. How do I find that? Because you see in the fraud case, the element includes the, the, the victims being misled. Yes

. What you're libeled wherever it's published, you don't have to be there where it's published. That you are libeled wherever it's published. And Justice, that's correct. And Justice Scalia, this is exactly why you were asking the question, why is it that Justice then Justice Ranker's opinion in KWALDA has the discussion that the other side is focusing on about how the article was centered on California and how it came from California sources. Now, none of the holding of the case describes it, but you wondered and he has emphasized, my friend has, why is it in the opinion and it's for the reason you've just given. And that is defamation and libel cases. When you're talking about the publication to the internet or publication nationwide like the National Inquirer, the lower courts have rightly focused on the fact, can we say that this isn't just directed to the United States? You could say that KWALDA, far from being an expansive decision, was a narrowing decision. It said, you know, there's jurisdiction not necessarily everywhere where the libel was published, which is where the injury occurs, but there's jurisdiction only in California where these other connections exist. We're saying the same thing, I'm just not explaining my view of it well enough. And that is the part for you to establish that the injury occurred in Nevada. I don't think so, and let me try my best. All right, the reason these defamation cases about internet and national publications say the New York Times is sued for defamation. The court was very concerned and the lower courts are concerned that the publisher can't be sued in all 50 states. And so what the lower courts have done in the wake of KWALDA is say, I know you published it to the whole country in National Inquirer, but is it fair to say you expected to be hailed into court in California because there were special features about this defamation? Now defamation and nationwide publication is very different from the other courts, the lower courts confront, which is what was suggested in the first 30 minutes of questioning, I think, by Justice Kagan, are directed at a person, the shoot the gun example, the defraud, the victim. But are jurisdiction cases have not been based on where you expected to be sued? You could expect to be sued anywhere if the State says you're going to be sued here. Are cases have focused on whether the State has jurisdiction, whether the State has enough connection with it to assert its power, not the expectation of the defendant, but the power of the State? Justice, what's going on here? Justice, I agree with you, but I will say in my defense that when the Court has said when we're trying to figure out if there are minimum contacts and whether it's consistent with fair play and substantial justice, the language the Court has used is, is it fair because the defendant could reasonably expect to be hailed into the Court? That's true of purposeful, available cases like Macintyre is true of intentional court cases, and that is we measure fairness and whether you're getting processed that is due to you procedurally. By whether this is something that you could expect to happen to you, that you've turned out the Court. Justice, just whether you could expect this to happen. No, sir. No, sir. I've given you a specific test about where you have to intentionally injure the person, knowing that they will be injured there and the injury has to arise there. And as I've said, the way in intentional court cases that has to work is that the lower courts recognize that a tort has a wrong and an injury, and the injury is what makes the tort complete and the tort occurs where the victim is. Just take the shoot, the gun example, right? The reason is that the person is injured there. It doesn't have to be that you shoot the gun, that the bullet travels across the state line because the same thing can happen when money is taken out of your bank account. What is the, what are the elements of the, of the second tort? Yes. It is essentially a fraud claim. And what is the element? That he knowingly submitted information that caused the government not to send us the money. No, the injury element. Right. Yeah, that is, there's no need. How do I find that? Because you see in the fraud case, the element includes the, the, the victims being misled. Yes. That's not necessarily true here. I, I wonder that. No, it's actually not the case that the victim has to be misled in fraud, Justice Breyer. So for example, it has to be a, a misrepresentation. Yes. A knowing material to, material to, here to the government's decision not here, but material to, normally, it has to be material to the, the obtaining of, say, of property. Right. Or the, for, for free, should a return. Now, what's, what, where do I find the elements of the tort that you're alleging here? The, the, tort that we are alleging here is a, is essentially common law fraud under bivans. I can give you, citations. I don't see anything in the complaints as anything like that. It just says a, where, where do I look to see it? Okay. The, the citations that the complaint about, or would be paragraphs 99 to 101. It's alleged to violate the Fourth Amendment and our due process rights to have submitted the false affidavit that caused the government not to send us the money. And if you were to conclude Justice Scalia that this injury doesn't arise here, let me just tell you what the consequences of that are. And that is, there are a large number of cases that arise constantly where people lose access to money, where they don't have the insurance proceeds sent to them, or the social security checks, or the IRS refunds. Mr. Goldstein, as I understood what Mr. Buckholz was saying, he was saying there's a distinction between an officer who commits a fraud in Georgia, when your money is in Nevada, and so he commits a fraud and he freezes your bank account in Nevada, versus he commits a fraud by filing this affidavit, but it's as to money that is located where he is, not where you are, but where he is in Georgia. That's the distinction I understood him to be drawing. What do you think about that? It doesn't make any practical sense to me, and the money wasn't in Georgia. The money was in an account in Quantico, Virginia that belonged to the DEA. What difference does it make as a matter of personal jurisdiction between the following two cases? And that is, the defendant in sitting in Georgia steals money from my bank account in Nevada. Or, the defendant sitting in Georgia causes the government not to send me the money. Because the element, one of the elements of the crime in the second case, no element of the crime or no element of the tort, it's only the injury which isn't an element of the actual underlying behavior that gives rise to, and in the first case, it's the other. So there's an element that digs place there. That's what I'm looking for. I'm looking for that. I'm not saying I have it. But that's why I asked the question I didn't. I believe that the elements of the tort that Justice Kagan is describing are the same elements that I'm talking about here. It's just where the money starts

. That's not necessarily true here. I, I wonder that. No, it's actually not the case that the victim has to be misled in fraud, Justice Breyer. So for example, it has to be a, a misrepresentation. Yes. A knowing material to, material to, here to the government's decision not here, but material to, normally, it has to be material to the, the obtaining of, say, of property. Right. Or the, for, for free, should a return. Now, what's, what, where do I find the elements of the tort that you're alleging here? The, the, tort that we are alleging here is a, is essentially common law fraud under bivans. I can give you, citations. I don't see anything in the complaints as anything like that. It just says a, where, where do I look to see it? Okay. The, the citations that the complaint about, or would be paragraphs 99 to 101. It's alleged to violate the Fourth Amendment and our due process rights to have submitted the false affidavit that caused the government not to send us the money. And if you were to conclude Justice Scalia that this injury doesn't arise here, let me just tell you what the consequences of that are. And that is, there are a large number of cases that arise constantly where people lose access to money, where they don't have the insurance proceeds sent to them, or the social security checks, or the IRS refunds. Mr. Goldstein, as I understood what Mr. Buckholz was saying, he was saying there's a distinction between an officer who commits a fraud in Georgia, when your money is in Nevada, and so he commits a fraud and he freezes your bank account in Nevada, versus he commits a fraud by filing this affidavit, but it's as to money that is located where he is, not where you are, but where he is in Georgia. That's the distinction I understood him to be drawing. What do you think about that? It doesn't make any practical sense to me, and the money wasn't in Georgia. The money was in an account in Quantico, Virginia that belonged to the DEA. What difference does it make as a matter of personal jurisdiction between the following two cases? And that is, the defendant in sitting in Georgia steals money from my bank account in Nevada. Or, the defendant sitting in Georgia causes the government not to send me the money. Because the element, one of the elements of the crime in the second case, no element of the crime or no element of the tort, it's only the injury which isn't an element of the actual underlying behavior that gives rise to, and in the first case, it's the other. So there's an element that digs place there. That's what I'm looking for. I'm looking for that. I'm not saying I have it. But that's why I asked the question I didn't. I believe that the elements of the tort that Justice Kagan is describing are the same elements that I'm talking about here. It's just where the money starts. What if the plaintiffs in this case didn't leave Georgia? Yes. They said, look, I'm not leaving until I get my money back. And I'm going to get my money back as soon as the lawyer sends us the receipts or whatever it is. Is that a different case? It is a different case. Mr. Chief Justice, in the lower court say the real question is, where is this a kind of injury that will arise where the plaintiff lives and works? And any case, I thought your arguments were basically it does arise where he lives and works because it's in Nevada. And he still lives and works in Nevada even if he stays in Georgia and says, I'm not leaving till I get the money. No. So I, that is, for example, on our seizure claim, we acknowledge that the very least there wouldn't be venue, venue. And there's another difference in addition to the fact that they had returned to Nevada and they had returned to living and working. And that is in our actual case, we have the documents that are sent at his request from Nevada. We have the fact that he searches the Nevada law enforcement databases. And we have the fact that the money is going to be sent by the government to Nevada. It's requested by their Nevada lawyer sending documents from Nevada. And so those are, if we think of Calder as a case in which there's not merely injury in California, but a few extra factors that were in California, that's much more of this case than it is any of the other cases that the lower courts are confronting. I would just discourage the Court if I could. So, Mr. Closeman, it is of no consequence to you, Walden, whether this person is from California, the sources came from California, the paper, how this principle, circulation in California seems to me. There's nothing resembling that in this case. Justice Ginsburg, to my mind, what resembles it are the documents that go from Nevada to the defendant. And we think that's specific to the fact that it was a libel in defamation case. Thank you. Thank you, Council. Mr. Buckholz, you have four minutes remaining. There was a lot of talk about intentional torts being different and how there should be a different rule of intentional torts. And I want to start by emphasizing the implications of that. The other side is putting all their eggs in the basket of what's in Officer Walden's mind, triggering some different personal jurisdiction inquiry. And my friend even referred to qualified immunity by analogy, but I think that analogy is very important and shows why it would be unworkable to make personal jurisdiction turn on what's allegedly in the defendant's mind. This court initially created qualified immunity on that model as based on subjective good faith. That turned out not to work because subject to good faith. Council, write a holding that takes care of your case without putting at risk the internet cases that he's talking about

. What if the plaintiffs in this case didn't leave Georgia? Yes. They said, look, I'm not leaving until I get my money back. And I'm going to get my money back as soon as the lawyer sends us the receipts or whatever it is. Is that a different case? It is a different case. Mr. Chief Justice, in the lower court say the real question is, where is this a kind of injury that will arise where the plaintiff lives and works? And any case, I thought your arguments were basically it does arise where he lives and works because it's in Nevada. And he still lives and works in Nevada even if he stays in Georgia and says, I'm not leaving till I get the money. No. So I, that is, for example, on our seizure claim, we acknowledge that the very least there wouldn't be venue, venue. And there's another difference in addition to the fact that they had returned to Nevada and they had returned to living and working. And that is in our actual case, we have the documents that are sent at his request from Nevada. We have the fact that he searches the Nevada law enforcement databases. And we have the fact that the money is going to be sent by the government to Nevada. It's requested by their Nevada lawyer sending documents from Nevada. And so those are, if we think of Calder as a case in which there's not merely injury in California, but a few extra factors that were in California, that's much more of this case than it is any of the other cases that the lower courts are confronting. I would just discourage the Court if I could. So, Mr. Closeman, it is of no consequence to you, Walden, whether this person is from California, the sources came from California, the paper, how this principle, circulation in California seems to me. There's nothing resembling that in this case. Justice Ginsburg, to my mind, what resembles it are the documents that go from Nevada to the defendant. And we think that's specific to the fact that it was a libel in defamation case. Thank you. Thank you, Council. Mr. Buckholz, you have four minutes remaining. There was a lot of talk about intentional torts being different and how there should be a different rule of intentional torts. And I want to start by emphasizing the implications of that. The other side is putting all their eggs in the basket of what's in Officer Walden's mind, triggering some different personal jurisdiction inquiry. And my friend even referred to qualified immunity by analogy, but I think that analogy is very important and shows why it would be unworkable to make personal jurisdiction turn on what's allegedly in the defendant's mind. This court initially created qualified immunity on that model as based on subjective good faith. That turned out not to work because subject to good faith. Council, write a holding that takes care of your case without putting at risk the internet cases that he's talking about. Just a sort of where I think there's absolutely no reason the court needs to address internet cases or any other cases involving modern technology. This case is the most modern technology involved in this case, I think, is a dog sniff at the airport. There's just no reason for the court to address any of those. You're right. You're right. We write rules that get applied to different contexts. Right. And write the holding for me. That can't be just plaintiff's activities because Calder did more than that. And just defendants' activities. So write a different, write the holding. Of course, Mrs. Sotomayor, I understand there has to be a rule. And the rule is here there's tangible property. This isn't a case about property with no real-world presence that only exists on a server somewhere. This is a case about cash. It was in a bag. And the bag was in Atlanta on the plaintiff's persons in Atlanta. It was seized in Atlanta. And the only effect. There would be a difference if the bag had been shipped to Washington, D.C. And, you know, money is, is fungible. Money is everywhere and nowhere. So it seems as though money is a bit different from a gold watch. It's only contingent that the money remained in Atlanta rather than being shipped to a bank someplace else. Well, I think it's not contingent. And from Officer Walden's perspective, I think it's incidental and contingent that the plaintiffs happen to be from Nevada. And that's where the effects of the seizure or the continued seizure or the delay in return are felt. But I think, Tart answer, Justice Sotomayor, your question and your question earlier about freezing a bank account and other kind of electronic cases or internet cases where different technologies are involved. Maybe there's a difference between freezing a bank account in Nevada. Maybe that can be said to be something that occurs in Nevada that's reaching into Nevada to cause a real effect in Nevada to cause something to happen in Nevada, which is different from season cash in Atlanta knowing and failing to return it, knowing that the failure to return it is going to have an impact wherever the plaintiffs are, which presumably will include where they live, which is Nevada and California

. Just a sort of where I think there's absolutely no reason the court needs to address internet cases or any other cases involving modern technology. This case is the most modern technology involved in this case, I think, is a dog sniff at the airport. There's just no reason for the court to address any of those. You're right. You're right. We write rules that get applied to different contexts. Right. And write the holding for me. That can't be just plaintiff's activities because Calder did more than that. And just defendants' activities. So write a different, write the holding. Of course, Mrs. Sotomayor, I understand there has to be a rule. And the rule is here there's tangible property. This isn't a case about property with no real-world presence that only exists on a server somewhere. This is a case about cash. It was in a bag. And the bag was in Atlanta on the plaintiff's persons in Atlanta. It was seized in Atlanta. And the only effect. There would be a difference if the bag had been shipped to Washington, D.C. And, you know, money is, is fungible. Money is everywhere and nowhere. So it seems as though money is a bit different from a gold watch. It's only contingent that the money remained in Atlanta rather than being shipped to a bank someplace else. Well, I think it's not contingent. And from Officer Walden's perspective, I think it's incidental and contingent that the plaintiffs happen to be from Nevada. And that's where the effects of the seizure or the continued seizure or the delay in return are felt. But I think, Tart answer, Justice Sotomayor, your question and your question earlier about freezing a bank account and other kind of electronic cases or internet cases where different technologies are involved. Maybe there's a difference between freezing a bank account in Nevada. Maybe that can be said to be something that occurs in Nevada that's reaching into Nevada to cause a real effect in Nevada to cause something to happen in Nevada, which is different from season cash in Atlanta knowing and failing to return it, knowing that the failure to return it is going to have an impact wherever the plaintiffs are, which presumably will include where they live, which is Nevada and California. So maybe there's a way to draw a line between freezing a bank account in Nevada or in bankruptcy masters and Dutnikov, the case that my friend relied on, there were real world activities happening in the forum state. And Dutnikov, there were goods. There were fabric prints that existed in the real world. There were in Colorado and there were to be sold in Colorado. The defendant. The defendant. The defendant. The defendant. The defendant. The defendant, where he was substantially altered by the Fultz Affidavit based on the misuse of the information received from Nevada. Well, provide use of the California measure on the low profile as per the bailout for these tax charges now I'm gonna give you a substitute. We'll get that presentation in term Monday. What's the Sugar найдesearch regarding to the blue? The解決 was about $10 million because I'm here to buy things from someone who thought this law personally said to me on the pool today. So where the defendant ASMR holdings went out on a high profile, besides I'm sure that we see only backs on the vacation of time. upon the search and seizure which occurred in Atlanta. The quantum of damages wasn't known yet at that time because the plaintiffs didn't know whether they'd get the money back or when or what might happen in between, but that fourth amendment injury occurred then and there. And so the fact that maybe their consequential damages are higher because they didn't have the use of the money for longer as opposed to shorter, I suppose that could increase their damages, but it doesn't fundamentally change the nature of this case as one that has no meaningful connection between officer Walden's conduct, all of which occurred in Atlanta and Nevada. You see, the affidavit wouldn't give rise to a fourth amendment claim. I think Judge Akuda made that point below just this belief, and I would agree with that, that that however is with the complaint alleges and we're here on personal jurisdiction and venue and not on the merits of the complaint. So again, the complaint alleges that there's this affidavit, may I finish, Mr. Chief Justice? You can finish your sentence. The point alleges that there is this affidavit written in Georgia for the purpose of seizing funds that were seized in Georgia that were to be forfeited in Georgia. The only connection to Nevada is the fact that the plaintiffs allegedly felt the impact there. Under any of this Court's precedents, that's not sufficient. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Council. Council, the case is submitted.

We'll hear argument first this morning in case 12574, World in versus Fury. Mr. Buckhoats? Mr. Chief Justice, I'm at please the Court. In holding that the, in holding that respondents could bring this Bivens lawsuit against Officer Anthony Walden in Nevada, the Ninth Circuit made two errors that independently require a reversal. First, as to personal jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit held that it was sufficient that respondents have connections to Nevada, and that Officer Walden allegedly targeted his conduct at them knowing of their contacts with Nevada. That plaintiff's senator to approach is inconsistent with the Court's precedence, which emphasize that the defendant himself must have meaningful contacts with the forum state. Second, as to venue, the Ninth Circuit relied on the fact that respondents felt in Nevada the effects of Officer Walden's alleged conduct in Georgia. That similarly plaintiff's senator to approach is in conflict with the text of the Ninth Circuit's defense or emissions, giving rise to the claim occurred not where the impact of those events or emissions may be felt. Do you have any preferences to which of those errors you would like us to rely on? Well, just as clear, I think for the reason set out in the federal law enforcement officers Amika's brief which I'll try to explain, I think that it would be preferable for the Court to address personal jurisdiction and not just venue. The reason is that venue and remove cases works differently. There really is no venue per se and removed cases. And so if the court only reaches venue here and holds that venue is improper, in theory, maybe there are limitations problems with this, but in theory, the plaintiffs could refile the same lawsuit in State Court in Nevada. It would be a bivin's lawsuit, it would arise under federal laws, so we would remove it. But then removal would mean under 1441A, venue would be proper per se in the district of removal, because that's the way removal works. And this court so held in the policy half a century ago. And then there would be no personal jurisdiction, and then the personal jurisdiction would be under the Ninth Circuit's decision, and we would be back exactly where we are now. Q. Of course, the venue question does not bring into the court a constitutional question and the jurisdiction one does. That's true. Q. And we usually try to avoid constitutional questions. That's true. And the avoidance can, and is certainly one factor of the court that can do account in deciding which issue to reach or which issues to reach or in what order. On the other hand, the personal jurisdiction question is a constitutional question, but it's not a constitutional question in the strong sense of the term, because the only reason that the personal jurisdiction question as applied in this case is a constitutional one is because Congress hasn't provided for nationwide service of process for bivin's claims. And as the court pointed out in Omni Capital, the Congress has the power to do that. It's not for the court to do that on its own to fill a perceived policy gap in personal jurisdiction law. And so even though it is a constitutional question as currently configured, if Congress thought that it were a problem to apply the existing personal jurisdiction jurisprudence to bivin's claims and wanted to provide for nationwide service of process based on the idea that what counts is contacts with the U.S. as a whole, as opposed to any particular state. But is it considering that the bivin's claim was created by this Court and not Congress? I'm not suggesting that Congress should do that. I think Congress should not do that. I think bivin's claims for the reason that Your Honor just stated is sort of the last place that anyone should start to create a more plaintiff-friendly version of personal jurisdiction. The Court has gone, I'm sorry, Your Honor. You would not have any problem about, assuming we agree with you that there's no personal jurisdiction, there's the wrong venue for the district court in Nevada to transfer the case to the Federal District Court in Georgia. Well, I think Justice Ginsburg in the ordinary course, in a case starting in district court under Section 1631 or the venue statute, that would be an appropriate course here. The district court asked respondents specifically, if I agree with Officer Walden on personal jurisdiction or venue, do you want me to transfer or do you want me to dismiss? Because the statute gives the district court discretion and says in the interest of justice transfer is permissible and lieu of dismissal, the respondent said, and fatically, we don't want you to transfer. We want you to dismiss. I guess they decided they would rather have an appeal to the Ninth Circuit and take their chances with an appeal than pursue the case in Georgia. So I think under the- Sotomayor New York to be a good strategy, at least to the extent they got to the Ninth Circuit. Isn't a call to against Jones in considerable tension with your proposition that you don't look to the plaintiff's contacts with the forum? I don't think so, Your Honor. I think there's definitely some language and call that could be read in a variety of ways. I think the key language and call that is the court states its conclusion. It says in some, California was the focal point both of the article and of the harm suffered by the plaintiff. And then the court later says that the defendant expressly aimed the conduct that California doesn't say at the plaintiff who happened to be in California. It says at California. And I think that's not an accident that the court used those formulations. In all of the personal jurisdiction cases before Calder and Sins, and for that matter decided the same day, and Keaton decided the same day as Calder, the court has emphasized that random, you know, attenuated and fortuitous contacts with the forum state aren't sufficient. And then in particular, contacts between the defendant and the forum that are created by the unilateral activity of the plaintiff are not sufficient. What do you say to the court meant when it said that the article was aimed at California? I think what the court meant just as Alito is that the article was distributed in California. The California was by far the largest market for the national inquire. The article recounted events or alleged events that happened in California. And the article was drawn from California's sources. So it's not for two of us that the effect of the article was felt in California. That was, that was, nothing about that was fortuitous because the defendants knew that the article would be distributed widely in California, that was the largest market. And they just distributed it. It was distributed everywhere. It was the national inquire, or so it was probably in every supermarket in the country. And why does California as an abstract entity care about an article that makes allegedly defamatory statements about things that people are supposedly did in California? I don't quite understand that. Well, let me try to answer the first part of your question. First Justice Alito, it's true that the national inquire was national and was distributed throughout the country. But the court went to, to Paynes in the opinion to emphasize that California was the largest market. And so when the court said the brunt of the harm that, that, that this is right after the court's reference to express aiming, where the court said, the largest market for everything, isn't it? Well, I think particularly for the national inquire, or when you're talking about articles, about celebrities, about actresses in particular, that allegedly injure their professional reputation and prevent them from getting viewed for a long time. Are you suggesting if this, everything was the same except, Ms. Jones was in New York, there'd be a different result in that case? No, I'm not suggesting that. I think that- Well, I thought several times you said California was the biggest market. Right, I think the way that, that that called her reads, I think that there are a number of factors. One of them is plaintiffs' residents in California, and that's where she was when she suffered the emotional distress from, from reading the article about herself and where her job prospects were allegedly adversely affected. But it's also true that the court points out that not only is, when the court says the defendant's expressly aim their conduct at California, the next passage after that, where the court explains what that express aiming at California means, says California was not only where, where Ms. Jones suffered the brunt of the harm, but where the defendant knew that the inquire had its lower discirculation. So I don't think you can disentangle the fact that that's where she was, which, of course, was a relevant factor in that case because it was true, from the fact that the defendant in a broader sense, in a sense not based on her even letter of activity, but in a sense based on their own contacts aimed at California through their- Kagan- Well, what does it mean in the context of an intentional tort, which is what we're talking about here, to aim at a particular state? If it doesn't mean to aim at a person who you know to be within that state, I mean nobody conducts an intentional tort intending to injure California per se. You're intending to injure a person who resides in California. So what would it actually mean to aim conduct at a state irrespective of a person? Well, just as Kagan, I think the answer is that it could take a few forms, and it depends on the type of case. And it would be very difficult to try to come up with the single, you know, sort of comprehensive unitary answer to that question that would govern all types of cases. I think the way that the plurality put it in J. McIntyre for intentional tort cases is that maybe you're intending to obstruct the laws of the forum state that would be more meaningfully aimed at the forum state, quest state, and not just somebody who happens to be in it or have a connection to it. Another way that conduct could be aimed at a state would be if it's a species of purpose full of ailment or purposeful direction, where you're projecting your conduct into that state, whether that's physical and literal, or whether it's through some indirect or technological means. Well, suppose I'm sorry, please. For some benefit, for some reason, where you're projecting your conduct into that state, not just because that's where the plaintiff happens to be, which is incidental and irrelevant to you, that the plaintiff is there as opposed to anywhere else. But because you're seeking that state out, that could be, it could be in a case like J. McIntyre, the Court, of course, divided over whether in a very broad sense sending your product into the terms of commerce, intending that it, in some sense, you know, go to the U.S. as a whole without any particular focus on a given state was sufficient. But at least there, at least there, you have the intent to serve the U.S. market as a whole. And so you at least are unnoticed that your own conduct is putting you at risk of being held into court in any one of the states. Yes, I mean, I guess I just, the McIntyre example is a very different kind of example because in those cases, you really are talking about a company seeking to serve a general market in a state. But intentional tort cases don't usually have that quality. You're going after a particular person in an intentional tort case, and it's odd to think of going after an intentional, a particular person, whether it's a defamation suit or it's a fraud suit or what have you as targeting the state itself. Well, I think if it's a defamation suit, Justice Kagan, if you project your defamation into the forum state, then it's fair to say that you've, in a sense, entered the forum state whether that's electronic or physical as in Calder. But in this case, it was known or should have been known that these were gamblers. They were in Nevada. That's where their gambling takes place. They were residents of Nevada. So in that sense, they were like the plaintiff in Calder. The injury was there and the defendant arguably knew or should have known that that's where its major impact would be. I recognize your point that when you take money away, then you're inconvenience in any state where you happen to be. But there was an argument here, it seems to me there is an argument that this was gambling. And these people were from Nevada. And so this curtail is their right or their option to conduct their activities in Nevada. Well, Justice Kennedy, the complaint alleges that the plaintiffs had contacts with Nevada were residents of Nevada. Of course, they showed Officer Walden California licenses. That's what the complaint alleges, not Nevada licenses. And so at the time of their actual- But didn't they say they were a resident in both places, in both California and Nevada? They do say that. But there's no reason to think, and even they don't want to ledge this, that Officer Walden knew that at the time that he actually interacted with them. And so there's no allegation that- But let me ask this, and it's probably clear in the reason. Is the gravimund of the complaint, the seizure at the airport, or the later false affidavit? Because to the extent it's the later false affidavit that cuts against you marginally? Well, I would emphasize marginally, Justice Kennedy, because I think the gravimund of the complaint is both. I don't think there was a way to separate them. The fact that the plaintiffs are- The reason for their lawsuit, their claim damages based on the allegedly false affidavit is that it took them longer than it otherwise would have to get their money back. It's the same money that was seized in Atlanta. So it's a continuation of the effect of the seizure. You can't separate them cleanly. And the affidavit- Would your answer be different? Suppose that the officer had said, you can keep your money. Go on to Nevada with it. And then once- The affioreans had reached Nevada, the officer said the officer filed a false affidavit, which, let's say, froze the Fiori's bank accounts. Would your answer be different? The affidavit was filed in Georgia, but the money was not seized in Georgia. Instead the money has gone onto Nevada. Is there a personal jurisdiction in the data? Justice Kagan, I think if what Officer Walden allegedly had done- And of course, that's not this case. It's free as a bank account in Nevada. Well, you did it by filing an affidavit in Georgia, and then it froze a bank account. No, I understand the question. But if what he had done is free as a bank account in Nevada, then maybe it would be fair to say that he had entered into Nevada by freezing the bank account in Nevada. But here, the cash was in Atlanta. The plaintiffs brought the cash to Atlanta. Officer Weldon didn't seek them out knowing that they had any connection to Nevada. They even go to Nevada. He didn't direct anyone in Nevada to do anything. He didn't see or freeze a bank account in Nevada or direct anyone to do anything like that. He never had any contact with Nevada at all, except for the very intangible contact, if you can call it that, of allegedly writing this affidavit to keep the plaintiffs from getting the money back sooner than they would have. But the plaintiffs would have gotten the money back wherever they happened to be, or really more precisely wherever their lawyer happened to be. The fact that they chose a lawyer in Nevada, and that's where they asked the government to send them their money back ultimately, is the very definition of fortuitous contact being walled in Nevada. You started by saying that our personal jurisdiction and venue provisions, and jurisprudence, center on a defendant's action, not on the plaintiffs' action, or injury. Colder suggests otherwise. But how do you respond not only to justice, I'll do this after, but let me just pose a question. You can ask her it on your rebuttal. Thank you. I'm worried about the internet thefts from somebody's accountant Vermont by someone in Illinois's, the hypothetical on page 19, who steals something from a store in California. Thank you, Justice Sotomayor. All right, if I may, I'll reserve the balance of my time, and as you suggest, I'll address that on her bottle. Thank you. Thank you, counsel. Mr. Chief Justice, and may I please the court? If I could start with this court's decision in Calder, because the facts of this case and stark contrast to Calder, in Calder, the article was all about the state of California. It was about the California activities of a California resident whose career was centered in California based on California sources, and in a magazine that it's where its primary publication was in California. Here, even if you were to focus just on the affidavit, the affidavit, it is in every real sense, focused on the state of Georgia. According to Respondent's own allegation, it recounts what happened in the Atlanta airport in Georgia. It was based on information that was received by Officer Walden in Georgia. It's about funds that were seized in Georgia, that remained in Georgia. It was repaired in Georgia, forwarded to an AUSA in Georgia, for four-footer proceedings in Georgia. And so the two cases could not be more different, just as the focal point of the torsious activity in Calder was on the state of California. Here, the focus of the torsious activity was on the state of Georgia. Did the affidavit ever get to Nevada? It didn't get to Nevada based on Respondent's own allegations. It was sent to an AUSA in Georgia for four-footer proceedings in Georgia. And notably, had Respondent's wanted to regain their property during the six months period of seizure, they would have had to go to Georgia to do so. Do we know how much of the information, supplemental information that was prepared in Nevada and then was forwarded to Georgia? How much of that information was in the affidavit? Based on the current record, I don't know that we do if you look at the complaint allegation. They suggest that the ex-cultiv- what they call the ex-cultivatory information was left out of the affidavit, the affidavit itself, if it even exists, is not in the record in this case. And then, you know, by focusing, you asked the question, Your Honor, about what the gravimint of this case is. I think in a very real way, the gravimint of the case is the initial seizure. The Ninth Circuit focused exclusively on the affidavit and Respondent's do so here as well. But I think it's the quintessential example of the tell wagging the dog. The affidavit is that best a thin and artificial read, even if you were to focus exclusively on the affidavit as I. It was dated as a separate claim. And I think Judge Brisson read it that way. And I don't think petitioner has taken issue with that. That there's one claim is for the seizure, another claim is for the false affidavit. So the seizure stops the funds immediately. And then the false affidavit keeps them there. So I didn't think there was a genuine difference between the parties on whether the affidavit, knowingly composing a false affidavit is an independent claim. There is an for purposes of this case and this court, and I don't mean to suggest otherwise, but while there may be a distinct claim, there is no distinct injury. The injury that Respondent's alleged based on the affidavit is simply that the initial seizure continued beyond the time that it otherwise would have. And for that reason, the harm, the same economic harm that they were already feeling in Nevada continued beyond a certain point. But imagine a case where everybody agreed that the initial seizure was lawful, so that that wasn't part of the complaint at all. And the only complaint was that a false affidavit had been filed so that after making a preliminary investigation, the officer hadn't transferred the money but had instead kept it. And again, obviously that's not this case, but I don't think that case would be any different because assuming that the affidavit looks the same as the alleged to look in this case, it would still be focused at money in Georgia and everything about it would still be related to Georgia. Again, the only connection to Nevada would be the fact that Respondent felt some harm in that state. It's not a harm that's unique in any respect to Nevada. It's a harm that they would have felt no matter where they traveled that they had gone to their other residents in California, that they had left on another. And that would be true even if the Respondents had never been in Georgia. No, I think it's significant here that the Respondents did go to Georgia. I mean, here we are talking about a traveling plane to the mobile plaintiff who voluntarily left their home state and traveled to other states, traveled to New Jersey, traveled to San Juan, and traveled to Walden's home state, the place where he lives and works, and brought their cash with them there. And so I think it is significant that they did travel to the state of Georgia. And I think it shows how broad the Ninet Circuit ruling really is. As far as law enforcement officers though, federal, state, or local, this is a really problematic decision because they interact with travelers from all 50 states and beyond on a daily basis. The idea that based on those interactions that they can be hauled into a faraway and distant forum, based on nothing more than their interaction with the traveler and finding out where that person is from, which of course, unlike this case, the facts here are somewhat unique in that the driver's licenses that were showed were not from the state of Nevada. In most cases when travelers show a driver's license, it's from their state of residents. Do you think it's relevant in a case like this, whether the Federal Officer who is sued is represented by the Justice Department? I don't think it's relevant at all. I would point your honor to the Court's decision in Stafford v. Briggs. In that case, it's a venue case. It's about 1391 E. In that case, the dissent made an argument that that provision should extend to personal capacity cases against government officials and one of the arguments made is there's really not much of a burden on them because they have DOJ representation because they have indemnification. And the majority there rejected that argument, I think it's equally implausible here. And I think it's significant that not only did the Ninth Circuit rely on the fact of DOJ representation, which mind you, is not a guarantee it's a discretionary determination. But not only did they rely on it, they relied on it to say that there would be personal jurisdiction here. Because this is a Federal official or really a State official, deputized as a Federal official. I mean, Sherry, just to try to figure out how far your argument goes, suppose there's an IRS agent sitting in Washington, D.C. And she maliciously does something, files an affidavit, does whatever she does to impose a tax penalty on somebody in Nevada. And everything that she does happens in Washington, D.C. Does the person in Nevada, who is the victim of this malicious attempt to impose a tax penalty have to go to Washington, D.C. to sue her? I think there's more difficult questions there where the individual hasn't left the state at all and where it's targeted at the state. I think that comes to your honor's question of how well you do. Well, she's a very mobile person. She lives in Nevada, but she goes other places. And this could harm her wherever she goes. Isn't that what you said? So why should she be able to bring suit in Nevada under your view? That is what I said. I think maybe it goes to your honor's other question earlier about what it means to express Lee Amier conduct at the forum state as opposed to just the forum resident when we're talking about an intentional tort. And the cases that have looked at this, they have looked for something more besides simply aiming your conduct at a forum resident. Some indication that the defendant is trying to reach into the forum state. And some of the examples that have come up is when they've actually sent something into the forum state, whether it's a defamatory article or a letter, the bullet example that's in the statement and mentioned in the briefs. In those cases, the defendant is actually sending something physically into the state, or for example, directing activity in the forum state, directing something to happen in the forum state. Whatever the answer is to that hypothetical, the facts here are really quite different. Walden didn't do anything to reach into the state in Nevada. And as my colleague pointed out, the only connection to Nevada and the idea that the money was going to be returned there and eventually was returned there is entirely fortuitous. It's based entirely on the unilateral acts of the plaintiff, the fact that they happen to hire a Las Vegas attorney. And Sherry, would you want us to decide this case on the jurisdictional question or the venue question? The Court, I think, can do either. My preference would be that that's why I asked the question. My preference would be that this is the same as petitioners that the Court decided on personal jurisdiction grounds and the reasons are the ones expressed in the Federal Law Enforcement Office or brief. What type of action would the United States have brought if they decided to bring an action? It would have been in persona or in Ram against the assets. It would have been an in-ram action against the assets. It would have been a forfeiture complaint that would have been filed in Georgia. And in those proceedings, the respondents would have had an opportunity to contest the forfeiture. If during either the dependency of those proceedings or even before those proceedings that they had wanted to seek to regain control of their property, they would have had to file a motion or a petition in the state of Georgia. They wouldn't have been able to file one in their home state. And again, those are the statutes that we cite at page 31 of our brief. The consequence of the Ninth Circuit's decision here really is to allow personal jurisdiction as well as venue to travel with a mobile plane to be in a way that it cannot travel with mobile travel. We've talked mostly about personal jurisdiction here, but if I could just take a quick moment on venue and point the court to this, to the Leeroy decision in 1979, nobody can test that there would be no venue in the district of Nevada under the Leeroy decision. The language change in 1990 does nothing to change that. It does nothing to change the result in Leeroy respondents avoid the statutory tax, and I think it resolves this case. Thank you. Thank you, counsel. Mr. Goldstein? Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court, you are being asked by the other side of the slide, to write an opinion about personal jurisdiction that is going to try and slice the slumy, very, very, very thin, that is going to create a huge amount of confusion about these facts versus the facts in Calder, and that is going to be very, very difficult to reconcile with the internet cases and the cases that the lower courts are constantly confronting about where a person in state A intentionally injures a person in state B, and that person frequently doesn't shoot a gun into the other state. They sit at their computer and they steal money out of the bank account, they take the person's ID, they use their credit cards and the like. I think, in truth, the way the case is most likely to be resolved. He didn't really injure a person in state B here. I mean, these people were in Georgia when the injury occurred. Justice Scalia, we disagree, and so let me focus on your point in Justice Kennedy's question about which claim it is. The claim here, the complaint states to complaints, Judge Berzon recognized. One is about the seizure, it's exactly what you're describing. The other is about the false affidavit, and those really are different as a matter of law. I have a couple of citations to give you to explain how this legal process works. What happens is the DEA ceases the money at the Atlanta Hartfield Airport. He takes the cash and he turns it into a locker. Then what happens is that we have to state a claim to the money, and when we state a claim to the money, they either have to do one of two things. They have to give it back to a ceasematter of law, or they have to start a forfeiture process as a matter of law. And if you start the forfeiture process, you have to provide to the assistant U.S. attorney a factual basis for the forfeiture. And the way to look at this, I think, is the way that Justice Kagan's hypothetical asked, and that is, imagine that there were two officers here, not one. Officer A. will call him Walden. He's at the Atlanta Hartfield Airport, and he ceases our money. And just assume that that's perfectly lawful. We then state a claim to the money, and then we provide factual information about why it is that the money is not subject to seizure. They have to return it to us at that point, or they have to start the forfeiture process. And when that second officer creates a false affidavit to start the forfeiture process, we are not in Georgia. We have no ongoing contacts with Georgia, and we are losing access to the money only in Nevada, that's the only place we're in. I suppose that the plaintiffs in this case were not professional gamblers. Let's say they were majorly umpires, or they are members of a rock group that's going on a tour of 25 cities. Where would there be personal jurisdiction there? In every place where the umpire was going to appear at a game, every place where the group was going to perform? No, sir. The lower courts have tackled this question, because people go visit their mother-in-law, they do travel around, it's a mobile society, and they have taken from your opinion in Calder and Jones the focus on where it is that the plaintiff lives and works. And there's a good reason for that. Personal jurisdiction is trying to tackle the question of where does the defendant reasonably believe that he will be hailed in court? It's a fairness principle, and that is we need to have a predictable rule that allows the would-be defendants to know, okay, if I do this. Well, here the plaintiffs apparently lived in two places, right? California and Nevada. That is not. Suppose my hypothetical rock performer has five houses, one in California, one in Montana and so forth. Yeah. That personal jurisdiction everywhere? No, sir. And let me just start with a premise of this case, all right? My friend said that this officer was shown in California, California driver's license, that's not correct. He wasn't shown in California driver's license, the officer in San Juan Puerto Rico was shown one. They only had their principal residents, the complaint alleges, I think, in paragraph two, is in Nevada. We do have situations, and that's where they lived in work. Well, they were sufficiently residents of California to get California driver's licenses, were they not? That is true. At one point, and they had moved. I'm going to step outside the record just so I can accurately answer your question. But it will give you a sense of how these cases actually operate. Most often, you have the situation where they're college students. You know, you have a college student who lives at home with their parents, but they go off to college, and they may be injured where it is that they live and go to school, and in that case. And what the lower courts do is sensibly they say, if you know where the person's principal residence is, and this case is simplified by the fact that the district court understood and assumed that the defendant knew that they lived in Nevada, it's never been contested in the case. And Judge Burzon said, quite correctly, what you have to do is you have to make it a prime facie case, because there's no evidence in this case that the principal residence was Nevada and that the defendant knew that. So you're really arguing for a very broad principal. Whenever there is an intentional tort, you can be hailed into court at the place of residents of the person against whom the tort is committed. No, sorry. I'm sorry. That's what I thought you were saying. And I've misled you and let me state our test, which I haven't done yet, and that may help you. Our rule is this follows. When the defendant intentionally targets the plaintiff for injury in State A where the injury arises, and that's going to be the big difference, does the injury arise? There are just a Scalia, your impression in your earlier question was that this injury didn't arise in Nevada, but our test requires that it arise in Nevada, and the defendant knows that it's going to arise in Nevada. I'll contrast our fall seizure claim, right? We were in the airport. We lose the $97,000. If we then go back to Nevada and then file suit, our injury can't travel with us. And that's the big concern of the fact that I don't see how it arises in Nevada. What they're saying is that some people in Georgia didn't give back some money that they took in Georgia. To take your example, my question is this. You say there are many, many, many cases to get this all mixed up if we don't follow your rule. All I want you to do is cite me a few. But the few that I want you to cite me will meet certain criteria. Okay. For example, a college student goes into the bookstore and it's also a pharmacy by the way, and he breaks his finger in the door, which he thinks is faulty, says, I'm going home, send me some bandages. Yeah. The store never does. Send me some books. I just bought them. The store never does. They know his home address. All right. What about those? They cite me some lower cases where they say there's jurisdiction in cases like that. I have not seen it. Oh, I lost my billfold. I lost it here in the store. When you find it, when you send it back, they never send it back, but they found it. All right. So just give me some lower court cases that find jurisdiction in that kind of situation. In that kind of situation where the injury actually, and you've named several situations. No, no, the injury, my goodness, he lost his billfold. There was money in it. Yeah. And by the way, when he gets home, his parents are away, and he's not going to have any money to spend on food or even like CDs or anything. So just as prior, it is our position that in that situation, there is not personal jurisdiction. And let me try. There's no jurisdiction. In those cases where he lost his billfold in the bookstore in the college town, 1,000 miles away from home, and he's going home, and everybody knows he's never going to have any money, and they keep the money. Okay. What's the difference if there's no cases on those? What is the difference between that case and yours? Okay. The difference is that the defendant in that instance, the injury arises at the bookstore. And the fact that it has a continuing effect is a practical matter. The lower courts uniformly treat the injury arising as in the bookstore. But there are situations that you can imagine the following. And that is, he loses the billfold in the store. That injury arose there. Now, someone takes the credit card from the billfold. After he's gone home, knows that he's at home, and starts spending his money with it. That injury arises where he lives. Okay. Now, give me the case that says that. Okay. The cases that are closest to that are two of them are at page 25A of the petition appendix. They are the bankroft case, and these are not going to be billfold cases. Okay. Billfold cases, people tend not to, if you lose $100, people don't file lawsuit. These are bigger cases. And it's the petition appendix. You're allowed, you've pulled open the red brief. So I'm asking you for the serve petition. The bankroft case at 25A is where a Georgia resident writes to a Virginia registrar. And the registrar misappropriates the website of a California company. And that is, they never set foot in California. They don't, you know, do anything in California at all. And there, there's jurisdiction in California because they know that the person is going to be hurt in California. The next one is Metropolitan Life. That is, same page. And Alabama resident writes to an insurance company. And they say, ah, I'm entitled to the insurance proceeds. But the actual proceeds belong to someone in California, and they never get the money. So it's like this case, the money never gets sent into California. And these remote injury cases, and the- Just a case, is this a case like, I'll look at those cases. But as your case, a case like where the credit card is used, somebody finds it in the bookstore and starts spending the money. And did the agents here who were outside Nevada, and they were keeping the money, were they going and spending it? They weren't going and spending it. Is there a credit card that they were using? No, sir. I'm giving- I was trying to take a billfold example, and I'm trying to figure out just which cases I should read carefully, and I will read those cases. And there's a case that's discussed in several of the briefs called Dudenekov, and that involves an EBA- like auction, and someone in one state blocks an auction in another state. So one of the impressions- What was the money here in Georgia the whole time? The money is still there in that blocker? No, here's the thing about it. This is no longer about the cash. The actual answer to your question is he turns the money in into locker. Okay, then it's deposited into an account. It's not about the physical money in any way, shape, or form at that point. When we got the money, nobody sent us a duffle bag full of cash. There was a check, of course. Well, if it were about them- So suppose they seized a gold watch. And then they refused to return the gold watch. But the gold watch really is still sitting there in Georgia. Yes. Okay. Would you say that then there's this personal jurisdiction in Nevada? Okay, in same facts, and then there's a false affidavit. It's not just they seized it, it's they're giving false affidavit- Yeah, they seize it, and then there's a false affidavit keeping it. Yes, that- The complaint is only about the false affidavit, but it's in reference to property that is indisputably in Georgia. I do think if you can prove an injury, which I think is very hard from the gold watch, let's say a computer just to make it a little bit more possible that they would be heard in Nevada, then yes, I do think if you can make out an injury, which isn't- The tort doesn't arise until the injury occurs. That's why the lower courts treat these cases as the tort occurring where the victim is. Mr. Goldstein, can I take you back to the origins of all of this? Yes. The main move for personal jurisdiction traditionally is that the plaintiff must go to where the defendant is, no matter how inconvenient that is for the plaintiff. Jurisdiction is defendant-centered. You're trying to hold a defendant. You have to go where he is. Then the long-long age comes about, and we have a specific jurisdiction, which by the ways what you're urging is certain or not, they have all purpose jurisdiction over the Walden. And this court, as the McIntyre decision indicates, has been pretty careful about specific jurisdiction. There wasn't enough that the machine blew up while cut somebody's fingers in New Jersey. They had to purposely avail themselves of whatever the standard words are. And here you're asking for really pushing this specific jurisdiction to the limit. The defendant has acted only in Georgia. He hasn't set foot outside this state. Okay. So I don't think we are trying to push the bounds, but let me make one point about McIntyre and then try and create the misimpression that I think that's been left, that there are a few contacts between Nevada and this case and hopefully prove to you that there are far more contacts between this toward and this forum than will be true in the overwhelming majority of cases that the lower courts confront. And the point I would make just as Ginsburg and it's made by the plurality in McIntyre is that there have always been special rules for intentional toward cases. That's the distinction and that's why Calder comes out the way it does. Sighting restatement section 32nd of the second, the second restatement of the conflict of laws. And that is the reason, it's not just made up, the reason there's a special rule for intentional towards is that the defendant knows he's hurting someone somewhere else and therefore expects to be hailed in the court. The view of the McIntyre plurality, of course, was that the overseas manufacturer there wasn't itself doing anything directed at the forum, but if I could just get to the very important point about my- Before you move on from that point, your argument is dependent on the fact that the officer here knew that the plaintiffs were residents of Nevada, is that right? That they lived in work there. Why should that make any difference? The conduct is the same, the injury is the same. What if he didn't know? Then there would be no personal jurisdiction. That is actually generally what the lower courts hold and their reason is that the defendant is doing something knowing that he may be hailed into that court. It is a defendant-favoring rule that attempts to give predictability. Now, if that's wrong, it doesn't hurt my case because as the case comes to you, it's not- You should say that about whatever rule we adopt. Once we adopt the rule, when the defendant will know that if he violates that rule, he's going to be hailed into court. Justice Scalia, there is a sort of a self-fulfilling point. It's almost like the Fourth Amendment reasonable expectations are privacy. There is a circularity here, but it's not entirely circular because we're talking about a specific state here. It's not that he knows that the plaintiffs might be in, live in Georgia or might live anywhere in the United States. It's a very specific state, and that's why it's not circular. Now, if I could just help you understand our view that there are a lot more contacts between this toward in Nevada, then in the great, great, at least 90 percent of the cases the lower courts are confronting. So here are the points that I would make about those contacts, and there are six, and I will try and be brief. The case involves money in own by Nevada residents, $30,000 of which originated in Nevada, and all of which was on its way to Nevada. Second, the defendant intentionally hurt the plaintiffs, knowing that they would lose access to the money in Nevada where they lived and were. Third, we will use documents in Nevada to prove that his action was intentional, because it omitted the information that the defendant requested. This is not a unilaterally sending money at the Atlanta airport. He said, send us the proof that the funds are legitimate, that he requested and received from the plaintiffs in Nevada, and that he learned in searching a Nevada law enforcement database, which is paragraph 79 of the complaint. The two last points I would make is that the plaintiffs will show that they will deprived of the money in Nevada until the Nevada lawyer they had to hire used records in Nevada to persuade the government to send the money to Nevada. And the plaintiffs in their case, of course, will show, because it is the fact that they are gamblers working in Las Vegas, that the economic injury occurred to them there. Now, if you think that's not enough, if you conclude that's not enough, you are closing the door absolutely to all of the Internet cases, because those are cases where someone sits at the computer and targets someone in another state. This one you're talking about the Internet, you're in a different world, but this is a, the facts here are old fashioned. Everything that happened here could have happened in 1920. Could have happened in the 19th century. Yes. So I don't see what the Internet has to do with us. Justice Alita, you always tell us that you've got to write a legal rule. And there is no special personal jurisdiction rule and the lower courts are like- Yes, well, there it seems to be, because it's hard to think of an Internet case who are a defendant wouldn't be having communications with people in the foreign state, wouldn't be inviting business, wouldn't be doing all kinds of things. So there are many kinds of Internet cases, but I don't automatically see in deciding this that we're deciding any of them. Justice Breyer, the kinds of Internet cases, and it's wrong for me to just say Internet. The kinds of cases that I'm talking about are the fraud cases, the intentional tort case. Like what? You're sitting in Georgia, you don't, but someone is sitting in Georgia and they steal the identity of someone who's in the... I wouldn't do that. I'm exactly right. That's why I took it immediately back recognizing the error. He wouldn't know how. But there are bad people in the world, obviously, and those people do with increasing and distressing frequency with these new tools of communication, they are very, very capable of causing significant harm to someone else without actually do a setting foot in the state. Now I have to offer you a solution. Let me just speak here. I recognize that this can go either way, because if I say Internet cases, well, then I'm opening the door to potentially a very wide range of cases going into Nevada, and we have here the special case of a law enforcement officer, and I believe that I do have the solution, and that is this is actually a case about transfer. It is not a case about jurisdiction and venue. This is the unusual case where the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and did not file a 14-04 motion to transfer. In this case, you should treat it like Atlantic Marine, because what you need to do is recognize, I think, that there's the big category of jurisdiction, where there's jurisdiction, there's a subset, there's venue. That's where you can file a lawsuit. That is not where the case is going to be litigated. And in these cases, what defendants uniformly do, and the lower courts pay incredible attention to the fact that law enforcement officers are going to be witnesses or are the defendant. In these cases, the defendant comes in and says, okay, I recognize technically there's jurisdiction and venue, but let me tell you how disruptive it will be if I actually have to litigate the case. Well, I don't understand what you're saying. You're saying that we should reverse the night's circuits dismiss the dismissal and send it back for the district court to consider whether the case should be transferred? No, sir. I would not, this is my judgment. I do not want to reverse. Well, I'm saying no, that's why I'm accused by what you're saying. I'm trying to describe an opinion that you would write. And the opinion that I think you would write is this and says, look, personal jurisdiction in the wake of Calder, particularly where there are contacts here, exists. Veneu exists because several of these are event sonomissions, including the injury that occurs in Nevada. But what we expect the lower courts to do in a case like this is to pay particular attention at the beginning of the case as we do with qualified immunity to have an efficient process in which the defendant can say it would be. But you're asking the court to decide a big ticket item, personal jurisdiction, and what the theory that you're proposing would apply not to just two office of the world, but it would be about as far out as any specific jurisdiction case I know. So the court shouldn't say, well, jurisdiction, okay, Veneu, okay, but consider transferring it to Georgia. Justice, it seems to me well. Justice, but I am not trying to just skip over. I've talked for this entire time about why I think we're right on jurisdiction and venue, and I'm pleased to return to the issue. What I'm suggesting to you is that I recognize that we can't have, there are two ways of dealing with the prospect of a broad personal jurisdiction rule. One is to narrow it substantially. The second is to recognize that it doesn't determine where the case is going to ultimately be litigated. I will tell you, Justice Ginsburg, from personally reviewing all of the post-pollier cases in the Federal courts and the State courts, that the contacts here are much, much greater between Nevada and this tort than exists in the great majority of cases that the lower courts are confronting. And so if you fully- KWALDA have something to do with the notion that every defamation is a doubt. Every publication is a tort where it occurs. There is something special about the libel cases. There was that theory that wherever the paper that contains the libelist is, ironically, wherever it's sent, each one of those places, the tort occurs there. Two things about that. That is the rule for torts, not specifically. It does, it's true of libel, but it's true as well of fraud. The fraud occurs where the person is defrauded. This is straight from the restatement. It's the ordinary common law rule. So the tort does happen where the victim is injured in libel and in a case like this. What you're libeled wherever it's published, you don't have to be there where it's published. That you are libeled wherever it's published. And Justice, that's correct. And Justice Scalia, this is exactly why you were asking the question, why is it that Justice then Justice Ranker's opinion in KWALDA has the discussion that the other side is focusing on about how the article was centered on California and how it came from California sources. Now, none of the holding of the case describes it, but you wondered and he has emphasized, my friend has, why is it in the opinion and it's for the reason you've just given. And that is defamation and libel cases. When you're talking about the publication to the internet or publication nationwide like the National Inquirer, the lower courts have rightly focused on the fact, can we say that this isn't just directed to the United States? You could say that KWALDA, far from being an expansive decision, was a narrowing decision. It said, you know, there's jurisdiction not necessarily everywhere where the libel was published, which is where the injury occurs, but there's jurisdiction only in California where these other connections exist. We're saying the same thing, I'm just not explaining my view of it well enough. And that is the part for you to establish that the injury occurred in Nevada. I don't think so, and let me try my best. All right, the reason these defamation cases about internet and national publications say the New York Times is sued for defamation. The court was very concerned and the lower courts are concerned that the publisher can't be sued in all 50 states. And so what the lower courts have done in the wake of KWALDA is say, I know you published it to the whole country in National Inquirer, but is it fair to say you expected to be hailed into court in California because there were special features about this defamation? Now defamation and nationwide publication is very different from the other courts, the lower courts confront, which is what was suggested in the first 30 minutes of questioning, I think, by Justice Kagan, are directed at a person, the shoot the gun example, the defraud, the victim. But are jurisdiction cases have not been based on where you expected to be sued? You could expect to be sued anywhere if the State says you're going to be sued here. Are cases have focused on whether the State has jurisdiction, whether the State has enough connection with it to assert its power, not the expectation of the defendant, but the power of the State? Justice, what's going on here? Justice, I agree with you, but I will say in my defense that when the Court has said when we're trying to figure out if there are minimum contacts and whether it's consistent with fair play and substantial justice, the language the Court has used is, is it fair because the defendant could reasonably expect to be hailed into the Court? That's true of purposeful, available cases like Macintyre is true of intentional court cases, and that is we measure fairness and whether you're getting processed that is due to you procedurally. By whether this is something that you could expect to happen to you, that you've turned out the Court. Justice, just whether you could expect this to happen. No, sir. No, sir. I've given you a specific test about where you have to intentionally injure the person, knowing that they will be injured there and the injury has to arise there. And as I've said, the way in intentional court cases that has to work is that the lower courts recognize that a tort has a wrong and an injury, and the injury is what makes the tort complete and the tort occurs where the victim is. Just take the shoot, the gun example, right? The reason is that the person is injured there. It doesn't have to be that you shoot the gun, that the bullet travels across the state line because the same thing can happen when money is taken out of your bank account. What is the, what are the elements of the, of the second tort? Yes. It is essentially a fraud claim. And what is the element? That he knowingly submitted information that caused the government not to send us the money. No, the injury element. Right. Yeah, that is, there's no need. How do I find that? Because you see in the fraud case, the element includes the, the, the victims being misled. Yes. That's not necessarily true here. I, I wonder that. No, it's actually not the case that the victim has to be misled in fraud, Justice Breyer. So for example, it has to be a, a misrepresentation. Yes. A knowing material to, material to, here to the government's decision not here, but material to, normally, it has to be material to the, the obtaining of, say, of property. Right. Or the, for, for free, should a return. Now, what's, what, where do I find the elements of the tort that you're alleging here? The, the, tort that we are alleging here is a, is essentially common law fraud under bivans. I can give you, citations. I don't see anything in the complaints as anything like that. It just says a, where, where do I look to see it? Okay. The, the citations that the complaint about, or would be paragraphs 99 to 101. It's alleged to violate the Fourth Amendment and our due process rights to have submitted the false affidavit that caused the government not to send us the money. And if you were to conclude Justice Scalia that this injury doesn't arise here, let me just tell you what the consequences of that are. And that is, there are a large number of cases that arise constantly where people lose access to money, where they don't have the insurance proceeds sent to them, or the social security checks, or the IRS refunds. Mr. Goldstein, as I understood what Mr. Buckholz was saying, he was saying there's a distinction between an officer who commits a fraud in Georgia, when your money is in Nevada, and so he commits a fraud and he freezes your bank account in Nevada, versus he commits a fraud by filing this affidavit, but it's as to money that is located where he is, not where you are, but where he is in Georgia. That's the distinction I understood him to be drawing. What do you think about that? It doesn't make any practical sense to me, and the money wasn't in Georgia. The money was in an account in Quantico, Virginia that belonged to the DEA. What difference does it make as a matter of personal jurisdiction between the following two cases? And that is, the defendant in sitting in Georgia steals money from my bank account in Nevada. Or, the defendant sitting in Georgia causes the government not to send me the money. Because the element, one of the elements of the crime in the second case, no element of the crime or no element of the tort, it's only the injury which isn't an element of the actual underlying behavior that gives rise to, and in the first case, it's the other. So there's an element that digs place there. That's what I'm looking for. I'm looking for that. I'm not saying I have it. But that's why I asked the question I didn't. I believe that the elements of the tort that Justice Kagan is describing are the same elements that I'm talking about here. It's just where the money starts. What if the plaintiffs in this case didn't leave Georgia? Yes. They said, look, I'm not leaving until I get my money back. And I'm going to get my money back as soon as the lawyer sends us the receipts or whatever it is. Is that a different case? It is a different case. Mr. Chief Justice, in the lower court say the real question is, where is this a kind of injury that will arise where the plaintiff lives and works? And any case, I thought your arguments were basically it does arise where he lives and works because it's in Nevada. And he still lives and works in Nevada even if he stays in Georgia and says, I'm not leaving till I get the money. No. So I, that is, for example, on our seizure claim, we acknowledge that the very least there wouldn't be venue, venue. And there's another difference in addition to the fact that they had returned to Nevada and they had returned to living and working. And that is in our actual case, we have the documents that are sent at his request from Nevada. We have the fact that he searches the Nevada law enforcement databases. And we have the fact that the money is going to be sent by the government to Nevada. It's requested by their Nevada lawyer sending documents from Nevada. And so those are, if we think of Calder as a case in which there's not merely injury in California, but a few extra factors that were in California, that's much more of this case than it is any of the other cases that the lower courts are confronting. I would just discourage the Court if I could. So, Mr. Closeman, it is of no consequence to you, Walden, whether this person is from California, the sources came from California, the paper, how this principle, circulation in California seems to me. There's nothing resembling that in this case. Justice Ginsburg, to my mind, what resembles it are the documents that go from Nevada to the defendant. And we think that's specific to the fact that it was a libel in defamation case. Thank you. Thank you, Council. Mr. Buckholz, you have four minutes remaining. There was a lot of talk about intentional torts being different and how there should be a different rule of intentional torts. And I want to start by emphasizing the implications of that. The other side is putting all their eggs in the basket of what's in Officer Walden's mind, triggering some different personal jurisdiction inquiry. And my friend even referred to qualified immunity by analogy, but I think that analogy is very important and shows why it would be unworkable to make personal jurisdiction turn on what's allegedly in the defendant's mind. This court initially created qualified immunity on that model as based on subjective good faith. That turned out not to work because subject to good faith. Council, write a holding that takes care of your case without putting at risk the internet cases that he's talking about. Just a sort of where I think there's absolutely no reason the court needs to address internet cases or any other cases involving modern technology. This case is the most modern technology involved in this case, I think, is a dog sniff at the airport. There's just no reason for the court to address any of those. You're right. You're right. We write rules that get applied to different contexts. Right. And write the holding for me. That can't be just plaintiff's activities because Calder did more than that. And just defendants' activities. So write a different, write the holding. Of course, Mrs. Sotomayor, I understand there has to be a rule. And the rule is here there's tangible property. This isn't a case about property with no real-world presence that only exists on a server somewhere. This is a case about cash. It was in a bag. And the bag was in Atlanta on the plaintiff's persons in Atlanta. It was seized in Atlanta. And the only effect. There would be a difference if the bag had been shipped to Washington, D.C. And, you know, money is, is fungible. Money is everywhere and nowhere. So it seems as though money is a bit different from a gold watch. It's only contingent that the money remained in Atlanta rather than being shipped to a bank someplace else. Well, I think it's not contingent. And from Officer Walden's perspective, I think it's incidental and contingent that the plaintiffs happen to be from Nevada. And that's where the effects of the seizure or the continued seizure or the delay in return are felt. But I think, Tart answer, Justice Sotomayor, your question and your question earlier about freezing a bank account and other kind of electronic cases or internet cases where different technologies are involved. Maybe there's a difference between freezing a bank account in Nevada. Maybe that can be said to be something that occurs in Nevada that's reaching into Nevada to cause a real effect in Nevada to cause something to happen in Nevada, which is different from season cash in Atlanta knowing and failing to return it, knowing that the failure to return it is going to have an impact wherever the plaintiffs are, which presumably will include where they live, which is Nevada and California. So maybe there's a way to draw a line between freezing a bank account in Nevada or in bankruptcy masters and Dutnikov, the case that my friend relied on, there were real world activities happening in the forum state. And Dutnikov, there were goods. There were fabric prints that existed in the real world. There were in Colorado and there were to be sold in Colorado. The defendant. The defendant. The defendant. The defendant. The defendant. The defendant, where he was substantially altered by the Fultz Affidavit based on the misuse of the information received from Nevada. Well, provide use of the California measure on the low profile as per the bailout for these tax charges now I'm gonna give you a substitute. We'll get that presentation in term Monday. What's the Sugar найдesearch regarding to the blue? The解決 was about $10 million because I'm here to buy things from someone who thought this law personally said to me on the pool today. So where the defendant ASMR holdings went out on a high profile, besides I'm sure that we see only backs on the vacation of time. upon the search and seizure which occurred in Atlanta. The quantum of damages wasn't known yet at that time because the plaintiffs didn't know whether they'd get the money back or when or what might happen in between, but that fourth amendment injury occurred then and there. And so the fact that maybe their consequential damages are higher because they didn't have the use of the money for longer as opposed to shorter, I suppose that could increase their damages, but it doesn't fundamentally change the nature of this case as one that has no meaningful connection between officer Walden's conduct, all of which occurred in Atlanta and Nevada. You see, the affidavit wouldn't give rise to a fourth amendment claim. I think Judge Akuda made that point below just this belief, and I would agree with that, that that however is with the complaint alleges and we're here on personal jurisdiction and venue and not on the merits of the complaint. So again, the complaint alleges that there's this affidavit, may I finish, Mr. Chief Justice? You can finish your sentence. The point alleges that there is this affidavit written in Georgia for the purpose of seizing funds that were seized in Georgia that were to be forfeited in Georgia. The only connection to Nevada is the fact that the plaintiffs allegedly felt the impact there. Under any of this Court's precedents, that's not sufficient. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Council. Council, the case is submitted

Legal Case Summary

Walden v. Fiore

Date Argued: Mon Nov 04 2013

Case Number: 146440

Docket Number: 2599550

Judges:Not available

Duration: 62 minutes

Court Name: Supreme Court

Case Summary

Walden v. Fiore

Oral Audio Transcript(Beta version)